[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 4]
[House]
[Pages 5376-5386]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1560, PROTECTING CYBER NETWORKS 
      ACT, AND PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1731, NATIONAL 
            CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2015

  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on 
Rules, I call up House Resolution 212 and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 212

       Resolved, That at any time after adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 1560) to improve cybersecurity in the United 
     States through enhanced sharing of information about 
     cybersecurity threats, and for other purposes. The first 
     reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of 
     order against consideration of the bill are waived. General 
     debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one 
     hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking 
     minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be 
     considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall 
     be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose 
     of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the 
     nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The 
     committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 
     considered as read. All points of order against the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. No 
     amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute shall be in order except those printed in part A 
     of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
     resolution. Each such amendment may be offered only in the 
     order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member 
     designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall 
     be debatable for the time specified in the report equally 
     divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, 
     shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject 
     to a demand for division of the question in the House or in 
     the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against such 
     amendments are waived. At the conclusion of consideration of 
     the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report 
     the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
     adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House 
     on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the 
     bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute. The previous question shall be considered as 
     ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage 
     without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with 
     or without instructions.
       Sec. 2.  At any time after adoption of this resolution the 
     Speaker may, pursuant to

[[Page 5377]]

     clause 2(b) of rule XVIII, declare the House resolved into 
     the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union 
     for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1731) to amend the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enhance multi-directional 
     sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks and 
     strengthen privacy and civil liberties protections, and for 
     other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be 
     dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of 
     the bill are waived. General debate shall be confined to the 
     bill and amendments specified in this section and shall not 
     exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chair 
     and ranking minority member of the Committee on Homeland 
     Security. After general debate the bill shall be considered 
     for amendment under the five-minute rule. In lieu of the 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the 
     Committee on Homeland Security now printed in the bill, it 
     shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the 
     purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule an amendment 
     in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules 
     Committee Print 114-12. That amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute shall be considered as read. All points of order 
     against that amendment in the nature of a substitute are 
     waived. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute shall be in order except those printed in part B 
     of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
     resolution. Each such amendment may be offered only in the 
     order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member 
     designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall 
     be debatable for the time specified in the report equally 
     divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, 
     shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject 
     to a demand for division of the question in the House or in 
     the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against such 
     amendments are waived. At the conclusion of consideration of 
     the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report 
     the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
     adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House 
     on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the 
     bill or to the amendment in the nature of a substitute made 
     in order as original text. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
     final passage without intervening motion except one motion to 
     recommit with or without instructions.
       Sec. 3. (a) In the engrossment of H.R. 1560 the Clerk 
     shall--
       (1) add the text of H.R. 1731, as passed by the House, as 
     new matter at the end of H.R. 1560;
       (2) conform the title of H.R. 1560 to reflect the addition 
     of H.R. 1731, as passed by the House, to the engrossment;
       (3) assign appropriate designations to provisions within 
     the engrossment; and
       (4) conform cross-references and provisions for short 
     titles within the engrossment.
       (b) Upon the addition of the text of H.R. 1731, as passed 
     by the House, to the engrossment of H.R. 1560, H.R. 1731 
     shall be laid on the table.

                              {time}  1230

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins) is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, 
I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. 
Polis), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During 
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose 
of debate only.


                             General Leave

  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and 
to include extraneous materials on H. Res. 212, currently under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Georgia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring this rule 
forward on behalf of the Rules Committee. It is a rule that respects 
the legislative process and reflects the responsibility of Congress to 
address a critical deficit in the infrastructure of our Nation.
  This rule provides for consideration of both cybersecurity measures 
under a structured amendment process. As a result of a thorough and 
deliberative committee hearing yesterday evening, there are five 
amendments to H.R. 1560 and 11 amendments to H.R. 1731 that this body 
will have the opportunity to debate and ultimately vote for or against.
  The bipartisan nature of these bills speaks to the critical need for 
this legislation. Both bills passed their respective committees with 
bipartisan support, and I am hopeful this rule will enjoy similar 
overwhelming support.
  For each bill, amendments offered by Democrats exceeded those offered 
by Republicans. I would like to thank Chairman Nunes and also Chairman 
McCaul for their work, both within our conference and across the aisle, 
to ultimately bring forward two bills that reflect compromise, 
consistency, and a deep understanding of the dangers that cyber attacks 
pose every day.
  If both bills are adopted, this rule combines the bills and sends 
them to the Senate as a package in an effort to work with the other 
Chamber, go to conference, and to produce a product that will be signed 
into law. This is a fair rule that respects this body, the importance 
of this issue, and the legislative process as a whole.
  The world has changed greatly since this body last discussed 
cybersecurity. The ``Internet of Things'' has created unforeseen risks 
and exposed vulnerabilities and defects in the ability of companies to 
even simply talk to each other without fear of frivolous litigation.
  Our enemy is adapting, growing bolder and more sophisticated. North 
Korea, Iran, Russia, and China seek to exploit and devastate our 
economic security as a nation and our data security as individuals 
through cyber attacks that we cannot adequately anticipate, respond, or 
even communicate about.
  Foreign governments aren't the only ones who wish to do Americans 
harm. Terrorists and criminal enterprises have also recognized that 
American companies are crippled by the ambiguity in our law as it 
relates to sharing cyber threat information.
  The cyber attack surface has expanded. Wearables, connected vehicles, 
and embedded devices have made it possible for cyber attacks to 
literally be driven into the parking lot or walked through doors.
  The traditional ways of responding to cyber threats and recovering 
from them are not sufficient to safeguard the data privacy of Americans 
and the economic security of our Nation. The scope of these attacks and 
devastating damages are increasing as rapidly as the attackers are 
themselves.
  These bills are not a magic pill. They will not render inoperable the 
scores of foreign countries and enterprises that want to see American 
exceptionalism brought to its knees; but they do give clear, positive 
legal authority to American companies to allow them to protect their 
own and to appropriately share cyber threats with other countries and, 
in certain cases, Federal agencies.
  Let me be clear. These are not surveillance bills. These are not data 
collection bills. This is not the PATRIOT Act or FISA. This body will 
debate intelligence gathering, collecting, sharing, and using at some 
point in the future, but today is not that day.
  I know those rightly concerned with government surveillance, like 
myself, would like to use this rule for that purpose and the underlying 
measures as a platform to debate that, but I urge them to refrain. We 
will have that debate.
  Today's focus is on the perpetrating of the thousands of cyber 
threats American businesses face every single day. Let the attention be 
on North Korea. Let it be on Iran. Let it be on the countless enemies 
of the United States who want to destroy this Nation. For today, we 
speak with a united voice that they will fail.
  We declare with one voice that American companies have the right to 
protect their own, to protect and defend their own networks, to share 
technical information with the appropriate agencies on a voluntary 
basis if they so choose.
  I thank the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees and their 
staff for their tireless work they have done to ensure that we can 
protect our economy, our infrastructure, and our private information.
  I know detractors of the legislation may attempt to paint this rule 
and underlying measures in a different light, so let's allow the facts 
to speak for themselves.
  These bills have three key components. First, they provide for 
completely voluntary participation by private companies in a program 
with positive legal authority. This program allows three kinds of 
sharing--private

[[Page 5378]]

company to private company, government to private company, and private 
company to government--but this sharing of information is limited only 
to cyber threat indicators.
  Second, they require the removal of all unrelated personal 
information. It is the technical cyber threat information that is being 
shared, zeros and ones. In fact, there is a requirement that both the 
government and the private entity remove personally identifiable 
information when the information is shared and also when it is 
received.
  Third, the legislation expressly prohibits the cyber threat 
indicators from being used for surveillance.
  These bills will benefit all Americans by helping businesses better 
protect sensitive information. Attacks against our network often seek 
to steal Americans' personal information. This can include credit and 
debit card information, medical records, or even Social Security 
numbers.
  Many of the recent attacks that we have all read about in the news 
were specifically aimed at stealing the personal information of 
Americans. Cyber attackers are also increasingly targeting small 
businesses. In fact, in 2014, 60 percent of all targeted attacks struck 
at small- and medium-sized businesses.
  The underlying legislation will also help protect American jobs by 
protecting the intellectual property of American businesses. It is 
estimated that cyber attacks cost Americans roughly 500,000 jobs a 
year. Foreign companies often use cyber attacks to target the trade 
secrets of U.S. companies and then use the information to produce their 
own competing product.
  The threat is real, both to our economic security as a nation and our 
personal information as individuals. If we fail to act and pass this 
rule and the underlying bills, our Nation and our personal privacy is 
more at risk than ever before.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. POLIS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Georgia for 
yielding me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the rule and the underlying 
legislation.
  Today, the House is convening to debate a matter that we all agree is 
critical for our national security, our economic competitiveness, our 
prosperity, and the success of our private sector.
  The recent cyber attacks on Sony and Anthem are but two prominent 
examples of cases in which American businesses or government entities 
have come under attack by hackers, among many other instances that 
haven't even been reported.
  I want to recognize the work that the House Intelligence and Homeland 
Security Committees did on these pieces of legislation and their 
attempts to address these issues. Unfortunately, in spite of their hard 
work and the work of those that went into crafting these two bills, I 
regret that they fall short of their goals and would likely do more 
harm than good.
  Not only do both bills, particularly the Protecting Cyber Networks 
Act, raise enormous concerns about inappropriate sharing of personal 
information and surveillance on Americans' private lives, but they are 
built on the premise that many security experts have warned is 
fundamentally flawed, that sharing information with the Federal 
Government should be the central focus of our efforts to protect 
American cyber networks, rather than simply one aspect to a 
multipronged strategy to defeat hackers, foreign and domestic.
  Now, before I address the substance of these two bills, I want to 
discuss this unusual rule before us and how it treats two bills which 
contradict each other in significant ways.
  Ordinarily, when two committees share jurisdiction over a matter--in 
this case, the Homeland Security Committee and the Intelligence 
Committee--they collaborate. One committee handles one portion of the 
bill, reports it out; the other committee handles the other portion, 
reports it out, and they work together to bring a single piece of 
legislation to the floor for Members to debate, amend, and vote for or 
against.
  This is what happened, for example, with the recent SGR repeal 
legislation, which had components under the jurisdiction of no less 
than six different committees in this body, but was presented before us 
as a single bill.
  In this case, however, because there seems to be some kind of turf 
war between the Intelligence Committee and the Homeland Security 
Committee, we are actually voting on two overlapping bills that, in 
several respects, contradict one another.
  For instance, the bills have drastically different determinations of 
what kind of information may be shared, what purposes the government 
may use the information for, and what hacking countermeasures companies 
are allowed to take to protect their networks.
  Instead of having a meaningful debate on the merits of each bill's 
approach, this body, if this rule passes, would forego that, and we 
would simply debate and vote on each bill separately, and if they both 
pass, the rule directs the Clerk to mesh them together through 
something called conforming amendments.
  Not only would this leave businesses to wade their way through two 
separate, contradictory regulatory schemes, but it leaves it unclear 
which bill's provisions would actually prevail in practice and under 
which circumstances. It actually would create more uncertainty in the 
marketplace, rather than less.
  I don't think anybody could reasonably call this an open process. We 
shouldn't be depriving our constituents of an open debate on important 
issues. The major amendments of this bill that would have restored 
privacy, many of which I was a cosponsor, are not even allowed to be 
debated on the floor of the House, not for 10 minutes, not for 5 
minutes, not even for 1 minute.
  My colleagues and I on both sides of the aisle are being denied a 
vote on the very amendments that we feel could address the concerns we 
have with the cybersecurity legislation and make sure that we keep 
American networks safe.
  Mr. Speaker, in the 2 years since the NSA's shockingly broad data 
collection program PRISM came to light, we have heard from many of our 
constituents. The American people want an end to unwarranted 
surveillance. They want Congress to restore desperately needed 
accountability and transparency to our Nation's often out-of-control 
intelligence-gathering apparatus.
  It is bewildering to many people that, at the very time the American 
people have spoken out that we want more safeguards, instead, we are 
bringing forward two bills whose central objective is to facilitate the 
flow of more personal information to the Federal Government, when we 
continue to put off the question of surveillance reform and bringing an 
end to the NSA's bulk data collection without warrants.
  It is especially disappointing in light of the fact that several 
PATRIOT Act provisions will sunset at the end of next month, giving 
Congress a crucial opportunity to reexamine and rein in Federal 
surveillance programs.
  By putting off that issue and bringing mass information sharing to 
the floor, Congress is asking the American people for a blank check. 
Congress is saying: Trust the President. No President would allow this 
information sharing to infringe on your civil liberties, even though we 
have utterly failed to pass a single piece of legislation to end the 
privacy abuses that we know have occurred under this administration and 
the prior administration.
  The problem with these bills is that they go far beyond, and they 
open up additional loopholes and potential abuses with regard to 
privacy abuses, particularly H.R. 1560, the so-called Protecting Cyber 
Networks Act. Both bills open up Americans' private information to 
inappropriate scrutiny by the Federal Government.
  Now, I expect we will hear proponents of both bills argue at length 
that the protections against sharing personal information are 
sufficiently robust.
  For instance, under both bills, they will cite that cyber threat data 
is

[[Page 5379]]

scrubbed twice for personal information, once by private entities 
before they transmit it to the government and once by government 
entities before they store the information or share it with anybody 
else.
  Now, that sounds good, but, unfortunately, the devil is in the 
details, and a close reading of the bill shows that there is an 
enormous loophole in the information-scrubbing component and that it 
fails to offer Americans safeguards for the personal information.

                              {time}  1245

  Under both bills, any Federal entity in receipt of cyber data threat 
information may store and share personal information it receives--
unscrubbed information--if they believe that it is related to a 
cybersecurity threat.
  Now, this standard isn't too vague, considering that information 
``related'' to a cybersecurity threat could be interpreted to mean just 
about anything, but it is also incredibly broad. It includes an 
implicit assumption that Americans' personal information should be 
shared, unless Federal officials have information that it is not 
related to a cybersecurity threat. In many cases, the burden is to show 
that the personal information is not related to a cybersecurity threat 
for it to be scrubbed, rather than the other way around.
  So, yes, companies and Federal entities are required to scrub the 
data for information that can be used to identify a specific person. 
But the loophole then calls on them not to remove any personally 
identifiable information unless they can show that it is not related to 
cybersecurity. Even if there is an off chance that something at some 
point might be pertinent to some kind of investigation, it puts 
Americans' personal information--without warrants, without due process, 
including information about patterns of Internet use, location, content 
of online communications--at great risk.
  We have seen before that the Federal Government has a poor track 
record of safeguarding our personal information when they are entrusted 
with it. The last thing we should be doing is empowering Federal 
agencies even more with a broad discretion to look at personal 
information unless there is clear evidence that doing so would combat a 
cybersecurity threat.
  I introduced, along with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, a 
number of amendments to both bills--one with the gentlewoman from 
California, Representative Zoe Lofgren, and one with Representative Zoe 
Lofgren and the gentleman from Michigan, Representative Justin Amash--
to impose a higher standard on Federal entities who are entrusted with 
this personal information. Our proposal would simply require the 
Federal Government to remove personally identifiable information unless 
it is directly necessary to identify or mitigate a cybersecurity 
threat--the purported purpose of this bill.
  These amendments would have imposed no additional burdens on private 
companies, but they would have given our Nation's technology companies 
and the customers who keep them globally competitive more confidence 
that private information shared under these bills would not be 
subjected to inappropriate mass scrutiny by the government.
  Sadly, our amendments met the same fate as nearly two dozen others 
put forth to add in important privacy safeguards.
  The potential for abuse of private information under H.R. 1560 is 
even more far-reaching. The Homeland Security bill at least makes clear 
that the information companies transmit to DHS should be shared 
specifically with other agencies that need it to protect critical 
infrastructure. But the circumstances under which information can be 
shared under the Intelligence bill--and who it can be shared with--are 
fuzzier and broader.
  Under the approach taken by H.R. 1560, every cyber threat indicator 
shared with a civilian agency of the Federal Government is immediately 
shared with a host of other government agencies, including the NSA. 
This increases the threat to cybersecurity by having repositories of 
information replicated across numerous government agencies, creating 
additional avenues for attack by malicious hackers. That means that 
private sector companies will not be able to participate in the program 
and promise their users they will not share information with NSA or 
other government agencies unless required by law.
  Furthermore, it is true that the Homeland Security bill includes some 
troubling provisions that allow the government to use cybersecurity 
threat information for criminal investigations unrelated to 
cybersecurity. Fortunately, the Rules Committee made in order an 
amendment by Representatives John Katko, Zoe Lofgren, and Anna Eshoo 
that would address this problem in the Homeland Security bill. I hope 
that my colleagues adopt this amendment.
  Unfortunately, no such amendment is being considered to address this 
issue within the Intelligence bill, H.R. 1560, where the problem 
actually runs much deeper. H.R. 1560 permits cyber threat data, 
including Americans' private information, that is shared with the 
Federal Government to be stored and used for a raft of unrelated 
purposes, unconstrained by congressional directive, including 
investigations and potential prosecution of crimes completely unrelated 
to cybersecurity.
  Obviously, all of us want law enforcement agencies to be equipped to 
prevent and prosecute violent crime, but the inclusion of these matters 
completely unrelated to cybersecurity broadens the scope of the measure 
far beyond what it is purported to be: a cybersecurity bill. In fact, 
it reduces the focus of our efforts on combating cybersecurity when you 
open it up to everything under the sun.
  By including a vast array of other reasons the government can invoke 
to store and share personal information, the authors of the bill 
essentially transformed the information-sharing initiative into a broad 
new surveillance program.
  Yes. Rather than a cybersecurity measure, effectively, these bills 
are a stalking horse for broad new surveillance authority by multiple 
agencies of the Federal Government without warrants, without oversight.
  H.R. 1560 empowers Federal entities to hold onto any information 
about an individual that may be ``related to'' any of the many law 
enforcement purposes lumped into the bill. That gives the Federal 
Government enormous incentive to retain and scrutinize personal 
information, even if it is unrelated to a cybersecurity threat.
  The scope of the use authorizations also undermines due process 
protections that exist to protect Americans against unwarranted search 
and seizure. Private information about a person that was transmitted 
warrantlessly to the NSA under a program that was purportedly designed 
to combat hackers should not be admissible or used in court against 
them on an unrelated offense--not related to cybersecurity, not related 
to hacking. It would render all of our due process protections invalid 
simply because of the medium of the information that is used with 
regard to these matters in this case: Internet and cyber-related 
mediums and communications through them.
  I joined Representatives Zoe Lofgren, Darrell Issa, and Blake 
Farenthold on an amendment to make clear that information sharing may 
only be used for the purpose of mitigating cybersecurity threats, 
again, the purported purpose of this bill. If the proponents of this 
bill are serious about combating cybersecurity, why did the Rules 
Committee deny Members the opportunity to limit the provisions of this 
bill to cybersecurity rather than a whole host of unrelated offenses?
  I also joined the gentleman from Kansas, Representative Kevin Yoder, 
to sponsor an amendment to address a longstanding due process issue 
that has plagued our Nation's legal system and our privacy rights.
  While the government is required to get a warrant if it wants to 
search through a person's physical mail, it is not required to get a 
warrant to search through somebody's old emails, provided the emails 
are older than 6

[[Page 5380]]

months. That contradiction and loophole was based on a 1986 law that 
was written before most people knew what email was.
  Representative Yoder and I sponsor a bipartisan bill that has 261 
cosponsors, and yet when we offered a provision on this bill, we were 
not given a chance to vote on it and pass it in spite of the grave due 
process implications that the underlying legislation has.
  In addition to these privacy and due process concerns, I am alarmed 
by the prospect that H.R. 1560 will actually invite attempts by both 
private and public entities to deliberately weaken the integrity of 
software systems in the name of cybersecurity.
  H.R. 1560, for instance, authorizes companies to deploy 
countermeasures that are called defensive measures in the form of hack 
backs that would otherwise be illegal. A countermeasure operated on one 
network should never cause harm to another that is prohibited by the 
Federal antihacking statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. But that 
is precisely what can happen when a company places malware on its own 
network, because if that data gets stolen along with other valuable 
data, it can harm or lead to unauthorized or backdoor access of other 
proprietary networks or information.
  The gentleman from Virginia, Representative Gerry Connolly, put 
forward two amendments to address this issue in a very thoughtful 
manner. Regrettably, neither one will be allowed to be debated or 
receive a vote on the floor of the House unless we can defeat this 
rule.
  Furthermore, both bills present the risk that Federal entities will 
use the threat information they receive from private companies to 
circumvent the security protections safeguarding those same private 
companies' information systems, effectively creating their own back 
doors which could later be exploited by malicious hackers.
  As a matter of routine, our intelligence apparatus already demands 
that private companies include defects in their encryption system for 
the purported purpose of conducting backdoor surveillance. Today's 
legislation only makes it easier for the NSA to find and exploit more 
of these back doors and, therefore, easier--not harder--for hackers to 
find and exploit these very same security weaknesses.
  Once again, Representative Lofgren put forward an amendment that 
would actually improve cybersecurity by making it clear that Federal 
entities could not use data obtained through information sharing to 
demand that private entities create new encryption weaknesses to enable 
backdoor hacking. Sadly, once again, her amendment will not be heard on 
the floor of the House, and this bill will encourage and allow 
additional venues for the illicit hacking it purports to combat.
  Mr. Speaker, I don't doubt the intentions and the goals of my 
colleagues on the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees, but 
these bills simply represent a step backwards rather than a step 
forward, present risks on too many fronts, from privacy, to due 
process, to the threats that they add to the integrity of the very 
networks that these bills are designed to safeguard.
  In addition, the bills' focus on information sharing negates an 
important conversation about more important mechanisms Congress should 
be looking at to protect cyber systems, mechanisms that are not as 
fraught with risks to our civil liberties and are more effective at 
protecting our networks. We should be doing more, for instance, to 
educate businesses and governments about basic network security.
  Even here in Congress, we have seen evidence of how woefully lacking 
even elementary knowledge about cyber threats is. Helping businesses 
prevent cyber attacks doesn't have to mean that the government vacuums 
up endless amounts of personal data about how individual Americans are 
using the Internet and their personal communications.
  In fact, if we stop allowing the NSA to demand that U.S. businesses 
deliberately weaken their own networks for the purpose of government 
surveillance, that, in itself, would be a big step forward to 
strengthening our national cybersecurity.
  Sadly, today's rule doesn't even allow for a debate or for a vote on 
the most significant concerns surrounding this legislation and denies 
Members the opportunity to consider changes that would address the 
issues that we have raised and improve cybersecurity under this bill. 
For these reasons, I hope my colleagues join me in opposing the rule 
and the underlying legislation.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, again, I want to focus this 
debate. There are many things my friend from Colorado brought up that 
will be debated, that are coming up, I think, as early, frankly, as 
tomorrow in some committees and will be debated on this floor. This is 
about sharing. This is about information protection.
  And with that, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York (Mr. King), who is a member of both the 
Homeland Security and the Intelligence Committees. He is the chairman 
of the Homeland Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, and he is also the 
former chairman of the full committee.
  Mr. KING of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the rule and also of the 
underlying bills, H.R. 1731 and H.R. 1560.
  As was pointed out, I am the only Member of Congress who is on the 
Homeland Security Committee and the Intelligence Committee; and I was 
able to both take part and also to observe closely the extent to which 
the gentleman from Texas, Chairman McCaul, and the gentleman from 
California, Chairman Nunes, worked with Members on both sides of the 
aisle, worked with privacy groups, worked with Federal officials, 
government officials, and administration officials to try to make this 
as bipartisan a bill as possible, to ensure that privacy would be 
protected, but also to ensure that everything possible can be done to 
protect our Nation against cyber intrusions.
  Now, every day there are attacks upon our infrastructure. The 
critical infrastructure--mostly in private hands--is being targeted; 
and Federal networks, databases that are vital to our national 
security, are under assault every second of every day.
  Cyberterrorism, whether it is carried out by a nation-state, such as 
Iran or Russia or China, or carried out by terrorist organizations, 
such as ISIS or al Qaeda, is extremely damaging and threatening to our 
national security; and it is essential that we, especially since so 
much of our critical infrastructure is in the hands of the private 
sector, allow for sharing, that we allow companies to share information 
with the government, that there is mutual sharing with the government, 
with the private sector, so that these companies can do it without fear 
of being sued, without fear of liability--they act in good faith; they 
do what has to be done.
  Every measure that was put in there--I know the gentleman from 
Colorado disagrees, but every measure is in there to ensure that 
individual rights will not be violated, that privacy will not be 
violated. And again, we have to look at, for instance, if the gentleman 
from Colorado is wrong, what this could mean to our country, how this 
could devastate--devastate--our infrastructure, devastate our national 
security, devastate our financial system.
  So again, this was not something that was rushed into. And when you 
have both bills passing out of committee with, as far as I recall, not 
one dissenting vote--not that everyone was in full agreement with the 
bills. But the fact is this is probably as close to a consensus as you 
can come in the Halls of Congress on such a critical and, in some ways, 
such a controversial issue, to find that type of unanimity on the two 
committees that deal with this most significantly.

                              {time}  1300

  H.R. 1731 is the Homeland Security Committee bill that allows this 
information to be shared. The port will be the Department of Homeland 
Security, and that was done, again, working with privacy groups and 
working with those who are concerned with civil liberties,

[[Page 5381]]

at the same time working with those who realize how absolutely 
essential to our security passage of this legislation is and how we 
have to have this type of cooperation, this type of sharing, this 
information sharing, and being done with the government and with the 
private sector working together to combat these enemies which can come 
at us from all directions. Again, every second of every day these 
attacks are being attempted and carried out.
  That is the crisis that faces us as a nation. It is not as obvious as 
a bomb going off in Times Square, and it is not as obvious as a bomb 
going off at the Boston Marathon, but it is just as critical.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an 
additional 1 minute.
  Mr. KING of New York. It is just as critical and just as vital, in 
some ways more so, in that the ultimate result could be so devastating 
to our Nation.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I would ask, again, passage of the rule, which I 
believe is obviously essential, but also passage of the underlying 
bills because, again, our Congress has been criticized, with some 
validity, for not being able to work together and for not being able to 
get things done. But to have such a vital, controversial issue as this, 
to have both committees who deal with it most closely, to have them 
come together, all the effort and work that went into it, to have them 
come together to come up with this package of legislation, this shows 
Congress works. It shows we take this issue seriously, and it means we 
are going to go forward in all we can to combat terrorism in all its 
forms. Right now, probably the most lethal are the cybersecurity 
attacks being made on us.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge strong support of the rule and the underlying 
bill.
  Mr. POLIS. Mr. Speaker, I would just add that demanding that private 
companies deliberately include defects in their own encryption systems 
for the purpose of allowing the NSA to conduct backdoor surveillance 
only increases the risk of our cybersecurity networks rather than 
decreases it, which is exactly what the bill does.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), the ranking member of the Committee on 
Homeland Security.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
Colorado for yielding the time.
  Mr. Speaker, though I support H.R. 1731, the National Cybersecurity 
Protection Advancement Act, as approved by voice vote in my committee, 
I rise to express my disappointment with the rule.
  Yesterday the White House announced support for House passage of H.R. 
1731 but said that ``improvements to the bill are needed to ensure that 
its liability protections are appropriately targeted to encourage 
responsible cybersecurity practices.'' The White House was referring to 
the language that was inserted at the direction of the Judiciary 
majority.
  Instead of providing a targeted safe harbor for companies to share 
timely cyber threat information, it establishes an unduly complicated 
legal framework that runs the risk of providing liability relief to 
companies that act negligently. Moreover, it explicitly immunizes 
companies from not acting on timely cyber information. This language 
runs counter to the fundamental goal of the legislation: to get 
companies timely, actionable information to use to protect their 
networks.
  Yet when H.R. 1731 is considered tomorrow, Members will not be 
allowed to vote on a single amendment to fix the liability provision 
that the White House has called ``sweeping'' and said may weaken 
cybersecurity overall. Remarkably, none of the seven amendments that 
were filed to fix it are being allowed.
  I would also like to register my disappointment that the rule calls 
for H.R. 1731, upon passage, to be attached to the Intelligence 
Committee bill. From my conversation with Members, I know that there is 
a great deal of support for authorizing cyber information sharing with 
the Federal civilian lead, the Department of Homeland Security. As 
such, I would argue that the rule should have called for H.R. 1560 to 
be folded into our bill.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. At this point, Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to 
yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. 
Issa), the chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.
  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, I will be supporting the rule, but not without 
trepidation. I will be opposing the underlying bill, but not without 
regret. The underlying bill could have done what we wanted it to do. It 
could have allowed for the exchange of information while protecting 
individuals' privacy. It could have limited that information to 
preventing a cyberterrorist attack. But, in fact, amendments that were 
offered on a bipartisan basis, a number of them, that could have 
limited this would have, in fact, allowed us to have the confidence 
that this information would be used only for what it was intended.
  Mr. Speaker, since 9/11, the government has begun to know more and 
more about what we are doing, who we are, where we live, where we 
sleep, whom we love, whom we do business with, and where we travel. And 
we have known less and less. Just a few days ago, the Ninth Circuit in 
northern California had to rule that the government had to turn over 
information in a usable format. It took a Federal court order to do so.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an 
additional 1 minute.
  Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill should mandate our knowing more and the 
government not knowing. It should have ensured that the government only 
had what it needed. It should have protected private companies who 
wanted to exchange appropriate information between each other. It 
should not have created a vast treasure trove here in Washington or 
somewhere in the hinterland where the government now and in the future 
can dig in for any purpose--criminal background investigations or 
perhaps simply checking to see if you paid your taxes. The fact is, 
this is a data vault that is not narrowly construed, and, therefore, 
sadly, without the amendments that were not allowed, I am not in a 
position to vote for this bill. I thank the chairman, and I thank Mr. 
Polis for his kind remarks also.
  Mr. POLIS. Mr. Speaker, if we defeat the previous question, we will 
offer an amendment to the rule that will allow the House to consider 
the Department of Veterans Affairs Cybersecurity Protection Act.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Arizona (Mrs. 
Kirkpatrick) to discuss our proposal.
  Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for giving me a 
couple of minutes to talk about the importance of protecting our 
veterans from cyber attack.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1128, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Cyber Security Protection Act. My bill will protect 
veterans' personal and sensitive information from cyber attacks without 
compromising the VA's ability to provide the health care, benefits, and 
services our veterans have earned.
  This legislation will do primarily three things. First, it will 
require the VA to develop an information security strategic plan that 
protects current veterans' information and anticipates future 
cybersecurity threats. Second, it mandates a report on VA actions to 
hold employees accountable for data breaches. Third, it requires the VA 
to propose a reorganization of the VA's information-security 
infrastructure to protect veterans and provide greater levels of 
accountability and responsibility in the VA.
  My bill will also require the VA to report employee violations of its 
policy and report any incidents involving the compromise of veterans' 
personal information by the VA or from outside cyber attacks.

[[Page 5382]]

  Mr. Speaker, this bill is one commonsense way that we can hold the VA 
accountable and protect veterans' private and personal information from 
cyber threats, and I urge all of my colleagues to support H.R. 1128.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, at this time I am pleased to 
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Carter), a member of 
the Homeland Security Committee and a colleague of mine from Georgia.
  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, national cybersecurity will be an issue this House will 
have to constantly address for the foreseeable future. To achieve a 
system that will protect our Nation's citizens and its infrastructure, 
we must create a public-private partnership between Federal agencies 
and American businesses. This partnership will allow Federal agencies 
and American businesses to share cyber threat information, 
vulnerabilities within our cyber network, and the creation of new 
systems to protect consumer information. However, private businesses 
need to be provided protections and incentives to ensure they are 
protected from government abuse and private legal proceedings meant to 
gain access to private security information.
  Mr. Speaker, one of our top priorities with these two bills should be 
to clearly acknowledge protections given to companies that engage in 
penetration testing and clearly state that company proprietary 
information is protected from nefarious legal proceedings and exempted 
from Freedom of Information Act requests. It is reasonable to think 
that individuals would actively pursue this sort of proprietary 
information for the sole purpose of accessing the vulnerabilities of 
private cyber networks if we do not clearly state that this information 
is protected and exempt from those actions.
  I believe we should consider these possibilities and ensure that 
protections are provided so our country and its citizens can fully 
benefit from these laws.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. I want to thank my colleague from Georgia who 
sits on the Homeland Security Committee for his passion and his 
commitment to addressing these critical defects in the laws governing 
this voluntary sharing of cyber threat information. The legislation 
before us today is good policy reflective of the hard work of the 
committees on which you sit, Homeland Security and the Intelligence 
Committee, as well as input from a vast array of stakeholders. It is 
important to know that the legislation is supported by every sector of 
the economy.
  As my friend so eloquently noted, the legislative process will 
rightly continue after these bills are considered by the full House 
this week and for years to come as we revisit and reassess the needs of 
Americans' privacy and also the laws governing cybersecurity.
  Mr. Speaker, I agree with my friend that if there is a conference 
committee on this bill, we should encourage them to seek additional 
clarification language as needed to ensure that companies are 
appropriately incentivized to share cyber threat information.
  I just want to say personally that I appreciate all the hard work 
that you have done on this issue bringing this forward and continuing 
to work for not only the companies in Georgia but across this Nation 
who depend on a safe and secure cyber network.
  Mr. POLIS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, it is ironic that on this very day, leaders on the 
Judiciary Committee will introduce legislation designed to reform and 
rein in the Federal Government's surveillance programs. I haven't had 
the opportunity to review those bills yet, so I can't speak to their 
merits. But I hope that if it is a strong bill, it will make its way 
through both Chambers and become law.
  But, today, this body is considering a rule that would take us in the 
wrong direction. Recent history has shown that this body shares the 
American people's concerns that we don't take the threat of unwarranted 
surveillance seriously enough and that Congress needs to pass 
meaningful reforms that balance our liberties, our freedoms, and our 
privacy with the need to keep America safe.
  Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell introduced legislation 
yesterday that would extend the NSA's surveillance program without any 
of the reforms that many of us on both sides of the aisle have 
advocated to rein them in. This is despite the national outcry and, 
indeed, international embarrassment that has been counterproductive to 
the very American security goals that these provisions are designed to 
advance.
  This makes me fear that Congress is not learning from the mistakes of 
the past, mistakes of overly broad surveillance authorities, but 
instead is about to repeat them. So before we approve faster, broader, 
and easier sharing of vast amounts of personal information from 
innocent Americans with the Federal Government, Congress should be 
taking up legislation to prove that we have the ability to curb abuse 
and the Federal Government's penchant for abusing its access to this 
kind of data.
  So far Congress has not shown its aptitude for preventing this kind 
of abuse. Yet today we ask the American people to trust us, to trust 
the President, yet again, by opening up even more information to the 
NSA and other surveillance agencies.
  Our experience with the NSA has shown us that to protect American 
civil liberties from an overzealous surveillance apparatus, the 
authorities to review and share Americans' personal information need to 
be construed as narrowly, as unambiguously, and as specifically as 
possible by the United States Congress. We need to limit very 
specifically to a specific set of circumstances under which sharing 
data and information is necessary for mitigating a security threat.
  We offered to do that through bipartisan amendments, working with 
Representative Lofgren, Representative Issa, and others, but none of 
those amendments are allowed to be discussed or debated under this 
rule.
  Both the Protecting Cyber Networks Act and the National Cybersecurity 
Protection Advancement Act fall well short of the standard--and in the 
case of the Protecting Cyber Networks Act can even be counterproductive 
and falls woefully short.

                              {time}  1315

  These pieces of legislation would enable Federal agencies to store 
and share Americans' private information, such as Internet usage 
patterns, even the content of online communications, based on a vague 
or broad standard that doing so is not unrelated to a cybersecurity 
threat.
  Again, not affirmatively, they don't have to prove that it is related 
to a cybersecurity threat; the burden of proof is to show that it is 
not unrelated to a cybersecurity threat. How can you demonstrably show 
that about anything?
  It would make it easier for government agencies to deliberately 
weaken software systems for the purpose of creating new surveillance 
back doors that foreign nation-states and hackers can presumably also 
exploit.
  It would leave the door wide open to more NSA surveillance by 
allowing the sharing of personal information for a raft of purposes 
unrelated to cybersecurity. We can do better.
  By rejecting this rule, Members of Congress will show that, yes, we 
take cybersecurity seriously, so seriously that we want to take the 
time to get it right. Whether that takes another week or 2 weeks or 3 
weeks, getting it right means allowing Members of this body input into 
the formulation of the final bill meaningfully through the kinds of 
amendments that have been rejected outright under this rule without 
discussion, without debate, without a vote.
  Unfortunately, the rule before us today denies us the ability to 
consider amendments that would have addressed many of the concerns with 
the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the 
amendment in the Record, along with extraneous material, immediately 
prior to the vote on the previous question.

[[Page 5383]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Colorado?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. POLIS. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle to vote ``no'' and defeat the previous question.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on this bizarre rule that combines two, at 
times, contradictory bills and rejects bipartisan amendments that would 
have addressed the concerns that many of us have with the underlying 
legislation.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on the previous question and the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  As we move forward, I think one of the things--and there are many 
things that are going to be discussed, and I encourage all Members to 
vote for this rule. As we move into general debate, there will be a lot 
of discussion that talks about what we are moving forward; but, also, I 
want to bring forward that we are--as is seemingly not discussed 
bringing forth, there are amendments being brought forth on both of 
these bills.
  There also were 20-something amendments in Homeland Security; there 
was also an amendment in Intelligence. These are vetted bills. This is 
a proper role with what we are doing in Congress in bringing these to 
the floor.
  Are there times that someone may want others? Yes; but, at this 
point, we are going to have that debate here on the floor. That is why 
voting for this rule and moving this forward is the proper thing to do.
  Before we also move back from this, I want to talk about this need 
and why we are here even to start with. Most Americans recognize and 
understand that the growing attacks against our cyber networks and 
critical infrastructure and our laws fail to provide proper legal 
authority for information regarding cyber threats to be shared.
  In fact, when I am back home in the Ninth District of Georgia 
discussing this, most people don't realize there is this barrier, and 
especially everything that is going on, they don't understand why some 
of these impediments were put into place that keeps companies from 
protecting their own, but also protecting their own personal 
information.
  One of the things that is missing in this debate is the discussion of 
what has actually happened and the personal information that is shared 
by these hackers who are getting into our system.
  Some of the latest attacks perpetrated by North Korea and other 
criminal enterprises on Sony Pictures and health insurance providers 
Anthem and Blue Cross Blue Shield speak to the type of attacks that 
occur on a daily basis that target the backbone of American business 
and the privacy of America's most sensitive data.
  As we look to constrain this, as we look to put in proper safeguards, 
we have to realize that doing nothing exposes more and more of our 
American citizens to personal information being shared. If we don't 
believe it, just read the headlines from Sony, Anthem, and these others 
that have come out recently.
  According to the Department of Homeland Security, in 2014 alone, they 
received almost 100,000 cyber incident reports and detected 64,000 
cyber vulnerabilities, and these numbers are just based on information 
given to DHS and does not reflect the full scope of the attacks on our 
Nation.
  When we look at this and we talk about the personal information, the 
FBI Director James Comey said:

       There are two kinds of big companies in the United States. 
     There are those who have been hacked . . . and those who 
     don't know they have been hacked.

  A recent survey by the Ponemon Institute showed an average cost of a 
cyber crime for U.S. retail stores more than doubled from 2013 to an 
annual average of 8.6 million per company in 2014.
  The annual average cost for a company of a successful cyber attack in 
2014 increased to 20.8 million in financial services, 14.5 million in 
the technology sector, and 12.7 million in the communications industry.
  The scope of many attacks are not fully known. For example, in July 
of 2014, the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team issued an advisory 
that more than 1,000 U.S. businesses have been affected by the Backoff 
malware, which targets point-of-sale systems used by most retail 
industries. These attacks targeted administrative and customer data 
and, in many cases, financial data. Most companies encounter multiple 
cyber attacks every day, many unknown to the public and many unknown to 
the companies themselves even.
  Again, as we look back over the attacks of just the past year, Target 
announced an additional 70 million individual contact information was 
taken during the December 2013 breach in which 40 million customers' 
credit and debit information was stolen.
  Between May 2013 and January 2014, the payment cards of 2.6 million 
Michaels customers were affected. Attackers targeted the Michaels POS 
system to gain access to their systems.
  The email service Yahoo! Mail was reportedly hacked in for 273 
million users, although the specific number of accounts affected was 
not released.
  For 2 weeks, AT&T was hacked from the inside by personnel who 
accessed user information, including Social Security information.
  Foreign nationals from China have been indicted for computer hacking 
and economic espionage. We have seen these attacks all over the board.
  Looking at this, the real issue that comes to mind is if we sit back 
and are not productive and not proactive as the Intelligence Committee 
and the Homeland Security Committee have been here, we are putting in 
danger more personal information being exposed in ways that no American 
needs to have their personal information exposed and are being targeted 
in the process.
  This is good legislation that needs to stay on the floor, and that is 
why we are here today to support this rule and to look forward to that 
debate that has already happened and will continue to happen.
  I appreciate the discussion we have had over the past hour. Although 
we may have some differences, our unity should be clear against the 
cyber attacks and our resolve to prevent them and show their success is 
strong.
  This rule provides for ample debate on the floor, the opportunity to 
debate and to vote on 16 amendments, and a smooth and deliberative 
process for sending one bill to the Senate. These bills will help 
protect American consumers, jobs, and small businesses.
  Allowing companies, again, to voluntarily share cyber threat 
indicators with other companies and government agencies will help bring 
awareness to new threats and vulnerabilities.
  If businesses can learn about a new threat from another business or 
from the government before they are targeted themselves, they can 
better act to protect their customers' personal information from a 
similar attack.
  I would like to thank Intel, Homeland Security, Judiciary, and Rules 
Committee members and staff for the thoughtful and involved processes 
that have brought us to this point.
  I urge my colleagues to support the rule and these two cybersecurity 
bills.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on the Rule governing 
debate on H.R. 1731 and H.R. 1560.
  H.R. 1731 and H.R. 1569: 1. provides for consideration of important 
improvements to both bills; 2. makes clear the role of the Department 
of Homeland Security in securing civil government networks; and 3. the 
responsibilities of DHS in assist private sector entities in improving 
overall cybersecurity for themselves and their customers.
  The bipartisan process that the Homeland Security Committee followed 
through the leadership of Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson 
is an example of what can be accomplished when partisanship is removed 
from the policymaking equation.
  I would also like to thank Chairman Sessions and Ranking Member 
Slaughter as well as members of the Rules Committee for making 4 of my 
amendments in order.
  I join my colleagues in the work to secure our nation's 
cybersecurity, while preserving the privacy and civil liberties of our 
citizens.

[[Page 5384]]

  The road to today began in 2011, when President Obama took several 
steps to move the issue of cybersecurity to the forefront by: 1. 
releasing a cybersecurity legislative proposal; 2. calling on Congress 
to take urgent action to give the private sector and government the 
tools needed to combat cyber threats at home and abroad; and 3. issuing 
the International Strategy for Cyberspace to make clear to nations 
abroad that the United States was firmly committed to improving 
cybersecurity and combating cyber terrorism.
  I will be offering several amendments as the two bills are 
considered.
  The Jackson Lee amendments are simple and will improve the privacy 
protections already in the bills and allow the Department of Homeland 
Security to become a better partner with the private sector in its work 
to improve domestic cybersecurity.
  One of the Jackson Lee amendments that will be offered to the both 
bills will improve privacy and civil liberties by providing the public 
with a report from the Government Accountability Office that their 
privacy and civil liberties are not being compromised by the programs 
established by this bill.
  Other Jackson Lee Amendments to H.R. 1731 will include an assurance 
that DHS's remains current on innovations: 1. on data security that can 
improve privacy and civil liberties protections; 2. in industrial 
control systems to keep pace with industry adoption of new 
technologies; and industry best practices; and 3. that can aid DHS in 
aligning federally funded cybersecurity research and development with 
private sector efforts to protect privacy and civil liberties.
  These amendments will make sure that technology and equipment 
purchased with taxpayer dollars provided to ensure cybersecurity will 
remain current and focused on real-world applications that reflect 
constitutional values and how businesses and industry function.
  An important building block for improving the Nation's cybersecurity 
is ensuring that private entities can collaborate to share timely cyber 
threat information with each other and the Federal Government.
  The Administration is expressing concerns with H.R. 1560's broad 
liability protections offered to companies that sharing information 
with federal government programs established under this bill.
  Appropriate liability protections should be established that 
incentivize good cybersecurity practices and would not grant immunity 
to a private company for failing to act on information it receives 
about the security of its networks.
  The important component of cybersecurity is that computer network 
owners and managers will act to improve cyber defense of their systems 
when provided with information that vulnerabilities in their computer 
networks exist.
  Legislation should not provide incentives for companies not to act 
when presented with evidence of network cyber security vulnerabilities.
  Electronic data breaches involving Sony, Target, Home Depot, Neiman 
Marcus, JPMorgan Chase, and Athem are only a few of the cyber incidents 
that have plagued private sector networks.
  These data breaches also are a reminder that the Internet is not yet 
what it must become to continue to meet the remote communication needs 
of a global marketplace.
  As with other threats this nation has faced in the past and overcome 
we must create the resources and the institutional responses to protect 
our nation while preserving our liberties and freedoms.
  We cannot accomplish the task of better cybersecurity without the 
cooperation and full support of citizens; the private sector; local 
state and federal government; computing research community; and 
academia.
  This level of cooperation requires the trust and confidence of the 
American people that the actions taken by government to combat cyber 
threats will not threaten our way of life nor our hard fought 
Constitutional rights.
  H.R. 1731 makes clear that the Department of Homeland Security will 
be the federal government agency responsible for securing civilian 
government networks and supporting voluntary efforts by private sector 
companies and institutions to improve coordination and response to 
cyber security threats.
  The issues regarding liability protection related to cybersecurity 
must be addressed in order for H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731 to have any 
chance of succeeding.
  It is my understanding that Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member 
Thompson have reached agreement on language that addresses concerns 
that have been raised regarding liability.
  There are talented and resourceful people outside and inside of 
government who can inform Congress on approaches to information sharing 
that will yield the desired results without compromising privacy or 
civil liberties.
  Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Rule for H.R. 
1560 and H.R. 1731. Members from both parties have a shared goal of 
bolstering cybersecurity and improving the quality of information that 
the private sector receives about timely cyber threats so that they can 
protect their systems. I am greatly disappointed that the Rules 
Committee failed to make in order any of the several amendments 
submitted by both Democrats and Republicans to refine what the White 
House has called ``sweeping'' liability protections, as they appear in 
both cyber information sharing bills to be considered this week.
  Extending liability protection to a company that ``fails to act'' on 
timely threat information could encourage companies to simply do 
nothing despite receiving information critical to the security of its 
systems. Appropriate liability protection does not grant immunity to 
companies for failing to act on such cybersecurity threat information, 
but rather incentivizes sound cybersecurity practices. The provision 
also effectively preempts state laws--including those in California, 
Massachusetts, and Maryland--that hold businesses liable for failing to 
maintain reasonable security of their systems, thereby undermining 
important protections for consumers and their sensitive data.
  Instead, my Democratic colleagues on the Homeland Security Committee 
and I support President Obama's straightforward, tailored approach to 
addressing what some in industry have identified as a major barrier to 
the sharing of cyber threat information--the risk that sharing such 
information would expose companies to legal liability. Unfortunately, 
the liability protection provision included in the bill puts in place 
an unduly complicated structure that runs the risk of providing 
liability relief to companies that fail to act on timely cyber 
information. I submitted two amendments to address the liability 
protection problems that exist in both information sharing bills to be 
considered this week. The first would have struck the provision 
immunizing companies that fail to act on timely threat information and 
clarified that the Act has no impact on a duty to act on shared 
cybersecurity threat information. The second would have removed all 
potential liability exemptions for willful misconduct by government 
actors.
  These provisions would have improved both bills greatly, and at a 
minimum they deserved to be debated on the House floor today. The 
effectiveness of information sharing legislation and efforts to improve 
the security of companies' systems depends on getting liability 
protection right. I look forward to continuing the discussion on 
liability protection with Members from both sides of the aisle as the 
bill moves forward.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, House Report 114-88, the report 
to accompany H. Res. 212, the special rule governing consideration of 
H.R. 1731, does not reflect a request by Mr. Mulvaney of South Carolina 
to add Mr. Thompson of Mississippi as a cosponsor of his amendment, 
number 8 printed in part B of the report.
  The material previously referred to by Mr. Polis is as follows:

      An Amendment to H. Res. 212 Offered by Mr. Polis of Colorado

       At the end of the resolution, add the following new 
     sections:
       Sec. 4. Immediately upon adoption of this resolution the 
     Speaker shall, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule XVIII, declare 
     the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on 
     the state of the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R. 
     1128) to amend title 38, United States Code, to make certain 
     improvements in the information security of the Department of 
     Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes. General debate 
     shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour 
     equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking 
     minority member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. After 
     general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment 
     under the five-minute rule. All points of order against 
     provisions in the bill are waived. At the conclusion of 
     consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall 
     rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
     may have been adopted. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
     final passage without intervening motion except one motion to 
     recommit with or without instructions. If the Committee of 
     the Whole rises and reports that it has come to no resolution 
     on the bill, then on the next legislative day the House 
     shall, immediately after the third daily order of business 
     under clause 1 of rule XIV, resolve into the Committee of the 
     Whole for further consideration of the bill.
       Sec. 5. Clause 1(c) of rule XIX shall not apply to the 
     consideration of H.R. 1128.
                                  ____


        The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means

       This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous 
     question on a special rule, is not

[[Page 5385]]

     merely a procedural vote. A vote against ordering the 
     previous question is a vote against the Republican majority 
     agenda and a vote to allow the Democratic minority to offer 
     an alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should 
     be debating.
       Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of 
     Representatives (VI, 308-311), describes the vote on the 
     previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or 
     control the consideration of the subject before the House 
     being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous 
     question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the 
     subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling 
     of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the 
     House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes 
     the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to 
     offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the 
     majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated 
     the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to 
     a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to 
     recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: 
     ``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman 
     from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to 
     yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first 
     recognition.''
       The Republican majority may say ``the vote on the previous 
     question is simply a vote on whether to proceed to an 
     immediate vote on adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no 
     substantive legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' 
     But that is not what they have always said. Listen to the 
     Republican Leadership Manual on the Legislative Process in 
     the United States House of Representatives, (6th edition, 
     page 135). Here's how the Republicans describe the previous 
     question vote in their own manual: ``Although it is generally 
     not possible to amend the rule because the majority Member 
     controlling the time will not yield for the purpose of 
     offering an amendment, the same result may be achieved by 
     voting down the previous question on the rule. . . . When the 
     motion for the previous question is defeated, control of the 
     time passes to the Member who led the opposition to ordering 
     the previous question. That Member, because he then controls 
     the time, may offer an amendment to the rule, or yield for 
     the purpose of amendment.''
       In Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of 
     Representatives, the subchapter titled ``Amending Special 
     Rules'' states: ``a refusal to order the previous question on 
     such a rule [a special rule reported from the Committee on 
     Rules] opens the resolution to amendment and further 
     debate.'' (Chapter 21, section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: 
     ``Upon rejection of the motion for the previous question on a 
     resolution reported from the Committee on Rules, control 
     shifts to the Member leading the opposition to the previous 
     question, who may offer a proper amendment or motion and who 
     controls the time for debate thereon.''
       Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does 
     have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only 
     available tools for those who oppose the Republican 
     majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the 
     opportunity to offer an alternative plan.

  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Marchant). The question is on ordering 
the previous question.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. POLIS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair 
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on 
the question of adoption of the resolution.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 237, 
nays 179, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 163]

                               YEAS--237

     Abraham
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Amash
     Amodei
     Babin
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Benishek
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (MI)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blum
     Bost
     Boustany
     Brat
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Burgess
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Clawson (FL)
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Comstock
     Conaway
     Cook
     Costello (PA)
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis, Rodney
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     Diaz-Balart
     Dold
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers (NC)
     Emmer (MN)
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Garrett
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (LA)
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Hanna
     Hardy
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Heck (NV)
     Hensarling
     Herrera Beutler
     Hice, Jody B.
     Hill
     Holding
     Hudson
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurd (TX)
     Hurt (VA)
     Issa
     Jenkins (KS)
     Jenkins (WV)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jolly
     Jones
     Jordan
     Joyce
     Katko
     Kelly (PA)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Knight
     Labrador
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Latta
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Loudermilk
     Love
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     MacArthur
     Marchant
     Marino
     Massie
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McHenry
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McSally
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Messer
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Moolenaar
     Mooney (WV)
     Mullin
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Neugebauer
     Newhouse
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Perry
     Pittenger
     Pitts
     Poliquin
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price, Tom
     Ratcliffe
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rice (SC)
     Rigell
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney (FL)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Rouzer
     Royce
     Russell
     Ryan (WI)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scalise
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Stefanik
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Trott
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Walters, Mimi
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IA)
     Young (IN)
     Zeldin
     Zinke

                               NAYS--179

     Adams
     Aguilar
     Ashford
     Bass
     Beatty
     Becerra
     Bera
     Beyer
     Bishop (GA)
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brownley (CA)
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardenas
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     DeSaulnier
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Duckworth
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Esty
     Farr
     Fattah
     Foster
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Graham
     Grayson
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Heck (WA)
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinojosa
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huffman
     Israel
     Jackson Lee
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kind
     Kirkpatrick
     Kuster
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lawrence
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis
     Lieu, Ted
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan Grisham (NM)
     Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
     Lynch
     Maloney, Carolyn
     Maloney, Sean
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Meng
     Moore
     Moulton
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nolan
     Norcross
     O'Rourke
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rangel
     Rice (NY)
     Richmond
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Sherman
     Sinema
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Speier
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takai
     Takano
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Tonko
     Torres
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Waters, Maxine
     Watson Coleman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Brady (TX)
     Costa
     Curbelo (FL)
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Graves (MO)
     Hastings
     Murphy (FL)
     Neal
     Olson
     Payne
     Poe (TX)
     Schrader
     Smith (WA)
     Wasserman Schultz

                              {time}  1349

  Messrs. CLEAVER and GENE GREEN of Texas changed their vote from 
``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Messrs. NEUGEBAUER, HUDSON, and STIVERS changed their vote from 
``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the previous question was ordered.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:

[[Page 5386]]


  Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 163, had I been present, I 
would have voted ``no.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. POLIS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 238, 
noes 182, not voting 11, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 164]

                               AYES--238

     Abraham
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Amodei
     Ashford
     Babin
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Benishek
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (MI)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blum
     Bost
     Boustany
     Brat
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Burgess
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Clawson (FL)
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Comstock
     Conaway
     Cook
     Costa
     Costello (PA)
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis, Rodney
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     Diaz-Balart
     Dold
     Duckworth
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers (NC)
     Emmer (MN)
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Garrett
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (LA)
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Hanna
     Hardy
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Heck (NV)
     Hensarling
     Herrera Beutler
     Hice, Jody B.
     Hill
     Holding
     Hudson
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurd (TX)
     Hurt (VA)
     Issa
     Jenkins (KS)
     Jenkins (WV)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jolly
     Jordan
     Joyce
     Katko
     Kelly (PA)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Knight
     Labrador
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Latta
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Loudermilk
     Love
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     MacArthur
     Marchant
     Marino
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McHenry
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McSally
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Messer
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Moolenaar
     Mooney (WV)
     Mullin
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Neugebauer
     Newhouse
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Perry
     Pittenger
     Pitts
     Poe (TX)
     Poliquin
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price, Tom
     Ratcliffe
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rice (SC)
     Rigell
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney (FL)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Rouzer
     Royce
     Russell
     Ryan (WI)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scalise
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sinema
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Stefanik
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Trott
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Walters, Mimi
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IA)
     Young (IN)
     Zeldin
     Zinke

                               NOES--182

     Adams
     Aguilar
     Amash
     Bass
     Beatty
     Becerra
     Bera
     Beyer
     Bishop (GA)
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brownley (CA)
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardenas
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     DeSaulnier
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Esty
     Farr
     Fattah
     Foster
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Graham
     Grayson
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Heck (WA)
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinojosa
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huffman
     Israel
     Jackson Lee
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kind
     Kirkpatrick
     Kuster
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lawrence
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis
     Lieu, Ted
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan Grisham (NM)
     Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
     Lynch
     Maloney, Carolyn
     Maloney, Sean
     Massie
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Meng
     Moore
     Moulton
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nolan
     Norcross
     O'Rourke
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rangel
     Rice (NY)
     Richmond
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrader
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Sherman
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Speier
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takai
     Takano
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Tonko
     Torres
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Waters, Maxine
     Watson Coleman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--11

     Brady (TX)
     Curbelo (FL)
     DesJarlais
     Graves (MO)
     Hastings
     Murphy (FL)
     Neal
     Olson
     Payne
     Smith (WA)
     Wasserman Schultz

                              {time}  1356

  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________