[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 20167-20174]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST--S. 579

  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I am on the floor this afternoon to 
talk about S. 579, which is called the Inspector General Empowerment 
Act, but it really ought to be called ``Let the inspectors general do 
their jobs.''
  As I look back on my time as a State auditor and I think of all I 
learned about how government works well and how government behaves 
badly, I have a special point of respect for inspectors general because 
of the work I did as an auditor. I believe they are our first line of 
defense against waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. We should 
be helping them every way we can to do their jobs.
  I want to thank Senator Johnson, the chairman of the committee I 
serve on that has primary jurisdiction on government oversight, and I 
want to thank Senator Grassley for his long championing the cause of 
inspectors general and the GAO and all of the noble public servants who 
are out there every day trying to uncover government behaving badly.
  This bill serves three main purposes. It provides additional 
authority to inspectors general to enhance their ability to conduct 
oversight investigations. It reforms the process by which the Council 
of the Inspectors General integrity committee investigates accusations 
against IGs, which is very important. IGs need to be above reproach.

[[Page 20168]]

Any whiff of politics, any whiff of unethical conduct, any whiff of 
self-dealing--we have to empower the Council of the Inspectors General 
to deal with that in a way that is effective.
  It restores the intent of the 1978 Inspectors General Act to ensure 
that IGs have timely access to documents they need to conduct good, 
comprehensive oversight audits and investigations. Many of the 
provisions are authorities that the IGs have been seeking for a long 
time, and most of them are beyond noncontroversial.
  I wish to focus on one section of the bill for a minute and explain 
how critical its provision is to congressional overseers and for the 
taxpayers. The main issue I wish to talk about today is the section of 
the bill that ensures IGs have access to all agency documents. The 
Inspector General Act, which was passed in 1978, explicitly grants 
access to ``all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
recommendations, or other material.''
  For the last 37 years, we lived in a world where ``all'' meant all. 
But this summer, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 
issued an opinion that allows agencies to withhold documents from the 
inspectors general. Other than national security concerns, intelligence 
concerns, and statutes that explicitly restrict disclosure of documents 
to IGs, all of which are addressed by this bill, there is absolutely no 
reason that IGs should have their access to documents restricted. There 
is no universe in which the Inspector General Act should be interpreted 
to mean anything less than what it says. They have to have access to 
the documents or they can't do their work. It really isn't any more 
complicated than that.
  The convoluted legal reasoning that is being implemented by the 
counsel at the Department of Justice is a big step backwards for 
effective oversight of our government. We can't expect them to do their 
jobs well without fear or favor if they can't get access to the 
information that is vital to their work.
  When the auditors in my office came back with an access issue, my 
instruction to them was this: Well, get on your ``dog with a bone 
act,'' because if they are trying to withhold documents from you, there 
is something in those documents we need to see.
  I think if every agency knows that the inspector general has access 
to documents, it will have a deterrent effect on people behaving badly 
with taxpayer money or engaging in self-dealing or other activities 
that frustrate taxpayers and heighten the level of cynicism that, 
frankly, right now is breaking my heart in this country about our 
government.
  I join with my Republican colleagues today in asking unanimous 
consent for this bill to be brought up. We have worked on it for years. 
It is time. I appreciate the hard work of both on this, and I stand 
shoulder to shoulder with them trying to get this one across the finish 
line.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues to 
pass S. 579, the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2015. I want to 
thank Senator McCaskill for her hard work on this and her support and 
Senator Grassley for his many years as a real champion of this cause, 
as well as the other bipartisan cosponsors of this legislation and for 
the work their staff have done on this very important issue.
  In 1978 Congress created a crucial oversight partner for all of us--
inspectors general. They are independent watchdogs embedded in each 
agency, accountable only to Congress and the American people. That is 
crucial. They are the American people's eyes and ears, and they are our 
best partner in rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse. As an example, in 
fiscal year 2014 alone, inspectors general identified $45 billion in 
potential savings to the taxpayer.
  What this bill aims to do is to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse by 
increasing accountability and ensuring transparency. The bill exempts 
inspectors general from time-consuming and independence-threatening 
requirements such as the computer matching and paperwork reduction 
statutes. It allows inspectors general to compel the testimony of 
former agency employees or Federal contractors and grant recipients in 
some administrative misconduct or civil fraud cases.
  Too often we lose crucial information or have to end an investigation 
because the bad actor either leaves Federal employment or is a 
contractor or grantee and under current law cannot be subpoenaed. For 
example, the State Department inspector general oversees the $10.5 
billion the agency obligates in grants every year yet cannot compel 
testimony of the grant recipients even in the event of suspected fraud 
or misconduct. He can only require current agency employees to speak to 
his team, which can result in an incomplete or one-sided investigation. 
If we care about oversight and accountability, inspectors general must 
be able to compel relevant testimony. In addition to these authorities, 
the bill requires inspectors general to publish reports within 3 days 
to ensure transparency and accountability.
  I want to spend a little bit of time on the transparency aspect of 
this. Like many places around the country, we have seen some real 
problems with the VA health care system. There was a scandal in the 
Tomah facility in Tomah, WI. The result of that tragedy was that people 
died. I will never forget a call that I made to the surviving daughter 
of Mr. Thomas Baer, a veteran who went to the Tomah facility seeking 
care with stroke-like symptoms. Thomas Baer sat in the waiting room for 
2 or 3 hours. He suffered a couple of strokes and died. I talked to his 
surviving daughter, Candace Baer, and I will never forget the fact that 
she said to me: Senator, had I only known, had I only known there were 
problems with the Tomah VA health facility, I never would have taken my 
father there, and my father would be alive today. That is how important 
transparency and accountability is. That is what this bill restores to 
the inspectors general.
  Finally, the bill reiterates that inspectors general should have 
access to all agency documents necessary to do their job, unless 
Congress expressly denies that access by statute. The bill not only 
maintains current authorities for certain agency heads to keep 
inspector general work if it is necessary to preserve the country's 
national security interests, it actually enhances those authorities.
  In sum, this is a bipartisan commonsense cause. We all want 
inspectors general to be able to do their jobs well. That is why this 
bill was unanimously approved by my committee--the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. It is why it has 14 
bipartisan cosponsors representing Committees of the Judiciary, 
Appropriations, Armed Services, Energy and Natural Resources, and the 
Senate Intelligence Committee.
  Even retired Senator John Glenn has asked my committee to take action 
to ensure inspectors general have access to documents. In the letter he 
wrote to my committee and to the House oversight committee, Senator 
Glenn says: ``The success of the IG Act is rooted in the principles on 
which the Act is grounded--independence, direct reporting to Congress, 
dedicated staff and resources, unrestricted access to agency records, 
subpoena power, special protections for agency employees who cooperate 
with the IG, and the ability to refer criminal matters to the 
Department of Justice without clearing such referrals through the 
agency.''
  This is the heart of what the Inspector General Act asked for. This 
is what this bill restores. I cannot imagine anything controversial 
about wanting inspectors general to have access to the people and the 
documents they need to do their jobs. Americans deserve an accountable, 
transparent, and effective government. This is one tangible thing that 
we can do to help achieve that common goal.
  I urge my colleagues to pass S. 579 today.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
an excellent article that appeared in the New York Times, as well as 
the letter we received from Senator John Glenn.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page 20169]]



                [From the New York Times, Nov. 27, 2015]

    Tighter Lid on Records Threatens to Weaken Government Watchdogs

                          (By Eric Lichtblau)

       Washington.--Justice Department watchdogs ran into an 
     unexpected roadblock last year when they began examining the 
     role of federal drug agents in the fatal shootings of unarmed 
     civilians during raids in Honduras.
       The Drug Enforcement Administration balked at turning over 
     emails from senior officials tied to the raids, according to 
     the department's inspector general. It took nearly a year of 
     wrangling before the D.E.A. was willing to turn over all its 
     records in a case that the inspector general said raised 
     ``serious questions'' about agents' use of deadly force.
       The continuing Honduran inquiry is one of at least 20 
     investigations across the government that have been slowed, 
     stymied or sometimes closed because of a long-simmering 
     dispute between the Obama administration and its own 
     watchdogs over the shrinking access of inspectors general to 
     confidential records, according to records and interviews.
       The impasse has hampered investigations into an array of 
     programs and abuse reports--from allegations of sexual 
     assaults in the Peace Corps to the F.B.I.'s terrorism powers, 
     officials said. And it has threatened to roll back more than 
     three decades of policy giving the watchdogs unfettered 
     access to ``all records'' in their investigations.
       ``The bottom line is that we're no longer independent,'' 
     Michael E. Horowitz, the Justice Department inspector 
     general, said in an interview.
       The restrictions reflect a broader effort by the Obama 
     administration to prevent unauthorized disclosures of 
     sensitive information--at the expense, some watchdogs insist, 
     of government oversight.
       Justice Department lawyers concluded in a legal opinion 
     this summer that some protected records, like grand jury 
     transcripts, wiretap intercepts and financial credit reports, 
     could be kept off limits to government investigators. The 
     administration insists there is no intention of curtailing 
     investigations, but both Democrats and Republicans in 
     Congress have expressed alarm and are promising to restore 
     full access to the watchdogs.
       The new restrictions grew out of a five-year-old dispute 
     within the Justice Department. After a series of scathing 
     reports by Glenn Fine, then the Justice Department inspector 
     general, on F.B.I. abuses in counterterrorism programs, 
     F.B.I. lawyers began asserting in 2010 that he could no 
     longer have access to certain confidential records because 
     they were legally protected.
       That led to a series of high-level Justice Department 
     reviews, a new procedure for reviewing records requests and, 
     ultimately, a formal opinion in July from the department's 
     Office of Legal Counsel. That opinion, which applies to 
     federal agencies across the government, concluded that the 
     1978 law giving an inspector general access to ``all 
     records'' in investigations did not necessarily mean all 
     records when it came to material like wiretap intercepts and 
     grand jury reports.
       The inspector-general system was created in 1978 in the 
     wake of Watergate as an independent check on government 
     abuse, and it has grown to include watchdogs at 72 federal 
     agencies. Their investigations have produced thousands of 
     often searing public reports on everything from secret 
     terrorism programs and disaster responses to boondoggles like 
     a lavish government conference in Las Vegas in 2010 that 
     featured a clown and a mind reader.
       Not surprisingly, tensions are common between the watchdogs 
     and the officials they investigate. President Ronald Reagan, 
     in fact, fired 15 inspectors general in 1981. But a number of 
     scholars and investigators said the restrictions imposed by 
     the Obama administration reflect a new level of acrimony.
       ``This is by far the most aggressive assault on the 
     inspector general concept since the beginning,'' said Paul 
     Light, a New York University professor who has studied the 
     system. ``It's the complete evisceration of the concept. You 
     might as well fold them down. They've become defanged.''
       While President Obama has boasted of running ``the most 
     transparent administration in history,'' some watchdogs say 
     the clampdown has scaled back scrutiny of government 
     programs.
       ``This runs against transparency,'' said the Peace Corps 
     inspector general, Kathy Buller.
       At the Peace Corps, her office began running into problems 
     two years ago in an investigation into the agency's handling 
     of allegations of sexual assaults against overseas 
     volunteers. Congress mandated a review after a volunteer in 
     Benin was murdered in 2009; several dozen volunteers reported 
     that the Peace Corps ignored or mishandled sexual abuse 
     claims.
       But Peace Corps lawyers initially refused to turn over 
     abuse reports, citing privacy restrictions. Even after 
     reaching an agreement opening up some material, Ms. Buller 
     said investigators have been able to get records that are 
     heavily redacted.
       ``It's been incredibly frustrating,'' she said. ``We have 
     spent so much time and energy arguing with the agency over 
     this issue.''
       The Peace Corps said in a statement, however, that it was 
     committed to ``rigorous oversight'' and has cooperated fully 
     with the inspector general.
       Agencies facing investigations are now sometimes relying on 
     the Justice Department's opinion as justification for denying 
     records--even records that are not specifically covered in 
     the opinion, officials said.
       At the Commerce Department, the inspector general this year 
     shut down an internal audit of enforcement of international 
     trade agreements because the department's lawyers, citing the 
     Justice Department's guidance, refused to turn over business 
     records that they said were ``proprietary'' and protected.
       The Environmental Protection Agency's inspector general has 
     reported a series of struggles with the organization over its 
     access to documents, including records the agency said were 
     classified or covered by attorney-client privilege. And 
     investigators at the Postal Service, a special Afghanistan 
     reconstruction board, and other federal agencies have 
     complained of tightened restrictions on investigative records 
     as well.
       Hopes of a quick end to the impasse have dimmed in recent 
     days after the Obama administration volunteered to restore 
     full access for the Justice Department's inspector general--
     but not the other 71 watchdogs.
       Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch, asked about the issue at 
     a House hearing last week, said the proposal was intended to 
     ensure, at least at the Justice Department, ``that the 
     inspector general would receive all the information he 
     needed.''
       But watchdogs outside the Justice Department said they 
     would be left dependent on the whims of agency officials in 
     their investigations.
       ``It's no fix at all,'' said Senator Charles E. Grassley, 
     Republican of Iowa, who leads the Judiciary Committee.
       In a rare show of bipartisanship, the administration has 
     drawn scorn from Democrats and Republicans. The Obama 
     administration's stance has ``blocked what was once a free 
     flow of information'' to the watchdogs, Senator Patrick J. 
     Leahy of Vermont, the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary 
     Committee, said at a hearing.
       A Justice Department spokeswoman, Emily Pierce, said in a 
     statement on Friday: ``Justice Department leadership has 
     issued policy guidance to ensure that our inspector general 
     gets the documents he requests as quickly as possible, even 
     when those documents are protected by other statutes 
     protecting sensitive information. The department is unaware 
     of any instance in which the inspector general has sought 
     access to documents or information protected from disclosure 
     by statute and did not receive them.''
       Nowhere has the fallout over the dispute been felt more 
     acutely than at the Justice Department, where the inspector 
     general's office said 14 investigations had been hindered by 
     the restricted access.
       These include investigations into the F.B.I.'s use of phone 
     records collected by the National Security Agency, the 
     government's sharing of intelligence information before the 
     2013 Boston Marathon bombings, a notorious gun-tracing 
     operation known as ``Fast and Furious'' and the deadly 
     Honduran drug raids.
       In the case of the Honduran raids, the inspector general 
     has been trying to piece together the exact role of D.E.A. 
     agents in participating in, or even leading, a series of 
     controversial drug raids there beginning in 2011.
       Details of what happened remain sketchy even today, but 
     drug agents in a helicopter in 2012 reportedly killed four 
     unarmed villagers in a boat, including a pregnant woman and a 
     14-year-old boy, during a raid on suspected drug smugglers in 
     northeastern Honduras. They also shot down several private 
     planes--suspected of carrying drugs--in possible violation of 
     international law.
       An investigation by the Honduran government cleared 
     American agents of responsibility. But when the inspector 
     general began examining the case last year, D.E.A. officials 
     refused to turn over emails on the episodes from senior 
     executives, the inspector general's office said. Only after 
     more than 11 months of back-and-forth negotiations were all 
     the records turned over.
       The D.E.A. refused to comment on the case, citing the 
     investigation. A senior Justice Department official, speaking 
     on the condition of anonymity because of the continuing 
     review, said the refusal to turn over the records was the 
     flawed result of ``a culture within the D.E.A.'' at the 
     time--and not the result of the Justice Department's new 
     legal restrictions.
       Mr. Horowitz, the inspector general, said the long delay 
     was a significant setback to his investigation. He now hopes 
     to complete the Honduran review early next year.
       In the meantime, the watchdogs say they are looking to 
     Congress to intervene in a dispute with the administration 
     that has become increasingly messy.
       ``It's essential to enshrine in the law that the inspector 
     general has access to all agency records,'' said Mr. Fine, 
     who is now the Pentagon's principal deputy inspector general. 
     ``The underlying principle is key: To be an effective 
     inspector general, you need the right to receive timely 
     access to all agency records.''

[[Page 20170]]

     
                                  ____
                                                    July 23, 2015.
     Hon. Ron Johnson,
     Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
         Affairs.
     Hon. Jason Chaffetz,
     Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
       Dear Senator Johnson and Representative Chaffetz: Since the 
     enactment of the Inspector General Act in 1978, the 
     Inspectors General have provided independent oversight of 
     government programs and operations and pursued prosecution of 
     criminal activity against the government's interests. 
     Recommendations from IG audits have led to improvements in 
     the economy and efficiency of government programs that have 
     resulted in better delivery of needed services to countless 
     citizens. Investigations of those who violate the public 
     trust to enrich themselves at the expense of honest 
     taxpayers, of contractors who skirt the rules to illegally 
     inflate their profits, and of others who devise criminal 
     schemes to defraud the government have led to billions of 
     dollars being returned to the U.S. Treasury.
       The success of the IG Act is rooted in the principles on 
     which the Act is grounded--independence, direct reporting to 
     Congress, dedicated staff and resources, unrestricted access 
     to agency records, subpoena power, special protections for 
     agency employees who cooperate with the IG, and the ability 
     to refer criminal matters to the Department of Justice 
     without clearing such referrals through the agency. We 
     considered these safeguards to be vital when we developed the 
     Act and they remain essential today. No other entity within 
     government has the unique role and responsibility of 
     Inspectors General, and their ability to accomplish their 
     critical mission depends on the preservation of the 
     principles underlying the Inspector General Act.
       In recent years, IGs have experienced challenges to their 
     ability to have independent access to records and information 
     in their host agencies. Broad independent access to such 
     records is a fundamental tenet in the IG Act and to 
     compromise or in any way erode such access would strike at 
     the heart of important law. In short, full and unfettered 
     access is vital to an IG's ability to effectively prevent and 
     detect fraud, waste, and abuse in agency programs and 
     activities.
       The Inspector General Act has stood the test of time. The 
     billions of dollars recovered for the government and the 
     increased efficiency and effectiveness of government programs 
     and operations are a testament to the Act's continued 
     success. Any action that would impair the IG's ability to 
     achieve their mission--particularly the denial of full and 
     independent access to agency records and information--would 
     have an immeasurable adverse impact and severely damage their 
     critical oversight function. For this reason, I urge you to 
     take action to protect the independent access rights of 
     Inspectors General.
           Sincerely,
                                                       John Glenn,
                                     United States Senator (Ret.).

  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to compliment 
Senator McCaskill and Senator Johnson for their leadership in bringing 
this bill out of their committee--a committee I don't serve on but a 
bill that is very important to the oversight work of this Senator, and 
I hope every Senator considers it to be very important. I would say 
that I agree with everything they have said. I want to emphasize what 
they said, and I want to take a few minutes to do that because I feel 
strongly about this piece of legislation.
  There is an important principle here--a very important principle--
that we ought to keep in mind, because it is an insult to 100 Senators 
and 435 Members of the House of Representatives when legislation is 
written and it is explained very clearly what that legislation is 
supposed to accomplish: that an inspector general would have access to 
all records. Then we have a lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel in 
the Department of Justice--one person making an interpretation of a law 
that is contrary to congressional intent--that one person out of 2 
million people in the executive branch of government can override the 
will of 535 Members of Congress. That will was expressed way back in 
1978.
  This is just a little different quote from a letter Senator Johnson 
has already talked about from a respected Member of this Senate for 24 
or maybe 30 years, Senator John Glenn of Ohio, who was very much 
interested in making sure that we had strong oversight by Congress and 
that within the executive branch, they had strong oversight that the IG 
would do within a specific department.
  Senator John Glenn of Ohio was one of the chief architects of this 
legislation. He said: ``Full and unfettered access is vital to an IG's 
ability to effectively prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in an 
agency's programs and activities.''
  Here we are with what Senator John Glenn said when he was a Member of 
this body and this legislation passed. Then we have one lawyer out of 2 
million executive branch employees interpreting a statute contrary to 
congressional intent and then overriding it--in other words, giving 
Cabinet heads opportunities to avoid doing what the inspector general 
law says and what an inspector general needs to do to do their job: 
have access to all records.
  Senator McCaskill made that clear. Senator Johnson made that clear. 
This is a bipartisan effort coming unanimously out of this committee, 
that this is an egregious attack on the powers of Congress and we can't 
let one person out of 2 million people in the executive branch of the 
government get away with it. Yet we seem to have some problems getting 
it passed. I don't understand it. You try to explain that to the people 
of this country, whether it is in New York City or whether it is in Des 
Moines, IA. There is no way this can be justified, that one lawyer out 
of 2 million people in the executive branch of government can issue an 
opinion and override the Congress of the United States.
  I intend to go into some detail about how I feel about this 
legislation, if my colleagues haven't come to that conclusion already. 
To ensure accountability and transparency in government, Congress 
created inspectors general, or IGs, as our eyes and ears within the 
executive branch. That is the foresight of one famous Senator and 
astronaut by the name of John Glenn. But IGs cannot do their job 
without timely and independent access to all agency records. That is 
why this bill is called ``all means all.'' Agencies cannot be trusted 
not to restrict the flow of potentially embarrassing documents to the 
IGs who oversee them. If the agencies can keep IGs in the dark, then 
this Congress will be kept in the dark as well.
  When Congress passed the Inspectors General Act of 1978, the Congress 
explicitly said that IGs should have access to all agency records. 
Inspectors general are designed to be independent but to also be part 
of an agency. Inspectors general are there to help agency leadership 
identify and correct waste, fraud, and abuse. What Cabinet head 
wouldn't want somebody in their department to have access to all 
records that show that maybe that department isn't spending money 
according to congressional intent or maybe not following the law the 
way Congress intended? It ought to be welcome by any administration 
head.
  Fights between an agency and its own inspector general over access to 
documents are a waste of taxpayers' money and personnel time. The law 
requires that inspectors general have access to all agency records--
precisely, by the way, to avoid these costly and time-consuming 
disputes. However, since 2010, a handful of agencies, led by the FBI--
and I respect the FBI, but in this case I don't--has refused to comply 
with this legal obligation.
  The Justice Department claimed that the inspector general could not 
access certain records until--guess what--department leadership gave 
them permission to do it, even though the law says they are entitled to 
all documents. Requiring private approval from agency leadership for 
access to agency information undermines inspectors general 
independence. That is bad enough, but it also causes wasteful delays.
  After this access problem came to light, Congress took action. So we 
have the 2015 Department of Justice Appropriations Act declaring--this 
is Congress again declaring--that no funds should be used to deny the 
inspector general timely access to all records. In other words, just 
this year--or last year when the appropriations bill was passed for 
2015--we had Members of Congress saying that this lawyer, out of 2 
million executive branch employees, who is frustrating the will of 
Congress is wrong.
  This new law directed the inspector general to report to Congress 
within 5

[[Page 20171]]

days whenever there was a failure to comply with this requirement. In 
February alone, the Justice Department's IG notified Congress of three 
separate occasions in which the FBI failed to provide access to records 
requested for oversight investigations. IGs for the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Department of Commerce, and the Peace Corps have 
experienced similar stonewalling.
  Then, in July, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel--that 
is this one lawyer out of 2 million employees--the Office of Legal 
Counsel released a memo arguing that we did not really mean ``all 
records'' when we put those words in the statute. Here we have somebody 
in the Justice Department--one person out of 2 million employees--
trying to tell 535 Members of Congress what they meant when they said 
``all'' means all. So let me be clear. We meant what we said in the IG 
act: ``All records'' really means all records.
  I told my colleagues about the Department of Justice Appropriations 
Act responding to this a year ago. Well, 1 week after this report was 
issued, that the Office of Legal Counsel issued its awful legal 
opinion, Senator Mikulski and Senator Shelby--both outstanding members 
of the Committee on Appropriations--sent a letter to the Justice 
Department correcting the Office of Legal Counsel's misreading of the 
appropriations rider, also known as section 218. I would like to read 
from the Mikulski and Shelby letter:

       We write to inform you that the OLC's interpretation of 
     section 218 is wrong and the subsequent conclusion of our 
     committee's intention is wrong. We expect the department and 
     all of its agencies to fully comply with section 218 and to 
     provide the Office of Inspector General with full and 
     immediate access to all records, documents, and other 
     materials in accordance with section 6(a) of the Inspectors 
     General Act.

  So we wrote a statute in 1978. We have no problems with it until this 
person--one lawyer out of 2 million executive branch employees--writes 
an opinion saying ``all'' doesn't mean all. Then we have Members of the 
body who are insulted by that interpretation, and these Members write: 
No money in this appropriations bill can be used to carry out that 
Office of Legal Counsel opinion. And, if they would have listened to 
the members of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Johnson and 
Senator McCaskill would not have to work so hard to correct a bad 
opinion, contrary to congressional intent, that was written by the 
Office of Legal Counsel.
  I applaud my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee, particularly 
Senators Mikulski and Shelby, for standing up for the inspectors 
general.
  In early August I chaired a Judiciary Committee hearing on the Office 
of Legal Counsel opinion and the devastating impact it is already 
having on the work of inspectors general across the country. Remember, 
the Office of Legal Counsel is in the Justice Department. Well, we had 
a Justice Department witness before our committee disagree with the 
results of the Office of Legal Counsel opinion and actually support 
legislative action to solve the problem.
  So following the hearing, 11 of my colleagues and I sent a 
bipartisan--I want to emphasize bipartisan--as well as bicameral letter 
to the Department of Justice and the entire inspectors general 
community. In this letter, the chairs and ranking members of the 
committee of jurisdiction in both the House and the Senate asked for 
specific legislative language to reaffirm that ``all'' means all. As 
the witness from the Justice Department said, there ought to be 
legislative language to correct this awful interpretation by one lawyer 
out of 2 million employees in the executive branch, overriding 535 
Members of Congress.
  It took the Justice Department 3 months to respond to this letter, 
and its proposed language was far too narrow to actually override this 
Office of Legal Counsel opinion. However, the inspectors general 
community responded to our letter within 2 weeks. In September, a 
bipartisan group of Senators and I incorporated the core of this 
language into the bill we are talking about today, S. 579. It is 
entitled the ``Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2015.'' In total, 
13 colleagues have joined me on this bill: Senators Johnson, McCaskill, 
Ernst, Baldwin, Carper, Cornyn, Lankford, Collins, Ayotte, Kirk, 
Mikulski, Fischer, and Wyden. It is bipartisan.
  I am grateful to each of them for standing up with me for inspectors 
general. I especially want to thank Senators Johnson and McCaskill, as 
I have already done, but do it again for working closely with me on 
this legislation from the very beginning and for their work in getting 
this bill through their committee.
  Let me tell you what this bill does. The Inspector General 
Empowerment Act includes further clarification that Congress intended 
IGs to have access to all agency records, notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, unless other laws specifically state that IGs are not 
to receive such access.
  Let me be clear. The purpose of this provision is to nullify and 
overturn this awful decision that this one lawyer in the Department of 
Justice out of 2 million-plus Federal employees in the executive branch 
issued this opinion. These words, notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, are key to accomplishing that goal, but the bill does much more 
than overturning the OLC opinion, which has been roundly criticized by 
both sides of the aisle. It bolsters IG independence by preventing 
agency heads from placing them on arbitrary and indefinite 
administrative leave. It promotes transparency by requiring IGs to post 
more of their reports online, including those involving misconduct by 
senior officials that the Justice Department chose not to prosecute.
  Also, the bill equips IGs with tools they need to conduct effective 
investigation, such as the ability to subpoena testimony from former 
Federal employees. When employees of the U.S. Government are accused of 
wrongdoing or misconduct, IGs should be able to conduct a full and 
thorough investigation of those allegations. Getting to the bottom of 
these allegations is necessary to restore public trust. God only knows 
how much restoration of public trust in the government in Washington we 
have to restore. Unfortunately, employees who may have violated that 
trust are often allowed to evade the IGs inquiry by simply retiring 
from the government. So the bill empowers IGs to obtain testimony from 
employees like that.
  (Ms. AYOTTE assumed the Chair.)
  Similarly, the bill helps IGs better expose waste, fraud, and abuse 
by those who receive Federal funds. It enables IGs to require testimony 
from government contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees. 
Currently, most IGs can subpoena documents from entities from outside 
their agency. However, most cannot subpoena testimony, just documents--
although there are a few agencies that can. For example, the inspector 
general for the Defense Department and the Department of Health and 
Human Services already have that authority. The ability to require 
witnesses outside the agency to talk to the IG can be critical in 
carrying out an inspector general's statutory duties or recovering 
wasted Federal funds.
  The IG community recently provided me with numerous examples of 
actual, real-life cases that illustrate the need to subpoena witnesses.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record a document that lists these accounts.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

          Inspectors General & Testimonial Subpoena Authority


               the use of testimonial subpoena authority

 Examples of when Testimonial Subpoena Authority Would Have Been Useful

       Below are examples where subjects of IG oversight could 
     have been served with testimonial subpoena's by an Inspector 
     General:
       1. Among a number of schemes identified during a 
     multiagency OIG investigation, Target owner of small 
     businesses submitted overlapping small business proposals to 
     two federal agencies and obtained funding for both projects, 
     approximately $500,000 from each agency. During the course of 
     the projects, the work funded by one of the agencies was 
     falsely reported out in project reports to both agencies. 
     National Science

[[Page 20172]]

     Foundation (NSF) OIG requested interviews with the Target 
     owner and two of his company's employees, and they initially 
     agreed through counsel to be interviewed.
       However, during the first of the interviews, an employee 
     confessed to having destroyed company timesheets and created 
     new company time sheets in response to an IG subpoena, and 
     informed NSF OIG that he did so at the Target's request. 
     After that interview, the Target declined to be interviewed. 
     In addition, a fourth employee declined to be interviewed 
     about his timesheets and work performed, which would have 
     been relevant to the fraud scheme. NSF OIG's inability to 
     compel testimony negatively impacted our ability to pursue 
     the obstruction and other potential charges against the 
     Target and company employees.
       2. In a matter involving a very senior level Securities and 
     Exchange Commission (SEC) executive, instances of serious 
     administrative misconduct were being investigated. During the 
     pendency of the investigation, which had been declined 
     criminally, the executive resigned and refused to cooperate 
     any further. As a result, the investigation was completed 
     without all of the investigative steps completed that would 
     have indicated whether the misconduct was simply the result 
     of a ``bad actor,'' or whether there are more systemic issues 
     that should be addressed by the agency. A testimonial 
     subpoena would ensure that the necessary investigative steps 
     could be completed. This is particularly important in an 
     agency like the SEC where employees are able to leave rather 
     quickly for private sector jobs (the proverbial ``revolving 
     door'').
       3. The Peace Corps awarded a $1.5 million contract to a 
     small business under the 8(a) Business Development Program, 
     which is intended to provide eligible small disadvantaged 
     businesses additional opportunities to obtain certain 
     government contracts. The 8(a) Program requires that eligible 
     small businesses perform a significant portion of the 
     contract; however, an investigation disclosed that the small 
     business did not comply with that requirement. Instead, the 
     small business allowed a large subcontractor to perform 
     nearly all of the work. Because Peace Corps was not in a 
     direct contractual relationship with the subcontractor 
     actually performing the work, OIG had no recourse to obtain 
     statements of the subcontractor.
       4. During a criminal investigation conducted by the 
     Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) OIG of allegations 
     involving a CPSC Assistant General Counsel representing a 
     company obtain contracts to provide supplies to the DoD, 
     records were obtained from the CPSC, Department of the Army, 
     and DoD regarding several of the alleged (accused eventually 
     pled guilty to them) offenses. However, additional offenses 
     could not be proven as CPSC OIG had no authority to require 
     US based members of the foreign company to submit to 
     interviews or provide testimonial information. CPSC OIG 
     requested interviews with both senior managers and agents of 
     the company in question, and although they initially agreed 
     to be interviewed all later declined.
       5. During the course of a review conducted after Fast & 
     Furious, DOJ OIG wanted to interview a former U.S. Attorney 
     in Arizona. When asked for a voluntary interview with the 
     then retired U.S. Attorney declined. DOJ OIG had no way to 
     reach the retired U.S. Attorney to elaborate on prior 
     statements he had made.
       6. In a Farm Credit Administration OIG case where a senior 
     staff member retired during an investigation, it was 
     subsequently discovered he/she had changed official 
     documents, impersonated an official and committed libel and 
     slander, before retiring during the middle of an 
     investigation on other matters. The former government 
     employee was not receptive to interview post retirement and 
     due to his retirement from government service, there was no 
     recourse.
       7. Peace Corps OIG, in the course of performing an audit of 
     one of the largest agency contracts, discovered that an 
     unauthorized subcontractor was performing the majority of the 
     work under the contract. The contract was misidentified as a 
     fixed-price contract, did not include an IG audit clause, and 
     the subcontractor was not in a direct contractual 
     relationship with Peace Corps. Peace Corps OIG was hindered 
     in examining potentially false or fraudulent billing by 
     having to rely solely on documentary subpoenas.
       8. NSF OIG conducted an investigation of two professors, a 
     husband and wife, who both served as Principal Investigators 
     at a U.S. university and received grant funds from multiple 
     federal agencies. The Targets also had full time tenured 
     positions at a foreign university and used federal funds to 
     travel to that foreign country, without disclosing their 
     affiliation in either grant proposals or the U.S. university. 
     During the investigation, the Targets declined, through 
     counsel, to be interviewed. The case was declined by the U.S. 
     attorney's office, and ultimately by the state attorney 
     general's office. NSF OIG's inability to interview these 
     Targets negatively affected NSF OIG's ability to obtain all 
     relevant evidence to effectively pursue grant fraud charges 
     against the Targets.
       9. The Farm Credit Administration OIG was advised of a 
     contractor who was paid by the agency for contract services 
     it had not provided. Attempts to contact a company 
     representative by mail and telephone were not productive 
     (telephone messages were not returned; certified mail not 
     answered). Fortunately, OIG was able to prevail upon the FBI 
     who had contacts with the company representative. Had the 
     contractor not responded to the FBI contacts, the OIG would 
     have had little recourse in obtaining information from the 
     contractor regarding recovery of the funds. There was a 
     scarce amount of information regarding bank accounts to 
     subpoena for financial records. A testimonial subpoena would 
     have been instrumental under those circumstances.
       10. In three other small business grant-fraud cases pursued 
     by NSF OIG, three Targets declined to be interviewed 
     regarding apparent fraud schemes that had been identified. 
     Having testimonial subpoena would have provided an important 
     tool to more effectively pursue these cases.
       i. The first Target faked letters of support for his 
     proposals, applied for duplicate proposals to multiple 
     federal agencies, listed his in-laws (over 90) as company 
     employees, and paid for his wife's business facility with 
     federal funds. Target declined to be interviewed, negatively 
     affecting NSF OIG's ability to fully investigate the matter.
       ii. The second Target provided financial reports to NSF 
     that did not match his company's expenditure ledger for the 
     award and appeared to include personal expenditures. The 
     Target initially agreed to be interviewed but canceled such 
     interviews on multiple occasions, negatively affecting NSF 
     OIG's ability to fully investigate the matter.
       iii. The third Target made up a fake investment company to 
     support a matching award from the agency, and the individual 
     who purportedly signed the investment letter as CFO did not 
     sign the letter and never heard of the fake investment 
     company. The Target initially agreed to be interviewed by NSF 
     OIG, but terminated the interview early on after 
     understanding the implications of the NSF OIG investigation. 
     Since then, he has declined to even comply with a subpoena 
     for documents.


      a case study: DOD IG's use of testimonial subpoena authority

       Testimonial subpoena authority, found at Sec. 8(i) of the 
     Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 5 U.S.C. App., was 
     originally provided by Sec. 1042 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act of 2010, 111 Pub. L. 84.
       Testimonial subpoena authority has never been delegated, 
     but has always been retained/exercised personally by the DoD 
     IG.
       Internal procedures mandate that before a testimonial 
     subpoena is issued: (1) the witness, who cannot be a Federal 
     employee, must have declined a voluntary interview, (2) the 
     interview must be expected to produce information needed to 
     resolve critical issue(s) or corroborate essential facts, and 
     (3) the information sought cannot reasonably be obtained 
     through any other means.
       Sec. 8(i)(3) of the IG Act requires the DoD IG notify the 
     Attorney General seven days before issuing a testimonial 
     subpoena. This notice requirement has not hindered the DoD 
     IG's use of its testimonial subpoena authority.
       To date, since 2010, the DoD IG has considered a total of 
     eight testimonial subpoena requests, all in connection with 
     administrative investigations:
       Two requests were considered but denied because they failed 
     to meet the internal procedures criteria.
       One request, associated with the Retired Military Advisor 
     (RMA) administrative re-investigation, was authorized by the 
     DoD IG and served on the witness, a former Assistant 
     Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
       Two requests, also associated with the RMA administrative 
     re-investigation, were authorized by the DoD IG but not 
     served on the witnesses, a former Secretary of Defense and a 
     former DoD General Counsel, because the witnesses belatedly 
     agreed to be interviewed voluntarily.
       One request, associated with an internal administrative 
     review of a DCIS investigation, was authorized by the DoD IG 
     and served on the witness, a former DoD Deputy Inspector 
     General for Investigations/ Acting Chief of Staff.
       One request, associated with an Audit Policy review of 
     DCAA, was authorized by the DoD IG but not served on the 
     witness, a former DCAA Director, because the witness 
     belatedly agreed to be interviewed voluntarily.
       One request, associated with an IPO evaluation of the 
     transfer of ITAR controlled technology by MDA to NASA, was 
     authorized by the DoD IG but not served on the witness, a 
     former NASA contractor, because the witness belatedly agreed 
     to be interviewed.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, I also ask unanimous consent to have 
printed in the Record a letter I received yesterday from the Project on 
Government Oversight.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


[[Page 20173]]


                                                  POGO--Project on


                                         Government Oversight,

                                                December 14, 2015.
     Hon. Chuck Grassley,
     Hart Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Claire McCaskill,
     Hart Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Grassley and Senator McCaskill: The Project On 
     Government Oversight (POGO) is a nonpartisan independent 
     watchdog that champions good government reforms. POGO's 
     investigations into corruption, misconduct, and conflicts of 
     interest achieve a more effective, accountable, open, and 
     ethical federal government. Recognizing the vital role that 
     Inspectors General (IG) play, POGO has investigated and 
     worked to improve the IG system since 2006. This work 
     includes multiple reports on the IG system, maintaining an IG 
     vacancy tracker, and working with Congress to incorporate 
     needed reforms in the Inspector General Act of 2008. In light 
     of this work, we are writing to thank you for introducing the 
     Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2015, and to urge 
     Congress to quickly pass this important legislation.
       Inspectors General can make all the difference when it 
     comes to creating a better government, but Congress needs to 
     ensure that IGs have access to all the information they need 
     to do their job effectively. Federal agencies have begun to 
     unreasonably challenge IGs' statutory right to access agency 
     data in attempts to prevent embarrassing events from coming 
     to light. It is essential that Congress act quickly to pass 
     the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2015 to prevent the 
     overbroad interpretation of restrictions on IG authority from 
     becoming accepted law, allowing current and future waste, 
     fraud, and abuse to remain hidden.
       In order to serve as the eyes and ears of Congress, an IG 
     office must have an unrestricted view of the agency it 
     oversees. This principle is enshrined in Section 6(a)(1) of 
     the Inspector General Act, which states that each IG office 
     shall have ``access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, 
     documents, papers, recommendations, or other material . . . 
     which relate to programs and operations with respect to which 
     that Inspector General has responsibilities under this Act.'' 
     It seems crystal clear that ``all'' means all, but some 
     agencies have fought back against that idea.
       The most blatant rejection of ``all means all'' can be 
     found in the July 2015 opinion by the Department of Justice's 
     (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that improperly limits IG 
     access and caters to agency resistance to necessary 
     oversight. If left unchallenged, this opinion will allow 
     agencies' incorrect interpretation of Section 6(a)(1) to 
     become de facto law. The OLC's opinion states that the 
     unfettered access afforded by Section 6(a) of the Inspector 
     General Act is superseded by specific restrictions on the 
     dissemination of Title III, grand jury, and FCRA information. 
     The OLC concluded, for instance, that the IG office may not 
     be entitled to obtain these records when conducting financial 
     audits and other administrative and civil reviews that are 
     only tangentially related to DOJ's criminal and law 
     enforcement activities. POGO disagrees with this 
     interpretation because it rests upon a clear misreading of 
     the common language Congress made clear in the law.
       Congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle have 
     rightly condemned the OLC's opinion, according to which ``all 
     records'' does not mean ``all records.'' POGO believes this 
     OLC opinion makes a mockery of the entire IG system: these 
     offices cannot possibly be effective watchdogs on behalf of 
     Congress and the American public if agencies restrict IG 
     access and force them to negotiate with agency leaders for 
     access on a case-by-case basis. Agency records provide the 
     raw materials IG offices need to fulfill their statutory 
     responsibilities. The very purpose of having an independent 
     IG is undermined if the office has to seek the agency's 
     permission in order to carry out its mission. Unless Congress 
     acts quickly, this OLC opinion will gut the IG system and 
     prevent meaningful oversight.
       While many federal agencies handle records that are highly 
     sensitive and legitimately withheld from public 
     dissemination, that does not mean they should be withheld 
     from IG offices, or by extension from Congress, both of which 
     offer independent oversight and recommendations to improve 
     agency operations. Secret agency programs are particularly 
     susceptible to waste, fraud, and abuse, but IG offices cannot 
     uncover or correct these problems without access to agency 
     records. Agency actions that deny access to those records 
     violate our system of checks and balances, and do so unduly, 
     as IGs have proven they can responsibly handle sensitive 
     information.
       For example, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
     has shown that it can effectively and responsibly oversee the 
     most sensitive DOJ operations without jeopardizing law 
     enforcement actions. It has reviewed grand jury materials and 
     other sensitive records when it examined the FBI's potential 
     targeting of domestic advocacy groups, the FBI's efforts to 
     access records of reporters' toll calls during a media leak 
     probe, the President's Surveillance Program, and the firing 
     of U.S. Attorneys, among other important and high-profile 
     cases.
       Congress needs to clarify that IG offices must be granted 
     access to all agency records notwithstanding any other 
     existing or future law or any other prohibition on 
     disclosure, including but not limited to: 1) the federal 
     rules of criminal procedure; 2) Title III; 3) the FCRA; and 
     4) laws such as the Kate Puzey Act that restrict the 
     dissemination of personally identifiable information. In 
     addition, Congress should specify that agencies do not waive 
     the attorney-client or other common law privileges when 
     records are turned over to IG offices. The Inspector General 
     Empowerment Act of 2015 addresses this issue and corrects the 
     troublesome OLC memo. However, until Congress passes the 
     bill, that memo can be and has been used to block oversight.
       The bill also addresses other improper challenges to IG 
     access. Under the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection 
     Act (CMPPA), IGs must get approval from agency leaders in 
     order to match the computer records of one federal agency 
     against other federal and non-federal records. The Inspector 
     General Empowerment Act of 2015 would exempt IG offices from 
     the CMPPA so they can access records at other agencies 
     without getting approval from the very officials they are 
     supposed to oversee. Additionally, under current law, IGs can 
     only compel testimony from federal employees. This means that 
     former federal employees, contractors, or grant recipients 
     can refuse to testify before an IG in the course of an 
     investigation. This bill would provide IGs with testimonial 
     subpoena power over these individuals, and allow for fuller 
     and more effective oversight of federal programs and 
     agencies.
       In the light of the erroneous July OLC opinion, it is 
     urgent that Congress act now to make sure IGs have the 
     ability to function as intended. Not correcting this 
     precedent now will cripple current and future IGs and in turn 
     limit Congress's and the public's ability to oversee the 
     executive branch and hold it accountable.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Danielle Brian,
                                               Executive Director.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, the Project on Government Oversight is 
a nonpartisan, independent watchdog that has been advocating good 
government reforms for decades. In this letter the Project on 
Government Oversight expresses its support for this bill in general and 
for provisions that equip inspectors general with the authority to 
require testimony. Let it be clear that the bill also imposes 
limitations on the authority of IGs to require testimony.
  There are several procedural protections in place to ensure that this 
authority is exercised wisely. For example, the subpoena must be 
approved by a designated panel of three other IGs. It is then referred 
to the Attorney General. For those IGs who can already subpoena 
witnesses' testimony, I am not aware of any instances in which it has 
been misused. In fact, the inspector general for the Department of 
Defense has established a policy that spells out additional procedures 
and safeguards to ensure the subjects of subpoenas are treated fairly. 
I am confident the rest of the IG community will be just as scrupulous 
in providing appropriate protection for the use of this authority. You 
see, we all win when inspectors general can do their jobs. Most 
importantly, the public is better served when IGs are able to shine 
light in the government operation and stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
  In September we attempted to pass this important bill by unanimous 
consent. It has been nearly 3 months since leadership asked whether any 
Senator would object. Not one Senator has put a statement in the Record 
or come to the floor to object publicly. At the August Judiciary 
Committee hearing, there was a clear consensus that Congress needed to 
act legislatively and needed to overturn this Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion that one person out of 2-plus million employees in the 
executive branch overruled this 1978 act that the inspector general 
ought to be entitled to all information. Every day that goes by without 
fixing the opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel is another day that 
watchdogs across government can be stonewalled.
  At that hearing, Senator Leahy said this access problem is ``blocking 
what was once a free flow of information'' and Senator Leahy called for 
a permanent legislative solution. Senator Cornyn noted that the Office 
of Legal Counsel opinion is ``ignoring the mandate of Congress'' and 
undermining the oversight authority that Congress has under the 
Constitution. Senator Tillis

[[Page 20174]]

stated that the need to fix this access problem was ``a blinding flash 
of the obvious'' and that ``we all seem to be in violent agreement that 
we need to correct this.''
  However, some Members raised concern about guaranteeing IGs unchecked 
access to certain national security information. Fortunately, we were 
able to agree on some changes to the bill that addressed those 
concerns, without gutting the core of the bill. We made these 
concessions so the bill can pass by unanimous consent. This Senator 
thanks my colleagues who worked with me to arrive at this compromise.
  As we move forward, it is important to note the following: First, I 
am not aware of a single instance in which an IG has mishandled any 
classified or sensitive operational information. IGs are subject to the 
same restrictions on disclosing information as everyone else in the 
agency they oversee.
  Second, the Executive orders restricting and controlling classified 
information are issued under the President's constitutional authority. 
Naturally, this bill does not attempt to limit that constitutional 
authority at all. It just clarifies that no law can prevent an IG from 
obtaining documents from the agency it oversees unless the statute 
explicitly states that IG access should be restricted. No one thinks 
this statute could supersede the President's constitutional authority.
  Third, there is already a provision in law that allows the Secretary 
of Defense to prohibit an Inspector General review to protect vital 
national security interests and to protect sensitive operational 
information. We agreed to clarify that already existing provision to 
include the ability to restrict access to information as well as to 
prevent a review from occurring. However, we kept the language in that 
provision that requires notification to Congress whenever that 
authority to restrict an IG's access to information is exercised.
  After making these changes, we attempted to hotline the revised bill 
last week. Since then, no Senator has publicly stated any other 
concerns. The cosponsors have worked hard behind the scenes over the 
past 3 months in good faith to accommodate the concerns of any and all 
Members willing to work with us. Now the time has come to pass this 
bill. We all lose when Inspectors General are delayed or prevented from 
doing their work.
  I urge my colleagues to stand up for Inspectors General, overturn the 
Office of Legal Counsel opinion, and restore the intent of the 
Inspector General Act. All IGs should have access and timely 
independent access to all agency records. The most important thing is 
the principle that not one lawyer--that any one lawyer in the 
Department of Justice or any agency of government doesn't have a right 
to override the opinion of the Congress expressed in a statute so 
clearly as this is expressed.
  Madam President, at this time I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 68, S. 579, the 
Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2015; I further ask consent that 
the Johnson substitute amendment be agreed to; that the bill, as 
amended, be read a third time and passed and the motion to reconsider 
be considered made and laid upon the table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. Objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa has the floor.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. REID. Yes.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. May I ask on whose behalf the minority leader is 
objecting? Is it on his own behalf or on behalf of another Senator?
  Mr. REID. Other Senators are concerned about it, and I made the 
objection on my behalf.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I will not question what the minority leader just said, 
but it seems to me we ought to know who that Senator is besides the 
minority leader because Senator Wyden and I have worked very hard over 
the last 10 years, and we finally got done what we thought was a very 
good measure for this body; that the people who put holds on 
legislation ought to be made public, and there has been nothing in the 
Record. So why don't these people have guts enough to put in the Record 
their reasons and who they are? The public has a right to know that.
  Mr. REID. I am it.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. REID. No.
  Mr. JOHNSON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Madam President, I want to rise and voice my 
disappointment. This is a very commonsense piece of legislation that 
has strong bipartisan support. Senator Grassley has worked tirelessly 
on this and certainly our committee has as well. We cannot get a 
simple, commonsense bipartisan piece of legislation passed by the 
Senate--and then the insult of not even hearing what the objection is.
  What is the objection to giving the inspectors general the tools they 
need to provide the accountability and the transparency to safeguard 
American taxpayer money?
  I cited my example of the Potomac Healthcare system, the Potomac VA 
health care system, where because an inspector general was not 
transparent because the VA inspector general held 140 reports on 
inspections and investigations, the family of Thomas Baer did not 
realize there were problems. They took their father to that health care 
facility and their father died of a stroke because of neglect. That is 
how important this is. Yet we cannot even hear the reason behind the 
objection as to why they would not allow this very commonsense piece of 
legislation to pass.
  This is very disappointing.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gardner). The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I have a unanimous consent request.

                          ____________________