[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 11181-11182]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                 BURMA

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, on an entirely different matter, a few 
weeks ago I came to the floor to discuss the importance of Burma's 
election this fall. I noted that its conduct would tell us a lot about 
the Burmese Government's commitment to the path of political reform. I 
said that demonstrating that commitment would be critical to reassuring 
Burma's friends abroad and that it could even have consequences for 
further normalization of relations with the United States, at least as 
it concerns the legislative branch.

[[Page 11182]]

  So I urged Burmese officials to take every step to ensure an election 
that would be as free and fair as possible. Yet on June 25, the Burmese 
Government took a step backward from the path to more representative 
government.
  Let me explain. There is little doubt that Burma's Constitution 
contains numerous flaws that need to be revised if the government is to 
be truly representative.
  First, it unreasonably restricts who can be a candidate for 
President--a not so subtle attempt to bar the country's most popular 
opposition figure from ever standing for that office. But then it goes 
even further, ensuring an effective military veto over constitutional 
change--for instance, amendments about who can run for the Presidency--
by requiring more than three-fourths parliamentary support in a 
legislature where the Constitution also reserves one-fourth of the 
seats for the military.
  Let me say that again. The Constitution reserves one-fourth of the 
seats for the military and requires a three-fourths vote to amend the 
Constitution--completely jerry-rigged. It is obvious to see why things 
should change if Burma is to pursue a path of a more representative 
government.
  Allowing appropriate constitutional fixes to pass through the 
Parliament would have said some very positive things about the Burmese 
Government's commitment to political reform. But when the measures were 
put to a vote on June 25, the government's allies exercised the very 
undemocratic power the Constitution grants them to stymie the reform.
  This stands in stark contrast to the support for reform among elected 
Burmese lawmakers, which is likely higher than 80 percent. So among the 
people elected by the people, 80 percent favor the reform, and the 25 
percent inserted into the process by the military guaranteed that no 
reform occurred. So even if the actual conduct of the election proves 
to be free and fair, it risks being something other than, certainly, 
the will of the people.
  When the most popular figure in the country is precluded from being a 
candidate for the highest office in the land, and when approximately 80 
percent of the people's chosen representatives are stymied by lawmakers 
who are not democratically elected, it raises fundamental questions 
about the balloting that is coming up this fall and about the Burmese 
Government's commitment to democracy. In fact, at this point it is 
unclear if the opposition NLD Party will even participate in this 
fall's election.
  We knew that legal, economic, political, and constitutional 
development and reform would evolve in that country through fits and 
starts. This is only realistic, given the baseline from which Burma was 
starting when Congress agreed to lift some of the sanctions.
  Those of us who have followed Burma for a long time also know that, 
given its history, the military fears change, ethnic unrest, and the 
uncertainty that a more democratic government might bring. That is well 
acknowledged, but improving relations with the United States meant both 
sides would have to take some risks. This was a moment for the military 
to take another important step on its end, and it was a missed 
opportunity.
  In light of the recent defeat of constitutional reform, I believe 
that steps such as including Burma in the Generalized System of 
Preferences Program should be put on hold until after this fall's 
election. Only after the ballots have been cast and counted in Burma 
can an appropriate evaluation be made about the pace of reform in the 
country and whether additional normalization of relations is warranted.

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