[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 12153-12154]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          THE NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN AND OUR NATIONAL SECURITY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from 
Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn) for 5 minutes.
  Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor this morning to talk 
for a few minutes about the primary issue that my constituents are 
talking about right now, and that is the issue of national security, 
homeland security, and how what is happening in the world is affecting 
our communities right where we live and work and where our children go 
to school. Isn't that what everyone wants to know: that we are going to 
be safe, that our children are going to be safe, and that future 
generations are going to be safe here in the United States?
  Mr. Speaker, as we look at these issues of illegal immigration, as we 
look at ISIS and the threats that are carried out, such as what 
happened in Chattanooga, and as we look at the Iran deal, we know this 
affects where we live and where we work.
  Today, Mr. Speaker, I want to spend just a few minutes talking about 
the Iran nuclear deal.
  One of the members, retired, of a military organization, MOAA, came 
up to me Saturday as I was talking to them. He said: Marsha, this is a 
bad, bad deal. It is a bad, bad deal.
  I have got to agree with him. It is. Of course, he speaks from the 
perspective of having worn the uniform and served, having had a full 
military career. It is interesting. They know a bad deal when they see 
one, and in this Iran nuclear deal that is proposed, they see the 
tenets of a very bad deal.
  Let's look at a few of these components that will not serve us and 
future generations, our national security, or our homeland security 
well.
  As you review this deal, you see that Iran retains the ability to 
enrich uranium. That does not stop. It is going to continue on. We can 
already see how a nuclear Iran would create an arms race in an area 
which is already volatile. Any capability to enrich uranium may cause a 
nuclear arms race to happen and further destabilize the Middle East.
  You see, Mr. Speaker, we are not prohibiting them from doing 
anything. All we are doing is basically setting a date certain 10, 15, 
or 20 years down the road. Now, think about your children and 
grandchildren 10, 15 or 20 years down the road. If Iran has a nuclear 
weapon, what are they going to say at that point in time? How is it 
going to affect them?
  Think about the region. A Saudi official has said: ``Politically, it 
would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability 
and not the kingdom.'' I am quoting a Saudi official's remarks.
  Any deal must have full transparency, and we need to know that there 
can be and will be because there must be anytime, anywhere inspections. 
It is my fear that a deal with Iran is not going to accomplish this.
  The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday--and, Mr. Speaker, I will 
submit this for the Record--``Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even 
Close.'' It was a Wall Street Journal article, and I commend it to my 
colleagues to read as they review this and think about how they are 
going to vote on this deal.
  The Wall Street Journal stated: ``The Obama administration assures 
Americans that the Iran deal grants access within 24 days to undeclared 
but suspected Iranian nuclear sites.''
  When you look at the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it reveals 
that actually it is going to be closer to months. They can end up 
holding inspectors at bay for months.
  Again, from the Journal I am reading and quoting: ``So from the 
moment the IAEA first tips its hand about what it wants to inspect, 
likely three or more months may pass.''
  Now, Mr. Speaker, I ask you, does this sound like the type of deal 
that you would want to make with a country whose people recently were 
out chanting ``death to America'' and burning our flag to celebrate the 
Muslim holy day with the Supreme Leader in attendance at that rally? 
Does this sound like the type of deal that should be approved by our 
Secretary of State and supported by our President? Why? Why would they 
want to do this? Why would there be a deal that sets a date certain and 
kind of lays out that path? Simply put, there is no way--no way--that 
we can trust Iran to allow inspectors unfettered access to both 
civilian and military sites to verify that they are not pushing a 
nuclear weapon. So we would be left wondering if--if--they are going to 
hold up their end of this so-called nuclear deal.
  Mr. Speaker, a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guard has 
recently said that inspectors will not be allowed on military sites. 
General Hossein Salami said: ``We will respond with hot lead . . . We 
will not roll out the red carpet for the enemy.''
  In addition, Mr. Speaker, it is extremely concerning that Iran is 
asking for sanctions on weapons sales and ballistic missile technology 
transfers to be lifted. It is a bad, bad deal, as my constituent said. 
I commend further study to my colleagues.

             [From the Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2015]

              Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close

                  (By Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby)

       The Obama administration assures Americans that the Iran 
     deal grants access within 24 days to undeclared but suspected 
     Iranian nuclear sites. But that's hardly how a recalcitrant 
     Iran is likely to interpret the deal. A close examination of 
     the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action released by the Obama 
     administration reveals that its terms permit Iran to hold 
     inspectors at bay for months, likely three or more.
       Paragraphs 74 to 78 govern the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency's access to suspect sites. First, the IAEA tells Iran 
     ``the basis'' of its concerns about a particular location, 
     requesting clarification. At this point Iran will know where 
     the IAEA is headed. Iran then provides the IAEA with 
     ``explanations'' to resolve IAEA concerns. This stage has no 
     time limit.
       Opportunities for delay abound. Iran will presumably want 
     to know what prompted the IAEA's concern. The suspect site 
     identified by the IAEA is likely to be remote, and Iran will 
     no doubt say that it must gather skilled people and equipment 
     to responsibly allay IAEA concerns. Iran may offer 
     explanations in stages, seeking IAEA clarifications before 
     ``completing'' its response. That could take a while.
       Only if Iran's ``explanations do not resolve the IAEA's 
     concerns'' may the IAEA then ``request access'' to the 
     suspect site. Oddly, the agreement doesn't specify who judges 
     whether the explanations resolve concerns. If Iran claims 
     that it has a say in the matter, the process may stall here. 
     Assuming Iran grants that the IAEA can be the judge, might 
     Iran claim that the ``great Satan'' improperly influenced 
     IAEA conclusions? Let's assume that Tehran won't do that.
       Now the IAEA must provide written reasons for the request 
     and ``make available relevant information.'' Let's assume 
     that even though the IAEA may resist revealing the secret 
     sources or technical means that prompted its suspicions, Iran 
     acknowledges that a proper request has been supplied.
       Only then do the supposed 24 days begin to run. First, Iran 
     may propose, and the IAEA must consider, alternative means of 
     resolving concerns. This may take 14 days. Absent 
     satisfactory ``arrangements,'' a new period begins.
       During this period Iran, ``in consultation with'' the Joint 
     Commission, will ``resolve'' the IAEA concerns ``through 
     necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.'' The Joint 
     Commission includes China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., 
     the U.S., the European Union and, of course, Iran. Not 
     exactly a wieldy bunch.
       The Iranians will likely claim that ``consultation'' with 
     the Joint Commission doesn't bind Tehran, just as the U.S. 
     president isn't bound by consultations with Congress. The 
     agreement says the consultation process will not exceed seven 
     days, but Iran can point out that the nuclear deal doesn't 
     specify when Iran and the IAEA must reach agreement and 
     ``resolve'' IAEA concerns.
       In the absence of Iran-IAEA agreement, a majority of the 
     Joint Commission has seven days to ``advise'' on the 
     ``necessary means'' to resolve the matter. Iran may fairly 
     argue that the commission's right to ``advise'' is not the 
     same as a right to ``determine'' the ``necessary means.'' 
     Lastly, the agreement provides that ``Iran would implement 
     the necessary means within 3 additional days.'' But what 
     ``necessary means'' are these? As noted, the agreement refers 
     to ``necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.'' So 
     these additional three days don't even begin until an 
     agreement is reached.
       Now what? Well, the U.S. may take a ``Dispute'' to the 
     Joint Commission, on which

[[Page 12154]]

     Iran sits, which has 15 days to resolve the issue. Parties 
     may or may not invoke a similar 15 days for foreign ministers 
     to act. Parties may also request a nonbinding opinion within 
     15 days from an advisory board consisting of three members, 
     one appointed by Iran, one by the complaining country and ``a 
     third independent member.''
       But Iran may argue that nothing in the nuclear deal 
     specifies how quickly a country must appoint its advisory-
     board member or even how the ``independent member'' is 
     selected. In short, this stage may take at least 30 days and 
     possibly 45 of consideration at the different levels, but 
     Iran may argue that the last 15 days don't start until an 
     advisory board has been duly formed. Then we get another five 
     days of Joint Commission deliberation, before a disappointed 
     U.S. or other commission member seeking IAEA inspections can 
     hobble off to the United Nations seeking resolutions 
     reimposing sanctions.
       In short, as Iran is free to interpret the agreement, 63 or 
     even 78 days may pass, plus three potentially lengthy periods 
     that Iran can stretch out: One of ``explanations'' before the 
     clock starts, one to agree on necessary means and ``resolve 
     concerns,'' and one for advisory-board selection near the 
     end.
       So from the moment the IAEA first tips its hand about what 
     it wants to inspect, likely three or more months may pass. 
     All along, the Joint Commission is required to act in ``good 
     faith,'' and to make only ``minimum necessary'' requests 
     limited to verification, not ``interference.'' Tehran could 
     also cite these terms to challenge particular requests.
       The description of this process is based on the English-
     language text of the nuclear agreement. The text lacks a 
     provision that it is the entire agreement, so Iran may claim 
     support in supposed side agreements or statements during 
     negotiations.
       Announcing this ``comprehensive, long-term'' deal, 
     President Obama quoted President Kennedy's 1961 call for 
     negotiations with the Soviets. Kennedy reached two notable 
     nuclear agreements. Mr. Obama didn't mention that within a 
     decade of Kennedy's 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, Soviet 
     nuclear forces--once a fraction of America's--were at parity 
     or had surpassed ours.
       During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy reached 
     secret agreements--undisclosed to Americans for decades--not 
     to invade Cuba and to withdraw U.S. weapons from Turkey. By 
     invoking Kennedy was President Obama signaling there is more 
     to this ``long-term'' deal than we know?
       He is a subtle man.

                          ____________________