[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 14]
[House]
[Pages 18974-18987]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill 
(H.R. 4127) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 4127

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Budgetary effects.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Clarification regarding authority for flexible personnel 
              management among elements of intelligence community.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector General 
              of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 304. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence Community in 
              Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 
              Efficiency.
Sec. 305. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil Liberties 
              Oversight Board.
Sec. 306. Enhancing government personnel security programs.
Sec. 307. Notification of changes to retention of call detail record 
              policies.
Sec. 308. Personnel information notification policy by the Director of 
              National Intelligence.
Sec. 309. Designation of lead intelligence officer for tunnels.
Sec. 310. Reporting process required for tracking certain requests for 
              country clearance.
Sec. 311. Study on reduction of analytic duplication.
Sec. 312. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of the United 
              States national security overhead satellite architecture.
Sec. 313. Cyber attack standards of measurement study.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National 
              Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 402. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, United 
              States Code.
Sec. 403. Analytic objectivity review.

       Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency and Other Elements

Sec. 411. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 412. Prior congressional notification of transfers of funds for 
              certain intelligence activities.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

                 Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia

Sec. 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K container missile 
              system by the Russian Federation.
Sec. 502. Assessment on funding of political parties and 
              nongovernmental organizations by the Russian Federation.
Sec. 503. Assessment on the use of political assassinations as a form 
              of statecraft by the Russian Federation.

            Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries

Sec. 511. Report on resources and collection posture with regard to the 
              South China Sea and East China Sea.
Sec. 512. Use of locally employed staff serving at a United States 
              diplomatic facility in Cuba.
Sec. 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information facilities 
              in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba.
Sec. 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available through 
              sanctions relief.

 TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO 
                               BAY, CUBA

Sec. 601. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of 
              individuals detained at United States Naval Station, 
              Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States.
Sec. 602. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or modify facilities 
              in the United States to house detainees transferred from 
              United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 603. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release to 
              certain countries of individuals detained at United 
              States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

                          Subtitle A--Reports

Sec. 701. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 702. Reports on foreign fighters.
Sec. 703. Report on strategy, efforts, and resources to detect, deter, 
              and degrade Islamic State revenue mechanisms.
Sec. 704. Report on United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, 
              dismantle, and defeat the Islamic State, al-Qai'da, and 
              their affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
              adherents.
Sec. 705. Report on effects of data breach of Office of Personnel 
              Management.
Sec. 706. Report on hiring of graduates of Cyber Corps Scholarship 
              Program by intelligence community.
Sec. 707. Report on use of certain business concerns.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

Sec. 711. Use of homeland security grant funds in conjunction with 
              Department of Energy national laboratories.
Sec. 712. Inclusion of certain minority-serving institutions in grant 
              program to enhance recruiting of intelligence community 
              workforce.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
        (a) Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (b) Intelligence Community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

     SEC. 3. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

       The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 
     complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall 
     be determined by reference to the latest statement titled 
     ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act, 
     submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the 
     Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such 
     statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2016 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

[[Page 18975]]

       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, 
     subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as 
     of September 30, 2016, for the conduct of the intelligence 
     activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through 
     (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this bill.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate 
     portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel 
     in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2016 by 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such 
     element.
       (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment in--
       (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
       (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2016 the sum of $516,306,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2017.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 785 positions as of 
     September 30, 2016. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
     United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2016 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for 
     advanced research and development shall remain available 
     until September 30, 2017.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2016, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

     SEC. 105. CLARIFICATION REGARDING AUTHORITY FOR FLEXIBLE 
                   PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AMONG ELEMENTS OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Clarification.--Section 102A(v) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(v)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraph (3):
       ``(3) A covered department may appoint an individual to a 
     position converted or established pursuant to this subsection 
     without regard to the civil-service laws, including parts II 
     and III of title 5, United States Code.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply with respect to an appointment under section 
     102A(v) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3024(v)) made on or after the date of the enactment of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public 
     Law 112-87) and to any proceeding pending on or filed after 
     the date of the enactment of this section that relates to 
     such an appointment.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2016 the sum of $514,000,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE TO 
                   INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Section 103H(j)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3033(j)(4)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``any department, 
     agency, or other element of the United States Government'' 
     and inserting ``any Federal, State (as defined in section 
     804), or local governmental agency or unit thereof''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``from a department, 
     agency, or element of the Federal Government'' before ``under 
     subparagraph (A)''.

     SEC. 304. INCLUSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY IN COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON 
                   INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY.

       Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 
     (Public Law 95-452; 5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking 
     ``the Office of the Director of National Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``the Intelligence Community''.

     SEC. 305. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL 
                   LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       Section 1061(g) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(g)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5) Access.--Nothing in this section shall be construed 
     to authorize the Board, or any agent thereof, to gain access 
     to information regarding an activity covered by section 
     503(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3093(a)).''.

     SEC. 306. ENHANCING GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.

       (a) Enhanced Security Clearance Programs.--
       (1) In general.--Part III of title 5, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

           ``Subpart J--Enhanced Personnel Security Programs

          ``CHAPTER 110--ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS

``Sec.
``11001. Enhanced personnel security programs.

     ``SEC. 11001. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.

       ``(a) Enhanced Personnel Security Program.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall direct each agency to implement a 
     program to provide enhanced security review of covered 
     individuals--
       ``(1) in accordance with this section; and
       ``(2) not later than the earlier of--
       ``(A) the date that is 5 years after the date of the 
     enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2016; or
       ``(B) the date on which the backlog of overdue periodic 
     reinvestigations of covered individuals is eliminated, as 
     determined by the Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(b) Comprehensiveness.--
       ``(1) Sources of information.--The enhanced personnel 
     security program of an agency shall integrate relevant and 
     appropriate information from various sources, including 
     government, publicly available, and commercial data sources, 
     consumer reporting agencies, social media, and such other 
     sources as determined by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.

[[Page 18976]]

       ``(2) Types of information.--Information obtained and 
     integrated from sources described in paragraph (1) may 
     include--
       ``(A) information relating to any criminal or civil legal 
     proceeding;
       ``(B) financial information relating to the covered 
     individual, including the credit worthiness of the covered 
     individual;
       ``(C) publicly available information, whether electronic, 
     printed, or other form, including relevant security or 
     counterintelligence information about the covered individual 
     or information that may suggest ill intent, vulnerability to 
     blackmail, compulsive behavior, allegiance to another 
     country, change in ideology, or that the covered individual 
     lacks good judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and
       ``(D) data maintained on any terrorist or criminal watch 
     list maintained by any agency, State or local government, or 
     international organization.
       ``(c) Reviews of Covered Individuals.--
       ``(1) Reviews.--
       ``(A) In general.--The enhanced personnel security program 
     of an agency shall require that, not less than 2 times every 
     5 years, the head of the agency shall conduct or request the 
     conduct of automated record checks and checks of information 
     from sources under subsection (b) to ensure the continued 
     eligibility of each covered individual to access classified 
     information and hold a sensitive position unless more 
     frequent reviews of automated record checks and checks of 
     information from sources under subsection (b) are conducted 
     on the covered individual.
       ``(B) Scope of reviews.--Except for a covered individual 
     who is subject to more frequent reviews to ensure the 
     continued eligibility of the covered individual to access 
     classified information and hold a sensitive position, the 
     reviews under subparagraph (A) shall consist of random or 
     aperiodic checks of covered individuals, such that each 
     covered individual is subject to at least 2 reviews during 
     the 5-year period beginning on the date on which the agency 
     implements the enhanced personnel security program of an 
     agency, and during each 5-year period thereafter.
       ``(C) Individual reviews.--A review of the information 
     relating to the continued eligibility of a covered individual 
     to access classified information and hold a sensitive 
     position under subparagraph (A) may not be conducted until 
     after the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date the 
     covered individual receives the notification required under 
     paragraph (3).
       ``(2) Results.--The head of an agency shall take 
     appropriate action if a review under paragraph (1) finds 
     relevant information that may affect the continued 
     eligibility of a covered individual to access classified 
     information and hold a sensitive position.
       ``(3) Information for covered individuals.--The head of an 
     agency shall ensure that each covered individual is 
     adequately advised of the types of relevant security or 
     counterintelligence information the covered individual is 
     required to report to the head of the agency.
       ``(4) Limitation.--Nothing in this subsection shall be 
     construed to affect the authority of an agency to determine 
     the appropriate weight to be given to information relating to 
     a covered individual in evaluating the continued eligibility 
     of the covered individual.
       ``(5) Authority of the president.--Nothing in this 
     subsection shall be construed as limiting the authority of 
     the President to direct or perpetuate periodic 
     reinvestigations of a more comprehensive nature or to 
     delegate the authority to direct or perpetuate such 
     reinvestigations.
       ``(6) Effect on other reviews.--Reviews conducted under 
     paragraph (1) are in addition to investigations and 
     reinvestigations conducted pursuant to section 3001 of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 
     U.S.C. 3341).
       ``(d) Audit.--
       ``(1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the date of the 
     implementation of the enhanced personnel security program of 
     an agency under subsection (a), the Inspector General of the 
     agency shall conduct at least 1 audit to assess the 
     effectiveness and fairness, which shall be determined in 
     accordance with performance measures and standards 
     established by the Director of National Intelligence, to 
     covered individuals of the enhanced personnel security 
     program of the agency.
       ``(2) Submissions to dni.--The results of each audit 
     conducted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted to the 
     Director of National Intelligence to assess the effectiveness 
     and fairness of the enhanced personnel security programs 
     across the Federal Government.
       ``(e) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `agency' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341);
       ``(2) the term `consumer reporting agency' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 603 of the Fair Credit Reporting 
     Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a);
       ``(3) the term `covered individual' means an individual 
     employed by an agency or a contractor of an agency who has 
     been determined eligible for access to classified information 
     or eligible to hold a sensitive position;
       ``(4) the term `enhanced personnel security program' means 
     a program implemented by an agency at the direction of the 
     Director of National Intelligence under subsection (a); 
     and''.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of 
     chapters for part III of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end following:

           ``Subpart J--Enhanced Personnel Security Programs

``110.  Enhanced personnel security programs...............11001''.....

       (b) Resolution of Backlog of Overdue Periodic 
     Reinvestigations.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall develop and implement a plan to eliminate the backlog 
     of overdue periodic reinvestigations of covered individuals.
       (2) Requirements.--The plan developed under paragraph (1) 
     shall--
       (A) use a risk-based approach to--
       (i) identify high-risk populations; and
       (ii) prioritize reinvestigations that are due or overdue to 
     be conducted; and
       (B) use random automated record checks of covered 
     individuals that shall include all covered individuals in the 
     pool of individuals subject to a one-time check.
       (3) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       (A) The term ``covered individual'' means an individual who 
     has been determined eligible for access to classified 
     information or eligible to hold a sensitive position.
       (B) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' has the meaning 
     given such term in section 3001(a)(7) of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 
     3341(a)(7)).

     SEC. 307. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES TO RETENTION OF CALL DETAIL 
                   RECORD POLICIES.

       (a) Requirement To Retain.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 15 days after learning that 
     an electronic communication service provider that generates 
     call detail records in the ordinary course of business has 
     changed the policy of the provider on the retention of such 
     call detail records to result in a retention period of less 
     than 18 months, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     notify, in writing, the congressional intelligence committees 
     of such change.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report identifying 
     each electronic communication service provider that has, as 
     of the date of the report, a policy to retain call detail 
     records for a period of 18 months or less.
       (b) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Call detail record.--The term ``call detail record'' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 501(k) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1861(k)).
       (2) Electronic communication service provider.--The term 
     ``electronic communication service provider'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 701(b)(4) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4)).

     SEC. 308. PERSONNEL INFORMATION NOTIFICATION POLICY BY THE 
                   DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Directive Required.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall issue a directive containing a written 
     policy for the timely notification to the congressional 
     intelligence committees of the identities of individuals 
     occupying senior level positions within the intelligence 
     community.
       (b) Senior Level Position.--In identifying positions that 
     are senior level positions in the intelligence community for 
     purposes of the directive required under subsection (a), the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall consider whether a 
     position--
       (1) constitutes the head of an entity or a significant 
     component within an agency;
       (2) is involved in the management or oversight of matters 
     of significant import to the leadership of an entity of the 
     intelligence community;
       (3) provides significant responsibility on behalf of the 
     intelligence community;
       (4) requires the management of a significant number of 
     personnel or funds;
       (5) requires responsibility management or oversight of 
     sensitive intelligence activities; and
       (6) is held by an individual designated as a senior 
     intelligence management official as such term is defined in 
     section 368(a)(6) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259; 50 U.S.C. 404i-1 note).
       (c) Notification.--The Director shall ensure that each 
     notification under the directive issued under subsection (a) 
     includes each of the following:
       (1) The name of the individual occupying the position.
       (2) Any previous senior level position held by the 
     individual, if applicable, or the position held by the 
     individual immediately prior to the appointment.
       (3) The position to be occupied by the individual.
       (4) Any other information the Director determines 
     appropriate.
       (d) Relationship to Other Laws.--The directive issued under 
     subsection (a) and any

[[Page 18977]]

     amendment to such directive shall be consistent with the 
     provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401 et seq.).
       (e) Submission.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees the directive issued 
     under subsection (a).

     SEC. 309. DESIGNATION OF LEAD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR 
                   TUNNELS.

       (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall designate an official to manage the collection and 
     analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of 
     tunnels by state and nonstate actors.
       (b) Annual Report.--Not later than the date that is 10 
     months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
     biennially thereafter until the date that is 4 years after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
     committees (as such term is defined in section 101(a)(16) of 
     title 10, United States Code) a report describing--
       (1) trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and 
     nonstate actors; and
       (2) collaboration efforts between the United States and 
     partner countries to address the use of tunnels by 
     adversaries.

     SEC. 310. REPORTING PROCESS REQUIRED FOR TRACKING CERTAIN 
                   REQUESTS FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE.

       (a) In General.--By not later than September 30, 2016, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall establish a formal 
     internal reporting process for tracking requests for country 
     clearance submitted to overseas Director of National 
     Intelligence representatives by departments and agencies of 
     the United States. Such reporting process shall include a 
     mechanism for tracking the department or agency that submits 
     each such request and the date on which each such request is 
     submitted.
       (b) Congressional Briefing.--By not later than December 31, 
     2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the 
     congressional intelligence committees on the progress of the 
     Director in establishing the process required under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 311. STUDY ON REDUCTION OF ANALYTIC DUPLICATION.

       (a) Study and Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than January 31, 2016, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall--
       (A) carry out a study to evaluate and measure the incidence 
     of duplication in finished intelligence analysis products; 
     and
       (B) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the findings of such study.
       (2) Methodology requirements.--The methodology used to 
     carry out the study required by this subsection shall be able 
     to be repeated for use in other subsequent studies.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a)(1)(B) 
     shall include--
       (1) detailed information--
       (A) relating to the frequency of duplication of finished 
     intelligence analysis products; and
       (B) that describes the types of, and the reasons for, any 
     such duplication; and
       (2) a determination as to whether to make the production of 
     such information a routine part of the mission of the 
     Analytic Integrity and Standards Group.
       (c) Customer Impact Plan.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a plan for revising analytic 
     practice, tradecraft, and standards to ensure customers are 
     able to clearly identify--
       (1) the manner in which intelligence products written on 
     similar topics and that are produced contemporaneously differ 
     from one another in terms of methodology, sourcing, or other 
     distinguishing analytic characteristics; and
       (2) the significance of that difference.
       (d) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed 
     to impose any requirement that would interfere with the 
     production of an operationally urgent or otherwise time-
     sensitive current intelligence product.

     SEC. 312. STRATEGY FOR COMPREHENSIVE INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF 
                   THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY OVERHEAD 
                   SATELLITE ARCHITECTURE.

       (a) Requirement for Strategy.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall collaborate with the Secretary of Defense 
     and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a 
     strategy, with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that 
     there is a comprehensive interagency review of policies and 
     practices for planning and acquiring national security 
     satellite systems and architectures, including the 
     capabilities of commercial systems and partner countries, 
     consistent with the National Space Policy issued on June 28, 
     2010. Such strategy shall, where applicable, account for the 
     unique missions and authorities vested in the Department of 
     Defense and the intelligence community.
       (b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) 
     shall ensure that the United States national security 
     overhead satellite architecture--
       (1) meets the needs of the United States in peace time and 
     is resilient in war time;
       (2) is fiscally responsible;
       (3) accurately takes into account cost and performance 
     tradeoffs;
       (4) meets realistic requirements;
       (5) produces excellence, innovation, competition, and a 
     robust industrial base;
       (6) aims to produce in less than 5 years innovative 
     satellite systems that are able to leverage common, 
     standardized design elements and commercially available 
     technologies;
       (7) takes advantage of rapid advances in commercial 
     technology, innovation, and commercial-like acquisition 
     practices;
       (8) is open to innovative concepts, such as distributed, 
     disaggregated architectures, that could allow for better 
     resiliency, reconstitution, replenishment, and rapid 
     technological refresh; and
       (9) emphasizes deterrence and recognizes the importance of 
     offensive and defensive space control capabilities.
       (c) Report on Strategy.--Not later than February 28, 2016, 
     the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of 
     Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall 
     jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a 
     report on the strategy required by subsection (a).

     SEC. 313. CYBER ATTACK STANDARDS OF MEASUREMENT STUDY.

       (a) Study Required.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
     Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a study to determine 
     appropriate standards that--
       (1) can be used to measure the damage of cyber incidents 
     for the purposes of determining the response to such 
     incidents; and
       (2) include a method for quantifying the damage caused to 
     affected computers, systems, and devices.
       (b) Reports to Congress.--
       (1) Preliminary findings.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees the initial findings of the study 
     required under subsection (a).
       (2) Report.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report containing the complete findings of such study.
       (3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (2) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.
       (4) The Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. APPOINTMENT AND CONFIRMATION OF THE NATIONAL 
                   COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

       (a) In General.--Section 902(a) of the Counterintelligence 
     Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3382) is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(a) Establishment.--There shall be a National 
     Counterintelligence Executive who shall be appointed by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
     Senate.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on the date that is one year after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 402. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PAY UNDER TITLE 5, 
                   UNITED STATES CODE.

       Section 5102(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (vii), by striking ``or'';
       (2) by inserting after clause (vii) the following new 
     clause:
       ``(viii) the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence;''; and
       (3) in clause (x), by striking the period and inserting a 
     semicolon.

     SEC. 403. ANALYTIC OBJECTIVITY REVIEW.

       (a) Assessment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall assign the Chief of the Analytic Integrity and 
     Standards Group to conduct a review of finished intelligence 
     products produced by the Central Intelligence Agency to 
     assess whether the reorganization of the Agency, announced 
     publicly on March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss of 
     analytic objectivity.
       (b) Submission.--Not later than March 6, 2017, the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees, in writing, the results of

[[Page 18978]]

     the review required under subsection (a), including--
       (1) an assessment comparing the analytic objectivity of a 
     representative sample of finished intelligence products 
     produced by the Central Intelligence Agency before the 
     reorganization and a representative sample of such finished 
     intelligence products produced after the reorganization, 
     predicated on the products' communication of uncertainty, 
     expression of alternative analysis, and other underlying 
     evaluative criteria referenced in the Strategic Evaluation of 
     All-Source Analysis directed by the Director;
       (2) an assessment comparing the historical results of 
     anonymous surveys of Central Intelligence Agency and 
     customers conducted before the reorganization and the results 
     of such anonymous surveys conducted after the reorganization, 
     with a focus on the analytic standard of objectivity;
       (3) a metrics-based evaluation measuring the effect that 
     the reorganization's integration of operational, analytic, 
     support, technical, and digital personnel and capabilities 
     into Mission Centers has had on analytic objectivity; and
       (4) any recommendations for ensuring that analysts of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency perform their functions with 
     objectivity, are not unduly constrained, and are not 
     influenced by the force of preference for a particular 
     policy.

       Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency and Other Elements

     SEC. 411. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Information and Assistance.--Paragraph (9) of section 
     17(e) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
     U.S.C. 3517(e)(9)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information 
     or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties 
     and responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by 
     this section from any Federal, State, or local governmental 
     agency or unit thereof.
       ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information 
     or assistance from a department or agency of the Federal 
     Government, the head of the department or agency involved, 
     insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any 
     existing statutory restriction or regulation of such 
     department or agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General, 
     or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
       ``(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide 
     any new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to 
     conduct intelligence activity in the United States.
       ``(D) In this paragraph, the term `State' means each of the 
     several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
     Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
     Islands, and any territory or possession of the United 
     States.''.
       (b) Technical Amendments Relating to Selection of 
     Employees.--Paragraph (7) of such section (50 U.S.C. 
     3517(e)(7)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(A)'' before ``Subject to applicable 
     law''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources 
     allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final 
     approval of--
       ``(i) the selection of internal and external candidates for 
     employment with the Office of Inspector General; and
       ``(ii) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel 
     permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, 
     including selection and appointment to the Senior 
     Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based 
     determinations that are not within the authority of a head of 
     other Central Intelligence Agency offices.''.

     SEC. 412. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF 
                   FUNDS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), none 
     of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or 
     otherwise made available for the intelligence community for 
     fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate a transfer of funds 
     from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the 
     Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund to be used for 
     intelligence activities unless the Director of National 
     Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, 
     submits to the congressional intelligence committees, by not 
     later than 30 days before initiating such a transfer, written 
     notice of the transfer.
       (b) Waiver.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence or 
     the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive 
     subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a transfer 
     of funds if the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, 
     determines that an emergency situation makes it impossible or 
     impractical to provide the notice required under such 
     subsection by the date that is 30 days before such 
     initiation.
       (2) Notice.--If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver 
     under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case 
     may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, by not later than 48 hours after the initiation 
     of the transfer of funds covered by the waiver, written 
     notice of the waiver and a justification for the waiver, 
     including a description of the emergency situation that 
     necessitated the waiver.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

                 Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia

     SEC. 501. NOTICE OF DEPLOYMENT OR TRANSFER OF CLUB-K 
                   CONTAINER MISSILE SYSTEM BY THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) Notice to Congress.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees written notice if the intelligence community 
     receives intelligence that the Russian Federation has--
       (1) deployed, or is about to deploy, the Club-K container 
     missile system through the Russian military; or
       (2) transferred or sold, or intends to transfer or sell, 
     the Club-K container missile system to another state or non-
     state actor.
       (b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--Not 
     later than 30 days after the date on which the Director 
     submits a notice under subsection (a), the Director shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written 
     update regarding any intelligence community engagement with a 
     foreign partner on the deployment and impacts of a deployment 
     of the Club-K container missile system to any potentially 
     impacted nation.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.

     SEC. 502. ASSESSMENT ON FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
                   NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees an intelligence community assessment on the 
     funding of political parties and nongovernmental 
     organizations in former Soviet states and countries in Europe 
     by the Russian Security Services since January 1, 2006. Such 
     assessment shall include the following:
       (1) The country involved, the entity funded, the security 
     service involved, and the intended effect of the funding.
       (2) An evaluation of such intended effects, including with 
     respect to--
       (A) undermining the political cohesion of the country 
     involved;
       (B) undermining the missile defense of the United States 
     and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
       (C) undermining energy projects that could provide an 
     alternative to Russian energy.
       (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.

     SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT ON THE USE OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS 
                   AS A FORM OF STATECRAFT BY THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) Requirement for Assessment.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an intelligence community assessment 
     on the use of political assassinations as a form of 
     statecraft by the Russian Federation since January 1, 2000.
       (b) Content.--The assessment required by subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) a list of Russian politicians, businessmen, dissidents, 
     journalists, current or former government officials, foreign 
     heads-of-state, foreign political leaders, foreign 
     journalists, members of nongovernmental organizations, and 
     other relevant individuals that the intelligence community 
     assesses were assassinated by Russian Security Services, or 
     agents of such services, since January 1, 2000; and
       (2) for each individual described in paragraph (1), the 
     country in which the assassination took place, the means 
     used, associated individuals and organizations, and other 
     background information related to the assassination of the 
     individual.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.

[[Page 18979]]



            Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries

     SEC. 511. REPORT ON RESOURCES AND COLLECTION POSTURE WITH 
                   REGARD TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND EAST CHINA 
                   SEA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees an intelligence community assessment on the 
     resources used for collection efforts and the collection 
     posture of the intelligence community with regard to the 
     South China Sea and East China Sea.
       (b) Elements.--The intelligence community assessment 
     required by subsection (a) shall provide detailed information 
     related to intelligence collection by the United States with 
     regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea, including--
       (1) a review of intelligence community collection 
     activities and a description of these activities, including 
     the lead agency, key partners, purpose of collection 
     activity, annual funding and personnel, the manner in which 
     the collection is conducted, and types of information 
     collected;
       (2) an explanation of how the intelligence community 
     prioritizes and coordinates collection activities focused on 
     such region; and
       (3) a description of any collection and resourcing gaps and 
     efforts being made to address such gaps.

     SEC. 512. USE OF LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF SERVING AT A UNITED 
                   STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITY IN CUBA.

       (a) Supervisory Requirement.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), not 
     later than one year after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary of State shall ensure that each key 
     supervisory position at a United States diplomatic facility 
     in Cuba is occupied by a citizen of the United States.
       (2) Extension.--The Secretary of State may extend the 
     deadline to carry out paragraph (1) by not more than one year 
     if the Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional 
     committees written notification and justification of such 
     extension before making such extension.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the heads of other appropriate departments 
     or agencies of the Federal Government, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on--
       (1) the progress made by the Secretary with respect to 
     carrying out subsection (a)(1); and
       (2) the use of locally employed staff in United States 
     diplomatic facilities, including--
       (A) the number of such staff;
       (B) the responsibilities of such staff;
       (C) the manner in which such staff are selected, including 
     efforts to mitigate counterintelligence threats to the United 
     States; and
       (D) the potential cost and effect on the operational 
     capacity of the diplomatic facility if the number of such 
     staff was reduced.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 513. INCLUSION OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION 
                   FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC 
                   FACILITIES IN CUBA.

       (a) Restricted Access Space Requirement.--The Secretary of 
     State shall ensure that each United States diplomatic 
     facility in Cuba that, after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, is constructed or undergoes a construction upgrade 
     includes a sensitive compartmented information facility.
       (b) National Security Waiver.--The Secretary of State may 
     waive the requirement under subsection (a) if the Secretary--
       (1) determines that such waiver is in the national security 
     interest of the United States;
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees 
     written justification for such waiver; and
       (3) a period of 90 days elapses following the date of such 
     submission.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 514. REPORT ON USE BY IRAN OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE 
                   THROUGH SANCTIONS RELIEF.

       (a) In General.--At the times specified in subsection (b), 
     the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with 
     the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the 
     following:
       (1) The monetary value of any direct or indirect forms of 
     sanctions relief that Iran has received since the Joint Plan 
     of Action first entered into effect.
       (2) How Iran has used funds made available through 
     sanctions relief, including the extent to which any such 
     funds have facilitated the ability of Iran--
       (A) to provide support for--
       (i) any individual or entity designated for the imposition 
     of sanctions for activities relating to international 
     terrorism pursuant to an executive order or by the Office of 
     Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury as 
     of the date of the enactment of this Act;
       (ii) any organization designated by the Secretary of State 
     as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) as of 
     the date of the enactment of this Act;
       (iii) any other terrorist organization; or
       (iv) the regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria;
       (B) to advance the efforts of Iran or any other country to 
     develop nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles overtly or 
     covertly; or
       (C) to commit any violation of the human rights of the 
     people of Iran.
       (3) The extent to which any senior official of the 
     Government of Iran has diverted any funds made available 
     through sanctions relief to be used by the official for 
     personal use.
       (b) Submission to Congress.--
       (1) In general.--The Director shall submit the report 
     required by subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional 
     committees--
       (A) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and every 180 days thereafter during the period 
     that the Joint Plan of Action is in effect; and
       (B) not later than 1 year after a subsequent agreement with 
     Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran takes effect and 
     annually thereafter during the period that such agreement 
     remains in effect.
       (2) Nonduplication.--The Director may submit the 
     information required by subsection (a) with a report required 
     to be submitted to Congress under another provision of law 
     if--
       (A) the Director notifies the appropriate congressional 
     committees of the intention of making such submission before 
     submitting that report; and
       (B) all matters required to be covered by subsection (a) 
     are included in that report.
       (c) Form of Reports.--Each report required by subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Joint plan of action.--The term ``Joint Plan of 
     Action'' means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at Geneva 
     November 24, 2013, by Iran and by France, Germany, the 
     Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the 
     United Kingdom, and the United States, and all implementing 
     materials and agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action, 
     including the technical understandings reached on January 12, 
     2014, the extension thereto agreed to on July 18, 2014, and 
     the extension thereto agreed to on November 24, 2014.

 TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO 
                               BAY, CUBA

     SEC. 601. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRANSFER OR RELEASE 
                   OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL 
                   STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, TO THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
     available to an element of the intelligence community may be 
     used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer, 
     release, or assist in the transfer or release, to or within 
     the United States, its territories, or possessions, Khalid 
     Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee who--
       (1) is not a United States citizen or a member of the Armed 
     Forces of the United States; and
       (2) is or was held on or after January 20, 2009, at United 
     States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department 
     of Defense.

     SEC. 602. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO CONSTRUCT OR MODIFY 
                   FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES TO HOUSE 
                   DETAINEES TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL 
                   STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       (a) In General.--No amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence 
     community may be used during the period beginning on the date 
     of the enactment of this Act and

[[Page 18980]]

     ending on December 31, 2016, to construct or modify any 
     facility in the United States, its territories, or 
     possessions to house any individual detained at Guantanamo 
     for the purposes of detention or imprisonment in the custody 
     or under the control of the Department of Defense unless 
     authorized by Congress.
       (b) Exception.--The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not 
     apply to any modification of facilities at United States 
     Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
       (c) Individual Detained at Guantanamo Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``individual detained at Guantanamo'' means 
     any individual located at United States Naval Station, 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of October 1, 2009, who--
       (1) is not a citizen of the United States or a member of 
     the Armed Forces of the United States; and
       (2) is--
       (A) in the custody or under the control of the Department 
     of Defense; or
       (B) otherwise under detention at United States Naval 
     Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

     SEC. 603. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRANSFER OR RELEASE 
                   TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT 
                   UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, 
                   CUBA.

       No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
     available to an element of the intelligence community may be 
     used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer, 
     release, or assist in the transfer or release of any 
     individual detained in the custody or under the control of 
     the Department of Defense at United States Naval Station, 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the custody or control of any 
     country, or any entity within such country, as follows:
       (1) Libya.
       (2) Somalia.
       (3) Syria.
       (4) Yemen.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

                          Subtitle A--Reports

     SEC. 701. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Quadrennial Audit of Positions Requiring Security 
     Clearances.--Section 506H of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (a);
       (2) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (a) and (b), respectively; and
       (3) in subsection (b), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``The results required under subsection (a)(2) and the 
     reports required under subsection (b)(1)'' and inserting 
     ``The reports required under subsection (a)(1)''.
       (b) Reports on Role of Analysts at FBI.--Section 2001(g) of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3700; 28 U.S.C. 532 note) is 
     amended by striking paragraph (3) and redesignating paragraph 
     (4) as paragraph (3).
       (c) Report on Outside Employment by Officers and Employees 
     of Intelligence Community.--
       (1) In general.--Section 102A(u) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(u)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The 
     Director''; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (2).
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (a) of section 507 of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 3106) is amended--
       (A) by striking paragraph (5); and
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5).
       (3) Technical amendment.--Subsection (c)(1) of such section 
     507 is amended by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (a)''.
       (d) Reports on Nuclear Aspirations of Non-State Entities.--
     Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371) is repealed.
       (e) Reports on Espionage by People's Republic of China.--
     Section 3151 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2000 (42 U.S.C. 7383e) is repealed.
       (f) Reports on Security Vulnerabilities of National 
     Laboratory Computers.--Section 4508 of the Atomic Energy 
     Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2659) is repealed.

     SEC. 702. REPORTS ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS.

       (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days 
     thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     on foreign fighter flows to and from Syria and to and from 
     Iraq. The Director shall define the term ``foreign fighter'' 
     in such reports.
       (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
       (1) The total number of foreign fighters who have traveled 
     to Syria or Iraq since January 1, 2011, the total number of 
     foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq as of the date of the 
     submittal of the report, the total number of foreign fighters 
     whose countries of origin have a visa waiver program 
     described in section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality 
     Act (8 U.S.C. 1187), the total number of foreign fighters who 
     have left Syria or Iraq, the total number of female foreign 
     fighters, and the total number of deceased foreign fighters.
       (2) The total number of United States persons who have 
     traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq since 
     January 1, 2011, the total number of such persons who have 
     arrived in Syria or Iraq since such date, and the total 
     number of such persons who have returned to the United States 
     from Syria or Iraq since such date.
       (3) The total number of foreign fighters in the Terrorist 
     Identities Datamart Environment and the status of each such 
     foreign fighter in that database, the number of such foreign 
     fighters who are on a watchlist, and the number of such 
     foreign fighters who are not on a watchlist.
       (4) The total number of foreign fighters who have been 
     processed with biometrics, including face images, 
     fingerprints, and iris scans.
       (5) Any programmatic updates to the foreign fighter report 
     since the last report was submitted, including updated 
     analysis on foreign country cooperation, as well as actions 
     taken, such as denying or revoking visas.
       (6) A worldwide graphic that describes foreign fighters 
     flows to and from Syria, with points of origin by country.
       (c) Additional Report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report that includes--
       (1) with respect to the travel of foreign fighters to and 
     from Iraq and Syria, a description of the intelligence 
     sharing relationships between the United States and member 
     states of the European Union and member states of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
       (2) an analysis of the challenges impeding such 
     intelligence sharing relationships.
       (d) Form.--The reports submitted under subsections (a) and 
     (c) may be submitted in classified form.
       (e) Termination.--The requirement to submit reports under 
     subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 3 years 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 703. REPORT ON STRATEGY, EFFORTS, AND RESOURCES TO 
                   DETECT, DETER, AND DEGRADE ISLAMIC STATE 
                   REVENUE MECHANISMS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the intelligence community should dedicate necessary 
     resources to defeating the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic 
     State.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of the 
     intelligence community that are necessary to detect, deter, 
     and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State.

     SEC. 704. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
                   TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT THE ISLAMIC 
                   STATE, AL-QA'IDA, AND THEIR AFFILIATED GROUPS, 
                   ASSOCIATED GROUPS, AND ADHERENTS.

       (a) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive 
     report on the counterterrorism strategy of the United States 
     to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic State, al-
     Qa'ida, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
     adherents.
       (2) Coordination.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     prepared in coordination with the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense, 
     and the head of any other department or agency of the Federal 
     Government that has responsibility for activities directed at 
     combating the Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated 
     groups, associated groups, and adherents.
       (3) Elements.--The report under by paragraph (1) shall 
     include each of the following:
       (A) A definition of--
       (i) core al-Qa'ida, including a list of which known 
     individuals constitute core al-Qa'ida;
       (ii) the Islamic State, including a list of which known 
     individuals constitute Islamic State leadership;
       (iii) an affiliated group of the Islamic State or al-
     Qa'ida, including a list of which known groups constitute an 
     affiliate group of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida;
       (iv) an associated group of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida, 
     including a list of which known groups constitute an 
     associated group of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida;
       (v) an adherent of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida, 
     including a list of which known groups constitute an adherent 
     of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida; and
       (vi) a group aligned with the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida, 
     including a description of what actions a group takes or 
     statements it makes that qualify it as a group aligned with 
     the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida.
       (B) An assessment of the relationship between all 
     identified Islamic State or al-Qa'ida affiliated groups, 
     associated groups, and adherents with Islamic State 
     leadership or core al-Qa'ida.
       (C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of the 
     Islamic State or al-Qa'ida,

[[Page 18981]]

     its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, from 
     January 1, 2010, to the present, including a description of 
     the metrics that are used to assess strengthening or 
     weakening and an assessment of the relative increase or 
     decrease in violent attacks attributed to such entities.
       (D) An assessment of whether an individual can be a member 
     of core al-Qa'ida if such individual is not located in 
     Afghanistan or Pakistan.
       (E) An assessment of whether an individual can be a member 
     of core al-Qa'ida as well as a member of an al-Qa'ida 
     affiliated group, associated group, or adherent.
       (F) A definition of defeat of the Islamic State or core al-
     Qa'ida.
       (G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command, 
     and control between the Islamic State or core al-Qa'ida and 
     their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, 
     specifically addressing each such entity.
       (H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
     operations against the Islamic State or core al-Qa'ida, their 
     affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, and 
     whether such operations have had a sustained impact on the 
     capabilities and effectiveness of the Islamic State or core 
     al-Qa'ida, their affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
     adherents.
       (4) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       (3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.

     SEC. 705. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF DATA BREACH OF OFFICE OF 
                   PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the data 
     breach of the Office of Personnel Management disclosed in 
     June 2015.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The effects, if any, of the data breach on the 
     operations of the intelligence community abroad, including 
     the types of operations, if any, that have been negatively 
     affected or entirely suspended or terminated as a result of 
     the data breach.
       (2) An assessment of the effects of the data breach on each 
     element of the intelligence community.
       (3) An assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or 
     countries may use the data collected by the data breach 
     (particularly regarding information included in background 
     investigations for security clearances), including with 
     respect to--
       (A) recruiting intelligence assets;
       (B) influencing decisionmaking processes within the Federal 
     Government, including regarding foreign policy decisions; and
       (C) compromising employees of the Federal Government and 
     friends and families of such employees for the purpose of 
     gaining access to sensitive national security and economic 
     information.
       (4) An assessment of which departments or agencies of the 
     Federal Government use the best practices to protect 
     sensitive data, including a summary of any such best 
     practices that were not used by the Office of Personnel 
     Management.
       (5) An assessment of the best practices used by the 
     departments or agencies identified under paragraph (4) to 
     identify and fix potential vulnerabilities in the systems of 
     the department or agency.
       (c) Briefing.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     provide to the congressional intelligence committees an 
     interim briefing on the report under subsection (a), 
     including a discussion of proposals and options for 
     responding to cyber attacks.
       (d) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 706. REPORT ON HIRING OF GRADUATES OF CYBER CORPS 
                   SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the 
     National Science Foundation, shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     employment by the intelligence community of graduates of the 
     Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. The report shall include the 
     following:
       (1) The number of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship 
     Program hired by each element of the intelligence community.
       (2) A description of how each element of the intelligence 
     community recruits graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholar 
     Program.
       (3) A description of any processes available to the 
     intelligence community to expedite the hiring or processing 
     of security clearances for graduates of the Cyber Corps 
     Scholar Program.
       (4) Recommendations by the Director of National 
     Intelligence to improve the hiring by the intelligence 
     community of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship 
     Program, including any recommendations for legislative action 
     to carry out such improvements.
       (b) Cyber Corps Scholarship Program Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``Cyber Corps Scholarship Program'' means 
     the Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service Program under 
     section 302 of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (15 
     U.S.C. 7442).

     SEC. 707. REPORT ON USE OF CERTAIN BUSINESS CONCERNS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the representation, as of the date of 
     the report, of covered business concerns among the 
     contractors that are awarded contracts by elements of the 
     intelligence community for goods, equipment, tools, and 
     services.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The representation of covered business concerns as 
     described in subsection (a), including such representation 
     by--
       (A) each type of covered business concern; and
       (B) each element of the intelligence community.
       (2) If, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director does not record and monitor the statistics required 
     to carry out this section, a description of the actions taken 
     by the Director to ensure that such statistics are recorded 
     and monitored beginning in fiscal year 2016.
       (3) The actions the Director plans to take during fiscal 
     year 2016 to enhance the awarding of contracts to covered 
     business concerns by elements of the intelligence community.
       (c) Covered Business Concerns Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``covered business concerns'' means the following:
       (1) Minority-owned businesses.
       (2) Women-owned businesses.
       (3) Small disadvantaged businesses.
       (4) Service-disabled veteran-owned businesses.
       (5) Veteran-owned small businesses.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

     SEC. 711. USE OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT FUNDS IN CONJUNCTION 
                   WITH DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL 
                   LABORATORIES.

       Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 609(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1) by inserting ``including by working in conjunction with a 
     National Laboratory (as defined in section 2(3) of the Energy 
     Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801(3))),'' after ``plans,''.

     SEC. 712. INCLUSION OF CERTAIN MINORITY-SERVING INSTITUTIONS 
                   IN GRANT PROGRAM TO ENHANCE RECRUITING OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.

       Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3224) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``historically black 
     colleges and universities and Predominantly Black 
     Institutions'' and inserting ``historically black colleges 
     and universities, Predominantly Black Institutions, Hispanic-
     serving institutions, and Asian American and Native American 
     Pacific Islander-serving institutions''; and
       (B) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Historically 
     Black'' and inserting ``Certain Minority-Serving''; and
       (2) in subsection (g)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7); and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new 
     paragraphs (5) and (6):
       ``(5) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term `Hispanic-
     serving institution' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 502(a)(5) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1101a(a)(5)).
       ``(6) Asian american and native american pacific islander-
     serving institution.--The term `Asian American and Native 
     American Pacific Islander-serving institution' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 320(b)(2) of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059g(b)(2)).''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).


                             General Leave

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4127.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, when Ranking Member Schiff and I assumed the helm of the 
Intelligence Committee, we committed

[[Page 18982]]

to carrying on the practice of passing annual intelligence 
authorization bills, which is the most important tool Congress can use 
to control the intelligence activities of the United States Government. 
Today, building on the legacy of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger, we are bringing the sixth consecutive intelligence 
authorization bill to the floor.
  Earlier this year the House passed its version of the bill with a 
strong vote. Since then, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
reported out its version of the bill by a unanimous consent vote. I 
commend Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein for their leadership 
on the bill, and I look forward to working with them in future years.
  The current bill contains text agreed to by both the House and the 
Senate committees. It preserves key House initiatives while adding 
several important provisions from the Senate. None of these provisions 
are considered controversial.
  As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified 
programs, the bulk of the direction is found in the bill's classified 
annex, which has been available in HVC-304 for all Members to review 
since yesterday.
  At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex is 
consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. It reduces the 
President's request by less than 1 percent while still providing an 
increase above last year's level.
  The agreed text preserves key committee and House funding initiatives 
that are vital to national security. These initiatives are offset by 
reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies. The 
agreement also provides substantial intelligence resources to help 
defeat ISIS and other terrorist groups.
  Mr. Speaker, today the threat facing America is higher than at any 
time since 9/11. ISIS has established a safe haven across Iraq and 
Syria, and the group hopes to create a state stretching from Lebanon to 
Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and Israel.
  The goal of our counterterrorism strategy should be to deny safe 
havens from which terrorists can plot attacks against the United States 
and our allies. Regrettably, we have not prevented ISIS from 
establishing a safe haven and the group has become skilled at hiding 
from western intelligence services.
  ISIS members have used that breathing room to plan attacks in Europe, 
North Africa, and the Middle East, and they are undoubtedly planning 
attacks against the United States.
  We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policymakers 
with the best and most timely information possible on the threats we 
face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, plan, and 
fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that steal 
American jobs. We ask them to track nuclear missile threats. We demand 
that they get it right every time.
  This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our 
intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and support they 
need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe.
  Before closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women of 
this country who serve in our intelligence community. I am honored to 
get to know so many of them in the course of our oversight work.
  I would also like to thank all the staff of the committee, both 
majority and minority, for their hard work on the bill and for their 
daily oversight of the intelligence community.
  I would especially like to thank Jeff Shockey, Shannon Stuart, Andy 
Peterson, Jake Crisp, and Michael Ellis for all the long hours they put 
in to get this bill across the finish line.
  From the minority staff, I would like to thank Michael Bahar, Tim 
Bergreen, Carly Blake, and Wells Bennett for their work on the bill.
  Finally, thank you to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). It 
has been a pleasure to work with him on this bill, and I look forward 
to continuing the committee's oversight work with him over the next 
year.
  I would also like to recognize one member of the committee staff, 
Bill Flanigan. Bill is undergoing surgery today. We wish him all the 
best in his recovery.
  I urge passage of H.R. 4127.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the Intelligence Authorization 
                        Act for Fiscal Year 2016

       The following consists of the joint explanatory statement 
     to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2016.
       This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of 
     negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the 
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter, ``the 
     Agreement''). The joint explanatory statement shall have the 
     same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as 
     if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of 
     conference.
       The joint explanatory statement comprises three parts: 
     first, an overview of the application of the annex to 
     accompany this statement; second, select unclassified 
     congressional direction; and third, a section-by-section 
     analysis of the unclassified legislative text.


              PART I: APPLICATION OF THE CLASSIFIED ANNEX

       The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities 
     prevents the congressional intelligence committees from 
     publicly disclosing many details concerning the conclusions 
     and recommendations of the Agreement. Therefore, a classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations and a classified annex have been 
     prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of the 
     congressional intelligence committees' actions. The Agreement 
     authorizes the Intelligence Community to obligate and expend 
     funds not altered or modified by the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations as requested in the President's budget, 
     subject to modification under applicable reprogramming 
     procedures.
       The classified annex is the result of negotiations between 
     the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It reconciles the 
     differences between the committees' respective versions of 
     the bill for National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the 
     Homeland Security Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2016. 
     The Agreement also makes recommendations for the Military 
     Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information Systems 
     Security Program, consistent with the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, and provides certain 
     direction for these two programs
       The Agreement supersedes the classified annexes to the 
     reports accompanying H.R. 2596, as passed by the House on 
     June 16, 2015, and S. 1705, as reported by the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence on July 7, 2015. All references to 
     the House-passed and Senate-reported annexes are solely to 
     identify the heritage of specific provisions.
       The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated 
     into the bill pursuant to Section 102. It has the status of 
     law. The classified annex supplements and adds detail to 
     clarify the authorization levels found in the bill and the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified annex 
     shall have the same legal force as the report to accompany 
     the bill.


          PART II: SELECT UNCLASSIFIED CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION

     Enhancing Geographic and Demographic Diversity
       The Agreement directs the Office of the Director for 
     National Intelligence (ODNI) to conduct an awareness, 
     outreach, and recruitment program to rural, under-represented 
     colleges and universities that are not part of the IC Centers 
     of Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program. Further, the 
     Agreement directs that ODNI shall increase and formally track 
     the number of competitive candidates for IC employment or 
     internships who studied at IC CAE schools and other 
     scholarship programs supported by the IC.
       Additionally, the Agreement directs that ODNI, acting 
     through the Executive Agent for the IC CAE program, the IC 
     Chief Human Capital Officer, and the Director, IC Equal 
     Opportunity & Diversity, as appropriate, shall:
       1. Add a criterion to the IC CAE selection process that 
     applicants must be part of a consortium or actively 
     collaborate with under-resourced schools in their area;
       2. Work with CAE schools to reach out to rural and under-
     resourced schools, including by inviting such schools to 
     participate in the annual IC CAE colloquium and IC 
     recruitment events;
       3. Increase and formally track the number of competitive IC 
     internship candidates from IC CAE schools, starting with 
     Fiscal Year 2016 IC summer internships, and provide a report, 
     within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, on its plan to 
     do so;
       4. Develop metrics to ascertain whether IC CAE, the Pat 
     Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, the Louis Stokes 
     Educational Scholarship Program, and the Intelligence Officer 
     Training Program reach a diverse demographic and serve as 
     feeders to the IC workforce;
       5. Include in the annual report on minority hiring and 
     retention a breakdown of the students participating in these 
     programs who

[[Page 18983]]

     serve as IC interns, applied for full-time IC employment, 
     received offers of employment, and entered on duty in the IC;
       6. Conduct a feasibility study with necessary funding 
     levels regarding how the IC CAE could be better tailored to 
     serve under-resourced schools, and provide such study to the 
     congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of the 
     enactment of this Act;
       7. Publicize all IC elements' recruitment activities, 
     including the new Applicant Gateway and the IC Virtual Career 
     Fair, to rural schools, Historically Black Colleges and 
     Universities, and other minority-serving institutions that 
     have been contacted by IC recruiters;
       8. Contact new groups with the objective of expanding the 
     IC Heritage Community Liaison Council; and
       9. Ensure that IC elements add such activities listed above 
     that may be appropriate to their recruitment plans for Fiscal 
     Year 2016.
       ODNI shall provide an interim update to the congressional 
     intelligence committees on its efforts within 90 days of the 
     enactment of this Act and include final results in its annual 
     report on minority hiring and retention.
     Analytic Duplication & Improving Customer Impact
       The congressional intelligence committees are concerned 
     about potential duplication in finished analytic products. 
     Specifically, the congressional intelligence committees are 
     concerned that contemporaneous publication of substantially 
     similar intelligence products fosters confusion among 
     intelligence customers (including those in Congress), impedes 
     analytic coherence across the IC, and wastes time and effort. 
     The congressional intelligence committees value competitive 
     analysis, but believe there is room to reduce duplicative 
     analytic activity and improve customer impact.
       Therefore, the Agreement directs ODNI to pilot a repeatable 
     methodology to evaluate potential duplication in finished 
     intelligence analytic products and to report the findings to 
     the congressional intelligence committees within 60 days of 
     the enactment of this Act. In addition, the Agreement directs 
     ODNI to report to the congressional intelligence committees 
     within 180 days of enactment of this Act how it will revise 
     analytic practice, tradecraft, and standards to ensure 
     customers can clearly identify how products that are produced 
     contemporaneously and cover similar topics differ from one 
     another in their methodological, informational, or temporal 
     aspects, and the significance of those differences. This 
     report is not intended to cover operationally urgent analysis 
     or current intelligence.
     Countering Violent Extremism and the Islamic State in Iraq 
         and the Levant
       The Agreement directs ODNI, within 180 days of enactment of 
     this Act and in consultation with appropriate interagency 
     partners, to brief the congressional intelligence committees 
     on how intelligence agencies are supporting both (1) the 
     Administration's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program 
     first detailed in the 2011 White House strategy Empowering 
     Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
     States, which was expanded following the January 2015 White 
     House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, and (2) the 
     Administration's Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of 
     Iraq and the Levant, which was announced in September 2014.
     Analytic Health Reports
       The Agreement directs the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
     to provide Analytic Health Reports to the congressional 
     intelligence committees on a quarterly basis, including an 
     update on the specific effect of analytic modernization on 
     the health of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program 
     (DIAP) and its ability to reduce analytic risk.
     All-Source Analysis Standards
       The Agreement directs DIA to conduct a comprehensive 
     evaluation of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's (DIE) 
     all-source analysis capability and production in Fiscal Year 
     2015. The evaluation should assess the analytic output of 
     both NIP and MIP funded all-source analysts, separately and 
     collectively, and apply the following four criteria 
     identified in the ODNI Strategic Evaluation Report for all-
     source analysis: 1) integrated, 2) objective, 3) timely, and 
     4) value-added. The results of this evaluation shall be 
     included as part of the Fiscal Year 2017 congressional budget 
     justification book.
     Terrorism Investigations
       The Agreement directs the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     (FBI) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
     within 180 days of enactment of this Act, a report detailing 
     how FBI has allocated resources between domestic and foreign 
     terrorist threats based on numbers of investigations over the 
     past 5 years. The report should be submitted in unclassified 
     form but may include a classified annex.
     Investigations of Minors Involved in Radicalization
       The Agreement directs the FBI to provide a briefing to the 
     congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of 
     enactment of this Act on investigations in which minors are 
     encouraged to turn away from violent extremism rather than 
     take actions which that would lead to Federal terrorism 
     indictments. This briefing should place these rates in the 
     context of all investigations of minors for violent extremist 
     activity and should describe any FBI engagement with minors' 
     families, law enforcement, or other individuals or groups 
     connected to the minor during or after investigations.
       Furthermore, the Agreement directs the FBI to include how 
     often undercover agents pursue investigations based on a 
     location of interest related to violent extremist activity 
     compared to investigations of an individual or group believed 
     to be engaged in such activity. Included should be the number 
     of locations of interest associated with a religious group or 
     entity. This briefing also should include trend analysis 
     covering the last five years describing violent extremist 
     activity in the U.S.


 PART III: SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF LEGISLATIVE 
                                  TEXT

       The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
     explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2016.


                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
       Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
     agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
     appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for Fiscal Year 2016.
  

     Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
       Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
     levels by program for Fiscal Year 2016 are contained in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
     Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives and to the President.
     Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
       Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility 
     to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in managing 
     the civilian personnel of the Intelligence Community (IC). 
     Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment of 
     civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2016 in excess of the 
     number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding 
     three percent of the total limit applicable to each IC 
     element under Section 102. The DNI may do so only if 
     necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
     functions.
     Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
       Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account (ICMA) of the Director of 
     National Intelligence and sets the authorized personnel 
     levels for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2016.
     Section 105. Clarification regarding authority for flexible 
         personnel management among elements of intelligence 
         community
       Section 105 clarifies that certain Intelligence Community 
     elements may make hiring decisions based on the excepted 
     service designation.


 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
       Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
     $514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2016 for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  First, I want to begin by thanking Chairman Nunes. It has been a 
great pleasure to work with him. I greatly appreciate his dedication to 
the responsibilities that we have, the bipartisan way that he has run 
this committee, the professional way that he and his staff have 
conducted all the business of the committee. It has just been an honor 
to work with him, and I am greatly appreciative of all he has done to 
bring this bill forward.
  I also want to express my gratitude to Senators Burr and Feinstein 
for their efforts at producing this bipartisan, bicameral work product.
  Earlier this year the House passed its version of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2016. After the Senate's 
Intelligence Committee advanced its version out of committee, we worked 
together to produce the bill that is before us today. It is the result 
of careful negotiations and of a bipartisan and bicameral commitment to 
produce a strong intelligence bill for the sake of our country and of 
our allies.
  I was not able to vote for the intelligence authorization when it 
first came before the House in June, but I am proud to support it 
today. Many of the underlying issues have been resolved or 
significantly improved. This

[[Page 18984]]

annual bill, like those that came before it, funds, equips, and sets 
priorities for the U.S. intelligence community, which is critical in 
the world that we inhabit today.
  The recent Paris attacks drive home just how vigilant we need to be, 
and the bill before us provides urgent resources for the fight against 
ISIS and al Qaeda. At the same time, we must never let our focus on any 
one threat or terror group distract us from the other challenges we 
face, like those posed by Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China.
  This bill strikes the right balance by providing the necessary means 
to counter other wide-ranging threats from state and nonstate actors, 
particularly in cyberspace, outer space, and in the undersea 
environment. The bill also takes critical steps to shore up our 
counterintelligence capabilities. This is of particular significance 
after the devastating OPM breach.
  Additionally, the intelligence authorization continues to be the 
single most important means by which Congress conducts oversight of the 
intelligence community. We much support the IC, but we also have to 
rigorously oversee it and make sure that what it does in our name 
comports with our values.
  The bill, therefore, prioritizes and provides detailed guidance, 
strict authorizations, and precise limitations on the activities of the 
intelligence community. It also fences funds to ensure that throughout 
the year congressional guidance is strictly followed.
  Some of the other highlights of the bill include emphasizing 
collection to monitor and ensure Iran's compliance with the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action--this is critical--funding our most 
important space programs, investing in space protection and resiliency, 
preserving investments in cutting-edge technologies, and enhancing 
oversight of contracting and procurement practices. I am particularly 
pleased with where the revised bill ends up with respect to our space 
programs.
  Other highlights of the bill are promoting enhancements to our 
foreign partner capabilities, which are crucial to multiplying the 
reach and impact of our own intelligence efforts; enhancing human 
intelligence capabilities, which is often the key to understanding and 
predicting global events; greatly intensifying oversight of defense 
special operation forces activities worldwide.
  The revised bill also continues to incorporate some of the excellent 
provisions championed by many of the Democratic members of the House 
Intelligence Committee as well as Republicans, in particular, Mr. 
Himes' effort to enhance the quality of metrics we use to enable more 
thorough oversight, Ms. Sewell's provisions to enhance diversity within 
the intelligence community, Mr. Carson's provisions to better 
understand FBI resource allocation against domestic and foreign threats 
and the role of FBI and DNI in countering violent extremism 
particularly in minors, Ms. Speier's provision to provide greater human 
rights oversight of the IC's relationships with certain foreign 
partners, Mr. Quigley's provision regarding intelligence support to 
Ukraine, and Mr. Swalwell's provision to ensure that Department of 
Energy's national labs can work with State and local government 
recipients of Homeland Security grants.
  As I said earlier, I was not able to support the prior version of the 
bill, but I am proud to support this version. I urge my colleagues to 
do the same. This version corrects the misguided overreliance on short-
term overseas contingency operations funding to evade the Budget 
Control Act caps at the expense of our domestic programs.
  The bill still contains unwelcome restrictions, in my view, on the 
closure of our facility at Guantanamo Bay, but it modifies them to 
mirror the provisions, which passed in the National Defense 
Authorization Act and which the President recently signed into law. To 
the extent there are any intelligence funds which could be used to 
close the prison, these IAA provisions would subject them to the same 
restrictions as govern the spending of defense funds in the NDAA.
  I remain strongly opposed to any restrictions on closing the prison 
at Guantanamo Bay. As these provisions reflect what is currently in 
law, I support the larger bill. Especially with what happened in Paris, 
we need to act now to fund and enable our intelligence agencies.
  Once again, I want to thank Chairman Nunes, Chairman Burr, and Vice 
Chairman Feinstein, as well as the wonderful and hardworking staff of 
the HPSCI and the SSCI. I also want to thank the administration for 
their good work.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I insert in the Record at this point the 
second part of the joint explanatory statement.


                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits 
         authorized by law
       Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and 
     other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
     additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
     increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
     Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence 
         activities
       Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
     appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
     authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that 
     is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of 
     the United States.
     Section 303. Provision of information and assistance to 
         Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
       Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
     clarify the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community's 
     authority to seek information and assistance from federal, 
     state, and local agencies or units thereof.
     Section 304. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence 
         Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity 
         and Efficiency
       Section 304 amends Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector 
     General Act of 1978 to reflect the correct name of the Office 
     of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. The 
     section also clarifies that the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community is a member of the Council of the 
     Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
     Section 305. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil 
         Liberties Oversight Board
       Section 305 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to clarify that nothing in the 
     statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access 
     to information regarding an activity covered by section 503 
     of the National Security Act of 1947.
     Section 306. Enhancing government personnel security programs
       Section 306 directs the Director of National Intelligence 
     (DNI) to develop and implement a plan for eliminating the 
     backlog of overdue periodic investigations, and further 
     requires the DNI to direct each agency to implement a program 
     to provide enhanced security review to individuals determined 
     eligible for access to classified information or eligible to 
     hold a sensitive position.
       These enhanced personnel security programs will integrate 
     information relevant and appropriate for determining an 
     individual's suitability for access to classified 
     information; be conducted at least 2 times every 5 years; and 
     commence not later than 5 years after the date of enactment 
     of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act, or 
     the elimination of the backlog of overdue periodic 
     investigations, whichever occurs first.
     Section 307. Notification of changes to retention of call 
         detail record policies
       Section 307 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to notify the congressional intelligence committees in 
     writing not later than 15 days after learning that an 
     electronic communication service provider that generates call 
     detail records in the ordinary course of business has changed 
     its policy on the retention of such call details records to 
     result in a retention period of less than 18 months. Section 
     307 further requires the Director to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of 
     enactment a report identifying each electronic communication 
     service provider (if any) that has a current policy in place 
     to retain call detail records for 18 months or less.
     Section 308. Personnel information notification policy by the 
         Director of National Intelligence
       Section 308 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to establish a policy to ensure timely notification to the 
     congressional intelligence committees of the identities of 
     individuals occupying senior level positions within the 
     Intelligence Community.
     Section 309. Designation of lead intelligence officer for 
         tunnels
       Section 309 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to designate an official to

[[Page 18985]]

     manage the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding 
     the tactical use of tunnels by State and non-State actors.
     Section 310. Reporting process for tracking country clearance 
         requests
       Section 310 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     (DNI) to establish a formal reporting process for tracking 
     requests for country clearance submitted to overseas DNI 
     representatives. Section 310 also requires the DNI to brief 
     the congressional intelligence committees on its progress.
     Section 311. Study on reduction of analytic duplication
       Sec. 311 requires DNI to carry out a study to identify 
     duplicative analytic products and the reasons for such 
     duplication, ascertain the frequency of and reasons for 
     duplication, and determine whether this review should be 
     considered a part of the responsibilities assigned to the 
     Analytic Integrity and Standards office inside the Office of 
     the DNI. Sec. 311 also requires DNI to provide a plan for 
     revising analytic practice, tradecraft and standards to 
     ensure customers are able to readily identify how analytic 
     products on similar topics that are produced 
     contemporaneously differ from one another and what is the 
     significance of those differences.
     Section 312. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of 
         the United States national security overhead satellite 
         architecture
       Section 312 requires the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, and the 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy, 
     with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that there is a 
     comprehensive interagency review of policies and practices 
     for planning and acquiring national security satellite 
     systems and architectures, including the capabilities of 
     commercial systems and partner countries, consistent with the 
     National Space Policy issued on June 28, 2010. Where 
     applicable, this strategy shall account for the unique 
     missions and authorities vested in the Department of Defense 
     and the Intelligence Community.
     Section 313. Cyber attack standards of measurement study
       Section 313 directs the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
     Secretary of Defense, to carry out a study to determine the 
     appropriate standards to measure the damage of cyber 
     incidents.


  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     Section 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National 
         Counterintelligence Executive
       Section 401 makes subject to Presidential appointment and 
     Senate confirmation, the executive branch position of 
     National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), which was 
     created by the 2002 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act. 
     Effective December 2014, the NCIX was also dual-hatted as the 
     Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
     Center.
     Section 402. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 
         5, United States Code
       Section 402 amends 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5102(a)(1) to expressly 
     exclude the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
     (ODNI) from the provisions of chapter 51 of title 5, relating 
     to position classification, pay, and allowances for General 
     Schedule employees, which does not apply to ODNI by virtue of 
     the National Security Act. This proposal would have no 
     substantive effect.
     Section 403. Analytic Objectivity Review
       The ODNI's Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office 
     was established in response to the requirement in IRTPA for 
     the designation of an entity responsible for ensuring that 
     the Intelligence Community's finished intelligence products 
     are timely, objective, independent of political 
     considerations, based upon all sources of available 
     intelligence, and demonstrative of the standards of proper 
     analytic tradecraft.
       Consistent with responsibilities prescribed under IRTPA, 
     Section 403 requires the AIS Chief to conduct a review of 
     finished intelligence products produced by the CIA to assess 
     whether the reorganization of the Agency, announced publicly 
     on March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss of analytic 
     objectivity. The report is due two years from the date that 
     the reorganization was announced, March 6, 2017.


       Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency and Other Elements

     Section 411. Authorities of the Inspector General for the 
         Central Intelligence Agency
       Section 411 amends Section 17 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 to consolidate the Inspector General's 
     personnel authorities and to provide the Inspector General 
     with the same authorities as other Inspector Generals to 
     request assistance and information from federal, state, and 
     local agencies or units thereof.
     Section 412. Prior congressional notification of transfers of 
         funds for certain intelligence activities
       Section 412 requires notification to the congressional 
     intelligence committees before transferring funds from the 
     Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the 
     Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that are to be used for 
     intelligence activities.


             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

                 Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia

     Section 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K 
         container missile system by the Russian Federation
       Section 501 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit written notice to the appropriate congressional 
     committees if the Intelligence Community receives 
     intelligence that the Russian Federation has deployed, or is 
     about to deploy, the Club-K container missile system through 
     the Russian military, or transferred or sold, or intends to 
     transfer or sell, such system to another state or non-state 
     actor.
     Section 502. Assessment on funding of political parties and 
         nongovernmental organizations by the Russian Federation
       Section 502 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit an Intelligence Community assessment to the 
     appropriate congressional committees concerning the funding 
     of political parties and nongovernmental organizations in the 
     former Soviet States and Europe by the Russian Security 
     Services since January 1, 2006, not later than 180 days after 
     the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence 
     Authorization Act.
     Section 503. Assessment on the use of political 
         assassinations as a form of statecraft by the Russian 
         Federation
       Section 503 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit an Intelligence Community assessment concerning the 
     use of political assassinations as a form of statecraft by 
     the Russian Federation to the appropriate congressional 
     committees, not later than 180 days after the enactment of 
     the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act.


            Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries

     Section 511. Report of resources and collection posture with 
         regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea
       Section 511 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit to the appropriate congressional committees an 
     Intelligence Community assessment on Intelligence Community 
     resourcing and collection posture with regard to the South 
     China Sea and East China Sea, not later than 180 days after 
     the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence 
     Authorization Act.
     Section 512. Use of locally employed staff serving at a 
         United States diplomatic facility in Cuba
       Section 512 requires the Secretary of State, not later than 
     one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, to 
     ensure that every supervisory position at a United States 
     diplomatic facility in Cuba is occupied by a citizen of the 
     United States who has passed a thorough background check. 
     Further, not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the provision requires the Secretary 
     of State, in coordination with other appropriate government 
     agencies, to submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a plan to further reduce the reliance on locally 
     employed staff in United States diplomatic facilities in 
     Cuba. The plan shall, at a minimum, include cost estimates, 
     timelines, and numbers of employees to be replaced.
     Section 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information 
         facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba
       Section 513 requires that each United States diplomatic 
     facility in Cuba that is constructed, or undergoes a 
     construction upgrade, be constructed to include a sensitive 
     compartmented information facility.
     Section 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available 
         through sanctions relief
       Section 514 requires the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     assessing the monetary value of any direct or indirect form 
     of sanctions relief Iran has received since the Joint Plan of 
     Action (JPOA) entered into effect, and how Iran has used 
     funds made available through such sanctions relief. This 
     report shall be submitted every 180 days while the JPOA is in 
     effect, and not later than 1 year after an agreement relating 
     to Iran's nuclear program takes effect, and annually 
     thereafter while that agreement remains in effect.


 TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO 
                               BAY, CUBA

     Section 601. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or 
         release of individual detained at United States Naval 
         Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States
       Section 601 states that no amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the 
     Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release 
     individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay to or within the 
     United States, its territories, or possessions.

[[Page 18986]]


     Section 602. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or 
         modify facilities in the United States to house detainees 
         transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
         Bay, Cuba
       Section 602 states that no amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the 
     Intelligence Community may be used to construct or modify 
     facilities in the United States, its territories, or 
     possessions to house detainees transferred from Guantanamo 
     Bay.
     Section 603. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or 
         release to certain countries of individuals detained at 
         United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
       Section 603 states that no amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the 
     Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release an 
     individual detained at Guantanamo Bay to the custody or 
     control of any country, or any entity within such country, as 
     follows: Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen.


                  TITLE VII--Reports and other Matters

                          Subtitle A--Reports

     Section 701. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
       Section 701 repeals certain reporting requirements.
     Section 702. Reports on foreign fighters
       Section 702 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit a report every 60 days for the three years 
     following the enactment of this Act to the congressional 
     intelligence committees on foreign fighter flows to and from 
     Syria and Iraq. Section 702 requires information on the total 
     number of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria or 
     Iraq, the total number of United States persons who have 
     traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq, the total 
     number of foreign fighters in Terrorist Identities Datamart 
     Environment, the total number of foreign fighters who have 
     been processed with biometrics, any programmatic updates to 
     the foreign fighter report, and a worldwide graphic that 
     describes foreign fighter flows to and from Syria.
     Section 703. Report on strategy, efforts, and resources to 
         detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State revenue 
         mechanisms
       Section 703 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit a report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of 
     the intelligence community that are necessary to detect, 
     deter, and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic 
     State.
     Section 704. Report on United States counterterrorism 
         strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic 
         State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated groups, associated 
         groups, and adherents
       Section 704 requires the President to submit to the 
     appropriated congressional committees a comprehensive report 
     on the counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and 
     defeat the Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated 
     groups, associated groups, and adherents.
     Section 705. Report on effects of data breach of Office of 
         Personnel Management
       Section 705 requires the President to transmit to the 
     congressional intelligence communities a report on the data 
     breach of the Office of Personnel Management. Section 705 
     requires information on the impact of the breach on 
     intelligence community operations abroad, in addition to an 
     assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or countries may 
     use data collected by the breach and what Federal Government 
     agencies use best practices to protect sensitive data.
     Section 706. Report on hiring of graduates of Cyber Corps 
         Scholarship Program by intelligence community
       Section 706 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     (DNI) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
     a report on the employment by the intelligence community of 
     graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. Section 706 
     requires information on the number of graduates hired by each 
     element of the intelligence community, the recruitment 
     process for each element of the intelligence community, and 
     DNI recommendations to improve the hiring process.
     Section 707. Report on use of certain business concerns
       Section 707 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report of covered business concerns--including minority-
     owned, women-owned, small disadvantaged, service-enabled 
     veteran-owned, and veteran-owned small businesses--among 
     contractors that are awarded contracts by the intelligence 
     community for goods, equipment, tools and services.


                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

     Section 711. Use of homeland security grant funds in 
         conjunction with Department of Energy national 
         laboratories
       Section 711 amends Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 to clarify that the Department of Energy's 
     national laboratories may seek access to homeland security 
     grant funds.
     Section 712. Inclusion of certain minority-serving 
         institutions in grant program to enhance recruiting of 
         intelligence community workforce
       Section 712 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
     include certain minority-serving institutions in the 
     intelligence officer training programs established under 
     Section 1024 of the Act.

                              {time}  1315

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
  The world is a dangerous place, and our intelligence agencies and 
professionals are on the front lines of keeping us, our allies, and our 
partners safe. We also have to ensure that no matter how dangerous the 
world becomes, the United States adheres to its values. What is done to 
protect America cannot undermine America, and this legislation ensures 
consistent and rigorous oversight.
  To the men and women of our intelligence community, you continue to 
have my sincerest gratitude and respect for all that you do and my full 
appreciation of your dedication, your patriotism, and your unparalleled 
skills.
  We in Congress must now do our part by passing this bill, and then we 
must turn to completing work on cyber legislation and to beginning the 
urgent task of preparing for the fiscal year 2017 authorization bill.
  To Chairman Nunes, Chairman Burr, and Vice Chair Feinstein, thank you 
again for your leadership, your bipartisanship, and your determination 
to do what is right.
  To all the Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, I thank you for your good work as well.
  Finally, thank you to our very superb professional staff. You do a 
great job each and every day, and often for very, very long hours.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, before I close, I want to reiterate that the 
bill is the most effective way for Congress to carry out oversight of 
intelligence activities. This bill forces the executive branch to 
remain responsive to congressional direction and priorities.
  As the recent terrorist attacks in Paris show, our enemies are 
rapidly improving their ability to launch deadly strikes against the 
United States and our allies. Given these elevated threat levels, it is 
crucial that our intelligence professionals receive the resources they 
need to keep Americans safe. This bill will authorize those resources 
while ensuring full congressional oversight of the intelligence 
community. I urge my colleagues to vote for the bill.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, I want to again thank Mr. Schiff for his 
congeniality and all of his staff's work and our staff's work on our 
side.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of the bill.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland 
Security Committee and Ranking member of the Judiciary Committee's 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 
Investigations, I rise in support of H.R. 4127, the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,'' for several reasons.
  With bipartisan legislative changes negotiated and incorporated, H.R. 
4127, is an improved and acceptable bill that will provide critical 
funding for our nation's 16 intelligence agencies.
  While this measure is not perfect, H.R. 4127 corrects many of the 
provisions that were objectionable by providing a more balanced and 
realistic budget for our Intelligence Community.
  The revised Intelligence Authorization Act makes cuts to less 
effective programs, adds money to underfunded ones, and requires 
intelligence agencies to keep Congress abreast of their activities to 
ensure responsible and lawful spending practices.
  More specifically, I am pleased that this bill will: provide critical 
resources for the fight against ISIL; emphasize collection to monitor 
and ensure compliance with the Iranian nuclear agreement; provide the 
necessary means to counter threats from nation-state actors, 
particularly in cyberspace, space and the undersea environment, and 
furthermore helps to shore up our counter-proliferation and counter-
intelligence capabilities; support our overhead architecture through 
the funding of critical space programs, invests in space protection and 
resiliency, preserves investments

[[Page 18987]]

in cutting-edge technologies, and enhances the oversight of contracting 
and procurement practices; promotes foreign partner capabilities; and 
enhance human intelligence capabilities and oversight throughout CIA's 
reorganization process.
  H.R. 4127 will provide funding that is 7% above last year's enacted 
budget level, and only 1% less than President Obama's budget request.
  Importantly, this version of the bill corrects the over-reliance on 
short-term Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to evade 
Budget Control Act caps, which proved problematic in the earlier 
version.
  I applaud my colleagues for working together to reach agreement on a 
fair and balanced budget framework that does not harm our economy or 
require draconian cuts.
  Additionally of concern in the prior measure, to the extent 
intelligence funds might be used in an effort to shutter the Guantanamo 
facility, the Guantanamo-related language in the current version will 
merely subject those funds to restrictions identical to those imposed 
by the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, recently passed and 
signed into law by the President.
  Lastly, while a provision of H.R. 4127 still curtails the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board's (PCLOB) ability to access information 
regarding covert action, it does not alter the PCLOB's broader 
jurisdiction or mission to provide independent oversight and to ensure 
that the U.S. appropriately protects privacy and civil liberties in its 
counter terrorism programs.
  With respect to covert actions, the language of H.R. 4127 has been 
reworded to emphasize that such actions are subject to presidential 
approval and reporting to Congress pursuant to existing law.
  The balance between liberty and security must be respected to 
preserve our way of life and the values that countless generations have 
fought to preserve.
  This includes taking precautionary measures to ensure that lives are 
safe from eminent danger and terrorist threats both domestically and 
abroad.
  On balance, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4127 contains more salutary than 
objectionable provisions, and for that reason I support this bill.
  Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Speaker, I commend Chairman Nunes, Ranking Member 
Schiff, and the entire Intelligence Committee for crafting the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. This is a strong 
and bipartisan piece of legislation that will ensure the safety of 
every American.
  For the people of the Fourth District of Kansas, whom I represent, 
and for many other Americans, this bill represents more than just the 
three letter agencies it oversees, this bill is about ensuring the U.S. 
has a robust national security posture to keep Americans safe. When we 
empower the men and women in the Intelligence Community with the 
resources, tools, and capabilities they need, they are able to do their 
jobs and protect our nation.
  It is in the finest traditions of Congress that there has been such 
close cooperation between the House and Senate in undertaking our 
oversight responsibilities, and also productive collaboration with the 
Intelligence Community. As always, in the Committee's work of providing 
guidance to the Intelligence Community, we continue to recommend fiscal 
responsibility through increased efficiency and the elimination of 
unnecessary programs. All of this is done with a close eye to 
protecting every American's Constitutional rights.
  I do not need to remind anyone that the threats facing the United 
States are real and dangerous. I applaud the decision to empower our 
intelligence agencies with potent tools, all the while focused on 
protecting privacy, to ensure that our interests and our way of life 
are protected in these uncertain times.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 4127.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________