[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 3]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 4037-4038]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




INTRODUCTION OF THE SMARTER APPROACH TO NUCLEAR EXPENDITURES (SANE) ACT 
                                OF 2015

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. EARL BLUMENAUER

                               of oregon

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, March 23, 2015

  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, today I introduce the Smarter Approach 
to Nuclear Expenditures (SANE) Act of 2015, a bill that would enable 
the U.S. to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent without shortchanging 
combat readiness and operations.
  The SANE Act would allow the U.S. to adopt a more practical and 
stable nuclear deterrent, while at the same time reducing costs and 
risks without compromising our security or that of our allies. This is 
achieved by strategically sizing our nuclear weapons programs, all 
while saving approximately $100 billion over 10 years and staying 
within the New START Treaty warhead levels.
  President Obama has committed to completely rebuilding all three legs 
of our nuclear triad--strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), and nuclear-armed submarines (SLBMs). The SANE Act 
does not challenge whether the United States should maintain a triad. 
It does, however, inject fiscal responsibility and strategic reality 
into the administration's nuclear weapons planning, which many current 
and former officials have acknowledged is unaffordable. For instance, 
in 2013 former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
James Cartwright, said of U.S. nuclear weapons modernization plans, 
``The challenge here is that we have to recapitalize all three legs [of 
the nuclear triad] and we don't have the money to do it.''
  The Pentagon's 2013 ``Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the 
United States'' declared ``that we can ensure the security of the 
United States and our Allies [and] partners and maintain a strong and 
credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third 
reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in the 
New START Treaty.'' Other experts, including a commission chaired by 
former, General Cartwright, said the U.S. could go even lower without 
jeopardizing security.
  Despite these facts, U.S. nuclear weapons planning calls for spending 
$350 billion over the next decade, according to the Congressional 
Budget Office, and up to $1 trillion over the next 30 years, to build a 
nuclear force that will far exceed what the President, the Pentagon, 
and security experts have said will be needed to effectively deter a 
nuclear threat. Such spending is not only problematic for taxpayers 
concerned about fiscal responsibility, but those deeply committed to 
strong and capable military.
  Choosing to rebuild a nuclear triad with such capacity excesses means 
choosing not to invest in other areas. The recent National Defense 
Panel report called these plans ``unaffordable'' and a threat to 
``needed improvements in conventional forces.'' Frank Kendall, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, has 
echoed similar sentiments, stating in December 2014 that ``[w]e've got 
a big affordability problem out there with those [nuclear 
modernization] programs.''
  America must reconcile the facts: our Defense budget is already 
squeezed, a nuclear deterrent is irrelevant to current international 
security challenges such as ISIS, the Ebola virus in Africa or even 
Russian aggression in Ukraine, and yet a nuclear deterrent is still a 
national security imperative nonetheless. It's time for the U.S. to 
procure what it needs, and what it can afford.
  The SANE Act deals with the coming fiscal and strategic reality 
scaling back and limiting new nuclear weapons programs now rather than 
waiting for ``disarmament by default.''
  The SANE Act of 2015 is critical to securing a nuclear deterrent 
without undercutting critical

[[Page 4038]]

investments in readiness and other essential programs.

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