[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 7]
[House]
[Pages 9664-9687]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016


                             General Leave

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 
5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
insert extraneous material on H.R. 2596, the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2016.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Holding). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 315 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2596.
  The Chair appoints the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Bishop) to preside 
over the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  1406


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Bishop of Utah in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act is the annual blueprint for the 
work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence 
efforts. The bill sets priorities for our critical intelligence efforts 
and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those efforts. As 
you may recall, the House has passed intelligence authorization bills 
with strong bipartisan support in the past several Congresses.
  The ranking member, Mr. Schiff, and I worked in a bipartisan manner 
to draft this legislation in front of you today. Passing annual 
intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for 
Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps 
ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and 
authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed 
unanimously out of our committee.
  As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified 
programs, the bulk of the committee's recommendations each year are 
found in the classified annex of the bill, which has been available for 
Members to review since June 4. Among other initiatives, the bill 
provides authorization for critical national security functions, 
including fighting terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from unauthorized 
disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in the 
resiliency of our national security space architecture.
  At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for fiscal year 
2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget 
request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed 
Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and 
with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military 
Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence 
capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within 
the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the budget 
resolution.
  Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global 
environments in our Nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11 
attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al Qaeda and its affiliates. We 
have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success. But 
despite various strategies employed by two administrations to prevent 
the spread of radical Islam, that threat remains. The Arab Spring civil 
war in Syria and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant in places such as north Africa highlight only a few of the many 
events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy failures 
in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has exploded from a 
largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al Qaeda as the 
vanguard of global jihad.
  Moreover, nation-states like Russia and China continue to expand 
their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia 
has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven 
leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core 
Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East 
China Sea and, if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control 
over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next 
decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant 
proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its 
allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to 
counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the intelligence 
community to collect information on and to assess these activities 
carefully and accurately.
  Perhaps more troubling, state and nonstate actors alike are 
developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber 
attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are 
overwhelmed. Attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at 
will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management 
servers, possibly one of the most significant national security 
incidents in the past decade, highlight the continued threat to our 
Nation's infrastructure.
  Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, the 
committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range 
of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting 
our Nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges while also directing 
the intelligence community to make strategic investments in the future. 
In particular, I believe that the bill goes a long way toward 
encouraging the intelligence community to make much-needed investments, 
such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence 
capabilities.
  Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of 
the committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security 
issues, like reauthorizing important provisions related to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing bipartisan 
legislation on cyber threat sharing information. I applaud Ranking 
Member Schiff for his help on these issues, and I look forward to 
working together in the future.
  Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both 
sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The committee 
staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the 
legislation.
  In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia National Labs 
fellow, Mr. Randy Smith. He has been with the committee for almost 2 
years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He has been a 
tremendous asset to this committee, and I would like to thank him for 
all his hard work.
  I would also like to thank the men and women of the intelligence 
community for all their efforts to continue to protect this Nation.
  I look forward to passing this legislation.

[[Page 9665]]

  Mr. Chair, the intelligence authorization act is the annual blueprint 
for the work of the intelligence community and America's military 
intelligence efforts. The bill sets the priorities for our critical 
intelligence efforts, and the legal framework of guidance and oversight 
for those efforts. As you may recall, the House has passed intelligence 
authorization bills with strong bipartisan support in the past several 
Congresses.
  The Ranking Member, Mr. Schiff, and I worked in a bipartisan manner 
to draft the legislation in front of you today. Passing annual 
intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for 
Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps 
ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and 
authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed 
unanimously out of our Committee.
  As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified 
programs, the bulk of the Committee's recommendations each year are 
found in the classified annex to the bill, which has been available for 
Members to review since June 4th. Among other initiatives, the bill 
provides authorization for critical national security functions, 
including: fighting terrorism and countering the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from 
unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in 
the resiliency of our national security space architecture.
  At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for Fiscal Year 
2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget 
request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed 
Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and 
with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military 
Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence 
capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within 
the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the Budget 
Resolution.
  Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global 
environments in our nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11 
attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. We 
have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success, but 
despite various strategies employed by two administrations to prevent 
the spread of radical Islam, the threat remains. The Arab Spring, civil 
war in Syria, and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant in places such as Northern Africa highlight only a few of the 
many events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy 
failures in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has exploded 
from a largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al-Qa'ida 
as the vanguard of the global jihad.
  Moreover, nation states like Russia and China continue to expand 
their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia 
has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven 
leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core 
Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East 
China Sea, and if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control 
over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next 
decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant 
proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its 
allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to 
counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the Intelligence 
Community to collect information on, and assess, these activities 
carefully and accurately.
  Perhaps more troubling, state and non-state actors alike are 
developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber 
attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are 
overwhelmed; attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at 
will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management 
servers--possibly one of the most significant national security 
incidents in the past decade--highlight the continued threat to our 
nation's infrastructure.
  Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, this 
Committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range 
of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting 
our nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges, while also directing 
the Intelligence Community to make strategic investments in the future. 
In particular, I believe that this bill goes a long way toward 
encouraging the Intelligence Community to make much-needed investments, 
such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence 
capabilities.
  Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of 
the Committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security 
issues, including reauthorizing important provisions related to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing 
bipartisan legislation on cyber threat information sharing. I applaud 
Ranking Member Schiff for his help on these issues and look forward to 
working together in the future.
  Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both 
sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The Committee 
staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the 
legislation. In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia 
National Labs fellow, Randy Smith. He has been with the Committee for 
almost two years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He 
has been a tremendous asset to this Committee and I thank him for all 
his hard work. I would also like to thank the men and women of the 
Intelligence Community for all their efforts protecting this nation. I 
look forward to passing this legislation.
  Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First, I want to say thank you to Chairman Nunes. This Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 is our third major piece of 
legislation together, and it once again demonstrates the fruits of our 
commitment to bipartisanship.
  We also have our difference of opinion from time to time, and on this 
bill, we have some differences. But I know that as long as we continue 
to work together, there is no end to the good that we can accomplish.
  Through our cyber bill and our surveillance reform bill, we have been 
guided by two core principles: first, that national security is truly 
the security of the entire Nation and all Americans; second, that 
national security can and must coexist with privacy and civil 
liberties. I believe the bill today largely furthers these principles 
as well.
  The IAA funds, equips, and sets the priorities for the U.S. 
intelligence community; and it is a crucial vehicle by which Congress 
provides oversight of the IC and ensures that U.S. intelligence 
professionals and intelligence programs have the funds and authorities 
they need to keep us safe, as well as our allies and partners.
  As the annual IAA provides hundreds of pages of detailed guidance, 
strict authorizations, and precise limitations, it is also the single 
most important means by which Congress conducts its oversight of the 
intelligence community.

                              {time}  1415

  As in past years, this year's IAA is a carefully considered bill and 
the result of thoughtful oversight.
  The Fiscal Year 2016 IAA funds the intelligence community at about 1 
percent below the President's budget request and about 7 percent above 
last year's enacted budget level.
  The bill makes cuts to less-effective programs, adds money to 
underfunded programs, and requires intelligence agencies to regularly 
inform Congress of their activities, ensuring funds are spent 
responsibly and lawfully.
  Notably, the bill today holds, or ``fences,'' significant amounts of 
money to make sure Congress' direction is followed to the letter and on 
time.
  I want to highlight just a few particular aspects of the bill. It 
continues the committee's longstanding emphasis on counterintelligence 
and security reforms. It also continues to support our overhead 
architecture by funding our most critical space programs, investing in 
space protection and resiliency, preserving investments in cutting-edge 
technologies, and enhancing oversight of contracting and procurement 
practices.
  It also promotes enhancements to our foreign partner capabilities, 
which are critical to multiplying the reach and impact of our own 
intelligence efforts. It enhances human intelligence, or HUMINT, 
capabilities, which are often the key to understanding and predicting 
global events.
  It provides resources to safeguard vulnerable signals intelligence, 
or SIGINT, collection while enhancing oversight of these and other 
sources of intelligence. It emphasizes collection to monitor and ensure 
compliance with treaties and potential international agreements. It 
greatly enhances oversight of Defense special operation forces 
activities worldwide.

[[Page 9666]]

  The bill also incorporates some excellent provisions championed by 
the Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, as well as the 
Republican members.
  In particular, I want to highlight Mr. Himes' provision to enhance 
the quality of metrics we receive to enable more thorough oversight; 
Ms. Sewell's multiple provisions to enhance diversity within the 
intelligence community; Mr. Carson's provisions to better understand 
FBI resource allocation against domestic and foreign threats and the 
role of the FBI and DNI in countering violent extremism, particularly 
in minors; Ms. Speier's provision to provide greater human rights 
oversight of the IC's relationship with certain foreign partners; Mr. 
Quigley's provision regarding intelligence support to Ukraine; and Mr. 
Swalwell's provision to ensure that Department of Energy National Labs 
can work with State and local government recipients of homeland 
security grants.
  All this said, while I believe the bill largely reflects sound 
choices, I am concerned that it uses the overseas contingency 
operations--or OCO--funding as a way to evade the sequestration levels 
mandated by the ill-conceived Budget Control Act.
  Again, I largely support the funding levels and the programs which 
the IAA authorizes, but I cannot endorse how it has funded them. We 
need to be serious and thoughtful about the budget and undo 
sequestration--not just employ accounting tricks to evade its levels 
only for defense and national security-related items.
  Even some domestic programs and agencies that contribute to our 
homeland security cannot qualify for OCO dollars, while vital programs 
like our children's education and our social services are left to 
languish.
  Instead of arbitrary, across-the-board cuts, let's do what this bill 
does substantively: make cuts to some areas and add money to others in 
a deliberate, well thought out manner. It is time to forthrightly deal 
with sequestration for all of our national priorities, not just for 
defense.
  I am also opposed to provisions in this bill which would tie the 
hands of the administration and prevent the orderly transfer of 
detainees from the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. These 
restrictions have never been included in prior versions of the IAA, and 
there is no reason to introduce them into the IAA process now.
  The bill goes even further than restricting transfer of detainees to 
the United States and includes a new provision which restricts 
transfers to ``combat zones,'' a term that is so broad as to include 
allies and partners such as Jordan.
  As I have long said, keeping the Guantanamo prison serves as a 
recruitment tool for militants, undercuts our relationships with our 
allies, and undermines our international standing.
  With that said, the bill, as a whole, is largely a strong product, 
and I appreciate the close partnership we have enjoyed with the 
chairman in working on it. But, unfortunately, I cannot support the 
bill so long as it includes these Guantanamo restrictions and employs 
the OCO budget gimmick at the expense of our domestic spending 
priorities.
  I look forward to a robust amendment process today, and I am 
committed to working with the chairman, the Senate, the administration, 
the other committees of jurisdiction, and all Members of Congress to 
make critical improvements to the bill as it moves forward, and to 
resolve the issues to keep alive the string of consecutive signed IAAs.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, at this time I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger).
  Mr. PITTENGER. I thank the chairman for his vital leadership on the 
Intelligence Committee.
  I rise in support of this legislation providing the intelligence 
community the authorization needed to protect and defend the United 
States and support critical national security programs protecting 
Americans from nation states and Islamic terrorists.
  In December, NSA Director Admiral Rogers warned that China has the 
capability of shutting down the U.S. electric grid through cyber 
attack. Homeland security Secretary Johnson has warned about the threat 
of attacks launched by sleeper cells in most of our States. ISIS 
continues to expand into new territory, while Americans are more at 
risk because President Obama has no strategy for defeating ISIS, whom 
he initially referred to as the JV team.
  This is not the time to impede our intelligence efforts. America 
faces grave danger from those who wish to destroy our way of life. 
Please join me in full bipartisan support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act. Let us be united in confronting the perilous threats 
of our adversaries.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am pleased to yield 2 
minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), the ranking member 
on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for yielding.
  I want to say that I appreciate the bipartisan, hard work of Chairman 
Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff, but I want to bring to the House's 
attention recent reports that this bill makes drastic cuts in our so-
called covert support to the moderate Syrian opposition.
  A headline in the Saturday Washington Post read: ``Secret CIA effort 
in Syria faces large funding cut.'' If these reports are true, just as 
the moderate Syrian forces may be starting to make progress, especially 
in the south, then I am afraid we may be making a big mistake.
  Unfortunately, most Members of the House don't know for certain if 
this legislation will reduce our support for the moderate opposition. 
Those funding decisions are made behind closed doors. And that is why I 
believe this bill is not the right place for us to be making decisions 
that have a major impact on our Syria strategy.
  I have no doubt that Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff are 
determined to get the intelligence piece of our Syria response right, 
but this is not merely an intelligence issue, and our overall strategy 
in Syria goes far beyond what is included in any covert program. I 
believe we shouldn't be dealing with this problem in a piecemeal way.
  As we have been doing in the Foreign Affairs Committee on a 
bipartisan basis, I urge my colleagues to take a step back, look at the 
big picture, and address our Syria policy in a way that makes sense and 
involves all the relevant players.
  I am troubled if it is true that this bill makes drastic cuts in our 
so-called covert support to the moderate Syria opposition. And I 
commend the hard work of our chairman and ranking member.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would urge my colleague, the ranking member on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, that we shouldn't always believe what is in the newspaper. 
There have been lots of different reports about lots of different 
things.
  I would say that Mr. Schiff and I worked in a bipartisan manner to 
look at all programs across the spectrum of the 17 agencies. And we 
would be glad to spend some time with the gentleman from New York down 
in the committee spaces to raise the concerns that he brought up about 
a newspaper article. As I said, I think there are a lot of things that 
we read in the newspaper.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act is the vehicle by which we ensure 
that U.S. intelligence professionals and programs have the funds and 
the authorities that they need. It is the single most important means 
by which Congress can conduct its oversight. We need to pass this 
legislation, just as the committee has done over the last several 
years.
  It is my hope that as the legislation moves forward, we will be able 
to dispose of the Guantanamo provisions--I will have an amendment to 
address that in a few minutes--and that we can also resolve the issues 
regarding the

[[Page 9667]]

overseas contingency account. I look forward to working with my 
colleague as the bill moves forward to address those issues.
  I want to join the chairman in saluting the members of the 
intelligence community--the men and women who do such an extraordinary 
job for us each and every day. They have our sincerest gratitude and 
full appreciation for their dedication, their patriotism, and their 
unparalleled skills. I also want to thank again our chairman for his 
leadership, his commitment to bipartisanship, and his determination to 
do what is right. I want to thank our colleagues on the committee, who 
have done an extraordinary job in helping to put this bill together.
  I also want to join the chairman in thanking our wonderful staff on 
our side of the aisle. I want to thank Carly Blake, Linda Cohen, 
Allison Getty, Robert Minehart, Amanda Rogers Thorpe, Rheanne Wirkkala, 
as well as Patrick Boland and our shared technical and security staff, 
including Kristin Jepson, Brandon Smith, and Kevin Klein. We have an 
extraordinary team on the committee. It is a great pleasure to serve 
and work with each and every one of them.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to thank the ranking member for his continued cooperation to 
work in a bipartisan fashion. As I think most Americans know, the 
threats continue to add up every day, and it is up to the men and women 
in the intelligence community to help keep us safe. I know the ranking 
member and I are committed to doing just that.
  With that, I look forward to debate on the amendments and passage of 
the final underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chair, today I will vote against H.R. 2596, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2016, because this bill continues 
the expansion of our intelligence community and includes harmful policy 
riders that will only serve to make America less safe, not more.
  While large portions of the intelligence budget are classified, 
publicly available estimates are as high as $80 billion a year. That's 
in addition to the more than $580 billion we're set to spend on defense 
in the next 12 months. If today's bill moves forward, funding will 
again rise by nearly $6 billion. Worse, it would do so by sidestepping 
Congressionally-imposed budget caps, while continuing to enforce these 
arbitrary rules for critical domestic programs, from education to 
medical research.
  Efforts by the majority to undercut our president's ability to 
conduct foreign policy are nothing new, but for the first time this 
bill would put in place additional barriers to finally closing 
Guantanamo Bay, a recruiting tool available to terrorists so long as 
its doors remain open. It would also limit the types of information our 
intelligence community can share with our allies, a level of discretion 
best left to the President himself.
  There are over 4.5 million federal employees and contractors with 
access to secret information, which is larger than the entire 
population of Los Angeles. I am concerned that the amount of 
information being reviewed by the intelligence community and number of 
people involved may actually be making us less safe.
  Today's bill is a missed opportunity to reevaluate methods of 
domestic surveillance, the growing size of the intelligence 
bureaucracy, and ending programs, like Guantanamo Bay, that only harm 
our national security, not help it.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Chair, I rise to express my opposition to H.R. 
2596, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2016. Though I have always 
appreciated the bipartisan spirit in which the Intelligence Committee 
members work to craft the annual authorization bill, and I acknowledge 
the many vital programs the bill support, I disagree with the way H.R. 
2596 uses Overseas Contingency Operations funding and how it prevents 
the closure of the detainment facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. For 
those reasons, I cannot vote for the bill.
  H.R. 2596 authorizes funding to support important research, 
information gathering and information sharing resources for decision 
makers at all levels of the federal government. The funding helps to 
maintain and support the intelligence infrastructure and it helps to 
strengthen our defenses against threats from around the world. This 
bill provides for cutting-edge counterintelligence technical analysis, 
cybersecurity, it protects Americans against the use of advanced 
weapons, and helps to arrest nuclear and other weapon proliferation 
threats. The funding in this bill is also the reason we were able to 
kill Nasir al Wuhayshi, al Qaida's number two leader.
  However, the bill also continues Republican-led efforts to lock in 
sequestration and, as a result, fails to authorize sufficient funds for 
important intelligence community priorities. Instead, the bill uses OCO 
funding in ways that leaders of both parties have made clear are 
inappropriate. Just last year, House Republicans criticized the abuse 
of the OCO loophole in their budget report, stating that it 
``undermines the integrity of the budget process.'' Moreover, in 
following the strategy of the Republican budget, this legislation 
begins the process of locking in sequestration for nondefense programs, 
which will have a devastating impact on investments critical to the 
nation.
  We need to get back to the table to have an honest debate about our 
budget and renegotiate the funding caps for both defense and 
nondefense. Only then will we be able to provide the necessary 
resources for our national security needs and to ensure we keep the 
nation's commitments to education, research, infrastructure, and other 
crucial drivers of economic prosperity.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, as a senior member of the Homeland 
Security Committee and Ranking member of the Judiciary Committee's 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 
Investigations, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2596, the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,'' for several reasons.
  I opposed the rule because Section 2 of the rule permits the House 
leadership to continue to be postponed through the legislative day of 
Thursday, July 30, 2015, further consideration of the motion to 
reconsider the vote by the House rejecting the Senate amendment to H.R. 
1314, the ``Trade Adjustment Act of 2015.''
  I do not believe it is appropriate to commingle in one rule subjects 
as complex, critical, and disparate as international trade policy, on 
the one hand, and authorization of Intelligence community programs and 
activities, on the other.
  They should be considered separately, debated separately, and voted 
on separately.
  Second, I also opposed the rule because the appropriations authorized 
by H.R. 2596 are predicated on a continuation of the draconian funding 
levels set by sequestration rather than more realistic and responsible 
limits to be negotiated and agreed to by the House and Senate.
  I agree with President Obama that prior to consideration of 
appropriations or annual authorization bills, the House and Senate 
should first reach agreement on a fair and balanced budget framework 
that does not harm our economy or require draconian cuts to middle-
class priorities.
  When applied to national security information gathering, 
sequestration is harmful because it adversely affects the ability of 
the intelligence community to: provide strategic warning to decision-
makers across all levels of government; improve collection technologies 
to exploit existing and future opportunities and increase resilience; 
provide cutting-edge technical analysis of counterintelligence, cyber, 
advanced weapons, and proliferation threats; to spur IC integration; 
and increase intelligence capacity by investing in critical information 
technologies.
  Third, I oppose the bill because it uses funds intended for Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) in a manner that is inappropriate.
  By ignoring the pre-negotiated terms regarding war spending, H.R. 
2596 seeks to take monies budgeted for war and defense and apply them 
to domestic defense while neglecting other vital non-defense priorities 
of the American people.
  Specifically, the bill uses OCO funding to circumvent budget caps in 
defense and intelligence spending and ignores the long-term connection 
between national security and economic security and fails to account 
for vital national security functions carried out at non-defense 
agencies.
  Finally Mr. Chair, I oppose H.R. 2596 on the merits because it 
contains a highly objectionable ban on the use of funds to transfer any 
Guantanamo detainee into the United States or construct or modify 
facilities in the United States to house detainees transferred from 
Guantanamo.
  Also highly objectionable is the provision in the bill providing that 
nothing in the statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access 
to information the executive branch deems to be related to covert 
action.
  Mr. Chair, in this digital information age the federal government has 
at its disposal a wealth of resources that enable it to record,

[[Page 9668]]

track, and monitor the daily activities of ordinary law abiding 
citizens.
  The balance between liberty and security must be respected to 
preserve our way of life and the values that countless generations have 
fought to preserve.
  This includes taking precautionary measures to ensure that their 
lives are safe from eminent danger and terrorist threats both 
domestically and abroad.
  I have long supported effective legislation that seeks to do this 
such as the bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act, which imposes necessary limits 
on the bulk collection of telecommunication metadata on U.S. citizens 
by American intelligence agencies, including the National Security 
Agency.
  Because I have long advocated greater diversity and inclusion in 
government contracting and procurement, I am pleased that H.R. 2596 
includes section 334, which requires the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit a report to Congress regarding participation in 
contracting opportunities by women, minorities, veterans, and small 
businesses awarded by elements of the intelligence community for goods, 
equipment, tools, and services.
  There are several other provisions in the bill that I support, 
including provisions: allowing the Department of Energy's national 
laboratories to compete for homeland security grants; ensuring better 
understanding of FBI resource allocation against domestic and foreign 
threats, and the role of the FBI and DNI in countering violent 
extremism, particularly among young people; promoting greater oversight 
of the Intelligence Community's relationships with certain foreign 
partners; and giving intelligence support to the Ukraine.
  But, on balance, Mr. Chair, H.R. 2596 contains more objectionable 
than salutary provisions, and for that reason I cannot support the bill 
or the rule governing the terms of floor debate.
  The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the 5-minute rule.
  In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it 
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of 
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 114-19. That 
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H.R. 2596

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                      Subtitle A--General Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Prior congressional notification of initiations of certain 
              new special access programs.
Sec. 304. Prior congressional notification of transfers of funds for 
              certain intelligence activities.
Sec. 305. Designation of lead intelligence officer for tunnels.
Sec. 306. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil Liberties 
              Oversight Board.
Sec. 307. Reporting process required for tracking certain requests for 
              country clearance.
Sec. 308. Prohibition on sharing of certain information in response to 
              foreign government inquiries.
Sec. 309. National Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
Sec. 310. Intelligence community business system transformation.
Sec. 311. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence Community in 
              Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 
              Efficiency.
Sec. 312. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 313. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector General 
              of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 314. Clarification relating to information access by Comptroller 
              General.
Sec. 315. Use of homeland security grant funds in conjunction with 
              Department of Energy national laboratories.
Sec. 316. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, United 
              States Code.

Subtitle B--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
                               Bay, Cuba

Sec. 321. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of 
              individuals detained at United States Naval Station, 
              Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 322. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or modify facilities 
              in United States to house detainees transferred from 
              United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 323. Prohibition on use of funds to transfer or release 
              individuals detained at United States Naval Station, 
              Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to combat zones.

                          Subtitle C--Reports

Sec. 331. Reports to Congress on individuals formerly detained at 
              United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 332. Reports on foreign fighters.
Sec. 333. Reports on prisoner population at United States Naval 
              Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 334. Report on use of certain business concerns.
Sec. 335. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
        (a) Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (b) Intelligence Community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2016 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, 
     subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as 
     of September 30, 2016, for the conduct of the intelligence 
     activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through 
     (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill 
     H.R. 2596 of the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate 
     portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel 
     in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2016 by 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in

[[Page 9669]]

     section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such 
     element.
       (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment in--
       (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
       (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2016 the sum of $501,850,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2017.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 785 positions as of 
     September 30, 2016. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
     United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2016 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for 
     advanced research and development shall remain available 
     until September 30, 2017.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2016, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2016 the sum of $514,000,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                      Subtitle A--General Matters

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF INITIATIONS OF 
                   CERTAIN NEW SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), none 
     of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or 
     otherwise made available for the intelligence community for 
     fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate any new special 
     access program pertaining to any intelligence or 
     intelligence-related activity or covert action unless the 
     Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of 
     Defense, as appropriate, submits to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services 
     of the House of Representatives and the Senate, by not later 
     than 30 days before initiating such a program, written 
     notification of the intention to initiate the program.
       (b) Waiver.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence or 
     the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive 
     subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a new 
     special access program if the Director or Secretary, as the 
     case may be, determines that an emergency situation makes it 
     impossible or impractical to provide the notice required 
     under such subsection by the date that is 30 days before such 
     initiation.
       (2) Notice.--If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver 
     under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case 
     may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House 
     of Representatives and the Senate, by not later than 48 hours 
     after the initiation of the new special access program 
     covered by the waiver, written notice of the waiver and a 
     justification for the waiver, including a description of the 
     emergency situation that necessitated the waiver.
       (c) Special Access Program Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``special access program'' has the meaning given such 
     term in Executive Order 13526 as in effect on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 304. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF 
                   FUNDS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), none 
     of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or 
     otherwise made available for the intelligence community for 
     fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate a transfer of funds 
     from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the 
     Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund to be used for 
     intelligence activities unless the Director of National 
     Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, 
     submits to the congressional intelligence committees, by not 
     later than 30 days before initiating such a transfer, written 
     notice of the transfer.
       (b) Waiver.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence or 
     the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive 
     subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a transfer 
     of funds if the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, 
     determines that an emergency situation makes it impossible or 
     impractical to provide the notice required under such 
     subsection by the date that is 30 days before such 
     initiation.
       (2) Notice.--If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver 
     under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case 
     may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, by not later than 48 hours after the initiation 
     of the transfer of funds covered by the waiver, written 
     notice of the waiver and a justification for the waiver, 
     including a description of the emergency situation that 
     necessitated the waiver.

     SEC. 305. DESIGNATION OF LEAD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR 
                   TUNNELS.

       The Director of National Intelligence shall designate an 
     official to manage the collection and analysis of 
     intelligence regarding the tactical use of tunnels by state 
     and nonstate actors.

     SEC. 306. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL 
                   LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       Section 1061(g) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(g)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5) Limitations.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to authorize the Board, or any agent thereof, to 
     gain access to information that an executive branch agency 
     deems related to covert action, as such term is defined in 
     section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3093(e)).''.

     SEC. 307. REPORTING PROCESS REQUIRED FOR TRACKING CERTAIN 
                   REQUESTS FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE.

       (a) In General.--By not later than September 30, 2016, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall establish a formal 
     internal reporting process for tracking requests for country 
     clearance submitted to overseas Director of National 
     Intelligence representatives by departments and agencies of 
     the United States. Such reporting process shall include a 
     mechanism for tracking the department or agency that submits 
     each such request and the date on which each such request is 
     submitted.
       (b) Congressional Briefing.--By not later than December 31, 
     2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the 
     congressional intelligence committees on the progress of the 
     Director in establishing the process required under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 308. PROHIBITION ON SHARING OF CERTAIN INFORMATION IN 
                   RESPONSE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES.

       (a) Prohibition.--None of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by this Act for any element of the intelligence 
     community may be used to respond to, share, or authorize the 
     sharing of any non-public information related to intelligence 
     activities carried out by the United States in response to a 
     legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government 
     into the intelligence activities of the United States.
       (b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 30 days 
     after an element of the intelligence community receives a 
     legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government 
     related to intelligence activities carried out by the United 
     States, the element shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees written notification of the inquiry.
       (c) Clarification Regarding Collaboration With Foreign 
     Partners.--The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not be 
     construed as limiting routine intelligence activities with 
     foreign partners, except in any case in which the central 
     focus of the collaboration with the foreign partner is to 
     obtain information for, or solicit a response to, a 
     legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government 
     related to intelligence activities carried out by the United 
     States.

     SEC. 309. NATIONAL CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION 
                   CENTER.

       (a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended--

[[Page 9670]]

       (1) by redesignating section 119B as section 119C; and
       (2) by inserting after section 119A the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 119B. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is within the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence a Cyber Threat Intelligence 
     Integration Center.
       ``(b) Director.--There is a Director of the Cyber Threat 
     Intelligence Integration Center, who shall be the head of the 
     Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, and who shall 
     be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(c) Primary Missions.--The Cyber Threat Intelligence 
     Integration Center shall--
       ``(1) serve as the primary organization within the Federal 
     Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence 
     possessed or acquired by the United States pertaining to 
     cyber threats;
       ``(2) ensure that appropriate departments and agencies of 
     the Federal Government have full access to and receive all-
     source intelligence support needed to execute the cyber 
     threat intelligence activities of such agencies and to 
     perform independent, alternative analyses;
       ``(3) disseminate cyber threat analysis to the President, 
     the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal 
     Government, and the appropriate committees of Congress;
       ``(4) coordinate cyber threat intelligence activities of 
     the departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and
       ``(5) conduct strategic cyber threat intelligence planning 
     for the Federal Government.
       ``(d) Limitations.--The Cyber Threat Intelligence 
     Integration Center--
       ``(1) may not have more than 50 permanent positions;
       ``(2) in carrying out the primary missions of the Center 
     described in subsection (c), may not augment staffing through 
     detailees, assignees, or core contractor personnel or enter 
     into any personal services contracts to exceed the limitation 
     under paragraph (1); and
       ``(3) shall be located in a building owned or operated by 
     an element of the intelligence community as of the date of 
     the enactment of this section.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     amended by section 102 of this title, is further amended by 
     striking the item relating to section 119B and inserting the 
     following new items:

``Sec. 119B. Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
``Sec. 119C. National intelligence centers.''.

     SEC. 310. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM 
                   TRANSFORMATION.

       Section 506D of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3100) is amended to read as follows:


        ``intelligence community business system transformation

       ``Sec. 506D.  (a) Limitation on Obligation of Funds.--(1) 
     Subject to paragraph (3), no funds appropriated to any 
     element of the intelligence community may be obligated for an 
     intelligence community business system transformation that 
     will have a total cost in excess of $3,000,000 unless the 
     Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community makes 
     a certification described in paragraph (2) with respect to 
     such intelligence community business system transformation.
       ``(2) The certification described in this paragraph for an 
     intelligence community business system transformation is a 
     certification made by the Chief Information Officer of the 
     Intelligence Community that the intelligence community 
     business system transformation--
       ``(A) complies with the enterprise architecture under 
     subsection (b) and such other policies and standards that the 
     Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community 
     considers appropriate; or
       ``(B) is necessary--
       ``(i) to achieve a critical national security capability or 
     address a critical requirement; or
       ``(ii) to prevent a significant adverse effect on a project 
     that is needed to achieve an essential capability, taking 
     into consideration any alternative solutions for preventing 
     such adverse effect.
       ``(3) With respect to a fiscal year after fiscal year 2010, 
     the amount referred to in paragraph (1) in the matter 
     preceding subparagraph (A) shall be equal to the sum of--
       ``(A) the amount in effect under such paragraph (1) for the 
     preceding fiscal year (determined after application of this 
     paragraph), plus
       ``(B) such amount multiplied by the annual percentage 
     increase in the Consumer Price Index (all items; U.S. city 
     average) as of September of the previous fiscal year.
       ``(b) Enterprise Architecture for Intelligence Community 
     Business Systems.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall develop and implement an enterprise architecture to 
     cover all intelligence community business systems, and the 
     functions and activities supported by such business systems. 
     The enterprise architecture shall be sufficiently defined to 
     effectively guide, constrain, and permit implementation of 
     interoperable intelligence community business system 
     solutions, consistent with applicable policies and procedures 
     established by the Director of the Office of Management and 
     Budget.
       ``(2) The enterprise architecture under paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       ``(A) An information infrastructure that will enable the 
     intelligence community to--
       ``(i) comply with all Federal accounting, financial 
     management, and reporting requirements;
       ``(ii) routinely produce timely, accurate, and reliable 
     financial information for management purposes;
       ``(iii) integrate budget, accounting, and program 
     information and systems; and
       ``(iv) provide for the measurement of performance, 
     including the ability to produce timely, relevant, and 
     reliable cost information.
       ``(B) Policies, procedures, data standards, and system 
     interface requirements that apply uniformly throughout the 
     intelligence community.
       ``(c) Responsibilities for Intelligence Community Business 
     System Transformation.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall be responsible for the entire life cycle of an 
     intelligence community business system transformation, 
     including review, approval, and oversight of the planning, 
     design, acquisition, deployment, operation, and maintenance 
     of the business system transformation.
       ``(d) Intelligence Community Business System Investment 
     Review.--(1) The Chief Information Officer of the 
     Intelligence Community shall establish and implement, not 
     later than 60 days after October 7, 2010, an investment 
     review process for the intelligence community business 
     systems for which the Chief Information Officer of the 
     Intelligence Community is responsible.
       ``(2) The investment review process under paragraph (1) 
     shall--
       ``(A) meet the requirements of section 11312 of title 40, 
     United States Code; and
       ``(B) specifically set forth the responsibilities of the 
     Chief Information Office of the Intelligence Community under 
     such review process.
       ``(3) The investment review process under paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following elements:
       ``(A) Review and approval by an investment review board 
     (consisting of appropriate representatives of the 
     intelligence community) of each intelligence community 
     business system as an investment before the obligation of 
     funds for such system.
       ``(B) Periodic review, but not less often than annually, of 
     every intelligence community business system investment.
       ``(C) Thresholds for levels of review to ensure appropriate 
     review of intelligence community business system investments 
     depending on the scope, complexity, and cost of the system 
     involved.
       ``(D) Procedures for making certifications in accordance 
     with the requirements of subsection (a)(2).
       ``(e) Relation to Annual Registration Requirements.--
     Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the 
     requirements of section 8083 of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287; 118 Stat. 989), 
     with regard to information technology systems (as defined in 
     subsection (d) of such section).
       ``(f) Relationship to Defense Business Enterprise 
     Architecture.--Intelligence community business system 
     transformations certified under this section shall be deemed 
     to be in compliance with section 2222 of title 10, United 
     States Code. Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
     exempt funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department 
     of Defense for activities other than an intelligence 
     community business system transformation from the 
     requirements of such section 2222, to the extent that such 
     requirements are otherwise applicable.
       ``(g) Relation to Clinger-Cohen Act.--(1) Executive agency 
     responsibilities in chapter 113 of title 40, United States 
     Code, for any intelligence community business system 
     transformation shall be exercised jointly by--
       ``(A) the Director of National Intelligence and the Chief 
     Information Officer of the Intelligence Community; and
       ``(B) the head of the executive agency that contains the 
     element of the intelligence community involved and the chief 
     information officer of that executive agency.
       ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence and the head of 
     the executive agency referred to in paragraph (1)(B) shall 
     enter into a memorandum of understanding to carry out the 
     requirements of this section in a manner that best meets the 
     needs of the intelligence community and the executive agency.
       ``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `enterprise architecture' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 3601(4) of title 44, United States 
     Code.
       ``(2) The terms `information system' and `information 
     technology' have the meanings given those terms in section 
     11101 of title 40, United States Code.
       ``(3) The term `intelligence community business system' 
     means an information system, including a national security 
     system, that is operated by, for, or on behalf of an element 
     of the intelligence community, including a financial system, 
     mixed system, financial data feeder system, and the business 
     infrastructure capabilities shared by the systems of the 
     business enterprise architecture, including people, process, 
     and technology, that build upon the core infrastructure used 
     to support business activities, such as acquisition, 
     financial management, logistics, strategic planning and 
     budgeting, installations and environment, and human resource 
     management.
       ``(4) The term `intelligence community business system 
     transformation' means--
       ``(A) the acquisition or development of a new intelligence 
     community business system; or
       ``(B) any significant modification or enhancement of an 
     existing intelligence community business system (other than 
     necessary to maintain current services).

[[Page 9671]]

       ``(5) The term `national security system' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 3552(b) of title 44, United States 
     Code.''.

     SEC. 311. INCLUSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY IN COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON 
                   INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY.

       Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 
     (Public Law 95-452; 5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking 
     ``the Office of the Director of National Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``the Intelligence Community''.

     SEC. 312. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Information and Assistance.--Paragraph (9) of section 
     17(e) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
     U.S.C. 3517(e)(9)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information 
     or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties 
     and responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by 
     this section from any Federal, State, or local governmental 
     agency or unit thereof.
       ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information 
     or assistance from a department or agency of the Federal 
     Government, the head of the department or agency involved, 
     insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any 
     existing statutory restriction or regulation of such 
     department or agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General, 
     or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
       ``(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide 
     any new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to 
     conduct intelligence activity in the United States.
       ``(D) In this paragraph, the term `State' means each of the 
     several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
     Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
     Islands, and any territory or possession of the United 
     States.''.
       (b) Technical Amendments Relating to Selection of 
     Employees.--Paragraph (7) of such section (50 U.S.C. 
     3517(e)(7)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(A)'' before ``Subject to applicable 
     law''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources 
     allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final 
     approval of--
       ``(i) the selection of internal and external candidates for 
     employment with the Office of Inspector General; and
       ``(ii) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel 
     permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, 
     including selection and appointment to the Senior 
     Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based 
     determinations that are not within the authority of a head of 
     other Central Intelligence Agency offices.''.

     SEC. 313. PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE TO 
                   INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Section 103H(j)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3033) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``any department, 
     agency, or other element of the United States Government'' 
     and inserting ``any Federal, State (as defined in section 
     804), or local governmental agency or unit thereof''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``from a department, 
     agency, or element of the Federal Government'' before ``under 
     subparagraph (A)''.

     SEC. 314. CLARIFICATION RELATING TO INFORMATION ACCESS BY 
                   COMPTROLLER GENERAL.

       Section 348(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259; 124 Stat. 2700; 50 
     U.S.C. 3308) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(4) Requests by certain congressional committees.--
     Consistent with the protection of classified information, the 
     directive issued under paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the 
     Comptroller General from obtaining information necessary to 
     carry out the following audits or reviews:
       ``(A) An audit or review carried out--
       ``(i) at the request of the congressional intelligence 
     committees; or
       ``(ii) pursuant to--

       ``(I) an intelligence authorization Act;
       ``(II) a committee report or joint explanatory statement 
     accompanying an intelligence authorization Act; or
       ``(III) a classified annex to a committee report or joint 
     explanatory statement accompanying an intelligence 
     authorization Act.

       ``(B) An audit or review pertaining to intelligence 
     activities of the Department of Defense carried out--
       ``(i) at the request of the congressional defense 
     committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, 
     United States Code); or
       ``(ii) pursuant to a national defense authorization Act.''.

     SEC. 315. USE OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT FUNDS IN CONJUNCTION 
                   WITH DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL 
                   LABORATORIES.

       Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 609(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1) by inserting ``including by working in conjunction with a 
     National Laboratory (as defined in section 2(3) of the Energy 
     Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801(3)),'' after ``plans,''.

     SEC. 316. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PAY UNDER TITLE 5, 
                   UNITED STATES CODE.

       Section 5102(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (vii), by striking ``or'';
       (2) by inserting after clause (vii) the following new 
     clause:
       ``(viii) the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence;''; and
       (3) in clause (x), by striking the period and inserting a 
     semicolon.

Subtitle B--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
                               Bay, Cuba

     SEC. 321. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRANSFER OR RELEASE 
                   OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL 
                   STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
     available to an element of the intelligence community may be 
     used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer, 
     release, or assist in the transfer or release, to or within 
     the United States, its territories, or possessions, Khalid 
     Sheikh Mohammed or any other individual detained at 
     Guantanamo (as such term is defined in section 322(c)).

     SEC. 322. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO CONSTRUCT OR MODIFY 
                   FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES TO HOUSE DETAINEES 
                   TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, 
                   GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       (a) In General.--No amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence 
     community may be used during the period beginning on the date 
     of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, 
     to construct or modify any facility in the United States, its 
     territories, or possessions to house any individual detained 
     at Guantanamo for the purposes of detention or imprisonment 
     in the custody or under the control of the Department of 
     Defense.
       (b) Exception.--The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not 
     apply to any modification of facilities at United States 
     Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
       (c) Individual Detained at Guantanamo Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``individual detained at Guantanamo'' means 
     any individual located at United States Naval Station, 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of October 1, 2009, who--
       (1) is not a citizen of the United States or a member of 
     the Armed Forces of the United States; and
       (2) is--
       (A) in the custody or under the control of the Department 
     of Defense; or
       (B) otherwise under detention at United States Naval 
     Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

     SEC. 323. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO TRANSFER OR RELEASE 
                   INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL 
                   STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, TO COMBAT ZONES.

       (a) In General.--No amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence 
     community may be used during the period beginning on the date 
     of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, 
     to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release of 
     any individual detained in the custody or under the control 
     of the Department of Defense at United States Naval Station, 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to a combat zone.
       (b) Combat Zone Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``combat zone'' means any area designated as a combat zone 
     for purposes of section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
     1986 for which the income of a member of the Armed Forces was 
     excluded during 2014, 2015, or 2016 by reason of the member's 
     service on active duty in such area.

                          Subtitle C--Reports

     SEC. 331. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON INDIVIDUALS FORMERLY 
                   DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, 
                   GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       (a) Additional Matters for Inclusion in Reports.--
     Subsection (c) of section 319 of the Supplemental 
     Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123 Stat. 1874; 
     10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by adding after paragraph (5) 
     the following new paragraphs:
       ``(6) A summary of all contact by any means of 
     communication, including telecommunications, electronic or 
     technical means, in person, written communications, or any 
     other means of communication, regardless of content, between 
     any individual formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo 
     Bay, Cuba, and any individual known or suspected to be 
     associated with a foreign terrorist group.
       ``(7) A description of whether any of the contact described 
     in the summary required by paragraph (6) included any 
     information or discussion about hostilities against the 
     United States or its allies or partners.
       ``(8) For each individual described in paragraph (4), the 
     period of time between the date on which the individual was 
     released or transferred from Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, 
     Cuba, and the date on which it is confirmed that the 
     individual is suspected or confirmed of reengaging in 
     terrorist activities.
       ``(9) The average period of time described in paragraph (8) 
     for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).''.
       (b) Form.--Subsection (a) of such section is amended by 
     adding at the end the following: ``The reports may be 
     submitted in classified form.''.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the 
     amendments made by this section shall be construed to 
     terminate, alter, modify, override, or otherwise affect any 
     reporting of information required under section 319(c) of the 
     Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123 
     Stat. 1874; 10 U.S.C. 801 note), as in effect immediately 
     before the enactment of this section.

     SEC. 332. REPORTS ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS.

       (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act,

[[Page 9672]]

     and every 60 days thereafter, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on foreign fighter flows to and from 
     Syria and to and from Iraq. The Director shall define the 
     term ``foreign fighter'' in such reports.
       (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
       (1) The total number of foreign fighters who have traveled 
     to Syria or Iraq since January 1, 2011, the total number of 
     foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq as of the date of the 
     submittal of the report, the total number of foreign fighters 
     whose countries of origin have a visa waiver program 
     described in section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality 
     Act (8 U.S.C. 1187), the total number of foreign fighters who 
     have left Syria or Iraq, the total number of female foreign 
     fighters, and the total number of deceased foreign fighters.
       (2) The total number of United States persons who have 
     traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq since 
     January 1, 2011, the total number of such persons who have 
     arrived in Syria or Iraq since such date, and the total 
     number of such persons who have returned to the United States 
     from Syria or Iraq since such date.
       (3) The total number of foreign fighters in Terrorist 
     Identities Datamart Environment and the status of each such 
     foreign fighter in that database, the number of such foreign 
     fighters who are on a watchlist, and the number of such 
     foreign fighters who are not on a watchlist.
       (4) The total number of foreign fighters who have been 
     processed with biometrics, including face images, 
     fingerprints, and iris scans.
       (5) Any programmatic updates to the foreign fighter report 
     since the last report was issued, including updated analysis 
     on foreign country cooperation, as well as actions taken, 
     such as denying or revoking visas.
       (6) A worldwide graphic that describes foreign fighters 
     flows to and from Syria, with points of origin by country.
       (c) Form.--The reports submitted under subsection (a) may 
     be submitted in classified form.
       (d) Termination.--The requirement to submit reports under 
     subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is three 
     years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 333. REPORTS ON PRISONER POPULATION AT UNITED STATES 
                   NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every 30 days 
     thereafter, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
     in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     shall submit to the Members of Congress specified in 
     subsection (b) a report on the prisoner population at the 
     detention facility at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
     Bay, Cuba.
       (b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The 
     Members of Congress specified in this subsection are the 
     following:
       (1) The majority leader and minority leader of the Senate.
       (2) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the Senate.
       (3) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (4) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.
       (5) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       (6) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
       (7) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
       (8) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (9) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (c) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
       (1) The name and country of origin of each prisoner 
     detained at the detention facility at United States Naval 
     Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of such report.
       (2) A current summary of the evidence, intelligence, and 
     information used to justify the detention of each prisoner 
     listed under paragraph (1) at United States Naval Station, 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
       (3) A current accounting of all the measures taken to 
     transfer each prisoner listed under paragraph (1) to the 
     individual's country of citizenship or another country.
       (4) A current description of the number of individuals 
     released or transferred from detention at United States Naval 
     Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected 
     of returning to terrorist activities after such release or 
     transfer.
       (5) An assessment of any efforts by foreign terrorist 
     organizations to recruit individuals released from detention 
     at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
       (6) A summary of all contact by any means of communication, 
     including telecommunications, electronic or technical means, 
     in person, written communications, or any other means of 
     communication, regardless of content, between any individual 
     formerly detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
     Bay, Cuba, and any individual known or suspected to be 
     associated with a foreign terrorist group.
       (7) A description of whether any of the contact described 
     in the summary required by paragraph (6) included any 
     information or discussion about hostilities against the 
     United States or its allies or partners.
       (8) For each individual described in paragraph (4), the 
     period of time between the date on which the individual was 
     released or transferred from United States Naval Station, 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the date on which it is confirmed 
     that the individual is suspected or confirmed of reengaging 
     in terrorist activities.
       (9) The average period of time described in paragraph (8) 
     for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).

     SEC. 334. REPORT ON USE OF CERTAIN BUSINESS CONCERNS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     communities a report on the representation, as of the date of 
     the report, of covered business concerns among the 
     contractors that are awarded contracts by elements of the 
     intelligence community for goods, equipment, tools, and 
     services.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The representation of covered business concerns as 
     described in subsection (a), including such representation 
     by--
       (A) each type of covered business concern; and
       (B) each element of the intelligence community.
       (2) If, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director does not record and monitor the statistics required 
     to carry out this section, a description of the actions taken 
     by the Director to ensure that such statistics are recorded 
     and monitored beginning in fiscal year 2016.
       (3) The actions the Director plans to take during fiscal 
     year 2016 to enhance the awarding of contracts to covered 
     business concerns by elements of the intelligence community.
       (c) Covered Business Concerns Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``covered business concerns'' means the following:
       (1) Minority-owned businesses.
       (2) Women-owned businesses.
       (3) Small disadvantaged businesses.
       (4) Service-disabled veteran-owned businesses.
       (5) Veteran-owned small businesses.

     SEC. 335. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Quadrennial Audit of Positions Requiring Security 
     Clearances.--Section 506H of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (a); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (a) and (b), respectively.
       (b) Reports on Role of Analysts at FBI and FBI Information 
     Sharing.--Section 2001(g) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 
     Stat. 3700; 28 U.S.C. 532 note) is amended by striking 
     paragraphs (3) and (4).
       (c) Report on Outside Employment by Officers and Employees 
     of Intelligence Community.--
       (1) In general.--Section 102A(u) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The 
     Director''; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (2).
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (a) of section 507 of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 3106(a)) is amended--
       (A) by striking paragraph (5); and
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5).
       (3) Technical amendment.--Subsection (c)(1) of such section 
     507 is amended by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (a)''.
       (d) Reports on Nuclear Aspirations of Non-state Entities.--
     Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371) is repealed.
       (e) Reports on Espionage by People's Republic of China.--
     Section 3151 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2000 (42 U.S.C. 7383e) is repealed.
       (f) Reports on Security Vulnerabilities of National 
     Laboratory Computers.--Section 4508 of the Atomic Energy 
     Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2659) is repealed.

  The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 114-
155. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in 
the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered 
read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally 
divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be 
subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division 
of the question.


                 Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Israel

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 12, line 10, strike ``The Director'' and insert ``(a) 
     In General.--The Director''.
       Page 12, after line 13, insert the following:
       (b) Annual Report.--Not later than the date that is 10 
     months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
     biennially thereafter until the date that is four years after

[[Page 9673]]

     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees (as such term is defined in section 101(a)(16) of 
     title 10, United States Code) a report describing--
       (1) trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and 
     nonstate actors; and
       (2) collaboration efforts between the United States and 
     partner countries to address the use of tunnels by 
     adversaries.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Israel) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer an amendment with my very good friend 
from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn) and my very good friend from Florida (Ms. 
Graham). This is a bipartisan amendment with respect to tunnels being 
used as a military tactic, technology, and strategy in asymmetric 
warfare.
  Mr. Chairman, almost exactly a year ago, when war broke out in the 
Middle East and Hamas attacked Israel, I visited Israel and saw for 
myself the sophistication of the tunnels being dug from Gaza to Israel 
through which terrorists traveled. They went to the other side of the 
tunnels, popped up, and tried to kill innocent civilians.
  These tunnels are not the tunnels that many of us characterize in our 
own minds. These tunnels are sophisticated. These are expressways 
underground. It is like the Queens-Midtown Tunnel going from Gaza to 
Israel. They are ventilated. They are lit. They are massive. They are 
deep. They are huge. They are impenetrable, and they are very difficult 
to detect.
  Mr. Chairman, the FY16 Intelligence Authorization bill properly says 
that the Director of National Intelligence will designate an official 
to manage the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding the 
tactical use of tunnels by state and nonstate actors.

                              {time}  1430

  This bipartisan amendment simply asks for accountability. It requires 
a report from this new lead intelligence officer for tunnels describing 
the trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and nonstate actors 
and collaborative efforts between the United States and partner nations 
to address the use of tunnels by our adversaries.
  Mr. Chairman, I talked about tunnels in the Middle East, but in fact, 
these tunnels are dynamic force multipliers for our enemies and enemies 
of our allies around the world. They are used for terrorist attacks, 
but they are also used to smuggle arms and contraband.
  We have learned that these tunnels are being used well beyond Israel. 
Korea is another example. Tunnels have been found in North Korea. Here 
at home, more than 150 tunnels have been found since 2009.
  Mr. Chairman, we have plenty of enemies today looking for ways to 
attack the United States and our interests around the globe. This bill 
recognizes these threats and, very wisely, creates a lead intelligence 
officer for tunnels.
  This amendment simply encourages greater oversight by Congress. It 
allows Congress to make informed decisions on how and where to spend 
future funds in order to counter this threat and protect U.S. national 
security interests.
  Most importantly, Mr. Chairman, these reports will help shape the 
efforts of the newly created position, making it clear that Congress 
expects accountability and transparency, and that is something that the 
American people require.
  I ask my colleagues to support this bipartisan amendment, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do 
not intend to oppose the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. 
Lamborn).
  Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Congressman Steve Israel 
and Congresswoman Gwen Graham for working together with me on this 
bipartisan effort in the defense bills, as well as now in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act. I would also like to thank Chairman 
Nunes and his staff for working together with me on this important 
issue.
  Mr. Chairman, as Representative Israel just described, there is a 
real and growing tunnel threat to American bases and embassies around 
the world, to our southern border, as well as to our ally Israel, both 
in Gaza, as well as Israel's northern border.
  Language I offered in the base intelligence bill, combined with this 
amendment, will ensure that our intelligence community stays focused on 
this threat. There will be a dedicated person watching on this issue.
  Going forward, partnership with Israel is the best way to address 
this growing threat. As we have seen with Iron Dome and other missile 
defense efforts, partnering with a vital ally like Israel enables both 
countries to learn quickly, while sharing costs and new technologies. 
It is a win-win situation for Israel and the U.S. and, hopefully, a 
loss situation for the bad guys.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my very good friend from Colorado 
for his bipartisan support of this bill.
  I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida. (Ms. Graham).
  Ms. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Representative Steve 
Israel's amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act to provide 
oversight for the joint U.S.-Israel antitunneling defense project.
  The joint antitunneling project, which was added to the National 
Defense Authorization Act in an amendment sponsored by my good friend 
Representative Lamborn and myself, will help our closest ally in the 
Middle East, Israel, protect its borders.
  The terrorist group Hamas has spent years developing a complex 
network of tunnels under the Gaza Strip and Israel to smuggle weapons, 
kidnap Israelis, and launch mass murder attacks.
  This project will develop new technology to detect and destroy these 
tunnels, and it will send a clear message to our allies and enemies 
alike. The United States is committed to protecting Israel and to 
rooting out and destroying the terrorists who wish to do her harm.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff), the distinguished ranking member of the 
committee.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank Mr. 
Israel, Mr. Lamborn, and Ms. Graham for this very important amendment 
and issue.
  This will call for a report on our adversaries' use of tunnels and an 
update on our collaboration with international partners in ways to 
detect and defeat tunnels.
  All of us remember the fear that set in, in much of southern Israel 
last summer, as Hamas militants used a complex network of tunnels to 
attack Israeli soldiers from the Gaza Strip. This was not the first use 
of tunnels by Hamas. Cross-border tunnels were used in the capture of 
IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006.
  In addition to using them against military targets, Israel has 
uncovered evidence that the tunnels are being prepared for large-scale 
attacks against Israeli civilians.
  Tunnels are not just a problem for Israel. For decades, the North 
Korean military has also been digging tunnels under the DMZ to 
facilitate infiltration of South Korea.
  According to press reports, four tunnels from the north have been 
found in all, although none since 1990. The South Korean Defense 
Ministry believes there may be 20 in all, and they could pose a mortal 
threat to Koreans and American service personnel in the region.
  I strongly support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to support the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, all that I can say is thank you.

[[Page 9674]]

  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Israel).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Israel

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 16, after line 24, insert the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Reports.--Not later than 10 months after the date of 
     the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter for 
     three years, the Director of the Cyber Threat Intelligence 
     Integration Center shall submit a report to Congress that 
     includes the following:
       ``(1) With respect to the year covered by the report, a 
     detailed description of cyber threat trends, as compiled by 
     the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
       ``(2) With respect to the year covered by the report, a 
     detailed description of the coordination efforts by the Cyber 
     Threat Intelligence Integration Center between departments 
     and agencies of the Federal Government, including the 
     Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the 
     Department of Homeland Security.
       ``(3) Recommendations for better collaboration between such 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government.''.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Israel) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I will attempt to continue my winning 
streak on the floor this morning.
  I rise to offer an amendment with my distinguished friend and partner 
from New York (Mr. Hanna).
  This bipartisan amendment addresses an issue that has concerned many 
of us for some time, and that is the fact that, when it comes to cyber 
defense and cyber war, many Federal agencies are doing something; it is 
just that they may not be aware of what each of them is doing. We need 
closer coordination and collaboration among all the Federal agencies 
and entities dealing with cyber war.
  Mr. Chairman, we recently found out that the United States Office of 
Personnel Management suffered a cyber attack impacting millions of 
Federal workers. This attack, in my view, highlights a disconnect 
between agencies tasked to provide cyber defense, a foreign government 
hacking into a Federal government system, taking the records of 
millions of government employees, spanning the jurisdiction of several 
Federal agencies.
  It is clear that there is an obvious need for greater collaboration 
between these agencies to create a credible defense and, if needed, a 
deterrent to those wishing to attack through the cyber domain.
  That is why I was very pleased in February of this year when the 
President directed the DNI to establish the Cyber Threat Intelligence 
Integration Center, CTIIC. This bill very properly authorizes that 
position.
  CTIIC will serve as the primary organization within the Federal 
Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or 
acquired by the U.S. pertaining to cyber threats and coordinate cyber 
threat intelligence activities.
  This bipartisan amendment, Mr. Chairman, simply ensures congressional 
oversight of CTIIC by requiring an annual report detailing three 
things: number one, cyber attack trends identified by the CTIIC; number 
two, an assessment of the collaborative efforts between the CTIIC and 
various Federal agencies tasked to defend this country against cyber 
attacks; and number three, recommendations for better collaboration 
between these agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, we have entered a new era of warfare. Our networks are 
being attacked daily. We need to do a much better job of coordinating, 
collaborating, and cooperating at the Federal level. This amendment 
ensures oversight and accountability.
  I want to thank my partner on this measure, Mr. Hanna, for his 
bipartisan assistance and support.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I 
do not intend to oppose the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, over the last several years, cyber attacks have 
become a pressing concern for the United States. The recent breach of 
the Office of Personnel Management has put the personal information of 
millions of current and former Federal employees, including many of the 
men and women of our intelligence community, at risk.
  Every day, cyber thieves attack private companies, stealing credit 
card numbers, accessing medical records, leaking proprietary 
information, and publishing confidential emails, affecting tens of 
millions of Americans.
  The intelligence community has worked to improve our cyber defenses 
by improving information sharing between the private sector and the 
Federal Government through the support of H.R. 1560, the Protecting 
Cyber Networks Act.
  While the Senate has yet to act on this bill, the legislation we 
consider today will help improve the Federal Government's ability to 
detect and defeat cyber attacks by creating the new Cyber Threat 
Intelligence Integration Center.
  This thoughtful amendment by Mr. Israel and Mr. Hanna will require 
that the Center produce a report on cyber threat trends and 
coordination on cyber threats between different government agencies.
  I thank the gentlemen from New York for their work on this issue and 
urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member of the committee.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman, and I thank him for his excellent 
amendment and support in the intelligence process.
  With each passing day, we are learning more about the cyber breach at 
the Office of Personnel Management. The volume of personal information 
lost during these events is of tremendous concern. Mr. Israel's 
amendment will help us better inform Congress on the effectiveness of 
the government's collaborative efforts to defend against future cyber 
events.
  I thank my colleagues for their work on it, and I urge support of Mr. 
Israel's amendment.
  Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the distinguished chairman 
for his bipartisan leadership and the distinguished ranking member. I 
appreciate their support for this amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Israel).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Crowley

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 29, after line 17, insert the following:

     SEC. 317. INCLUSION OF HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTIONS IN GRANT 
                   PROGRAM TO ENHANCE RECRUITING OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.

       Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C.) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, Hispanic-serving 
     institutions, and'' after ``universities''; and
       (B) in the subsection heading for such subsection, by 
     striking ``Historically Black'' and inserting ``Certain 
     Minority-serving''; and
       (2) in subsection (g)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new 
     paragraph (5):
       ``(5) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term `Hispanic-
     serving institution' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 502(a)(5) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1101a(a)(5)).''.


[[Page 9675]]


  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Crowley) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, like many of my colleagues, I am focused on growing 
educational opportunities for young Hispanic Americans, particularly in 
the areas that will be so critical to our Nation's success in the years 
ahead.
  Last month, the House approved a bipartisan amendment to the America 
COMPETES Reauthorization Act designed to increase opportunities for 
Latinos in the STEM fields.
  The amendment I am offering today with my colleagues, Mr. Serrano and 
Mr. Curbelo, builds upon that effort and would further expand 
opportunities for Hispanic students.
  Our proposal would allow the Director of National Intelligence to 
offer grants to Hispanic-Serving Institutions of higher education for 
advanced foreign language education programs that are in the immediate 
interest of the intelligence community.
  It would also promote study abroad and cultural immersion programs in 
those areas, which we all know are crucial to truly understanding the 
intricacies of other languages and other cultures. This is a time when 
we need to be encouraging more of our young people to enter careers 
aimed at making our Nation safer.
  Of the nearly 2 million Latino students enrolled in college today, 
the majority attend Hispanic-Serving Institutions. With these targeted 
grants, HSIs would be able to help increase the ranks of Latinos going 
into the intelligence community, where they are underrepresented today.
  This amendment would not only promote diversity in national security 
and intelligence communities, but it would also strengthen our youngest 
and fastest growing minority, Hispanic Americans.
  We must ensure that these young people are prepared with the 
knowledge and skills that will contribute to our Nation's future 
strength, security, and global leadership because, when education is 
available to everyone, our entire Nation is a stronger nation.
  I want to thank my colleagues who have worked with me on this issue, 
Mr. Serrano and Mr. Curbelo, who have cosponsored this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do 
not intend to oppose the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I thank Mr. Crowley, Mr. Serrano, and Mr. 
Curbelo for offering this amendment to include Hispanic-Serving 
Institutions in the grant program to improve recruitment efforts for 
the intelligence community.
  I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Curbelo).

                              {time}  1445

  Mr. CURBELO of Florida. I thank the chairman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of this amendment and 
thank my colleague from New York for allowing me to join in leading on 
this important issue.
  This amendment would allow the Director of National Intelligence to 
provide grants to Hispanic-Serving Institutions of higher education to 
offer advanced foreign language programs that are important to our 
intelligence community. These students, in addition to the traditional 
classroom setting, would also be able to travel and study abroad so 
they can gain a firsthand perspective of the culture in which they are 
immersing themselves.
  Mr. Chairman, the study of Farsi, Middle Eastern, and South Asian 
dialects is of the utmost importance in developing our country's 
continued relationships abroad. I am proud to advocate for Hispanic-
Serving Institutions, like Florida International University and Miami 
Dade College in my district, and will strive to provide them the 
opportunity to train their students so that they can go on to serve our 
country.
  I am proud to be working with the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Crowley) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Serrano) to provide more 
opportunities for these young Hispanic students who want to serve their 
country and to provide our intelligence community this special tool to 
recruit those who could be useful in advancing the cause of building 
the relationships that are so critical to our intelligence services 
operating throughout the world.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida's 
comments on this bill and his support.
  At this time, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank my colleague from New York (Mr. Crowley) for 
yielding and for his work on this amendment. I am very happy to support 
it.
  Diversity and language skills are critical to national security. 
Together, they allow the intelligence community to reach its potential 
and expand its reach, its access, as well as its understanding.
  This amendment would further both goals by providing better language-
learning opportunities to students of Hispanic-Serving Institutions. I 
am very proud to support this amendment and urge my colleagues to do 
the same.
  Again, I thank my friend from New York (Mr. Crowley) as well as my 
other colleagues who worked with him on this amendment. I urge passage.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for his support of 
this amendment as well as the ranking member, Mr. Schiff, for his 
support of this amendment, and all the Members who have worked on this 
amendment.
  I think the amendment speaks for itself. It is providing a great 
opportunity for a growing minority community within our country who 
want to serve our country in this capacity.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Crowley).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Keating

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 35, after line 17, insert the following new subsection 
     (and redesignate the subsequent subsections accordingly):
       (c) Additional Report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report that includes--
       (1) with respect to the travel of foreign fighters to and 
     from Iraq and Syria, a description of the intelligence 
     sharing relationships between the United States and member 
     states of the European Union and member states of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
       (2) an analysis of the challenges impeding such 
     intelligence sharing relationships.
       Page 35, line 19, insert ``and (c)'' after ``(a)''.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I offer this bipartisan amendment with the 
support of Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul and 
Representatives Katko and Loudermilk to help Congress identify ways to 
improve intelligence sharing on the flow of foreign fighters around the 
world--with particular attention to their travel to and from Iraq and 
Syria.
  Already, this legislation that we are considering today makes 
substantial strides in ensuring that intelligence surrounding the flow 
of foreign fighters is shared with Congress. These continuous reports 
will shed light on the

[[Page 9676]]

total number of attempted and successful fighters since the beginning 
of 2011.
  My amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to 
report to Congress on the intelligence community's progress in forging 
information-sharing agreements with foreign partners and help Congress 
identify the challenges impeding coordinated intelligence efforts.
  Over 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to join rebel and 
terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, including ISIS and al Qaeda 
affiliates like al-Nusrah. Their movements are proving increasingly 
difficult to track in our globalized world, particularly given the 
uneven or nonexistent tracking efforts from some of our foreign 
partners.
  As the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and as a member of the Homeland 
Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, I have 
engaged on the issue of intelligence sharing from two perspectives--
from our efforts to improve the intelligence community's coordination 
with State, local, and other Federal agencies and from our work to 
better improve our information-sharing practices with our overseas 
allies to prevent terrorist attacks and the flow of foreign fighters 
here at home.
  While the intelligence community has made improvements to the 
processes of sharing pertinent information with the relevant Federal, 
State, and local agencies, there still exists a blind spot in our 
intelligence-gathering efforts on foreign fighters. That blind spot 
stems from the failure of some foreign governments to take commonsense 
information-sharing steps, and it has made the task of tracking foreign 
fighters even more challenging.
  The inability or unwillingness of some foreign governments to pass 
along even the most basic information about these individuals 
represents a major risk to the safety of the American people.
  An additional threat looms when some of these individuals return to 
their homelands from Iraq and Syria, battle-hardened and radicalized. 
Once back home, some can travel between international borders with 
relative ease, which makes tracking them a truly difficult feat.
  This amendment will also provide insight into our current 
intelligence-sharing relationships and will give Congress the 
opportunity to highlight best practices while also revealing areas for 
improvement.
  I thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for their 
cooperation.
  I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
McCaul).
  Mr. McCAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of the Keating-McCaul amendment 
in the Intelligence Authorization Act. If adopted, our amendment would 
require the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on 
the state of intelligence information sharing with overseas partners to 
help us identify security gaps so that we can improve international 
monitoring of foreign fighter travel both in and out of Syria and Iraq.
  Islamist fanatics from more than 100 countries have traveled overseas 
to fight with groups like ISIS and al Qaeda. Thousands of the jihadists 
carry Western passports and can exploit security gaps in places like 
Europe to return to the West, where they can plot attacks against 
America and our allies.
  Last month, I led a congressional delegation to the Middle East to 
investigate the flow of these foreign fighters. And while progress is 
being made, I am still troubled by intelligence and screening gaps, 
especially with our foreign partners. We need to make sure our allies 
not only share the identities of terrorists and foreign fighters with 
us but also with each other so that these extremists can be stopped 
before they cross our borders into the United States.
  This amendment will provide Congress critical information needed to 
close these security gaps and improve intelligence information sharing 
to defend our homeland.
  I applaud the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) for his hard 
work on the amendment and for his strong participation in our 
delegation overseas, where we learned quite a bit. It is not very often 
you can pass something you think can save American lives, and I think 
this is one of them. I thank the gentleman again.
  Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of Homeland Security 
for his leadership on this issue. We really have established a very 
strong bipartisan effort, putting our national security first and 
realizing what holes there are in our system, in our security for our 
country.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the work of my colleagues 
from Massachusetts and from Texas. This is a superb amendment that will 
help us track foreign fighters, and I am proud to support it.
  Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Keating

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I have another amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 41, line 8, strike ``paragraphs (3) and (4)'' and 
     insert ``paragraph (3) and redesignating paragraph (4) as 
     paragraph (3)''.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, the recent events involving the plan of 
radicalized individuals in Massachusetts to target law enforcement 
officials--police, in particular--underscore the truth that protecting 
America will require the efforts of local, State, and Federal law 
enforcement.
  Since the Boston Marathon bombings, the FBI has made great efforts to 
improve their information-sharing efforts with the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force and other Federal agencies.
  With my work and the work of my colleagues on the congressional 
investigation of the Boston Marathon bombings through the Homeland 
Security Committee, I can attest to the seriousness in which the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation has set out to improve their 
information-sharing practices.
  However, the FBI's efforts to institutionalize sharing across law 
enforcement and intelligence are still a work in progress.
  The current version of this bill eliminates the requirement for the 
FBI to report to Congress on their progress to implement information-
sharing principles. This is a reporting requirement that has kept 
Congress aware of the FBI's information-sharing practices since 2004, 
and it has been vital to understand what works and what can be 
improved.
  This amendment will reinstate that requirement, with the recognition 
that the FBI has more work to do on information sharing to better 
protect the American public.
  These necessary reforms include re-executing FBI current memorandums 
of understanding with local partners, improving training and 
accessibility for the eGuardian platform, and formalizing methods for 
disseminating intelligence to relevant consumers up- and downstream.
  Without information on the progress the FBI is making in these 
reforms, Congress is hindered in taking the critical steps needed to 
protect the American public.
  I would like to again thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff.
  I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank my colleague from Massachusetts, who has been an

[[Page 9677]]

active and important voice on national security since he joined the 
Congress several years ago. In particular, he has worked to ensure that 
we maintain a strong focus on information sharing across agencies.
  One of the key lessons we learned from 9/11 is the need to tear down 
stovepipes and to ensure that inappropriate barriers to information 
sharing across agencies never reappear.
  The gentleman from Massachusetts' amendment seeks to maintain our 
vigilance on this issue and would require the FBI to report to Congress 
on its information-sharing progress.
  As a fellow native Bostonian, I am very pleased to see my colleague 
do such great work. I want to thank him for his commitment to the 
issue. And I am very happy to support the amendment.
  Mr. KEATING. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Strike sections 321, 322, 323, and 331.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would strike the sections of 
the bill which would undermine the administration's ability to close 
the prison at Guantanamo by transferring the remaining detainees to the 
United States for further disposition of their cases or to third 
countries that agree to accept them, secure them, and monitor them.
  I am grateful that my colleague from Washington, Adam Smith, ranking 
member of the Armed Services Committee, has joined me in urging the 
House to make this important change to the bill.
  Every day that it remains open, the prison at Guantanamo Bay damages 
the United States. Because there are other, better options for the 
prosecution and detention of these inmates, we are not safer for 
Guantanamo's existence. In fact, it makes us more vulnerable by drawing 
new recruits to the jihad.
  The Congress, the administration, and the military can work together 
to find a solution that protects our people even as we maintain our 
principles and devotion to the rule of law.
  Under the provisions included in this bill, the administration would 
be barred from transferring Guantanamo detainees to a ``war zone.''
  While I agree that it would be foolhardy to seek to send a detainee 
to Yemen while that country is immersed in civil war, the definition of 
``war zone'' used here is derived from the U.S. Tax Code and is 
extremely broad, ruling out countries like Jordan, for example, that 
have either successfully resettled and monitored former detainees or 
demonstrated a genuine commitment to doing so.
  These provisions also prevent the administration from transferring 
Guantanamo detainees to the United States for further proceedings under 
the military commissions process or for trial in an article III court.

                              {time}  1500

  The Department of Justice and our courts have proven themselves time 
and time again to be more than capable of handling the toughest 
terrorism cases and doing so in a way that ennobles us and sets an 
example to the world that a great nation can both safeguard its people 
and the rule of law.
  As a practical matter, our civilian courts have proven much more 
adept at handling these cases than the military commissions process 
has. In fact, this past Friday, a three-judge panel of the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, one of the most important appellate 
courts in the Nation, further struck down the legality of commission 
charges, so narrowing the jurisdiction of the military commissions 
themselves that any utility as an alternative to article III courts has 
been called into further question.
  And while Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his fellow Guantanamo terrorists 
still await their date with justice, a host of others--including 
Richard Reid, the shoe bomber; and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the 
underwear bomber; and Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber--have 
been tried, convicted, and sent to ADX Florence, the toughest prison in 
America. They are gone, and they are not coming back.
  The inclusion of these provisions is the first time that restrictions 
related to Guantanamo have been included in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act, and I believe that alone sets an unfortunate 
precedent that could undermine what has been a largely bipartisan 
effort. These provisions are unnecessary and unwise, and they do not 
belong in this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge the House to reconsider these provisions, to 
trust in American justice, diplomacy, and the best military advice, and 
to give the administration a means to shutter a prison that both shames 
us and perpetuates the threat to the Nation.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, although I appreciate the ranking member's concerns 
about these provisions, I do remain concerned that further releases 
from Guantanamo will threaten our national security.
  Press reports now indicate that the administration intends to 
transfer up to 10 additional detainees this month. As the committee 
learned through its many briefings and hearings, the five detainees 
released to Qatar last May have participated in activities that 
threaten the United States and its allies and are counter to U.S. 
national security interests, not unlike their activities before they 
were detained. No intelligence community element should enable any 
future transfers that endanger national security.
  Furthermore, I would note that these provisions are substantively 
identical to the provisions passed by the House Armed Services 
Committee as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. Mr. 
Chairman, 26 of the 27 Democrats on that committee voted to advance an 
NDAA that contained similar restrictions. The provisions in our bill 
will complement those restrictions, as well as the restrictions put 
forward in the defense appropriations bills for several years running 
and this committee's previous intelligence authorization bills. The 
ranking member may have forgotten, but in 2012, there were provisions 
similar to this one that were included in the legislation.
  In sum, these provisions represent a strong and enduring consensus in 
Congress that Guantanamo should remain open and that detainees should 
not be transferred to the U.S. for any reason. As everyone here is 
aware, several detainees who have been released from Guantanamo have 
gone back to the fight and killed and wounded Americans. Putting 
detainees in U.S. prisons, as the administration originally proposed, 
would be disruptive and potentially disastrous. The threat is real, and 
Guantanamo is already equipped to handle the detention and military 
trial of these individuals, as appropriate.
  For those reasons, I would urge my colleagues to oppose this 
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to urge support for this amendment. This is one of the few 
areas of disagreement between the chairman and myself. When we look at 
how we are progressing or the lack of more progress in our struggle 
against ISIS and al Qaeda in places like Syria and Iraq, we are often 
tempted to consider those that we take off the battlefield as a metric 
of our success--we have eliminated so many combatants

[[Page 9678]]

from the battlefield. But of course that number in isolation means very 
little. And the challenge is that with every one we take off the 
battlefield, there are new foreign fighters coming onto the 
battlefield.
  The recruitment of those additional fighters uses a variety of images 
and issues to attract people to join the jihad. One of the issues that 
is continually used as recruiting propaganda is the presence of the 
detention center at Guantanamo Bay. This is a recruitment vehicle for 
the jihadis. It is a rallying cry for the jihadis.
  The closure of this prison will not end the threat from ISIS or al 
Qaeda. There will be other efforts to recruit. But why give them this 
recruitment tool when there are other, better ways that these people 
can be incarcerated? Why give them this recruitment vehicle when there 
are ways that we can secure the people at Guantanamo Bay, prosecute the 
people at Guantanamo Bay, uphold our highest standards and the rule of 
law, and remove at least one part the jihadi social media and other 
propaganda campaign?
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is in our national security interest to do 
so. I would urge support for the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chair, I know that the gentleman believes every word that he is 
saying. We have had robust debate in the Intelligence Committee behind 
closed doors, and we have had robust debate out in open session, and it 
is a debate I think that will always continue.
  However, the concern remains from the majority Members of Congress 
that they would prefer to keep Guantanamo open because no one wants to 
bring those terrorists to the United States, to their backyard, to try 
them in their State or their county or their community.
  So I respect the gentleman's concerns, and we will continue to debate 
those, but I will continue to oppose closing Guantanamo or having our 
intelligence community participate in the removal of detainees from 
Guantanamo.
  Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be 
postponed.


            Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Rooney of Florida

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 3__. REPORT ON HIRING OF GRADUATES OF CYBER CORPS 
                   SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the 
     National Science Foundation, shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     employment by the intelligence community of graduates of the 
     Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. The report shall include the 
     following:
       (1) The number of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship 
     Program hired by each element of the intelligence community.
       (2) A description of how each element of the intelligence 
     community recruits graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholar 
     Program.
       (3) A description of any processes available to the 
     intelligence community to expedite the hiring or processing 
     of security clearances for graduates of the Cyber Corps 
     Scholar Program.
       (4) Recommendations by the Director to improve the hiring 
     by the intelligence community of graduates of the Cyber Corps 
     Scholarship Program, including any recommendations for 
     legislative action to carry out such improvements.
       (b) Cyber Corps Scholarship Program Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``Cyber Corps Scholarship Program'' means 
     the Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service Program under 
     section 302 of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (15 
     U.S.C. 7442).

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Rooney) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, as we debate this bill today, hackers across the world 
are trying furiously to break into our cyber networks, as we all know. 
And as we have seen in recent weeks, they are occasionally successful, 
and the consequences are grave. These cracks in our cyber defense put 
our security at risk. They also threaten American businesses and the 
privacy and credit of individuals across this country.
  For the sake of our national security and our economy, we must work 
together to improve our cyber capabilities. This requires a stronger, 
more capable cyber workforce, which our bipartisan amendment will help 
facilitate.
  The Federal CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program gives 
scholarships to students who study in the cybersecurity field. In 
exchange, those students commit to serving in government cybersecurity 
positions after graduation. Leaders within the intelligence community 
and DOD have told us that they need to expand their workforce and want 
to hire graduates from this program. Unfortunately, outdated personnel 
rules and insufficient direct hire authority make it extremely 
difficult for them to do so. As a result, these students aren't able to 
fulfill their work commitment and we are unable to meet our workforce 
needs, and our cybersecurity suffers.
  We believe Congress should help remove those obstacles and make it 
easier to bring those graduates into the cyber workforce. Our amendment 
starts that process by requiring a report back to us on how many 
CyberCorps graduates go to work for the intelligence community and how 
these agencies recruit them. This information will help us determine 
how to streamline the hiring process so we are capitalizing on the best 
cybersecurity talent available.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a simple, bipartisan amendment, but it will pay 
dividends to improve and expand our cyber workforce and strengthen our 
national security.
  I would like to thank Congresswoman Sewell from Alabama for her 
assistance in this amendment.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition, 
even though I am not opposed.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to thank the gentleman from Florida and the gentlewoman from 
Alabama, both HPSCI colleagues, for their amendment, and I am happy to 
support it.
  This amendment furthers two important goals: first, to ensure that 
academic programs that should serve as a resource to the government--in 
this case, the National Science Foundation's CyberCorps Scholarship for 
Service--actually do result in a good number of students choosing 
employment within the intelligence community; and second, to deepen the 
bench of our cyber defenders.
  As a recent series of serious cyber breaches has demonstrated, it is 
an imperative for the protection of this Nation's workforce, privacy, 
and sensitive intelligence that we strengthen the IC's cyber cadre with 
our best and brightest. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a fine addition 
to the gentleman's and the gentlewoman's other initiatives already 
represented in the bill, particularly those that advance diversity in 
the intelligence community.
  Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleagues for their work. I 
urge support for this bipartisan amendment.

[[Page 9679]]

  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of this 
bipartisan, common sense amendment that seeks to streamline and 
strengthen our Intelligence Community's (IC) cyber workforce. I am 
pleased to join my fellow colleague, Rep. Rooney, who shares my deeply 
held desire to help meet the incredible need to raise the number of 
professionals in the critically important field of cybersecurity.
  The recent breach of OPM which compromised the personal information 
of nearly 4 million federal employees further illustrates our urgent 
and immediate need to make substantial improvements to our cyber 
databases and overall cyber infrastructure. Cyberattacks have become 
increasingly common, and state sponsored bad actors pose a serious 
threat to our national security. These types of attacks are one of the 
most urgent modern challenges to our nation. Our government must be 
poised to do more to prevent future attacks. We must position ourselves 
to curtail any threat, no matter how great or small.
  In December 2011, the National Science and Technology Council, in 
cooperation with the National Science Foundation (NSF), advanced a 
broad, coordinated federal strategic plan to enhance cybersecurity 
research and education. As part of this plan, the NSF launched the 
CyberCorps Scholarship for Service (SFS) program. In an effort to 
bolster our federal workforce's capacity and advance the nation's 
economic prosperity and national security, this program provides 
funding for undergraduate and graduate level scholarships to students 
interested in cybersecurity. In return, scholarship recipients are 
required to work for a Federal, State, Local, or Tribal Government 
organization in a position related to cybersecurity for a period equal 
to the length of the scholarship. In essence, students receive a 
scholarship in exchange for their commitment to federal civil service. 
This program seeks to cultivate pipelines for applicants from 
undergraduate and graduate programs into federal careers focusing on 
combatting emerging cyber security threats.
  Leaders within the Intelligence Community tell me, however, that 
outdated policies and onerous clearance procedures are inhibiting their 
ability to fill industry vacancies with young and diverse cybersecurity 
professionals.
  Our amendment simply requires the Intelligence Community to report to 
Congress on how many CyberCorps graduates actually go to work for the 
IC and how IC agencies recruit these CyberCorps graduates. This 
information will help Congress determine how we can best improve the 
hiring process.
  I strongly believe that Congress should be facilitating ways to help 
the Intelligence Community hire these critically important CyberCorps 
graduates and create a pipeline directly into our cyber workforce.
  I encourage my colleagues to vote yes on this amendment.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Rooney).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Moulton

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 3__. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF DATA BREACH OF OFFICE OF 
                   PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the data 
     breach of the Office of Personnel Management disclosed in 
     June 2015.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The effects, if any, of the data breach on the 
     operations of the intelligence community abroad, including 
     the types of operations, if any, that have been negatively 
     affected or entirely suspended or terminated as a result of 
     the data breach.
       (2) An assessment of the effects of the data breach to each 
     element of the intelligence community.
       (3) An assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or 
     countries may use the data collected by the data breach 
     (particularly regarding information included in background 
     investigations for security clearances), including with 
     respect to--
       (A) recruiting intelligence assets;
       (B) influencing decision-making processes within the 
     Federal Government, including regarding foreign policy 
     decisions; and
       (C) compromising employees of the Federal Government and 
     friends and families of such employees for the purpose of 
     gaining access to sensitive national security and economic 
     information.
       (4) An assessment of which departments or agencies of the 
     Federal Government use the best practices to protect 
     sensitive data, including a summary of any such best 
     practices that were not used by the Office of Personnel 
     Management.
       (5) An assessment of the best practices used by the 
     departments or agencies identified under paragraph (4) to 
     identify and fix potential vulnerabilities in the systems of 
     the department or agency.
       (c) Briefing.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     provide to the congressional intelligence committees an 
     interim briefing on the report under subsection (a), 
     including a discussion of proposals and options for 
     responding to cyber attacks.
       (d) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Moulton) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, recently, the Office of Personnel Management disclosed 
a massive security breach that may have exposed personal information of 
millions of current and former Federal employees, including those who 
work in sensitive national security positions. Simply put, this cyber 
breach is unacceptable and breaks faith with those dedicated military 
and civilian personnel who commit their lives to keeping our country 
safe.
  Although responsibility has not yet been officially confirmed, many 
observers believe that individuals in China, who may have been acting 
on orders of the Chinese Government, were responsible for hacking into 
OPM databases.
  Two things are clear, Mr. Chairman. First, we must ensure this does 
not happen again; we must protect our Federal employees--our foreign 
service officers, State Department staff, members of the intelligence 
community, and many others. Second, we must make clear to the rest of 
the world that these attacks will not be tolerated and that there will 
be consequences.
  Mr. Chairman, that is why my amendment takes the first of many 
critical steps to respond to this breach. My amendment starts the 
process of holding OPM accountable. It makes sure we leverage the best 
data security practices that our intelligence agencies use to protect 
sensitive personal information about our military and civilian 
personnel who work day in and day out to keep our country safe.
  Finally, my amendment ensures that the United States Congress can 
play a constructive role in developing a meaningful, forceful response 
to cyber attacks--especially attacks aimed at our Nation's security. We 
must stop these attacks and protect those who commit their lives to our 
safety. This amendment is an important first step in doing just that.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I am prepared to accept the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Committee, I think, in a 
bipartisan manner, has the same concerns as the gentleman.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  We expect timely briefs on all major cyber attacks, but in this case, 
I agree, we need to require specific reporting and briefing on the 
impacts of the recent OPM breach. We need to learn far more about how 
hackers accessed the systems, what they obtained, and how we can 
prevent this from happening again. In addition, this will help us 
understand the impact to the intelligence community.
  Mr. Chairman, as I have said before, our public and private networks 
are

[[Page 9680]]

not sufficiently secure, and they are a regular target for cyber 
attacks. We must do everything we can to shore them up, and we must do 
so now.
  I want to thank my colleague for his work, and I urge support of his 
amendment.
  Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Moulton).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Turner

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 3__. ASSESSMENT ON FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
                   NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees an intelligence community assessment on the 
     funding of political parties and nongovernmental 
     organizations in former Soviet states and countries in Europe 
     by the Russian Federation and the security and intelligence 
     services of the Russian Federation since January 1, 2006. 
     Such assessment shall include the following:
       (1) The country involved, the entity funded, the security 
     service involved, and the intended effect of the funding.
       (2) An evaluation of such intended effects, including with 
     respect to--
       (A) undermining the political cohesion of the country 
     involved;
       (B) undermining the missile defense of the United States 
     and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
       (C) undermining energy projects that could provide an 
     alternative to Russian energy.
       (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence communities.
       (2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Turner) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

                              {time}  1515

  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, my bipartisan amendment requires the 
Director of National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on the 
funding of political parties and NGOs in former Soviet states by the 
Russian Federation and its associated security and intelligence 
services.
  As Congress well knows, a resurgent Russia, led by President Vladimir 
Putin, is once again determined to destabilize the West and various 
Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO.
  While we have seen the blatant use of military force both in Georgia 
and Ukraine, Russia has employed a variety of nontraditional methods to 
disrupt the West. These methods include the use of propaganda through 
state-owned media outlets such as Russia Today, manipulation of 
European natural gas markets, and the use of money to influence 
political parties and nongovernmental organizations throughout Europe.
  In a recent New York Times article, authors Peter Baker and Steven 
Erlanger highlight a series of instances in which the Russian 
Federation covertly funneled money to political organizations in Europe 
in order to influence various decisionmakers and parties.
  While their ultimate goal remains the fragmentation of institutions 
such as the EU and NATO, Russia hopes to achieve incremental victories 
like influencing the EU's upcoming decision on whether or not to renew 
sanctions against them.
  As president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and chair of the 
Assembly's U.S. delegation, I have had the opportunity to meet 
frequently with my European counterparts to discuss this issue. In all 
instances, Assembly members continue to validate and echo the concerns 
discussed here today. Only through an increased understanding can we 
begin to effectively plan and combat President Putin and a resurging 
Russia.
  I ask all of my colleagues to rise in support of this bipartisan 
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition, even though I am not 
opposed.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlemen from Ohio, 
Alabama, and New York for their amendment, which I am proud to support.
  This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to 
provide an assessment on funding of political parties and NGOs in the 
former Soviet states and countries in Europe by the Russian Federation 
and its security and intelligence services.
  Over the past few years, we have witnessed a number of highly 
visible, aggressive actions by Russia, particularly in Ukraine; but 
Moscow's efforts to destabilize its neighbors are also subtler and more 
nefarious. Russia is sponsoring and funding political parties to groom 
the next generation of puppets which they can control from Moscow.
  We must better understand what they are doing, even if what they are 
doing is very deep behind the scenes; so long as sources and methods 
are properly protected, I support this effort.
  Again, I want to thank my colleagues for their work, and I urge 
support of the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, as the chairman well remembers, with the 
cold war, there was a time when the conflict between the United States 
and Russia was very tense. This amendment will help us bring to bear 
light on the actions of Russia so that we can make certain our policies 
reflect the new aggressiveness of the Russian Federation.
  Mr. NUNES. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TURNER. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. NUNES. I really appreciate the gentleman. He is one of the most 
involved Members of Congress with NATO, so I know that his concerns are 
valid. I, too, share those concerns and would urge my colleagues to 
support the amendment.
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Turner).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Farr

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 3__. REPORT ON CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCES.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
     congressional defense committees (as defined in section 
     101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a report on the 
     continuous evaluation of security clearances of employees, 
     officers, and contractors of the intelligence community. The 
     report shall include the following:
       (1) The status of the continuous evaluation program of the 
     intelligence community, including a timeline for the 
     implementation of such program.
       (2) A comparison of such program to the automated 
     continuous evaluation system of the Department of Defense.
       (3) Identification of any possible efficiencies that could 
     be achieved by the intelligence community leveraging the 
     automated continuous evaluation system of the Department of 
     Defense.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Farr) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

[[Page 9681]]

  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise to offer an amendment which 
strengthens the process for granting security clearances to those 
working in the intelligence community through a continuous evaluation 
process.
  This amendment directs the National Intelligence Director to provide 
the intelligence and defense committees a report on the status of its 
current efforts for continuous evaluation of security clearance 
holders, including a timeline for its rollout. The report will also 
provide a cost-benefit analysis of DNI's efforts to similar efforts 
that are being carried on in the Department of Defense.
  We learned, after the tragic shooting in the Navy Yard in September 
2013, the DOD should continuously evaluate these personnel, rather than 
do it once every 5 years.
  Clearance starts by an initial vetting that determines a person's 
suitability and eligibility to have access to classified material by 
examining the person's past and making a judgment on future 
reliability. Now, once cleared, a continuous evaluation process is 
designed to examine a person's behavior to ensure its continued 
reliability.
  Congress directed the DOD to create a process that would be a 
governmentwide solution for continuous personnel security evaluations. 
This solution is called ACES, Automated Continuous Evaluation System.
  Now, the Director of National Intelligence is also seeking its own 
capability for continuous evaluation. While I support the intelligence 
community's requirement, their efforts may be redundant.
  DOD's system already has measurable successes. Their system is also 
flexible enough to be tailored to meet any specific requirements that 
the intelligence community may need.
  My amendment simply assures that the DNI does not work towards a 
continuous evaluation system in a vacuum. By working together to share 
lessons learned or build a common evaluation system, the DNI and the 
DOD can build a better program that ensures our national security and 
uses taxpayer dollars effectively.
  As we have all seen recently, the insider threat to our national 
security is real. We must continue to ensure that we remain secure by 
only granting security clearances to those who are suitable and 
reliable.
  I ask for an ``aye'' vote on the amendment, and I reserve the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I 
am not opposed.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff), my colleague, the ranking member of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman and my good 
friend from California for his amendment, which I am very happy to 
support.
  An important role of Congress and of this bill is to ensure that our 
intelligence agencies protect sensitive information and protect 
taxpayer dollars.
  This amendment supports both of these goals by requiring that the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence report to Congress on 
its continuous evaluation process for security clearances and to 
compare those processes to those the Department of Defense uses. This 
comparative study will help identify places where we may be able to 
make improvements and save money.
  I want to thank Mr. Farr for his amendment and his diligence.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Farr).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 amendment no. 11 offered by ms. sinema

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, and I 
offer that amendment at this time.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 336. REPORT ON STRATEGY, EFFORTS, AND RESOURCES TO 
                   DETECT, DETER, AND DEGRADE ISLAMIC STATE 
                   REVENUE MECHANISMS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the intelligence community should dedicate necessary 
     resources to defeating the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic 
     State.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on the 
     strategy, efforts, and resources of the intelligence 
     community that are necessary to detect, deter, and degrade 
     the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentlewoman from 
Arizona (Ms. Sinema) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Arizona.
  Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to say thank you to Mr. Fitzpatrick for cosponsoring this 
amendment and for his leadership as the chairman of the Task Force to 
Investigate Terrorism Financing. Thank you also to Chairman Nunes and 
Ranking Member Schiff for supporting this important amendment.
  The purpose of the bipartisan Sinema-Fitzpatrick amendment is to 
choke off the Islamic State's revenue stream. Our amendment directs the 
intelligence community to detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State's 
revenue sources and to report on the strategy and resources needed for 
success.
  The Islamic State is one of the world's most violent and dangerous 
terrorist groups. Its goals to build a caliphate in the Middle East and 
encourage attacks in Europe and the United States represent a new 
threat to our country and to global stability.
  ISIL is also believed to be the richest terrorist organization in 
history, controlling a huge territory in Iraq and Syria containing 
significant oil resources. In 2014, the Islamic State generated 
approximately $1 million per day through the sale of smuggled oil, 
extortion, and kidnapping for ransom.
  U.S. strikes have reportedly diminished ISIL's oil revenues, but the 
breadth of this terrorist organization's funding sources represents a 
serious challenge to our national security.
  A February report by the Financial Action Task Force estimated that 
ISIL now largely finances itself through extortion in the territory it 
controls, and another study places this extortion revenue at $360 
million per year. In Iraq, ISIL levies a 5 percent tax on all 
withdrawals from banks, and the organization also gains tens of 
millions of dollars from kidnapping on an annual basis.
  To defeat ISIL and protect our country, we must cut off the Islamic 
State's diverse and substantial sources of revenue.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this commonsense bipartisan 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I 
do not intend to oppose the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzpatrick).
  Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman, and I thank my 
colleague Ms. Sinema for her work on this important amendment and for 
her work as well on the task force established to investigate terrorism 
financing.
  Today, the terror threat faced by our Nation and our intelligence 
community is more diverse and sophisticated than it has ever been 
before. Organizations

[[Page 9682]]

like Hezbollah, ISIS, and Boko Haram can no longer simply be considered 
terrorist groups.
  They have grown into much more dangerous entities, ones with the 
abilities to self-finance their actions through means far beyond 
traditional methods, from illicit oil sales and human trafficking to 
regional taxation and antiquity dealing.
  In order to effectively combat such evolved threats, U.S. policy must 
also evolve. As chair of the bipartisan Task Force to Investigate 
Terrorism Financing, established by the Committee on Financial 
Services, I have worked with lawmakers and policy experts to guarantee 
the U.S. response to terror's new revenue streams are quickly and 
effectively choked out.
  This amendment is important to ensure each level of our government, 
from Congress to the intelligence community, has identified the 
problem, as well as potential weaknesses, and is ready to address the 
threats that we face.
  By both expressing the sense of Congress that our intelligence 
agencies must dedicate resources to eradicate terror revenue 
mechanisms, as well as report to relevant committees on their 
strategies, this amendment strengthens the underlying bill and 
Congress' understanding of our global response to terrorism.
  The threat to freedom and democracy posed by the Islamic State and 
groups like it circles the globe, and the United States can ill afford 
to combat these enemies on the battlefield alone. Any strategy against 
terror groups worldwide must attack not only militarily, but at their 
funding source. Organizations, no matter how complex, cannot 
effectively function without requisite resources.
  Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community is second to none, and I am 
certain that, together, we can formulate and carry out long-term 
solutions to combat terror financing.
  I thank the chairman for his leadership on this issue and Ms. Sinema 
for offering this amendment.
  Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California, Ranking Member Schiff, and thank him for his leadership on 
national security issues.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlewoman from 
Arizona for her amendment, as well as the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 
I am proud to support it.
  Behind ISIL's rapid and dangerous rise are its many sources of 
illicit funding. This amendment expresses the conviction of Congress 
that the intelligence community should dedicate resources to finding 
and eliminating those revenue sources and that the IC must report on 
its effort to do so.
  Again, I want to thank both of my colleagues for their leadership on 
this issue, and I urge strong support of their amendment.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger).
  Mr. PITTENGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment and 
congratulate Ms. Sinema and Mr. Fitzpatrick, the chairman of the 
committee. This will help our terrorism task force efforts undermine 
the funding of ISIS.
  Terrorism experts concur that ISIS is the most well-funded terrorist 
threat that we have ever faced. Through the illicit sale of stolen oil 
and antiquities, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, bank robberies, and 
usurious taxation, ISIS continues to amass tens of millions of dollars.
  Stopping this flow of money to terrorists must be a top priority if 
we are to defeat ISIS. Unfortunately, earlier this month, the President 
admitted he does not have a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS.
  This amendment will require the Director of National Intelligence to 
submit to Congress the current efforts they use to undermine the 
funding of ISIS, increasing our ability to ensure these efforts are a 
priority.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I will look forward 
to the continued bipartisan support of the Financial Services Task 
Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing.

                              {time}  1530

  Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chair, as a member of the Task Force to Investigate 
Terrorism Financing, I am working with my colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle to keep money out of the hands of terrorists and to find 
solutions like this amendment, which strengthens America's security.
  Again, I would like to thank Mr. Fitzpatrick for his partnership and 
leadership on this issue. I also thank Chairman Nunes, Ranking Member 
Schiff, and Mr. Pittenger for their work on this important legislation.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I am prepared to support the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Arizona (Ms. Sinema).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Crowley

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 336. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN 
                   UNITED STATES, INDIA, AND ISRAEL.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report on 
     possibilities for growing national security cooperation 
     between the United States, India, and Israel.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Crowley) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise today to urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan 
amendment.
  I appreciate the support of my colleagues from California, Ohio, 
North Carolina, Arizona, and New York, who are coleaders on this 
effort. They are Mr. Bera, Mr. Engel, Mr. Nadler, Mr. Chabot, Mr. 
Schweikert, and Mr. Holding. I also thank the chairman and ranking 
member of the Intelligence Committee for their support of this 
amendment.
  This amendment is about expanding the cooperation between the world's 
oldest democracy, the world's largest democracy, and a true democracy 
within the Middle East. That is the United States, India, and Israel. 
In recent years, the United States has expanded relations with Israel, 
as well as with India, in a number of areas.
  We have also seen India and Israel work more and more together on a 
bilateral basis. Of course, that is because a lot of their interests 
overlap, but it is also because many of our values overlap.
  There is so much that our three countries can be doing together in 
the realm of scientific cooperation, research, best practices, national 
security implementation, defense, and much, much more.
  There is also a lot that we can learn from each other, whether it is 
about drip irrigation to build food supplies, desalinization to address 
water shortages, or refrigeration practices to prevent the kind of food 
spoilage that leads to hunger, not to mention how much potential there 
is in technological research and economic development.
  This amendment, of course, just deals with a narrow portion of these 
areas because the underlying bill is limited to security issues, but it 
is a needed start.
  I truly believe that the United States-India relationship has the 
potential to be the world's most important ``big country'' relationship 
in the 21st century. As our ties with India grow, it is important to 
see the India-Israel ties increasing as well.
  Here in the United States, as a former co-chair of the Congressional 
Caucus on India and Indian Americans, I have met with many members of 
the Indian American community, and I have consistently heard from 
visiting

[[Page 9683]]

members of India's Government that there is a genuine desire to expand 
relations between India and Israel now and in the future.
  In fact, it has already been reported that, in the coming months, 
India's Prime Minister will become the first-ever Indian Prime Minister 
to travel to Israel. We are going to see the leader of what will be the 
world's most populous nation visiting and engaging with one of the 
smallest nations.
  The sky is really the limit on this effort going forward, and that is 
why the amendment asks the Director of National Intelligence to submit 
to Congress a plan on how to grow the U.S.-India-Israel national 
security relationship. This is a real possibility, and I hope the DNI 
can identify a solid number of ways to work together even more in the 
future.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do 
not intend to oppose the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, Mr. Holding was just here, but unfortunately, 
he got called away to another meeting because I know he worked closely 
with Mr. Crowley and others as chair of the India Caucus, and he wanted 
me to express his strong support for this amendment. I also urge my 
colleagues to support the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chair, working with international partners is an essential 
element of the IC's mission to understand the global threat 
environment, as well as the political, social, and economic trends 
around the world.
  For nearly 70 years, Israel has been a close friend and ally, as well 
as a vital source of intelligence about the world's most volatile 
region. In recent years, India, the world's largest democracy, has 
upgraded its bilateral relationships with both the United States and 
Israel. Given India's complex relationship with both Pakistan and 
China, exploring the potential for enhanced trilateral intelligence 
cooperation is very much in our interest.
  Mr. Crowley's amendment to direct the DNI to report to Congress on 
the potential for intelligence sharing is timely, and I urge the House 
to support it.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, again, let me thank Mr. Nunes, the chair 
of the committee, as well as the ranking member, Mr. Schiff, for their 
support of this valuable amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Crowley).
  The amendment was agreed to.


        Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Wilson of South Carolina

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at 
the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 336. CYBER ATTACK STANDARDS OF MEASUREMENT STUDY.

       (a) Study Required.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
     Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a study to determine 
     appropriate standards that--
       (1) can be used to measure the damage of cyber incidents 
     for the purposes of determining the response to such 
     incidents; and
       (2) include a method for quantifying the damage caused to 
     affected computers, systems, and devices.
       (b) Reports to Congress.--
       (1) Preliminary findings.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall provide to the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives the initial 
     findings of the study required under subsection (a).
       (2) Report.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland 
     Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the House of Representatives a report containing the 
     complete findings of such study.
       (3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (2) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Wilson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for 
Chairman Nunes and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
for their leadership on this important legislation.
  I am particularly grateful that I was here to hear the presentation 
by Congressman Joe Crowley relative to promoting a better relationship 
with the world's largest democracy, India, by the world's oldest 
democracy, the United States.
  He and I have served as the past co-chairs of the Caucus of India and 
Indian Americans, and I know of his commitment to promoting a better 
relationship between India and the United States.
  Last week, the Office of Personnel Management revealed they were the 
targets of an extended cyber attack on Federal employee personnel 
records. These attacks stole personal data, such as Social Security 
numbers, financial information, and security clearance documents, 
putting the personal and financial security of our citizens at risk.
  This cyber attack was not a novelty. Recently, we have seen a growing 
number of cyber attacks on government Web sites, national retailers, 
and small businesses. Indeed, according to Symantec, most businesses 
reported a completed or an attempted cyber attack in the last year, and 
60 percent of those facing an attack were small- or medium-sized 
businesses. These cyber attacks are a sober reminder to Congress that 
all government agencies need to work together to better protect their 
public and private networks.
  After each of these attacks, we have had a number of questions: Who 
is behind it? Is it an agent of a foreign government or a nonstate 
actor? How many records were affected? What kind of information was 
accessed?
  As of now, we gather this information through various government 
agencies, and each uses a different measure to assess and quantify the 
damage of the attack, so we waste valuable time and resources when 
trying to piece together a response.
  We need a clear, unified system of measurement for cyber attacks that 
can be used across all government agencies and military branches. By 
putting government agencies and branches of the military on the same 
page, we can have an effective and rapid response.
  This amendment directs the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of 
the FBI, and the Secretary of Defense, to conduct a study to define a 
method of measuring a cyber incident so we can determine an appropriate 
response.
  As chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging 
Threats and Capabilities, it is apparent that cyber is a new domain of 
warfare. This amendment is a critical first step in building a more 
comprehensive cyber defense system.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition even though I am not 
opposed.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman from 
South Carolina for his important amendment.

[[Page 9684]]

  There is a limit to how effective a defensive cyber strategy can be 
because, while we have to defend everything at all times, our 
adversaries get to attack everywhere and need to be successful only 
once, so we need to create a more effective deterrent, which this 
amendment will help further.
  It would require that the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence report to Congress on how we measure cyber attacks so that 
we can know how best to respond once we are attacked or to communicate 
in advance how we would respond if we were attacked. Measuring the 
scale and effects of cyber attacks is no easy task, especially as we 
must factor in second and third order effects.
  I want to thank Mr. Wilson for his amendment. I am proud to support 
it.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson).
  The amendment was agreed to.


              Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 336. REPORT ON WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING.

       (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 365 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees 
     specified in subsection (b) a report on wildlife trafficking.
       (b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The 
     congressional committees specified in this subsection are the 
     following:
       (1) Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (3) Committee on Environment and Public Works of the 
     Senate.
       (4) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
     of Representatives.
       (5) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (6) Committee on Natural Resources of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (c) Matters to Be Included.--The report submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
       (1) An assessment of the major source, transit, and 
     destination countries for wildlife trafficking products or 
     their derivatives and how such products or derivatives are 
     trafficked.
       (2) An assessment of the efforts of those countries 
     identified as major source, transit, and destination 
     countries to counter wildlife trafficking and to adhere to 
     their international treaty obligations relating to endangered 
     or threatened species.
       (3) An assessment of critical vulnerabilities that can be 
     used to counter wildlife trafficking.
       (4) An assessment of the extent of involvement of 
     designated foreign terrorist organizations and transnational 
     criminal organizations in wildlife trafficking.
       (5) An assessment of key actors and facilitators, including 
     government officials, that are supporting wildlife 
     trafficking.
       (6) An assessment of the annual net worth of wildlife 
     trafficking globally and the financial flows that enables 
     wildlife trafficking.
       (7) An assessment of the impact of wildlife trafficking on 
     key wildlife populations.
       (8) An assessment of the effectiveness of efforts taken to 
     date to counter wildlife trafficking.
       (9) An assessment of the effectiveness of capacity-building 
     efforts by the United States Government.
       (10) An assessment of the impact of wildlife trafficking on 
     the national security of the United States.
       (11) An assessment of the level of coordination between 
     United States intelligence and law enforcement agencies on 
     intelligence related to wildlife trafficking, the capacity of 
     those agencies to process and act on that intelligence 
     effectively, existing barriers to effective coordination, and 
     the degree to which relevant intelligence is shared with and 
     acted upon by bilateral and multilateral law enforcement 
     partners.
       (12) An assessment of the gaps in intelligence capabilities 
     to assess transnational wildlife trafficking networks and 
     steps currently being taken, in line with the Implementation 
     Plan to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife 
     Trafficking, to remedy such information gaps.
       (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  This amendment, cosponsored by the ranking member on the Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Mr. Keating from 
Massachusetts, requires the Director of National Intelligence to 
produce a report on wildlife trafficking, how terrorist organizations 
are involved, how they are making money off of wildlife trafficking, 
and the impact it has on U.S. national security.
  During our Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee 
hearing on this very issue in February, we learned that rhinos and 
elephants are on the path to extinction.
  For example, back in the seventies, there were approximately 65,000 
rhinos in Africa. Since then, about 1,000 a year have been killed, and 
now, there are only 5,000 left in Africa. That is a 94 percent drop in 
those rhinos. There are only five white rhinos in the whole world.
  Elephants are not faring much better. From 2002 to 2010, the elephant 
population across Africa dropped 66 percent. Back in the thirties and 
forties, Mr. Chairman, there were approximately 5 million African 
elephants. Now there are about a half a million African elephants.
  One of the most famous was Satao in this photograph that was taken 
last year. He was, presumably, the oldest elephant that was in 
existence in Africa. He was killed last year for his tusks, which 
almost touched the ground. In fact, National Geographic, a year ago 
today, did an article on him and how he was killed for his tusks and 
how other elephants are being killed for their tusks. He was about 46 
years old when he was killed for those tusks.
  The reason that poaching seems to be on the increase over the last 
few years is that there is a low risk of apprehension, and it is easy 
to commit these crimes. Also, even when someone is captured, penalties 
for wildlife trafficking are far less than for drug trafficking.
  Who uses these tusks? Who uses these rhino horns? The number one 
country in the world that is the consumer of the illegal ivory trade is 
China. Vietnam is the number one country in the world that uses the 
illegal trade of rhino horns. This is where these tusks and these rhino 
horns go, and it brings in a lot of money.
  For example, a kilogram of rhino horns--if I remember my math 
correctly, that is 2.2 pounds--sells for $60,000. So there is a lot 
more money involved in the sale of rhino horns and of elephant tusks 
than even of gold and platinum.
  Overall, the illegal wildlife trade is about $10 billion to $20 
billion a year. It should come as no surprise that terrorist 
organizations are also involved in this criminal enterprise, like al 
Qaeda's affiliate al Shabaab and like Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance 
Army. They are cashing in on the illegal wildlife trafficking.
  It is getting so bad that the poachers have become very sophisticated 
in the sense that they no longer just shoot elephants, for example, 
because that makes a noise, that warns them. They are even being 
poisoned. An elephant is poisoned, and the elephant dies.
  Then, when people approach the elephant, they not only see the dead 
elephant, but they see other animals that were feeding on the carcass 
of the elephant, and they are all dead, too, so that the poachers can 
get those tusks. They have become very innovative.

                              {time}  1545

  Local park rangers are underresourced; they are ill-equipped; and 
some of them are corrupt as well. So we can't fight what we don't know.
  There is a lot about this issue--and terrorist involvement in 
wildlife trafficking--that is murky, so we need to find out, for 
example: How much money do terrorists get from wildlife trafficking? 
Who are the key facilitators of the trade? What government officials 
are complicit? What impact does this have on the U.S. national 
security?

[[Page 9685]]

  This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to 
report to Congress on these and other questions. The better we 
understand the threat, the better we understand what is happening and 
how terrorists are involved in the illegal killing of rhinos and 
elephants, the more effective we can be against fighting those 
terrorists. And that is just the way it is.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, even though 
I am not opposed.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlemen from Texas 
and Massachusetts for their amendment, which I am proud to support.
  The trafficking of wildlife by terrorist organizations is an 
important issue, not only because it threatens to wipe out elephants, 
rhinos, and tigers, but also because it could threaten our national 
security. The World Wildlife Fund estimates that the amount of money 
generated by wildlife trafficking trade reaches into the hundreds of 
millions of dollars, and much of this goes to fund terrorists, 
including The Lord's Resistance Army, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. That 
is money going into the coffers of those who every day seek to harm us 
and others.
  We must put our intelligence professionals to the task. We must 
understand from beginning to end how terrorists acquire, transfer, and 
profit from wildlife trafficking. This is the first step to putting an 
end to it.
  Again, I want to thank my colleagues for offering this amendment. I 
urge support.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. POE of Texas. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Poe).
  The amendment was agreed to.


              Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 336. REPORT ON TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees 
     specified in subsection (b) a report that represents the 
     coordinated assessment of the intelligence community on 
     terrorist use of social media.
       (b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The 
     congressional committees specified in this subsection are the 
     following:
       (1) Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (3) Committee on Judiciary of the Senate.
       (4) Committee on Homeland and Government Affairs of the 
     Senate.
       (5) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
     of Representatives.
       (6) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (7) Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
       (8) Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (c) Matters to Be Included.--The report submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
       (1) An assessment of what role social media plays in 
     radicalization in the United States and elsewhere.
       (2) An assessment of how terrorists and terrorist 
     organizations are using social media, including trends.
       (3) An assessment of the intelligence value of social media 
     posts by terrorists and terrorist organizations.
       (4) An assessment of the impact on the national security of 
     the United States of the public availability of terrorist 
     content on social media for fundraising, radicalization, and 
     recruitment.
       (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, terrorists' use of social media has exploded over the 
past several years. A recent study by The Brookings Institution found 
that ISIS had over 40,000 Twitter accounts. Terrorist groups from ISIS 
to the Taliban use social media platforms to recruit, to radicalize, to 
spread propaganda, and to raise money. I have seen fan pages for the 
Khorasan Group, an online press conference held on Twitter by the al 
Qaeda branch in Yemen, and we all remember al-Shabaab live tweeting the 
murder of 72 people in Kenya. All terrorist groups.
  The benefits of social media are clear. Social media is easy to use, 
it is free, and it reaches huge audiences across the world. We need to 
better understand why terrorists' use of social media is effective and 
what impact it is having on the world.
  This bipartisan amendment is cosponsored by the ranking member on our 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. Keating 
from Massachusetts. This amendment requires the Director of National 
Intelligence to assess four parts of the social media problem: First, 
what role does social media play in radicalizing people in the United 
States and abroad?
  The rise of the lone wolf terrorism in recent years has been fueled, 
in part, by terrorists' use of social media. Just recently, in Garland, 
Texas, two individuals claiming ISIS connections were killed while they 
were attacking an assembly on free speech and peaceable assembly of 
religion. Evidence shows that they had some social connection, social 
media connection with ISIS. The Boston bombers made two pressure cooker 
bombs. The recipes for those bombs were published before the attack in 
al Qaeda's Inspire magazine. That magazine was released and promoted on 
social media.
  Second, how exactly are terrorists using social media? Social media 
is constantly evolving, just like terrorists' use of social media 
platforms. Following online trends is an essential element in putting 
resources where they have the most impact. We need to make fast-paced 
improvements in this area as new trends and platforms emerge.
  Third, what is the real intelligence value of terrorists' posts? In 
2012, a number of my colleagues and I sent a letter to the FBI asking, 
What intelligence value is terrorists' use of social media? The FBI has 
not come up with an answer. We need a detailed understanding from the 
whole intelligence community on just how valuable the intelligence is 
that we are getting from terrorists' use of social media.
  Finally, how does online fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment 
by terrorists impact U.S. national security? We know social media is a 
valuable tool to the terrorists just by how often they use it. 
Unfortunately, the United States is way behind on countering 
terrorists' use of social media, so we should do more. Terrorists like 
ISIS are out to destroy us. We have to fight to defeat them on every 
battlefield, and that includes in social media.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, even though 
I am not opposed.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, social media, like any other form of 
communication, can be exploited by bad actors for nefarious purposes. 
While we are lucky to live in a time of remarkable innovation that 
brings us closer to one another no matter what our geographical 
distance may be, our adversaries use the same tools to spread hateful 
and dangerous messages across the globe.
  I, therefore, support this amendment that calls on the intelligence 
community to provide Congress with greater information about how 
terrorist organizations use social media for fundraising, 
radicalization, and recruitment. Armed with that knowledge, we are more 
capable of stopping them.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

[[Page 9686]]


  Mr. POE of Texas. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Poe).
  The amendment was agreed to.


              Amendment No. 16 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 16 printed in 
House Report 114-155.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 42, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 336. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
                   TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT ISIL, AL-
                   QAEDA, AND THEIR AFFILIATED GROUPS, ASSOCIATED 
                   GROUPS, AND ADHERENTS.

       (a) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a comprehensive report on the United States 
     counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 
     the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaeda, 
     and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
     adherents.
       (2) Coordination.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of 
     State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, 
     and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other 
     department or agency of the United States Government that has 
     responsibility for activities directed at combating ISIL, al-
     Qaeda, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
     adherents.
       (3) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include each of the following:
       (A) A definition of--
       (i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known 
     individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;
       (ii) ISIL, including a list of which known individuals 
     constitute ISIL leadership;
       (iii) an affiliated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a 
     list of which known groups constitute an affiliate group of 
     ISIL or al-Qaeda;
       (iv) an associated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a 
     list of which known groups constitute an associated group of 
     ISIL or al-Qaeda;
       (v) an adherent of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a list of 
     which known groups constitute an adherent of ISIL or al-
     Qaeda; and
       (vi) a group aligned with ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a 
     description of what actions a group takes or statements it 
     makes that qualify it as a group aligned with ISIL or al-
     Qaeda.
       (B) An assessment of the relationship between all 
     identified ISIL or al-Qaeda affiliated groups, associated 
     groups, and adherents with ISIL leadership or al-Qaeda core.
       (C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of ISIL 
     or al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
     adherents, from January 1, 2010, to the present, including a 
     description of the metrics that are used to assess 
     strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the relative 
     increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed to such 
     entities.
       (D) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a 
     member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in 
     Afghanistan or Pakistan.
       (E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a 
     member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of an al-Qaeda 
     affiliated group, associated group, or adherent.
       (F) A definition of defeat of ISIL or core al-Qaeda.
       (G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command, 
     and control between ISIL or core al-Qaeda and their 
     affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, 
     specifically addressing each such entity.
       (H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
     operations against ISIL or core al-Qaeda, their affiliated 
     groups, associated groups, and adherents, and whether such 
     operations have had a sustained impact on the capabilities 
     and effectiveness of ISIL or core al-Qaeda, their affiliated 
     groups, associated groups, and adherents.
       (4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the House of Representatives; and
       (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment requires a strategy to defeat ISIS and 
other like-minded groups. It is incredible that after 4 years of the 
rise of ISIS, we still have to talk about needing a strategy, but here 
we are.
  Four years, Mr. Chairman, what is that? Well, in 4 years the United 
States mobilized the whole country and had to fight two wars--one in 
the Pacific and one in Europe--during World War II, and we were 
successful in protecting the United States, but here after 4 years of 
the rise of ISIS, we are not sure even what our strategy is.
  One thing we do know: controlling land is a top priority for ISIS. 
Its own credibility is wrapped up in the idea of establishing a 
caliphate. Without land, ISIS has no caliphate. Without a caliphate, 
ISIS loses its legitimacy among its hardcore fighters. Controlling land 
is also how ISIS makes a lot of its money. See, ISIS extorts the people 
that it controls. It also taxes them. ISIS is still bringing in 
millions of dollars a day by other illegal activities.
  The only way to stop that source of money is by taking back land that 
ISIS controls. Because ISIS is embedded in civilian populations, U.S. 
airstrikes are not enough to take the land back. The Iraqi Army is 
still too unprofessional to show that they are up to the job, and we 
have all seen ourselves how the Iraqis have dropped American weapons 
and run. We have yet to give the Kurds the weapons they need to fight 
for themselves, and we don't expect the dictator Assad to get the job 
done.
  The problem of ISIS is only getting bigger. Thousands of foreign 
fighters are still streaming into Iraq and Syria from other countries. 
Outside of Iraq and Syria, ISIS still has 10 networks, not including 
Iraq and Syria. There are three in Libya, two in Saudi Arabia, and one 
each in the Sinai, Nigeria, Yemen, Algeria, and one in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.
  Saudi Arabia is known for its strong government control, but the ISIS 
affiliate in Saudi Arabia recently pulled off two successful suicide 
attack bombings in 2 weeks. Its affiliate in Yemen has taken advantage 
of the fall of the government to take over more land. The ISIS 
affiliate in Libya is running free in a lawless area throughout the 
same country that killed our Ambassador and three other Americans. All 
of ISIS' 10 networks are growing stronger, not weaker, by the day.
  The President said last year that the United States would defeat and 
dismantle ISIS. Well, here we are a year later; we still do not have 
that strategy. That is at least according to the President himself last 
week when he was meeting with the world leaders at the G7 summit. He 
said: We do not yet have a complete strategy against ISIS.
  This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to 
report to Congress within 6 months a complete strategy to defeat ISIS 
and other groups like it. The same amendment did pass unanimously last 
year with this committee's support. So I ask Members to support it once 
again this year and make it become the law of the land. Today's 
terrorists control more land than they have at anytime since World War 
II. We need a strategy; we need a plan; and we need it soon.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the United States 
continue to refine and implement a comprehensive and aggressive 
strategy to counter ISIL, al Qaeda, and their affiliates, but that 
responsibility does not lie with the Director of National Intelligence. 
The DNI's job is to ensure that our national leadership, who do 
generate our counterterrorism strategy, have the timeliest, most 
germane, and detailed information to be sure our strategy will be 
successful.
  Mr. Poe's amendment misclassifies that responsibility and 
misconstrues the important role of the Director of National 
Intelligence. Our intelligence community must be free to collect and 
assess intelligence outside of the scope of political decisions to be 
sure their

[[Page 9687]]

analysis remains impartial and objective.
  So, reluctantly, I must oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues 
to do the same.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. POE of Texas. The amendment does state that the Director of 
National Intelligence will work with other appropriate agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, it is hard to fathom that this Nation does not have a 
plan to deal with ISIS. This amendment says Congress will move forward 
and expect and put into law that we will have a plan; we will have a 
strategy; and if the Director of National Intelligence is not an 
individual who is supposed to help form that plan, then I don't know 
who would be.
  I would ask that this amendment be adopted.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, with respect to my colleague, we have a 
strategy with respect to defeating al Qaeda and ISIL, with respect to 
the war in Syria and Iraq. It is a comprehensive strategy and, frankly, 
it is a difficult strategy to implement. It is a strategy that involves 
cutting off terrorism financing. It is a strategy that involves cutting 
off the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. It is a strategy 
that involves drying up the resources, the propaganda, the attacking of 
the recruitment mechanism of ISIS. It is a strategy that involves 
enlisting the support of our partners in the region and within the 
Islamic world to combat the perversion of their faith that is used to 
recruit people to this jihad. It is a strategy that is also military in 
character, that employs our air assets, that seeks to train and assist 
Iraqi forces. So we have a strategy. It is comprehensive, and it is 
tough.
  While I recognize that there is frustration that many of my 
colleagues have that our strategy has thus far not borne more success--
and I share that frustration--I have yet to hear any of my colleagues 
offer an alternative. It is one thing to bash the administration 
because you don't like the strategy; it is another to ignore the fact 
that we have a strategy or to propose improvements to it.
  But the subject matter of this amendment is whether the top 
intelligence official in the country should be charged with the 
responsibility of developing the policy to defeat ISIS, and I think it 
is rather his responsibility to make sure that the policymakers in 
Congress and the administration have the very best intelligence to 
inform those decisions.
  We see, frankly, this misunderstanding of the role of the 
intelligence community many times even in our committee when committee 
members will ask witnesses from the intelligence community to state 
policy positions on how they think certain policies should be 
implemented when that is really not their responsibility.
  Here, much as I concur with the need to perfect our strategy, improve 
our strategy, and the execution of that strategy, I don't believe that 
this is something that we should lay at the feet of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1600

  Mr. POE of Texas. I don't have anything to say, believe it or not, 
Mr. Chairman, so I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Poe).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Poe 
of Texas) having assumed the chair, Mr. Bishop of Utah, Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2596) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.

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