[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 4]
[House]
[Pages 4554-4561]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




    MISCONDUCT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL TODD ZINSER, COMMERCE DEPARTMENT

  (Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas asked and was given permission to 
address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Congress 
relies upon inspectors general, IGs, as a key component of the Federal 
accountability community. When IGs themselves engage in illegal, 
unethical, or inappropriate behavior, Congress has an obligation to 
investigate them.
  In the last Congress, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

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launched a bipartisan investigation of the Department of Commerce 
Inspector General Todd Zinser. The evidence the committee obtained 
regarding Mr. Zinser's personal misconduct and professional 
mismanagement of his office is overwhelming.
  Any one of the multiple issues highlighted in my extended remarks 
would be sufficient to justify the removal of this IG. This serious 
step is made necessary by the abundant and deeply disturbing evidence 
that I am making public today. It gives me no pleasure to provide this 
account to the Congress, but I believe it is my obligation to report on 
what we have found.
  Todd J. Zinser has been the Inspector General of the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) since December 2007. Prior to his present post, he 
served as Acting IG and Deputy IG at the Department of Transportation's 
Office of Inspector General (OIG). He has had a thirty year career in 
the federal accountability community.
  Our Committee relies on the Commerce IG's office to identify and 
investigate issues of waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement within 
agencies under the Committee's jurisdiction, including the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which encompasses the 
National Weather Service (NWS) and National Hurricane Center, as well 
as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The 
Committee also has wide-ranging oversight jurisdiction over all non-
military research and development, which touches upon other components 
of the Department of Commerce.
  Issues relating to Mr. Zinser's conduct in office first came to the 
attention of the Committee in 2012. As some of you may recall, the 
Chief Financial Officer at the National Weather Service was removed 
after it was found that he had established an improper and illegal 
process for moving tens of millions of dollars across appropriated 
accounts at NWS in violation of the Anti-deficiency Act. Subsequently, 
the then-head of the NWS also retired as a result of this scandal. The 
Committee learned of this improper conduct the same way the rest of the 
world did: we read about it in the Washington Post on May 28, 2012.
  However, Inspector Generals are required by the Inspector General Act 
to notify Congress when they become aware of significant problems in 
their agency. The Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended says very 
clearly that it is a purpose of the establishment of inspector generals 
that they are ``to provide a means for keeping the head of the 
establishment and the Congress fully and currently informed about 
problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of'' that 
agency.
  That act also directs that ``[e]ach Inspector General shall report 
immediately to the head of the establishment involved whenever the 
Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant 
problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of 
programs and operations of such establishment. The head of the 
establishment shall transmit any such report to the appropriate 
committees or subcommittees of Congress within seven calendar days, 
together with a report by the head of the establishment containing any 
comments such head deems appropriate.'' Mr. Zinser never suggested that 
he had followed this provision and there is no evidence that the IG 
ever communicated any report to the Secretary of Commerce regarding 
ongoing violations of the Anti-deficiency Act within the National 
Weather Service.
  In this case, Mr. Zinser did not notify our Committee by any means 
that NWS had been running a huge, illegal accounting scam. That failure 
to notify came as a grave disappointment to me and to other Members of 
the Committee. When staff met with Mr. Zinser to understand what had 
happened in this case, and the role of his office in the investigation, 
they were astonished to learn that in November 2011 the IG had 
concluded that a violation of the Anti-deficiency Act had likely 
occurred. That meant that the IG went six months without mentioning 
this significant matter to the Congress, letting us instead learn of 
the issue in the press.
  In that meeting with staff, Mr. Zinser disclosed that he had no idea 
that his office had received multiple tips regarding financial 
misconduct at NWS. He admitted that his office had actually misplaced 
some of these allegations. The Commerce OIG received its first of 
several Hotline complaints about this issue in June 2010. Mr. Zinser 
also claimed he had no idea that his audit staff were conducting an 
examination of these allegations until a memorandum on the topic--
eleven months in the making--hit his desk on November 18, 2011. It 
seemed impossible that, with his years of experience, he would have 
established a system for receiving whistleblower tips that could 
actually lose those tips. It also seemed impossible that he could not 
know that his staff was conducting a ``preliminary audit'' on matters 
involving possible illegal activity by one of the top officials at the 
NWS.
  At the time, his office only had about 120 employees and misconduct 
at the National Weather Service would be a very, very high profile 
matter. Even if Mr. Zinser's account is true--and my staff have 
gathered significant evidence that Mr. Zinser is actually a 
micromanager who has been personally involved in assignments of hotline 
complaints and held weekly reviews of ongoing work at the time, back in 
2011--such failings suggest an extraordinary lack of personal 
engagement in the work of his office and a serious lack of competence 
in Mr. Zinser's management of significant, potentially criminal, 
allegations.
  Most surprising of all the things staff learned in this meeting was 
that Mr. Zinser declined to conduct a formal investigation into these 
financial improprieties even after he said he became aware of them. 
Instead, the IG gave the investigation back to the agency. Given the 
vast scope of the financial shenanigans that occurred at NWS over many 
years, it is reasonable to question whether others in the agency knew 
about this conduct or played some role in allowing it to go on. In 
letting the agency essentially investigate itself on this violation of 
the law, the IG created a situation where there could have been a 
cover-up. In the end, the agency's report on this incident found only 
one official--the NWS Chief Financial Officer--to have been responsible 
for years of illegal accounting practices.
  IGs exist to carry out investigations precisely when allegations of 
illegal activity have been made. Members and staff found it impossible 
to understand why the IG had failed in what can only be described as a 
``core responsibility'' to investigate this misconduct and to keep the 
Congress informed. My staff has posed this scenario to several other 
IGs who work at agencies in our jurisdiction, every one of them has 
said they would never have given such an investigation back to the 
agency. Such a decision is inexplicable.
  These failures to investigate a violation of law, to inform the 
Congress of significant issues at his agency, or to effectively manage 
his own office led to doubts among Committee Members regarding Mr. 
Zinser's reliability as an IG. As a result, our staff began to examine 
the work of Mr. Zinser's office in more detail.
  Let me be clear: Mr. Zinser came to our attention because of Mr. 
Zinser's own misconduct. We know from sources on other Committees as 
well as correspondence he has sent, that he has tried to explain away 
our interest in his conduct as the result of former IG staff with an ax 
to grind coming to us with false stories, or even that my own Committee 
staff are personally hostile to Mr. Zinser. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. Mr. Zinser has only himself to blame for drawing our 
attention to him.
  In the wake of a hearing in which Members heard directly from Mr. 
Zinser regarding his mishandling of the NWS Anti-Deficiency Act 
violations, my staff began looking into the IG's hotline system. How 
could tips involving illegal activity and the potential waste of 
millions of dollars get set aside without any action? While the staff 
and Members were wondering how this bizarre conduct on the NWS could be 
explained, another item in the Washington Post caught our eye. Mr. 
Zinser's office was the subject of a whistleblower retaliation 
complaint that had been taken up by the Office of Special Counsel 
(OSC)--the Federal government's whistleblower protection office.
  On December 3, 2012 the Washington Post reported on this case because 
the OSC had to take the extraordinary step of issuing instructions that 
Inspector General Zinser vacate a gag agreement with the complainants. 
This gag agreement, which OSC ultimately found had been essentially 
extorted from the complainants, had barred them from communicating 
about their experiences in Mr. Zinser's office to the press, OSC or 
Congress.
  This press account was every bit as shocking as the revelations Mr. 
Zinser had made to the Committee regarding his mishandling of the NWS 
case. It seemed impossible that an IG, or his top aides, would 
establish a gag order to silence former staff from talking to the 
press, the OSC, or Congress. That such a gag order was the result of 
retaliation for suspected whistleblowing conduct by the former 
employees made this situation even more disturbing. By law, IG offices 
are to be a safe haven for whistleblowers. That an IG, or his senior 
staff, would attempt to punish and silence whistleblowers within their 
own office flies in the face of everything we expect of an IG.
  This story opened up new lines of communication between 
whistleblowers remaining in Mr. Zinser's office and our staff. For the 
remainder of the 113th Congress we worked to

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understand how the office operated and why so many problems seemed to 
emerge from the IG's office. Over time, this initiative expanded from 
work done solely by the Minority staff of the Committee to become a 
fully bipartisan investigation with participation by the Majority as 
well. My friend from Wisconsin, the then-Vice Chairman of the 
Committee, Representative Sensenbrenner, was particularly important in 
driving the investigation forward and forging a bipartisan effort. Mr. 
Sensenbrenner has a long history of taking action to protect 
whistleblowers.
  I want to touch on some of the most outrageous things that we 
uncovered during the two years of our work. I may depart from a 
chronological treatment in an effort to bring the most disturbing 
elements to the attention of the House in the most expeditious way.
  For those who wonder how I know what I am saying is true, let me 
share a summary of the work our staff engaged in.
  The staff interviewed more than 70 officials who have worked for or 
with Mr. Zinser, including more than 60 current or former Commerce OIG 
employees. The Committee has also obtained thousands of pages of 
supporting documentation, court records and other evidence from 
informed sources. Most of the material that has informed our 
investigation has come to the staff through whistleblowers sharing 
materials. Despite two bipartisan document request letters in the last 
Congress, Mr. Zinser provided very little responsive material, 
particularly to our second request in August 2014 that specifically 
focused on the conduct of Mr. Zinser and some of his senior most 
officials targeting whistleblowers in his own office.
  Coincidentally, and I will discuss this in more detail later, six 
days--let me repeat, six days--after Mr. Zinser received the 
Committee's bipartisan document request regarding efforts to identify 
and retaliate against whistleblowers in his office, he was seen using 
his personal hand-cart to remove two bankers boxes of materials from 
his office to his car on a holiday weekend. Although we don't know what 
was in those boxes, the timing of this removal is extremely suspicious.
  Committee staff has built a network of sources that provided 
accurate, contemporaneous insights into actions within the office. The 
stories and documents these whistleblowers provided paint a deeply 
disturbing picture of an IG's office ruled by fear and intimidation, 
where unethical conduct is rewarded at the top, while the line staff 
are largely prevented from conducting the good work expected of an IG's 
office.
  Let me start by acknowledging two apparent public successes of Mr. 
Zinser's: he produced two reports in 2014 on misconduct at the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that received extensive press 
coverage and inspired a joint hearing by the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform and the House Judiciary Committee. Each 
of these seeming successes, though, points to core problems in the 
credibility of Mr. Zinser and the work of his office.
  On July 8, 2014, Mr. Zinser's office released an investigative report 
about the conduct of Deborah Cohn, the Commissioner for Trademarks at 
PTO. The report found that Commissioner Cohn violated several federal 
laws regarding federal officials using their public office for an 
individual's private gain (5 C.F.R. 2635.702 and 702(a)), providing 
preferential treatment to an applicant (5 U.S.C. 2302(b), and 5 C.F.R. 
2635.101(b)(8)), and violating federal ethics violations (5 C.F.R. 
2635.501(a)). What was Ms. Cohn's offense? She had intervened in a 
hiring decision to assist her daughter's fiance in getting a job.
  In September, in the wake of the report, Deborah Cohn announced plans 
to retire by the end of 2014. According to her online biography, she 
worked at PTO for over 30 years, and retired in January, 2015. At the 
time of the release of the report, IG Zinser was quoted in the press as 
saying the OIG investigation found Ms. Cohn exerted ``undue influence 
in the hiring process'' and ``intervened and created an additional 
position specifically for the applicant.'' The Commerce OIG report also 
said that beyond the letter of the law, the PTO official's actions 
``reflected poor judgment.'' The take away quote for the press: ``As a 
long-term senior manager in the federal government, she should have 
known about the federal laws governing hiring and should have steered 
clear of any appearance of impropriety,'' the report said.
  Ms. Cohn was wrong to have intervened in this hiring case in the 
manner that she did, but she is to be congratulated for choosing to 
retire in the face of these significant findings that called her 
judgement into question. But as my staff learned, Mr. Zinser is really 
not in a very credible position to lecture anyone on hiring 
irregularities.
  Mr. Zinser has his own rather astounding record of inappropriate 
hiring in the Commerce IG's office. For example, since coming to the IG 
post in December of 2007, he personally intervened to save the career 
of one of his closest friends as it was imploding at the Department of 
Transportation due to mismanagement issues. This person is one of the 
same people who ultimately had the OSC complaint lodged against him 
that I referenced above. Mr. Zinser also personally intervened to get 
his own son's friend an internship position in the OIG and then 
directed his senior staff to push the Department of Commerce Security 
Office to issue credentials for the young man when a security issue 
arose. The friend of Mr. Zinser's son was eventually hired into a 
permanent position in the OIG with a starting salary of more than 
$42,000.
  Most disturbingly, Mr. Zinser hired a woman that substantial evidence 
and witness testimony reveals was involved in a ``romantic'' 
relationship with Mr. Zinser at the time he hired her in August 2010. 
At that time, she was in the middle of her probationary year as a 
candidate for the Senior Executive Service (SES) at an office within 
the Department of Commerce. Notified by her managers that she would be 
removed from her SES probationary position immediately due to 
significant conduct problems, she asked her supervisor if she could 
have an extra day because ``Todd Zinser'' would hire her. Mr. Zinser 
then personally intervened to have her detailed to his office within 
days. This required a frantic push among all levels of his office to 
get the paperwork done and signed before her SES position at DOC was 
vacated--which would have washed her out of the SES probationary 
program.
  Witnesses in the Commerce IG's office who had been involved in the 
transfer say there was an extreme, personal urgency in Mr. Zinser's 
actions to have this employee detailed to his office. In addition, the 
Committee has confirmed that Mr. Zinser never contacted this woman's 
former supervisors at the other DOC agency where she worked to 
ascertain why she was in the process of being removed from her SES 
position. This would seem to have been a reasonable action for anyone 
hiring a person into an SES position, even more so for an IG who 
routinely handles sensitive personal information and criminal 
investigations.
  The morning before the Department of Commerce ``officially'' approved 
her detail to the IG's office, she was provided with a window office, 
desk, computer and phone in the Commerce Office of Inspector General, 
according to former OIG employees and contemporaneous emails. In the 
wake of this effort, the then-Director of Human Resources in the IG's 
office e-mailed the Counsel to the IG: ``you can add illegal 
appointments to my annual performance discussion. With [Todd's son's 
friend] and this one, I am going to be an entire series in the 
Washington post [sic].''
  Within five weeks of being brought to the OIG on detail, Mr. Zinser 
appointed his friend to the position of Assistant Inspector General for 
Administration--a SES position that paid $150,000 a year. Subsequently, 
Mr. Zinser directly approved three SES Performance Bonuses for her from 
January 2011 to October 2012 totaling $28,199.
  Let me be clear, I am not making any comment on the qualifications or 
skills of the woman hired by Mr. Zinser, and I am attempting to limit 
my comments about the broader situation of their relationship out of 
sensitivity for the feelings of innocent parties. However, Mr. Zinser's 
personal conduct in this case is deplorable. His conduct undermined the 
integrity of the SES process and the Federal hiring system more 
generally.
  It is clear that he hired this intimate friend to do her a favor 
given her difficult professional circumstances. No one interviewed by 
the Committee staff who worked in the IG's office at the time of her 
detail or subsequent appointment believes that she was hired because 
there was a pressing need for someone with her skill set. The universal 
reaction among the staff was that this behavior was highly irregular, 
and right from the beginning there were some in the office who had 
knowledge of his relationship with this person. The result was that 
rumors began immediately regarding this person's special status. 
Witnesses indicate she wielded unusual authority in the office due to 
the close nature of her relationship to Mr. Zinser. This is the kind of 
personnel action that destroys the effectiveness of an organization and 
that IGs themselves often investigate.
  The Committee has no more interest in Mr. Zinser's private affairs 
than the Congress would have in Ms. Cohn's daughter's fiance. However, 
Todd Zinser just as blatantly entangled his personal affairs with his 
public duties as Ms. Cohn had done when he used his position of trust 
to advance a romantic partner's

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position. This has created not simply ethically troubling behavior on 
his part but potential violations of federal law. His actions to 
further the career of a romantic interest compromises the credibility 
of the IG and his office to investigate inappropriate hiring by others, 
even when justified.
  Mr. Zinser's press comment about Ms. Cohn applies to him as well: 
``As a long-term senior manager in the federal government, (h)e should 
have known about the federal laws governing hiring and should have 
steered clear of any appearance of impropriety.'' It should go without 
saying that such a statement is even more true of a person who the 
Congress has placed in a law enforcement position. The difference 
between Cohn and Zinser is that there is no IG to hold Mr. Zinser 
accountable. That is a job for the Congress and the President.
  There is one more twist in this tale. In January 2011, an anonymous 
complaint about Mr. Zinser's inappropriate hiring of the Assistant IG 
for Administration was received by the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). The complaint went to 
their Integrity Committee to investigate. On February 22, 2011, CIGIE's 
Integrity Committee wrote to Mr. Zinser regarding the complaint asking 
that he respond within 30 days. On April 11, 2011, Mr. Zinser provided 
a written response completely denying that there was anything improper 
in his hiring of this woman. He told CIGIE that he had a critical need 
to hire someone with her skills. In the letter Mr. Zinser wrote, ``. . 
. her assignment was based solely on business necessity, not on a 
personal relationship.''
  As I mentioned, no one interviewed by Committee staff who worked in 
the Commerce IG's office at the time believes she was hired because 
there was a pressing need for someone with her skill set. The position 
of Assistant IG for Administration had been vacant in the Commerce OIG 
for over two years before it was given to Mr. Zinser's romantic 
interest, and numerous former OIG employees recall that Zinser had 
refused to fill that position on a number of occasions claiming he did 
not see a need for it. Not until his close friend was in desperate need 
of a job did Mr. Zinser discover a necessity to fill the post.
  In addition, not a single record provided by the Commerce IG in 
response to our Committee's July 2014 document request regarding 
records related to Mr. Zinser's hiring of this person supports IG 
Zinser's declaration to CIGIE that he hired her into the position of 
Assistant IG for Administration ``based solely on business necessity, 
not a personal relationship.'' There is no contemporaneous record 
confirming that Mr. Zinser had been pushing for filling that position 
prior to the quick detail of his intimate friend to the office.
  In his written response to CIGIE, Mr. Zinser acknowledged that he did 
have a personal relationship with his new Assistant Inspector General 
for Administration, and that they were ``avid long distance runners and 
trained together on a fairly regular basis.'' ``Contrary to the 
insinuations of the anonymous complaint,'' he wrote, ``our relationship 
is neither romantic nor sexual in nature,'' and while he said there are 
no rules ``against maintaining personal friendships with colleagues or 
subordinates, to minimize any potential appearance of impropriety, we 
curtailed our running together'' after she came to his office. It may 
be true that their running relationship was ``curtailed'', but the 
staff has convincing evidence that other aspects of their relationship, 
more pertinent to the allegation, continued outside of the work place 
after her hiring and were ongoing at the time of the CIGIE inquiry.
  In his response Mr. Zinser also suggested to CIGIE that the anonymous 
complaint they received was from his friend's husband who was 
attempting to use the complaint ``as a tool to gain advantage in 
divorce proceedings.'' It is true that this woman's husband filed for 
divorce in March 2011--the divorce was granted in January 2012--but it 
is not true that her now-former husband was the source of the CIGIE 
complaint. Despite Zinser's speculation, designed to throw the CIGIE 
Integrity Committee off his trail, Committee staff has spoken at length 
on multiple occasions to the individual who filed the anonymous 
complaint. The complainant is a person in the IG community not related 
to either Zinser's girlfriend or her former husband. This counter-
allegation by Mr. Zinser fits with a long pattern of behavior he has 
displayed in trying to deflect criticism or questions by making 
assertions about the motivations or integrity of those who question or 
challenge him.
  As to the relationship between Mr. Zinser and his Assistant IG for 
Administration, The Washington Post asked Mr. Zinser about it for an 
article they wrote about him on July 17, 2014. According to that 
article, ``Zinser said there was nothing improper about him hiring a 
highly qualified manager who was a close personal friend. He said the 
romantic nature of their relationship predated her coming to work for 
him.'' Mr. Zinser seems to have forgotten that he told CIGIE that there 
was no romantic element to their relationship.
  The combination of misleading claims Mr. Zinser made to CIGIE 
regarding both his relationship with the close friend he hired and the 
``business'' necessity of hiring her into his office appears to be an 
intentionally false narrative spun by Mr. Zinser to cover up his own 
unethical behavior. CIGIE's Integrity Committee accepted Mr. Zinser's 
explanation on April 28, 2011 and closed the complaint without further 
investigation. The Integrity Committee was operating in the dark 
regarding the extensive evidence my own Committee's staff has obtained 
that this hiring was improper and that Mr. Zinser was misleading them 
as to the real facts of his conduct.
  What have we learned from this case? That Mr. Zinser has corrupted 
the Federal hiring process and the Senior Executive Service appointment 
process. That Mr. Zinser was willing to make false allegations about 
another to avoid having to answer for his own actions. That Mr. Zinser 
was willing to mislead the Integrity Committee of CIGIE, a body 
established to investigate questionable activities or mismanagement of 
IGs. That Mr. Zinser was willing to lecture another senior official for 
conduct that is no more disturbing than his own. All in all, this does 
not sound like the conduct we should expect from an Inspector General. 
We also have learned that Ms. Cohn was willing to act with 
accountability for her actions--she retired in the wake of the IG's 
report--while Mr. Zinser clings to his position in the face of 
substantial evidence that he is not fit to serve.
  The second 2014 PTO report by the DOC IG's office to capture public 
attention involved abuse of time and attendance practices. In July 
2014, the DOC OIG released a report entitled, ``Review of Waste and 
Mismanagement at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,'' OIG Case 13-1077-
I, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, Office of 
Investigations, July 28 2014. In a memorandum dated the same day, 
Zinser wrote to the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual 
Property regarding their findings. Mr. Zinser's summary of findings 
said, ``Our investigation uncovered waste in the PTAB that persisted 
for more than four years (2009-13) and resulted in the misuse of 
federal resources totaling more than $5 million. The bulk of the wasted 
resources related to PTAB's paralegals, who had insufficient workloads 
and considerable idle time during those years.''
  According to the July 2014 OIG report as many as 95% of the PTAB 
paralegals were involved in the PTO's Patent Hoteling Program (PHP), 
the agency's largest telework program.
  This apparent successful report takes on a different light when one 
realizes that in February 2012 the Commerce OIG released an audit of 
the PTO's Patent Hoteling Program that labelled it a great success. The 
title of the IG's audit report, ``The Patent Hoteling Program Is 
Succeeding as a Business Strategy,'' and news headlines at the time 
reporting on the IG's findings described how the IG audit praised the 
PTO's telework program: ``Teleworking PTO employees process more 
patents, less expensive,'' declared one headline.
  It is difficult to know how auditors from the IG's office could have 
so completely missed the signs of waste, fraud and abuse that have now 
been widely identified in this program. Just as hard to explain is why 
Mr. Zinser initially turned these allegations over to the agency to 
investigate, just as he had in the NWS financial misconduct case. 
Again, there may have been violations of law, and the sums of money 
involved were not insignificant.
  On November 18, 2014 the House Oversight and Government Reform and 
Judiciary Committees held a joint congressional hearing about the PTO's 
telework program. During his sworn testimony Mr. Zinser was asked by my 
friend, Ms. Lofgren of California, why his office turned the PTAB 
investigation back to the PTO. His response was because ``none of those 
allegations made specific allegations against specific individuals that 
would warrant us opening up a criminal investigation,'' he said.
  Mr. Zinser's statement was not accurate, however. One complaint that 
the IG's office received on its Hotline in February 2013 identified ONE 
DOZEN specific individuals at the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB) by name, including the chief judge of the Board and two 
administrators, who were knowingly approving non-production time of PTO 
employees, according to the allegation. Despite the fact that 
``specific allegations'' were made ``against specific individuals'' 
this complaint was referred to PTO by the Commerce OIG, which requested 
PTO conduct an administrative inquiry.

[[Page 4558]]

  The Committee has learned that the PTO did a thorough evaluation of 
the PTAB time and attendance issues, substantiated the allegations, 
concluded that there were problems with time and attendance reporting, 
and that steps should be taken to clean up the system with significant 
savings possible.
  The IG's staff received the PTO's audit report of the PTAB time and 
attendance issues, and senior leadership at the IG's office realized 
they could not claim the significant monetary savings, in the millions 
of dollars, associated with the PTO report because they can only claim 
savings associated with their own work. To attempt to take credit for 
those savings, the OIG launched an audit that re-did the PTO's work. 
That OIG report was released in July 2014 and received widespread media 
coverage with story titles such as ``IG uncovers substantial waste at 
USPTO, says paralegals `paid to do nothing,''' and ``This May Be The 
Worst Abuse of Federal Telework Ever.'' Thus, to claim savings already 
identified by the agency, the IG wasted staff time and resources on a 
repetitive audit, and then worked the press to claim the credit for 
finding the problem. All this while conveniently forgetting that nearly 
2\1/2\ years earlier, the IG was praising the very same telework 
program that he later said had wasted money during that same time 
period.
  What does this case teach us? That Mr. Zinser was willing to spend 
taxpayer dollars to get the credit for saving taxpayer dollars. It also 
shows that he was willing to mislead a senior Member of the House 
regarding why he had initially passed on carrying out this 
investigation. Finally, Mr. Zinser promised to provide documentation in 
response to Ms. Lofgren's questions, but in his submission for the 
record he went back on that promise by saying he would only provide 
those materials if he received a letter from the Chairman of the 
Committee.
  Identifying savings is important for this IG because, on balance, Mr. 
Zinser is one of the least productive IGs in the federal government. 
According to the GAO, which is working to report on this office's 
productivity based on my request, the average Cabinet-level IGs 
recovered $22.64 for each dollar they spent from 2011 to 2013. By 
comparison, the Commerce OIG recovered just $4.18 for each dollar it 
spent. In addition, 95% of the Commerce OIG's savings came from joint 
investigations with other federal law enforcement agencies, and so much 
of these savings were claimed on work that may have been led by another 
IG or office.
  Now, let me return to the story that gave additional momentum to our 
investigative activities: the fate of the whistleblower retaliation 
case before OSC. As I said, I learned of that case through reading of 
it in the press in December of 2012. Much of my staff's subsequent work 
was about getting more information regarding that case, which was being 
investigated by OSC. Everyone in this institution knows that the 
Congress relies on whistleblowers to do our oversight work. IGs are in 
the same position: they must be trusted by whistleblowers or they will 
not learn of problems in their agency. Congress feels so strongly about 
this that there is an entire section in the IG Act, Section 7, which 
addresses the role of IGs in receiving allegations and in protecting 
whistleblowers from retaliation. The idea that senior officials in the 
IG's office would retaliate against whistleblowers is inconceivable, 
but that is what the OSC case suggested happened in Mr. Zinser's 
office.
  To its credit, OSC worked that case very, very diligently. The OSC 
issued a report in September 2013 that found Mr. Zinser's two closest 
aides--his legal counsel and the Principal Assistant Inspector General 
for Investigations and Whistleblower Protection--had engaged in what 
amounted to a coordinated effort to gag whistleblowers in the IG's own 
office from reporting misconduct to the OSC, the Congress or the press.
  The OSC's ``Report on Prohibited Personnel Practices'' concluded: 
``In this matter, OSC's investigation uncovered willful, concerted acts 
of retaliation that necessitate disciplinary action. Holding management 
accountable for engaging in prohibited personnel practices is essential 
to assuring employees that they can blow the whistle or engage in other 
protected activity without fear of reprisal.''
  According to the OSC report: ``The record is also replete with 
evidence establishing that PAIGI [Rick] Beitel retaliated against the 
whistleblowers by drafting their unfounded failing interim performance 
appraisals. . . . The evidence demonstrates that PAIGI Beitel was 
motivated to retaliate against the whistleblowers for their engagement 
in protected 
activity and/or their perceived whistle-
blowing. . . . PAIGI Beitel's behavior is particularly egregious based 
on his position as the OIG's expert on whistleblower protection,'' the 
OSC determined.
  While the OSC could find no ``documentary evidence'' that Mr. Zinser 
was involved in the case, every member of Mr. Zinser's staff that the 
Committee staff has spoken with who had experience of Mr. Zinser's 
management practices indicates that he rarely writes his directions 
down, instead relying on face-to-face meetings and oral directions. 
These witnesses also indicate that the PAIGI, Mr. Beitel, would never 
act on something this significant without clearing it with the IG. This 
is the same close, personal friend whose career Mr. Zinser saved by 
bringing him in from the Department of Transportation. The two had 
worked together since the early 1990s and were perceived by staff 
across both IG offices to have a very close working relationship of a 
mentor and mentee. In court documents unrelated to their federal 
employment Rick Beitel acknowledged that Todd Zinser was his ``close 
friend and personal confidant'' and that they routinely socialize with 
one another outside of work.
  Mr. Zinser took no significant steps to punish either his good friend 
Rick Beitel or the other Commerce OIG official after receiving the OSC 
report. As a result of the OSC investigation and findings IG Zinser 
agreed to take twelve minimal actions, including the destruction of the 
coerced ``interim performance appraisals'' the whistleblowers were 
forced into signing, Mr. Beitel was removed from ``supervisory'' duties 
for one year, both officials were required to take ``performance 
counseling,'' and the Commerce OIG was required to hire an ``employee 
relations'' specialist.
  But two officials who had used their position to threaten to destroy 
the professional careers of whistleblowers if they did not agree to gag 
orders denying them access to the Congress or the OSC should really not 
be in senior leadership positions in any office of the government, and 
especially not in an IG's office. That is my strong view, and I am not 
alone in thinking so.
  After receiving a copy of this report and learning that no 
significant punishment had been meted out by Mr. Zinser, all seven 
Members of our Subcommittee on Oversight--four Republicans and three 
Democrats--wrote to Mr. Zinser on April 1, 2014. The real driving force 
in pushing this letter was my friend, Mr. Sensenbrenner. The letter 
said that Mr. Zinser should ``immediately terminate'' the two senior 
Commerce OIG officials who were found by OSC to have engaged in 
prohibited personnel practices against whistleblowers in his office.
  Mr. Zinser responded on April 15, 2014, expressing doubts about the 
credibility of OSC's work and the legal basis for their findings. 
Incredibly, Mr. Zinser reiterated all of the knowingly inaccurate 
claims about the whistleblowers--essentially repeating the lies that 
OSC had found Mr. Beitel to have concocted to damage their careers and 
reputations. OSC thoroughly documented those claims to be 
inappropriate, misleading and simply false. Nevertheless, Mr. Zinser 
knowingly used those false claims again, further defaming his former 
employees.
  This was not the first time Mr. Zinser had used these false, 
derogatory allegations to protect his office from tough questions. On 
January 7, 2013, Mr. Zinser wrote a 52 page letter to then Congressman 
Frank Wolf, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, 
and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations. Mr. Wolf had 
raised questions regarding the OSC investigation that was then 
underway.
  Mr. Zinser's letter defended the actions of his two top aides and 
reiterated the false allegations they had made against whistleblowers 
in the IG's office as if those claims were unshakable truths. For 
someone who claimed to OSC that he knew nothing about his aides' 
actions, Zinser seemed very comfortable defending their behavior and 
attacking the victims.
  It is important to note that even after the OSC report found that 
there was no merit to any of these allegations, Mr. Zinser continued to 
leave his letter to Chairman Wolf up on his public web site, 
perpetuating false claims that defamed innocent former employees, and 
standing as a warning sign to other whistleblowers that their 
reputations were at risk should they challenge Mr. Zinser.
  After this spirited defense of his closest staff and his refusal to 
take any noteworthy steps to punish them for their significant misdeeds 
even in the wake of OSCs findings, Mr. Zinser suddenly changed 
direction in August 2014 when he announced that both officials were to 
be placed on leave and a decision about termination would be made 
within 30 days. In the end, Mr. Zinser's legal counsel was terminated 
and his PAIGI--and close friend--was allowed to retire. This was a 
dramatic 180 degree turn from his previous public statements about the 
actions of these top aides.
  Despite his outrageous conduct and botched management choices, Mr. 
Zinser was

[[Page 4559]]

not found by OSC in their 2013 report to have known about the treatment 
of the whistleblowers. The OSC, however, was careful to say they found 
no ``documentary evidence'' regarding Mr. Zinser's knowledge of the 
actions of his two senior most staff. This lack of documentation saved 
him from any personal consequences as a result of the OSC report.
  However, I believe it is important to tell my colleagues that Mr. 
Zinser had been named in a prior OSC report. That earlier report found 
he had personally engaged in retaliation against a whistleblower in his 
office. The similarities between the 1996 case and this 2013 case--both 
built around a concocted tissue of lies to remove or silence a 
whistleblower--are striking enough to suggest that perhaps OSC should 
have looked harder for evidence of Mr. Zinser's involvement in the more 
recent case.
  The Committee has uncovered a 1996 case in which Todd Zinser, then 
the Deputy Assistant IG for Investigations at the Department of 
Transportation Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG), personally 
retaliated against Mr. John Deans. We have all the relevant filings and 
my staff has even spoken with Mr. Deans. Retired from law enforcement 
now, at the time of this case Mr. Deans was a former FBI agent working 
as a DOT OIG GS-12 Special Agent, criminal investigator. Deans was 
assigned to the Denver office, and while there he found what he 
believed to be compelling evidence that federal funding for the Denver 
International Airport was being illegally redirected to support local 
projects.
  Deans briefed Mr. Zinser and two other DOT OIG officials on his case. 
Importantly, Deans suggested to others that very senior Federal 
officials may have been aware of this possible diversion of federal 
funds.
  Mr. Zinser travelled to Denver a few days after he learned of Deans' 
comments about the potential knowledge of senior Federal officials 
regarding this alleged diversion. Soon after, Mr. Zinser flew to San 
Francisco to see if the Special-Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the San 
Francisco office of the DOT OIG would be willing to have Deans detailed 
to his office. It is not clear what Zinser told the Special Agent in 
Charge about Deans but the Special Agent advised Zinser to have an 
``impartial investigator'' look into the allegations against Deans. 
Instead, Mr. Zinser decided to investigate the Deans matter himself. 
Zinser had Mr. Deans transferred to San Francisco, then had him placed 
on administrative leave and ultimately had him fired.
  In response to Mr. Zinser's actions, Deans appealed to the Office of 
Special Counsel (OSC), which supported his complaint that this was 
retaliation for his work. OSC sought a stay of the transfer of Deans to 
San Francisco. On the same day the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB) ordered that Mr. Deans be returned to his post in Denver, Mr. 
Zinser placed Deans on administrative leave.
  Todd Zinser's behavior was considered so outlandish by the OSC that 
the Office filed a ``Petition for Enforcement'' against Todd Zinser 
with MSPB. OSC asked that, ``The [Merit Systems Protection] Board 
should order Zinser to immediately assign Deans the duties of his 
former GS-12 special agent, criminal investigator, position. Moreover . 
. . the Board should order that Todd Zinser not receive payment for 
service as an employee from May 23, 1996, until Deans is returned to 
his former position, i.e., until the agency complies with the Board's 
May 23, 1996, Opinion and Order.''
  What did OSC think of the substance of the case Mr. Zinser had made 
against Deans to justify his actions? They thoroughly investigated Mr. 
Zinser's claims--reinterviewed witnesses, collected documents and 
deposed the principal players. OSC found, ``(A)s addressed in detail 
below, the evidence established that the specific charges that formed 
the basis for Deans' removal are unsupportable. . . . The evidence does 
not support any of these allegations. On the other hand, it is clear 
that Deans' removal was ordered at the behest of Deputy Assistant 
Inspector General (DAIG) for Investigations Tod[d] Zinser, who strongly 
objected to Deans' protected conduct.'' OSC investigators in 1996 
concluded that Mr. Zinser's actions towards Deans were ``draconian in 
nature'' and ``motivated by animus.'' They determined Mr. Zinser took 
these actions because Deans ``discovered violations and politically 
embarrassing information about high-level government officials and 
community leaders.''
  As a result of these findings against Mr. Zinser, Deans had to be 
rehired and restored to a post in Denver. Deans was repaid almost a 
year of back pay and benefits. On top of this, the government had to 
pay over $10,000 in Mr. Deans' attorney fees. In short, the taxpayer 
had to pay the bill for Mr. Zinser's outrageous and indefensible 
conduct towards this whistleblower.
  Mr. Speaker, it is reasonable for Members to wonder how someone with 
this kind of history of abuse against a whistleblower could possibly 
have been confirmed by the Senate to the post of Inspector General. I 
wondered that too. It turns out, based on witness testimony and extant 
documents, that Mr. Zinser never disclosed the OSC case to either the 
White House or the Senate during his confirmation process.
  The Senate routinely submits questionnaires to potential IGs with 
questions that must be filled out. That questionnaire asks about legal, 
ethical or other cases that the Committee should be aware of in 
considering his nomination. In response to that specific question Mr. 
Zinser wrote, ``I have never been disciplined or cited for a breach of 
ethics.'' The questionnaire also asked: ``Please advise the Committee 
of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel 
should be disclosed in connection with your nomination.'' Mr. Zinser 
wrote simply ``None.''
  None? A potential IG does not think it is relevant to the 
confirmation process to acknowledge that he was found to have engaged 
in prohibited personnel practices? Mr. Zinser was asked by a Washington 
Post reporter why he did not disclose this case during his 
confirmation. In a story on Mr. Zinser published by the Washington Post 
on July 17, 2014, Mr. Zinser told the Post that he did not disclose the 
case because, ``I just never thought of myself as a subject [of the 
investigation], although maybe I was''.
  More recently, in January 2015, Mr. Zinser responded to a Question 
For the Record (QFR) from my friend, Ms. Lofgren, regarding the same 
matter. In that response, Mr. Zinser gave a lawyerly answer, ``it is my 
understanding that the subject [of the investigation] was the 
Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General.'' 
Technically that is true because under the law, cases filed with the 
OSC name the office that is responsible for the alleged misconduct, not 
the individual. Similarly, lawsuits filed against an agency name the 
head of the agency in their official capacity regardless of whether 
that official has any personal knowledge of the matter or not. However, 
this artful response suggests that the case had nothing to do with Mr. 
Zinser. Let me be clear: The case only existed because of Mr. Zinser's 
personal misconduct, and he was squarely the subject of the allegations 
of prohibited personnel practices.
  The OSC's key document in the John Deans case--the OSC's ``request 
for stay''--refers to Todd Zinser BY NAME 53 separate times in a 26-
page report. In addition, this document makes it exceedingly evident 
that Todd Zinser was the sole individual in the Department of 
Transportation IG's office who was believed to have retaliated against 
John Deans. Looking at the OSC records, it is evident that the Office 
found Mr. Zinser personally investigated Deans, personally constructed 
unsupported findings against Deans to be used to justify adverse 
employment actions, personally ordered those actions, and personally 
resisted setting things right when OSC and the MPRB ordered the DOT OIG 
to do so. Of all the employees at the DOT OIG's office, only Todd 
Zinser was singled out by OSC for punishment by way of seeking that his 
salary be withheld.
  The 1996 case was specifically built on Mr. Zinser's misconduct just 
as the 2013 report by OSC is specifically about misconduct by Mr. 
Zinser's two closest (now former) aides. Had Mr. Zinser divulged his 
role in the Deans case at the time of his confirmation, it is highly 
unlikely he would have been confirmed as the Commerce Inspector 
General. The actions taken by Mr. Zinser in the John Deans case, and 
described in detail in the OSC documents, are all antithetical to the 
behavior and ethical grounding that the public deserves and that 
Congress expects of an Inspector General. He showed no remorse about 
his conduct at that time. Similarly, he showed no sympathy for the 
victims of his aides' abuse in 2013. His initial reaction to the 2013 
report was to protect those officials from the consequences of their 
actions as documented in the OSC report. He maintained that position 
for months, even under pressure from the Committee on Science, Space & 
Technology where I am the Ranking Member.
  For any IG to be associated with two whistleblower retaliation cases 
of this kind would be an indelible stain on their reputation. However, 
as my staff talked to more employees of the IG's office, we learned 
that these two cases do not mark the end of whistleblower retaliation 
at his office. We know of other recent instances of Mr. Zinser 
expressing his belief that specific individuals that he personally 
named were cooperating with our Committee or making protected 
complaints to OSC. We also know that these individuals were targeted in 
different ways for adverse actions in order to convince them to leave 
or to remove them from the office. Separately, one senior OIG official 
was placed on ``Administrative Leave'' immediately after they contacted

[[Page 4560]]

the Office of Special Counsel. That individual has since left the IG's 
office for another federal agency. We also know that the current Deputy 
Inspector General had, as of several months ago, obtained and retained 
the entire email records of two former and one current high level IG 
staff, including two of her predecessors--all of whom were viewed by 
Mr. Zinser as disloyal to him or untrustworthy with the secrets of his 
office. One of those predecessors is a sitting, Senate-confirmed 
Inspector General at another Federal agency.
  There is no legitimate reason to have collected and then retained the 
emails of those three senior staff, including two former Deputy IGs. 
There is certainly no justification for the current Deputy IG, widely 
viewed as being the closest current personal aide to Mr. Zinser, to be 
carrying those records on her laptop computer's hard drive. What would 
such records be used for? It is impossible to know, but we do know that 
there was a search and analysis of one of those former Deputy IG's 
email records. A memorandum was prepared based on that search 
documenting the exchanges between the former-Deputy and a woman who had 
applied for a position within the OIG, who was a family friend. Mr. 
Zinser was clearly aware of this relationship since the woman was a 
reference for the former Deputy IG who was called as a reference by Mr. 
Zinser when the former Deputy IC applied for his job.
  Based on information obtained by Committee staff it seems clear that 
Mr. Zinser was simply searching for anything he might uncover in his 
former Deputy's emails that Mr. Zinser might be able to use against 
him, since the former Deputy had fallen out of favor with Mr. Zinser.
  When employee emails are to be pulled, there is a policy in place at 
the DOC Office of Inspector General that requires Mr. Zinser to 
personally sign a memorandum to the Chief Information Officer 
requesting specific materials be produced. This policy has been in 
place since October 2012. However, in the last year, in particular, 
this policy has been largely set aside, permitting other OIG staff in 
Mr. Zinser's chain of command to authorize the collection of Commerce 
OIG employees' e-mails invoking Zinser's authority and with his clear 
knowledge and, in some cases, specific direction but without his actual 
signature. That occurred in the case of the former Deputy IG.
  The IT staff in the IG's office has had to comply with these requests 
even though they violate a policy Mr. Zinser himself put in place. This 
is an example of a long-standing issue in Mr. Zinser's management 
style--he establishes policies and then ignores or stretches them 
without any warning to those who work for him. This creates an 
environment where it is easy for the IG to claim someone has violated 
policy if he wants to punish them because the policy environment is 
constantly and mysteriously shifting.
  The pulls of email records, the targeting of suspected 
whistleblowers, the adverse employee actions taken in retaliation for 
protected disclosures are all widely known and discussed by employees 
within the Department of Commerce OIG's office. We have heard from many 
whistleblowers that they fear that if Mr. Zinser is not removed, there 
will be--in the words of more than one of these individuals--''a 
bloodbath''--in the office. As soon as Mr. Zinser believes no one is 
looking, he will begin to take steps to invent allegations against 
individuals he wants to retaliate against--as he did against Mr. Deans 
and as his close aides did against OIG investigative staff in 2011--the 
case which led to the 2013 OSC report--and then take steps to remove 
them. People are frightened, and given Mr. Zinser's prior conduct they 
have good reason to fear him and his potential actions.
  The last whistleblower issue I wish to raise, Mr. Speaker, is that 
Mr. Zinser has let his office fall out of compliance with the U.S. Code 
33 specifically, 5 U.S. Code Sec. 2302 (prohibited personnel 
practices). That provision establishes the Office of Special Counsel's 
(OSC's) 2302(c) Certification Program and requires that Federal agency 
managers participate in training regarding the rights of whistleblowers 
and their right to make protected disclosures.
  Last year the White House directed agencies to take affirmative steps 
to complete the OSC certification program. According to the Commerce 
OIG's own web-site ``That provision charges `[t]he head of each 
agency''' with responsibility for ``ensuring (in consultation with the 
Office of Special Counsel) that agency employees are informed of the 
rights and remedies available to them'' under the prohibited personnel 
practice and whistleblower retaliation protection provisions of Title 
5.'' As the head of the IG's office it is Todd Zinser's responsibility 
to ensure his office is certified under this program. The Commerce OIG 
web-site currently states ``OIG has been certified by the U.S. Office 
of Special Counsel (OSC) for conducting training and promoting 
awareness of provisions of the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2302(c).''
  However, the OSC has confirmed to Committee staff that the Commerce 
OIG's whistleblower protection certification required under 5 U.S. Code 
Sec. 2302 lapsed in September 2014. Six months later the Commerce IG's 
office still has made no attempts to recertify. According to multiple 
Commerce OIG sources as well as documentary evidence obtained by the 
Committee, Mr. Zinser's new Deputy IG Morgan Kim has specifically 
directed multiple OIG staff not to attempt to recertify.
  I wish that I could provide more definitive accounts of all the 
misconduct that has been going on in Mr. Zinser's office, but the truth 
is that Mr. Zinser refused to comply with the Committee's document 
requests. Mr. Zinser and his Deputy IG actively worked to obstruct the 
Committee's investigation. These two top officials have been behind a 
campaign to intimidate staff into not cooperating with the Committee by 
pushing some to get lawyers, even though they were not the target of 
the investigation, and by reminding people that if they say something 
quotable during interviews with the Committee it may end up in the 
Washington Post or a Committee Report.
  One individual widely known within the office to be particularly 
close to Mr. Zinser pressured OIG staff to call the Committee to report 
the ``positive'' aspects of Mr. Zinser's management. Several 
individuals have told the Committee they felt this was both completely 
inappropriate and an attempt to coerce individuals into taking part in 
these efforts to obstruct the Committee's investigation.
  IG Zinser has also attempted to ``paper'' the Committee with a 
voluminous production of materials wildly unresponsive to our document 
requests. Since the Committee's August 2014 request letter, the 
Committee has received less than two boxes of responsive materials and 
17 boxes of completely unresponsive material. Some material provided 
showed a complete lack of concern for their contents for they included 
sensitive personally identifiable information, such as social security 
numbers of Commerce OIG employees, private phone numbers and 
birthdates.
  Meanwhile, we know that the materials we were seeking were going 
through an extraordinarily slow search and review process within the 
OIG. None of that material was ever delivered to the Committee. 
Committee investigators cannot recall any comparable example of such a 
complete failure to comply with a document request--even from private 
parties--across a quarter century of Committee investigations. The idea 
that an Inspector General, who has an obligation to cooperate with 
Congress that goes beyond that expected of any other Executive branch 
official, would fail to comply with a request from a Committee of the 
House is simply unfathomable.
  The Committee sent two bipartisan document request letters to IG Todd 
Zinser on July 16, 2014 and August 26, 2014. The July letter requested 
documents related to Mr. Zinser's inappropriate hiring of the former 
Assistant IG for Administration and Rick Beitel, including copies of 
relevant records from his personal work journals. The letter warned Mr. 
Zinser: ``These journals represent official records and we remind you 
that such records should not be removed from the office nor tampered 
with in any way. The Committee intends to continue to examine the 
conduct and productivity of your office, and we consider your journals 
to be important evidence in that effort,'' the letter said. On August 
26th the Committee sent a second letter to IG Zinser demanding 
documents concerning multiple allegations that Mr. Zinser was 
inappropriate collecting and monitoring his employees' e-mails in a 
hunt for potential whistleblowers in his office.
  Six days after IG Todd Zinser received that second letter informing 
him of the Committee's knowledge that he was hunting for whistleblowers 
in his own office, the Inspector General was seen using his personal 
hand-truck to remove two banker's boxes of materials to his car. This 
occurred on Labor Day, Monday, September 1, 2014, a federal holiday 
when few witnesses would have been on site at the Department of 
Commerce. Furthermore, the Committee has evidence that IG Zinser 
conducted his removal of this material with great haste. He was in and 
out of his office with his two boxes of material inside of 30 minutes. 
Although there is no way to know what Mr. Zinser removed from his 
office over Labor Day weekend, the timing of his actions is highly 
suspicious and raises serious questions about his efforts to obstruct 
the Committee's investigation.
  The Committee is aware of at least one more incident where records 
were removed from his office and destroyed. Since he is under a 
microscope, actions of removing or destroying records cannot help but 
be seen as obstructionist in nature and his cavalier disregard for the 
effects of this on his reputation

[[Page 4561]]

and the opinion of others--even senior members of a Committee with 
broad jurisdiction over his Department--highlights the serious mismatch 
between Mr. Zinser and the ethical and professional requirements of 
serving as an Inspector General.
  Mr. Zinser also invoked attorney-client privilege to prevent 
witnesses from fulfilling their obligation to speak to the Committee, 
and to withhold materials responsive to our request. As a common law, 
non-Constitutionally derived concept, attorney-client privilege is not 
recognized by Congress as a legitimate reason to withhold information 
during Congressional inquiries. While I understand that private parties 
sometimes have a particular concern with defending this privilege, I 
cannot fathom how a Senate-confirmed government employee, using 
government lawyers paid with tax dollars, can think that the work of 
those attorneys could be considered privileged from review by Congress.
  Never in the last quarter century of Committee investigations has an 
official in a statutorily-established Federal office attempted to 
withhold materials or testimony using this claim of attorney-client 
``privilege.'' The usual accommodation is for an agency to provide the 
records or testimony, while noting that they believe the materials 
should be treated with care. Frankly, OIG attorneys are routinely 
released from this privilege in order to cooperate with OSC and EEO 
investigations. The Congress should not be treated any less 
cooperatively than those offices, but Mr. Zinser would not release the 
attorneys to answer questions. His former counsel, who had been found 
by OSC to have engaged in prohibited personnel practices, very much 
wanted to speak with the Committee as he believed he had evidence that 
might exonerate him as well as implicate Mr. Zinser. IG Zinser 
specifically intervened to prevent this former employee from talking to 
Committee staff about illegal activities that he believes he had 
witnessed during his work for Mr. Zinser. This misuse of attorney-
client privilege, with a hidden threat to seek punishment by the Bar if 
an attorney decided their obligation to the Constitution outweighed Mr. 
Zinser's personal desire, is clearly abusive and appears motivated by a 
desire to hide evidence of his misconduct from the Congress.
  I have not reached the end of the account of failed management and 
misconduct by Mr. Zinser. Just last month, the Department of Commerce's 
Office of Civil Rights issued its findings in an Equal Employment 
Opportunity (EEO case related to age discrimination and retaliation 
filed by a former Commerce OIG employee. The detailed 282-page report 
found that the Commerce OIG discriminated against the complainant in 
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and 
retaliated against him for filing his EEOC complaint `` in violation of 
non-retaliation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,'' the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and ``in 
violation of the EEOC regulations prohibiting retaliation.'' In sworn 
testimony to EEOC investigators regarding the monitoring and 
examination of the former employee's e-mails and files, the EEOC also 
found that Mr. Zinser's ``testimony does not fully mesh with the 
documentary evidence. . . .''
  The Commerce OIG has been ordered to compensate the employee for 
``backpay to remedy the change to lower grade he took due to the 
hostile work environment'' in the IG's office; expunge its official 
files of the inaccurate interim performance appraisal the employee was 
coerced into signing and any related document; provide all supervisors 
in the Commerce OIG, including the IG and Deputy IG, with at least 8 
hours of EEO training and require IG Todd Zinser to sign and post (for 
60 days) a notice to all OIG employees that the office has been found 
in violation of age discrimination and retaliated against former 
Commerce OIG employee. The notice states that the OIG will abide by 
federal requirements, equal employment opportunity laws and will not 
retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints in the future. The 
notice is supposed to be placed in center within the IG's office or on 
the OIG intranet and is required to be signed by IG Zinser. Mr. Zinser 
refused for two solid weeks to sign that notice. Only after my friend, 
Mr. Honda, asked IG Zinser about this matter during an appearance 
before the Appropriations Committee did Mr. Zinser finally sign the 
notice on February 25.
  Not for the first time, Mr. Zinser is going to rely on the taxpayer 
to cover the costs of his misconduct. There are more claims out there 
that will also cost the taxpayer to defend against and settle. In fact, 
during the last two years six employees in the IG's office have filed 
complaints of retaliation with the Office of Special Counsel. The 
Department of Energy's OIG, which is nearly twice as large as the 
Commerce IG's office has had zero complaints of retaliation filed with 
OSC during this same period. The Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) OIG, which has a staff of more than 1,200 people and is 
nearly seven times the current size of the Commerce OIG had a single 
alleged case of retaliation filed with OSC in the same time frame.
  The issues I have identified reveal an endemic failing in Mr. 
Zinser's leadership. There is a sustained pattern of misconduct and 
malfeasance that would be unacceptable in any senior federal official 
but is particularly troubling for an Inspector General. Based on the 
exhaustive work by Committee staff, as well as Mr. Zinser's 
representations to other Members, we have convincingly shown that:
  During his Senate confirmation for the Commerce IG post, Mr. Zinser 
failed to disclose a significant case against him involving his 
personal retaliation against a whistleblower;
  Over a period of many years, Mr. Zinser and his closest staff have 
engaged in efforts to identify and retaliate against whistleblowers in 
his office;
  Mr. Zinser has repeatedly misled the Congress about his conduct, and 
took steps to obstruct the Committee's investigation into allegations 
of misconduct;
  Mr. Zinser has been disingenuous in his official correspondence with 
the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
(CIGIE) regarding inappropriate hiring in his office;
  Mr. Zinser has failed to conduct himself by ethical standards 
expected of an Inspector General;
  Mr. Zinser has engaged in inappropriate hiring practices that 
undermine the integrity of federal hiring; and,
  Mr. Zinser has failed to establish policies and procedures in his 
office that would guarantee accountability and efficiency.
  Mr. Speaker, how can this person still hold a high position of public 
trust? His continued presence in Federal service stands as a blot on 
our record, in that we have tolerated such conduct by an IG. We could 
impeach him, and I believe there is adequate information to justify 
that. However, it would be time consuming and expensive, and while we 
worked through that process, the taxpayer would still be paying the 
senior leadership of DOC OIG, and whistleblowers would still be 
legitimately worried for their careers. That is unacceptable.
  We could ask CIGIE to redo the investigation my staff and the 
Committee did in the 113th Congress. I respect the CIGIE, but the cold 
truth is that CIGIE's Integrity Committee is slow moving, and their 
prior failure to do diligent work into a serious allegation against Mr. 
Zinser leads me to question their responsiveness--or at least the 
responsiveness they displayed four years ago. And as with impeachment, 
it would be slow and expensive and whistleblowers would stand in danger 
every day the process dragged on.
  The law provides that the President can remove an IG without any 
requirement that CIGIE has first done an investigation. If an IG 
conducts themselves in an outrageous and disreputable way, it would be 
irresponsible to leave them in office once that has been established. I 
believe that Mr. Zinser's wide-ranging misconduct, supported by just a 
tiny coterie of current senior staff, is sufficient in and of itself to 
justify immediate removal. I intend to ask the President to do just 
that.
   Mr. Speaker, I believe I have established the need for immediate 
change in the senior leadership of this office. The current leadership 
must be replaced with individuals who can serve as beacons of integrity 
and stewards of appropriate and diligent federal oversight. If any 
Member wants a fuller recounting of the evidence in this case, I will 
be happy to provide them with additional information.
  That information provides as much documentation for my account as we 
can provide without compromising the position of whistleblowers whose 
careers still stand at risk so long as Mr. Zinser and his closest 
senior leaders remain in their positions. I will extend that same offer 
to the President as I believe that his role under law complements my 
own obligations as a Member to reveal significant violations of law 
that I believe we have uncovered.

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