[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 5]
[House]
[Pages 6601-6624]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY FULFILLING RIGHTS AND ENSURING 
            EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE OVER MONITORING ACT OF 2015

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 255, I call 
up the bill (H.R. 2048) to reform the authorities of the Federal 
Government to require the production of certain business records, 
conduct electronic surveillance, use pen registers and trap and trace 
devices, and use other forms of information gathering for foreign
intelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal purposes, and for other 
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 255, the 
amendment printed in part B of House Report 114-111 is adopted, and the 
bill, as amended, is considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 2048

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Uniting 
     and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring 
     Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015'' or the 
     ``USA FREEDOM Act of 2015''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
              1978.

                 TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS REFORMS

Sec. 101. Additional requirements for call detail records.
Sec. 102. Emergency authority.
Sec. 103. Prohibition on bulk collection of tangible things.
Sec. 104. Judicial review.
Sec. 105. Liability protection.
Sec. 106. Compensation for assistance.
Sec. 107. Definitions.
Sec. 108. Inspector General reports on business records orders.
Sec. 109. Effective date.
Sec. 110. Rule of construction.

      TITLE II--FISA PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE REFORM

Sec. 201. Prohibition on bulk collection.
Sec. 202. Privacy procedures.

   TITLE III--FISA ACQUISITIONS TARGETING PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                             STATES REFORMS

Sec. 301. Limits on use of unlawfully obtained information.

       TITLE IV--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORMS

Sec. 401. Appointment of amicus curiae.
Sec. 402. Declassification of decisions, orders, and opinions.

                TITLE V--NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REFORM

Sec. 501. Prohibition on bulk collection.
Sec. 502. Limitations on disclosure of national security letters.
Sec. 503. Judicial review.

         TITLE VI--FISA TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Sec. 601. Additional reporting on orders requiring production of 
              business records; business records compliance reports to 
              Congress.
Sec. 602. Annual reports by the Government.
Sec. 603. Public reporting by persons subject to FISA orders.
Sec. 604. Reporting requirements for decisions, orders, and opinions of 
              the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the 
              Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.
Sec. 605. Submission of reports under FISA.

            TITLE VII--ENHANCED NATIONAL SECURITY PROVISIONS

Sec. 701. Emergencies involving non-United States persons.
Sec. 702. Preservation of treatment of non-United States persons 
              traveling outside the United States as agents of foreign 
              powers.
Sec. 703. Improvement to investigations of international proliferation 
              of weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 704. Increase in penalties for material support of foreign 
              terrorist organizations.
Sec. 705. Sunsets.

    TITLE VIII--SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
                       CONVENTIONS IMPLEMENTATION

               Subtitle A--Safety of Maritime Navigation

Sec. 801. Amendment to section 2280 of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 802. New section 2280a of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 803. Amendments to section 2281 of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 804. New section 2281a of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 805. Ancillary measure.

              Subtitle B--Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism

Sec. 811. New section 2332i of title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 812. Amendment to section 831 of title 18, United States Code.

[[Page 6602]]



     SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                   ACT OF 1978.

       Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this 
     Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an 
     amendment to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision, 
     the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or 
     other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).

                 TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS REFORMS

     SEC. 101. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CALL DETAIL RECORDS.

       (a) Application.--Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``a 
     statement'' and inserting ``in the case of an application 
     other than an application described in subparagraph (C) 
     (including an application for the production of call detail 
     records other than in the manner described in subparagraph 
     (C)), a statement''; and
       (B) in clause (iii), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as 
     subparagraphs (B) and (D), respectively; and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) (as so 
     redesignated) the following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) in the case of an application for the production on 
     an ongoing basis of call detail records created before, on, 
     or after the date of the application relating to an 
     authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) 
     conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to protect 
     against international terrorism, a statement of facts showing 
     that--
       ``(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the call 
     detail records sought to be produced based on the specific 
     selection term required under subparagraph (A) are relevant 
     to such investigation; and
       ``(ii) there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
     such specific selection term is associated with a foreign 
     power engaged in international terrorism or activities in 
     preparation therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged 
     in international terrorism or activities in preparation 
     therefor; and''.
       (b) Order.--Section 501(c)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(2)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(F) in the case of an application described in subsection 
     (b)(2)(C), shall--
       ``(i) authorize the production on a daily basis of call 
     detail records for a period not to exceed 180 days;
       ``(ii) provide that an order for such production may be 
     extended upon application under subsection (b) and the 
     judicial finding under paragraph (1) of this subsection;
       ``(iii) provide that the Government may require the prompt 
     production of a first set of call detail records using the 
     specific selection term that satisfies the standard required 
     under subsection (b)(2)(C)(ii);
       ``(iv) provide that the Government may require the prompt 
     production of a second set of call detail records using 
     session-identifying information or a telephone calling card 
     number identified by the specific selection term used to 
     produce call detail records under clause (iii);
       ``(v) provide that, when produced, such records be in a 
     form that will be useful to the Government;
       ``(vi) direct each person the Government directs to produce 
     call detail records under the order to furnish the Government 
     forthwith all information, facilities, or technical 
     assistance necessary to accomplish the production in such a 
     manner as will protect the secrecy of the production and 
     produce a minimum of interference with the services that such 
     person is providing to each subject of the production; and
       ``(vii) direct the Government to--

       ``(I) adopt minimization procedures that require the prompt 
     destruction of all call detail records produced under the 
     order that the Government determines are not foreign 
     intelligence information; and
       ``(II) destroy all call detail records produced under the 
     order as prescribed by such procedures.''.

     SEC. 102. EMERGENCY AUTHORITY.

       (a) Authority.--Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsections:
       ``(i) Emergency Authority for Production of Tangible 
     Things.--
       ``(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, 
     the Attorney General may require the emergency production of 
     tangible things if the Attorney General--
       ``(A) reasonably determines that an emergency situation 
     requires the production of tangible things before an order 
     authorizing such production can with due diligence be 
     obtained;
       ``(B) reasonably determines that the factual basis for the 
     issuance of an order under this section to approve such 
     production of tangible things exists;
       ``(C) informs, either personally or through a designee, a 
     judge having jurisdiction under this section at the time the 
     Attorney General requires the emergency production of 
     tangible things that the decision has been made to employ the 
     authority under this subsection; and
       ``(D) makes an application in accordance with this section 
     to a judge having jurisdiction under this section as soon as 
     practicable, but not later than 7 days after the Attorney 
     General requires the emergency production of tangible things 
     under this subsection.
       ``(2) If the Attorney General requires the emergency 
     production of tangible things under paragraph (1), the 
     Attorney General shall require that the minimization 
     procedures required by this section for the issuance of a 
     judicial order be followed.
       ``(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving the 
     production of tangible things under this subsection, the 
     production shall terminate when the information sought is 
     obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or 
     after the expiration of 7 days from the time the Attorney 
     General begins requiring the emergency production of such 
     tangible things, whichever is earliest.
       ``(4) A denial of the application made under this 
     subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.
       ``(5) If such application for approval is denied, or in any 
     other case where the production of tangible things is 
     terminated and no order is issued approving the production, 
     no information obtained or evidence derived from such 
     production shall be received in evidence or otherwise 
     disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or 
     before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, 
     regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
     the United States, a State, or a political subdivision 
     thereof, and no information concerning any United States 
     person acquired from such production shall subsequently be 
     used or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or 
     employees without the consent of such person, except with the 
     approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates 
     a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
       ``(6) The Attorney General shall assess compliance with the 
     requirements of paragraph (5).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 
     1861(d)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``pursuant to an order'' and inserting ``pursuant to an order 
     issued or an emergency production required'';
       (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``such order'' and 
     inserting ``such order or such emergency production''; and
       (C) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``the order'' and 
     inserting ``the order or the emergency production''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``an order'' and 
     inserting ``an order or emergency production''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``an order'' and 
     inserting ``an order or emergency production''.

     SEC. 103. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS.

       (a) Application.--Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)), 
     as amended by section 101(a) of this Act, is further amended 
     by inserting before subparagraph (B), as redesignated by such 
     section 101(a) of this Act, the following new subparagraph:
       ``(A) a specific selection term to be used as the basis for 
     the production of the tangible things sought;''.
       (b) Order.--Section 501(c) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking the semicolon and 
     inserting ``, including each specific selection term to be 
     used as the basis for the production;''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) No order issued under this subsection may authorize 
     the collection of tangible things without the use of a 
     specific selection term that meets the requirements of 
     subsection (b)(2).''.

     SEC. 104. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       (a) Minimization Procedures.--
       (1) Judicial review.--Section 501(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 
     1861(c)(1)) is amended by inserting after ``subsections (a) 
     and (b)'' the following: ``and that the minimization 
     procedures submitted in accordance with subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     meet the definition of minimization procedures under 
     subsection (g)''.
       (2) Rule of construction.--Section 501(g) (50 U.S.C. 
     1861(g)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection 
     shall limit the authority of the court established under 
     section 103(a) to impose additional, particularized 
     minimization procedures with regard to the production, 
     retention, or dissemination of nonpublicly available 
     information concerning unconsenting United States persons, 
     including additional, particularized procedures related to 
     the destruction of information within a reasonable time 
     period.''.
       (3) Technical and conforming amendment.--Section 501(g)(1) 
     (50 U.S.C. 1861(g)(1)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the USA

[[Page 6603]]

     PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, the'' 
     and inserting ``The''; and
       (B) by inserting after ``adopt'' the following: ``, and 
     update as appropriate,''.
       (b) Orders.--Section 501(f)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(f)(2)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)(i)--
       (A) by striking ``that order'' and inserting ``the 
     production order or any nondisclosure order imposed in 
     connection with the production order''; and
       (B) by striking the second sentence; and
       (2) in subparagraph (C)--
       (A) by striking clause (ii); and
       (B) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (ii).

     SEC. 105. LIABILITY PROTECTION.

       Section 501(e) (50 U.S.C. 1861(e)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(e)(1) No cause of action shall lie in any court against 
     a person who--
       ``(A) produces tangible things or provides information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance in accordance with an 
     order issued or an emergency production required under this 
     section; or
       ``(B) otherwise provides technical assistance to the 
     Government under this section or to implement the amendments 
     made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
       ``(2) A production or provision of information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance described in paragraph (1) shall not 
     be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any 
     other proceeding or context.''.

     SEC. 106. COMPENSATION FOR ASSISTANCE.

       Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as amended by section 102 of 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(j) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate a 
     person for reasonable expenses incurred for--
       ``(1) producing tangible things or providing information, 
     facilities, or assistance in accordance with an order issued 
     with respect to an application described in subsection 
     (b)(2)(C) or an emergency production under subsection (i) 
     that, to comply with subsection (i)(1)(D), requires an 
     application described in subsection (b)(2)(C); or
       ``(2) otherwise providing technical assistance to the 
     Government under this section or to implement the amendments 
     made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.''.

     SEC. 107. DEFINITIONS.

       Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as amended by section 106 of 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(k) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) In general.--The terms `foreign power', `agent of a 
     foreign power', `international terrorism', `foreign 
     intelligence information', `Attorney General', `United States 
     person', `United States', `person', and `State' have the 
     meanings provided those terms in section 101.
       ``(2) Address.--The term `address' means a physical address 
     or electronic address, such as an electronic mail address or 
     temporarily assigned network address (including an Internet 
     protocol address).
       ``(3) Call detail record.--The term `call detail record'--
       ``(A) means session-identifying information (including an 
     originating or terminating telephone number, an International 
     Mobile Subscriber Identity number, or an International Mobile 
     Station Equipment Identity number), a telephone calling card 
     number, or the time or duration of a call; and
       ``(B) does not include--
       ``(i) the contents (as defined in section 2510(8) of title 
     18, United States Code) of any communication;
       ``(ii) the name, address, or financial information of a 
     subscriber or customer; or
       ``(iii) cell site location or global positioning system 
     information.
       ``(4) Specific selection term.--
       ``(A) Tangible things.--
       ``(i) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     a `specific selection term'--

       ``(I) is a term that specifically identifies a person, 
     account, address, or personal device, or any other specific 
     identifier; and
       ``(II) is used to limit, to the greatest extent reasonably 
     practicable, the scope of tangible things sought consistent 
     with the purpose for seeking the tangible things.

       ``(ii) Limitation.--A specific selection term under clause 
     (i) does not include an identifier that does not limit, to 
     the greatest extent reasonably practicable, the scope of 
     tangible things sought consistent with the purpose for 
     seeking the tangible things, such as an identifier that--

       ``(I) identifies an electronic communication service 
     provider (as that term is defined in section 701) or a 
     provider of remote computing service (as that term is defined 
     in section 2711 of title 18, United States Code), when not 
     used as part of a specific identifier as described in clause 
     (i), unless the provider is itself a subject of an authorized 
     investigation for which the specific selection term is used 
     as the basis for the production; or
       ``(II) identifies a broad geographic region, including the 
     United States, a city, a county, a State, a zip code, or an 
     area code, when not used as part of a specific identifier as 
     described in clause (i).

       ``(iii) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this paragraph 
     shall be construed to preclude the use of multiple terms or 
     identifiers to meet the requirements of clause (i).
       ``(B) Call detail record applications.--For purposes of an 
     application submitted under subsection (b)(2)(C), the term 
     `specific selection term' means a term that specifically 
     identifies an individual, account, or personal device.''.

     SEC. 108. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS ON BUSINESS RECORDS 
                   ORDERS.

       Section 106A of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
     Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-177; 120 Stat. 
     200) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``and calendar years 
     2012 through 2014'' after ``2006'';
       (B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3);
       (C) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
     (2) and (3), respectively; and
       (D) in paragraph (3) (as so redesignated)--
       (i) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) with respect to calendar years 2012 through 2014, an 
     examination of the minimization procedures used in relation 
     to orders under section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) and whether the 
     minimization procedures adequately protect the constitutional 
     rights of United States persons;''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``(as such term is 
     defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))'';
       (2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(3) Calendar years 2012 through 2014.--Not later than 1 
     year after the date of enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act of 
     2015, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice 
     shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report 
     containing the results of the audit conducted under 
     subsection (a) for calendar years 2012 through 2014.'';
       (3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections 
     (e) and (f), respectively;
       (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d) Intelligence Assessment.--
       ``(1) In general.--For the period beginning on January 1, 
     2012, and ending on December 31, 2014, the Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community shall assess--
       ``(A) the importance of the information acquired under 
     title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) to the activities of the 
     intelligence community;
       ``(B) the manner in which that information was collected, 
     retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the intelligence 
     community;
       ``(C) the minimization procedures used by elements of the 
     intelligence community under such title and whether the 
     minimization procedures adequately protect the constitutional 
     rights of United States persons; and
       ``(D) any minimization procedures proposed by an element of 
     the intelligence community under such title that were 
     modified or denied by the court established under section 
     103(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)).
       ``(2) Submission date for assessment.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date on which the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice submits the report required under 
     subsection (c)(3), the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report 
     containing the results of the assessment for calendar years 
     2012 through 2014.'';
       (5) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (3)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``a report under subsection (c)(1) or 
     (c)(2)'' and inserting ``any report under subsection (c) or 
     (d)''; and
       (ii) by striking ``Inspector General of the Department of 
     Justice'' and inserting ``Inspector General of the Department 
     of Justice, the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community, and any Inspector General of an element of the 
     intelligence community that prepares a report to assist the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Justice or the 
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in complying 
     with the requirements of this section''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the reports submitted 
     under subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2)'' and inserting ``any 
     report submitted under subsection (c) or (d)'';
       (6) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (3)--
       (A) by striking ``The reports submitted under subsections 
     (c)(1) and (c)(2)'' and inserting ``Each report submitted 
     under subsection (c)''; and
       (B) by striking ``subsection (d)(2)'' and inserting 
     ``subsection (e)(2)''; and
       (7) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence 
     community' has the meaning

[[Page 6604]]

     given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
       ``(2) United states person.--The term `United States 
     person' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1801).''.

     SEC. 109. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       (a) In General.--The amendments made by sections 101 
     through 103 shall take effect on the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
     construed to alter or eliminate the authority of the 
     Government to obtain an order under title V of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et 
     seq.) as in effect prior to the effective date described in 
     subsection (a) during the period ending on such effective 
     date.

     SEC. 110. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the 
     production of the contents (as such term is defined in 
     section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code) of any 
     electronic communication from an electronic communication 
     service provider (as such term is defined in section 
     701(b)(4) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4))) under title V of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et 
     seq.).

      TITLE II--FISA PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE REFORM

     SEC. 201. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION.

       (a) Prohibition.--Section 402(c) (50 U.S.C. 1842(c)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) a specific selection term to be used as the basis for 
     the use of the pen register or trap and trace device.''.
       (b) Definition.--Section 401 (50 U.S.C. 1841) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4)(A) The term `specific selection term'--
       ``(i) is a term that specifically identifies a person, 
     account, address, or personal device, or any other specific 
     identifier; and
       ``(ii) is used to limit, to the greatest extent reasonably 
     practicable, the scope of information sought, consistent with 
     the purpose for seeking the use of the pen register or trap 
     and trace device.
       ``(B) A specific selection term under subparagraph (A) does 
     not include an identifier that does not limit, to the 
     greatest extent reasonably practicable, the scope of 
     information sought, consistent with the purpose for seeking 
     the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, such as 
     an identifier that--
       ``(i) identifies an electronic communication service 
     provider (as that term is defined in section 701) or a 
     provider of remote computing service (as that term is defined 
     in section 2711 of title 18, United States Code), when not 
     used as part of a specific identifier as described in 
     subparagraph (A), unless the provider is itself a subject of 
     an authorized investigation for which the specific selection 
     term is used as the basis for the use; or
       ``(ii) identifies a broad geographic region, including the 
     United States, a city, a county, a State, a zip code, or an 
     area code, when not used as part of a specific identifier as 
     described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(C) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term `address' 
     means a physical address or electronic address, such as an 
     electronic mail address or temporarily assigned network 
     address (including an Internet protocol address).
       ``(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
     preclude the use of multiple terms or identifiers to meet the 
     requirements of subparagraph (A).''.

     SEC. 202. PRIVACY PROCEDURES.

       (a) In General.--Section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(h) Privacy Procedures.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Attorney General shall ensure that 
     appropriate policies and procedures are in place to safeguard 
     nonpublicly available information concerning United States 
     persons that is collected through the use of a pen register 
     or trap and trace device installed under this section. Such 
     policies and procedures shall, to the maximum extent 
     practicable and consistent with the need to protect national 
     security, include privacy protections that apply to the 
     collection, retention, and use of information concerning 
     United States persons.
       ``(2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection 
     limits the authority of the court established under section 
     103(a) or of the Attorney General to impose additional 
     privacy or minimization procedures with regard to the 
     installation or use of a pen register or trap and trace 
     device.''.
       (b) Emergency Authority.--Section 403 (50 U.S.C. 1843) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Privacy Procedures.--Information collected through 
     the use of a pen register or trap and trace device installed 
     under this section shall be subject to the policies and 
     procedures required under section 402(h).''.

   TITLE III--FISA ACQUISITIONS TARGETING PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                             STATES REFORMS

     SEC. 301. LIMITS ON USE OF UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED INFORMATION.

       Section 702(i)(3) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)(3)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) Limitation on use of information.--
       ``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), if 
     the Court orders a correction of a deficiency in a 
     certification or procedures under subparagraph (B), no 
     information obtained or evidence derived pursuant to the part 
     of the certification or procedures that has been identified 
     by the Court as deficient concerning any United States person 
     shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any 
     trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, 
     grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, 
     legislative committee, or other authority of the United 
     States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no 
     information concerning any United States person acquired 
     pursuant to such part of such certification or procedures 
     shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner 
     by Federal officers or employees without the consent of the 
     United States person, except with the approval of the 
     Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of 
     death or serious bodily harm to any person.
       ``(ii) Exception.--If the Government corrects any 
     deficiency identified by the order of the Court under 
     subparagraph (B), the Court may permit the use or disclosure 
     of information obtained before the date of the correction 
     under such minimization procedures as the Court may approve 
     for purposes of this clause.''.

       TITLE IV--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORMS

     SEC. 401. APPOINTMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE.

       Section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subsections:
       ``(i) Amicus Curiae.--
       ``(1) Designation.--The presiding judges of the courts 
     established under subsections (a) and (b) shall, not later 
     than 180 days after the enactment of this subsection, jointly 
     designate not fewer than 5 individuals to be eligible to 
     serve as amicus curiae, who shall serve pursuant to rules the 
     presiding judges may establish. In designating such 
     individuals, the presiding judges may consider individuals 
     recommended by any source, including members of the Privacy 
     and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the judges determine 
     appropriate.
       ``(2) Authorization.--A court established under subsection 
     (a) or (b), consistent with the requirement of subsection (c) 
     and any other statutory requirement that the court act 
     expeditiously or within a stated time--
       ``(A) shall appoint an individual who has been designated 
     under paragraph (1) to serve as amicus curiae to assist such 
     court in the consideration of any application for an order or 
     review that, in the opinion of the court, presents a novel or 
     significant interpretation of the law, unless the court 
     issues a finding that such appointment is not appropriate; 
     and
       ``(B) may appoint an individual or organization to serve as 
     amicus curiae, including to provide technical expertise, in 
     any instance as such court deems appropriate or, upon motion, 
     permit an individual or organization leave to file an amicus 
     curiae brief.
       ``(3) Qualifications of amicus curiae.--
       ``(A) Expertise.--Individuals designated under paragraph 
     (1) shall be persons who possess expertise in privacy and 
     civil liberties, intelligence collection, communications 
     technology, or any other area that may lend legal or 
     technical expertise to a court established under subsection 
     (a) or (b).
       ``(B) Security clearance.--Individuals designated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) shall be persons who are determined to be 
     eligible for access to classified information necessary to 
     participate in matters before the courts. Amicus curiae 
     appointed by the court pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be 
     persons who are determined to be eligible for access to 
     classified information, if such access is necessary to 
     participate in the matters in which they may be appointed.
       ``(4) Duties.--If a court established under subsection (a) 
     or (b) appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph (2)(A), the 
     amicus curiae shall provide to the court, as appropriate--
       ``(A) legal arguments that advance the protection of 
     individual privacy and civil liberties;
       ``(B) information related to intelligence collection or 
     communications technology; or
       ``(C) legal arguments or information regarding any other 
     area relevant to the issue presented to the court.
       ``(5) Assistance.--An amicus curiae appointed under 
     paragraph (2)(A) may request that the court designate or 
     appoint additional amici curiae pursuant to paragraph (1) or 
     paragraph (2), to be available to assist the amicus curiae.
       ``(6) Access to information.--
       ``(A) In general.--If a court established under subsection 
     (a) or (b) appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph (2), the 
     amicus curiae--

[[Page 6605]]

       ``(i) shall have access to any legal precedent, 
     application, certification, petition, motion, or such other 
     materials that the court determines are relevant to the 
     duties of the amicus curiae; and
       ``(ii) may, if the court determines that it is relevant to 
     the duties of the amicus curiae, consult with any other 
     individuals designated pursuant to paragraph (1) regarding 
     information relevant to any assigned proceeding.
       ``(B) Briefings.--The Attorney General may periodically 
     brief or provide relevant materials to individuals designated 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) regarding constructions and 
     interpretations of this Act and legal, technological, and 
     other issues related to actions authorized by this Act.
       ``(C) Classified information.--An amicus curiae designated 
     or appointed by the court may have access to classified 
     documents, information, and other materials or proceedings 
     only if that individual is eligible for access to classified 
     information and to the extent consistent with the national 
     security of the United States.
       ``(D) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to require the Government to provide information 
     to an amicus curiae appointed by the court that is privileged 
     from disclosure.
       ``(7) Notification.--A presiding judge of a court 
     established under subsection (a) or (b) shall notify the 
     Attorney General of each exercise of the authority to appoint 
     an individual to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (2).
       ``(8) Assistance.--A court established under subsection (a) 
     or (b) may request and receive (including on a 
     nonreimbursable basis) the assistance of the executive branch 
     in the implementation of this subsection.
       ``(9) Administration.--A court established under subsection 
     (a) or (b) may provide for the designation, appointment, 
     removal, training, or other support for an individual 
     designated to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (1) or 
     appointed to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (2) in a 
     manner that is not inconsistent with this subsection.
       ``(10) Receipt of information.--Nothing in this subsection 
     shall limit the ability of a court established under 
     subsection (a) or (b) to request or receive information or 
     materials from, or otherwise communicate with, the Government 
     or amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) on an ex parte 
     basis, nor limit any special or heightened obligation in any 
     ex parte communication or proceeding.
       ``(j) Review of FISA Court Decisions.--Following issuance 
     of an order under this Act, a court established under 
     subsection (a) shall certify for review to the court 
     established under subsection (b) any question of law that may 
     affect resolution of the matter in controversy that the court 
     determines warrants such review because of a need for 
     uniformity or because consideration by the court established 
     under subsection (b) would serve the interests of justice. 
     Upon certification of a question of law under this 
     subsection, the court established under subsection (b) may 
     give binding instructions or require the entire record to be 
     sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.
       ``(k) Review of FISA Court of Review Decisions.--
       ``(1) Certification.--For purposes of section 1254(2) of 
     title 28, United States Code, the court of review established 
     under subsection (b) shall be considered to be a court of 
     appeals.
       ``(2) Amicus curiae briefing.--Upon certification of an 
     application under paragraph (1), the Supreme Court of the 
     United States may appoint an amicus curiae designated under 
     subsection (i)(1), or any other person, to provide briefing 
     or other assistance.''.

     SEC. 402. DECLASSIFICATION OF DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND 
                   OPINIONS.

       (a) Declassification.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.) is 
     amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``REPORTING REQUIREMENT'' 
     and inserting ``OVERSIGHT''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 602. DECLASSIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS, 
                   ORDERS, AND OPINIONS.

       ``(a) Declassification Required.--Subject to subsection 
     (b), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
     with the Attorney General, shall conduct a declassification 
     review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (as defined in 
     section 601(e)) that includes a significant construction or 
     interpretation of any provision of law, including any novel 
     or significant construction or interpretation of the term 
     `specific selection term', and, consistent with that review, 
     make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable 
     each such decision, order, or opinion.
       ``(b) Redacted Form.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, may 
     satisfy the requirement under subsection (a) to make a 
     decision, order, or opinion described in such subsection 
     publicly available to the greatest extent practicable by 
     making such decision, order, or opinion publicly available in 
     redacted form.
       ``(c) National Security Waiver.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, may 
     waive the requirement to declassify and make publicly 
     available a particular decision, order, or opinion under 
     subsection (a), if--
       ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, determines that a 
     waiver of such requirement is necessary to protect the 
     national security of the United States or properly classified 
     intelligence sources or methods; and
       ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence makes publicly 
     available an unclassified statement prepared by the Attorney 
     General, in consultation with the Director of National 
     Intelligence--
       ``(A) summarizing the significant construction or 
     interpretation of any provision of law, which shall include, 
     to the extent consistent with national security, a 
     description of the context in which the matter arises and any 
     significant construction or interpretation of any statute, 
     constitutional provision, or other legal authority relied on 
     by the decision; and
       ``(B) that specifies that the statement has been prepared 
     by the Attorney General and constitutes no part of the 
     opinion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in 
     the first section is amended--
       (1) by striking the item relating to title VI and inserting 
     the following new item:

                        ``TITLE VI--OVERSIGHT'';

     and
       (2) by inserting after the item relating to section 601 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 602. Declassification of significant decisions, orders, and 
              opinions.''.

                TITLE V--NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REFORM

     SEC. 501. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION.

       (a) Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and 
     Transactional Records.--Section 2709(b) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) 
     by striking ``may'' and inserting ``may, using a term that 
     specifically identifies a person, entity, telephone number, 
     or account as the basis for a request''.
       (b) Access to Financial Records for Certain Intelligence 
     and Protective Purposes.--Section 1114(a)(2) of the Right to 
     Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(2)) is 
     amended by striking the period and inserting ``and a term 
     that specifically identifies a customer, entity, or account 
     to be used as the basis for the production and disclosure of 
     financial records.''.
       (c) Disclosures to FBI of Certain Consumer Records for 
     Counterintelligence Purposes.--Section 626 of the Fair Credit 
     Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``that information,'' 
     and inserting ``that information that includes a term that 
     specifically identifies a consumer or account to be used as 
     the basis for the production of that information,'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``written request,'' and 
     inserting ``written request that includes a term that 
     specifically identifies a consumer or account to be used as 
     the basis for the production of that information,''; and
       (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``, which shall include 
     a term that specifically identifies a consumer or account to 
     be used as the basis for the production of the information,'' 
     after ``issue an order ex parte''.
       (d) Disclosures to Governmental Agencies for 
     Counterterrorism Purposes of Consumer Reports.--Section 
     627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v(a)) 
     is amended by striking ``analysis.'' and inserting ``analysis 
     and that includes a term that specifically identifies a 
     consumer or account to be used as the basis for the 
     production of such information.''.

     SEC. 502. LIMITATIONS ON DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   LETTERS.

       (a) Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and 
     Transactional Records.--Section 2709 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking subsection (c) and 
     inserting the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
       ``(1) Prohibition.--
       ``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under 
     subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 
     under subsection (d) is provided, no wire or electronic 
     communication service provider that receives a request under 
     subsection (b), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall 
     disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or 
     records under this section.
       ``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A) 
     shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall 
     be no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau 
     headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field 
     office, certifies that the absence of a prohibition of 
     disclosure under this subsection may result in--
       ``(i) a danger to the national security of the United 
     States;
       ``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
     counterintelligence investigation;
       ``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or

[[Page 6606]]

       ``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
       ``(2) Exception.--
       ``(A) In general.--A wire or electronic communication 
     service provider that receives a request under subsection 
     (b), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, may disclose 
     information otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure 
     requirement to--
       ``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 
     order to comply with the request;
       ``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or 
     assistance regarding the request; or
       ``(iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the 
     Director.
       ``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made 
     under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure 
     requirements applicable to a person to whom a request is 
     issued under subsection (b) in the same manner as the person 
     to whom the request is issued.
       ``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person 
     described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 
     to a nondisclosure requirement shall notify the person of the 
     applicable nondisclosure requirement.
       ``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the 
     request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person 
     making or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or 
     (iii) of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the Director or 
     such designee the person to whom such disclosure will be made 
     or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
       (b) Access to Financial Records for Certain Intelligence 
     and Protective Purposes.--Section 1114 of the Right to 
     Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(5), by striking subparagraph (D); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
       ``(1) Prohibition.--
       ``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under 
     subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 
     under subsection (d) is provided, no financial institution 
     that receives a request under subsection (a), or officer, 
     employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person that 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained 
     access to information or records under subsection (a).
       ``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A) 
     shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall 
     be no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau 
     headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field 
     office, certifies that the absence of a prohibition of 
     disclosure under this subsection may result in--
       ``(i) a danger to the national security of the United 
     States;
       ``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
     counterintelligence investigation;
       ``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
       ``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
       ``(2) Exception.--
       ``(A) In general.--A financial institution that receives a 
     request under subsection (a), or officer, employee, or agent 
     thereof, may disclose information otherwise subject to any 
     applicable nondisclosure requirement to--
       ``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 
     order to comply with the request;
       ``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or 
     assistance regarding the request; or
       ``(iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the 
     Director.
       ``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made 
     under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure 
     requirements applicable to a person to whom a request is 
     issued under subsection (a) in the same manner as the person 
     to whom the request is issued.
       ``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person 
     described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 
     to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the 
     applicable nondisclosure requirement.
       ``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the 
     request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person 
     making or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or 
     (iii) of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the Director or 
     such designee the person to whom such disclosure will be made 
     or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
       (c) Identity of Financial Institutions and Credit 
     Reports.--Section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 
     U.S.C. 1681u) is amended by striking subsection (d) and 
     inserting the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
       ``(1) Prohibition.--
       ``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under 
     subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 
     under subsection (e) is provided, no consumer reporting 
     agency that receives a request under subsection (a) or (b) or 
     an order under subsection (c), or officer, employee, or agent 
     thereof, shall disclose or specify in any consumer report, 
     that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or 
     obtained access to information or records under subsection 
     (a), (b), or (c).
       ``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A) 
     shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall 
     be no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau 
     headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field 
     office, certifies that the absence of a prohibition of 
     disclosure under this subsection may result in--
       ``(i) a danger to the national security of the United 
     States;
       ``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
     counterintelligence investigation;
       ``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
       ``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
       ``(2) Exception.--
       ``(A) In general.--A consumer reporting agency that 
     receives a request under subsection (a) or (b) or an order 
     under subsection (c), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, 
     may disclose information otherwise subject to any applicable 
     nondisclosure requirement to--
       ``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 
     order to comply with the request;
       ``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or 
     assistance regarding the request; or
       ``(iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the 
     Director.
       ``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made 
     under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure 
     requirements applicable to a person to whom a request under 
     subsection (a) or (b) or an order under subsection (c) is 
     issued in the same manner as the person to whom the request 
     is issued.
       ``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person 
     described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 
     to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the 
     applicable nondisclosure requirement.
       ``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the 
     request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person 
     making or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or 
     (iii) of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the Director or 
     such designee the person to whom such disclosure will be made 
     or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
       (d) Consumer Reports.--Section 627 of the Fair Credit 
     Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v) is amended by striking 
     subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
       ``(1) Prohibition.--
       ``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under 
     subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 
     under subsection (d) is provided, no consumer reporting 
     agency that receives a request under subsection (a), or 
     officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose or 
     specify in any consumer report, that a government agency 
     described in subsection (a) has sought or obtained access to 
     information or records under subsection (a).
       ``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A) 
     shall apply if the head of the government agency described in 
     subsection (a), or a designee, certifies that the absence of 
     a prohibition of disclosure under this subsection may result 
     in--
       ``(i) a danger to the national security of the United 
     States;
       ``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
     counterintelligence investigation;
       ``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
       ``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
       ``(2) Exception.--
       ``(A) In general.--A consumer reporting agency that 
     receives a request under subsection (a), or officer, 
     employee, or agent thereof, may disclose information 
     otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement 
     to--
       ``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 
     order to comply with the request;
       ``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or 
     assistance regarding the request; or
       ``(iii) other persons as permitted by the head of the 
     government agency described in subsection (a) or a designee.
       ``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made 
     under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure 
     requirements applicable to a person to whom a request under 
     subsection (a) is issued in the same manner as the person to 
     whom the request is issued.
       ``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person 
     described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 
     to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the 
     applicable nondisclosure requirement.

[[Page 6607]]

       ``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the 
     request of the head of the government agency described in 
     subsection (a) or a designee, any person making or intending 
     to make a disclosure under clause (i) or (iii) of 
     subparagraph (A) shall identify to the head or such designee 
     the person to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom 
     such disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
       (e) Investigations of Persons With Access to Classified 
     Information.--Section 802 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162) is amended by striking subsection (b) 
     and inserting the following new subsection:
       ``(b) Prohibition of Certain Disclosure.--
       ``(1) Prohibition.--
       ``(A) In general.--If a certification is issued under 
     subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 
     under subsection (c) is provided, no governmental or private 
     entity that receives a request under subsection (a), or 
     officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any 
     person that an authorized investigative agency described in 
     subsection (a) has sought or obtained access to information 
     under subsection (a).
       ``(B) Certification.--The requirements of subparagraph (A) 
     shall apply if the head of an authorized investigative agency 
     described in subsection (a), or a designee, certifies that 
     the absence of a prohibition of disclosure under this 
     subsection may result in--
       ``(i) a danger to the national security of the United 
     States;
       ``(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
     counterintelligence investigation;
       ``(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or
       ``(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
       ``(2) Exception.--
       ``(A) In general.--A governmental or private entity that 
     receives a request under subsection (a), or officer, 
     employee, or agent thereof, may disclose information 
     otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement 
     to--
       ``(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 
     order to comply with the request;
       ``(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or 
     assistance regarding the request; or
       ``(iii) other persons as permitted by the head of the 
     authorized investigative agency described in subsection (a) 
     or a designee.
       ``(B) Application.--A person to whom disclosure is made 
     under subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the nondisclosure 
     requirements applicable to a person to whom a request is 
     issued under subsection (a) in the same manner as the person 
     to whom the request is issued.
       ``(C) Notice.--Any recipient that discloses to a person 
     described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 
     to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the 
     applicable nondisclosure requirement.
       ``(D) Identification of disclosure recipients.--At the 
     request of the head of an authorized investigative agency 
     described in subsection (a), or a designee, any person making 
     or intending to make a disclosure under clause (i) or (iii) 
     of subparagraph (A) shall identify to the head of the 
     authorized investigative agency or such designee the person 
     to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom such 
     disclosure was made prior to the request.''.
       (f) Termination Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall adopt 
     procedures with respect to nondisclosure requirements issued 
     pursuant to section 2709 of title 18, United States Code, 
     section 626 or 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 
     U.S.C. 1681u and 1681v), section 1114 of the Right to 
     Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. 3414), or section 802 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162), as amended by 
     this Act, to require--
       (A) the review at appropriate intervals of such a 
     nondisclosure requirement to assess whether the facts 
     supporting nondisclosure continue to exist;
       (B) the termination of such a nondisclosure requirement if 
     the facts no longer support nondisclosure; and
       (C) appropriate notice to the recipient of the national 
     security letter, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, 
     subject to the nondisclosure requirement, and the applicable 
     court as appropriate, that the nondisclosure requirement has 
     been terminated.
       (2) Reporting.--Upon adopting the procedures required under 
     paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall submit the 
     procedures to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate 
     and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (g) Judicial Review.--Section 3511 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking subsection (b) and 
     inserting the following new subsection:
       ``(b) Nondisclosure.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Notice.--If a recipient of a request or order for a 
     report, records, or other information under section 2709 of 
     this title, section 626 or 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting 
     Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u and 1681v), section 1114 of the Right to 
     Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414), or section 
     802 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162), 
     wishes to have a court review a nondisclosure requirement 
     imposed in connection with the request or order, the 
     recipient may notify the Government or file a petition for 
     judicial review in any court described in subsection (a).
       ``(B) Application.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
     of receipt of a notification under subparagraph (A), the 
     Government shall apply for an order prohibiting the 
     disclosure of the existence or contents of the relevant 
     request or order. An application under this subparagraph may 
     be filed in the district court of the United States for the 
     judicial district in which the recipient of the order is 
     doing business or in the district court of the United States 
     for any judicial district within which the authorized 
     investigation that is the basis for the request is being 
     conducted. The applicable nondisclosure requirement shall 
     remain in effect during the pendency of proceedings relating 
     to the requirement.
       ``(C) Consideration.--A district court of the United States 
     that receives a petition under subparagraph (A) or an 
     application under subparagraph (B) should rule expeditiously, 
     and shall, subject to paragraph (3), issue a nondisclosure 
     order that includes conditions appropriate to the 
     circumstances.
       ``(2) Application contents.--An application for a 
     nondisclosure order or extension thereof or a response to a 
     petition filed under paragraph (1) shall include a 
     certification from the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney 
     General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee in a 
     position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau 
     headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field 
     office designated by the Director, or in the case of a 
     request by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the 
     Federal Government other than the Department of Justice, the 
     head or deputy head of the department, agency, or 
     instrumentality, containing a statement of specific facts 
     indicating that the absence of a prohibition of disclosure 
     under this subsection may result in--
       ``(A) a danger to the national security of the United 
     States;
       ``(B) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
     counterintelligence investigation;
       ``(C) interference with diplomatic relations; or
       ``(D) danger to the life or physical safety of any person.
       ``(3) Standard.--A district court of the United States 
     shall issue a nondisclosure order or extension thereof under 
     this subsection if the court determines that there is reason 
     to believe that disclosure of the information subject to the 
     nondisclosure requirement during the applicable time period 
     may result in--
       ``(A) a danger to the national security of the United 
     States;
       ``(B) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
     counterintelligence investigation;
       ``(C) interference with diplomatic relations; or
       ``(D) danger to the life or physical safety of any 
     person.''.

     SEC. 503. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       (a) Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and 
     Transactional Records.--Section 2709 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as 
     subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d) Judicial Review.--
       ``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (b) or a 
     nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such 
     request under subsection (c) shall be subject to judicial 
     review under section 3511.
       ``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (b) shall include 
     notice of the availability of judicial review described in 
     paragraph (1).''.
       (b) Access to Financial Records for Certain Intelligence 
     and Protective Purposes.--Section 1114 of the Right to 
     Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d) Judicial Review.--
       ``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (a) or a 
     nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such 
     request under subsection (c) shall be subject to judicial 
     review under section 3511 of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (a) shall include 
     notice of the availability of judicial review described in 
     paragraph (1).''.
       (c) Identity of Financial Institutions and Credit 
     Reports.--Section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 
     U.S.C. 1681u) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (e) through (m) as 
     subsections (f) through (n), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Judicial Review.--

[[Page 6608]]

       ``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (a) or (b) or 
     an order under subsection (c) or a non-disclosure requirement 
     imposed in connection with such request under subsection (d) 
     shall be subject to judicial review under section 3511 of 
     title 18, United States Code.
       ``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (a) or (b) or an 
     order under subsection (c) shall include notice of the 
     availability of judicial review described in paragraph 
     (1).''.
       (d) Identity of Financial Institutions and Credit 
     Reports.--Section 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 
     U.S.C. 1681v) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as 
     subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d) Judicial Review.--
       ``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (a) or a non-
     disclosure requirement imposed in connection with such 
     request under subsection (c) shall be subject to judicial 
     review under section 3511 of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (a) shall include 
     notice of the availability of judicial review described in 
     paragraph (1).''.
       (e) Investigations of Persons With Access to Classified 
     Information.--Section 802 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (c) through (f) as 
     subsections (d) through (g), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Judicial Review.--
       ``(1) In general.--A request under subsection (a) or a 
     nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such 
     request under subsection (b) shall be subject to judicial 
     review under section 3511 of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(2) Notice.--A request under subsection (a) shall include 
     notice of the availability of judicial review described in 
     paragraph (1).''.

         TITLE VI--FISA TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

     SEC. 601. ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON ORDERS REQUIRING PRODUCTION 
                   OF BUSINESS RECORDS; BUSINESS RECORDS 
                   COMPLIANCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       (a) Reports Submitted to Committees.--Section 502(b) (50 
     U.S.C. 1862(b)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as 
     paragraphs (6), (7), and (8), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting before paragraph (6) (as so redesignated) 
     the following new paragraphs:
       ``(1) a summary of all compliance reviews conducted by the 
     Government for the production of tangible things under 
     section 501;
       ``(2) the total number of applications described in section 
     501(b)(2)(B) made for orders approving requests for the 
     production of tangible things;
       ``(3) the total number of such orders either granted, 
     modified, or denied;
       ``(4) the total number of applications described in section 
     501(b)(2)(C) made for orders approving requests for the 
     production of call detail records;
       ``(5) the total number of such orders either granted, 
     modified, or denied;''.
       (b) Reporting on Certain Types of Production.--Section 
     502(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1862(c)(1)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'';
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(C) the total number of applications made for orders 
     approving requests for the production of tangible things 
     under section 501 in which the specific selection term does 
     not specifically identify an individual, account, or personal 
     device;
       ``(D) the total number of orders described in subparagraph 
     (C) either granted, modified, or denied; and
       ``(E) with respect to orders described in subparagraph (D) 
     that have been granted or modified, whether the court 
     established under section 103 has directed additional, 
     particularized minimization procedures beyond those adopted 
     pursuant to section 501(g).''.

     SEC. 602. ANNUAL REPORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT.

       (a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.), as 
     amended by section 402 of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORTS.

       ``(a) Report by Director of the Administrative Office of 
     the United States Courts.--
       ``(1) Report required.--The Director of the Administrative 
     Office of the United States Courts shall annually submit to 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the Senate, subject to a declassification 
     review by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence, a report that includes--
       ``(A) the number of applications or certifications for 
     orders submitted under each of sections 105, 304, 402, 501, 
     702, 703, and 704;
       ``(B) the number of such orders granted under each of those 
     sections;
       ``(C) the number of orders modified under each of those 
     sections;
       ``(D) the number of applications or certifications denied 
     under each of those sections;
       ``(E) the number of appointments of an individual to serve 
     as amicus curiae under section 103, including the name of 
     each individual appointed to serve as amicus curiae; and
       ``(F) the number of findings issued under section 103(i) 
     that such appointment is not appropriate and the text of any 
     such findings.
       ``(2) Publication.--The Director shall make the report 
     required under paragraph (1) publicly available on an 
     Internet Web site, except that the Director shall not make 
     publicly available on an Internet Web site the findings 
     described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1).
       ``(b) Mandatory Reporting by Director of National 
     Intelligence.--Except as provided in subsection (d), the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall annually make 
     publicly available on an Internet Web site a report that 
     identifies, for the preceding 12-month period--
       ``(1) the total number of orders issued pursuant to titles 
     I and III and sections 703 and 704 and a good faith estimate 
     of the number of targets of such orders;
       ``(2) the total number of orders issued pursuant to section 
     702 and a good faith estimate of--
       ``(A) the number of search terms concerning a known United 
     States person used to retrieve the unminimized contents of 
     electronic communications or wire communications obtained 
     through acquisitions authorized under such section, excluding 
     the number of search terms used to prevent the return of 
     information concerning a United States person; and
       ``(B) the number of queries concerning a known United 
     States person of unminimized noncontents information relating 
     to electronic communications or wire communications obtained 
     through acquisitions authorized under such section, excluding 
     the number of queries containing information used to prevent 
     the return of information concerning a United States person;
       ``(3) the total number of orders issued pursuant to title 
     IV and a good faith estimate of--
       ``(A) the number of targets of such orders; and
       ``(B) the number of unique identifiers used to communicate 
     information collected pursuant to such orders;
       ``(4) the total number of orders issued pursuant to 
     applications made under section 501(b)(2)(B) and a good faith 
     estimate of--
       ``(A) the number of targets of such orders; and
       ``(B) the number of unique identifiers used to communicate 
     information collected pursuant to such orders;
       ``(5) the total number of orders issued pursuant to 
     applications made under section 501(b)(2)(C) and a good faith 
     estimate of--
       ``(A) the number of targets of such orders;
       ``(B) the number of unique identifiers used to communicate 
     information collected pursuant to such orders; and
       ``(C) the number of search terms that included information 
     concerning a United States person that were used to query any 
     database of call detail records obtained through the use of 
     such orders; and
       ``(6) the total number of national security letters issued 
     and the number of requests for information contained within 
     such national security letters.
       ``(c) Timing.--The annual reports required by subsections 
     (a) and (b) shall be made publicly available during April of 
     each year and include information relating to the previous 
     calendar year.
       ``(d) Exceptions.--
       ``(1) Statement of numerical range.--If a good faith 
     estimate required to be reported under subparagraph (B) of 
     any of paragraphs (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (b) is fewer 
     than 500, it shall be expressed as a numerical range of 
     `fewer than 500' and shall not be expressed as an individual 
     number.
       ``(2) Nonapplicability to certain information.--
       ``(A) Federal bureau of investigation.--Paragraphs (2)(A), 
     (2)(B), and (5)(C) of subsection (b) shall not apply to 
     information or records held by, or queries conducted by, the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       ``(B) Electronic mail address and telephone numbers.--
     Paragraph (3)(B) of subsection (b) shall not apply to orders 
     resulting in the acquisition of information by the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation that does not include electronic mail 
     addresses or telephone numbers.
       ``(3) Certification.--
       ``(A) In general.--If the Director of National Intelligence 
     concludes that a good faith estimate required to be reported 
     under subsection (b)(2)(B) cannot be determined accurately 
     because some but not all of the relevant elements of the 
     intelligence community are able to provide such good faith 
     estimate, the Director shall--
       ``(i) certify that conclusion in writing to the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on

[[Page 6609]]

     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives;
       ``(ii) report the good faith estimate for those relevant 
     elements able to provide such good faith estimate;
       ``(iii) explain when it is reasonably anticipated that such 
     an estimate will be able to be determined fully and 
     accurately; and
       ``(iv) make such certification publicly available on an 
     Internet Web site.
       ``(B) Form.--A certification described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall be prepared in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       ``(C) Timing.--If the Director of National Intelligence 
     continues to conclude that the good faith estimates described 
     in this paragraph cannot be determined accurately, the 
     Director shall annually submit a certification in accordance 
     with this paragraph.
       ``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Contents.--The term `contents' has the meaning given 
     that term under section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(2) Electronic communication.--The term `electronic 
     communication' has the meaning given that term under section 
     2510 of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(3) National security letter.--The term `national 
     security letter' means a request for a report, records, or 
     other information under--
       ``(A) section 2709 of title 18, United States Code;
       ``(B) section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial 
     Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A));
       ``(C) subsection (a) or (b) of section 626 of the Fair 
     Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u(a), 1681u(b)); or
       ``(D) section 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 
     U.S.C. 1681v(a)).
       ``(4) United states person.--The term `United States 
     person' means a citizen of the United States or an alien 
     lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in 
     section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a))).
       ``(5) Wire communication.--The term `wire communication' 
     has the meaning given that term under section 2510 of title 
     18, United States Code.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents, as 
     amended by section 402 of this Act, is further amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 602, as added by 
     section 402 of this Act, the following new item:

``Sec. 603. Annual reports.''.
       (c) Public Reporting on National Security Letters.--Section 
     118(c) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
     of 2005 (18 U.S.C. 3511 note) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``United States''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``, excluding the 
     number of requests for subscriber information'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
       ``(2) Content.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     each report required under this subsection shall include a 
     good faith estimate of the total number of requests described 
     in paragraph (1) requiring disclosure of information 
     concerning--
       ``(i) United States persons; and
       ``(ii) persons who are not United States persons.
       ``(B) Exception.--With respect to the number of requests 
     for subscriber information under section 2709 of title 18, 
     United States Code, a report required under this subsection 
     need not separate the number of requests into each of the 
     categories described in subparagraph (A).''.
       (d) Stored Communications.--Section 2702(d) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) the number of accounts from which the Department of 
     Justice has received voluntary disclosures under subsection 
     (c)(4).''.

     SEC. 603. PUBLIC REPORTING BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO FISA ORDERS.

       (a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.), as 
     amended by sections 402 and 602 of this Act, is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 604. PUBLIC REPORTING BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO ORDERS.

       ``(a) Reporting.--A person subject to a nondisclosure 
     requirement accompanying an order or directive under this Act 
     or a national security letter may, with respect to such 
     order, directive, or national security letter, publicly 
     report the following information using one of the following 
     structures:
       ``(1) A semiannual report that aggregates the number of 
     orders, directives, or national security letters with which 
     the person was required to comply into separate categories 
     of--
       ``(A) the number of national security letters received, 
     reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999;
       ``(B) the number of customer selectors targeted by national 
     security letters, reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-
     999;
       ``(C) the number of orders or directives received, 
     combined, under this Act for contents, reported in bands of 
     1000 starting with 0-999;
       ``(D) the number of customer selectors targeted under 
     orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for 
     contents reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999;
       ``(E) the number of orders received under this Act for 
     noncontents, reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999; 
     and
       ``(F) the number of customer selectors targeted under 
     orders under this Act for noncontents, reported in bands of 
     1000 starting with 0-999, pursuant to--
       ``(i) title IV;
       ``(ii) title V with respect to applications described in 
     section 501(b)(2)(B); and
       ``(iii) title V with respect to applications described in 
     section 501(b)(2)(C).
       ``(2) A semiannual report that aggregates the number of 
     orders, directives, or national security letters with which 
     the person was required to comply into separate categories 
     of--
       ``(A) the number of national security letters received, 
     reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499;
       ``(B) the number of customer selectors targeted by national 
     security letters, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-
     499;
       ``(C) the number of orders or directives received, 
     combined, under this Act for contents, reported in bands of 
     500 starting with 0-499;
       ``(D) the number of customer selectors targeted under 
     orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for 
     contents, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499;
       ``(E) the number of orders received under this Act for 
     noncontents, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499; 
     and
       ``(F) the number of customer selectors targeted under 
     orders received under this Act for noncontents, reported in 
     bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
       ``(3) A semiannual report that aggregates the number of 
     orders, directives, or national security letters with which 
     the person was required to comply in the into separate 
     categories of--
       ``(A) the total number of all national security process 
     received, including all national security letters, and orders 
     or directives under this Act, combined, reported in bands of 
     250 starting with 0-249; and
       ``(B) the total number of customer selectors targeted under 
     all national security process received, including all 
     national security letters, and orders or directives under 
     this Act, combined, reported in bands of 250 starting with 0-
     249.
       ``(4) An annual report that aggregates the number of 
     orders, directives, and national security letters the person 
     was required to comply with into separate categories of--
       ``(A) the total number of all national security process 
     received, including all national security letters, and orders 
     or directives under this Act, combined, reported in bands of 
     100 starting with 0-99; and
       ``(B) the total number of customer selectors targeted under 
     all national security process received, including all 
     national security letters, and orders or directives under 
     this Act, combined, reported in bands of 100 starting with 0-
     99.
       ``(b) Period of Time Covered by Reports.--
       ``(1) A report described in paragraph (1) or (2) of 
     subsection (a) shall include only information--
       ``(A) relating to national security letters for the 
     previous 180 days; and
       ``(B) relating to authorities under this Act for the 180-
     day period of time ending on the date that is not less than 
     180 days prior to the date of the publication of such report, 
     except that with respect to a platform, product, or service 
     for which a person did not previously receive an order or 
     directive (not including an enhancement to or iteration of an 
     existing publicly available platform, product, or service) 
     such report shall not include any information relating to 
     such new order or directive until 540 days after the date on 
     which such new order or directive is received.
       ``(2) A report described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a) 
     shall include only information relating to the previous 180 
     days.
       ``(3) A report described in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) 
     shall include only information for the 1-year period of time 
     ending on the date that is not less than 1 year prior to the 
     date of the publication of such report.
       ``(c) Other Forms of Agreed to Publication.--Nothing in 
     this section prohibits the Government and any person from 
     jointly agreeing to the publication of information referred 
     to in this subsection in a time, form, or manner other than 
     as described in this section.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Contents.--The term `contents' has the meaning given 
     that term under section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(2) National security letter.--The term `national 
     security letter' has the meaning given that term under 
     section 603.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents, as 
     amended by sections 402 and 602 of this Act, is further 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 603, 
     as added by section 602 of this Act, the following new item:


[[Page 6610]]


``Sec. 604. Public reporting by persons subject to orders.''.

     SEC. 604. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND 
                   OPINIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE COURT AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW.

       Section 601(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1871(c)(1)) is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(1) not later than 45 days after the date on which the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issues a decision, 
     order, or opinion, including any denial or modification of an 
     application under this Act, that includes significant 
     construction or interpretation of any provision of law or 
     results in a change of application of any provision of this 
     Act or a novel application of any provision of this Act, a 
     copy of such decision, order, or opinion and any pleadings, 
     applications, or memoranda of law associated with such 
     decision, order, or opinion; and''.

     SEC. 605. SUBMISSION OF REPORTS UNDER FISA.

       (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 108(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 
     1808(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate,'' and inserting ``the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
     Senate''.
       (b) Physical Searches.--The matter preceding paragraph (1) 
     of section 306 (50 U.S.C. 1826) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate,'' and inserting 
     ``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the Senate''; and
       (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives''.
       (c) Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices.--Section 
     406(b) (50 U.S.C. 1846(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period and inserting 
     a semicolon; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(4) each department or agency on behalf of which the 
     Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government 
     has made an application for an order authorizing or approving 
     the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace 
     device under this title; and
       ``(5) for each department or agency described in paragraph 
     (4), each number described in paragraphs (1), (2), and 
     (3).''.
       (d) Access to Certain Business Records and Other Tangible 
     Things.--Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 1862(a)) is amended by 
     striking ``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
     Senate'' and inserting ``Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate''.

            TITLE VII--ENHANCED NATIONAL SECURITY PROVISIONS

     SEC. 701. EMERGENCIES INVOLVING NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 105 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i) as 
     subsections (g), (h), (i), and (j), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
       ``(f)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
     the lawfully authorized targeting of a non-United States 
     person previously believed to be located outside the United 
     States for the acquisition of foreign intelligence 
     information may continue for a period not to exceed 72 hours 
     from the time that the non-United States person is reasonably 
     believed to be located inside the United States and the 
     acquisition is subject to this title or to title III of this 
     Act, provided that the head of an element of the intelligence 
     community--
       ``(A) reasonably determines that a lapse in the targeting 
     of such non-United States person poses a threat of death or 
     serious bodily harm to any person;
       ``(B) promptly notifies the Attorney General of a 
     determination under subparagraph (A); and
       ``(C) requests, as soon as practicable, the employment of 
     emergency electronic surveillance under subsection (e) or the 
     employment of an emergency physical search pursuant to 
     section 304(e), as warranted.
       ``(2) The authority under this subsection to continue the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information is limited to 
     a period not to exceed 72 hours and shall cease upon the 
     earlier of the following:
       ``(A) The employment of emergency electronic surveillance 
     under subsection (e) or the employment of an emergency 
     physical search pursuant to section 304(e).
       ``(B) An issuance of a court order under this title or 
     title III of this Act.
       ``(C) The Attorney General provides direction that the 
     acquisition be terminated.
       ``(D) The head of the element of the intelligence community 
     conducting the acquisition determines that a request under 
     paragraph (1)(C) is not warranted.
       ``(E) When the threat of death or serious bodily harm to 
     any person is no longer reasonably believed to exist.
       ``(3) Nonpublicly available information concerning 
     unconsenting United States persons acquired under this 
     subsection shall not be disseminated during the 72 hour time 
     period under paragraph (1) unless necessary to investigate, 
     reduce, or eliminate the threat of death or serious bodily 
     harm to any person.
       ``(4) If the Attorney General declines to authorize the 
     employment of emergency electronic surveillance under 
     subsection (e) or the employment of an emergency physical 
     search pursuant to section 304(e), or a court order is not 
     obtained under this title or title III of this Act, 
     information obtained during the 72 hour acquisition time 
     period under paragraph (1) shall not be retained, except with 
     the approval of the Attorney General if the information 
     indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any 
     person.
       ``(5) Paragraphs (5) and (6) of subsection (e) shall apply 
     to this subsection.''.
       (b) Notification of Emergency Employment of Electronic 
     Surveillance.--Section 106(j) (50 U.S.C. 1806(j)) is amended 
     by striking ``section 105(e)'' and inserting ``subsection (e) 
     or (f) of section 105''.
       (c) Report to Congress.--Section 108(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 
     1808(a)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) the total number of authorizations under section 
     105(f) and the total number of subsequent emergency 
     employments of electronic surveillance under section 105(e) 
     or emergency physical searches pursuant to section 301(e).''.

     SEC. 702. PRESERVATION OF TREATMENT OF NON-UNITED STATES 
                   PERSONS TRAVELING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AS 
                   AGENTS OF FOREIGN POWERS.

       Section 101(b)(1) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting before the semicolon 
     at the end the following: ``, irrespective of whether the 
     person is inside the United States''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B)--
       (A) by striking ``of such person's presence in the United 
     States''; and
       (B) by striking ``such activities in the United States'' 
     and inserting ``such activities''.

     SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENT TO INVESTIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
                   PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

       Section 101(b)(1) is further amended by striking 
     subparagraph (E) and inserting the following new subparagraph 
     (E):
       ``(E) engages in the international proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction, or activities in preparation therefor, 
     for or on behalf of a foreign power, or knowingly aids or 
     abets any person in the conduct of such proliferation or 
     activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly conspires 
     with any person to engage in such proliferation or activities 
     in preparation therefor; or''.

     SEC. 704. INCREASE IN PENALTIES FOR MATERIAL SUPPORT OF 
                   FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

       Section 2339B(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``15 years'' and inserting ``20 years''.

     SEC. 705. SUNSETS.

       (a) USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
     2005.--Section 102(b)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
     Reauthorization Act of 2005 (50 U.S.C. 1805 note) is amended 
     by striking ``June 1, 2015'' and inserting ``December 15, 
     2019''.
       (b) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004.--Section 6001(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is 
     amended by striking ``June 1, 2015'' and inserting ``December 
     15, 2019''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 102(b)(1) of the USA 
     PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (50 
     U.S.C. 1805 note), as amended by subsection (a), is further 
     amended by striking ``sections 501, 502, and'' and inserting 
     ``title V and section''.

    TITLE VIII--SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
                       CONVENTIONS IMPLEMENTATION

               Subtitle A--Safety of Maritime Navigation

     SEC. 801. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2280 OF TITLE 18, UNITED 
                   STATES CODE.

       Section 2280 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)(A)(i), by striking ``a ship flying the 
     flag of the United States'' and inserting ``a vessel of the 
     United States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the 
     United States (as defined in section 70502 of title 46)'';

[[Page 6611]]

       (B) in paragraph (1)(A)(ii), by inserting ``, including the 
     territorial seas'' after ``in the United States''; and
       (C) in paragraph (1)(A)(iii), by inserting ``, by a United 
     States corporation or legal entity,'' after ``by a national 
     of the United States'';
       (2) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 2(c)'' and 
     inserting ``section 13(c)'';
       (3) by striking subsection (d);
       (4) by striking subsection (e) and inserting after 
     subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Definitions.--As used in this section, section 2280a, 
     section 2281, and section 2281a, the term--
       ``(1) `applicable treaty' means--
       ``(A) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
     Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
       ``(B) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
     against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 
     September 1971;
       ``(C) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
     Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
     Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the 
     United Nations on 14 December 1973;
       ``(D) International Convention against the Taking of 
     Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
     Nations on 17 December 1979;
       ``(E) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
     Material, done at Vienna on 26 October 1979;
       ``(F) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
     Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 
     supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
     Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at 
     Montreal on 24 February 1988;
       ``(G) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
     against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
     Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988;
       ``(H) International Convention for the Suppression of 
     Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the 
     United Nations on 15 December 1997; and
       ``(I) International Convention for the Suppression of the 
     Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of 
     the United Nations on 9 December 1999;
       ``(2) `armed conflict' does not include internal 
     disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
     sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar 
     nature;
       ``(3) `biological weapon' means--
       ``(A) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins 
     whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
     in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
     protective, or other peaceful purposes; or
       ``(B) weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to 
     use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed 
     conflict;
       ``(4) `chemical weapon' means, together or separately--
       ``(A) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where 
     intended for--
       ``(i) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
     pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes;
       ``(ii) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly 
     related to protection against toxic chemicals and to 
     protection against chemical weapons;
       ``(iii) military purposes not connected with the use of 
     chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic 
     properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; or
       ``(iv) law enforcement including domestic riot control 
     purposes,

     as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such 
     purposes;
       ``(B) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through the toxic properties of those 
     toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (A), which would be 
     released as a result of the employment of such munitions and 
     devices; and
       ``(C) any equipment specifically designed for use directly 
     in connection with the employment of munitions and devices 
     specified in subparagraph (B);
       ``(5) `covered ship' means a ship that is navigating or is 
     scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the 
     outer limit of the territorial sea of a single country or a 
     lateral limit of that country's territorial sea with an 
     adjacent country;
       ``(6) `explosive material' has the meaning given the term 
     in section 841(c) and includes explosive as defined in 
     section 844(j) of this title;
       ``(7) `infrastructure facility' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 2332f(e)(5) of this title;
       ``(8) `international organization' has the meaning given 
     the term in section 831(f)(3) of this title;
       ``(9) `military forces of a state' means the armed forces 
     of a state which are organized, trained, and equipped under 
     its internal law for the primary purpose of national defense 
     or security, and persons acting in support of those armed 
     forces who are under their formal command, control, and 
     responsibility;
       ``(10) `national of the United States' has the meaning 
     stated in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
       ``(11) `Non-Proliferation Treaty' means the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
     London, and Moscow on 1 July 1968;
       ``(12) `Non-Proliferation Treaty State Party' means any 
     State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to include 
     Taiwan, which shall be considered to have the obligations 
     under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of a party to that treaty 
     other than a Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Non-
     Proliferation Treaty;
       ``(13) `Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty' means a State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     that is a nuclear-weapon State, as that term is defined in 
     Article IX(3) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
       ``(14) `place of public use' has the meaning given the term 
     in section 2332f(e)(6) of this title;
       ``(15) `precursor' has the meaning given the term in 
     section 229F(6)(A) of this title;
       ``(16) `public transport system' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 2332f(e)(7) of this title;
       ``(17) `serious injury or damage' means--
       ``(A) serious bodily injury,
       ``(B) extensive destruction of a place of public use, State 
     or government facility, infrastructure facility, or public 
     transportation system, resulting in major economic loss, or
       ``(C) substantial damage to the environment, including air, 
     soil, water, fauna, or flora;
       ``(18) `ship' means a vessel of any type whatsoever not 
     permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically 
     supported craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft, 
     but does not include a warship, a ship owned or operated by a 
     government when being used as a naval auxiliary or for 
     customs or police purposes, or a ship which has been 
     withdrawn from navigation or laid up;
       ``(19) `source material' has the meaning given that term in 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute, done at New 
     York on 26 October 1956;
       ``(20) `special fissionable material' has the meaning given 
     that term in the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute, 
     done at New York on 26 October 1956;
       ``(21) `territorial sea of the United States' means all 
     waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles from the 
     baselines of the United States determined in accordance with 
     international law;
       ``(22) `toxic chemical' has the meaning given the term in 
     section 229F(8)(A) of this title;
       ``(23) `transport' means to initiate, arrange or exercise 
     effective control, including decisionmaking authority, over 
     the movement of a person or item; and
       ``(24) `United States', when used in a geographical sense, 
     includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of 
     the Northern Mariana Islands, and all territories and 
     possessions of the United States.''; and
       (5) by inserting after subsection (d) (as added by 
     paragraph (4) of this section) the following:
       ``(e) Exceptions.--This section shall not apply to--
       ``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed 
     conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war, 
     which are governed by that law; or
       ``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state 
     in the exercise of their official duties.
       ``(f) Delivery of Suspected Offender.--The master of a 
     covered ship flying the flag of the United States who has 
     reasonable grounds to believe that there is on board that 
     ship any person who has committed an offense under section 
     2280 or section 2280a may deliver such person to the 
     authorities of a country that is a party to the Convention 
     for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
     Maritime Navigation. Before delivering such person to the 
     authorities of another country, the master shall notify in an 
     appropriate manner the Attorney General of the United States 
     of the alleged offense and await instructions from the 
     Attorney General as to what action to take. When delivering 
     the person to a country which is a state party to the 
     Convention, the master shall, whenever practicable, and if 
     possible before entering the territorial sea of such country, 
     notify the authorities of such country of the master's 
     intention to deliver such person and the reasons therefor. If 
     the master delivers such person, the master shall furnish to 
     the authorities of such country the evidence in the master's 
     possession that pertains to the alleged offense.
       ``(g)(1) Civil Forfeiture.--Any real or personal property 
     used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the 
     commission of a violation of this section, the gross proceeds 
     of such violation, and any real or personal property 
     traceable to such property or proceeds, shall be subject to 
     forfeiture.
       ``(2) Applicable Procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures 
     under this section shall be governed by the provisions of 
     chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, relating to civil 
     forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed upon the 
     Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws described in 
     section 981(d) shall be performed by such officers, agents, 
     and other persons as may be designated for that purpose by 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, or 
     the Secretary of Defense.''.

[[Page 6612]]



     SEC. 802. NEW SECTION 2280A OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 111 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding after section 2280 the following 
     new section:

     ``Sec. 2280a. Violence against maritime navigation and 
       maritime transport involving weapons of mass destruction

       ``(a) Offenses.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subject to the exceptions in subsection 
     (c), a person who unlawfully and intentionally--
       ``(A) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or 
     context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
     government or an international organization to do or to 
     abstain from doing any act--
       ``(i) uses against or on a ship or discharges from a ship 
     any explosive or radioactive material, biological, chemical, 
     or nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device in a 
     manner that causes or is likely to cause death to any person 
     or serious injury or damage;
       ``(ii) discharges from a ship oil, liquefied natural gas, 
     or another hazardous or noxious substance that is not covered 
     by clause (i), in such quantity or concentration that causes 
     or is likely to cause death to any person or serious injury 
     or damage; or
       ``(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death to any 
     person or serious injury or damage;
       ``(B) transports on board a ship--
       ``(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that 
     it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, 
     death to any person or serious injury or damage for the 
     purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a 
     government or an international organization to do or to 
     abstain from doing any act;
       ``(ii) any biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon or other 
     nuclear explosive device, knowing it to be a biological, 
     chemical, or nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive 
     device;
       ``(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, 
     or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for 
     the processing, use, or production of special fissionable 
     material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear 
     explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under 
     safeguards pursuant to an International Atomic Energy Agency 
     comprehensive safeguards agreement, except where--

       ``(I) such item is transported to or from the territory of, 
     or otherwise under the control of, a Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     State Party; and
       ``(II) the resulting transfer or receipt (including 
     internal to a country) is not contrary to the obligations 
     under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty State Party from which, to the territory of which, or 
     otherwise under the control of which such item is 
     transferred;

       ``(iv) any equipment, materials, or software or related 
     technology that significantly contributes to the design or 
     manufacture of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive 
     device, with the intention that it will be used for such 
     purpose, except where--

       ``(I) the country to the territory of which or under the 
     control of which such item is transferred is a Nuclear Weapon 
     State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
       ``(II) the resulting transfer or receipt (including 
     internal to a country) is not contrary to the obligations 
     under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of a Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty State Party from which, to the territory of which, or 
     otherwise under the control of which such item is 
     transferred;

       ``(v) any equipment, materials, or software or related 
     technology that significantly contributes to the delivery of 
     a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, with the 
     intention that it will be used for such purpose, except 
     where--

       ``(I) such item is transported to or from the territory of, 
     or otherwise under the control of, a Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     State Party; and
       ``(II) such item is intended for the delivery system of a 
     nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a Nuclear 
     Weapon State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; or

       ``(vi) any equipment, materials, or software or related 
     technology that significantly contributes to the design, 
     manufacture, or delivery of a biological or chemical weapon, 
     with the intention that it will be used for such purpose;
       ``(C) transports another person on board a ship knowing 
     that the person has committed an act that constitutes an 
     offense under section 2280 or subparagraph (A), (B), (D), or 
     (E) of this section or an offense set forth in an applicable 
     treaty, as specified in section 2280(d)(1), and intending to 
     assist that person to evade criminal prosecution;
       ``(D) injures or kills any person in connection with the 
     commission or the attempted commission of any of the offenses 
     set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C), or subsection 
     (a)(2), to the extent that the subsection (a)(2) offense 
     pertains to subparagraph (A); or
       ``(E) attempts to do any act prohibited under subparagraph 
     (A), (B) or (D), or conspires to do any act prohibited by 
     subparagraphs (A) through (E) or subsection (a)(2),
     shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 
     years, or both; and if the death of any person results from 
     conduct prohibited by this paragraph, shall be imprisoned for 
     any term of years or for life.
       ``(2) Threats.--A person who threatens, with apparent 
     determination and will to carry the threat into execution, to 
     do any act prohibited under paragraph (1)(A) shall be fined 
     under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the 
     activity prohibited in subsection (a)--
       ``(1) in the case of a covered ship, if--
       ``(A) such activity is committed--
       ``(i) against or on board a vessel of the United States or 
     a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (as 
     defined in section 70502 of title 46) at the time the 
     prohibited activity is committed;
       ``(ii) in the United States, including the territorial 
     seas; or
       ``(iii) by a national of the United States, by a United 
     States corporation or legal entity, or by a stateless person 
     whose habitual residence is in the United States;
       ``(B) during the commission of such activity, a national of 
     the United States is seized, threatened, injured, or killed; 
     or
       ``(C) the offender is later found in the United States 
     after such activity is committed;
       ``(2) in the case of a ship navigating or scheduled to 
     navigate solely within the territorial sea or internal waters 
     of a country other than the United States, if the offender is 
     later found in the United States after such activity is 
     committed; or
       ``(3) in the case of any vessel, if such activity is 
     committed in an attempt to compel the United States to do or 
     abstain from doing any act.
       ``(c) Exceptions.--This section shall not apply to--
       ``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed 
     conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war, 
     which are governed by that law; or
       ``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state 
     in the exercise of their official duties.
       ``(d)(1) Civil Forfeiture.--Any real or personal property 
     used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the 
     commission of a violation of this section, the gross proceeds 
     of such violation, and any real or personal property 
     traceable to such property or proceeds, shall be subject to 
     forfeiture.
       ``(2) Applicable Procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures 
     under this section shall be governed by the provisions of 
     chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, relating to civil 
     forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed upon the 
     Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws described in 
     section 981(d) shall be performed by such officers, agents, 
     and other persons as may be designated for that purpose by 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, or 
     the Secretary of Defense.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 111 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding after the item relating to section 2280 the 
     following new item:

``2280a. Violence against maritime navigation and maritime transport 
              involving weapons of mass destruction.''.

     SEC. 803. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2281 OF TITLE 18, UNITED 
                   STATES CODE.

       Section 2281 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 2(c)'' and 
     inserting ``section 13(c)'';
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking the definitions of 
     ``national of the United States,'' ``territorial sea of the 
     United States,'' and ``United States''; and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) Exceptions.--This section does not apply to--
       ``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed 
     conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war, 
     which are governed by that law; or
       ``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state 
     in the exercise of their official duties.''.

     SEC. 804. NEW SECTION 2281A OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 111 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding after section 2281 the following 
     new section:

     ``Sec. 2281a. Additional offenses against maritime fixed 
       platforms

       ``(a) Offenses.--
       ``(1) In general.--A person who unlawfully and 
     intentionally--
       ``(A) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or 
     context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
     government or an international organization to do or to 
     abstain from doing any act--
       ``(i) uses against or on a fixed platform or discharges 
     from a fixed platform any explosive or radioactive material, 
     biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon in a manner that 
     causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or 
     damage; or
       ``(ii) discharges from a fixed platform oil, liquefied 
     natural gas, or another hazardous or noxious substance that 
     is not covered by clause (i), in such quantity or 
     concentration

[[Page 6613]]

     that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or 
     damage;
       ``(B) injures or kills any person in connection with the 
     commission or the attempted commission of any of the offenses 
     set forth in subparagraph (A); or
       ``(C) attempts or conspires to do anything prohibited under 
     subparagraph (A) or (B),

     shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 
     years, or both; and if death results to any person from 
     conduct prohibited by this paragraph, shall be imprisoned for 
     any term of years or for life.
       ``(2) Threat to safety.--A person who threatens, with 
     apparent determination and will to carry the threat into 
     execution, to do any act prohibited under paragraph (1)(A), 
     shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 
     years, or both.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the 
     activity prohibited in subsection (a) if--
       ``(1) such activity is committed against or on board a 
     fixed platform--
       ``(A) that is located on the continental shelf of the 
     United States;
       ``(B) that is located on the continental shelf of another 
     country, by a national of the United States or by a stateless 
     person whose habitual residence is in the United States; or
       ``(C) in an attempt to compel the United States to do or 
     abstain from doing any act;
       ``(2) during the commission of such activity against or on 
     board a fixed platform located on a continental shelf, a 
     national of the United States is seized, threatened, injured, 
     or killed; or
       ``(3) such activity is committed against or on board a 
     fixed platform located outside the United States and beyond 
     the continental shelf of the United States and the offender 
     is later found in the United States.
       ``(c) Exceptions.--This section does not apply to--
       ``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed 
     conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war, 
     which are governed by that law; or
       ``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state 
     in the exercise of their official duties.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) `continental shelf' means the sea-bed and subsoil of 
     the submarine areas that extend beyond a country's 
     territorial sea to the limits provided by customary 
     international law as reflected in Article 76 of the 1982 
     Convention on the Law of the Sea; and
       ``(2) `fixed platform' means an artificial island, 
     installation, or structure permanently attached to the sea-
     bed for the purpose of exploration or exploitation of 
     resources or for other economic purposes.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 111 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding after the item relating to section 2281 the 
     following new item:

``2281a. Additional offenses against maritime fixed platforms.''.

     SEC. 805. ANCILLARY MEASURE.

       Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting ``2280a (relating to maritime safety),'' 
     before ``2281'', and by striking ``2281'' and inserting 
     ``2281 through 2281a''.

              Subtitle B--Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism

     SEC. 811. NEW SECTION 2332I OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding after section 2332h the following:

     ``Sec. 2332i. Acts of nuclear terrorism

       ``(a) Offenses.--
       ``(1) In general.--Whoever knowingly and unlawfully--
       ``(A) possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses 
     a device--
       ``(i) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
     injury; or
       ``(ii) with the intent to cause substantial damage to 
     property or the environment; or
       ``(B) uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or 
     uses or damages or interferes with the operation of a nuclear 
     facility in a manner that causes the release of or increases 
     the risk of the release of radioactive material, or causes 
     radioactive contamination or exposure to radiation--
       ``(i) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
     injury or with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause 
     death or serious bodily injury;
       ``(ii) with the intent to cause substantial damage to 
     property or the environment or with the knowledge that such 
     act is likely to cause substantial damage to property or the 
     environment; or
       ``(iii) with the intent to compel a person, an 
     international organization or a country to do or refrain from 
     doing an act,

     shall be punished as prescribed in subsection (c).
       ``(2) Threats.--Whoever, under circumstances in which the 
     threat may reasonably be believed, threatens to commit an 
     offense under paragraph (1) shall be punished as prescribed 
     in subsection (c). Whoever demands possession of or access to 
     radioactive material, a device or a nuclear facility by 
     threat or by use of force shall be punished as prescribed in 
     subsection (c).
       ``(3) Attempts and conspiracies.--Whoever attempts to 
     commit an offense under paragraph (1) or conspires to commit 
     an offense under paragraph (1) or (2) shall be punished as 
     prescribed in subsection (c).
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
       ``(1) the prohibited conduct takes place in the United 
     States or the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United 
     States;
       ``(2) the prohibited conduct takes place outside of the 
     United States and--
       ``(A) is committed by a national of the United States, a 
     United States corporation or legal entity or a stateless 
     person whose habitual residence is in the United States;
       ``(B) is committed on board a vessel of the United States 
     or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
     (as defined in section 70502 of title 46) or on board an 
     aircraft that is registered under United States law, at the 
     time the offense is committed; or
       ``(C) is committed in an attempt to compel the United 
     States to do or abstain from doing any act, or constitutes a 
     threat directed at the United States;
       ``(3) the prohibited conduct takes place outside of the 
     United States and a victim or an intended victim is a 
     national of the United States or a United States corporation 
     or legal entity, or the offense is committed against any 
     state or government facility of the United States; or
       ``(4) a perpetrator of the prohibited conduct is found in 
     the United States.
       ``(c) Penalties.--Whoever violates this section shall be 
     fined not more than $2,000,000 and shall be imprisoned for 
     any term of years or for life.
       ``(d) Nonapplicability.--This section does not apply to--
       ``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed 
     conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war, 
     which are governed by that law; or
       ``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state 
     in the exercise of their official duties.
       ``(e) Definitions.--As used in this section, the term--
       ``(1) `armed conflict' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 2332f(e)(11) of this title;
       ``(2) `device' means:
       ``(A) any nuclear explosive device; or
       ``(B) any radioactive material dispersal or radiation-
     emitting device that may, owing to its radiological 
     properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial 
     damage to property or the environment;
       ``(3) `international organization' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 831(f)(3) of this title;
       ``(4) `military forces of a state' means the armed forces 
     of a country that are organized, trained and equipped under 
     its internal law for the primary purpose of national defense 
     or security and persons acting in support of those armed 
     forces who are under their formal command, control and 
     responsibility;
       ``(5) `national of the United States' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
       ``(6) `nuclear facility' means:
       ``(A) any nuclear reactor, including reactors on vessels, 
     vehicles, aircraft or space objects for use as an energy 
     source in order to propel such vessels, vehicles, aircraft or 
     space objects or for any other purpose;
       ``(B) any plant or conveyance being used for the 
     production, storage, processing or transport of radioactive 
     material; or
       ``(C) a facility (including associated buildings and 
     equipment) in which nuclear material is produced, processed, 
     used, handled, stored or disposed of, if damage to or 
     interference with such facility could lead to the release of 
     significant amounts of radiation or radioactive material;
       ``(7) `nuclear material' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 831(f)(1) of this title;
       ``(8) `radioactive material' means nuclear material and 
     other radioactive substances that contain nuclides that 
     undergo spontaneous disintegration (a process accompanied by 
     emission of one or more types of ionizing radiation, such as 
     alpha-, beta-, neutron particles and gamma rays) and that 
     may, owing to their radiological or fissile properties, cause 
     death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to 
     property or to the environment;
       ``(9) `serious bodily injury' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 831(f)(4) of this title;
       ``(10) `state' has the same meaning as that term has under 
     international law, and includes all political subdivisions 
     thereof;
       ``(11) `state or government facility' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 2332f(e)(3) of this title;
       ``(12) `United States corporation or legal entity' means 
     any corporation or other entity organized under the laws of 
     the United States or any State, Commonwealth, territory, 
     possession or district of the United States;
       ``(13) `vessel' has the meaning given that term in section 
     1502(19) of title 33; and
       ``(14) `vessel of the United States' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 70502 of title 46.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2332h 
     the following:

``2332i. Acts of nuclear terrorism.''.

[[Page 6614]]

       (c) Disclaimer.--Nothing contained in this section is 
     intended to affect the applicability of any other Federal or 
     State law that might pertain to the underlying conduct.
       (d) Inclusion in Definition of Federal Crimes of 
     Terrorism.--Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting ``2332i (relating to acts of 
     nuclear terrorism),'' before ``2339 (relating to harboring 
     terrorists)''.

     SEC. 812. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 831 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES 
                   CODE.

       Section 831 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
        (a) in subsection (a)--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as 
     paragraphs (4) through (9);
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) without lawful authority, intentionally carries, 
     sends or moves nuclear material into or out of a country;'';
       (3) in paragraph (8), as redesignated, by striking ``an 
     offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)'' and inserting 
     ``any act prohibited under paragraphs (1) through (5)''; and
       (4) in paragraph (9), as redesignated, by striking ``an 
     offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)'' and inserting 
     ``any act prohibited under paragraphs (1) through (7)'';
       (b) in subsection (b)--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(7)'' and inserting 
     ``(8)''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``(8)'' and inserting 
     ``(9)'';
       (c) in subsection (c)--
       (1) in subparagraph (2)(A), by adding after ``United 
     States'' the following: ``or a stateless person whose 
     habitual residence is in the United States'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (5);
       (3) in paragraph (4), by striking ``or'' at the end; and
       (4) by inserting after paragraph (4), the following:
       ``(5) the offense is committed on board a vessel of the 
     United States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the 
     United States (as defined in section 70502 of title 46) or on 
     board an aircraft that is registered under United States law, 
     at the time the offense is committed;
       ``(6) the offense is committed outside the United States 
     and against any state or government facility of the United 
     States; or
       ``(7) the offense is committed in an attempt to compel the 
     United States to do or abstain from doing any act, or 
     constitutes a threat directed at the United States.'';
       (d) by redesignating subsections (d) through (f) as (e) 
     through (g), respectively;
       (e) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Nonapplicability.--This section does not apply to--
       ``(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed 
     conflict, as those terms are understood under the law of war, 
     which are governed by that law; or
       ``(2) activities undertaken by military forces of a state 
     in the exercise of their official duties.''; and
       (f) in subsection (g), as redesignated--
       (1) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (7), the following:
       ``(8) the term `armed conflict' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 2332f(e)(11) of this title;
       ``(9) the term `military forces of a state' means the armed 
     forces of a country that are organized, trained and equipped 
     under its internal law for the primary purpose of national 
     defense or security and persons acting in support of those 
     armed forces who are under their formal command, control and 
     responsibility;
       ``(10) the term `state' has the same meaning as that term 
     has under international law, and includes all political 
     subdivisions thereof;
       ``(11) the term `state or government facility' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 2332f(e)(3) of this title; 
     and
       ``(12) the term `vessel of the United States' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 70502 of title 46.''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) 
and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.


                             General Leave

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 2048, currently under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, as we speak, thousands--no, millions--of telephone 
metadata records are flowing into the NSA on a daily basis, 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week. Despite changes to the NSA bulk telephone metadata 
program announced by President Obama last year, the bulk collection of 
the records has not ceased and will not cease unless and until Congress 
acts to shut it down.
  Not even last week's decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
will end this collection. The responsibility falls to us, and today we 
must answer the call and the will of the American people to do just 
that.
  When we set out to reform this program 1 year ago, I made the pledge 
to my colleagues in Congress and to the American people that Americans' 
liberty and America's security can coexist, that these fundamental 
concepts are not mutually exclusive. They are embedded in the very 
fabric that makes this Nation great and that makes this Nation an 
example for the world.
  Mr. Speaker, the legislation before the House today--H.R. 2048, the 
USA FREEDOM Act--protects these pillars of American democracy. It 
affirmatively ends the indiscriminate bulk collection of telephone 
metadata. But it goes much further than this. It prohibits the bulk 
collection of all records under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, as well 
as under the FISA pen register trap and trace device statute and the 
National Security Letter statutes.
  In place of the current bulk telephone metadata program, the USA 
FREEDOM Act creates a targeted program that allows the intelligence 
community to collect non-content call detail records held by the 
telephone companies, but only with the prior approval of the FISA court 
and subject to the ``special selection term'' limitation. The records 
provided to the government in response to queries will be limited to 
two ``hops,'' and the government's handling of any records it acquires 
will be governed by minimization procedures approved by the FISA court.
  The USA FREEDOM Act prevents government overreach by strengthening 
the definition of ``specific selection term''--the mechanism used to 
prohibit bulk collection--to ensure the government can collect the 
information it needs to further a national security investigation while 
also prohibiting large-scale, indiscriminate collection, such as data 
from an entire State, city, or ZIP Code.
  The USA FREEDOM Act strengthens civil liberties and privacy 
protections by authorizing the FISA court to appoint an individual to 
serve as amicus curiae from a pool of experts to advise the court on 
matters of privacy and civil liberties, communications technology, and 
other technical or legal matters. It also codifies important procedures 
for recipients of National Security Letters to challenge nondisclosure 
requests.
  The bill increases transparency by requiring declassification of all 
significant FISA court opinions and provides procedures for certified 
questions of law to the FISA court of review and the United States 
Supreme Court.
  Additionally, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2048 requires the Attorney General 
and the Director of National Intelligence to provide the public with 
detailed information about how the intelligence community uses these 
national security authorities, and provides even more robust 
transparency reporting by America's technology companies.
  The USA FREEDOM Act enhances America's national security by closing 
loopholes that make it difficult for the government to track foreign 
terrorists and spies as they enter or leave the country; clarifying the 
application of FISA to foreign targets who facilitate the international 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; increasing the maximum 
penalties for material support of a foreign terrorist organization; and 
expanding the sunsets of the expiring PATRIOT Act provisions to 
December 2019.
  From beginning to end, this is a carefully crafted, bipartisan bill 
that enjoys wide support. I would like to thank the sponsor of this 
legislation, Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations 
Subcommittee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner; full

[[Page 6615]]

committee Ranking Member John Conyers; and Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet Subcommittee Ranking Member Jerry Nadler for 
working together with me on this important bipartisan legislation.
  I also want to thank the staffs of these Members for the many hours, 
weeks, yes, even months of hard work they have put into this effort. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank my staff, Caroline Lynch, the chief 
counsel of the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations 
Subcommittee, and Jason Herring, as well as Aaron Hiller with Mr. 
Conyers and Bart Forsyth with Mr. Sensenbrenner for their long hours 
and steadfast dedication to this legislation.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.
         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, May 4, 2015.
     Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office 
         Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Goodlatte: On April 30, 2015, the Committee 
     on the Judiciary ordered H.R. 2048, the USA Freedom Act of 
     2015, reported to the House.
       As you know, H.R. 2048 contains provisions that amend the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is within the 
     jurisdiction of the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence. As a result of your prior consultation with the 
     Committee, and in order to expedite the House's consideration 
     of H.R. 2048, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     will waive further consideration of the bill.
       The Committee takes this action only with the understanding 
     that this procedural route should not be construed to 
     prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence over this bill or any 
     similar bill. Furthermore, this waiver should not be 
     considered as precedent for consideration of matters of 
     jurisdictional interest to the Committee in the future, 
     including in connection with any subsequent consideration of 
     the bill by the House. The Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence will seek conferees on the bill during any 
     House-Senate conference that may be convened on this 
     legislation.
       Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our 
     exchange of letters on this matter in the Congressional 
     Record during the House debate on H.R. 2048. I appreciate the 
     constructive work between our committees on this matter and 
     thank you for your consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Devin Nunes,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                      Washington, DC, May 7, 2015.
     Hon. Devin Nunes,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Nunes: Thank you for your letter regarding 
     H.R. 2048, the ``U.S.A. Freedom Act of 2015.'' As you noted, 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was granted an 
     additional referral on the bill.
       I am most appreciative of your decision to waive further 
     consideration of H.R. 2048 so that it may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House floor. I acknowledge that although 
     you waived formal consideration of the bill, the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence is in no way waiving its 
     jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in those 
     provisions of the bill that fall within your Rule X 
     jurisdiction. Further, I understand the Committee reserves 
     the right to seek the appointment of an appropriate number of 
     conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this or 
     similar legislation, for which you will have my support.
       I will include a copy of your letter and this response in 
     the Committee Report as well as in the Congressional Record 
     during floor consideration of H.R. 2048.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Bob Goodlatte,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                                      Washington, DC, May 8, 2015.
     Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office 
         Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Goodlatte: On April 30, 2015, the Committee 
     on the Judiciary ordered H.R. 2048, the USA FREEDOM Act, to 
     be reported favorably to the House. As a result of your 
     having consulted with the Committee on Financial Services 
     concerning provisions of the bill that fall within our Rule X 
     jurisdiction, I agree to discharge our committee from further 
     consideration of the bill so that it may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House Floor.
       The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with 
     our mutual understanding that, by foregoing consideration of 
     H.R. 2048 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over 
     the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, 
     and that our committee will be appropriately consulted and 
     involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward so 
     that we may address any remaining issues that fall within our 
     Rule X jurisdiction. Our committee also reserves the right to 
     seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any 
     House-Senate conference involving this or similar 
     legislation, and requests your support for any such request.
       Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter 
     confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 2048 and 
     would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this 
     matter be included in your committee's report to accompany 
     the legislation and/or in the Congressional Record during 
     floor consideration thereof.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Jeb Hensarling,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                     Washington, DC, May 11, 2015.
     Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Hensarling: Thank you for your letter 
     regarding H.R. 2048, the ``U.S.A. Freedom Act of 2015.'' As 
     you noted, the Committee on Financial services was granted an 
     additional referral on the bill.
       I am most appreciative of your decision to waive further 
     consideration of H.R. 2048 so that it may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House floor. 1 acknowledge that although 
     you waived formal consideration of the bill, the Committee on 
     Financial Services is in no way waiving its jurisdiction over 
     the subject matter contained in those provisions of the bill 
     that fall within your Rule X jurisdiction. Further, I 
     understand the Committee reserves the right to seek the 
     appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any 
     House-Senate conference involving this or similar 
     legislation, for which you will have my support.
       I will include a copy of your letter and this response in 
     the Congressional Record during floor consideration of H.R. 
     2048.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Bob Goodlatte,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Ladies and gentlemen, with the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act today, 
the House will have done its part to enact historic and sweeping 
reforms to the government's surveillance program and powers. This 
legislation ends bulk collection, creates a panel of experts to guide 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and mandates extensive 
government reporting.
  Today we have a rare opportunity to restore a measure of restraint to 
surveillance programs that have simply gone too far. For years the 
government has read section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to mean that it may 
collect all domestic telephone records merely because some of them may 
be relevant at some time in the future.
  Last week, endorsing a view that I and many of my colleagues have 
held for years, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that ``the 
text of section 215 cannot bear the weight the government asks us to 
assign it, and it does not authorize the telephone metadata program.''
  Now, with section 215 set to expire on June 1, we have the 
opportunity--and the obligation--to act clearly and decisively and end 
the program that has infringed on our rights for far too long.
  A vote in favor of the USA FREEDOM Act is an explicit rejection of 
the government's unlawful interpretation of section 215 and similar 
statutes. Put another way, a vote in favor of this bill is a vote to 
end dragnet surveillance in the United States.
  Mr. Speaker, the ban on bulk collection contained in this legislation 
turns on the idea of a ``specific selection term'' and requires the 
government to limit the scope of production as narrowly as possible. 
This definition is much improved from the version of this bill that 
passed the House last Congress.
  The bill further requires the government to declassify and publish 
all novel and significant opinions of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.

                              {time}  1430

  It also creates a panel of experts to advise the court on the 
protection of

[[Page 6616]]

privacy and civil liberties, communications technology, and other legal 
and technical matters.
  These changes, along with robust reporting requirements for the 
government and flexible reporting options for private companies, create 
a new and inescapable level of that all-important consideration of 
transparency. The government may one day again attempt to expand its 
surveillance power by clever legal argument, but it will no longer be 
allowed to do so in secret.
  Mr. Speaker, there are Members of the House and Senate who oppose 
this bill because it does not include every reform to surveillance law 
that we can create, and then there are others who oppose it because it 
includes any changes to existing surveillance programs.
  This bill represents a reasonable consensus, and it will accomplish 
the most sweeping set of reforms to government surveillance in nearly 
40 years.
  H.R. 2048 has earned the support of privacy advocates, private 
industry, the White House, and the intelligence community. It ends 
dragnet surveillance and does so without diminishing in any way our 
ability to protect this country.
  I want to extend my sincere thanks to Chairman Goodlatte, to Mr. 
Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, and to Mr. Nadler of New York for working 
with me to bring a stronger version of the USA FREEDOM Act to the 
floor. I think we succeeded. I also want to thank Chairman Nunes and 
Ranking Member Schiff for helping us to reach this point.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support H.R. 2048, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 
5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the 
chairman of the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigation 
Subcommittee and the chief sponsor of this legislation.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, you know you have drafted a strong 
bill when you unite both national security hawks and civil 
libertarians. The USA FREEDOM Act has done that. It also has the 
support of privacy groups, tech companies, and the intelligence 
community.
  This bill is an extremely well-drafted compromise, the product of 
nearly 2 years of work. It effectively protects America's civil 
liberties and our national security. I am very proud of the USA FREEDOM 
Act and am confident it is the most responsible path forward.
  I do not fault my colleagues who wish that this bill went further to 
protect our civil liberties. For years, the government has violated the 
privacy of innocent Americans, and I share your anger, but letting 
section 215 and other surveillance authorities expire would not only 
threaten our national security, it would also mean less privacy 
protections. I emphasize it would also mean less privacy protections.
  The USA FREEDOM Act also ends bulk collections across all domestic 
surveillance authorities, not just section 215. It also expands 
transparency with increased reporting from both government and private 
companies. If the administration finds a new way to circumvent the law, 
Congress and the public will know. The bill also requires the FISC to 
declassify significant legal decisions, bringing an end to secret laws.
  If the PATRIOT Act authorities expire and the FISC approves bulk 
collection under a different authority, how will the public know? 
Without the USA FREEDOM Act, they will not. Allowing the PATRIOT Act 
authorities to expire sounds like a civil libertarian victory, but it 
will actually mean less privacy and more risk--less privacy and more 
risk.
  Now, to my colleagues who oppose the USA FREEDOM Act because they 
don't believe it does enough for national security, this bill is a 
significant improvement over the status quo. Americans will be safer 
post USA FREEDOM than they would be if Congress passes a clean 
reauthorization of the expiring provisions.
  I am not ignorant to the threats we face, but a clean reauthorization 
would be irresponsible. Congress never intended section 215 to allow 
bulk collection. That program is illegal and based on a blatant 
misinterpretation of the law. That said, the FREEDOM Act gives the 
intelligence community new tools to combat terrorism in more targeted 
and effective ways.
  Specifically, the bill replaces the administration's bulk metadata 
collection with a targeted program to collect only the records the 
government needs without compromising the privacy of innocent 
Americans.
  It includes new authorities to allow the administration to expedite 
emergency requests under section 215 and fills holes in our 
surveillance law that require intelligence agencies to go dark on known 
terrorists or spies when they transit from outside to inside the U.S. 
or vice versa.
  Under current law, the administration has to temporarily stop 
monitoring persons of interest as it shifts between domestic and 
international surveillance authorities. What is more likely to stop the 
next terrorist attack: the bulk collection of innocent Americans or the 
ability to track down a known terrorist as soon as he or she enters the 
United States?
  If you answer that question the same way I do, then don't let the 
bluster and fear-mongering of the bill's opponents convince you we are 
safer with a clean reauthorization than we are with this bill.
  Attorney General Lynch and Director of National Intelligence Clapper 
recognize this. In a recent letter of support, they wrote:

       The significant reforms contained in this legislation will 
     provide the public greater confidence in how our intelligence 
     activities are carried out and in the oversight of those 
     activities, while ensuring vital national security 
     authorities remain in place.

  Let's not kill these important reforms because we wish this bill did 
more. There is no perfect. Every bill we vote on could do more. I play 
the lottery. When I win, I don't throw away the winning ticket because 
I wish the jackpot were higher.
  It is time to pass the USA FREEDOM Act. I am asking all my 
colleagues--Democrats and Republicans, security hawks, and civil 
libertarians--to vote for it. Let's speak with one voice in the House 
of Representatives and together urge the United States Senate to work 
quickly and adopt these important reforms.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), to recognize his indefatigable 
work, a senior member of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman.
  Mr. Speaker, the USA FREEDOM Act represents a return to the basic 
principle of the Fourth Amendment, the right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.
  Before the government may search our homes, seize our persons, or 
intercept our communications, it must first make a showing of 
individualized suspicion. The intrusion it requests must be as targeted 
and as brief as circumstances allow. The Fourth Amendment demands no 
less.
  That is why we are here today. We have learned that the government 
has engaged in unreasonable searches against all of us. It has gathered 
an enormous amount of information about every phone call in the United 
States. It has deemed all of our phone calls relevant to a terrorism 
investigation. It is intolerable to our sense of freedom.
  Today, we are acting to stop it. The bill before us prohibits the 
intelligence community from engaging in bulk data collection within the 
United States.
  This practice, the dragnet collection without a warrant of telephone 
records and Internet metadata, is the contemporary equivalent of the 
British writs of assistance that early American revolutionaries opposed 
and that the Fourth Amendment was drafted to outlaw. It has never 
complied with the Constitution and must be brought to an end without 
delay.
  The legal theories that justified these programs were developed and 
approved in secret, and that practice

[[Page 6617]]

must also come to an end. There must not be a body of secret law in the 
United States.
  Section 215 says tangible things may be seized if they are relevant 
to a terrorism investigation. The government's interpretation that this 
means ``everything'' is obviously wrong, could only have been advanced 
in secret, and cannot withstand the public scrutiny to which it is now 
subjected. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals threw out this notion 
last week, and now, we must do so as well.
  This bill further requires the government to promptly declassify and 
release each novel or significant opinion of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court. In the future, if the government advances a 
similarly dubious legal claim, there will be an advocate in court to 
oppose it. If the court should agree with the novel claim, the public 
will know about it almost immediately, and the responsibility will lie 
with us to correct it just as quickly.
  Before I close, I want to be clear. Not every reform I would have 
hoped to enact is included in this bill. We must do more to protect 
U.S. person information collected under section 702 of FISA. We must 
act to reform other authorities, many of them law enforcement rather 
than intelligence community authorities, to prevent indiscriminate 
searches in other circumstances.
  I will continue to fight for these reforms, among others, and I know 
that I will not be alone in taking up that challenge in the days to 
come, but I am grateful that we have the opportunity to take this first 
major step to restore the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects and to do so without in any way 
endangering national security.
  I thank Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman Sensenbrenner, and Ranking 
Member Conyers for their continued leadership on this legislation, and 
I urge every one of my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Before I yield to the next speaker, I want to say to him and his 
colleagues on the House Intelligence Committee that they did marvelous 
work in protecting not only the national security, but the civil 
liberties of Americans.
  They worked with the Judiciary Committee together to prove that we 
can have very high levels of civil liberty and very high levels of 
national security. I thank Chairman Nunes and his staff for that 
outstanding work.
  Now, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Nunes), the chairman of the House Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2048, the USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2015.
  Ideally, we would reauthorize section 215 of the U.S. PATRIOT Act and 
other expiring FISA authorities without making any changes. These 
provisions authorize important counterterrorism programs, including the 
NSA bulk telephone metadata program.
  What is more, they are constitutional, authorized by Congress, and 
subject to multiple layers of oversight from all three branches of 
government. As threats to Americans at home and abroad increase by the 
day, now is not the time to be weakening our national security with all 
the tragic consequences that may follow.
  However, I also realize that some of my colleagues disagree. Despite 
the fact that the NSA bulk telephone metadata program has never been 
intentionally misused, many Members wish to make changes to increase 
confidence in the program and allow greater transparency into 
intelligence activities.
  Like the bill the House passed last year with more than 300 votes, 
this bill would replace the bulk program that will expire on June 1 
with a targeted authority. This new targeted authority will be slower 
and potentially less effective than the current program. Along with 
Ranking Member Schiff, I have worked with the Judiciary Committee to 
ensure these changes still allow as much operational flexibility as 
possible.
  Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and Subcommittee Chairman 
Sensenbrenner, thank you for the constructive work between our 
committees.
  In addition, the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 contains several significant 
measures to improve national security that were not part of last year's 
bill. It closes a loophole in current law that requires the government 
to stop monitoring the communications of foreign terrorists, including 
ISIL fighters from Syria and Iraq, when they enter the United States.
  It streamlines the process for the government to track foreign spies 
who temporarily leave the United States. It helps the government 
investigate proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. It increases 
the maximum sentence for material support to a foreign terrorist 
organization.
  Those changes are real improvements that will make it easier for our 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to keep Americans safe.
  Again, I would prefer a clean reauthorization, but the bill we 
consider today is the best way forward in the House to ensure Congress 
takes responsible action to protect national security. I urge my 
colleagues to support it.
                                      Administrative Office of the


                                         United States Courts,

                                      Washington, DC, May 4, 2015.
     Hon. Devin Nunes,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House 
         of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write regarding H.R. 2048, the ``USA 
     Freedom Act,'' which was recently ordered reported by the 
     Judiciary Committee, to provide perspectives on the 
     legislation, particularly an assessment that the pending 
     version of the bill could impede the effective operation of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts.
       In letters to the Committee on January 13, 2014 and May 13, 
     2014, we commented on various proposed changes to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Our comments focused on 
     the operational impact of certain proposed changes on the 
     Judicial Branch, particularly the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court (``FISC'') and the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review (collectively ``FISA Courts''), 
     but did not express views on core policy choices that the 
     political branches are considering regarding intelligence 
     collection. In keeping with that approach, we offer views on 
     aspects of H.R. 2048 that bear directly on the work of the 
     FISA Courts and how that work is presented to the public. We 
     sincerely appreciate the ongoing efforts of the bipartisan 
     leadership of all the congressional committees of 
     jurisdiction to listen to and attempt to accommodate our 
     perspectives and concerns.
       We respectfully request that, if possible, this letter be 
     included with your Committee's report to the House on the 
     bill.


                          Summary of Concerns

       We have three main concerns. First, H.R. 2048 proposes a 
     ``panel of experts'' for the FISA Courts which could, in our 
     assessment, impair the courts' ability to protect civil 
     liberties by impeding their receipt of complete and accurate 
     information from the government (in contrast to the helpful 
     amicus curiae approach contained in the FISA Improvements Act 
     of 2013 (``FIA''), which was approved in similar form by the 
     House in 2014). Second, we continue to have concerns with the 
     prospect of public ``summaries'' of FISA Courts' opinions 
     when the opinions themselves are not released to the public. 
     Third, we have a few other specific technical concerns with 
     H.R. 2048 as drafted.


                       Nature of the FISA Courts

       With the advent of a new Congress and newly proposed 
     legislation, it seems helpful to restate briefly some key 
     attributes of the work of the FISA Courts.
       The vast majority of the work of the FISC involves 
     individual applications in which experienced judges apply 
     well-established law to a set of facts presented by the 
     government--a process not dissimilar to the ex parte 
     consideration of ordinary criminal search warrant 
     applications. Review of entire programs of collection and 
     applications involving bulk collection are a relatively small 
     part of the docket, and applications involving novel legal 
     questions, though obviously important, are rare.
       In all matters, the FISA Courts currently depend on--and 
     will always depend on--prompt and complete candor from the 
     government in providing the courts with all relevant 
     information because the government is typically the only 
     source of such information.
       A ``read copy'' practice--similar to the practices employed 
     in some federal district

[[Page 6618]]

     courts for Title III wiretap applications--wherein the 
     government provides the FISC with an advance draft of each 
     planned application, is the major avenue for court 
     modification of government-sought surveillance. About a 
     quarter of ``read copies'' are modified or withdrawn at the 
     instigation of the FISC before the government presents a 
     final application--in contrast to the overwhelming majority 
     of formal applications that are approved by the Court because 
     modifications at the ``read copy'' stage have addressed the 
     Court's concerns in cases where final applications are 
     submitted.
       The FISC typically operates in an environment where, for 
     national security reasons and because of statutory 
     requirements, time is of the essence, and collateral 
     litigation, including for discovery, would generally be 
     completely impractical.
       At times, the FISA Courts are presented with challenging 
     issues regarding how existing law applies to novel 
     technologies. In these instances, the FISA Courts could 
     benefit from a conveniently available explanation or 
     evaluation of the technology from an informed non-government 
     source. Congress could assist in this regard by clarifying 
     the law to provide mechanisms for this to occur easily (e.g., 
     by providing for pre-cleared experts with whom the Court can 
     share and receive information to the extent it deems 
     necessary).


 the ``panel of experts'' approach of h.r. 2048 could impede the fisa 
                              courts' work

       H.R. 2048 provides for what proponents have referred to as 
     a ``panel of experts'' and what in the bill is referred to as 
     a group of at least five individuals who may serve as an 
     ``amicus curiae'' in a particular matter. However, unlike a 
     true amicus curiae, the FISA Courts would be required to 
     appoint such an individual to participate in any case 
     involving a ``novel or significant interpretation of law'' 
     (emphasis added)--unless the court ``issues a finding'' that 
     appointment is not appropriate. Once appointed, such amici 
     are required to present to the court, ``as appropriate,'' 
     legal arguments in favor of privacy, information about 
     technology, or other ``relevant'' information. Designated 
     amici are required to have access to ``all relevant'' legal 
     precedent, as well as certain other materials ``the court 
     determines are relevant.''
       Our assessment is that this ``panel of experts'' approach 
     could impede the FISA Courts' role in protecting the civil 
     liberties of Americans. We recognize this may not be the 
     intent of the drafters, but nonetheless it is our concern. As 
     we have indicated, the full cooperation of rank-and-file 
     government personnel in promptly conveying to the FISA Courts 
     complete and candid factual information is critical. A 
     perception on their part that the FISA process involves a 
     ``panel of experts'' officially charged with opposing the 
     government's efforts could risk deterring the necessary and 
     critical cooperation and candor. Specifically, our concern is 
     that imposing the mandatory ``duties''--contained in 
     subparagraph (i)(4) of proposed section 401 (in combination 
     with a quasi-mandatory appointment process)--could create 
     such a perception within the government that a standing body 
     exists to oppose intelligence activities.
       Simply put, delays and difficulties in receiving full and 
     accurate information from Executive Branch agencies 
     (including, but not limited to, cases involving non-
     compliance) present greater challenges to the FISA Courts' 
     role in protecting civil liberties than does the lack of a 
     non-governmental perspective on novel legal issues or 
     technological developments. To be sure, we would welcome a 
     means of facilitating the FISA Courts' obtaining assistance 
     from nongovernmental experts in unusual cases, but it is 
     critically important that the means chosen to achieve that 
     end do not impair the timely receipt of complete and accurate 
     information from the government.
       It is on this point especially that we believe the ``panel 
     of experts'' system in H.R. 2048 may prove counterproductive. 
     The information that the FISA Courts need to examine probable 
     cause, evaluate minimization and targeting procedures, and 
     determine and enforce compliance with court authorizations 
     and orders is exclusively in the hands of the government--
     specifically, in the first instance, intelligence agency 
     personnel. If disclosure of sensitive or adverse information 
     to the FISA Courts came to be seen as a prelude to disclosure 
     to a third party whose mission is to oppose or curtail the 
     agency's work, then the prompt receipt of complete and 
     accurate information from the government would likely be 
     impaired--ultimately to the detriment of the national 
     security interest in expeditious action and the effective 
     protection of privacy and civil liberties.
       In contrast, a ``true'' amicus curiae approach, as adopted, 
     for example, in the FIA, facilitates appointment of experts 
     outside the government to serve as amici curiae and render 
     any form of assistance needed by the court, without any 
     implication that such experts are expected to oppose the 
     intelligence activities proposed by the government. For that 
     reason, we do not believe the FIA approach poses any similar 
     risk to the courts' obtaining relevant information.


   ``summaries'' of unreleased fisa court opinions could mislead the 
                                 public

       In our May 13, 2014, letter to the Committee on H.R. 3361, 
     we shared the nature of our concerns regarding the creation 
     of public ``summaries'' of court opinions that are not 
     themselves released. The provisions in H.R. 2048 are similar 
     and so are our concerns. To be clear, the FISA Courts have 
     never objected to their opinions--whether in full or in 
     redacted form--being released to the public to the maximum 
     extent permitted by the Executive's assessment of national 
     security concerns. Likewise, the FISA Courts have always 
     facilitated the provision of their full opinions to Congress. 
     See, e.g., FISC Rule of Procedure 62(c). Thus, we have no 
     objection to the provisions in H.R. 2048 that call for 
     maximum public release of court opinions. However, a formal 
     practice of creating summaries of court opinions without the 
     underlying opinion being available is unprecedented in 
     American legal administration. Summaries of court opinions 
     can be inadvertently incorrect or misleading, and may omit 
     key considerations that can prove critical for those seeking 
     to understand the import of the court's full opinion. This is 
     particularly likely to be a problem in the fact-focused area 
     of FISA practice, under circumstances where the government 
     has already decided that it cannot release the underlying 
     opinion even in redacted form, presumably because the 
     opinion's legal analysis is inextricably intertwined with 
     classified facts.


               additional technical comments on h.r. 2048

       The Judiciary, like the public, did not participate in the 
     discussions between the Administration and congressional 
     leaders that led to H.R. 2048 (publicly released on April 28, 
     2015 and reported by the Judiciary Committee without changes 
     on April 30). In the few days we have had to review the bill, 
     we have noted a few technical concerns that we hope can be 
     addressed prior to finalization of the legislation, should 
     Congress choose to enact it. These concerns (all in the 
     amicus curiae subsection) include:
       Proposed subparagraph (9) appears inadvertently to omit the 
     ability of the FISA Courts to train and administer amici 
     between the time they are designated and the time they are 
     appointed.
       Proposed subparagraph (6) dots not make any provision for a 
     ``true amicus'' appointed under subparagraph (2)(B) to 
     receive necessary information.
       We are concerned that a lack of parallel construction in 
     proposed clause (6)(A)(i) (apparently differentiating between 
     access to legal precedent as opposed to access to other 
     materials) could lead to confusion in its application.
       We recommend adding additional language to clarify that the 
     exercise of the duties under proposed subparagraph (4) would 
     occur in the context of Court rules (for example, deadlines 
     and service requirements).
       We believe that slightly greater clarity could be provided 
     regarding the nature of the obligations referred to in 
     proposed subparagraph (10).
       These concerns would generally be avoided or addressed by 
     substituting the FIA approach. Furthermore, it bears emphasis 
     that, even if H.R. 2048 were amended to address all of these 
     technical points, our more fundamental concerns about the 
     ``panel of experts'' approach would not be fully assuaged. 
     Nonetheless, our staff stands ready to work with your staff 
     to provide suggested textual changes to address each of these 
     concerns.
       Finally, although we have no particular objection to the 
     requirement in this legislation of a report by the Director 
     of the AO, Congress should be aware that the AO's role would 
     be to receive information from the FISA Courts and then 
     simply transmit the report as directed by law.
       For the sake of brevity, we are not restating here all the 
     comments in our previous correspondence to Congress on 
     proposed legislation similar to H.R. 2048. However, the 
     issues raised in those letters continue to be of importance 
     to us.
       We hope these comments are helpful to the House of 
     Representatives in its consideration of this legislation. If 
     we may be of further assistance in this or any other matter, 
     please contact me or our Office of Legislative Affairs.
           Sincerely,
                                                    James C. Duff,
                                                         Director.

                              {time}  1445

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), an effective member of the 
House Judiciary Committee.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I believe this bill makes meaningful reform 
to a few of the surveillance programs, but it in no way stops all of 
the bulk collection of U.S. person communications currently occurring. 
This bill won't stop the most egregious and widely reported privacy 
violations that occur under section 702 and Executive Order No. 12333.
  In a declassified decision, the FISA court said that the NSA had been 
collecting substantially more U.S. person

[[Page 6619]]

communications through its upstream collection program than it had 
originally told the court. With upstream collection, the NSA directly 
taps into international Internet cables to search through all of the 
communications that flow through it, looking for communications that 
map certain criteria.
  Four years ago, the court found that the government was collecting 
tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications a year. Why? 
Because all of your data is everywhere. No accurate estimate can be 
given for the even larger number of communications collected in which a 
U.S. person was a party to the communication.
  The Director of National Intelligence confirmed the government 
searches this vast amount of data, including the content of email and 
of telephone calls, without individualized suspicion, probable cause, 
and without a warrant. The Director of the FBI says they use 
information to build criminal cases against U.S. persons. This is an 
end run around the Fourth Amendment, and it has to stop.
  This bill did not create those problems. However, this bill doesn't 
correct those problems. During the markup of the bill, Chairman 
Goodlatte stated that these issues would be next, but we can't afford 
to wait until the final hour of expiration to take action like we did 
with this bill. To do so would mean at least another 2 years of the 
mass surveillance of Americans, which is unconscionable. Last year, the 
House voted 293-123 to close these backdoor loopholes, but the Rules 
Committee would not allow the House to vote today to put these fixes 
into this bill.
  I voted in committee to advance this bill for a couple of reasons, 
and I do want to thank all of the members who worked on this but single 
out Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner, who was the author of the bill and 
who has worked so hard to make sure that improvements are made. The 
bill is an improvement over a straight reauthorization of the bill. I 
also listened carefully to the verbal commitments that the 702 fix 
would be included, and I reserve the right to oppose this bill when it 
comes back from the Senate if we can't close these loopholes.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), a member of the House Judiciary 
Committee and an original cosponsor of this legislation.
  Mr. FORBES. I thank the chairman.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the USA FREEDOM Act, which 
passed the Judiciary Committee with bipartisan support just 2 weeks 
ago.
  The bill accomplishes the twin goals of protecting our Nation from 
our enemies while safeguarding the civil liberties that our 
servicemembers fight for every day.
  Americans across the country have called for the NSA to listen less 
and elected officials to listen more. The USA FREEDOM Act will end the 
NSA's bulk collection program, which was established under section 215 
of the PATRIOT Act, and it will further protect Americans' Fourth 
Amendment rights by strengthening oversight and accountability of the 
intelligence community.
  As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I work with our 
servicemembers and military leaders daily to ensure our adversaries do 
not harm this great Nation. That is why I applaud Chairman Goodlatte 
and Mr. Sensenbrenner for including provisions in the bill to address 
the growing threat of ISIL.
  With continued threats of terrorism, our Nation's intelligence 
community must be equipped to protect our Nation and national security 
interests. However, any intelligence framework must be confined within 
the boundaries of the United States Constitution. Striking this balance 
between safeguarding privacy and protecting Americans is a challenge in 
today's post-9/11 world, but it is one that should not tip towards 
allowing the government to trample on our constitutional rights. 
Security must not come at the cost of Americans' liberties. That is why 
I urge my colleagues today to support this bill.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the ranking member and the chairman of 
the full committee. As my colleagues have done, let me also acknowledge 
the chairman of the Crime Subcommittee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, on which I 
serve as the ranking member. As many have noted, let me acknowledge the 
work of Mr. Goodlatte and Mr. Conyers and their leadership on a very 
important statement on behalf of the American people.
  Mr. Speaker, the USA FREEDOM Act is the House's unified response to 
the unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in 
June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from 
Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers which 
were authorized by the FISA court pursuant to section 215 of the 
PATRIOT Act.
  You can imagine, Mr. Speaker, the public was not happy. There was 
justifiable concern on the part of the public and by a large percentage 
of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of the NSA data 
collection bundling, which, by orders of magnitude, exceeded anything 
previously authorized or contemplated, may have constituted an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy and a threat to the civil liberties of 
Americans.
  Mr. Speaker, I have been a decade-plus-long member of the Homeland 
Security Committee. I do not in any way want to infringe upon the 
security of this Nation, but if we allow the terrorists to terrorize 
us, then we are in very bad shape, and I am glad the voices of 
opposition were raised.
  To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National 
Intelligence declassified and released limited information about the 
program, but it did not, by any means, satisfy the concern raised by 
Americans. The DNI stated that the only type of information acquired 
under the court's order was telephone metadata, such as telephone 
numbers dialed and length of calls. That did not satisfy our concern.
  I am very pleased that we are here on the floor of the House putting 
forward something that addresses the concerns but that does not 
undermine the security of America. For example, I introduced the FISA 
court in the Sunshine Act of 2013 in response to this. Without 
compromising national security, it was bipartisan legislation that gave 
much-needed transparency to the decision orders and opinions of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISA.
  My bill would require the Attorney General to disclose each decision. 
I am glad that, in this bill, we have positions and points where the 
Attorney General is conducting declassification review. I am also 
pleased that the bill before us contains an explicit prohibition and a 
restraint, pursuant to section 215, on the bulk collection of tangible 
things.
  We are making a difference with the USA FREEDOM Act, and it is 
interesting that groups as different as the R Street Institute and the 
Human Rights Watch are, in essence, supporting this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that we can do what we need to do by passing 
this legislation and by then going to an amendment on section 702, 
which I will support. Security goes along with protection, and I 
believe this particular legislation does it.
  Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and an 
original co-sponsor, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2048, the ``USA 
Freedom Act,'' which is stands for ``Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and 
Online Monitoring Act.''
  I support the USA Freedom Act for several reasons:
  1. The bill ends all bulk collection of business records under 
Section 215 and prohibits bulk collection under the FISA Pen Register/
Trap and Trace Device authority and National Security Letter 
authorities.
  2. The USA Freedom Act strengthens the definition of ``specific 
selection term,'' the mechanism used to prohibit bulk collection, which 
prevents large-scale, indiscriminate data collection while at the same 
time ensuring the government can collect the information it needs to 
further a national security investigation.
  3. The USA Freedom Act strengthens protections for civil liberties by 
creating a panel of

[[Page 6620]]

experts to advise the FISA Court on matters of privacy and civil 
liberties, communications technology, and other technical or legal 
matters and also codifies important procedures for recipients of 
National Security Letters.
  4. The bill increases transparency by requiring declassification of 
all significant opinions of the FISA Court and provides procedures for 
certified questions of law to the FISA Court of Review and the Supreme 
Court.
  5. The USA Freedom Act requires the Attorney General and the Director 
of National Intelligence to provide the public with detailed guidance 
about how they can use these national security authorities, and 
provides even more reporting by America's technology companies.
  6. The USA Freedom Act contains several important national security 
enhancements, including closing loopholes that make it difficult for 
the government to track foreign terrorists and spies as they enter or 
leave the country.
  The USA Freedom Act is the House's unified response to the 
unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in 
June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from 
Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers, which 
was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot 
Act.
  Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering 
operation was swift and negative.
  There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large 
percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of 
this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of 
magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil 
liberties of American citizens.
  To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National 
Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this 
program. According to the DNI, the information acquired under this 
program did not include the content of any communications or the 
identity of any subscriber.
  The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the 
Court's order is telephony metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed 
and length of calls.''
  The assurance given by the DNI, to put it mildly, was not very 
reassuring.
  In response, many Members of Congress, including the Ranking Member 
Conyers, and Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in 
response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of 
the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA 
Patriot Act and subsequent amendments.
  For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine 
Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that provided much needed 
transparency without compromising national security to the decisions, 
orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or 
``FISA Court.''
  Specifically, my bill required the Attorney General to disclose each 
decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority 
the government is claiming under the PATRIOT ACT and Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to 
keep Americans safe.
  I am pleased that these requirements are incorporated in substantial 
part in the USA Freedom Act, which requires the Attorney General to 
conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion 
of the FISA court that includes a significant construction or 
interpretation of law and to submit a report to Congress within 45 
days.
  As I indicated, perhaps the most important reasons for supporting 
passage of H.R. 2048 is the bill's prohibition on domestic bulk 
collection, as well as its criteria for specifying the information to 
be collected, applies not only to Section 215 surveillance activities 
but also to other law enforcement communications interception 
authorities, such as national security letters.
  Finally, I strongly support the USA Freedom Act because Section 301 
of the bill continues to contain protections against ``reverse 
targeting,'' which became law when an earlier Jackson Lee Amendment was 
included in H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007.
  ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this 
Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the 
arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government 
targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to 
collect information on certain U.S. persons.
  One of the main concerns of libertarians and classical conservatives, 
as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, in giving 
expanded authority to the executive branch was the temptation of 
national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be 
difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it.
  The Jackson Lee Amendment, preserved in Section 301 of the USA 
Freedom Act, reduces even further any such temptation to resort to 
reverse targeting by making any information concerning a United States 
person obtained improperly inadmissible in any federal, state, or local 
judicial, legal, executive, or administrative proceeding.
  Mr. Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 2007, 
that as Alexis DeTocqueville, the most astute student of American 
democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies 
invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the 
governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that 
are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a 
love of justice.
  I support the USA Freedom Act because it will help keep us true to 
the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance between cherished 
liberties and smart security.
  I urge my colleagues to support the USA Freedom Act.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Mimi Walters), a member of the 
House Judiciary Committee and an original cosponsor of this bill.
  Mrs. MIMI WALTERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support 
of H.R. 2048, the USA FREEDOM Act, of which I am proud to be an 
original cosponsor.
  This vital bill will reform our Nation's intelligence-gathering 
programs to end the bulk collection of data, strengthen Americans' 
civil liberties, and protect our homeland from those who wish to do us 
harm.
  In passing this legislation, we can provide officials with the tools 
they need to combat terrorist groups, such as ISIL, by closing a 
current loophole that requires the government to stop tracking foreign 
terrorists upon their entering the United States.
  This bill will also provide for the robust oversight of our 
intelligence agencies by requiring additional reporting standards on 
how FISA authorities are employed. Furthermore, H.R. 2048 will prevent 
government overreach and will increase privacy protections by ending 
the large-scale, indiscriminate collection of data, which includes all 
records from an entire State, city, or ZIP Code.
  With section 215 of the PATRIOT Act set to expire soon, it is vital 
that Congress acts quickly to pass this bipartisan bill so that we can 
keep our country safe and so that we can work to restore the trust of 
the American people.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Jeffries).
  Mr. JEFFRIES. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. Speaker, in a democracy, there must be a balance between 
effective national security protection on the one hand and a healthy 
respect for privacy and civil liberties interests on the other. This is 
a balance that traces all the way back to the founding of the Republic. 
It is rooted most prominently in the Bill of Rights, in the 
Constitution, in the Fourth Amendment. Yet, in its zeal to protect the 
homeland, our national security apparatus overreached into the lives of 
everyday, hard-working Americans in a manner that was inconsistent with 
our traditional notions of privacy and civil liberties. This overreach 
was unnecessary, unacceptable, and unconstitutional.
  By ending bulk collection through section 215, we have taken a 
substantial step in the right direction toward restoring the balance. 
More must be done, but I am going to support this legislation because 
of the meaningful effort that has been made to help strike the 
appropriate balance.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa), who is the chairman of the 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet Subcommittee and a 
strong supporter of this legislation.
  Mr. ISSA. I thank the chairman.
  Mr. Speaker, each person who comes up here will talk to you about the 
painstaking work that the chairman and the ranking member went through 
to craft a bill that would both strengthen our security, following on

[[Page 6621]]

with things we have learned since the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, and 
also make changes based on both lessons learned of things the PATRIOT 
Act overdid and excesses by the Presidential usurping of the intent of 
Congress. We have achieved that by a 25-2 vote in our committee, a vote 
that is almost unheard of.
  I think, most importantly, though, we are doing something the 
American people need to know, and that is we are bringing transparency 
to the process for the first time. Under this legislation, a FISA 
court, working in secrecy, that makes a decision to expand or to in 
some other way add more surveillance will have to publish those 
findings, declassify them, and make them available not just to Congress 
but to the American people.
  We cannot guarantee that behind closed doors secret--and necessarily 
secret--judge actions would always be what we would like, but under 
this reform, we can ensure that Congress and the American people will 
have the transparency and oversight as to those actions, not by whom 
they were after but what they did. That is going to bring the true 
reform that has been needed in a process in which the trust of the 
American people has been in doubt since the Snowden revelation.
  I, personally, want to thank the ranking member and the chairman. 
This could not have happened without bipartisan work and without the 
support of those who want to strengthen our security and of those who 
want to strengthen and retain our freedoms under the Fourth Amendment.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. DelBene).
  Ms. DelBENE. Mr. Speaker, last week, the Second Circuit confirmed 
what a lot of Members have been saying for years: the NSA has brazenly 
exploited the PATRIOT Act to conduct surveillance far beyond what the 
law permits; but the court refrained from enforcing its decision, 
instead placing the burden on Congress to protect Americans from 
unwarranted mass surveillance.
  That is why I am proud to be a cosponsor of this year's USA FREEDOM 
Act, a serious reform bill that would go a long way to protecting 
Americans' privacy by ending bulk collection and by creating greater 
transparency, oversight, and accountability.

                              {time}  1500

  After the House acts today, it is up to the Senate leaders to pass 
these reforms or let the expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act sunset 
on June 1 because a clean reauthorization is absolutely unacceptable. I 
urge my colleagues in each Chamber to support this critical effort to 
end bulk collection and protect both Americans' privacy and America's 
security.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hurd).
  Mr. HURD of Texas. I thank the chairman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, as a former CIA officer, I completely understand the 
need for the men and women in our intelligence agencies to have access 
to timely, vital information as they track down bad guys.
  As an American citizen, I know how important our civil rights are and 
that it is the government's job to protect those rights, not infringe 
upon them. I believe that we, as a nation, as a government, as a people 
can do both, and that is why I am supporting the USA FREEDOM Act. 
Because it prioritizes both and strikes the right balance between 
privacy and security, Americans can rest assured that their private 
information isn't being subjected to bulk collection by the NSA. They 
can be confident that there are privacy experts advising the FISA court 
advocating for our civil liberties, and they can be proud of an 
intelligence community who works hard every day to make sure that our 
country is protected.
  I have seen firsthand the value these programs bring, but I also know 
that if Americans don't feel they can trust their own government, we 
are losing the battle right here at home. It is my hope that this bill 
will increase transparency and accountability to the program so that 
our hard-working intelligence community can continue their job of 
defending the country, and American citizens can be confident that they 
are being protected from enemies both foreign and domestic. Upholding 
civil liberties are not burdens; they are what make all of us safer and 
stronger.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 8 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), who is the distinguished 
ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 
I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to manage that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First, let me say thank you to Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member 
Conyers as well as to my colleague, Chairman Nunes. We have worked this 
issue together for a long time, and I am very proud of the bipartisan 
legislation that we have produced. I also want to thank the 
administration that worked with us so long and hard, and the work done 
in the last Congress by former HPSCI Chairman Mike Rogers and former 
HPSCI Ranking Member Dutch Ruppersberger. I rise today in strong 
support of H.R. 2048.
  This Nation was founded on the revolutionary principle that liberty 
need not be sacrificed to security, that public safety can and must 
coexist with individual liberty. Our Founders set out to create a 
lasting Union and a great Nation, one in which the people would be free 
to govern themselves, to express themselves, to worship for themselves, 
while also being secure in their homes, their papers, and their 
persons.
  Nearly two-and-a-half centuries later, it is easy to forget that 
these freedoms were enshrined in the Constitution amidst great peril. 
Americans had only recently fought a war for independence and would be 
confronted by powerful and often hostile forces in the future, 
including the powerful empires of Britain, France, and Spain. Here were 
truly existential threats, and still the Founders said, We can be 
secure and we can be free. They were right; we can and we must.
  So today, at another moment of national danger, we are challenged to 
reaffirm our commitment to these twin imperatives--security and 
liberty--and to prove again that we can find the right balance for our 
times. The USA FREEDOM Act strikes that delicate but vitally important 
balance.
  On the side of freedom, it ends bulk collection, not just of 
telephone metadata under section 215, but of any bulk collection under 
any other authority. It creates a specific procedure for telephone 
metadata that allows the government, upon court approval, to query the 
data that the telephone companies already keep, something I have long 
advocated. It increases transparency by requiring a declassification 
review of all significant FISA court opinions and by requiring the 
government to provide the public with detailed information about how 
they use these national security authorities. And it provides for a 
panel of experts to advocate for privacy and civil liberties before the 
FISA court, also something that I have advocated for quite sometime.
  At the same time, the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 preserves important 
capabilities and makes further national security enhancements by 
closing loopholes that make it difficult for the government to track 
foreign terrorists and spies as they enter or leave the country, 
clarifying the application of FISA to those who facilitate the 
international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
increasing the maximum penalties for those who provide material support 
for terrorism. This is a strong bill and should advance with such an 
overwhelming majority that it compels the Senate to act.
  But this is not a one-and-done legislative fix or the end of our 
work. Rather, it is a reaffirmation of our commitment to constantly 
recalibrate our

[[Page 6622]]

laws to make sure that privacy and security are coexisting and mutually 
reinforcing. While the public may have begun its debate on these 
programs 2 years ago, many of us--myself included--have been working 
these issues long before, and we will continue to work them long 
afterwards. That is our responsibility and the great obligation the 
Founders bequeathed to us.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Holding).
  Mr. HOLDING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Virginia, the 
chair of the Committee on the Judiciary, for both the time today and 
for his diligent work on the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.
  Mr. Speaker, the world we live in is a dangerous place. Indeed, it is 
far more dangerous than it ever has been. Acts of terror reached a 
record level last year, and with the wickedness of groups like ISIS and 
Boko Haram showing continued, complete disregard for human life, our 
Nation must always remain prepared and vigilant.
  The legislation before us today, Mr. Speaker, builds on the reforms 
from the legislation passed last Congress, championed by my friend 
Representative Sensenbrenner, and it accounts for the absolute need to 
protect civil liberties while also remaining clear-eyed and vigilant 
about the real threats that we face every day around the world.
  I thank the chairman and I thank the committee for their work. I urge 
support for H.R. 2048.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA 
FREEDOM Act, which virtually deletes the National Security Agency's 
database of Americans' phone and email records. The bulk collection of 
what we know now as metadata will end.
  Under this bill, the government will now have to seek court approval 
before petitioning private cell phone companies for records. The court 
will have to approve each application except in emergencies, and major 
court decisions will be made public.
  It is very similar to legislation drafted and introduced last year by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, under the leadership of 
former Chairman Rogers and myself, together with our colleagues on the 
Committee on the Judiciary, led by Congressmen Goodlatte and Conyers. 
That bill passed with an overwhelming bipartisan majority, and I want 
to thank Congressmen Goodlatte and Conyers, as well as Congressmen 
Schiff and Nunes, also with Congressmen Sensenbrenner and Nadler and 
other Members who worked hard and continued the pursuit on this much-
needed reform.
  We need this bill, though, to keep our country safe. Section 215 of 
the PATRIOT Act, which is the part that legalizes much of NSA's 
critical work to protect us from terrorists, expires in less than 3 
weeks, on June 1. If we do not reauthorize it with the reforms demanded 
by the public, essential capabilities to track legitimate terror 
suspects will expire also. That couldn't happen at a worse time. We 
live in a dangerous world. The threats posed by ISIS and other 
terrorist groups are just the tip of the iceberg.
  We also need strong defenses against increasingly aggressive 
cyberterrorists and the lone wolf terrorists who are often American 
citizens, for example. This bill restores Americans' confidence that 
the government is not snooping on its own citizens by improving the 
necessary checks and balances to our democracy. This bill balances the 
need to protect our country with the need to protect our constitutional 
rights and civil liberties.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time I am pleased to yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino), chairman of 
our Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law Subcommittee and a 
strong supporter of this legislation.
  Mr. MARINO. I thank the chairman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the USA FREEDOM Act. I applaud my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their hard work on a true 
compromise piece of legislation. It protects the privacy of American 
citizens, according to the Constitution, while ensuring our national 
security, which is a priority. I understand the importance of 
reauthorizing these important FISA provisions.
  As a U.S. attorney, I had these tools at my disposal, and I used them 
to protect Americans in Pennsylvania and across the country. We needed 
them at the time, and we need them now. However, I equally understand 
the importance of also protecting the privacy interests of American 
citizens. The act ends bulk collection; it strengthens protections of 
civil liberties; it increases transparency; all while ensuring that our 
intelligence and national security agencies have the tools they need to 
fight terrorism abroad. In addition, the USA FREEDOM Act protects 
American citizens at home.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Himes).
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, let me begin by thanking the chairman and 
ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary, as well as Chairman 
Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, for their good, bipartisan work on a bill that I think is 
long overdue.
  The good work on this bill, Mr. Speaker, goes back to the fact that 
the PATRIOT Act, a piece of legislation crafted in haste and in fear 
after the tragic events of 9/11, in my opinion, pushed the boundaries 
too far on the government's ability to surveil and gather information 
on people, including American citizens.
  The USA FREEDOM Act, which I stand today to support, goes a very long 
way to restoring an appropriate balance between the imperative of 
national security and the civil liberties which we hold so dear. This 
bill makes important reforms to the FISA court, but, importantly, it 
prohibits--I will say again, prohibits--the bulk collection, under 
section 215, under the pen register authorities, and under National 
Security Letter statutes, of data on American citizens. Americans will 
now rest easy knowing that their calls or other records will not be 
warehoused by the government, no matter how careful that government is 
in the procedures it uses to access those files.
  Mr. Speaker, whatever the legal interpretations, most recently 
definitively ruled upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
whatever the legal interpretations, there is something about the idea 
of a government keeping extensive records on its free citizens which 
damages our intuitive sense of freedom and liberty. So whatever the law 
and whatever the legal interpretations--and I do believe those have 
been settled--what we do here today, which is to say that the 
government of the United States will not keep detailed call or other 
bulk records on its free citizens, I believe is an important step 
forward for this country.
  I urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor of the USA FREEDOM Act.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining 
on each side?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 30 seconds 
remaining, the gentleman from Virginia has 8\1/2\ minutes remaining, 
and the gentleman from Michigan has 6\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, 30 seconds, is that the total amount of 
time the other side has?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The minority has 7 minutes total remaining.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, once again I want to thank my colleagues for 
their good work. I also want to acknowledge Mr. Sensenbrenner for his 
strong advocacy on this measure.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1515

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, I would like to simply ask my

[[Page 6623]]

colleagues to reject an unlawful surveillance program, to restore 
limits to a range of surveillance authorities, to compel the government 
to act with some measure of transparency, and to end the practice of 
dragnet surveillance in the United States.
  In addition, I would like to thank the staff who have worked so hard 
on this bill: Caroline Lynch, Jason Herring, Bart Forsyth, Lara Flint, 
Chan Park, Matthew Owen, and Aaron Hiller.
  I close by thanking in advance my colleagues who, like many of us, 
are inclined to strongly support H.R. 2048.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  From the founding of the American Republic, this country has been 
engaged in a profound debate about the responsibilities and the limits 
of our Federal Government.
  The tension between these two essential functions of the government 
did not suddenly spring into existence in this age of cyber attacks and 
terrorist plots. Americans have long grappled with their need for 
security and their innate desire to protect their personal liberty from 
government intrusion.
  Benjamin Franklin is often quoted as saying:

       Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a 
     little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.

  After the horrific attacks on September 11, the country was 
determined not to allow such an attack to occur again. The changes we 
made then to our intelligence laws helped keep us safe from implacable 
enemies. Today, we renew our commitment to our Nation's security and 
the safety of the American people.
  We also make this pledge that the United States of America will 
remain a nation whose government answers to the will of its people. 
This country must be what it always has been, a beacon of freedom to 
the world, a place where the principles of the Founders--including the 
commitment to individual liberties--will continue to live, protected 
and nourished for future generations.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important 
bipartisan legislation.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Speaker, last week a federal appeals court declared 
that the NSA's bulk data collection on American citizens over the past 
14 years was illegal. So why is Congress considering a bill that would 
legalize a program already deemed illegal? Unfortunately, that is what 
the USA FREEDOM Act does, and I believe codifies a program that 
violates the Constitution. When the Fourth Amendment says that the 
American people have the right to be free from warrantless searches and 
seizures of themselves and their property, I think it's a pretty clear 
statement on the limits of governmental action. Unfortunately, the bill 
today does not fully protect that right and accordingly I don't support 
it. The bill's purpose was to rein in the NSA's bulk data collection 
program but failed on that front, and I wanted to offer a few thoughts 
as to why.
  First, the bill uses broad language to define who and what the 
government can search, which means that it still could technically 
collect Americans' information in bulk--just not as much as before. The 
bill does this by leaving the door open for the government to search 
geographic regions instead of the entire country as it does now. For 
example, the government could require phone companies to turn over all 
the records of their customers in South Carolina or even in a town like 
Mt. Pleasant in my district. I don't think the Founding Fathers' intent 
of the Fourth Amendment was to have it apply only in cases of nation-
wide warrantless searches; rather it should apply to any search 
anywhere.
  Second, the bill doesn't even address a part of the PATRIOT Act 
called Section 702 that covers data that crosses our borders. This 
section allows the government to sweep up the content of an American 
citizen's emails, instant messages and web browsing history just 
because they happen to be communicating with someone outside the U.S. 
In fact, the former NSA director General Keith Alexander admitted that 
the NSA specifically searches Section 702 data using ``U.S. person 
identifiers.'' This so-called ``back door search loophole'' should have 
been closed in this bill because it violates the Fourth Amendment by 
getting around the warrant requirement. The notion that Americans' 
rights are contingent on the geography of where a call is directed is 
not consistent with the Constitution and highlights why this particular 
section needs to be changed.
  Third, this bill does not require the government to destroy 
information obtained on Americans who are not connected to an 
investigation. The way this happens is the government stores the 
information it collected on a particular phone call, even if one of 
those individuals on the call is suspected of no wrongdoing. The 
Constitution I believe is rather clear in the principle that 
organizations like the NSA and the FBI should not be able to store 
information that is inadvertently collected on people who are not 
suspected of committing a crime, and at a very minimum the FREEDOM Act 
does not use this opportunity to shine a light on the problem.
  Pericles, the Greek general of Athens, once said that ``Freedom is 
the sure possession of those alone who have the courage to defend it.'' 
Ultimately, I believe this bill is another missed opportunity for 
Congress to address what the judiciary has now ruled to be the 
unconstitutional and unlawful actions of the Executive branch. It 
really matters the Second Circuit federal court in New York issued an 
opinion last week stating that the NSA has stretched the meaning of the 
text of the PATRIOT Act so that it no longer represents congressional 
intent and called the NSA's bulk data collection illegal. It really 
matters that this bill would codify actions of the NSA that were ruled 
to be outside the bounds of law. I think it also matters that the 
debate that is taking place is as old as civilization as there has 
always been a tension between security and freedom. And it really 
matters that historically those civilizations that have given up 
freedom in the interest of security have historically lost both. For 
all these reasons each one of us should care deeply about what happens 
next on bulk collections at the NSA--and the way this bill comes up 
short in protecting liberty's foundation, civil liberty.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, out of necessity to reauthorize the 
expiring intelligence gathering authorities, I reluctantly vote for 
H.R. 2048. A recent federal appeals court decision has increased our 
need to address these authorities. Unfortunately, their pending 
expiration is now forcing Congress to act hastily rather than take the 
necessary time to adequately analyze the court's decision and update 
the laws accordingly.
  I recognize the distrust created by the Obama Administration's abuse 
of power, as well as the damage caused by recent intelligence leaks 
containing fragments, inaccuracies, and speculation. It is unfortunate 
that those actions will continue to make it more difficult to gather 
the information necessary to counter terrorism. It is even more 
alarming that this trend will inevitably make our country less safe.
  Very few Americans will ever learn the full details of the 
considerable successes of the National Security Agency (NSA). But 
through the dedication and commitment of its men and women, the NSA has 
helped to keep our nation and its citizens safe. I remain confident in 
their professionalism as they strive to prevent future terrorist 
attacks and support our warfighters overseas.
  I believe the first job of the federal government is to defend the 
country and protect our citizens within the framework of the 
Constitution, and I will continue to do all I can to contribute to that 
effort.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Speaker, tonight I must rise to voice my concerns with 
the USA Freedom Act. While I recognize the improvements this bill 
attempts to make with regard to mass surveillance and information 
gathering efforts, I simply cannot vote for this bill.
  I was pleased to hear that the Second Circuit Court recently found 
metadata collection to be illegal and commend the bi-partisan work that 
resulted in a bill that attempts to adhere to the court's decision. I 
recognize that the USA Freedom Act includes positive changes such as 
tighter language dictating when the NSA can access a database of call 
records, new allowances that grant technology companies the right to 
disclose governmental inquiries to their users and increases penalties 
for people caught aiding in terrorist efforts.
  Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that other provisions in the bill would 
continue to allow for large swaths of information gathering. Simply 
put, I cannot vote for a bill that does not protect the privacy 
enshrined in the Fourth Amendment and guaranteed to all Americans. The 
risk of faulty information collection is not a risk I am willing to 
take with any American's privacy. Upholding the U.S. Constitution is 
non-negotiable.
  Mrs. CAPPS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the Record my 
strong support of H.R. 2048, the USA Freedom Act of 2015, which I am 
proud to cosponsor.

[[Page 6624]]

  This bipartisan bill will go a long way to reign in the abusive bulk 
surveillance practices that have left many Americans concerned for 
their privacy protections.
  Furthermore, this bill will establish additional civil liberty 
protections and increased transparency, accountability, and oversight 
for over our national security practices.
  As a policymaker, I am proud to support legislation that will protect 
our values of privacy and civil liberties while also providing our 
national security officials with the targeted tools that they need to 
ensure the safety of all Americans.
  This bill is also a testament to what we can accomplish when we come 
together to work in a bipartisan way to meet the needs of the American 
people.
  I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2048.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I have always been a staunch defender of 
privacy and civil liberties. I voted against the Patriot Act and its 
extension in 2008 and 2011 because I feared it gave the federal 
government too much unchecked power over the rights of law abiding 
citizens and lacked effective oversight tools for Congress. Clearly I 
was proven right. Thankfully, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit ruled that the NSA's program to collect telephone records in 
bulk under Section 215 of the Patriot Act is illegal. This was a big 
win for privacy and civil liberties advocates, but it is not the end of 
the fight. Given this decision, it is clear that Congress must do more 
to rein in unconstitutional intrusion into our personal lives. 
Unfortunately, today's bill fell short of those reforms.
  H.R. 2048 is an improvement from the weakened bill that passed the 
House last year. However, it falls short of shutting the door on 
unrestrained government surveillance. The bill does nothing to address 
``backdoor'' searches of U.S. citizens under Section 702 of the FISA 
Amendments Act. This statute is possibly of more concern than the 
telephone records collected under Section 215. While Section 702 
expressly prohibits the government from intentionally targeting the 
communications of U.S. persons, the NSA has applied an incredibly loose 
interpretation of this statute and used it to justify collecting not 
only communications records of U.S. citizens, but also the contents of 
communications, including email, social media messages, or web browsing 
history.
  While this bill attempts to address bulk data collection under 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act, the NSA has an unscrupulous tendency to 
find loopholes in statute and twist the intent of Congress to fulfill 
their own wishes. I fear that given our past experience, this bill will 
undermine the Second Circuit's decision and create new legal loopholes 
for the NSA and law enforcement agencies to collect even more data on 
millions of Americans.
  It is possible to gain information on potential terrorist threats 
while still protecting the privacy and freedom of American citizens, 
complying with the Constitution, and preserving adequate congressional 
and judicial oversight. The original version of the USA Freedom Act, 
introduced in 2013, balanced these priorities. The bill we considered 
today did not. I urge the Senate to make the needed reforms to this 
bill so that it bolsters the Second Circuit's decision and accomplishes 
the goal of once and for all ending mass government surveillance of 
law-abiding Americans.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 2048, 
the USA Freedom Act.
  In the wake of last week's 2nd Circuit Court Decision, I want to 
commend Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, Congressman 
Sensenbrenner, and Congressman Nadler, for crafting legislation that 
makes meaningful reforms to many NSA surveillance programs--including 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act--and is a departure from the untenable 
status quo. However, despite these positive reforms, this bill fails to 
address Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, an even more invasive 
program than Section 215 which allows the government to collect both 
data and content of Americans without a warrant.
  Last year's version of the USA Freedom Act similarly scaled back many 
of the surveillance programs the NSA currently has at its disposal. 
Unfortunately, Section 702 was not one of them. Throughout the process, 
we were repeatedly assured by Chairman Goodlatte and Congressman 
Sensenbrenner that there would be a real future effort to address 
Section 702. At that time, Rep. Sensenbrenner stated, ``Section 702 of 
FISA has been improperly used to obtain the content of Americans' 
private communications without a warrant, which is unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment and a blatant violation of Americans' civil 
liberties.''
  Like Rep. Sensenbrenner, I have also consistently said that Section 
702 opened the door to some of the most troublesome surveillance 
practices that have come to light in recent years. Last year, I 
strongly supported the effort to fix those aspects of Section 702. 
Unfortunately, as I indicated last year, last minute changes stripped 
out provisions that would have ``prevented the NSA from being able to 
search government databases for foreign communications content of 
American citizens without a warrant.'' When those important provisions 
were removed, Chairman Goodlatte and Rep. Sensenbrenner pledged that we 
would address these reforms without delay.
  Unfortunately, here we are a year later and Chairman Goodlatte and 
Rep. Sensenbrenner still have not allowed for a full debate and vote on 
this issue. Despite the Chairman's supposed support to end Section 702, 
when Congresswoman Lofgren offered an amendment during markup of the 
USA Freedom Act to prohibit these warrantless backdoor searches, 
Chairman Goodlatte said, ``this is a poison pill amendment . . ., there 
is a time and a place for everything.'' When this bill came before the 
Rules Committee, Rep. Lofgren was not even allowed to offer her 
amendment.
  The refusal to include reforms to Section 702 is even more 
disappointing given that there are many important provisions in this 
bill that provide additional safeguards to protect the privacy and 
civil liberties of Americans. Specifically, this bill puts significant 
constraints on the government's ability to collect data under Section 
215. No longer will the NSA be able to collect the phone records of 
millions of Americans who have no connection to crime or terrorism. 
Instead, every request made by the NSA for specific call records must 
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the FISA court.
  This legislation also carefully constructs the definition of the 
``specific selection terms'' the government can use to access call 
records. H.R. 2048 requires the ``specific selection term'' to be an 
``individual, account, or personal device.'' As a result, no longer 
will the NSA be able to collect phone records in bulk using terms like 
``People in Maryland'' and ``Area Code 301.''
  Despite these improvements to Section 215, I remain disappointed that 
the bill does not establish a Citizens Advocate to represent citizens' 
privacy interests at the secret FISA Court proceedings. In 2013, 
Representative Jim Jordan and I introduced bipartisan legislation to 
create such a position. The initial draft of last year's USA Freedom 
Act included this provision, but this language has since been weakened 
and only provides for a panel of advisors to be employed at the 
discretion of the FISC.
  Last month's decision by the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper, makes 
clear that Section 215 is illegal and that a clean re-authorization 
would be a clear violation of the law. So while I appreciate the 
reforms made in this bill to Section 215, these reforms are modest 
given the Court's recent decision. On the other hand, Section 702 of 
the FISA Amendments Act does not sunset until the end of 2017 and there 
is no clear indication that we will be voting to curtail this program 
anytime in the near future. I believe that today's legislation could be 
our last real opportunity to address this. It is my hope that the 
companion legislation in the Senate includes these provisions and that 
I will be able to support a final compromise bill later this year.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 255, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on 
this question will be postponed.

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