[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 12212-12215]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  2100
                     THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 6, 2015, the Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. 
Ros-Lehtinen) for 30 minutes.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, just a few days ago, the White House 
formally transmitted to Congress the Iranian nuclear agreement. I am 
holding it here in my hand. And now there will be much discussion in 
Congress over the role of this legislative body regarding nuclear 
agreements, but I would like to remind my colleagues that a process is 
already in place for civil nuclear agreements. This Iran deal that we 
have in front of us includes sections about a civil nuclear cooperation 
with Iran.
  Under current law, section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act specifies the 
conditions by which the United States should enter into a civil nuclear 
cooperation agreement with other countries. Parts of the terms 
determined by the 123 agreement is the cessation from enrichment or 
reprocessing, a term that is coined, Mr. Speaker, as the gold standard. 
But the Obama administration has taken the liberty to enter into 123 
agreements without abiding by the gold standard.
  Why should we hold different countries accountable for different 
terms when it comes to proliferation? We should be holding each country 
to the very strictest of standards to ensure maximum safeguards are in 
place.
  This is why, Mr. Speaker, in the last Congress I reintroduced, 
alongside with my congressional colleague Brad Sherman, a bill which 
reforms the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to provide greater congressional 
oversight of nuclear agreements with foreign countries and to protect 
against the threat of nuclear proliferation. So when the President says 
that it is either this deal or we go to war, there is actually another 
option.
  Let's not forget about the U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement, 
which was previously withdrawn by the Bush administration in 2008 
because the President could not certify under the Iran, North Korea, 
Syria Nonproliferation Act that Russia was not providing nuclear, 
missile, and advanced conventional weapons to Iran. Yet, through this 
new deal with Iran, Iran can buy nuclear, missile, and advanced 
conventional weapons from the Russians.
  Next on the list was the 123 agreement with Vietnam. I strongly 
opposed this agreement because it allowed Vietnam to enrich.
  Next up, the pending U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement. Again, 
I opposed that agreement because it allows China to enrich.
  So what kind of message are we sending to our allies, Mr. Speaker? 
Jordan and the UAE, some of our closest partners in the region, are not 
allowed to enrich based on their commitments to our 123 agreement, but 
bad actors such

[[Page 12213]]

as Russia, China, and Vietnam, oh, they can enrich. It does not make 
much sense, Mr. Speaker.
  Page 5, section 13--and I hope that our constituents read it--of the 
general provisions of the Iran nuclear agreement states that the P5+1 
nations will ``cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear 
cooperation projects as detailed in Annex 3.''
  So when we go to Annex 3, the situation becomes really scary. 
According to Annex 3, the P5+1 nations and Iran can cooperate on civil 
nuclear and scientific projects.
  What does that mean? Oh, it spells it out, and it includes--listen to 
this--facilitation of Iran's acquisition of light water research and 
power reactors, for research, development, and testing; construction of 
new light water power reactors, including small- and medium-sized 
nuclear reactors; construction of state-of-the-art light water 
moderated multipurpose research reactors; supply of state-of-the-art 
instrumentation and control systems for the research and power 
reactors.
  Oh, but the list keeps going.
  Supply of nuclear simulation and software solutions with regard to 
these research and power reactors; on-the-job training on fuel 
management scenarios for these research and power nuclear reactors; 
and, last but not least, joint technical review of Iran's current 
nuclear reactors, upon the request by Iran, in order to upgrade current 
equipment and systems.
  So, essentially, we will be helping Iran to modernize and upgrade 
their reactors. This is absolutely absurd--and dangerously absurd, Mr. 
Speaker. How could we ever expect any country to agree to the gold 
standard when they can point to the JCPOA and say they want the Iran 
standard? They don't want the gold standard. We want the Iran standard 
because that is what is going to be one of the lasting legacies of this 
weak and dangerous deal: we have obliterated any of our moral or legal 
standing to insist that other countries forgo their own enrichment 
programs.
  No country's leaders in their right minds would ever agree to 
anything less than what we have allowed Iran to do; and now if we don't 
block this deal's implementation, Mr. Speaker, we are putting into 
motion a nuclear arms race that we will not be able to stop.
  Mr. Speaker, one of the most egregious mistakes of this nuclear 
deal--which is saying something. It is a long list of bad things. This 
deal is chock-full egregious mistakes, but one of the worst is the 
lifting of U.S. sanctions on conventional weapons and ballistic 
missiles as well as the lifting of sanctions on Iran's central figures 
of its nuclear weapons program by the E.U. and the U.N.
  Just last night, Mr. Speaker, The Wall Street Journal reported on the 
sanctions that are to be lifted on the Iranians and the institutions 
behind Iran's decades-long, covert, and illegal nuclear program. This 
doesn't even begin to touch on the issues of sanctions being lifted 
against Iran's Quds Force leaders and the IRGC, the very same people 
who are responsible for carrying out and planning Iran's most deadly 
attacks and for supporting terror attacks across the world, the very 
same individuals, Mr. Speaker, who have American servicemembers' blood 
on their hands.
  That is right. The administration and the P5+1 have agreed right 
there in Annex 1 and Annex 2 to remove these individuals and these 
entities from the U.N. and European sanctions list. How the 
administration can even begin to try to justify removing these people 
from these sanctions lists and these designations is beyond 
comprehension. In fact, it is a direct affront to every man or woman 
who has served in the U.S. Armed Forces and their friends, families, 
and loved ones.
  The administration needs to explain--and I would like viewers to look 
at this poster--how Soleimani, the gentleman here in the middle, the 
head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, the commander of the Quds Force, 
not only gets to get rid of these sanctions, but soon will get a boon 
to his coffers to increase his attacks against the U.S. and our 
interests.
  But look at this rogues gallery. We are not done yet. How about 
General Vahidi? General Vahidi, this fine gentleman here, former Quds 
Force commander, Iranian defense minister, has been wanted by Interpol 
since 2007 for his role in the 1994 AMIA Jewish center bombing in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. He will come off some of these sanctions 
lists, this gentleman responsible for the murder of innocent men, 
women, and children.
  But as The Wall Street Journal article notes, we are actually going 
to be lifting the sanctions on the scientists and the individuals 
responsible for developing Iran's covert nuclear weapons program. Mr. 
Speaker, this will leave these individuals free to continue to work on 
the regime's nuclear program. But not only that, it will leave them 
free to proliferate their expertise and knowledge.
  What we have here, Mr. Speaker, is that we essentially have agreed to 
lift the sanctions and designations on most of the key individuals on 
Iran's covert nuclear weapons program while, at the same time, allowing 
all of Iran's key components of its nuclear program to remain intact. 
How does that benefit our national security?
  We have agreed to lift sanctions on the Iranian equivalent of A.Q. 
Khan, this gentleman here, the head of Iran's WMD program. A.Q. Khan, 
if you remember, Mr. Speaker, is the Pakistani nuclear physicist 
responsible for the proliferation network that helped Libya, North 
Korea, Iran, and China develop their nuclear programs. He is the 
equivalent of A.Q. Khan. The Iranian A.Q. Khan helped the regime in its 
attempt to develop a nuclear explosive device which the regime still 
refuses to come clean about to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
  So look at this rogues gallery. We are not done.
  Now the Iranian equivalent of A.Q. Khan will be likely taken off the 
designation list before the terms of this agreement is up, meaning 
that, by the time this deal expires, this Iranian, A.Q. Khan, will have 
had years to perfect his explosive device without repercussions.
  This deal will also lift sanctions on the nuclear scientist named 
Abbasi-Davani. This fine gentleman here was the head of Iran's Atomic 
Energy Agency. Not only was this man once the head of the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran, but he was sanctioned by the U.N. Security 
Council, sanctioned by the U.N. for his work on both Iran's nuclear and 
ballistic missile program, which, by the way, just underscores the 
absurdity of the notion that Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful 
purposes. Only nations that intend on having a nuclear payload develop 
ballistic missiles, and this man was involved in both. Yet he too will 
be removed from U.N. sanctions before this agreement expires, leaving 
him several years to continue his work without any international 
scrutiny.
  But we have one more fine gentleman to point out, Mr. Speaker, as if 
that weren't enough. German engineer Gerhard Wisser, right over here, 
is a collaborating German scientist. He was an individual who was 
convicted and imprisoned in South Africa for his involvement in the 
A.Q. Khan network and who has facilitated the sale of nuclear equipment 
to North Korea, to Iran, and to Libya. He will be delisted, as well.
  On top of all of this, Iran's organization involved in spearheading 
its nuclear weapons research will be removed from the U.S. sanctions 
list, despite its long record of noncompliance with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.
  All I see in this agreement, Mr. Speaker, is a path to the Iranian 
bomb and not the prevention of one, as the administration claimed was 
the objective. Any way you slice it, Mr. Speaker, Iran will be a 
nuclear weapons state within a decade or so, and these individuals will 
be free to harm our international interests.
  Even if the U.N. Security Council opts to reimpose sanctions on the 
regime, Iran has built into the agreement that this would be a 
violation of the agreement. Listen to that, Mr. Speaker. If the U.N. 
Security Council opts to

[[Page 12214]]

reimpose sanctions, Iran has in this deal a stipulation that this would 
be a violation of the agreement, and then it can simply snap back its 
own nuclear program. That is the only snapback that is involved, Iran 
snapping back its own nuclear program. And now it will be free of all 
the burdens of sanctions. It will have its entire infrastructure--
complete with the added benefit of U.S. assistance in modernizing its 
equipment, in advancing certain aspects of it--as well as the key 
individuals involved and responsible for advancing the program ready 
and able to produce a nuclear weapon without any problems whatsoever.
  Mr. Speaker, if Congress approves this deal, we are guaranteeing that 
Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state, and we are giving away every bit 
of leverage that we have against this rogue regime. This deal isn't 
going to avert a war. It might very well precipitate one. Our only real 
option for peace and a nuclear-free Middle East is to insist on a 
better deal.
  Mr. Speaker, we must back that up with tougher sanctions, not a 
promise to lift sanctions on some of the world's most dangerous 
individuals. How can we say, Mr. Speaker, that this nuclear deal is 
anything but a bad deal when it doesn't meet the benchmarks of the U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions or even the President's own benchmarks 
from 2013?

                              {time}  2115

  Iran was in violation of every one of those resolutions; yet, just 2 
days ago, the administration and the rest of the P5+1 went to the U.N. 
Security Council to bind ourselves to lifting the resolutions, even 
though the Iranian regime never complied with a single one--six 
resolutions violated.
  Each of those resolutions confirmed that Iran was not in compliance 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency, had not halted enrichment, 
had not stopped reprocessing, had not halted developing nuclear 
technology, and had not stopped its ballistic missile program.
  Iran has never met a U.N. Security Council resolution that it didn't 
violate; yet here we are, pretending that Iran has somehow complied 
with the international community and can be trusted this time to live 
up to its obligation under international law.
  Let's just take a look at what each of those resolutions required 
from Iran and what we are no longer requiring Iran to do as a result of 
this disastrous deal.
  Mr. Speaker, I will start with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, 
implemented on July 13, 2006. It demands that Iran suspend all 
enrichment related and reprocessing activities, which would be verified 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency after Iran's noncompliance 
with the IAEA for over 3 years.
  It gave Iran 1 month to comply with the IAEA or face the possibility 
of economic and diplomatic sanctions. It endorsed the diplomatic 
solution, specifically a P5+1 proposal from 2006 for a long-term, 
comprehensive agreement to determine the exclusively peaceful nature of 
Iran's nuclear program.
  It called upon states to exercise vigilance to prevent the transfer 
of any item, materials, goods, and technology that could contribute to 
Iran's enrichment and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile 
program. Iran did not comply.
  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 passed on December 23rd, 2006, 
it imposed sanctions on Iran for failing to halt uranium enrichment as 
stipulated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 that I 
just spoke about.
  It reaffirms that Iran shall, without further delay, suspend all 
enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and 
development to be verified by the IAEA and work on all heavy water-
related projects, including the construction of a research reactor, 
moderated by heavy water.
  The resolution further imposed sanctions on that country, blocking 
the import or export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment and 
freezing the financial assets of persons and entities supporting its 
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of 
nuclear weapons delivery systems.
  Also, this resolution established a new committee comprised of all 
council members to monitor the implementation of the present text and 
designate further individuals or entities to which the sanctions should 
apply. I bet Iran was really worried about that new committee.
  How about this resolution, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747, 
adopted on March 24, 2007? It widened the scope of the previous 
resolution by banning Iran's arms exports, arms embargo, prohibits 
transfers to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual-use items, exports from 
Iran of arms or WMD useful technology.
  It reaffirmed previous positions on Iran's nuclear program, including 
the suspension of all enrichment activity. It sanctioned additional 
individual and entities. How many more people could we put on that 
list?
  How about another resolution? U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803, 
adopted on March 3, 2008, it approved a new round of sanctions against 
Iran for refusing to suspend nuclear projects and activities.
  It reaffirmed all previous resolutions and demanded that Iran cease 
all enrichment and reprocessing and ballistic missile related activity. 
It required countries to inspect suspected cargo to and from Iran, 
extended the freezing of financial assets to persons or entities 
supporting Iran's nuclear-related programs or activities. It called 
upon countries to monitor activities of Iranian banks. It imposed 
travel restrictions on sanctioned individuals
  How about U.N. Security Council Resolution 1835, adopted on September 
27, 2008? It reaffirmed all previous resolutions. It reports that it 
found conclusively that Iran is continuing to develop its nuclear 
program.
  I bet that was a surprise. It found that Iran was making progress on 
developing and operating its centrifuges and continued to deliberately 
block and stonewall. It called on Iran to comply with obligations fully 
and without delay.
  Remember, these resolutions are gone now, Mr. Speaker.
  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 adopted on June 9, 2010, it 
reaffirmed all previous resolutions. It prohibited Iran from investing 
abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies, or nuclear 
capable ballistic missile technology.
  It prohibited Iran from launching ballistic missiles, including on 
its own territory. It required Iran to refrain from any development of 
ballistic missiles that are nuclear capable.
  It mandated that countries not export major combat systems to Iran, 
but does not bar sales of missiles that are not on the U.N. Register of 
Conventional Arms. It called on the vigilance of international lending 
to Iran, providing trade credits and other financing.
  It called on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran air cargo 
and Islamic Republic of Iran shipping lines or by any ship in national 
or international waters, if there are indications that they are 
carrying cargo banned for carriage to Iran.
  Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the 
country where the ship is registered, but it could happen. It froze the 
assets of Iranian persons and entities named in annexes to the 
resolutions and required that countries ban the travel of named 
Iranians.
  That was back in the day, Mr. Speaker; yet here we are today, 2 days 
after the administration went around Congress to bind the United States 
to a U.N. Security Council resolution that will lift all of those 
resolutions. You see all of those resolutions; we just ripped them up, 
no longer needed. We did not achieve a single thing that those previous 
six resolutions called for.
  Now, to make matters worse, Mr. Speaker, the P5+1 countries will 
honor their obligations on this new U.N. Security Council resolution, 
while the Iranian regime laughs at us all the way to the bomb.
  Iran has never felt compelled to honor its international obligations; 
and now, we are just supposed to expect it to fully comply with this? A 
zebra can't change its stripes, and this

[[Page 12215]]

Iranian regime will never feel obligated to abide by this new 
international agreement.
  Why tie our hands like this, Mr. Speaker? This is a bad and dangerous 
nuclear deal. I would urge my colleagues to reject it.
  There has been a lot of talk, Mr. Speaker, about these anytime, 
anywhere inspections. I think it is important for us to examine what 
this agreement actually says about anytime, anywhere.
  If the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or 
activities, they can request clarification from Iran. They request 
clarification from Iran, Oh, please explain to us. If Iran's 
clarification does not satisfy the IAEA, then the IAEA can request 
access to such locations--request.
  If the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements within 
14 days of the IAEA's original request--look at the timeline, Mr. 
Speaker--then the joint commission would advise on how to resolve that 
issue within an additional 7 days; then Iran will have another 3 days 
to implement such a decision.
  Can you keep up with me, ladies and gentlemen? Do the math. Iran 
actually has 24 days to stall or hide any undeclared nuclear material.
  Is that the definition now of anytime, anywhere inspections, Mr. 
Speaker? I don't think so, and Iran's Defense Minister doesn't think so 
either. Why do I say that? Just 2 days ago, he said that the IAEA would 
not be allowed to inspect any of Iran's military sites.
  They have been saying over and over again--the Supreme Leader has 
said the same thing multiple times--Iran will not let foreigners 
inspect any military center or interview its nuclear scientists.
  On top of that, Iran's Foreign Minister and chief negotiator said, 
just yesterday, that Iran has secured the so-called right to deny the 
IAEA access to its nuclear sites for inspections.
  Iran has also banned American nuclear inspectors from entering any 
nuclear site or participating on any International Atomic Energy Agency 
inspection team. No American can participate.
  Let's just say, for argument's sake, that Iran is caught cheating, as 
unlikely as that might be--and I am being facetious obviously--what 
happens then? Well, it says it right here. It is very clear. The deal 
states that, if the countries believe that Iran is not meeting its 
commitment under this agreement, they can refer the issue to the joint 
commission.
  The commission would have 15 days or longer to resolve the issue; 
then the issue can be referred to the ministers of foreign affairs if 
the commission could not resolve the issue. That is another 15 days for 
the ministers, Mr. Speaker.
  Let's do the math. We are already up to 30 days at the minimum. Then 
the compliance participant could request that the issue be considered 
to the advisory board, which will have another 15 days to issue a 
nonbinding opinion.
  If it is not resolved during this process and the U.N. Security 
Council gets notified, by the end, another 2 months or so would have 
passed and given Iran enough time to lobby Russia, China, and the rest 
of the P5+1 to vote with them so that sanctions are not reimposed.
  Remember, Mr. Speaker, sanctions will only be reimposed in the event 
of a significant nonperformance by Iran. The key word there is 
``significant.''
  What does the U.S. consider significant violations? What do the 
Europeans consider significant violations? What does China consider it? 
What does Russia and Iran, itself, consider significant violations?
  Iran can prevent from sanctions being reimposed, as long as they 
cheat only in small increments and not significantly. If they just 
cheat a little bit, they can get away with it.
  Additionally, the JCPOA explicitly states: ``Iran has stated that if 
sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as 
grounds to cease performing its commitment under this JCPOA in whole or 
in part.''
  Iran is saying: If you put sanctions on us, we don't have to continue 
with this agreement.
  I am not making it up. That is a quote. Even if Iran is caught 
cheating and we move to reimpose sanctions, as we are entitled to do 
under the JCPOA, Iran is actually entitled to walk away from the deal.
  In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I feel that Iran will use this as its 
trump card to bully the P5+1 into not addressing violations or holding 
Iran accountable for its cheating. Even though the United States has 
the ability to veto a Security Council vote, choosing not to reimpose 
sanctions and hold Iran accountable, we must, again, remember that such 
a veto would unravel this deal, reapply sanctions, and allow Iran to 
claim it can walk away.
  Finally, an effective sanctions regime against Iran that was 
established over many years cannot be easily reapplied. The idea of 
snapback sanctions is simply not viable.
  Mr. Speaker, I could go on and on about all of the loopholes in this 
deal. Suffice it to say, we can do better than this. We must do better 
than this. We owe it to our children and our grandchildren to do better 
than this.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

                          ____________________