[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 6]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 8395]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   HOW TO PREVENT THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. PETER T. KING

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, June 2, 2015

  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, Islamic State (ISIS) is a massive 
threat to America's national interests and to human decency. Each day 
brings more news of ISIS advances, terrorist attacks, military gains 
and horrible atrocities. And each day the Administration continues to 
deny its policies are failing.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that ISIS can indeed be stopped if it heeds 
the thoughtful recommendations which Kevin Carroll detailed in his May 
27, 2015 Wall Street Journal OP/ED (``How to Prevent the Fall of 
Baghdad'').
  Mr. Carroll speaks with authority and first-hand knowledge. He served 
as a U.S. Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan and as a CIA case 
officer in a Middle East war zone. Also, I had the benefit of having 
Kevin Carroll serve as Senior Counsel when I chaired the House Homeland 
Security Committee in 2011-2012. I found his advice to be invaluable. I 
urge the Administration to follow his advice today. I am proud to 
submit Kevin Carroll's article and urge all members to read and give 
thoughtful consideration to his proposals.


 Islamic State is likely to use the tactics that worked in Ramadi. The 
                 U.S. can do much to change the outcome

       Islamic State, also known as ISIS, has seized control of 
     Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province just 70 highway miles 
     from Baghdad. Fallujah, located between, is already a terror 
     stronghold.
       There is little doubt that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
     plans to capture the city whose name he bears. A man who 
     declared himself a caliph, Baghdadi knows his home was the 
     seat of the Abbasid caliphate, founded in the eighth century 
     to which ISIS would like to return.
       It would be a mistake for the Obama administration to 
     continue to underestimate ISIS as the junior varsity. ISIS 
     demonstrated operational capability recently, attacking in 
     opposite directions to occupy both Ramadi and Palmyra, deep 
     inside Syria.
       Its Ramadi assault mixed terrorism with conventional 
     tactics. At least 30 huge truck bombs, some reportedly as 
     large as the one used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 
     obliterated the city's defenses, and ISIS forces poured 
     through the breach. A similar attack could be in store for 
     Baghdad. It is assumed that ISIS operatives are in the 
     capital's Sunni enclaves, with more en route disguised as 
     refugees.
       The fall of Baghdad to ISIS would harm American strategic 
     interests as the fall of Saigon did in 1975. The blow to U.S. 
     credibility and the enhancement of ISIS's prestige, of its 
     black flag rising over an evacuated U.S. Embassy, would be 
     incalculable. To prevent this outcome, President Obama should 
     consider taking the following actions.
       Use strategic air power. America's unrivaled air forces can 
     hit ISIS from anywhere: neighboring countries, the sea and 
     the continental U.S. Yet the sorties flown so far have been 
     minimal, and damage inflicted still less, even as ISIS held a 
     parade in broad daylight in Rutba, Iraq, last week.
       That is the kind of target our aviators dream of. Rules of 
     engagement need to be loosened, U.S. air controllers sent to 
     the front to call in strikes, and more combat aircraft put 
     into the fight.
       Launch ruthless special operations. Recent raids into Syria 
     were daring and skillful. But a handful of missions do not 
     resemble the operations led by U.S. Army Gens. Stanley 
     McChrystal and Michael Flynn in 2006-07 that eventually broke 
     the back of ISIS's predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, and drove 
     it abroad.
       At that campaign's height, commandos conducted multiple 
     missions every night. They analyzed intelligence collected on 
     one ``objective'' to find and fix targets they finished on 
     successive raids. The rhythm, persistence and sheer number of 
     those operations crushed the enemy. Emulate them now, 
     starting near Baghdad.
       Capture and interrogate ISIS leaders. Much of the 
     intelligence exploited on those missions came from documents 
     and electronics found in terrorist safe houses. But the best 
     came from interrogations, some conducted on the battlefield 
     as the smoke cleared.
       Interrogators acted within the bounds of decency against 
     evil men who deserved no quarter. Yet neither were military 
     and CIA personnel constrained by the rules of evidence and 
     criminal procedure, because their goal wasn't a courtroom 
     conviction, but the location of the next high-value target. A 
     robust program of capturing and roughly interrogating 
     terrorists abroad should resume, first focused on the 
     whereabouts of ISIS operatives in and around Baghdad.
       There is also a role for police work. ISIS has devotees in 
     all 50 U.S. states; hundreds of Americans traveled abroad to 
     fight for them, and some number have returned. The FBI and 
     state and local law enforcement should make aggressive use of 
     antiterror statutes to question--and perhaps flip into 
     informants--suspects who may be in contact with terror 
     leaders with details of ISIS plans regarding Baghdad. 
     Congress should reauthorize the National Security Agency's 
     signals intelligence programs identifying such communications 
     between Americans and known terrorists abroad.
       Send ground combat forces. Despite U.S. efforts to retrain 
     them, the Iraqi army is now unable or unwilling to stand and 
     fight ISIS alone. Its commanders have shamefully thrown down 
     their weapons, discarded their uniforms, and abandoned their 
     men and posts when ISIS threatens. The Iraqi army needs a 
     backbone transplant.
       U.S. airborne units can arrive quickly to secure Baghdad's 
     airport and the long and vital road from the city to that 
     airfield. More Marines can better defend the U.S. Embassy in 
     Baghdad. Americans can stiffen Iraqi lines around the city, 
     and provide artillery and engineer units needed in urban 
     combat. U.S. cavalry units can launch what imperial Britain 
     called ``punitive expeditions'' to destroy ISIS lairs further 
     afield.
       The arrival of thousands more American fighting men will 
     improve the Iraqi army's performance. It was no accident that 
     the Sunni Awakening and U.S. surge succeeded at the same time 
     in 2006-07. As U.S. troops poured in, Sunni sheiks cast their 
     lot with what Bing West memorialized as the ``The Strongest 
     Tribe'' in his book of the same name.
       There are natural advantages to defending Baghdad, which 
     the Iraqis can exploit if steeled by U.S. troops. To seize 
     the capital, ISIS's lines of communication would expand, a 
     logistical challenge that would leave them more vulnerable to 
     counterattack. The Iraqi army's lines of communication would 
     helpfully contract.
       The Tigris River is a significant obstacle, and a 
     defensible one. Urban combat favors prepared defenders. And 
     Baghdad is a dense city, its population having swelled to 
     more than seven million, crammed into a place the size of 
     Baltimore or Boston.
       Most important, the predominantly Shiite Iraqi army would 
     be fighting to protect its brethren, unlike previous battles 
     in mostly Sunni cities where they broke and ran.
       This fight is winnable. But if the administration whistles 
     past the graveyard and insists its policy is working even as 
     ISIS nears Baghdad and our diplomats there, the White House 
     may face a debacle that makes Benghazi seem minor in 
     comparison.

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