[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 7]
[Senate]
[Pages 9945-9951]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                 TRADE

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I believe we are moving to a very 
important debate in the next week as the Senate moves forward with 
legislation passed by the House of Representatives today that would 
advance trade promotion authority. Trade promotion authority is a 
delegation by the U.S. Congress to the President of the United States, 
the Chief Executive--power that Congress has--authorizing and directing 
that the President go forward to negotiate a trade agreement. This 
trade agreement would then be brought back to the Congress and, through 
legislation, would be implemented. But the trade agreement would never 
be subject to full evaluation, full debate under the normal processes 
of Congress, nor would it be subject to any amendment. Indeed, if the 
trade promotion authority passes the Senate--maybe next week--this 
legislation, this trade agreement would be fast-tracked. That is why 
they call it a fast-track agreement.
  The fast-track would mean that the treaty--they call it ``agreement'' 
to avoid the fact that a treaty requires a two-thirds vote--that this 
trade agreement would be brought up so that Congress--it would be on 
the floor for 20 hours, it would be subject to no amendment, and it 
would be voted on, up or down. It would be filed, for example, at 4 
o'clock on a Monday afternoon and voted on final passage the next day 
at noon. That is the kind of situation we are faced with.
  Fast-track has been used for a number of years, a number of times, 
but it has always been focused on trade--what the tariff rates might be 
between trading partners, details of trade agreements and definitions 
and those kinds of things. But this agreement is far more extensive. It 
is more extensive in the size and the scope of the trade agreement, the 
number of nations, and the fact that it would cover--if the Atlantic 
agreement is also approved--75 percent of the world's economy.
  But even more significant to me is that it creates something that is 
a nontrading entity, a commission, a transpacific international 
commission. This commission will meet regularly. It will be created by 
legislation with certain rules. But according to the Trade 
Representative who is negotiating in advance of this legislation on 
behalf of President Obama and who is advocating for it, it will be a 
living agreement. That means the entity itself, the commission, will 
then be entitled to make the TPP say different things, eliminate 
provisions it does not like, and add provisions it does like. In fact, 
the commission is required to meet regularly and to hear advice for 
changes from outside groups and from inside committees of the 
commission so that they can update the situation to change 
circumstances.
  It is a breathtaking event. It says it is designed to promote the 
international movement of people, services, and products--basically the 
same language used to start the European Union. In fact, I have 
referred to it as a nascent European Union. I do not think that is far 
off base.
  So we will have 12 Pacific nations come together in this agreement. 
Well, the trade agreement, I would suggest, colleagues, is not that big 
of a deal--a part of it. We have free-trade agreements with big 
nations, such as Canada, Australia, Mexico, Chile. The negotiations--
really have an impact with two nations of significance: Japan and 
Vietnam. Why we can't negotiate trade agreements with them in a 
bilateral fashion? I don't know. Why do we have to create a 
transnational union, an institution that has the power, as I will 
explain, to impact the laws of the United States of America? It is not 
necessary.
  I voted for--it has not worked as well as we were told it would work, 
but I voted for the last bilateral agreement with South Korea. South 
Korea, like Japan, is our good friend. We do not have any fundamental 
disagreements with them. They are part of the civilized world and so 
forth. But they have a different view of trade than we have. They are 
mercantile. They have to be approached and considered in a different 
way. They just approach trade differently. They believe manufacturing 
and exports mean power. An actual study has shown not too long ago that 
mercantilism has enhanced their power. A nation with trading deficits 
like the United States has had their power diminished as their trade 
deficits have accrued.
  So some of our colleagues reject mercantilism. It is not healthy to 
trade for sure. We would like to see it go away. But it is our trading 
partner's policy. We have to deal with that reality when we negotiate 
agreements.
  So what I will say, colleagues, is that this is a significant event. 
I see no reason that when we are attempting to create a trade 
agreement, it can't be like South Korea in 2012. Why do we have to 
create an entirely new transnational union with the power where each 
nation has one vote? The Sultan of Brunei--Brunei is one of the 
countries, one of the 12--the Sultan of Brunei gets one vote, and the 
President of the United States gets one vote it appears, although from 
my reading of the document it is difficult to fully understand what 
they mean.
  I would say, at the most fundamental level, this Congress should not 
fast-track any transnational union of which we are a part until we 
understand every word in it, we know exactly what it means, and the 
President can answer. I have asked questions. I have asked him what it 
means--the living agreement language--in a letter. No answer. I asked 
the President of the United States: Do you contend this agreement will 
reduce the big trade deficit we have or will it increase the trade 
deficit? They don't answer. The only thing advocates for this treaty 
say is that it will advance or enhance employment in the exporting 
industry. That is the only statement they have made. Why are they being 
careful about that? I have listened to them. No one has ever said much 
more than that.
  Well, in 2011, the President of the United States asserted, when he 
was promoting the trade agreement with South Korea--this was his 
statement:

       We don't simply want to be an economy that consumes other 
     country's goods. We want to be building and exporting the 
     goods that create jobs here in America . . .

  Well, I agree with that. I think we do need to focus on that. We have 
a sustained trade deficit, we have a sustained decline in American 
manufacturing, and we have seen the wages of America's middle class 
decline for over a decade--since 2000. We have not had increases in 
wages but a decline in wages. Part of that is because of a decline in 
manufacturing, which is where higher wages are paid.
  So this is what the President said with regard to the Korea Free 
Trade Agreement in his announcement back in 2011: ``I'm interested in 
agreements that increase jobs and exports for the American people.''
  Well, I am, too. Well, what do we know about the Korea trade 
agreement? Did it work? President Obama said this at that announcement. 
I hate to recall what he said, but this is what the promise was when he 
made this announcement. This is the President's statement that he 
personally delivered: ``In short, the tariff reductions in this 
agreement alone are expected to boost annual exports of American goods 
by up to $11 billion.'' Annual exports would be increased by $11 
billion: ``This would advance my goal of doubling U.S. exports over the 
next 5 years.''

[[Page 9946]]

  So what happened after the trade agreement was signed? We have had 
less than $1 billion in 3 years in export increases to South Korea. 
They have had a $12 billion increase in imports to the United States, 
virtually doubling the trade deficit that was already large between our 
countries.
  This is a chart which shows how that worked. This black line is when 
the treaty was signed. This is the trade deficit we have been running 
with South Korea. This is zero. These are the deficits we have been 
running. Then when the treaty was signed--the agreement was signed--we 
had a marked decline in exports. I wish it were not so. I voted for it. 
I bought into free trade and drank the free trade Kool-Aid. But did it 
work? I have to say it hasn't worked yet. The reason? Mr. Clyde 
Prestowitz, who was a trade negotiator for President Reagan with the 
Pacific and with Japan in the 1980s, said: They have nontariff 
barriers. They have a mercantilist philosophy, and their philosophy is 
to buy the least possible from abroad, make everything they can 
possibly make at home, and export as much as possible, creating jobs in 
their country, creating surpluses in trade, creating wealth, they 
believe, and also creating power.
  So I am concerned about this. I would just contend that we do not 
need to be listening to Pollyannaish promises that these trade 
agreements are going to be so great for working Americans. They have 
not been doing so well, in my opinion.
  In fact, Mr. Prestowitz, whom I just mentioned, wrote a book on 
trade. In January of this year, he wrote an op-ed for the Los Angeles 
Times in which he said this. Instead of saying that we are going to 
have a $10 billion increase annually in exports, let's look at the 
facts. This is Mr. Prestowitz:

       Over the last 35 years, the U.S. has brought China into the 
     World Trade Organization and concluded many free-trade 
     agreements, including one with South Korea three years ago. 
     In advance of each, U.S. leaders promised the deals would 
     create high-paying jobs, reduce the trade deficit, increase 
     [gross domestic product] and raise living standards. But none 
     of these came true. In fact, the U.S. non-oil trade deficit 
     continued to grow, millions of jobs are offshored and mean 
     household income has hardly risen since 2000. And economists 
     overwhelmingly agree that rising U.S. income inequality is 
     being driven in part by international trade.

  That is President Reagan's adviser, a student of these issues who 
knows the Pacific well, who has written a book on trade and documents--
contrary to what some people say--that for the first 150 years of our 
country we had high tariffs on products imported.
  Now, I believe we should eliminate tariffs. I believe we should move 
to trade, and I have supported that over the years. But I just have to 
say I am less convinced that in a world where our partners aren't 
operating on the same policies we operate on, we have to be careful 
about these agreements.
  What our trading partners want, in substance, is access to the U.S. 
market, access so they can sell their products in the U.S. market and 
bring home wealth to their countries. That is their goal. It just is. 
That is the way they approach life.
  We want access to their markets. There is nothing wrong with that. 
That is just what the world is about, and we are not negotiating very 
effectively.
  So many of these countries have nontariff barriers that cause 
difficult problems in trade. And we reduce our tariff barriers and we 
have virtually no other barriers to the sale of foreign products in the 
United States, while we are not able to export competitive products 
abroad because of their nontariff barriers or even sometimes their 
tariff barriers.
  I just wish to say at the beginning that I am not of the view that we 
have to have a trade agreement passed this week and as part of it that 
we have to pass some union with 12 countries each having one vote. I 
don't see that has to be done.
  If we don't sign a trade agreement that affects Japan or Vietnam 
today, what, is the world going to collapse? We have been getting along 
without it for decades, apparently, maybe since the beginning of the 
history of the Republic. So I would say let's slow down, and I say we 
have to focus more effectively on what is good for America.
  Fast-track is a decision by Congress to suspend several of its most 
basic powers for 6 years, and any treaty that is created in the next 6 
years can take advantage of fast-track, be brought directly to the 
floor, and be passed on a simple majority in the House and the Senate 
without an amendment.
  One of my Republican colleagues said: Oh, well, we will have a 
Republican President, and we can really put up some good trade bills. 
Who knows who is going to be elected President next year. Who knows if 
the President, if he is a Republican, will send up a good trade bill. 
Congress has its duty to respond and study trade agreements and cast a 
knowledgeable vote on it. I don't think Congress, in this instance, 
should give up its procedural processes for passing any important 
legislation. I think a decision of the magnitude we are dealing with 
deserves the most careful scrutiny.
  This is not a trade agreement with one friend and ally, South Korea, 
it includes 12 nations in the Pacific. As soon as that is inked, we 
have been told--and brought forward for passage in the Congress--and, 
historically, if we get trade promotion authority, the agreements that 
are presented have always passed. Once that is said and done, we will 
begin to debate the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
TTIP. This transatlantic agreement, I suppose, will also have some sort 
of commission, a transatlantic union with powers that discipline and 
set rules outside the powers of the Congress.
  Then there is going to be a services agreement that has already been 
talked about. It has been leaked. Somebody leaked this. The other two 
are secret and cannot be seen by the American people.
  So this services agreement has 10 pages on immigration. They are 
going to fast-track through changes in our immigration law. It is a 
very serious matter. We have other issues out there like environmental 
law--that I will mention in a minute--that absolutely the President 
intends to advance through this trade agreement.
  So those are three major treaties, and those treaties would impact 75 
percent of the GDP of America, but that is not all. For the next 6 
years, any other treaty can be advanced in this same way. Presumably, 
three or four countries could get together and agree on some 
environmental regulation, and it could be advanced as some trade 
agreement in a fast-track procedure through Congress.
  So I think the burden of proof rests on the promoters of fast-track 
to demonstrate why three-fifths of the Senate shouldn't be required to 
agree, since this is so akin to a treaty, and/or advance this contrary 
to the proceedings of Congress.
  Some of my colleagues have been saying that the trade promotion 
authority, which the President is so desperately seeking--he has been 
hammering and bludgeoning his Members in the Senate and the House to 
get them to not vote their conscience but vote with what he wants--they 
say we should pass it because it restricts the power of the President.
  Well, give me a break. If this were true, why would the President 
want it? If he could do all he wants to do without Congress, why isn't 
he doing it anyway? The entire purpose of fast-track is for Congress to 
surrender its power to the executive branch for 6 years. Legislative 
concessions include control over the content of the legislation. The 
President negotiates it, he brings it back, we can't amend it. He 
controls the content on it, the power to fully consider the legislation 
on the floor. It is filed on one day and voted the next day. The power 
to keep debate open until Senate cloture is invoked--on any other 
legislation, you have to get a cloture vote.
  We couldn't get cloture on the Defense bill today. The Democrats 
refused to give 60 votes to pass the bill that appropriates the funds 
to defend America, but the President would be able to bring up this 
bill with a simple majority and no ability for extended debate that the 
Senate is famous for, and there is the constitutional requirement

[[Page 9947]]

that a treaty receives a two-thirds vote.
  When you are creating an international union, I mean, this crosses 
the line. May be someone can technically say that somehow this is an 
agreement and not a treaty. I don't know, lawyers could perhaps 
disagree, but Congress should assert its power.
  We should say: Mr. President, we have seen you operate. We are not 
going to authorize you to enter into the creation of an international 
union where you get to impose additional powers on us without creating 
it through the treaty process.
  The legislation, finally, is not amendable, which is exceedingly 
unusual.
  So without fast-track, Congress retains all its legislative powers. 
Individual Members retain all their procedural tools, and every single 
line of trade text is publically available before any action is taken 
to grease the skids for its final passage. I think that is the 
important issue.
  What about this union. What kind of powers is it that we are talking 
about? I am of the belief that the President hasn't been a strong 
advocate of trade. His supporters, many of them oppose this kind of 
trade agreement. I am coming to believe the primary part of his 
understanding of the importance of this legislation, and why he is 
breaking arms and heads over it, is the union, this international 
commission that has powers that he believes will allow him to advance 
agendas. I don't say that conspiratorially. I will explain in a moment 
that clearly seems to be one of the incentives this President has to 
advance this legislation.
  In a Ways and Means House document on a new Pacific union being 
formed by President Obama, a committee in the House hints at some of 
this union's power, this international commission on trade:

       If a proposed change to a trade agreement is contemplated 
     [by the TPP Commission] that would require a change in U.S. 
     law, all of TPA's congressional notification, consultation, 
     and transparency requirements would apply.

  In other words, Ways and Means is intimating that this new secret 
Pacific union would function like a third House of Congress, with 
legislative primacy, the ability to advance legislation, sending 
changes to the House and Senate under fast-track procedures--receiving 
less procedure, for example, than post office reform.
  Further, this legislative fast-track, Ways and Means implies, is a 
change in U.S. law, meaning that if this President or the next argues 
it is simply an Executive action, not a legal action, the Executive 
would have a free hand to implement any agreement the Commission 
creates without any approval of Congress.
  Well, he said he wouldn't do that. Did you see where people who were 
unlawfully in the country were given a photo ID card by the President 
of the United States, were given a Social Security number, and it says 
on the card ``work authorization,'' when the law says if you are in the 
country illegally you cannot have a Social Security number. He did 
that.
  He made a recess appointment in blatant violation of a definition of 
what a recess is. It took 2 or 3 years for the Congress to take it to 
the Supreme Court, and in a unanimous 9-to-0 ruling, the Supreme Court 
overturned it.
  So to say the President will not push his powers is naive indeed. How 
do you stop it? Do you file a lawsuit to say the President shouldn't 
have agreed to the Pacific Commission? Now a whole government 
bureaucracy is carrying out some global warming, some immigration, some 
trade issues that Congress opposes.
  Is a President capable of doing something like that, actually 
carrying out ideas and policies that Congress doesn't approve of. 
Absolutely. We have seen it time and again.
  So this is not merely a loophole, it is a purposeful delegation of 
congressional authority to the Executive and to an international body. 
We should understand what we are doing. Not enough of our people have 
read some agreement and fully understand. The fast-track-implementing 
legislation would have the ability to make these binding delegations 
binding as a matter of law, it seems to me. Well, maybe not. It 
probably wouldn't work that way. I don't think it works that way.
  Look, that is why I wrote the President and I said: Mr. President, 
make this part of the proposed TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
public. Let's have the lawyers study it. You explain to us exactly what 
these words mean--which he has refused to do. As a matter of fact, I 
don't think the American people have fully grasped that this is not a 
normal trade agreement but that it is the creation of an international 
entity.
  Amendments to specify Congress retains exclusive legislative 
authority and to actively prohibit foreign worker increases were 
blocked by the fast-track supporters. I offered legislation that would 
make clear that the President couldn't alter the constitutionally 
exclusive power of Congress over immigration, and they refused to give 
us a vote. It is not in the bill. Why not?
  I said: Well, we are not going to change immigration law.
  Some administration underlings say that. They don't have the power to 
bind the President. They are not lawyers, perhaps. They don't know what 
the words mean. The President of the United States hasn't said it 
publically, neither has his Trade Representative. He has come close, 
but if you read his words, you will see that they were clever words, in 
my opinion, with little meaning.
  Fast-track supporters have tried to temper concerns about the 
formation of this transnational union and the subsequent Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP, and the Trade in Services 
Agreement, TISA, that would be approved through fast-track by adding 
additional negotiating objectives via a separate Customs bill.
  However, negotiation objectives are, by design, not explicit or 
realistically enforceable. They include such vague language as saying 
it must be the goal of the White House ``to ensure that trade 
agreements reflect and facilitate the increasingly interrelated, multi-
sectoral nature of trade and investment activity.'' Those are the kinds 
of things in this language. That is not enforceable and has virtually 
no meaning.
  One of the vague goals is ``to recognize the growing significance of 
the Internet as a trading platform in international commerce.'' What 
does that mean?
  Under the Ways and Means solution, TPP, TTIP, and TISA would 
establish broad goals for labor mobility--immigration--allowing Ways 
and Means to say their negotiating objective, about requiring or 
obligating certain changes, had not been violated. And the President 
would then implement those changes through Executive action or as a 
result of fast-track where the laws have changed.
  So, together, TPP, TTIP, and TISA--these three trade agreements which 
we know are going to be advanced under fast-track--represent the goal 
of advancing the unrestricted global movement of goods and people and 
services.
  The European Commission--this is how they started, how they were 
formed. In explaining TISA--presumably the second major trade agreement 
that would be submitted after the Pacific agreement and we move to 
trade in services--this is how the European Commission explains what it 
means:

       TISA is open to all WTO members who want to open up trade 
     in services. China and Uruguay have asked to join the talks. 
     The EU supports their applications--

  The EU supports their applications because it wants as many countries 
as possible to join the agreement.
  TISA, of course, is the services agreement, and it will be worldwide. 
Anybody--even China--could be admitted to it. And the European Union 
Commission specifies that this services agreement, TISA, will be 
modeled on the General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS. This 
provides insight into how TISA will affect U.S. immigration procedures.
  When the United States became a member of the WTO in 1994, it signed 
on to the GATS and committed to issue certain numbers of work visas 
each year, immigration visas. Congress's ability to control the U.S. 
temporary entry programs has therefore been curtailed, as it would open 
up

[[Page 9948]]

the United States to foreign lawsuits in an international tribunal.
  In other words, they made an agreement on immigration visas under 
work ideas as part of GATS in the WTO, and it violates and complicates 
our ability to enforce American immigration law. But if we enforce the 
law the way it is written, then we will get disciplined by the foreign 
body. So when we sign up to a foreign body, we agree to rules. They say 
we have to do this. So it is not being enforced.
  So who wrote the law for the United States of America with regard to 
immigration? Under the Constitution, it is Congress, but in reality, 
once you join an international union, they have certain powers to 
enforce their will over the elected representatives, the accountable 
representatives of the people of the United States, and some other 
group does it.
  TISA--this services agreement--will, as the European Union suggests, 
require the United States to make additional legislative commitments on 
a much larger scale. Do we understand that? When people are voting for 
this trade agreement, this Pacific trade agreement, do we understand 
that we are opening up a mechanism for the services agreement and for 
the Atlantic agreement and perhaps another commission for the Atlantic? 
Will there be a commission set up under the TISA or TTIP bills? Do we 
know? Do we want to give a fast-track to grease the skids for the 
President to negotiate such a thing as this? I think not.
  The preamble to the South Korea Free Trade Agreement, for example, 
states that a principal goal of the agreement is to ``create new 
employment opportunities, and improve the general welfare . . . by 
liberalizing and expanding trade and investment between their 
territories.''
  In announcing that agreement, President Obama said:

       Because we don't simply want to be an economy that consumes 
     other countries' goods. We want to be building and exporting 
     the goods that create jobs here in America and that keeps the 
     United States competitive in the 21st century.

  That is what he said at that time.
  So for too long the United States has entered into trade deals on the 
promise of economic bounty, only to see workers impoverished, 
industries disappear, and manufacturing jobs decline. And we have been 
on a steady decline in manufacturing jobs.
  Mr. Dan DiMicco, one of the great CEOs in America and chairman 
emeritus of Nucor Steel, has written about these issues recently. He 
explains that these deals haven't worked as they have been promised. 
They haven't been, he says, free-trade deals at all. Instead, they have 
been ``unilateral trade disarmament,'' where we lower our barriers to 
foreign imports but they retain their barriers to our exports. Mr. 
DiMicco calls this the ``enablement of foreign mercantilism.''
  So consider this in the context of automobiles. In May, the Wall 
Street Journal--who is a free-trade entity for sure--published a news 
story about how the American auto sector could be jeopardized by the 
TPP. The Wall Street Journal wrote:

       In the transportation sector, led by cars, the TPP could 
     boost imports by an extra $30.8 billion by 2025, compared 
     with an exports gain to Japan of $7.8 billion, according to a 
     study co-written by Peter Petri, professor of international 
     finance at Brandeis University.

  I think that is exactly accurate. We are not going to have an 
increase in sales of automobiles in Japan. They have a 4 million 
automobile surplus capacity. They want to hire their people and they 
want to sell automobiles in Japan by producing automobiles in Japan, 
not by importing them. They are mercantilists in their approach. They 
have successfully resisted the penetration of their automobile market 
for decades, and it is not going to happen under this agreement. It is 
just not. But if we reduce our little 2.5 percent tariff on automobile 
imports to America, this, on the Japanese, has some sort of balancing 
effect for their failure to allow their markets to be open, and we will 
increase imports to the United States.
  I am not condemning Japan. I am just saying that is how they operate, 
and we need to understand that and be more effective in defending 
American interests.
  So what we hear from the promoters of this deal is ``We believe this 
trade deal will increase exports.'' Well, surely we will get some 
additional ability to sell products abroad. Surely the President can 
honestly say: If you sign the agreement with South Korea, well, we will 
have increased exports to South Korea. And we did--$800 million instead 
of the $11 billion he promised. So we got a little increase, but they 
got a $12 billion increase to the United States. And what did that do? 
That diminished manufacturing in the United States.
  Additionally, Clyde Prestowitz, who also served as trade negotiator 
under President Clinton in addition to President Reagan, offered this 
warning about the TPP:

       Two intertwined elements pose a virtually insuperable 
     barrier to mass market auto imports in Japan. First, Japan's 
     capacity for vehicle production is 13 million. Annual 
     domestic sales are 4 million and exports are another 5 
     million. That leaves 4 million vehicles equivalent of excess 
     capacity that constitutes a heavy cost burden on the Japanese 
     automobile industry. In the face of this, neither the 
     Japanese industry nor the Japanese Government will want to 
     make life easier for imports. The second structural element 
     is auto dealerships. By law U.S. dealers are independent of 
     the automakers and are free to sell any brand they wish. 
     Exporters to the United States thus find it easy to achieve 
     national distribution of their vehicles. Not so in Japan 
     where the automakers effectively control the dealers.

  And that is the big automobile manufacturing companies. I don't think 
anybody will dispute that.
  The essence of what he is saying is that we are really not going to 
gain market share in Japan, while they are going to gain market share 
in the United States. So that is why people would like to see tougher, 
more vigorous negotiation of trade agreements.
  Then there is the issue of currency manipulation. The President has 
made clear that he has no intention of enforcing currency manipulation, 
which can easily dwarf the impact of tariffs. A former Federal Reserve 
Chairman, a number of years ago--a great Chairman--said currency 
manipulation can dwarf the impact of tariffs. By manipulating their 
currency, our trading partners can artificially raise the price of our 
exports while lowering the price of their imports. This improper 
practice has resulted in closed plants, shuttered factories, and the 
shifting of U.S. jobs and wealth overseas. And China is a huge player 
in that.
  The middle class has shrunk 10 percentage points in the United States 
since 1970, and real hourly wages are lower today than they were more 
than four decades ago. That is hard to believe. The real hourly wages 
are lower than they were 40 years ago. The percentage of men age 25 to 
54 not working was less than 6 percent in the late 1960s; it has nearly 
tripled to 16.5 percent. The labor force participation rate for women--
the percentage of women in their working years who are actually 
working--has fallen 3 full percentage points since 2009 alone.
  We can't keep doing the same thing and expecting a different result. 
So last month, I sent a letter to the President asking how he planned 
to use fast-track authority and what it would mean for American 
workers. Those questions should not have been difficult to answer. 
These negotiators should have been having that on the front of their 
negotiating minds from the very beginning.
  They have been working on this agreement for years. Not one of these 
questions have been answered--not one. Nor have they been answered by 
anybody promoting fast-track. They won't answer these questions--the 
questions about the trade pact, the text of which remains confidential, 
locked downstairs in a secret room.
  This is a question I asked: Will it increase or reduce the trade 
deficit, and by how much?
  Shouldn't we know that? Shouldn't that be discussed? Shouldn't that 
be the first thing we discuss? Is this going to help the U.S. economy?
  No. 2, will it increase or reduce manufacturing employment and wages, 
including the auto sector, and accounting for jobs lost to imports?

[[Page 9949]]

  No answer. Shouldn't we know that?
  No. 3, will you make the ``living agreement'' section public and 
explain fully the implications of the new global governance authority 
known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Commission?
  Mr. President, shouldn't you tell us before we grease the skids to 
pass a new international commission? Shouldn't we know what it is 
about?
  Congress should just say no on this, colleagues. We don't have to 
advance fast-track. We ought to insist that at least this new 
Commission part be fully public. We want to study it before we agree to 
committing this great Nation to an entity that has very small nations 
with the same vote as we have.
  We asked: Will China be added to this Commission?
  No answer. In fact, they have hinted they could be added, and 
apparently the Commission can vote in new members without Congress 
voting on it. That looks to me to be pretty clear, from my reading of 
it.
  Will you pledge, we asked further, not to issue any Executive actions 
or enter into any future agreements impacting the flow of foreign 
workers into the United States?
  No answer. Not one of these questions has been answered. Yet they 
want us to shut off debate, limit congressional procedural power, and 
advance this legislation with no amendments. I don't see how anyone can 
say Congress is not entitled to have at least these questions answered.
  What about the American people? Shouldn't they know before their 
Members vote on whether it is going to improve their job prospects or 
reduce their job prospects, whether a new factory will be opened in 
Alabama or New Hampshire or closed? So we need to know about this.
  We must know what powers this Commission will have, and how the 
United States will be represented, how the votes will be counted, how 
the Commission will impact immigration, environment or patent law, and 
how Congress can deal with decisions of the Commission it doesn't like.
  The TPP is the agreement sitting in the basement room that lawmakers 
can go and read. It is the first secret fast-track agreement that would 
be put into effect.
  But the TPP is just the first of three colossal agreements. There are 
two more.
  Under what rationale should we in Congress acquiesce to such profound 
changes involving the global economy?
  We will be talking about it in light of the rules of a new trade 
agreement--a new agreement that could impact 70 to 75 percent of the 
world economy, and we haven't given it sufficient thought.
  Fast-track is an affirmative decision by the Congress of the United 
States to suspend several of Congress's most basic powers for the next 
6 years and to delegate those powers to the Executive. A decision of 
this magnitude should only be based upon the most thorough debate, the 
most complete evidence, and the most compelling data provided by 
proponents on the key questions at stake. A burden of proof rests on 
the promoters of fast-track to compel three-fifths of the Senate to 
agree to give up these powers. Fast-track not only authorizes the 
President to enter the United States into Trans-Pacific Partnership but 
into an unlimited group of agreements and partnerships in the future.
  The President will sign these agreements before Congress votes on 
them. He will then deliver implementing legislation to Congress that 
overrides previous law of the United States. This implementing 
legislation cannot be amended, cannot be filibustered, cannot be 
debated more than 20 hours, and cannot be subjected to the two-thirds 
treaty vote in the Senate.
  Well, I have been analyzing and thinking about this Commission--this 
transpacific Union, it is fair to call it. This goes far beyond the 
normal trade agreement. While it appears to give some respect to our 
domestic law, this respect is undermined by the difference between the 
trade agreement--the TPP--and the implementing legislation. While a 
trade agreement alone may not trump U.S. law--although it could--the 
implementing legislation necessary for the trade agreement would. 
Indeed, the implementing legislation is law. And as the last-passed law 
of the United States, it overrules any previous laws with which it 
might conflict. Then it would appear that, by implementing the trade 
agreement, the trade agreement itself could have the impact of law.
  So we pass a law that says: Mr. President, we agree with this treaty. 
Not a treaty--they call this an agreement. We agree with this 
agreement, Congress said, and the President implements it. Does it then 
become superior to any law in the United States? I think a good 
argument can be made that it does. We need to know that absolutely. 
Certainly, the implementing law states that the Congress agrees that 
the United States will be bound by the obligations under the trade 
agreement. The President signs a trade agreement with 12 nations, and 
when we ratify that, we then say we agree. The United States is bound 
by these provisions. As part of the provisions we are bound by is a new 
commission--one nation, one vote.
  But there is a further danger. What happens if the Commission uses 
its living agreement powers--as it will--to alter the obligations under 
the agreement? The Commission is empowered then to change its rules, 
clearly, by the powers given it. Is the United States bound by new 
rules that we never saw but are passed by the 12 nations?
  What if President Obama or some other President has an agenda, and 
they all get together and pass it? Is the United States bound by it? 
Does Congress have no control over it?
  Well, we don't sufficiently know. That is why we ought not to be fast 
tracking an international agreement until we have had it made public 
and it is studied by good lawyers who understand these things.
  Is the United States bound by the new rules they have changed? Can 
they add new members to the Commission? There are provisions about how 
new members should be added in the document itself. Does it say the 
Congress has to vote to do that? Can China be admitted?
  How about this. Can this new 12-nation body adopt environmental 
regulations or adopt liberal immigration laws? We have discussed these 
things in Congress. Congress has rendered opinions and passed 
legislation and rejected legislation. Can this Commission pass things 
that impact and override the powers of Congress?
  President Obama has said that climate change is one of his--actually, 
I think he said it is his highest--priority. His Trade Representative 
has been open and frank about this. The Trade Representative has 
negotiated this treaty. I am going to talk about that in a minute.
  But some say: Jeff, you are wrong. But I don't think I am wrong. I 
think the issues I raised are very real, and I believe the concerns I 
raised may in fact be what this new treaty requires. I believe this is 
a plausible scenario.
  But if you don't agree, bring the thing out, lay it out, bring 
lawyers in here, bring trade people, and explain every provision of it. 
Before I am going to vote to fast-track it, count that down. Congress 
should never fast-track any agreement for any transnational union that 
has the power to bind this Nation.
  Goodness gracious, every word should be studied, and all consequences 
understood. A vote for fast-track is a vote to erase valuable 
procedural and substantive powers of Congress concerning a matter of 
utmost importance involving the very sovereignty of this Nation.
  Without any doubt, the creation of this living Commission, with all 
its powers, will erode the power of the American people to directly 
elect or dismiss from office the people who impact their lives.
  Do you remember that in England they woke up one morning and somebody 
in the European Union in Brussels had outlawed fox hunting? How did 
this happen? They said: Well, it started just like this.
  Well, you say: Jeff, this is an exaggeration. They wouldn't use the 
Pacific union to advance political agendas outside of trade, tariffs, 
and those kinds of things. Well, let's look.

[[Page 9950]]

  This is an article in the American Thinker, ``Fast Tracking an 
International EPA,'' by Howard Richman, Raymond Richman, and Jesse 
Richman. They are professors, I think, all three. But this is on the 
Web site.
  This is a statement by Mr. Froman, President Obama's Trade 
Representative. He laid out environmental protection as President 
Obama's bottom line in trade negotiations--environmental protection. 
This is a quote from the Trade Representative:

       The United States' position on the environment in the 
     Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations is this: Environment 
     stewardship is a core American value, and we will insist on a 
     robust, fully enforceable environment chapter in the TPP or 
     we will not come to agreement.

  If they reach an agreement on the environmental issues that Congress 
won't pass, what happens then? The President signs off on it, votes for 
it, and then we will be disciplined by this Commission for failure to 
abide by the rules of the Commission.
  His Trade Representative--I believe this is Mr. Froman--continues:

       Our proposals in the TPP are centered around the 
     enforcement of environmental laws. . . .

  Let me repeat that:

       Our proposals in the TPP are centered around the 
     enforcement of environmental laws, including those 
     implementing multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in 
     TPP partner countries, and also around trailblazing, first-
     ever conservation proposals that will raise standards across 
     the region. Furthermore, our proposals would enhance 
     international cooperation and create new opportunities for 
     public participation in environmental governance and 
     enforcement.

  Well, that is a powerful statement. So there is no doubt that this 
President is intent on utilizing this agreement to drive his 
environmental agenda, whether the Congress or the American people agree 
with it or not. He is not bringing it up to the floor of the Senate, 
because Democrats and Republicans have no intention of passing his 
environmental agenda. I am not worried. This is the President's top 
negotiator on this trade agreement.
  Mr. Joshua Meltzer at the Brookings Institute said this:

       As a twenty-first-century trade agreement, the Trans-
     Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) presents an important 
     opportunity to address a range of environment issues, from 
     illegal logging to climate change and to craft rules that 
     strike an appropriate balance between supporting open trade 
     and ensuring governments can respond to pressing 
     environmental issues.

  Ensuring that governments respond to pressing environmental issues.
  Who is going to ensure? Who has the power to ensure that the United 
States meets some environmental standard somebody somewhere has set or 
even the President would like to see set? That is a serious matter. I 
don't think we should treat it lightly.
  I do believe that the American people are correct to be dubious about 
this trade agreement. Polling data, as I understand it, clearly shows 
that it is not supported by the American people. Yet forces are at 
work, breaking arms and breaking hands and bludgeoning people into 
acquiescence to vote for this thing. It cleared the House by the 
narrowest of margins. We had 62 votes when it passed through the 
Senate. They needed 60, and they got 62. The President was working, the 
Republican leaders were working, the chamber of commerce was working, 
Big Business was working, money was working and wheeling and dealing, 
and pork projects were promised, I am sure, to get the votes to pass 
this, to put it on a fast-track skid.
  I am against it. I believe I am speaking on behalf of the working 
people of the United States of America. I don't believe their interests 
are being properly considered. I am confident that if this agreement 
goes into effect, the trade deficit we have with Japan and with Vietnam 
will increase. Vietnam has 100 million people. We will not be much 
different with places such as Canada or Australia or Mexico because we 
basically have a free-trade agreement with them.
  So it is not necessary that we create some 12-nation entity, some 
commission. Why don't we just negotiate trade agreements that serve the 
interests of the American people with Japan and Vietnam and ensure 
exactly that they comply with what they say, that their markets are 
open to ours, as well as our markets are open to theirs? And we should 
have some reasonable expectation that if we enter into this agreement, 
it will be good for American workers, not just Japanese workers or 
workers in Vietnam.
  I don't say we shouldn't have a trade agreement. I am saying let's be 
more careful about it. Let's negotiate some trade agreements for a 
change that advance the interests of the United States. We need to 
reduce our trade deficits, not increase them. They are weakening our 
GDP. The deficit subtracts from the current account trade deficit, 
subtracts from our gross domestic product. It is not healthy for 
America to have this kind of deficit.
  One of the reports that was done lays out the argument that power 
comes from this mercantilist approach. The Richmans' and the American 
Thinker--I will quote a study, and it says this:

       To see if mercantilism works--

  This is the exporting drive of our trading partners and competitors--

     [the Richmans] conducted a statistical study of 11,623 
     country-year observations for 186 countries from 1870 through 
     2007 using panel data models. The results: a strong 
     statistically-significant correlation between balance of 
     trade and national power. A favorable balance of trade is 
     associated with an increase in power (national material 
     capabilities), an unfavorable balance with a decrease.

  This is what China believes to the core. This is what most of the 
Asian countries believe and act on. And apparently the Richmans 
conclude--an objective study--that it is accurate. I don't know. But 
those are the kinds of things we need to be careful about.
  They have two scenarios they have laid out based on this scenario. 
The first envisions 20 years of trade deficits at the rate of the trade 
deficit we ran in 2007. The second scenario envisions balanced trade, 
where we don't have a trade deficit. Under trade deficit, their 
definition of ``national power'' declined 28 percent. So the national 
power declined 28 percent. Under a balanced trade, our national power 
remains basically stable, increasing by one-half of 1 percent. I think 
balanced trade is certainly preferable. It is certainly preferable for 
working Americans.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair for your patience and allowing me to 
share these remarks. It could be that I am wrong. Maybe trade deficits 
make no difference. Maybe the loss of manufacturing is offset by the 
fact that we get cheaper goods. That is what some of our people in the 
United States say.
  When somebody sends subsidized goods here and that closes the U.S. 
factory and people can purchase their goods for below cost, we should 
send those countries a thank-you note--no concern about the people who 
got laid off and the jobs lost. I am not sure that model is now 
appropriate. Maybe it was 20 years ago.
  I sort of believe that cheaper products was the ultimate goal and 
voted that way, but I am reevaluating it. I think this country needs to 
go through a serious evaluation of that, No. 1. Secondly, we 
absolutely--colleagues, we absolutely should not fast-track a movement 
to the establishment of an international commission or international 
union and maybe creating two more of them as part of two more trade 
agreements--the three trade agreements that will be part of fast-track 
if it passes. And, of course, any number of other trade agreements for 
the next 6 years could be accelerated through this fast-track process, 
if it passes.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. HEITKAMP. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page 9951]]



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