[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 20151-20154]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, today our Nation is distracted by grave 
concerns, by threats abroad and at home, by concerns about our economy 
and our people. I stand here today to call on us to continue to be 
focused on something that is not currently at the top of the news but 
on something that is a pressing and ongoing national concern. We need 
to be strictly and aggressively enforcing the terms of our nuclear deal 
with Iran that we reached with a variety of our other international 
partners and that is currently moving forward. We need to push back on 
Iran's bad and disruptive behavior, not just in its region but 
globally, and give our administration and international agencies the 
resources and the nominees confirmed that will allow them to be 
successful in enforcing our actions against Iran.
  A few short months ago, if you asked anyone what topics would be at 
the top of the list of America's foreign policy conversation or the 
upcoming Presidential campaign, you would have been hard-pressed to 
find anyone who didn't mention the Iran nuclear agreement front and 
center. It completely centered the debate in this Chamber and around 
the country last summer and fall. What a difference a few months can 
make.
  This morning many of us are deeply concerned about an alleged bomb 
threat in Los Angeles that is causing hundreds of thousands of 
schoolchildren to be sent home mid-schoolday. And in response to the 
recent and horrific attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, we are focused 
on identifying weaknesses in our border security and in finding ways to 
protect the American people without compromising our fundamental 
values.
  We are rightly focused on expanding the U.S.-led coalition to defeat 
ISIS and on finding a way to assist our allies in providing safe haven 
to some of

[[Page 20152]]

the millions of refugees fleeing terror and chaos abroad. Sadly, we are 
also distracted by a Republican Presidential primary in which a leading 
candidate has cast aside the Constitution in favor of incendiary 
rhetoric. That is why I rise today to make sure we remain focused on 
one of America's most important challenges to the United States and our 
key allies, including, centrally, Israel, which is enforcing the terms 
of the nuclear deal with Iran.
  On September 1, after a long study and real reflection and 
significant debate, I ultimately announced my support for the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA, also known as the Iran 
nuclear agreement. Just over a week later, the review period ended and 
Congress failed to reject the deal, so it moved forward. The agreement 
took effect a month and a half later on October 18, known as adoption 
day, when Iran agreed to give the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
or IAEA, dramatically expanded inspection and verification powers. We 
are now 3 months into the JCPOA, and I want to take this opportunity 
today to assess areas where the Obama administration and our 
international partners have done well over the past 3 months and to 
highlight areas where we must do more.
  Since adoption day, we have seen some progress and some real setbacks 
on implementing the terms of the deal.
  First the positives, and there are some. Iran has begun to 
reconfigure its plutonium nuclear reactor at Arak so it can no longer 
produce materials necessary for a nuclear weapon. The government has 
also started to dismantle its enrichment centrifuges and its 
infrastructure that would have enabled it to use uranium as a nuclear 
weapon in the short term. The IAEA has also continued to make 
preparations to monitor and verify the deal and to increase its number 
of inspectors on the ground, to deploy modern technologies to monitor 
Iran's declared nuclear facilities, and to set up a comprehensive 
oversight program of Iran's centrifuge manufacturing facilities and its 
entire nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mines, to mills, to enrichment 
facilities.
  These steps are promising, but by no means do they tell the complete 
story of Iran's bad behavior since this deal was reached, nor do these 
few positive steps indicate that implementing the terms of this deal 
going forward will be anything less than exceptionally difficult. In 
fact, not only will enforcement of this deal be incredibly tricky, but 
I believe how effectively and aggressively we enforce the JCPOA in 
these early months and years will set the table for how we respond when 
Iran commits violations later. Whether we respond now when Iran commits 
minor violations around the boundaries of the nuclear deal will send a 
critical message to our allies and adversaries alike.
  I am confident that the actions taken by the United States and our 
allies to counter and restrain Iran and the Middle East, especially in 
these early months of the deal, will profoundly impact Iran's behavior 
going forward.
  That brings me to less positive news. When I announced my support for 
the JCPOA last September, I made it clear that it was based on a deep 
suspicion of Iran, an inherent distrust of their intentions, and a 
clear-eyed commitment to aggressively oversee and enforce the terms of 
the deal.
  My concerns proved justified on October 22 when Iran concluded a 
ballistic missile test in clear violation of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1929. Those unlawful tests came just days after adoption day 
under the JCPOA. Last week, before the U.N. Security Council could 
finish their investigations and take any concrete actions, we heard 
reports of a second Iranian ballistic missile test on November 21.
  I fear the Iranians are taking action after action in this area and 
others to demonstrate that they are willing to flout international 
rules, regulations, and restrictions. And in the absence of our 
decisive action, these misdeeds by the Iranians will simply continue 
and escalate.
  Today, a new report from the IAEA gives further justification to the 
distrust shared by supporters and opponents of the nuclear deal. The 
IAEA report on the so-called possible military dimensions--or PMD--of 
Iran's nuclear program found ``that a range of activities relevant to 
the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran 
prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities 
took place after 2003.'' These activities included computer modeling 
that took place as recently as 2009.
  The PMD report details just how determined Iran has been to develop 
nuclear weapons capability. Iran developed detonators. Iran 
experimented with explosives technology. Iran engaged in computer 
modeling of a nuclear explosive. Iran even set up organizations 
specifically dedicated to nuclear weapons activity. It is not hard to 
connect those dots, and the IAEA did. That agency found that Iran 
engaged in efforts to demolish, remove, and refurbish facilities 
related to testing nuclear weapons components. Its government also 
offered misleading explanations of its past nuclear behavior.
  It is equally important to note what the IAEA did not find. Iran's 
weapons program didn't advance beyond an exploratory stage. The IAEA 
found no indication there was a whole undeclared nuclear fuel cycle in 
Iran or that Iran held significant amounts of undeclared uranium.
  Despite the ambiguous nature of this report, I think the take-away is 
clear: Iran's nuclear weapons-related activities and its sustained 
determination to hide and obfuscate its behavior reinforce our 
justifications for ongoing distrust of the Iranian Government and for 
the strict monitoring and verification of the components of the nuclear 
deal.
  My colleagues and I have access to classified material, meaning we 
know more than is publicly known about the extent and direction of the 
nuclear weapons program in Iran. But the IAEA report is important 
because it establishes a baseline for Iran's program, for our 
assessment of their breakout time, and for our knowledge of how far 
they have gotten in weaponization. Knowledge of these efforts is 
critical to our future enforcement of this deal.
  The IAEA report also reaffirms that as implementation of the deal 
moves forward, the international community must continue to seek and 
consider information about Iran's past nuclear activity. In my view, 
the IAEA must maintain its ability to continue reviewing any new 
information related to Iran's past nuclear weapons program, and we have 
to continue to assertively investigate any new accusations of Iranian 
covert activity or malfeasance.
  We have to continue to counter Iran's rogue actions--which only serve 
to isolate Iran on the world stage--by continuing to enforce sanctions 
without exception and be prepared to impose new sanctions if and when 
Iran's behavior warrants it. For example, the U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Samantha Power, was right to immediately shine a 
spotlight on the recent ballistic missile test I recently cited and to 
call for a U.N. Security Council investigation promptly. When that 
investigation is completed, the Security Council should act, but if it 
doesn't, I hope and expect that the administration is ready to enforce 
a series of unilateral American actions, including direct sanctions 
against those Iranians responsible for this violation. While these 
ballistic missile tests are outside the parameters of the JCPOA, our 
response has to be strategic, and we have to make sure Iran knows it 
can't continue to simply and blatantly disregard the international 
community and the U.N. Security Council.
  Since the announcement of the JCPOA, the Treasury Department has 
taken steps to target Iran's malign activity in the region. In 
November, the Treasury Department designated three Hezbollah 
procurement agents and four companies in Lebanon, China, and Hong Kong 
for purchasing dual-use technology on behalf of Hezbollah. These 
sanctions followed actions in July against three senior Hezbollah 
military officials in Syria and Lebanon who were providing military 
support to the Syrian regime and an additional Hezbollah procurement 
agent who served as the point person for the procurement and 
transshipment of weapons and materials for the group and its Syrian 
partners for at least 15 years.

[[Page 20153]]

  These designations also follow Treasury's actions during negotiations 
over the JCPOA when the Department utilized multiple authorities and 
sanctioned more than 100 Iranians and Iran-linked persons and entities, 
including more than 40 under its ongoing terrorism sanction 
authorities.
  In November, Treasury also participated in the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation 
Council Working Group on Iran, through which participants discussed our 
joint efforts to counter Iran's support for Hezbollah, for the Assad 
regime, and for other militant proxies in the region. That working 
group continues to improve information sharing and cooperation to take 
joint actions targeting Iran's support for terrorism and its other 
destabilizing activities in the region and around the world.
  In early December, Saudi Arabia agreed to designate 12 Hezbollah 
officials for terrorism, further disrupting their ability to raise and 
move funds around the gulf.
  Implementing this agreement successfully will demand that we continue 
to develop discrete, clear, and public responses to minor Iranian 
violations of the agreement. My view on this was shaped in no small 
part by advice I got from a dear, long-term friend in New York, 
Maurice, who told me about his experience decades ago negotiating a 
complex commercial deal with Iran. After 2 years of excruciating and 
detailed back-and-forth negotiations, he told me they sat at the table 
to sign their agreement and begin their commercial partnership. After 
shaking hands across the table, the lead Iranian negotiator said: Now, 
my friend, the negotiations begin in earnest.
  All of us who have studied Iran's behavior and know the history of 
their work to conceal their nuclear weapons program and their work to 
destabilize the region know that Iran will cheat on this agreement. 
They will litigate the boundaries. They will find ways large and small 
to test us.
  For example, the nuclear agreement bars Iran from enriching beyond 
3.67 percent. How will we respond if, for example, for a month Iran 
claims it accidentally enriched to 4 percent? We are unlikely to snap 
back the full multilateral sanctions regime because such a move would 
have little support in the international community for such a small and 
transient infraction and could be perceived as an overreaction. But 
inaction is not an option either. In coordination with our allies, we 
must develop a menu of responses that allow us to respond quickly and 
precisely to minor violations of the deal because there are no real 
minor violations of the deal. Otherwise Iran will little by little eat 
away at the constraints of this agreement, and our deterrence and 
credibility will collapse.
  In addition to deploying sanctions more effectively and ratcheting 
them up as necessary, the international community must also increase 
our efforts to push back against Iran's malign activity in the Middle 
East. More specifically, we have to enhance our campaign of 
interdicting Iranian weapons shipments and support to its proxies in 
Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. Iran sends illicit arms shipments to 
terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis who pass 
through international waters, and under both domestic and international 
law, the United States maintains its authority to disrupt these 
shipments. We must use that authority to act and to demonstrate our 
will. We must use that authority to work with our partners in the 
region and our allies around the world to increase the tempo and scope 
of our interdiction efforts. Successful interdiction efforts not only 
get deadly weapons out of the hands of terrorists but also deter Iran 
and undermine its proxies throughout the Middle East.
  We know we can be successful in this aspect of our enforcement 
because the administration has already successfully disrupted Iranian 
weapons shipments in recent months. Although many of us have been 
briefed in a classified setting about encouraging developments in this 
area, I think it is important that we have at least one example that we 
can share with our colleagues and the world.
  Please take a look at this picture to my left. In September, a raid 
off the coast of Yemen seized a large cache of Iranian arms destined 
for the Houthi rebels who seek to undermine the legitimate Yemeni 
Government. This massive weapons shipment included a whole series of 
the component parts of sophisticated TOW missiles, including 56 tube-
launched, optically tracked, wire-guided TOW missiles and the 
associated sights, mounts, tubes, battery sets, launcher assemblies, 
guidance systems, battery assemblies, and nearly 20 other sophisticated 
anti-tank weapons. I commend the administration for these efforts and 
for this successful interdiction in international waters, but we cannot 
stop there.
  Every month while Iran negotiates with the international community 
with one hand, with the other hand it has been sending millions of 
dollars' worth of weapons to the murderous Assad regime in Syria, to 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to the Houthis in Yemen. We must not stand by 
while Iran continues to spread its terror and destabilize this region. 
Nor is it sufficient simply to increase our interdiction efforts. We 
must publicize these efforts when successful.
  When an American smalltown sheriff pulls off a successful drug bust, 
we better believe that sheriff is going to hold a press conference and 
put on the table the drugs and guns taken off the streets. Actions like 
that send a simple signal to those who engage in the drug trade that 
there is a sheriff in town who is actually going after bad actors and 
who isn't going to tolerate this destabilizing and illegal activity.
  I think the American people and the international community need to 
know about Iran's bad behavior and our willingness to take effective 
actions to push back. Just as importantly, Iran needs to know that the 
international community remains serious about cracking down on its 
illegal arms shipments and its promotion of terror.
  I am committed and I am willing and ready to help the administration 
increase its interdiction efforts in any way I can. A shared commitment 
to this from my colleagues--a shared focus on this from my colleagues--
is especially important today when many members of the administration 
and the American people are understandably focused elsewhere: on our 
Presidential election next year, on the global refugee crisis, and on 
recent terrorist attacks and the conflict with ISIS.
  These are busy times. As the holidays approach and as Congress nears 
a massive budget deal, I see my colleagues and my constituents focusing 
less and less on Iran, but we must maintain our focus for the months 
and years to come. Given the 24/7 news cycle and the media's incessant 
focus on the crisis of the moment, we will be tempted to turn our 
attention elsewhere.
  Adoption day was not the end of the agreement with Iran. In fact, it 
signified just the beginning. And we must think strategically about the 
Middle East, which critically includes Iran as the central promoter of 
terrorism and source of destabilizing action in the region.
  We must redouble our efforts to follow through on the most rigorous 
enforcement of the JCPOA or face terrible consequences. We have to 
scrutinize Iranian actions ever more closely for signs it is reneging 
on its commitments. This JCPOA is set to last in principle for 15 years 
but in some terms indefinitely. Congress must not waiver--not for 1 
day--in our oversight of the implementation of this agreement.
  Whether my colleagues supported or opposed the deal, we should put 
our differences about that aside and focus on enforcement. The deal is 
designed to deter Iran from evading or cheating on the deal while also 
countering Iranian bad activity in the region. That is why I worked 
with a group of my colleagues to introduce the Iran Policy Oversight 
Act in September. This bill, cosponsored by supporters and opponents of 
the JCPOA, helps ensure the United States aggressively enforces the 
terms of the nuclear deal. The Iran Policy Oversight Act also provides 
support for our friends in the Middle East, most centrally our vital 
and steadfast ally, Israel.
  I am pleased to hear the administration is working on negotiating a 
new

[[Page 20154]]

10-year memorandum of understanding for Israel's security, and I am 
pleased to hear that its assistance will continue to grow to ensure 
Israel maintains its qualitative military edge.
  In recent weeks, I have also had the chance to discuss the Iranian 
deal and our intention to continue to enforce the sanctions that remain 
on the books and to interdict and to push back against Iran's 
destabilizing regional activities. When I was in Paris at the global 
climate conference, I had the chance to discuss this issue with French 
Government officials and business leaders. I will continue these 
efforts in early January when I will travel with seven other Senators 
to the Middle East and to Europe to discuss our progress implementing 
this nuclear deal and the challenges that remain.
  I commend President Obama and his administration for engaging with 
Congress during the debate over the Iran agreement and in the months 
since it took effect, but I urge the administration not to lose focus 
and to work with this Congress in the months ahead to ensure strict 
enforcement of the agreement.
  But we in Congress have our part to do here as well, not the least of 
which is making sure the executive branch has capable and effective 
officials, which is a crucial part of effective implementation. In 
recent months, not only has the Senate not done its job, but this 
Chamber's inaction and our apparent focus instead on Presidential 
politics means we are increasingly making this Chamber less relevant in 
American foreign policy.
  The United States has a very qualified and capable leader in the 
enforcement of sanctions in Adam Szubin, who oversees the current 
imposition and enforcement of sanctions at the Department of Treasury. 
Mr. Szubin worked under the Bush administration and under the Obama 
administration. He is a dedicated, capable, seasoned career 
professional who has been widely complimented on a bipartisan basis by 
members of the Banking Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee on 
which I serve. He has been nominated to be the new Under Secretary of 
Treasury for Terrorism Financing--a position critical to the successful 
enforcement of the JCPOA--but his nomination has been on hold for 
months for no clear and publicly stated reason.
  Adam Szubin's nomination is one of more than two dozen national 
security-related nominations, including Tom Shannon, nominated to be 
the Under Secretary of Political Affairs at the State Department. Tom 
Shannon is a career Foreign Service officer and a determined, 
dedicated, nonpartisan professional who also would play a critical role 
in working with our allies and ensuring successful enforcement of this 
agreement.
  Adam Szubin, Tom Shannon, and nearly two dozen other nominees have 
been blocked, seemingly for purely partisan reasons in this Senate. I 
call on my colleagues to release their holds and to give the 
administration the resources and the personnel it needs to do its job 
in enforcing this difficult deal.
  The Senate's commitment to overseeing and enforcing the terms of this 
deal must go beyond simply doing our job and giving the President's 
nominees an up-or-down vote. We have to do more. I stand ready to work 
with this President and the next one to fully oversee the JCPOA. The 
length of this agreement will transcend Presidential terms, and 
implementing it should transcend politics as well.
  We know Iran will seek every opportunity to push the limits of this 
deal in an attempt to test our resolve. We must not let Iran relitigate 
the terms of the deal and escape the boundaries of this deal and lay 
the groundwork for its future development of a nuclear weapon. We must 
deter them by holding them accountable.
  When this President or a future President, Republican or Democrat, 
successfully enforces this deal, I will be the first one to compliment 
them for countering Iran's destabilizing activity in the region. And 
when the administration, current or future, isn't actively and 
vigorously enforcing this deal and pushing back on Iran, I will be the 
first to ask--to demand--that it do more.
  The Iranian Government is paying close attention to everything we do, 
and I, for one, am determined to make sure that Congress, the 
administration, and the American people are doing the same, to 
demonstrate to Iran our determination and our will to deter them and to 
closely and vigorously enforce this difficult deal.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cassidy). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________