[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 9]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 13083-13084]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




     IRANIAN NUCLEAR STATE ``INEVITABLE'' UNDER FLAWED WEAPONS DEAL

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 28, 2015

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, President Obama continues to 
tell Congress and the American people that the Iran nuclear agreement 
is the best deal possible and advances peace. Such boasting collapses 
under scrutiny. What was previously unacceptable--an Iranian nuclear 
state--is now inevitable under the terms and conditions of what is 
officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
  Tragically, the deal is riddled with serious flaws, gaps, and huge 
concessions to Iran. Taken as a whole, the deal poses an existential 
threat to Israel, our allies in the region--and even poses significant 
risks to the United States, despite assurances from Secretary of State 
John Kerry in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
today.
  Not only is Iran now permitted to continue enriching uranium--a 
previous nonnegotiable redline was no enrichment whatsoever--but 
inspections are anything but ``anytime, anywhere''--the Obama 
Administration's previous pledge to the nation and the world.
  And the key restriction on Iran's nuclear program--the ability to 
enrich at high levels--begins to expire in as little as 10 years. Once 
these restrictions expire, Iran could enrich on an industrial scale and 
the U.S. and its allies will be left with no effective measures to 
prevent Iran from initiating an accelerated nuclear program to produce 
the materials needed for a nuclear weapon.
  On the inspections front, Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei has stated 
that he will ``never'' permit inspectors to inspect Iran's military 
bases. Even after the agreement was signed, the Iranian Minister of 
Defense reportedly said that ``Tehran will not allow any foreigner to 
discover Iran's defensive and missile capabilities by inspecting the 
country's military sites.''
  Given Iran's repeated cover-ups of its clandestine nuclear program, 
its refusal to give the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
access to its Parchin military facility where Iran is believed to have 
tested detonators for nuclear warheads, and its stone-walling the IAEA 
concerning evidence that it had done extensive research and development 
on a nuclear explosive device, verification is fundamental to ensure 
that Iran is abiding by the agreement's terms. Secretary Kerry, after 
an Iranian history of refusal to allow inspections at Parchin, would 
only assure us of inspections there ``as appropriate,'' whatever that 
means.
  Yet the agreement contains many limits on access by IAEA inspectors 
to suspected sites, including a 24-day period in which Iran is allowed 
to continue to refuse the IAEA's request to visit a facility followed 
by a very long process needed to increase pressure on Iran to permit 
access if it still blocks access by inspectors. During this period, 
Iran will have sufficient time to remove, cover up, or destroy any 
evidence. ``Managed access'' would be better called ``manipulated 
access'' as inspectors will get access to suspected sites only after 
consultations between the world powers and Iran, over as long as 24 
days--or more.
  Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman has said that pledges by Obama 
Administration officials that the agreement would guarantee ``anywhere, 
anytime'' inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities were only 
``rhetorical.'' Mere words without substance? Why would our allies in 
the region trust us if our word--and negotiating positions-are indeed 
only rhetorical flourish?
  Congress recently discovered that the United States and other P5+1 
members have left the IAEA and Iran to work out inspection details in 
secret, which could allow Iran to simply submit samples and make its 
own certification of compliance in lieu of actual inspection of 
facilities such as Parchin.
  Mr. Speaker, the IAEA has uncovered significant evidence that Iran 
has engaged in activities related to the development of a nuclear 
weapon. Despite many agreements with the IAEA in which Iran has pledged 
to provide satisfactory information, the IAEA has repeatedly said that 
Iran has given it virtually nothing. Secretary of State Kerry has said 
that the U.S. has ``absolute knowledge'' of Iran's past military 
activities regarding its nuclear program, but Gen. Michael Hayden, the 
former Director of the CIA, recently testified to Congress that the 
U.S. did not have that capability.
  Furthermore, as witnesses testified at a joint hearing this afternoon 
by three Foreign Affairs subcommittees, there is ample evidence that 
Iran has a longstanding nuclear collaboration with North Korea. In 
light of the abundant evidence they will present, what gives the 
Administration certainty that the Iranians won't at some point during 
this agreement acquire fissile material beyond what they are allowed to 
produce for themselves or actual warheads from North Korea?
  Why was the Iran-North Korea nuclear collaboration not factored into 
the Iran nuclear agreement? Surely Secretary Kerry is aware of the 
Iran-North Korea nuclear linkage. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs Douglas Frantz, previously a high-ranking Kerry Senate 
aide, wrote a 2003 article about Iran's ties to the North Korean 
nuclear program. Are we to believe Frantz and Kerry

[[Page 13084]]

never discussed this issue? He dodged the question at today's committee 
hearing.
  Mr. Speaker, in March 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1747 which, inter alia, established an embargo on 
the export from Iran of all arms and related materials, thereby banning 
all states and groups from purchasing or receiving arms from Iran. The 
resolution also called on all states to ``exercise vigilance and 
restraint'' in their supply of any items covered by the U.N. Register 
of Conventional Arms to Iran.
  However, reports indicate that Russia is eager to sell massive 
amounts of military hardware to Iran. How will this shape other 
regional conflicts in which Iran is currently involved, including Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen? After the conventional arms embargo is lifted in just 
5 years, what limitations, if any, will there be on Iran's ability to 
export arms, specifically heavy weapons? Besides Russia, who else will 
sell weapons to Iran? China?
  Moreover, the Administration and its supporters of the Iranian 
nuclear agreement downplay the possibility of Saudi Arabia, for 
example, producing a nuclear weapon as part of a Middle East arms race. 
However, the Saudis are building King Abdullah City for Atomic 
Renewable Energy to train nuclear scientists and already have greater 
science and mathematics capacity than Pakistan had when it developed 
nuclear weapons. Why couldn't and why wouldn't the Saudis join the 
nuclear arms race when faced with a more nuclear and conventionally 
armed Iran? Secretary Kerry would have us believe that the Saudis and 
others in the region would prefer the current agreement to an effort to 
achieve a more effective one and would agree not to pursue nuclear 
weapons even though Iran is on the path to develop or acquire its own.
  Mr. Speaker, ballistic missiles are a central component of any 
country's nuclear weapons program as they allow for the quick, accurate 
delivery of nuclear weapons over long distances. While the agreement 
calls for Iran to abide by all U.N. Security Council resolutions--
including the requirement that ``Iran shall not undertake any activity 
related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons,'' 
Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's criticized the call for 
Iran to end its ballistic missile program, characterizing it as ``a 
stupid, idiotic expectation'' and claiming ``The Revolutionary Guards 
should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with the 
present level. They should mass produce.''
  In an 11th hour concession by the Obama Administration and others, 
the agreement ``sunsets'' U.N. sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile 
program after 8 years, and also requires that the European Union do the 
same. U.S. intelligence estimates Iran to have the largest arsenal of 
ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Congress has heard testimony 
that ``no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear weapons has 
ever opted to sustain'' a costly, long-range missile program. Simply 
put, countries build ICBMs to deliver nukes.
  Under this agreement, the Iranians have stated they are under no 
obligation to stop developing ballistic missiles. In fact, this 
agreement would allow them the two things they need to advance their 
program: money and foreign assistance.
  Mr. Speaker, the agreement requires ``full implementation'' by 
October 15 of the commitments in the ``roadmap'' made by Iran to the 
IAEA in their 2011 agreement, following which the IAEA is to provide 
its ``final assessment on the resolution of all past and present 
outstanding issues.'' However, there is no stated penalty if Iran 
continues to refuse to provide sufficient information to fully answer 
the IAEA's questions, which Iran cannot do without admitting it had a 
secret nuclear weapons program.
  Iran has repeatedly agreed to answer the IAEA's questions regarding 
extensive evidence that it had a secret research and development 
program regarding a nuclear device, including fitting it onto a 
ballistic missile. All that resulted was the Iranians stonewalling the 
inspectors.
  Is the failure to resolve the possible military dimensions as 
required by the IAEA a violation of the agreement? Why would Iran 
provide any information now when there is nothing in the agreement to 
compel it to do so?
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, Saeed Abedini is an American citizen. He was in 
Iran in 2012, visiting family and building an orphanage, when he was 
taken prisoner. Twelve years before, he had converted to Christianity 
and later was involved in the home church movement in Iran. Knowing 
about his conversion and earlier engagement with home churches, Iranian 
authorities approved his 2012 trip, approved his orphanage-building, 
and then imprisoned him. He has been in prison ever since then, and has 
suffered immensely, from beatings that have caused internal bleeding, 
death threats, solitary confinement, and more. His wife, Naghmeh, who 
is also an American and has been a heroic champion for her husband, and 
their two young children, have also suffered.
  I and many other Members of Congress have been advocating on behalf 
of Pastor Abedini and the other Americans unjustly held in Iran: Amir 
Hekmati, Jason Rezaian, and Robert Levinson. After our constant appeals 
for action to secure their release, Secretary Kerry said today that the 
Administration is now focusing on their release. We shall see what 
happens.
  Congress should vote down the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
reinstate comprehensive, robust sanctions and direct the executive 
branch to resume the struggle to craft an enforceable accord to ensure 
no nuclear weapons capability for Iran--ever. Congress did this with 
the SALT 1, SALT II and the Chemical Weapons Convention and ended up 
with stronger accords. Why not do so once again?

                          ____________________