[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 11]
[Senate]
[Pages 14981-14982]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

  Ms. BALDWIN. Mr. President, I wish to discuss the international 
nuclear agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, JCPOA. Reached on July 14, 2015, after years of difficult 
negotiations among the United States and the other P5+1 countries--
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany--and Iran, the 
agreement confronts the Iranian nuclear program, which has long been 
the subject of U.S., European Union, and United Nations sanctions.
  Throughout these years of international negotiations, and more 
recently, during these months of congressional debate, I have been 
focused on one goal--ensuring that our dual-track policy of diplomacy 
and economic sanctions results in an outcome that verifiably prevents 
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iran getting the bomb is simply 
unacceptable, and blocking that is in our national security interests 
and that of our allies, including Israel.
  This international agreement impacts the safety and security of 
Americans and our allies and is an incredibly serious matter, deserving 
careful and considered scrutiny. That includes a thorough and 
responsible debate in Congress. That is why I voted for the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, P.L. 114-17, which provided 
Congress with a 60-day window to consider the JCPOA prior to its taking 
effect. And that window was filled with vigorous debate in the Senate. 
Regardless of one's position for or against the international 
agreement, one thing is clear: every Senator has had an opportunity to 
pass their judgement on whether we are right to choose a path of 
international diplomacy to achieve our goal of verifiably preventing 
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In my judgement we are.
  For me personally, I felt that it was critical to closely review the 
details of the agreement and hear from individuals on all sides of this 
debate, including experts and constituents, and listen to their 
arguments. I have attended numerous classified briefings with 
administration officials, including those with firsthand technical, 
scientific, and diplomatic expertise, heard from the Ambassadors of our 
P5+1 partners, and benefited from many candid conversations with 
Wisconsin constituents. All of these interactions have been invaluable 
and have informed my conclusion that rejecting this international 
agreement is not in our national security interest. According to the 
agreement, before receiving relief from sanctions, Iran must comply 
with a number of far-reaching and long-term obligations to limit its 
nuclear program, all of which will be verified by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, through an unprecedentedly robust 
inspections and monitoring framework. Iran's obligations include 
redesigning the Arak reactor to eliminate the plutonium pathway to 
nuclear weapons; eliminating its current stockpile of highly enriched 
uranium, reducing its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97 
percent, and capping enrichment at that level for 15 years; reducing 
the number of operational centrifuges by two-thirds and severely 
limiting research on advanced enrichment technology; converting the 
underground Fordow facility to a medical research center; accepting 
intrusive IAEA monitoring of Iran's nuclear supply chain and fuel 
cycle; and satisfactorily answering IAEA questions into the possible 
military dimensions of its prior nuclear program. In exchange for 
verifiably meeting these obligations, Iran will receive relief from 
U.S. and international nuclear-related sanctions. And importantly, U.S. 
sanctions against Iran related to human rights violations, support for 
terrorism, and illicit arms shipments remain in effect. Should the 
international verification regime catch Iran noncompliant with its 
obligations, the agreement includes a provision allowing the United 
States to unilaterally reimpose nuclear-related U.N. sanctions.
  My judgement on this issue has also been guided by the hard lessons 
that should be learned when America chooses to engage in military 
action and war in the Middle East. It is easy to conclude that a 
rejection of international diplomacy and the JCPOA would shatter the 
current international coalition, making key multilateral sanctions 
impossible, and would result in Iran restarting its illicit nuclear 
activities, leading to inevitable military action. Indeed, I have been 
struck by the inability of opponents of the agreement to put forth a 
credible alternative that does not involve military action in the 
Middle East. In this case, it is simply not feasible for the United 
States to go it alone. So I am proud that America led six countries 
toward a historic international agreement with Iran that verifiably 
prevents it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
  While the agreement does represent the best option to prevent Iran 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon, moving forward, Congress and the 
administration must work together in a bipartisan manner and in concert 
with our allies to ensure that the agreement is implemented 
effectively. Implementation is critical because this agreement is not 
built on trust of Iran. In fact, the agreement is built on mistrust of 
Iranian motives and a clear-eyed view of Iran's past and present 
destabilizing activities in the region.
  That is why the JCPOA establishes the most intrusive inspections and 
monitoring framework in the history of arms control agreements. 
Approximately 150 IAEA inspectors, outfitted with the latest training 
and technology, much of which originates from the cutting-edge work of 
the U.S. Department of Energy's National Labs, will be onsite in Iran 
and ready to report any suspicious behavior.
  In addition to this stringent monitoring regime, the very real threat 
of snapback sanctions will work to incentivize Iranian compliance with 
its JCPOA obligations. According to the agreement, in the event of 
Iranian cheating, the United States has the ability to unilaterally 
reimpose nuclear-related U.N. sanctions as well as add on to U.S. 
sanctions against Iran beyond those related to human rights violations, 
support for terrorism, and illicit arms shipments that remain in place. 
And Iran should make no mistake: I, along with my colleagues in the 
Senate, will not hesitate to reapply sanctions should Iran break the 
terms of the JCPOA. In short, if Iran cheats, even along the margins, 
we will catch them and there will be a heavy price to pay.
  I am under no illusions regarding Iran's continuing destabilizing 
behavior in the region and its record during the Iraq war, which 
includes supporting Shiite militias that killed American 
servicemembers. From human rights violations to support for terrorism 
and criminal client states such as Assad's Syria to its illicit nuclear 
program, Iran is a bad actor. That is why it is absolutely critical 
that the JCPOA move forward and block Iran from developing or acquiring 
a nuclear weapon, an unthinkable outcome that would make it an even 
greater security challenge.
  At the same time, I support taking immediate, additional steps to 
counter Iran's non-nuclear activities in the region and bolster the 
security of our Gulf Cooperation Council partners--who support the 
JCPOA--and Israel. From the time of the establishment of the modern 
Jewish State in 1948, the United States and Israel have shared a

[[Page 14982]]

special bond, grounded in our mutual commitment to democracy, freedom, 
respect for the rule of law and the quest for a secure and stable 
Middle East. I have spent more time in Israel than in any foreign 
country, and my travel and interactions there have greatly informed my 
understanding of the security challenges Israel faces.
  That is why I have been a longtime supporter of annual U.S. aid to 
Israel, which is currently set at $3.1 billion per year, as well as 
additional funding for Israeli missile defense systems such as Iron 
Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow, all of which are so valuable in 
protecting Israeli citizens. I support increasing that level of 
assistance and broadening and deepening our two countries' 
collaboration in the security and intelligence spheres. The United 
States and Israel are currently drafting a new 10-year memorandum of 
understanding to govern the nature of U.S. military assistance to 
Israel. This is an opportunity to further strengthen our security 
relationship with Israel and ensure its qualitative military edge.
  In conclusion, the United States cannot afford to walk away from an 
international agreement that is based on a robust inspections and 
compliance regime and will verifiably prevent Iran from developing or 
acquiring a nuclear weapon. While there are legitimately held policy 
differences on this highly complex issue, going it alone is not an 
effective path forward and not in our national security interest. I 
support moving this international agreement forward so we can begin 
enforcing it and preventing Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear 
weapon. 

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