[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 161 (2015), Part 10]
[House]
[Pages 13958-13986]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




FINDING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SECTION 2 OF THE IRAN 
                  NUCLEAR AGREEMENT REVIEW ACT OF 2015

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 412, I call up 
the resolution (H. Res. 411) finding that the President has not 
complied with section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 
2015, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 412, the 
resolution is considered read.
  The text of the resolution is as follows:

                              H. Res. 411

       Whereas section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
     as enacted by section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review 
     Act of 2015, defined the term ``agreement'' as meaning ``an 
     agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that 
     includes the United States, commits the United States to take 
     action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or 
     otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it 
     takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and 
     regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including 
     any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made 
     between Iran and any other parties, and any additional 
     materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, 
     codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, 
     and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any 
     related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior 
     to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the 
     future.'';
       Whereas section C(14) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
     Action requires Iran to implement the ``Roadmap for 
     Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues 
     regarding Iran's Nuclear Program'' (referred to as the 
     ``Roadmap'') which was agreed to with the IAEA;
       Whereas the Roadmap identifies two separate, confidential 
     agreements between the IAEA and Iran, one to address 
     remaining outstanding issues related to ``Possible Military 
     Dimensions'' of Iran's nuclear program, and another 
     ``regarding the issue of Parchin'';
       Whereas both of those agreements constitute side agreements 
     within the meaning of section 135(h)(1);
       Whereas section 135(a)(1)(A) requires the President to 
     transmit the agreement, including any side agreements, as 
     defined by section 135(h)(1) to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership;
       Whereas the Executive Communication numbered 2307 and 
     captioned ``A letter from the Assistant Secretary, 
     Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a 
     letter and attachments satisfying all requirements of Sec. 
     135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the 
     Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-17), 
     as received July 19, 2015'', did not include the text of 
     either side agreement with the IAEA; and
       Whereas the President has not subsequently transmitted to 
     the appropriate congressional committees and leadership the 
     text of the separate agreements identified in the Roadmap: 
     Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That--
       (1) the President has not complied with section 2 of the 
     Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 because the 
     communication from the President did not constitute the 
     agreement as defined by section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954; and
       (2) the period for review by Congress of nuclear agreements 
     with Iran under section 135(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 has not commenced because the agreement has not yet been 
     transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees and 
     leadership.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The resolution shall be debatable for 2 
hours, equally divided and controlled by the chair of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and the minority leader or their respective designees.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) will control 1 hour. The 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) and the gentleman from Maryland 
(Mr. Cummings) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 days to revise and extend and submit extraneous materials on 
this measure.

[[Page 13959]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I think we all know why we are here to debate this 
resolution today. The bottom line is that, for those of us that were 
involved in this agreement, we always thought that international 
inspections were going to be done by international inspectors, not by 
the Iranians, not by those in the Iranian regime.
  Whether you like the Iran agreement or not, one thing I think all 
Members can agree on is that sound verification must be the bedrock of 
any viable agreement.
  Iran cannot cheat and get away with it. And the reason this is an 
issue for us is because Iran has cheated on every past agreement. That 
is why the verification was so important.
  The problem is key aspects of this verification agreement have not 
been presented to Congress to review. Indeed, there are two separate 
arrangements agreed to between Iran and an arm of the U.N. here, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.
  One is regarding the regime's past bomb work, of which there are a 
thousand pages of evidence that the IAEA tell us about, and the other 
involves access to the Iranian military base at Parchin, where that 
evidence shows that that testing took place.
  In order to fully assess the agreement, Members of Congress should 
have access to these documents. This is especially important since Iran 
will almost certainly treat these arrangements as setting a standard 
for future IAEA requests to access any suspicious sites, especially 
military sites, since they have made it clear nobody is going to their 
military sites.
  Physical access by the IAEA to Parchin is critical to understanding 
Iran's past bomb work. This is where ``Iran constructed a large 
explosives containment vessel,'' to quote the IAEA.
  Why did they do it? To conduct experiments related to the 
development, say the international inspectors, of nuclear weapons. Iran 
has blocked the international inspectors' access to Parchin for years.
  In the meantime, we are told by those inspectors that they watch on 
spy satellite as Iran bulldozes and paves over this site and then paves 
over the site again.
  If the international inspectors cannot attain a clear understanding 
of the experimentation that took place, then the United States will 
have great difficulty figuring out how long it would take Iran to rush 
toward a nuclear weapon.
  In recent congressional testimony, administration officials expressed 
confidence in their access to suspicious sites that the agreement 
provides the IAEA.
  Yet, these separate arrangements have the potential to seriously 
weaken our ability to verify the agreement as a whole even is true, 
that Iran is going to do self-inspections here, which is what Iran 
asserts.
  Mr. Speaker, the history of Iranian negotiating behavior, as we know, 
is to pocket past concessions. And then what do they do? They push for 
more and more and more.
  The separate arrangement agreed to between the IAEA and Iran 
regarding inspection of the facilities at Parchin will almost certainly 
be regarded by that government in Iran as a precedent for their IAEA 
access to future suspicious sites in Iran.
  In other words, if you don't get access to this site, you are not 
going to get access to other military sites where there is evidence 
that the same type of thing has occurred.
  So if Iran won't let international inspectors do the international 
inspecting today, what makes us think that the Iranians will allow 
intrusive terms to these agreements in the future after sanctions have 
been lifted when we find evidence of the next site?
  I have little doubt that the side deals of today will become central 
to the agreement's verification provisions tomorrow. This makes it 
imperative that these agreements are made available to Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, 350 Members of this House, Democrats and Republicans--I 
think we had the majority of the Democrats, and I think we had every 
Republican--wrote to Secretary Kerry last fall.
  Iran's willingness to resolve concerns over its bomb work, as we said 
in that letter, is a fundamental test of Iran's intention to uphold a 
comprehensive agreement. That is why we all wrote that letter together, 
in order to make that point.
  The administration once took the same position that we are taking 
right now on the House floor as well, but it gave that position away in 
negotiations. It gave away that position.
  Reviewing these side agreements is critical to understanding whether 
Iran intends to pass that test. We need access to those agreements.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, after several years of difficult negotiations with a 
dangerous and malevolent regime, the administration and representatives 
of the other P5+1 nations reached an agreement with Iran over its 
nuclear program.
  The primary objective of the United States in the negotiations was to 
prevent Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. Given the 
unthinkable consequences of Iran, the world's foremost sponsor of 
terrorism, obtaining the bomb, this has been an overriding national 
security imperative of the United States for decades.
  As an American and as a Jew who is deeply concerned about the 
security of Israel, it is also intensely personal.
  I believe our vital interests have been advanced under the agreement, 
since it would be extremely difficult for Iran to amass enough 
fissionable material to make a nuclear weapon without giving the United 
States ample notice and time to stop it.
  We will still need to guard against any Iranian effort to obtain 
nuclear material or technology from proliferators abroad, a reality 
even if Iran had given up all enrichment.
  But the agreement likely gives the world at least a decade and a half 
without the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon and without going to 
war to make that so. That is a major achievement.
  The United States realized this objective by securing a number of 
important provisions in the agreement, including the power to snap back 
sanctions, in whole or in part, and not subject to a veto in the United 
Nations.
  The United States and its allies also procured an extensive and 
intrusive inspections regime that lasts for 25 years or more. By 
applying to the whole chain of the enrichment process, from the ground 
to the centrifuge, it realistically precludes Iran from developing a 
hidden and parallel enrichment process.
  With respect to those inspections, I think it is very important to 
clarify something which I often hear the opponents obscure, and that is 
there are inspections with respect to Iran's prior military work, 
inspections of known nuclear sites and inspections of other sites which 
we may suspect Iran may conduct work in the future. And the mechanisms 
with respect to each are different.
  With respect to the known nuclear sites, there are 24/7 eyes on 
Iran's enrichment activities that would be the most extensive and 
intrusive inspections any nation has seen of its nuclear program.

                              {time}  1430

  With respect to its potential sites--that is sites we don't know, 
where we suspect in the future they may do work--we will have a 
mechanism to obtain inspections in a timely way and certainly in a 
timely enough way that, if they were to ever utilize radioactive 
material, they would be detected.
  Finally, we have the inspections into their prior military work. I 
will say this with respect to the prior military work, those of us that 
have reviewed the intelligence know that we have an extensive bank of 
information about what Iran had been doing in the past.

[[Page 13960]]

To the degree that we need a baseline for what Iran's work has been, we 
have that baseline, and I think that is a pivotal consideration going 
forward.
  As recently as yesterday, the Director of National Intelligence 
stated that he has great confidence that we can determine if Iran fails 
to comply with the agreement.
  For me, it is the size and sophistication of Iran's nuclear 
enrichment capability after 15 years that is the key challenge. At that 
point, it is the work necessary to produce the mechanism for the bomb 
that becomes the real obstacle to a breakout, and that work is the most 
challenging to detect. Nevertheless, I have searched for a better, 
credible alternative and concluded that there is none.
  When it comes to predicting the future, we are all looking through 
the glass darkly, but if Congress rejects the deal agreed to by the 
administration and much of the world, the sanctions regime will, if not 
collapse, almost certainly erode.
  This does not mean that Iran necessarily dashes madly for a bomb, but 
it will almost certainly move forward with its enrichment program, 
unconstrained by inspections, limits on research, and development of 
new centrifuges, metallurgy, or other protections in the deal.
  In short, Iran will have many of the advantages of the deal in access 
to money and trade with none of its disadvantages. Instead of rejecting 
the deal, therefore, Congress should focus on making it stronger.
  First, we should make it clear that, if Iran cheats, the 
repercussions will be severe.
  Second, we should continue to strengthen our intelligence 
capabilities to detect any form of Iranian noncompliance.
  Third, we should establish the expectation that, while Iran will be 
permitted to have an enrichment capability for civilian use, it will 
never, never be permitted to produce highly enriched uranium, and if it 
attempts to do so, it will be stopped with force.
  Fourth, we will share with Israel all the technologies necessary to 
maintain its regional military superiority and, if necessary, to 
destroy Iran's nuclear facilities no matter how deep the bunker.
  Finally, we are prepared to work with Israel and our Gulf allies to 
make sure that every action Iran takes to use its newfound wealth for 
destructive activities in the region will prompt an equal and opposite 
reaction, and we will combat Iran's malignant influence.
  The Iranian people will one day throw off the shackles of their 
repressive regime, and I hope that this deal will empower those who 
wish to reform Iranian governance and behavior. The 15 years or more 
this agreement provides will give us the time to test that proposition.
  Then, as now, if Iran is determined to develop the bomb, there is 
only one way to stop it, and that is by the use of force; but the 
American people and others around the world will recognize that we did 
everything possible to avoid war.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Nunes), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, although the Obama administration has pitched 
the Iran nuclear accord as a way to prevent the Ayatollahs from 
developing nuclear weapons, the agreement lifts the key restrictions on 
Iran's nuclear activities after 10 to 15 years. Many of my fellow 
Members wonder how the administration can be so naive as to pave the 
way for an Iranian bomb in the course of trying to prevent an Iranian 
bomb.
  Well, the answer is clear to me. The President is gambling. He is 
betting that the very act of engaging with Iran will moderate the 
regime's behavior so that, in a decade or so from now, we won't have to 
worry about it anymore. He has called his engagement with Iran a 
calculated risk. Indeed, it is a risk.
  As I said, the President is placing a bet; but why would anyone bet 
on the moderation of the Iranian regime? It has not changed one iota 
since the Ayatollahs seized power in 1979. Thirty-six years later, Iran 
is the world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism. It is also 
responsible for the deaths of thousands of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
  Obama has spoken of the Ayatollah Khamenei as possibly seeking to 
rejoin the community of nations. This is a thin reed to justify giving 
Iran a path to the bomb in the near future. With their ritual ``death 
to America'' chants, I don't know how the Iranians could make it any 
more clear that they do not want to rejoin the community of nations. 
They want to blow up the community of nations.
  Soon after the Iranian agreement was signed, Khamenei himself tweeted 
a silhouette image of President Obama holding a gun to his head. I just 
don't understand what is more clear that this regime could do to make 
its intentions clearer to the American people, but our President sees 
things differently.
  As he told The New York Times, if the nuclear agreement is signed, 
``Who knows? Iran may change.''
  Well, consider this: if you are rolling the dice at a casino, who 
knows? You may roll a 7. If you are at the roulette wheel, who knows? 
It may land on your number. When you are gambling, one thing is for 
sure; in the long run, the casino always wins.
  Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, this is not about a casino, nor is it 
about a gambler losing money. This is about gambling on human lives, 
U.S. lives and our Western allies' lives.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey), the ranking member of the 
Committee on Appropriations.
  Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, reasonable people disagree about the merits 
and shortcomings of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
  In the strongest democracy in the world, we have a sacred duty to 
uphold the high standard of debate and govern responsibly. That is why 
I am profoundly disappointed by vitriolic personal attacks and 
character assassinations on both sides of this debate; and I am 
outraged by the Republicans' attempt to score political points on this 
critical issue of national and global security.
  The threat to pursue wasteful litigation and to tie the hands of our 
President until the end of his term are particularly outrageous, when 
the Senate has indicated it will not even consider these measures. I 
strongly oppose the blatantly irresponsible partisan political measures 
before the House this week.
  As ranking Democratic member of the House Committee on Appropriations 
and the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, I have participated in 
dozens of classified and unclassified Iran briefings with the Obama 
administration, including members of our negotiating team and 
colleagues in Congress during the last 2 years.
  I have thoroughly evaluated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
released in July, met with foreign leaders, nuclear experts, and heard 
from thousands of thoughtful and passionate constituents.
  After careful consideration, I will vote against approval of the 
agreement. Sufficient safeguards simply are not in place to address the 
risk associated with this agreement, and it will not dismantle Iran's 
nuclear infrastructure.
  First, in 15 years, Iran will become an internationally recognized 
nuclear threshold state capable of producing highly enriched uranium to 
develop a nuclear weapon.
  Second, relieving U.N. sanctions on conventional arms and ballistic 
missiles and releasing billions of dollars to the Iranian regime will 
lead to a dangerous regional weapons race and enable Iran to bolster 
its funding of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Bashar al-Assad.
  Third, the deal does not explicitly require Iran to fully disclose 
its previous military work before sanctions relief is provided. 
Inspectors will not have anytime, anywhere access to the most 
suspicious facilities, particularly the Parchin military complex, with 
a process that lacks transparency and could

[[Page 13961]]

delay inspectors access for up to 24 days.
  Finally, there are no clear accountability measures regarding 
punishment for minor violations of the agreement. In recent weeks, the 
administration has responded to some of my concerns by committing to 
additional security assistance to Israel and our Gulf partners and to 
improving international cooperation on countering Iran's nonnuclear 
destabilizing activities.
  I will work in Congress and with the administration to expeditiously 
implement these commitments to enhance--not just maintain--nonnuclear-
related sanctions to establish stronger mechanisms to deter Iran and to 
ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon.
  One of my highest priorities will continue to be the protection of 
Israel's qualitative military edge so that our closest ally in the 
region can defend itself against all threats from Iran or its proxies.
  In the same week, my colleagues, that Congress holds this important 
vote, Iran's Supreme Leader vowed again to annihilate the Jewish State 
of Israel and to vilify the Great Satan that he calls the United States 
of America.
  It is my sincere hope that we can work together in a bipartisan way 
moving forward. The security of the United States of America and our 
allies depends on it.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), who chairs the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 
on the Middle East and North Africa and was the author of some of the 
Iran sanctions laws that are in force today.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my esteemed chairman for his 
leadership on this critical issue. I also want to congratulate Mr. 
Pompeo, whose resolution we are discussing.
  Mr. Speaker, this deal will allow Iran to become nuclear capable in 
just a short order. It will allow Iran to grow and expand its military. 
It will allow Iran to continue with its support for terror. These facts 
are indisputable.
  What is also indisputable is that the regime in Tehran detests the 
United States, the West, and the democratic Jewish State of Israel, our 
steadfast partner. The Supreme Leader of Iran constantly incites chants 
of ``death to America'' and ``death to Israel.'' Are we not listening?
  Through its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran seeks to make this 
threat into a reality. Earlier this week, the Supreme Leader threatened 
that Israel will no longer exist in just 25 years.
  Because of this agreement, Mr. Speaker, the regime will now have the 
weapons; it will now have the capabilities to pose an even greater 
threat to us, to Israel, and to our interests in the region. Giving a 
regime that openly calls for and works toward our destruction and the 
destruction of Israel is insane. We are providing Iran a path to 
nuclear weapons and increased conventional weapons capability.
  This isn't just bad policy. It is dangerous. It is naive to think 
that this nuclear deal with Iran won't make us and the world less safe, 
less secure, and less peaceful. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, we must reject 
it.
  I thank Chairman Royce and Mr. Pompeo for this resolution.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Clyburn), the distinguished assistant Democratic 
leader.
  Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated between the United States, the 
permanent 5 members of the United Nations Security Council plus 
Germany, the European Union, and Iran.
  I support this deal because it is the best available option to 
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, an outcome that all of us 
agree must be prevented. The opponents of this agreement say that Iran 
supports terrorism. I don't disagree with that.
  This deal, however, is about only one issue--the issue that the 
entire world agrees is by far the most pressing--preventing Iran from 
getting a nuclear weapon. It is precisely because Iran is so nefarious 
that this deal is so important.

                              {time}  1445

  As dangerous as Iran is and may remain, Iran would be far more 
dangerous if they acquired a nuclear weapon. This deal is the best way 
to prevent that unacceptable outcome.
  The opponents of this agreement say that we can't trust the Iranians 
to abide by the agreement's strict restrictions on their nuclear 
program. That may be true. And I wouldn't be supporting the agreement 
if it required us to trust the Iranians, but it doesn't.
  This deal is built around the strictest verifications ever devised. 
If Iran tries to dash toward a bomb, we will be more likely to catch 
them using the verification procedures under this deal than we would be 
without it.
  With this deal in place, if you do catch Iran dashing toward a 
nuclear weapon, all options will be on the table to stop them. But 
military force must always be a last resort. I have not heard any of 
the opponents of this agreement present any realistic diplomatic 
alternative that would be anywhere near as likely to stop Iran from 
getting a nuclear weapon, and if we reject this deal, military action 
will become more likely.
  Whenever we send Americans into harm's way, we must be able to look 
them and their families in the eye and honestly tell them that we have 
exhausted every other option. This deal is a diplomatic option we must 
exhaust. This deal's opponents present no other.
  The late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, said: ``You don't make 
peace with friends. You make it with unsavory enemies.''
  We are now faced with three choices: this deal, a drastically 
increased likelihood of military confrontation, or a nuclear Iran. I 
support this deal, and I ask my colleagues to join me in doing so.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Smith), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global 
Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, what was previously 
unacceptable, an Iranian nuclear state, is now inevitable under the 
terms and conditions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
  Tragically, the deal is riddled with serious flaws, gaps, and huge 
concessions to Iran. Taken as a whole, the deal poses an existential 
threat to Israel and other friends in the region--and is a significant 
risk to the United States.
  Not only is Iran now permitted to continue enriching uranium--a 
previous nonnegotiable red line was no enrichment whatsoever--but under 
this agreement, Iran will be able to assemble an industrial-scale 
nuclear program once the agreement begins to sunset in as little as a 
decade.
  And make no mistake about it, Iran's decades-long rabid hatred of 
Israel shows no sign of abating anytime soon. Yesterday, the Times of 
Israel reported that Iran's Supreme Leader said to Israel, ``You will 
not see the next 25 years,'' adding that the Jewish state will be 
hounded until it is destroyed.
  Mr. Speaker, inspections are anything but anytime or anywhere, the 
Obama administration's previous pledge to the Nation and the world. We 
have learned that the IAEA has entered into a secret agreement that 
precludes unfettered, robust inspection. That also violates the Corker 
law. We have not gotten that information.
  Mr. Speaker, Iran is the world's leading supporter of terrorism. This 
agreement provides tens of billions of dollars for weapons and war-
making materiel.
  The Supreme Leader also criticized any call to end its ballistic 
missile program, another eleventh hour concession. The Supreme Leader 
called that stupid and idiotic, and that they should mass produce such 
weapons and means of delivery.
  Countries build ICBMs, Mr. Speaker, to deliver nukes.
  The administration was reluctant, but I held two hearings and the 
chairman held several hearings on the Americans being held hostage. 
Pastor

[[Page 13962]]

Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati, Jason Rezaian, and Robert Levinson remain 
in jail--abused, tortured, or missing. Why are they not free?
  President Obama continues to tell Congress and the American people 
that the Iran nuclear agreement is the best deal possible and advances 
peace. Such boasting collapses under scrutiny. What was previously 
unacceptable--an Iranian nuclear state--is now inevitable under the 
terms and conditions of what is officially known as the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action.
  Tragically, the deal is riddled with serious flaws, gaps, and huge 
concessions to Iran. Taken as a whole, the deal poses an existential 
threat to Israel, our allies in the region--and even poses significant 
risks to the United States.
  Not only is Iran now permitted to continue enriching uranium--a 
previous nonnegotiable redline was no enrichment whatsoever--under this 
agreement, Iran will not be required to dismantle its bomb-making 
technology and will have an internationally recognized, industrial-
scale nuclear program once the agreement begins to ``sunset'' in as 
little as a decade.
  And make no mistake, Iran's decades-long rabid hatred of Israel shows 
no sign of abating anytime soon. Yesterday, the Times of Israel 
reported that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said to 
Israel: ``You will not see (the) next 25 years,'' adding that the 
Jewish state will be hounded until it is destroyed.
  On the inspections front, Supreme Leader Khamenei has stated that he 
will ``never'' permit inspectors to inspect Iran's military bases. Even 
after the agreement was signed, the Iranian Minister of Defense 
reportedly said that ``Tehran will not allow any foreigner to discover 
Iran's defensive and missile capabilities by inspecting the country's 
military sites.''
  Inspections under this agreement are anything but ``anytime, 
anywhere''--the Obama Administration's previous pledge to the nation 
and the world. We have learned that the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) has entered into a secret side agreement to preclude 
unfettered, robust inspection, and in another bizarre concession by the 
Administration and our negotiating partners, even allows Iran to self-
monitor in certain circumstances.
  Yet the agreement itself contains many limits on access by IAEA 
inspectors to suspected sites, including a 24-day period in which Iran 
is allowed to continue to refuse the IAEA's request to visit a facility 
followed by a very long process needed to increase pressure on Iran to 
permit access if it still blocks access by inspectors. During this 
period, Iran will have sufficient time to remove, cover up, or destroy 
any evidence. ``Managed access'' would be better called ``manipulated 
access'' as inspectors will get access to suspected sites only after 
consultations between the world powers and Iran, over nearly a month.
  Given Iran's repeated cover-ups of its clandestine nuclear program, 
its refusal to give the IAEA access to its Parchin military facility 
(where Iran is believed to have tested detonators for nuclear 
warheads), and its stone-walling the IAEA concerning evidence that it 
had done extensive research and development on a nuclear explosive 
device, verification is fundamental to ensure that Iran is abiding by 
the agreement's terms. Secretary of State John Kerry, after an Iranian 
history of refusal to allow inspections at Parchin, would only assure 
us of inspections there ``as appropriate,'' whatever that means.
  Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman has said that pledges by Obama 
Administration officials that the agreement would guarantee ``anywhere, 
anytime'' inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities were only 
``rhetorical.'' Mere words without substance? Why would our allies in 
the region trust us if our word--and negotiating positions--are indeed 
only rhetorical flourish?
  The key restriction on Iran's nuclear program--the ability to enrich 
at high levels--begins to expire in as little as 10 years. Once these 
restrictions expire, Iran could enrich on an industrial scale and the 
U.S. and its allies will be left with no effective measures to prevent 
Iran from initiating an accelerated nuclear program to produce the 
materials needed for a nuclear weapon.
  Mr. Speaker, the IAEA has uncovered significant evidence that Iran 
has engaged in activities related to the development of a nuclear 
weapon. Despite many agreements with the IAEA in which Iran has pledged 
to provide satisfactory information, the IAEA has repeatedly said that 
Iran has given it virtually nothing. Secretary Kerry has said that the 
U.S. has ``absolute knowledge'' of Iran's past military activities 
regarding its nuclear program, but Gen. Michael Hayden, the former 
Director of the CIA, recently testified to Congress that the U.S. did 
not have that capability.
  Furthermore, as witnesses testified at a joint hearing in July by 
three Foreign Affairs subcommittees, there is ample evidence that Iran 
has a longstanding nuclear collaboration with North Korea. In light of 
the abundant evidence they will present, what gives the Administration 
certainty that the Iranians won't at some point during this agreement 
acquire fissile material beyond what they are allowed to produce for 
themselves or actual warheads from North Korea?
  Why was the Iran-North Korea nuclear collaboration not factored into 
the Iran nuclear agreement? Surely Secretary Kerry is aware of the 
Iran-North Korea nuclear linkage. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs Douglas Frantz, previously a high-ranking Kerry Senate 
aide, wrote a 2003 article about Iran's ties to the North Korean 
nuclear program. Are we to believe Frantz and Kerry never discussed 
this issue? He dodged the question at today's committee hearing.
  Mr. Speaker, in March 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1747 which, inter alia, established an embargo on 
the export from Iran of all arms and related materials, thereby banning 
all states and groups from purchasing or receiving arms from Iran. The 
resolution also called on all states to ``exercise vigilance and 
restraint'' in their supply of any items covered by the U.N. Register 
of Conventional Arms to Iran.
  However, reports indicate that Russia is eager to sell massive 
amounts of military hardware to Iran. Major General Qassem Suleimani, 
Iran's Revolutionary Guard leader, recently visited Russia. How will 
this shape other regional conflicts in which Iran is currently 
involved, including Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? After the conventional arms 
embargo is lifted in just 5 years, what limitations, if any, will there 
be on Iran's ability to export arms, specifically heavy weapons? 
Besides Russia, who else will sell weapons to Iran? China?
  Moreover, the Administration and its supporters of the Iranian 
nuclear agreement downplay the possibility of Saudi Arabia, for 
example, producing a nuclear weapon as part of a Middle East arms race. 
However, the Saudis are building King Abdullah City for Atomic 
Renewable Energy to train nuclear scientists and already have greater 
science and mathematics capacity than Pakistan had when it developed 
nuclear weapons. Why couldn't and why wouldn't the Saudis join the 
nuclear arms race when faced with a more nuclear and conventionally 
armed Iran? Secretary Kerry would have us believe that the Saudis and 
others in the region would prefer the current agreement to an effort to 
achieve a more effective one and would agree not to pursue nuclear 
weapons even though Iran is on the path to develop or acquire its own.
  Mr. Speaker, ballistic missiles are a central component of any 
country's nuclear weapons program as they allow for the quick, accurate 
delivery of nuclear weapons over long distances. While the agreement 
calls for Iran to abide by all U.N. Security Council resolutions--
including the requirement that ``Iran shall not undertake any activity 
related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons,'' 
Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's criticized the call for 
Iran to end its ballistic missile program, characterizing it as ``a 
stupid, idiotic expectation'' and claiming ``The Revolutionary Guards 
should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with the 
present level. They should mass produce.''
  In an 11th hour concession by the Obama Administration and others, 
the agreement ``sunsets'' U.N. sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile 
program after 8 years, and also requires that the European Union do the 
same. U.S. intelligence estimates Iran to have the largest arsenal of 
ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Congress has received expert 
testimony that ``no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear 
weapons has ever opted to sustain'' a costly, long-range missile 
program. Simply put, countries build ICBMs to deliver nukes.
  Under this agreement, the Iranians have stated they are under no 
obligation to stop developing ballistic missiles. In fact, this 
agreement would allow them the two things they need to advance their 
program: money and foreign assistance.
  Iran dared to insert ballistic missiles and conventional weapons into 
the nuclear negotiations without fear of disturbing the talks. 
Meanwhile, the Administration was reluctant to use its leverage during 
the negotiations to free the four Americans held hostage in Iran today. 
Pastor Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati, Jason Rezaian, and Robert Levinson 
remain in jail--abused, tortured or missing.
  Mr. Speaker, the agreement requires ``full implementation'' by 
October 15 of the commitments in the ``roadmap'' made by Iran to the 
IAEA in their 2011 agreement, following which the IAEA is to provide 
its ``final assessment on the resolution of all past and present 
outstanding issues.'' However, there is no stated

[[Page 13963]]

penalty if Iran continues to refuse to provide sufficient information 
to fully answer the IAEA's questions, which Iran cannot do without 
admitting it had a secret nuclear weapons program.
  Iran has repeatedly agreed to answer the IAEA's questions regarding 
extensive evidence that it had a secret research and development 
program regarding a nuclear device, including fitting it onto a 
ballistic missile. All that resulted was the Iranians stonewalling the 
inspectors.
  Is the failure to resolve the possible military dimensions as 
required by the IAEA a violation of the agreement? Why would Iran 
provide any information now when there is nothing in the agreement to 
compel it to do so?
  Iran currently is the world's leading supporter of terrorism, and 
this agreement provides funding that will drastically expand Iran's 
regional destabilization efforts--from Israel to Iraq to Yemen to 
Lebanon and elsewhere. The Administration disputes the figure of $150 
billion to be released to Iran, but even a portion of that amount would 
provide significant resources to fund Iran's terrorism in the region--
threatening our allies in the region and global security.
  Moreover, the Administration underestimates the revenue from both 
rising oil prices at some point and the tax revenues from increased 
commercial investment and activity.
  Congress should oppose in any way possible the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action, reinstate comprehensive, robust sanctions and direct 
the executive branch to resume the struggle to craft an enforceable 
accord to ensure no nuclear weapons capability for Iran--ever.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Visclosky), the ranking member of the 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense.
  Mr. VISCLOSKY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my strong support for the Iran nuclear 
agreement.
  As the ranking member of the Defense Subcommittee of the House 
Appropriations Committee, I am acutely aware of the harmful influence 
Iran and its proxies have on the security situation in the greater 
Middle East. However, despite my clear and deep distrust of Iran, I 
firmly support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, given the 
improvement it works.
  This hard-fought multilateral agreement will severely limit Iran's 
nuclear ambitions, establish a verifiable and robust inspection regime, 
allow for the timely reinstatement of sanctions for violations of this 
agreement, and in no way limit U.S. military options.
  I cannot argue that the agreement is perfect, and I am frustrated at 
its limited scope. However, in any negotiation, especially one among 
sovereign nations, each having their own economic and security 
considerations, some compromise is necessary. Critically, I believe the 
agreement reached accomplishes the goal of preventing Iran from 
obtaining a nuclear weapon.
  I concur with the sentiments of my esteemed friend and former Senator 
Richard Lugar, who recently wrote that congressional rejection of the 
Iran deal would ``kill the last chance for Washington to reach a 
verifiable Iranian commitment not to build a nuclear weapon'' and 
``destroy the effective coalition that brought Iran to the negotiating 
table.''
  I believe it is vital for the duration of the agreement that the U.S. 
leads the international community to maintain focus on Iran's 
compliance and ensure that Iran does not undermine regional stability 
through other pathways. To accomplish this, we must remain steadfast in 
our commitments to Israel and all our regional partners.
  I ask all to constructively work to improve the security situation in 
the Middle East, rather than using all of their energy to undermine the 
agreement. We cannot rely on force of arms alone to bring lasting 
stability to any region of the world.
  In conclusion, I do hope that the exhaustive multilateral negotiation 
that led to this agreement will serve as a template for future U.S. and 
international engagement on other outstanding issues that have led to 
instability and violence in the region.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Poe), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade.
  Mr. POE of Texas. I thank the chairman, the gentleman from 
California, for his leadership on this critical national security 
issue.
  Mr. Speaker, this Iranian deal promises peace--peace in our time--by 
guaranteeing a nuclear weaponized Iran in our children's time.
  Anyone who has read the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act should support 
this legislation before us. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Act, known as 
the Corker bill, is to allow representatives of the American people--
us--to read what is in the deal before we vote on the deal. The nuclear 
deal with Iran may be the most important international agreement in our 
lifetime.
  The Corker bill is crystal clear when it comes to defining exactly 
what the President needs to provide Congress before the review period 
of 60 days begins. The President is obligated under the law--and let me 
read a portion of the law that the President signed. Here is what it 
says:

       Congress is allowed to have the agreement itself and any 
     additional materials related thereto, including annexes, 
     appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials 
     documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, 
     and any related agreements.

  The logic behind this requirement is simple and essential: Congress 
cannot review an agreement without having access to everything, 
including the fine print. We need to see all the secret side deals, Mr. 
Chairman.
  Testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Kerry, who 
was making the deal for us, said that even he had not seen the secret 
side deals. And these secret deals are not just technical formalities. 
The deals I am talking about are the IAEA agreement to let Iran inspect 
itself at the Parchin military facility. The Parchin facility is known 
as the place where Iran has worked to build nuclear warheads.
  There is absolutely nothing normal about allowing Iran to inspect 
itself. That is what this side agreement apparently does, if we ever 
get to see the whole thing.
  I was a judge in Texas for a long time. It is like having a burglar 
coming to trial and saying: ``Judge, I want 12 burglars on my jury.'' 
We would never let that happen, but we will let Iran inspect itself? We 
want to see these side secret deals.
  And these revelations may be only the tip of the iceberg. What else 
is included in these secret deals, these side deals? Well, we really 
don't know because we haven't been furnished--by law--these deals.
  It is the legal right of Congress to know all of those details before 
voting to approve or disapprove this nuclear agreement. We in Congress 
are the representatives of the people. Isn't it about time we start 
reading all the information before we vote? I don't know that Congress 
has learned that lesson.
  The citizens of this country have a right to know absolutely about 
these side deals. The President signed the Corker bill. It is the law. 
He has to live by it, whether he likes it or not.
  And that is just the way it is.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. In 2002, the President of the United States and this 
Congress voted to address the perceived threat of a mushroom cloud 
coming from Iraq by going to war, a war that unleashed massive violence 
in the Mideast and threatens the world even today.
  The Obama administration, faced with the actual threat of a nuclear 
weaponized Iran, has chosen, instead, the path of diplomacy, the path 
of peace, and I am proud to support this historic agreement.
  As the President said: ``This deal demonstrates that American 
diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change--change that makes 
our country, and the world, safer and more secure.''
  Voices inside and outside the Congress are calling for a rejection of 
this historic agreement, among them the same neocons who stampeded the 
United States into war with Iraq. They

[[Page 13964]]

were wrong then, and they are wrong now. Iran is now 2 to 3 months from 
being able to produce a nuclear weapon, and yet the critics have 
offered no credible alternative to a deal that blocks all the paths to 
a nuclear weapon.
  Now, we know this deal is not perfect. Iran is a bad actor. The 
President and all of us would have much preferred a deal that prohibits 
Iran from enriching any uranium forever and maintains sanctions until 
Iran changes its behavior and becomes a responsible member of the world 
community. But that deal didn't happen--because it never could have 
happened.
  This deal greatly improves the outlook for peace by blocking all of 
Iran's paths to a nuclear weapon, and this is carefully spelled out in 
the agreement itself, often in very technical language: Iran's 
stockpiles of rich uranium will be reduced from enough for 10 bombs to 
less than 1; the number of Iran's installed centrifuges is reduced by 
over two-thirds; and far from trusting Iran, the deal demands the most 
robust, intrusive inspections regime ever in an international 
agreement.
  We heard yesterday, many of us, from the ambassadors from five of our 
allies in the P5+1. These ambassadors said if the United States walks 
away, the deal collapses. Iran would be without any constraints to move 
ahead with its nuclear weapons program. All paths would be open. There 
would be no inspections whatsoever, no insight into Iran's activities. 
The ability of the United States to build meaningful international 
coalitions would be eroded for the foreseeable future.
  I view this upcoming vote on Iran as one of the most important of my 
career, and, my colleagues, I would say that is true for everyone. It 
is one of the most important of my life. For me, the choice is clear: 
diplomacy over war.
  Colleagues, let's remember, nothing is off the table. But why 
wouldn't we choose peace and give peace a chance?

                              {time}  1500

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Part of diplomacy is making certain that you have verification, and 
our problem here is that the Iranians are boasting right now that the 
U.S. is not going to have access--or any other international inspectors 
are going to have access--to their military sites where they do this 
work. The problem is that inspectors don't get 24 hours' notice; they 
get 24 days' notice, and then they go through a process in which Iran 
and China and Russia can block.
  The former head of the CIA Michael Hayden testified in front of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee that we never believed that the uranium at 
Iran's declared facilities would ever make its way into a weapon. We 
always believed that that work would be done somewhere else, in secret.
  So again, if you cannot get international inspectors into Parchin 
where they did that work, what makes you think, what makes us believe, 
that in the future we are going to have international inspectors, once 
that is the established premise, go anywhere else, go anywhere else?
  As Hayden said, requiring consultations between the world powers in 
Iran takes inspections from the technical level and puts it at the 
political level, which he calls a formula for chaos, obfuscation, 
ambiguity, and doubt.
  And we do not even know how bad the capitulation was in the site 
agreements, a capitulation that will undermine the ability to catch 
Iranian cheating. That is why we are concerned about the way this was 
negotiated.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. 
Pompeo), the author of H. Res. 411.
  Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Chairman Royce. A great deal about what we 
have learned has come out of your committee, about what we have learned 
about this deal and what the Iranians' objectives are. So thank you for 
all the hard work that the Foreign Affairs Committee has done related 
to this agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, there are lots of things to say about the Iranian deal 
that this President has set up, but this bill is very narrow and very 
simple and very straightforward. It is aimed to establish a simple 
precedent, which says, if the President signs something into law, he is 
going to fulfill the obligation which he has made for himself.
  I have listened to the debate so far today. I can tell you that we 
have not had any Member of this House stand up and tell you that they 
have read the entire agreement. I suspect that we will not. That is 
because there is no American who has read the entire agreement. That is 
right--not the President of the United States, not the Secretary of 
State, not Undersecretary Sherman. No Member of Congress, no member of 
the public, no American citizen has read this entire agreement. And yet 
we have got Members who say: This a great deal, and I am excited to 
vote for it.
  I don't know how one can feel that way about an agreement that one 
has not read.
  We have Members of Congress stand up and demand that they see the 
text of bills that rename post offices, and yet this is a historic 
agreement, and many of my colleagues are saying they are going to vote 
for it without even knowing what the details are about important 
components of how we are going to verify whether the Iranian regime has 
complied with this agreement. I think that is deeply troubling.
  I think, as Representatives, we have a moral obligation to understand 
what it is we are voting on. I think we have a constitutional duty to 
require that the President comply with his obligations, and I know 
there is a legal obligation for the President to turn over every 
element of this deal.
  Mr. Speaker, in July, Senator Cotton and I traveled to Vienna, where 
we were informed by the Deputy Director of the IAEA of these two secret 
side deals. He looked us straight in the eye and said he had read them 
but I wasn't going to get to.
  I think that is wrong. I think that makes it impossible for a Member 
of Congress to support this agreement.
  He informed me--that is, the Deputy Director of the IAEA informed 
me--that Iranians had read these two secret side deals, but Senator 
Cotton and I weren't going to get to read them.
  I have spent the intervening 50 days asking, cajoling, demanding, 
praying that this President would do what he is required to do under 
Corker-Cardin and what every Member of Congress is entitled to have--
that is, provide us with the deal. Well, we don't have that.
  H. Res. 411 simply says we, as Members of Congress, are going to 
demand that this President comply with what Corker-Cardin sets out. 
Show us the terms of the deal. Allow us the opportunity to read the 
agreement so that we can form judgments and the American people can 
form judgments about its scope.
  In the absence of that, H. Res. 411 makes clear that the President 
can't lift sanctions. That was the deal. In exchange for not demanding 
that this be a treaty, Corker-Cardin said what we want is simple 
transparency; just show us the simple terms of the deal. And this 
President couldn't do it.
  I ask all of my colleagues to vote for H. Res. 411 and demand that 
the President show us the secret side deals.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Becerra), the chairman of the House 
Democratic Caucus.
  Mr. BECERRA. I thank the ranking member, Mr. Schiff, for yielding the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, the goal of America and the international community in 
our negotiations with Iran is and has been to prevent Iran from 
producing and possessing nuclear weapons. By all accounts, Iran had 
already reached a point where it was perhaps just months away from 
crossing that nuclear threshold--I repeat, months away; not years, not 
decades--months away.
  So few votes can be taken more seriously than one intended to halt 
the spread of nuclear weapons. That is why this Congress and the 
American people should support the agreement negotiated to prevent Iran 
from producing and possessing nuclear weapons, and we should vote here 
in this Congress against any of these congressional

[[Page 13965]]

measures attempting to thwart its implementation.
  The negotiated agreement provides for inspection and verification, a 
regime which Iran had to consent to and it must now submit to. That 
regime for inspection and verification is not just credible, it is 
enforceable, and those who have conducted nuclear inspections will tell 
you that. Ask those who deal with nuclear materials, and they will tell 
you that. And ask those who have butted heads with and had to negotiate 
with Iran, and they will tell you that.
  Our ability to respond as well, should Iran decide to regress from 
its obligations, is real and it is robust. Nothing in this negotiated 
agreement is based on trust. The inspections, the penalties, they all 
are mandatory and unambiguous in their terms.
  No deal is perfect. We can all think of ways of making a deal better. 
But thinking is not doing, and speculation won't stop Iran from 
reaching a nuclear weapons capability.
  It should escape no one's notice that every measure, every economic 
sanction in place today against Iran has failed to stop Iran's lurch 
towards a nuclear weapon--remember, perhaps only months away from that 
nuclear threshold.
  It was time for America and our international partners to take this 
to another level before the only alternative available to all of us was 
the use of military force. This is why the U.S., Great Britain, 
Germany, France, Russia, and China joined together to force and drive 
Iran to the negotiated agreement.
  How often, these days, can we utter the names of those six countries 
together working for the same cause?
  This agreement constitutes a meaningful and enforceable check on 
Iran's nuclear ambitions and any intentions it might have to cheat.
  Back in July when this agreement was reached, I stated that it ``must 
constitute measurable progress in halting nuclear proliferation, 
driving the region and the world further away from nuclear 
Armageddon.''
  The negotiated agreement meets that test, and with the support of 
Great Britain, Germany, France, yes, even Russia, and, yes, even China, 
we will hold Iran to that test. And that is why we should support the 
negotiated agreement.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Mrs. Mimi Walters).
  Mrs. MIMI WALTERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in firm 
opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. This deal represents a direct 
threat to the United States, Israel, and the world.
  Recently, I visited Israel and met with Prime Minister Netanyahu. 
Prime Minister Netanyahu was firm in his warning--this is a very bad 
deal, and it could result in grave consequences for the world.
  First, this deal allows Iran to continue to enrich uranium that can 
be used to develop a nuclear weapon.
  Second, this deal abandons the President's promise of anytime, 
anywhere inspections to a process that allows Iran to delay up to 24 
days.
  Third, this agreement would result in the comprehensive lifting of 
the economic sanctions that have stifled Iran's quest for a nuclear 
weapon.
  Bottom line, this deal presents far too many risks for the U.S. and 
far too many rewards for Iran. When the Ayatollah chants ``death to 
America,'' he means it, and that should cause serious concern in every 
American citizen.
  It is time for America to wake up and understand the danger and 
threat this deal presents to our national security.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  First, I want to address briefly the very strained interpretation I 
think my friends are giving the Corker legislation. To accept the 
arguments of the opposition to the deal, you would have to accept the 
proposition that the Corker legislation requires the administration to 
provide an agreement between the IAEA and Iran to which the United 
States is not a party, to which the United States has no obligation, 
and of which the IAEA is precluded from providing to the 
administration. That seems to me a very farfetched interpretation of 
the Corker legislation.
  What's more, if you accept the argument that we can't have a vote on 
the agreement until we have this document between the IAEA and Iran, 
then why has the majority scheduled a vote on the agreement for 
tomorrow? So it is inconsistent with what their own majority has 
scheduled.
  But finally, I don't think anyone is fooled by the nature of this 
procedural motion or bill. No one expects, in the least, that anyone 
who has voiced their opposition to the agreement is somehow going to 
change their opinion if they have access to this private document 
between the IAEA and Iran. What's more, as we know, the IAEA enters 
into these agreements with individual nations around the world, so this 
is not at all unique to the situation with Iran.
  One final point I would like to make: We are now well into the debate 
on the agreement, and for all the arguments that have been advanced as 
to why we should have concerns about provisions in the agreement or 
concerns about Iranian behavior, many of which I share, there is one 
thing we have heard precious little about from the opposition to the 
deal, and that is, what is the credible alternative?
  So, I ask the question: What is the credible alternative?
  And the answer, from what I am able to divine from the scarce 
attention that the opposition pays to this----
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Loudermilk). The time of the gentleman 
has expired.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I yield myself an additional minute.
  The answer, as far as I can discern from the opposition to the deal, 
is this: This is how the alternative would work.
  Congress rejects the deal. Congress, the administration, then, 
somehow goes out and persuades the rest of the world to maintain 
sanctions, even when we rejected an agreement adopted by the other 
major powers, and even when those other powers tell us explicitly that 
there will be no new negotiations. But somehow we maintain the 
sanctions regime under this theoretical alternative.
  And what? Iran gives up all enrichment and comes back to the table 
prepared to capitulate everything?
  That seems so fanciful, so far removed from the reality of the 
situation, that it is no surprise that the opposition devotes very 
little, if any, time to discussing a credible alternative, because, 
indeed, there is no credible alternative.
  So, again, this is why I think it is so important for us to focus on 
how we can strengthen the constraints in the agreement, mitigate the 
risks that we will face, and that is a much more constructive path 
forward than rejection of this, seeing Iran going back to spinning up 
its centrifuges, picking up where they left off at 20 percent 
enrichment and going beyond, picking up where they left off with 19,000 
more centrifuges and thousands of kilos of uranium.
  Is that really the path we want to go down? I think not.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1515

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  There was a credible alternative. There was a credible alternative 
that this body passed by a vote of 400-20, bipartisan legislation which 
the administration blocked in the Senate, legislation which would have 
put that additional pressure on the regime in Iran.
  Knowing that the United States is the 800-pound gorilla, knowing that 
countries do not have the option and companies around the world do not 
have the option of making a choice when they have to make that choice 
between doing business with the United States or doing business with 
Iran, they have to do business with the United States.
  We have put that bill into the Senate. The administration blocked it. 
That legislation would have ensured the type of pressure on Iran that 
would have forced the Ayatollah to make a choice between real 
compromise--real compromise--on his plan to construct a

[[Page 13966]]

weapon or economic collapse for that regime.
  We would have had that leverage in this negotiation. That leverage 
was given up by this administration by blocking that bill in the Senate 
in the last Congress. And, frankly, that option is still available to 
us.
  I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot).
  Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, tomorrow is September 11, a solemn day in our history 
when thousands of Americans lost their lives in the worst terror attack 
in our history.
  It is disturbing that we happen to be debating whether a state 
sponsor of terror should have a glide path to nuclear weapons at this 
time. But we are.
  I have been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee for a long 
time, almost 20 years now. I chaired the Subcommittee on the Middle 
East and North Africa.
  I can tell you without any reservation that this deal with Iran is a 
disaster. It will weaken the security of our allies in the region, and 
it will make Americans less safe here at home.
  If this deal goes through, Iran will receive up to $150 billion. That 
is 25 times what Iran currently spends on its entire military. Does 
that seem like a good idea?
  We are talking about the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism 
here. This money will fund more and more terror across the globe and 
here.
  My district is the greater Cincinnati area. GE Aircraft Engines is 
headquartered there. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base is just up the 
road. They have been top potential targets for ICBMs, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, since the cold war.
  This deal allows Iran to get more sophisticated ICBM technology from 
Russia, which will allow them to target not only Tel Aviv, but 
Washington and New York and Cincinnati. This is just nuts.
  What happened to the ``anytime, anywhere'' inspections? Gone. It will 
take months to get the inspectors in. And, by that time, they will have 
moved the incriminating evidence elsewhere.
  The bottom line is the Obama administration wanted a deal, any deal, 
more than the Iranian mullahs did. This administration was willing to 
sell out Israel and our allies in the region and make us less safe here 
at home.
  This is a lousy, lousy deal, and it ought to be rejected.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume 
just to take a brief moment to respond to my colleague from California.
  I wish it were so simple that a credible alternative was the passage 
of a bill in Congress that had not passed
before that we could pass now and, through the mere act of our 
legislation, compel the rest of the world to join us in a new 
negotiation and a stronger round of sanctions. We simply don't have 
that power to coerce the rest of the world with a bill we pass here in 
Congress.
  What is more, to imagine that a new sanctions bill will somehow force 
Iran to come back to the table ready to concede its entire enrichment 
program is simply not credible. If that is what we are left with, we 
are really left with no really good alternative.
  Again, I think that is precisely why we need to move forward with the 
agreement that has been reached between the world powers and Iran.
  At this point, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Minnesota (Ms. McCollum).
  Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, the Iran nuclear agreement is fundamental 
to the national security of the United States.
  I applaud the tremendous efforts of Secretary Kerry and Secretary 
Moniz, who worked in concert with the world's most powerful military 
and economic nations to reach a verifiable agreement that will deny the 
ability of Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.
  In a past era, when politics was civil and foreign policy was 
bipartisan, this diplomatic agreement would have been championed by 
Republicans and Democrats as a nonproliferation triumph, as it is today 
in Great Britain, our greatest ally. This agreement will prevent Iran 
from developing a nuclear weapon.
  As an Israeli intelligence analyst has said, ``This is not about 
trust and goodwill between sides. It is the strict inspection and 
verification regimes that will ensure the success of the agreement.''
  And if Iran violates the agreement, sanctions will ``snap back'' and 
the international community together will take action.
  I strongly support this agreement, and I am grateful for President 
Obama's unwavering leadership in the face of hostile and unprecedented 
attacks from Republicans and Israel's Prime Minister.
  The New York Times calls the Republican efforts a ``vicious battle 
against Mr. Obama'' and an ``unseemly spectacle of lawmakers siding 
with a foreign leader against their own Commander in Chief.''
  I want to be crystal clear: I support our Commander in Chief.
  The Republicans and Israeli opponents of this agreement are the same 
neocons who sold the war in Iraq to America based on lies, distortions, 
and misinformation.
  And now what do the Republicans offer as an alternative? Nothing. 
They have no plan, no plan other than to kill this agreement, which 
means that Iran will either obtain a nuclear weapon or the U.S. goes to 
war to stop them. Well, let me tell you: I am not interested in another 
Republican war in the Middle East.
  Now is the time to put the national security of the American people 
first. Let's reject this Republican game playing and support a tough 
diplomatic agreement that will stop Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster), the chairman of the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure.
  Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice strong opposition to this fatally 
flawed Iran deal.
  By signing the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, the 
President agreed to allow all documents, secret annexes, and side deals 
to be reviewed by the U.S. Congress.
  But, once again, President Obama has not complied with the law of the 
land and, therefore, does not have the authority to waive sanctions on 
Iran.
  By lifting sanctions on the Iranian regime, a nation that finances 
the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups will receive 
over $100 billion in assets and no doubt will continue to fund 
terrorist organizations at probably greater levels than they are able 
to do today, those terrorist organizations with the motto ``death to 
America.''
  Have we learned nothing from our past mistakes? The same person that 
negotiated the deal with North Korea also led the discussions with 
Iran.
  We must ask ourselves, Is the world a safer place when unstable 
nations like North Korea are testing nuclear weapons?
  The number one responsibility of the United States Congress charged 
to us in the Constitution is national security.
  This agreement jeopardizes our security because I believe, as the 
Prime Minister of Israel believes, that this will ensure that Iran will 
get a nuclear weapon.
  For the security of America and our friends and allies around the 
world, we must oppose this agreement.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished minority 
leader.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
commend him for his extraordinary leadership as the ranking member on 
the
Intelligence Committee, which has served us so well.
  His leadership has served us so well in this debate today and in our 
deliberations leading up to this debate. It has served us well in the 
ongoing as we use intelligence to protect the American people. So I 
thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).

[[Page 13967]]

  I did not go to the well as usual for the leader, but I wanted to be 
here because I have some materials that I want to share with you, Mr. 
Speaker.
  Mr. Speaker, I think today and tomorrow, the next 24 hours, is a 
very, very special time in the Congress of the United States. Members 
will be called upon to make a decision that affects our oath of office, 
to protect and support the Constitution and, of course, the American 
people.
  This is a moment that we are prepared for. That is what I have this 
binder here for, to say I commend my colleagues because they have spent 
thousands of hours reviewing the agreement, reviewing the annexes and 
the classified materials, speaking with experts, gaining information, 
acquiring validation from outside sources other than the administration 
and the agreement itself, conversations with each other, conversations 
with their constituents, all to have, again, a sense of humility that 
we all don't know everything about this subject.
  And we have to get our assurances from those whose judgment we 
respect, as well as to support this agreement on the merits. It is a 
very fine agreement.
  I will take a moment just to talk about my own credentials because I 
see that people are doing that in their statements. I read with 
interest Senator Menendez' statement where he talks about his service 
in the Senate, and I will talk about mine in the House.
  For over 20 years, I have served as a member of the Intelligence 
Committee both as a member of the committee, as the top Democrat on the 
committee, and as the Speaker and leader ex officio over the years, 
longer than anyone in the history of the Congress.
  I went to the Intelligence Committee because I had a major concern 
which sprang from my district, which was a very big interest there in 
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Plowshares, an organization dedicated to that purpose, was founded 
there. They saluted President Reagan and the actions that he took when 
he was President. And they are very actively supporting this agreement 
now.
  But I mentioned my credentials because I brought that experience to 
make a judgment on the agreement after it was negotiated.
  Of course we were briefed, as members of the committee and members of 
the leadership, on the ongoing as to the progress that was being made 
in negotiations.
  Again, having been briefed all along the way, I still was pleasantly 
pleased to see what the final product was. What the President 
negotiated was remarkable. It was remarkable in several respects.
  One was that the P5, the permanent members of the Security Council, 
plus one--that would be Germany--the P5 nations negotiated this 
agreement with Iran: China, Russia, France, the U.K., the United 
States.
  This is quite remarkable, that all of those countries could come to 
agreement. And an important part of that leadership was the leadership 
of President Obama to have that engagement sustained over a couple-year 
period.
  Now, President Bush took us a bit down this path, and that is 
referenced in an op-ed that was put forth by Brent Scowcroft.
  When he supported this legislation, he says that ``The deal ensures 
that this will be the case for at least 15 years and likely longer.''
  But he talks about the fact that this has been a goal, as what Ronald 
Reagan did with the Soviet Union arms control and what President Nixon 
did with China. It was a negotiation.
  And he talked about the fact that this particular agreement was one 
that was worked on under the presidency of President Bush. Actually, he 
places it in time.
  So let me read his comment:
  ``Congress again faces a momentous decision regarding U.S. policy 
toward the Middle East. The forthcoming vote on the nuclear deal 
between the P5+1 and Iran (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, or JCPOA) will show the world whether the United States has the 
will and sense of responsibility to help stabilize the Middle East, or 
whether it will contribute to further turmoil, including the possible 
spread of nuclear weapons. Strong words perhaps, but clear language is 
helpful in the cacophony of today's media.
  ``In my view, the JCPOA''--as it is known--``meets the key objective, 
shared by recent administrations of both parties, that Iran limit 
itself to a strictly civilian nuclear program with unprecedented 
verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the U.N. Security Council.''
  He goes on for a couple of pages.
  Mr. Speaker, I will submit for the Record Brent Scowcroft's 
statement.

              [From the Washington Post, August 23, 2015]

   The Iran Deal: An Epochal Moment That Congress Shouldn't Squander

                          (By Brent Scowcroft)

       Congress again faces a momentous decision regarding U.S. 
     policy toward the Middle East. The forthcoming vote on the 
     nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran (known as the Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) will show the world 
     whether the United States has the will and sense of 
     responsibility to help stabilize the Middle East, or whether 
     it will contribute to further turmoil, including the possible 
     spread of nuclear weapons. (Strong words perhaps, but clear 
     language is helpful in the cacophony of today's media)
       In my view, the JCPOA meets the key objective, shared by 
     recent administrations of both parties, that Iran limit 
     itself to a strictly civilian nuclear program with 
     unprecedented verification and monitoring by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. Security 
     Council. Iran has committed to never developing or acquiring 
     a nuclear weapon; the deal ensures that this will be the case 
     for at least 15 years and likely longer, unless Iran 
     repudiates the inspection regime and its commitments under 
     the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
     Additional Protocol.
       There is no more credible expert on nuclear weapons than 
     Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, who led the technical 
     negotiating team. When he asserts that the JCPOA blocks each 
     of Iran's pathways to the fissile material necessary to make 
     a nuclear weapon, responsible people listen. Twenty-nine 
     eminent U.S. nuclear scientists have endorsed Moniz's 
     assertions.
       If the United States could have handed Iran a ``take it or 
     leave it'' agreement, the terms doubtless would have been 
     more onerous on Iran. But negotiated agreements, the only 
     ones that get signed in times of peace, are compromises by 
     definition. It is what President Reagan did with the Soviet 
     Union on arms control; it is what President Nixon did with 
     China.
       And as was the case with specific agreements with the 
     Soviet Union and China, we will continue to have significant 
     differences with Iran on important issues, including human 
     rights, support for terrorist groups and meddling in the 
     internal affairs of neighbors. We must never tire of working 
     to persuade Iran to change its behavior on these issues, and 
     countering it where necessary. And while I believe the JCPOA, 
     if implemented scrupulously by Iran, will help engage Tehran 
     constructively on regional issues, we must always remember 
     that its sole purpose is to halt the country's nuclear 
     weapons activities.
       Israel's security, an abiding U.S. concern, will be 
     enhanced by the full implementation of the nuclear deal. Iran 
     is fully implementing the interim agreement that has placed 
     strict limits on its nuclear program since January 2014 while 
     the final agreement was being negotiated. If Iran 
     demonstrates the same resolve under the JCPOA, the world will 
     be a much safer place. And if it does not, we will know in 
     time to react appropriately.
       Let us not forget that Israel is the only country in the 
     Middle East with overwhelming retaliatory capability. I have 
     no doubt that Iran's leaders are well aware of Israel's 
     military capabilities. Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation 
     Council (GCC) members have impressive conventional 
     militaries, and the United States is committed to enhancing 
     their capabilities.
       Congress rightfully is conducting a full review and hearing 
     from proponents and opponents of the nuclear deal. However, 
     the seeming effort to make the JCPOA the ultimate test of 
     Congress's commitment to Israel is probably unprecedented in 
     the annals of relations between two vibrant democracies. Let 
     us be clear: There is no credible alternative were Congress 
     to prevent U.S. participation in the nuclear deal. If we walk 
     away, we walk away alone. The world's leading powers worked 
     together effectively because of U.S. leadership. To turn our 
     back on this accomplishment would be an abdication of the 
     United States' unique role and responsibility, incurring 
     justified dismay among our allies and friends. We would lose 
     all leverage over Iran's nuclear activities. The 
     international sanctions regime would dissolve. And no member 
     of Congress should be

[[Page 13968]]

     under the illusion that another U.S. invasion of the Middle 
     East would be helpful.
       So I urge strongly that Congress support this agreement. 
     But there is more that Congress should do. Implementation and 
     verification will be the key to success, and Congress has an 
     important role. It should ensure that the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant bodies and U.S. 
     intelligence agencies have all the resources necessary to 
     facilitate inspection and monitor compliance. Congress should 
     ensure that military assistance, ballistic missile defense 
     and training commitments that the United States made to GCC 
     leaders at Camp David in May are fully funded and implemented 
     without delay. And it should ensure that the United States 
     works closely with the GCC and other allies to moderate 
     Iranian behavior in the region, countering it where 
     necessary.
       My generation is on the sidelines of policymaking now; this 
     is a natural development. But decades of experience strongly 
     suggest that there are epochal moments that should not be 
     squandered. President Nixon realized it with China. 
     Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush realized it with the 
     Soviet Union. And I believe we face it with Iran today.
  


                              {time}  1530

  Ms. PELOSI. I also want to quote another Republican--Brent Scowcroft 
served in the administration of President George Herbert Walker Bush--
Senator John Warner joined Senator Carl Levin. These are two chairmen 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee--one a Democrat, but before him, 
a Republican, John Warner. They talk about they support this. They say:

       The deal on the table is a strong agreement on many counts, 
     and it leaves in place the robust deterrence and credibility 
     of a military option. We urge our former colleagues not to 
     take any action which would undermine the deterrent value of 
     a coalition that participates in and could support the use of 
     a military option. The failure of the United States to join 
     the agreement would have that effect.

  Mr. Speaker, I submit Carl Levin and John Warner's statement for the 
Record.

                Why Hawks Should Also Back the Iran Deal

                    (By Carl Levin and John Warner)

       We both were elected to the Senate in 1978 and privileged 
     to have served together on the Senate Armed Services 
     Committee for 30 years, during which we each held committee 
     leadership positions of chairman or ranking minority member. 
     We support the Iran Agreement negotiated by the United States 
     and other leading world powers for many reasons, including 
     its limitations on Iran's nuclear activities, its strong 
     inspections regime, and the ability to quickly re-impose 
     sanctions should Iran violate its provisions.
       But we also see a compelling reason to support the 
     agreement that has gotten little attention: Rejecting it 
     would weaken the deterrent value of America's military 
     option.
       As former chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
     we have always believed that the U.S. should keep a strong 
     military option on the table. If Iran pursues a nuclear 
     weapon, some believe that military action is inevitable if 
     we're to prevent it from reaching its goal. We don't 
     subscribe to that notion, but we are skeptical that, should 
     Iran attempt to consider moving to a nuclear weapon, we could 
     deter them from pursuing it through economic sanctions alone.
       How does rejecting the agreement give America a weaker 
     military hand to play? Let's imagine a world in which the 
     United States rejects the nuclear accord that all other 
     parties have embraced. The sanctions now in place would 
     likely not be maintained and enforced by all the parties to 
     the agreement, so those would lose their strong deterrent 
     value. Iran would effectively argue to the world that it had 
     been willing to negotiate an agreement, only to have that 
     agreement rejected by a recalcitrant America.
       In that world, should we find credible evidence that Iran 
     is starting to move toward a nuclear weapon, the United 
     States would almost certainly consider use of the military 
     option to stop that program. But it's highly unlikely that 
     our traditional European allies, let alone China and Russia, 
     would support the use of the military option since we had 
     undermined the diplomatic path. Iran surely would know this, 
     and so from the start, would have less fear of a military 
     option than if it faced a unified coalition.
       While the United States would certainly provide the 
     greatest combat power in any military action, allies and 
     other partners make valuable contributions--not just in 
     direct participation, but also in access rights, logistics, 
     intelligence, and other critical support. If we reject the 
     agreement, we risk isolating ourselves and damaging our 
     ability to assemble the strongest possible coalition to stop 
     Iran.
       In short, then, rejecting the Iran deal would erode the 
     current deterrent value of the military option, making it 
     more likely Iran might choose to pursue a nuclear weapon, and 
     would then make it more costly for the U.S. to mount any 
     subsequent military operation. It would tie the hands of any 
     future president trying to build international participation 
     and support for military force against Iran should that be 
     necessary.
       Those who think the use of force against Iran is almost 
     inevitable should want the military option to be as credible 
     and effective as possible, both as a deterrent to Iran's 
     nuclear ambitions and in destroying Iran's nuclear weapons 
     program should that become necessary. For that to be the 
     case, the United States needs to be a party to the agreement 
     rather than being the cause of its collapse.
       In our many years on the Armed Services Committee, we saw 
     time and again how America is stronger when we fight 
     alongside allies. Iran must constantly be kept aware that a 
     collective framework of deterrence stands resolute, and that 
     if credible evidence evolves that Iran is taking steps 
     towards a nuclear arsenal, it would face the real possibility 
     of military action by a unified coalition of nations to stop 
     their efforts.
       The deal on the table is a strong agreement on many counts, 
     and it leaves in place the robust deterrence and credibility 
     of a military option. We urge our former colleagues not to 
     take any action which would undermine the deterrent value of 
     a coalition that participates in and could support the use of 
     a military option. The failure of the United States to join 
     the agreement would have that effect.

  Ms. PELOSI. Again, I refer to the statements of my colleagues. They 
are thoughtful; they are serious, and they are courageous in support of 
the agreement.
  I would like to thank President Obama and the entire administration 
for being available as Members sought clarification to respond to their 
concerns. I want to thank the President, Secretary Kerry, Secretary 
Moniz, Secretary Lew, and so many others for their leadership and 
availability to us in a bipartisan way in our Democratic Caucus.
  For years, Iran's rapidly accelerating enrichment capability and 
burgeoning nuclear stockpile has represented one of the greatest 
threats to peace and security anywhere in the world. We all stipulate 
to that. That is why we need an agreement.
  That is why I am so pleased that we have so many statements of 
validation from people. The experts say:

       This agreement is one of the greatest diplomatic 
     achievements of the 21st century.

  It is no wonder that such a diverse and extraordinary constellation 
of experts have made their voices heard in support of this--again, I 
use the word--``extraordinary'' accord.
  On the steps of the Capitol the other day with our veterans and with 
our Gold Star moms who have lost their sons, we heard the words of 
diplomats and soldiers, generals and admirals and diplomats by the 
score--Democrats, Republicans, and nonpartisan.
  We heard from our most distinguished nuclear physicists; we heard 
from those scientists, and we heard from people of faith. I would like 
to quote some of them. More than 100 Democratic and Republican former 
diplomats and ambassadors wrote:

       In our judgment, the JCPOA deserves congressional support 
     and the opportunity to show that it can work. We firmly 
     believe that the most effective way to protect U.S. national 
     security and that of our allies and friends is to ensure that 
     tough-minded diplomacy has a chance to succeed before 
     considering other more risky alternatives.

  That is the diplomats.
  The generals and admirals wrote:

       There is no better option to prevent an Iranian nuclear 
     weapon. If the Iranians cheat, our advanced technology, 
     intelligence, and the inspections will reveal it, and U.S. 
     military options remain on the table. And if the deal is 
     rejected by America, the Iranians could have a nuclear weapon 
     within a year. The choice is that stark.

  Twenty-nine of our Nation's most prominent nuclear scientists and 
engineers wrote:

       We consider that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action the 
     United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will 
     advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East 
     and can serve as a guidepost for future nonproliferation 
     agreements.

  I quote ``and can serve as a guidepost for future nonproliferation 
agreements.''

       This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent 
     constraints than any previously negotiated nonproliferation 
     framework.

  They went on to say more.
  Mr. Speaker, 440 rabbis urged Congress to endorse the statement, 
writing:


[[Page 13969]]

       The Obama administration has successfully brought together 
     the major international powers to confront Iran over its 
     nuclear ambitions. The broad international sanctions move 
     Iran to enter this historic agreement.

  They urge support.
  Mr. Speaker, 4,100 Catholic nuns wrote to Congress stating:

       As women of faith, followers of the one who said, ``Blessed 
     are the peacemakers,'' we urge that you risk on the side of 
     peace and vote to approve the Iran nuclear deal.

  Treasury Secretary Jack Lew warned of the hazards of rejecting the 
agreement, reminding us that foreign governments will not continue to 
make costly sacrifices at our demand. I say this in response to 
something that my distinguished colleague from California said:

       Indeed, they would be more likely to blame us for walking 
     away from a credible solution to one of the world's greatest 
     security threats and would continue to reengage with Iran.

  He went on to say:

       Instead of toughening the sanctions, the decision by 
     Congress to unilaterally reject the deal will end a decade of 
     isolation of Iran and put the United States at odds with the 
     rest of the world.

  We certainly don't want to do that.
  Today, something very interesting happened, Mr. Speaker. It was a 
statement put forth by U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, French 
President Francois Hollande, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. They 
wrote an op-ed for the Washington Post and said:

       This is an important moment. It is a crucial opportunity at 
     a time of heightened global uncertainty to show what 
     diplomacy can achieve.

  This is not an agreement based on trust or any assumption about how 
Iran may look in 10 or 15 years. It is based on detailed, tightly 
written controls that are verifiable and long-lasting.
  They went on to say:

       We condemn in no uncertain terms that Iran does not 
     recognize the existence of the State of Israel and the 
     unacceptable language that Iran's leaders use about Israel. 
     Israel's security matters are and will remain our key 
     interests, too. We would not have reached the nuclear deal 
     with Iran if we did not think that it removed a threat to the 
     region and the nonproliferation regime as a whole.
       We are confident that the agreement provides the foundation 
     for resolving a conflict on Iran's nuclear program 
     permanently. This is why we now want to embark on the full 
     implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
     once all national procedures are complete.

  Our own President wrote to Congressman Jerry Nadler:

       I believe that JCPOA, which cuts off every pathway Iran 
     could have to a nuclear weapon and creates the must robust 
     verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear 
     program, is a very good deal for the United States, for the 
     State of Israel, and for the region as a whole.

  Many of us share the views that had been expressed by those in a 
position to make a difference on this agreement.
  Tuesday night, again after the votes here in this House, dozens of 
Members supporting the nuclear agreement stood on the steps of the 
Capitol. We were honored to be joined by military veterans and Gold 
Star families, men and women whose sacrifices remind us of the 
significance of putting diplomacy before war. They remind us of the 
significance of this historic transformational achievement.
  Congratulations. These nuclear physicists, they congratulated the 
President on this agreement. I congratulate him, too.
  Our men and women in uniform and our veterans and our Gold Star moms 
remind us of our first duty, to protect and defend the American people. 
I am pleased to say we achieve that with this agreement.
  I urge my colleagues to support the agreement and to vote ``no'' on 
the other items that are being put before us today.
  I think we all have to, as we evaluate our decision, ask ourselves: 
If we were the one deciding vote as to whether this agreement would go 
forward or that we would fall behind, how would we vote? None of us has 
the luxury to walk away from that responsibility.
  I am proud of the statements that our colleagues have made, the 
agreement the President has reached; and I know that tomorrow we will 
sustain whatever veto the President may have to make.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. McHenry), the deputy chief whip and a member of the 
Financial Services Committee.
  Mr. McHENRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for his leadership on 
this important matter of national security.
  Today, I rise in opposition to this bad nuclear deal the President 
has negotiated. I don't oppose it because the President negotiated it. 
I don't oppose it because it was brought forth by this administration.
  I oppose it because it is bad for the security of America. It is bad 
for the security of the world. It is bad for the security of our most 
sacred ally, Israel. It is bad for the nonproliferation strategies the 
world has had to mean that we have fewer nuclear weapons on this 
planet.
  Now, you have to ask yourself a few basic questions: Has Iran 
warranted the trust of the international community to enter into this 
agreement? The answer is no. It is very clear by their actions over the 
last 20 and 30 years that they should not be trusted.
  Number two, we hear the Supreme Leader of Iran saying, time and 
again, ``death to America and Israel.'' He has declared his nation is 
committed to the destruction of Israel. He has called America the Great 
Satan.
  Now, how can we believe a country is fully committed to our 
destruction yet, at the same time, uphold their end of the bargain? We 
can't. We must oppose this agreement based off of what is best for 
international security and what is best for our Nation's security.
  We also have to oppose this because it will mean, during my lifetime 
or during my children's lifetime, we will have more nuclear weapons, 
not fewer.
  This is a bad agreement, and we should reject it.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield the balance 
of my time and the ability to control the time to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cummings).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, since 1998, I have had the privilege of sending a group 
of high school students each year to Israel where they are paired with 
Israeli teens to learn about what life is really like in Israel.
  When these students return, they have learned life lessons that stay 
with them forever, but just as important, they have made friendships 
that will also last a lifetime.
  I am a proud and strong friend and ally of Israel, and I have been 
for a very long time. This is why I believe we must support the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action and why I am here to oppose the 
resolution. The world cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran, and I will 
not stand by as Iran continues to gain ground towards that objective.
  This agreement puts real, concrete steps in place to prevent Iran 
from obtaining nuclear weapons, steps that have already begun to 
degrade Iran's ability to produce nuclear material.
  According to the independent experts, this deal ``effectively blocks 
the plutonium pathway for more than 15 years.'' These experts also 
assess that, without the deal, Iran may shrink its breakout time to a 
few weeks or even days.
  The steps outlined in the agreement complement existing prohibitions 
on the development of a nuclear weapon by Iran.

                              {time}  1545

  Under this agreement, the international community will have 
unprecedented access to ensure that Iran never gets one.
  This agreement will not be monitored merely according to the goodwill 
of Iran. Its enforcement mechanisms are verifiable and transparent.
  Under this agreement, there will be more inspectors than ever in 
Iran. These inspectors will have daily access to Iran's declared 
nuclear sites and will

[[Page 13970]]

be able to have access to undeclared sites that they suspect may be 
involved in nuclear activity. Inspections will be regular, and they 
will be invasive. They will not be oriented around Iranian convenience 
but, rather, around compliance, ensuring that the international 
community remains safe and, indeed, informed.
  If at any time Iran is found to be in violation of the agreement, the 
full brunt of international sanctions will snap back, once again 
hobbling the Iranian economy.
  It is important to note that many sanctions will still be in place. 
Relief will come only from those sanctions
related to nuclear activities. Bans
on technology exports, restrictions against the transfer of 
conventional weaponry and WMD technology, sanctions based on terrorism 
activities, and bans on foreign assistance will all continue.
  Without this deal, experts estimate that Iran will have enough 
nuclear material for weapons in 2 or 3 months. During negotiations, 
Iran stopped installing centrifuges, but they will resume if this 
agreement falls apart, potentially accelerating that timeline.
  The opponents of this agreement propose rejecting this deal and 
pursuing a stronger one, but that plan could have grave consequences. 
If the United States rejects this deal, Iran will continue developing 
more sophisticated enrichment technologies. By the time any new 
negotiations begin, Iran would likely already be a nuclear state. There 
is also no guarantee that Iran would return to the negotiating table 
after having wasted 2 years on this agreement.
  Is this worth the risk? I do not believe that it is. We should 
support this agreement.
  This agreement accomplishes a critical goal: establishing a set of 
verifiable provisions to prevent Iran from developing enough nuclear 
material to build a bomb.
  This deal does not change, in any way, our solemn commitment to 
protecting Israel, nor does this prevent us from using any other 
measures if Iran should violate this agreement, including using the 
full force of the strongest military in the world.
  But the United States must lead not only with our military might; we 
have worked diligently to achieve a peaceful resolution to this issue, 
and it is time for us to show our integrity and values for which we 
stand.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson), a true American hero who served this country 
with distinction in Korea and in Vietnam and as a prisoner of war for 
nearly 7 years.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the chairman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, at this grave hour, I come to express my opposition to 
President Obama's deal with Iran.
  To this day, Iran chants ``death to America.'' In fact, Iran is the 
world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. Its regime has the blood of 
America's servicemembers on its hands.
  Iran is our enemy.
  The President asks us to trust Iran; but what has Iran done to earn 
our trust? Nothing. This is a deal of surrender, and, with it, Iran 
will go nuclear.
  The alternative isn't war. The alternative is to strike a better 
deal. I say this as one of the few Members of Congress who has seen 
combat, who has fought two wars, and who has spent nearly 7 years as a 
POW.
  So I say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle: Do the 
right thing. Put country above party. Listen to the American people. 
Uphold your most sacred duty--safeguard our Republic from those who 
seek to destroy it. Vote this deal down.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).
  Ms. NORTON. I thank my good friend for yielding to me on this 
important subject for our country today and in the foreseeable future.
  Mr. Speaker, while many Republicans have been trying to find a way, 
just this very day, not to have a vote on the Iran agreement, I have 
been searching for a way to represent my 650,000 constituents by voting 
on any version offered. Five nations, whose systems differ from one 
another in every conceivable way, and the United Nations have approved 
this deal, but the Republicans are torn on whether to even vote on the 
deal at all.
  No wonder.
  Left with no credible argument against the deal, itself, Republicans 
have changed the subject, even knowing that Iran is close to getting 
the bomb as I speak and risking the loss of U.S. international 
credibility. Instead, Republicans cite side agreements. However, they 
have all of the information available to any nation on all nuclear 
agreements, or they cite issues not under negotiation at all, like 
Iran's role in the Middle East.
  Here is what my constituents cite, Mr. Speaker:
  $12,000 in Federal taxes per resident--the most per capita in the 
United States--but no vote on the Iran deal or on anything else on this 
House floor. With statehood, D.C. would vote ``yes'' and be counted 
just as Uncle Sam counts our taxes every single year.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Pittenger), a member of the Committee on Financial 
Services.
  Mr. PITTENGER. I thank the chairman for yielding this time. I thank 
him for his strong leadership to reject this administration's agreement 
with Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, this deal is a dramatic reversal of U.S. policy in the 
Middle East and towards the Iranian Government. For years, the Iranian 
Government has actively opposed U.S. interests in the region and has 
directly financed some of the world's most oppressive terrorist groups, 
most notably, Hezbollah.
  As a result of this agreement, over $100 billion will be released 
from repatriated oil profits back to the mullahs in Iran, and 46 banks 
in Iran will now be approved to transmit money through the 
international financial system. Look at what they have done previously 
with their finances. We gave them $700 million a month as a 
precondition just to come to the negotiations--$12 billion over a 16-
month period. You can see their footprint in Lebanon; you can see it in 
Iraq; you can see it in Yemen; you can see it in Syria; you can see it 
in South America.
  Mr. Speaker, what we are doing today is going to translate into 
increased, enhanced terrorist activities throughout the world. May we 
look back on this day as one of the most consequential votes we will 
take tomorrow in this Chamber, as consequential as what we did in 
declaring war against Japan and Germany. May we recognize the reality 
of what is taking place.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. DeSaulnier).
  Mr. DeSAULNIER. I thank the gentleman from Maryland, the 
distinguished ranking member of the committee.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to speak as a freshman Member of this body who 
has been able to learn a great deal about this difficult, difficult 
area of the world--a place where America has invested too many lives 
and too much money--and to talk about my journey in coming to the 
decision to vote with the President and feeling like he deserves a 
congratulatory note for this accomplishment in a very difficult and 
complex piece of diplomacy, perhaps equal to the difficulty and the 
complexity of this area of the world which has had so much turmoil and 
history.
  I have spent the last 60 days taking every opportunity to listen to 
constituents and experts.
  I, with a small group of my freshman colleagues, have been personally 
briefed at the White House by President Obama. I traveled to Israel for 
the first time and met with high-level Israeli officials for almost 2 
hours, including with Prime Minister Netanyahu. I learned about the 
3,000 years of history and animosity amongst groups and also of the 
very close proximity in which those groups have lived for thousands of 
years and shared their difficult history. I met

[[Page 13971]]

with leaders of our international coalition, and I continue to be a 
staunch supporter of the U.S.-Israeli relationship as, I believe, most 
of my colleagues on both sides are.
  I held six townhalls--a certain measure of masochism, perhaps, by a 
freshman Member--that took hours, meeting with both pro and opponents 
in my district, in the San Francisco Bay Area. We received over 1,000 
phone calls, emails, and constituent questions on this issue, and more 
than 70 percent of them were in favor of the proposal.
  Ultimately, at the heart of my decision in supporting a deal is the 
possibility that this deal promotes the long-term investment in peace 
on this difficult part of our planet. In addition, it creates security 
and stability, ultimately, for the United States. I believe that this 
accord is our best option for achieving both of those goals.
  As recently as yesterday, I was able to listen to advisers and 
leaders who represent our coalition partners. The sanctions regime, due 
in large part to the European Union's participation, deflated Iran's 
economy and forced them to the negotiating table. In 2012, Iran's 
economy shrank for the first time in two decades by almost 2 percent.
  This is the final proposal, I believe, if the U.S. were to withdraw. 
Our coalition partners that helped negotiate this deal and create the 
ability and the leverage to negotiate will not come back to the table. 
Our authority and standing in the world community will be severely 
diminished.
  There are some who say that Iran cannot be trusted, and I think we 
all agree on that. The future of this rollout is not black-and-white, 
and it has many unknowns and hypotheticals on both the supporters' and 
the opponents' sides. We do not know if Iran will cheat, but we do know 
that oversight and compliance is strong and consequential, and 
consequences for cheating will be enforced by the international 
community.
  In my view, it is in the national security interests of the United 
States of America to support this agreement. It is an opportunity to 
let diplomacy work and to put it in action.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Kentucky (Mr. Guthrie), a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee 
and the Education and the Workforce Committee.
  Mr. GUTHRIE. I thank the chairman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my disapproval of President 
Obama's deal with Iran.
  I ask myself this question: Has Iran earned the right to be trusted?
  We must ask this because we know there are secret deals that my 
colleagues and I were not privileged to. Therefore, a vote to support 
this deal is a vote to trust Iran.
  The behavior of Iran's leaders over the last 30 years offers no 
indication that the next decade will be any different; and now, with 
these secret details, we cannot know if the deal is verifiable, 
enforceable, and accountable.
  The people who know Iran best trust them the least. Iran's neighbors 
have already requested additional arms from the United States to 
protect themselves from this very deal. Any deal should include these 
three powerful principles: safety, security, stability. This deal falls 
short, and I cannot support it.

                              {time}  1600

  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, this has probably been one of the most 
difficult decisions I have had to make during my time in Congress. For 
the record, I still have deep reservations about the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action.
  However, while it is not without flaws or risks, I believe the plan 
presents our best chance to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions and protect 
the security of the United States and our allies, particularly the 
State of Israel.
  The preamble to the agreement is both critically important and 
crystal clear when it states that ``Iran reaffirms that under no 
circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear 
weapons.'' And we will hold Iran to it in perpetuity, as they have 
committed.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not trust Iran. But this agreement is built on 
verification, not trust, and I believe that it includes the needed 
monitoring and enforcement tools.
  If Iran violates the deal in any way, increased international 
monitoring will allow us to know quickly and act decisively. 
Conversely, if we were to abandon this agreement despite the 
international community's support, Iran's nuclear ambitions could go 
unchecked, and that is not a risk I am willing to take.
  Mr. Speaker, like many of my constituents, I still have significant 
concerns with the agreement and with Iran's pattern of behavior, 
particularly its support of terrorism.
  That is why I am committed to exercising rigorous oversight of this 
plan's implementation, leaving no doubt that cheating will result in 
severe repercussions.
  As the President has said publicly and he has reiterated to me 
personally, all of our options remain on the table when it comes to 
responding to failed Iranian commitments, including military options 
and the reimposition of sanctions, either in whole or in part, either 
unilaterally or multilaterally.
  Additionally, all the terrorism-related sanctions are outside the 
scope of this agreement and remain in force, and I am committed to 
providing any further tools necessary to constrain Iran's destructive 
nonnuclear activities.
  Mr. Speaker, Congress should also establish an oversight commission 
or Select Committee to ensure Iranian adherence to the deal and 
recommend courses of action in response to any breach of Iranian 
commitments.
  This would be in addition to the Oversight Committee related to 
Intelligence or the Foreign Affairs Committee or other committees, 
including the Armed Services Committee that might also have 
jurisdiction.
  The more eyes on Iran in this agreement in making sure that they are 
living up to the commitments, the better.
  Mr. Speaker, we need to show our resolve and ability to execute the 
fundamental objectives of the JCPOA, preventing an Iranian nuclear 
weapon.
  While I have deep concerns about aspects of the deal, rejecting it 
now would potentially lead us down an even darker path without the 
support of the international community and with severe and 
unpredictable consequences.
  I will vote to support this deal and what I believe is now our best 
chance to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threat, our best chance 
for an international community united in support of our interests, and 
our best option for peace. We must give diplomacy a chance to work.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Donovan), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, I believe the House of Representatives will 
stand on the right side of history in rejecting this dangerous deal. I 
have asked myself, as many people in this Chamber have asked, ``Why is 
this a good deal for the United States?''
  Iran is holding four Americans illegally hostage in their country. 
That was not part of the negotiations. Iran continues to support 
worldwide terrorism. There is no restrictions on that in this deal.
  Fifty billion dollars will be immediately released to the regime with 
no restrictions on its use. That was not part of the deal. They 
continue to develop ICBMs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, that 
could reach the American mainland. There were no restrictions on that 
during this deal.
  We are told by the administration that, if we reject this deal, the 
rest of the P5+1 will not join us. Well, last week Iran's top cleric 
said America remains Iran's number one enemy.
  Days after the deal was announced, Iran's Supreme Leader called for 
``death of America,'' not the death of France, not the death of Great 
Britain, not the death of Russia, not the death of China. It was the 
death of America.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hultgren). The time of the gentleman has 
expired.

[[Page 13972]]


  Mr. ROYCE. I yield another 30 seconds to the gentleman.
  Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, since when is America afraid to stand 
alone?
  I was one of the fortunate freshman that got to go to Israel recently 
and I sat with the Prime Minister, who told us this deal guarantees 
that, in 15 years, Iran will have a nuclear arsenal. Just yesterday the 
Supreme Leader tweeted that Israel won't exist in 25 years.
  I also visited the Holocaust Museum and, like many people who weren't 
alive during that historic tragedy, I asked myself, ``Why didn't anyone 
stop this?'' Well, my fear is that some day in the near future people 
are going to ask, ``Why didn't America stop Iran?''
  The bottom line is that this is a bad deal for America. It is a bad 
deal for Israel, and it is a bad deal for the world.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time each 
side has?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 14 minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from California has 27 minutes remaining.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Kentucky (Mr. Yarmuth).
  Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this historic 
agreement with Iran. It is good for America, absolutely critical for 
Israel, and is a historic step toward a more stable Middle East.
  We entered into P5+1 negotiations with one prevailing goal, to 
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That is what this 
agreement does.
  Under this deal, Iran can never have a nuclear weapon. I want to 
repeat that because there has been a lot of false reports and 
fearmongering about Iran being able to build a bomb in 10 years or 15 
years. Under this deal, Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.
  This is the third provision of the deal: ``Iran affirms that under no 
circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear 
weapons.''
  Iran has agreed to never have a nuclear weapon. With this agreement 
in place, we will have an unprecedented inspection regimen to guarantee 
it.
  IAEA inspectors will have more access in Iran than in any other 
country in the world. No nuclear site is off limits. They will have 
access wherever they need it, whenever they need it, and at every 
single stage of the process.
  This agreement is built on verification and full cooperation. If Iran 
fails to meet either of those standards, if at any point inspectors 
believe that Iran is stonewalling or being uncooperative, the deal is 
violated and strict sanctions return.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a good deal, and there is no possibility of a 
so-called better deal. Our partner nations have made it clear that, if 
we walk away from this agreement, they will not support the tough 
sanctions that have brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first 
place.
  That is the reality. As a result, a vote against this agreement is a 
vote to weaken international sanctions against Iran. It is a vote to 
allow them a clear path to a nuclear weapon, and it is a vote to make 
Israel less safe and the Middle East more dangerous.
  I urge my colleagues to recognize that reality, to support this 
agreement and allow our President and our Nation to take these historic 
steps toward a more peaceful world.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Latta).
  Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to 
President Obama's disastrous Iran nuclear deal. This deal not only 
threatens the safety and security of the United States, one of our 
closest allies, Israel, it threatens the safety and security of the 
entire world.
  It fails to prevent Iran from eventually having a nuclear weapon, the 
exact opposite of what it is intended to do. Iran now simply just has 
to wait a decade before becoming a nuclear power.
  In the meantime, because Iran gets everything they need and want in 
return for so-called reductions in their nuclear capabilities, they can 
dramatically expand their dominance in the region, build up their 
ballistic missile and weapons capabilities, grow their economy and 
military, and have even greater ability to fund and promote terrorism.
  Mr. Speaker, can we really expect to trust a government like Iran's 
whose leaders chant ``Death to America''?
  I strongly advise my colleagues to oppose this horrible deal. Our 
Nation and our allies deserve better.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut (Ms. Esty).
  Ms. ESTY. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action not as a perfect agreement, but as the only viable path 
forward to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. I do not come 
to this decision lightly or easily.
  Iran is a deadly state sponsor of terrorism, and the Iranian regime 
has repeatedly threatened America and our close ally, Israel.
  Despite decades of sanctions by the United States, Iran has come 
within months of succeeding in its effort to acquire sufficient 
material for a nuclear bomb.
  Mr. Speaker, the question before us today is not, Is this a perfect 
agreement that addresses all of Iran's dangerous behavior? The truth is 
there are no perfect options in dealing with this regime.
  Instead, we must ask: ``Will this agreement verifiably prevent a 
nuclear armed Iran? Will this agreement advance American national 
security interests in the region? Will this agreement advance the 
national security of our ally, Israel?''
  Through a very long and deliberate process, I have reached the 
conclusion that the answer to these three questions is yes.
  I believe that it is better to have this imperfect international 
agreement that we can aggressively enforce than to have no agreement at 
all.
  During August I spent a week in Israel meeting with political and 
military leaders and hearing from ordinary citizens who are deeply 
concerned about Iran's intentions.
  As I stood on the Golan Heights, I could see the smoke rising from 
shelling in Syria. That smoke is a visible sign of the chaos and danger 
in the region for both the United States and for the entire Middle 
East.
  I am keenly aware of the very real threats Iran poses to Israel's 
security and to our national security. I share the deep concerns of 
many of my constituents, of many Jewish leaders, who distrust Iran.
  That is why, Mr. Speaker, I believe that, after this week's vote, we 
have another critical choice to make. It is an important choice to make 
for our children, our grandchildren, and our men and women in uniform.
  Our choice is this: Will we come together as Americans to enforce the 
Iranian nuclear agreement in the years to come?
  As the Iran nuclear agreement goes into effect, we must work 
together--no matter our vote this week--to enforce Iran's commitments 
and to stand prepared to act decisively when Iran tests our resolve. We 
cannot afford to cast a vote and walk away.
  Mr. Speaker, we have the greatest opportunity to achieve stability in 
the region when we lead our allies and work with other international 
partners, as we did when we created the international sanctions that 
have brought Iran to the negotiating table.
  The Iranian nuclear agreement is the beginning of a long-term, 
multinational commitment. We must stand strong with our allies. We must 
commit to ensuring that the inspectors have the access and resources to 
carry out the agreement.
  We must stand ready to act, to lead the world to respond to signs of 
cheating or other Iranian efforts to undermine its obligations.

                              {time}  1615

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Lance).
  Mr. LANCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge rejection of the 
underlying Iranian agreement. The President

[[Page 13973]]

did not submit to Congress two inspection side agreements secretly 
negotiated between the IAEA and Iran.
  Congress and the American people have no information on what these 
secret side agreements entail, although news reports have suggested 
that Iran will be able to inspect at least some of its own military 
facilities.
  Under the underlying agreement, the world's leading state sponsor of 
terrorism--an antagonist of the United States, of Israel, and of 
several Arab nations, a 35-year-old regime known for horrible human 
rights abuses--will receive at least $100 billion immediately, some of 
which will undoubtedly be used for terrorism.
  A better underlying agreement can be negotiated, making sure Iran 
does not acquire nuclear weapons or ICBMs whose only purpose can be 
militaristic. It is important to note that a clear majority of the 
American people and a clear majority of both houses of Congress--
Republicans and some Democrats, together the representatives of the 
American people--oppose this deal.
  This is the most consequential vote I shall cast as a Member of 
Congress on foreign policy since I have been privileged to be here.
  I urge rejection of the Iranian agreement, which is not in the best 
interests of the national security of the United States.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to just clear up some things. The IAEA's separate 
arrangements with Iran are not part of the agreement within the 
definition of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. The separate 
arrangements were negotiated between the IAEA and Iran to resolve 
outstanding issues. The arrangements between Iran and the IAEA are 
considered safeguard confidentials, meaning that the IAEA does not 
share the information with member states.
  The U.S. also has safeguard confidentials, arrangements with the 
IAEA, and we would not want any member state to be able to request 
access to information about our nuclear infrastructure.
  Beyond that, Mr. Speaker, IAEA Director General Amano has declared 
that the arrangements between the IAEA and Iran are technically sound 
and consistent with the Agency's long-established practice. They do not 
compromise the IAEA safeguard standards in any way.
  Let's be clear. There is no self-inspection of Iranian facilities, 
and the IAEA has in no way given responsibility for nuclear inspections 
to Iran, not now and certainly not in the future. That is not how the 
IAEA does business.
  Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 6\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart), a member of the Committee on Appropriations 
and the Committee on the Budget.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak against a deal 
which I believe will become one of the most dangerous mistakes in U.S. 
history. This deal does not stop Iran from pursuing a nuclear program. 
It recognizes and legitimizes their nuclear program in short order.
  It allows Iran to develop ballistic missiles and brings an end to the 
arms embargo against that regime. It frees up hundreds of billions of 
dollars to fund and export terrorism. I am convinced that this deal 
will also lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. This deal, 
Mr. Speaker, is one of the biggest mistakes that we, our children, and 
our grandchildren will pay a very dear price for.
  Mr. Speaker, history will record this deal as the moment that the 
United States and the world granted the largest, most dangerous sponsor 
of terrorism that which it covets the most, nuclear weapons and the 
means to deliver them.
  I hope I am wrong, Mr. Speaker, but I fear that I am not.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to be clear that this agreement isn't based on 
trust. It is based on the most intrusive verification regimen in 
history. The international inspectors will have 24/7 access to 
surveillance of enrichment facilities and reactors and regular 
nonrestricted access to all other declared sites.
  Beyond declared facilities, the inspection provisions give the 
international inspectors the access they need, when they need it, to 
carry out the most intrusive inspection system ever peacefully 
negotiated.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Shimkus).
  Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Speaker, this Chamber has a lot of heroes. Sam 
Johnson is one of those. I am proud to have followed him, and I salute 
him.
  I have been fortunate to do many things. I was an Army officer in 
West Germany, a high school teacher, and a local elected official. Now, 
as a Member of Congress, I am honored to cast votes for the people that 
I represent.
  My constituents want the President to follow the law, as is his 
responsibility under article II of the Constitution. The President did 
not submit all the necessary documents as required under the law. I and 
my constituents want to know what is in these side agreements.
  To my colleague from Maryland, those assurances are not good enough 
when we are going down this path of peace and war to trust the IAEA 
with no documents, not being able to see that.
  Our primary responsibility here is to protect our citizens against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic. This deal gives Iran more money. 
They will remain the number one state sponsor of terror. They will 
continue to chant ``death to America'' and ``death to Israel.'' They 
will not free our citizens.
  Now, we assure that Iran will get nuclear weapons; the region will go 
into a nuclear arms race, and the world and the U.S. will be less safe. 
This is a terrible deal, an embarrassing deal, and one we will regret 
in the future.
  Vote to fully disclose this deal; vote against the deal, and vote to 
keep the sanctions on.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Perry), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. PERRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Speaker, no one wants Iran to have a nuclear weapon; I certainly 
don't think the President wants them to, but I think it is clear that 
they are going to. The question is when. Clearly, the President tried 
to make a good deal. I don't think he thinks that Iran can be trusted, 
but I do think he thinks that they won't cheat.
  Mr. Speaker, the road to hell was paved with good intentions, and I 
am sure that the administration had and has good intentions, but the 
facts remain. Iran has been cheating, literally, for thousands of 
years--or at least that region has--and certainly, we know the facts.
  The facts are, for the last 36 years, Iran has cheated on every 
single agreement they have signed. They are cheating at this very 
moment. An agreement that is based on that, that they wouldn't cheat, 
is an agreement that is fatally flawed.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the same country that won't cheat, this is the 
same country that leaders recognize and recommend the stoning of women, 
the hanging of homosexuals, the sponsor of mass terrorism. This is the 
nation that we have signed an accord with.
  Mr. Speaker, the other side will tell you that this is a great 
agreement with robust controls and an inspection paradigm. With all due 
respect, none of us know what that is; yet the pillar of this agreement 
is based upon solely that, an inspection paradigm that is so robust 
that Iran can't cheat, and no one knows what it is. We are literally 
voting for something and on something that we don't know what it is, 
and we are being urged to vote for it.

[[Page 13974]]

  Mr. Speaker, Iran cannot be trusted. The blood will not be on my 
hands from these rockets that Hamas launches into Israel and these 
American soldiers that come home in body bags in the future.
  I just want to let everybody know that the blood will not be on my 
hands and the hands of those who vote against this agreement.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Farr).
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Speaker, I have been listening to this debate all day, 
and I really have to be, I guess, angered by the amount of misstatement 
of fact here and about this House being so negative about this country 
and about our President.
  You can't get away with criticizing Presidents or leaders of other 
countries being negative about us when you are standing around being 
negative about our own country and our own President.
  This agreement is about trust, and it isn't about trust with Iran. It 
is about trust with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nobody has 
spoken about what that Agency does, other than the chairman, about how 
important it is.
  It has been around since 1957. We helped create it. It has 2,400 
employees. We probably trained most of them. They know about 
inspections. They are an international organization. They don't belong 
to anybody. No country owns them.
  You can't go and trash all day that they have a secret agreement with 
Iran when they have a secret agreement with the United States and with 
Russia and with China and with all the other signatories. That is their 
business. They go in and verify.
  We don't allow them to go into our top classified areas without some 
agreement of how you are going to handle that classified information. 
They are not going to release that information to other countries. They 
wouldn't have any credibility.
  When you are asking that the President release that information, he 
doesn't have it. He doesn't own it. It is the IAEA and Iran. What if 
Iran was saying, We don't want to enter into this agreement because we 
don't know what the IAEA has entered into with the United States?
  Stop trashing the process. Trust this organization. We have been 
proud of it for 58 years. It is the top cop on nuclear inspections, all 
the 1,100 facilities around the world, nuclear power plants, military 
bases with nuclear equipment, weapons. They are the inspectors. They 
are the ones that trust and verify. Give them a chance.
  Everybody in the world thinks this is the toughest agreement ever 
negotiated. Why would we not be celebrating it? This is diplomatic 
history. We have done great things here, and you want to trash it, and 
you want to trash the administration. That is not America. Give peace a 
chance.
  Vote ``no'' on this awful bill.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, some of us have seen this before. Some of us were around 
for the North Korean nuclear agreement, and President Obama's Iran 
nuclear deal looks increasingly like the dangerous deal that we struck 
with that regime in North Korea.
  In 1994, the U.S. Government signed a deal with North Korea that, 
according to then-President Clinton, would make the United States, the 
Korean peninsula, and the world safer, in his words.
  The agreement, we were told, did not rely on trust, but would instead 
involve a verification program which would stop the North Koreans from 
ever acquiring a nuclear bomb. That sounds familiar today.
  Unfortunately, the North Korean deal had holes that you could fire a 
ballistic missile through. The deal did not dismantle North Korea's 
program. It committed the United States to rewarding North Korea with 
large quantities of fuel oil without requiring the regime to implement 
the terms.
  Worst of all, the deal relied on inspection provisions that were 
naive and ultimately were worthless. The predictable result was that, 
on October 4, 2002, North Korea revealed it had been lying all along 
and that it had continued to secretly develop nuclear weapons.
  Four years later, North Korea's dictator, Kim Jong Il, ordered an 
underground nuclear test, and today, North Korea is a global menace, 
and it supports and sponsors terrorism, and it is the most unstable 
nuclear power on Earth. There is a reason why some of us raise these 
issues.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Rouzer).
  Mr. ROUZER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to this 
so-called Iran deal because it paves the way for Iran to obtain nuclear 
capabilities that will not only threaten Israel and create an arms race 
in the Middle East, but will also be a direct threat to America.

                              {time}  1630

  Time and time again, the Government of Iran has demonstrated its 
unwillingness to be transparent and open regarding their nuclear arms 
development and fraudulent behavior. Let's not forget that we just 
recently discovered two of their secret nuclear facilities, and who 
knows how many more they have.
  The sanctions relief included as part of this deal guarantees that 
Iran, the world's number one sponsor of terrorism, will have billions 
more to fund their evil acts. And if there is any confusion, Iran's 
stated intentions of wiping Israel off the face of the Earth and its 
public chants of ``death to America'' make their intentions very clear.
  Mr. Speaker, America has always stood for what is right--the greatest 
force for good mankind has ever known. Let's keep it that way and 
defeat this agreement.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho).
  Mr. YOHO. Mr. Speaker, I stand in opposition to this deal. This is a 
terrible deal for America, for the Middle East, and for the world.
  This is a deal that can't be verified. The IAEA, as so eloquently 
talked about by my colleague across the aisle, is the same IAEA that 
had their inspector buying nuclear material for North Korea.
  This is a deal that will embolden Iran. It will make them stronger. 
They are the number one sponsor of terrorism in the world, shouting, 
``Death to America.'' When they stop having the rhetoric from their 
Ayatollah and from their President saying ``death to America'' and they 
start denouncing terrorism and release our hostages, then we can go 
forward with this. But this will do nothing but embolden Iran, make 
them stronger, and make the Middle East more unstable.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Zeldin), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.
  The Congress is not on the clock, because we haven't received the 
entire agreement. And for anyone out there who wants to be supportive 
of this deal, let's think what the President was telling the American 
public and all of us.
  The House has a deal that wasn't based on trust; it is built on 
verification. How do you support a deal based on verification without 
knowing what the verification is?
  I would be happy to yield if anyone wanted to stand up and explain 
how you support a deal without knowing what the verification is. You 
can't. That is why we are asking for it.
  And for those who say that opposing this deal is somehow negative 
towards America, I took an oath to be an officer of the United States 
military, willing to fight and die in protection of our freedoms and 
liberties. I love this country. I took an oath to serve here the 
members of my district because I love America.
  So don't tell me that somehow opposing this deal is negative toward 
America. I oppose this deal because I love my country.

[[Page 13975]]


  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Roskam).
  Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, did you notice something? Did you notice 
that, for the past 2 years, the President of the United States has said 
that if we were going to have a deal, it was going to be based on full 
disclosure?
  Mr. Speaker, the President said that we were going to know all of the 
information. And the State Department submitted to the Congress a 
document that said: Here is all the information.
  But after that, Mr. Speaker, you know what we found out? There are 
two secret deals. There are two secret side deals, side arrangements, 
that we have not seen.
  Now, think about it. There are two alternatives: either this is 
sacrosanct between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
Iranian Government and no one is allowed to see it under the law--no 
one absolutely; it is totally confidential--or it is not.
  Now, how can it be, Mr. Speaker, that some elements of the 
administration have been briefed on those documents but they have not 
been disclosed to Congress and they have not been disclosed to the 
American public? How can that be?
  I will tell you how it can be. Because this is absurd. The 
administration has not disclosed material information.
  And so why are we here today? Why is Chairman Royce managing this 
time? Why are we contemplating this resolution that is brought forth by 
Congressman Pompeo and Congressman Zeldin? It is to say this: 
Administration, you have not complied. Therefore, Corker-Cardin has not 
been invoked. Therefore, the House is not going to vote on this 
nefarious deal.
  This is an awful deal, Mr. Speaker, and it should be wholeheartedly 
rejected with all urgency. I urge the passage of this resolution to 
make it very clear that we are not going to be complicit. We are not 
going to be complicit, Mr. Speaker. We are not going to be midwives and 
bring into the world this awful thing. We won't be complicit.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  A few speakers ago, there was a statement made about folks loving 
America. Well, guess what. We all love America. The fact that we may 
have disagreements with regard to this proposal does not take away from 
our love of this great country. We may differ, but the fact still 
remains that we love our country. And I just want to make that clear, 
because it is sickening to hear those kinds of comments.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. 
Emmer).
  Mr. EMMER of Minnesota. The American people have spoken and 
overwhelmingly oppose this agreement. Our allies in the region, who 
know Iran best, oppose this deal. The President, enabled by Senate 
Democrats, continues to live in a fantasyland.
  The President's track record in the region is appalling: Libya, 
Yemen, Somalia, Benghazi, the reset with Russia, red lines in Syria, 
his failed ISIL strategy, and his catastrophic withdrawal from Iraq, 
just to name a few, now handing billions, intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, and a legal pathway to a nuclear weapon to Iran.
  The American people deserve the truth rather than lies and half-
truths about snapback sanctions; secret side deals; anytime, anywhere 
inspections; Iran's right to enrich uranium or plutonium; and, as we 
stand here today, Congress' role in this bad deal.
  Members of Congress must ask themselves two questions: Does this deal 
make us more secure? Does this deal make us more safe? The answer to 
both questions is a resounding, no, it doesn't.
  Secretary of State Kerry said ``no deal is better than a bad deal.'' 
I couldn't agree more.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Loudermilk).
  Mr. LOUDERMILK. Mr. Speaker, let's be clear: Iran is an enemy to the 
United States of America, not by our declaration but by a proclamation 
of the most senior military leaders of that nation that have stated 
their destiny is to destroy the United States of America. Now, I was 
recently told by the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, that 
when someone says they want to destroy you, believe them.
  So what are we to trust? Are we to trust Iran, when they say that 
their destination, their goal, is to destroy the people of the United 
States of America? Or do we trust them when they say that they will 
commit to not develop a nuclear weapon? Or do we trust an international 
organization who has details about verification that they won't even 
share with the representatives of the people of this Nation who would 
be drastically affected by that?
  Oh, yes, but I have been told it is not about trust; it is about 
verification. But the details of the most critical part of that 
verification are being kept secret from the Members of this Congress 
who are expected to approve this deal that would have drastic effects 
upon the people of the United States.
  I would submit to you that those who chant ``death to America,'' the 
leaders in Iran, know the details of it.
  We must stop this now.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Tennessee (Mrs. 
Blackburn).
  Mrs. BLACKBURN. I thank the chairman for the work that he has done on 
this issue and the awareness that he has helped to raise not only with 
Members of this body, but with the American people.
  The American people are speaking out. They do not want this Iran deal 
to be on the books. And there are goods reasons why.
  As I was home and talking to my constituents, many are like me. They 
are a mom, they are a grandmother, and they fear for what this will do 
to our country. They fear for what it will do to the safety of our 
children and future generations. They are asking the right questions:
  Does Iran deserve the right to be trusted? Absolutely not.
  When their neighbors don't trust them, should we trust them? The 
answer is of course not.
  Is this a transparent agreement? Of course not. The secret side deals 
that have been made, why would we do that? Why would we incentivize, 
create a pathway, for Iran to have a nuclear weapon?
  I think what we should do is require the President to come forward 
with every component to expose this so we know what kind of future this 
creates for our children and our grandchildren.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Returning to an argument I was making earlier about this body's 
experience with North Korea, it does look to me like many are willing 
to concede to Iran the same loopholes that we gave North Korea.
  Supreme Leader Ayatollah has declared that his country would never 
agree to anywhere, anytime inspections. That is what is a little 
confusing about this. Especially, he says, in Iranian military sites. 
What we are informed of is that Iran is going to do its own inspection 
at Parchin. Without a full picture of Iran's nuclear program, without 
full ability to inspect these sites, we will be verifying in the dark, 
just as we were with North Korea.
  The Ayatollah is also demanding sanctions be lifted before Iran 
dismantles its nuclear infrastructure. In short, the Supreme Leader, 
again, is not going to let international inspectors into the places he 
builds his secret weapons, and yet he wants billions of sanctions in 
relief that he could funnel into terrorist groups that he funds, 
including Hezbollah and Hamas.
  Just like North Korea, Iran wants its rewards upfront. Again, like 
North Korea, what is Iran demanding? The best prize of all: the stamp 
of international legitimacy for its nuclear program.
  The truly stunning thing about this nuclear deal is that even if Iran 
fulfills all of its commitments in a few short

[[Page 13976]]

years, the mullahs will be free from restraints, have international 
blessing for Iran's nuclear program, and will have billions of dollars 
that they will use, in my opinion, for destabilizing the region. 
Because the IRGC controls most of these business contracts, their 
military controls the contracts.
  It is not too late to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but to 
do so, we need to learn from our mistakes; and if we don't, the 
Ayatollah, just like Kim Jong-il before him, will have, in my view, an 
easy path to the bomb.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. May I inquire as to how much time we have remaining, 
Mr. Speaker?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 3 minutes 
remaining. The gentleman from California has 8\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to make it clear that this agreement is not based 
on trust; it is based on the most intrusive verification regimen in 
history.
  There has been a lot of talk about $100 billion--others have floated 
other figures--in sanctions relief, but we know that it is more like 
around $50 billion, and it is conjecture as to how Iran will spend this 
money. Our terrorism sanctions will remain firmly in place to combat 
the money that Iran passes to any terrorist groups.

                              {time}  1645

  This is a good deal, not because the President says so, not because I 
say so, not because anyone else in this Chamber says so. It is a good 
deal because the experts say so.
  Nuclear physicists, disarmament experts, antinuclear proliferation 
experts, members of the intelligence community--including the former 
head of Mossad--and our allies all agree that the right thing to do to 
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is to support this deal.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Weber).
  Mr. WEBER of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, Neville Chamberlain landed at Heston Aerodrome on 
September 30, 1938, and spoke to the crowds. He said: ``The settlement 
of the Czechoslovakian problem has been achieved.''
  He said, ``This morning I had another talk with German Chancellor, 
Herr Hitler, and here is the paper that bears his name on it, as well 
as mine.''
  He went on to say, ``We regard the agreement signed last night and 
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two 
peoples never to go to war again.''
  Later that day, he stood outside of 10 Downing Street and read again. 
He said: ``My good friends, for the second time in our history, a 
British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with 
honour.''
  He said, ``I believe it is a peace for our time. We thank you from 
the bottom of our hearts. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.''
  Mr. Speaker, we all know how that turned out.
  My friends, if this deal passes--and make no mistake, it is quite a 
deal for Iran--Americans will not get a quiet night's sleep.
  As long as Barack Hussein Obama is in office aiding and abetting the 
Iranian terroristic regime, we will not be safe and Americans will not 
sleep well.
  This is a bad deal. You don't argue, you don't make deals with the 
devil, deals with the enemy. Do we not learn from history?
  Did we not learn anything from World War II?
  This is a bad deal. I urge my colleagues to vote this deal down. It 
is time to put America first.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Members are reminded to refrain from 
engaging in personalities toward the President.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Gohmert).
  Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Speaker, we have heard some try to demean the 
importance of what the chairman and others here on the Republican side 
are trying to do right now.
  The fact is that, when we talk about the information that has not 
been provided about the outside agreements with the IAEA, it is not 
only material, relevant, but it is also critical.
  I am reading directly from the Iran deal. Eight years after the 
adoption date or when the IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that 
all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever 
is earlier--it goes on to talk about sanctions that will be lifted.
  Another place, same thing, or when the IAEA has reached the broader 
conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful 
activities, then another protocol is lifted.
  If we don't know what the agreement is with the IAEA, then these 
years mean nothing. The IAEA, I have already heard say, as far as it 
knows, nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes. That would 
mean that these years are worthless.
  We have got to have the secret agreements.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time we have 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 1\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from California has 6 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  With regard to what the gentleman just stated, I would refer him to 
Senator Bob Corker, who drafted the process that gave Congress the 
right to review the agreement. In talking about this situation that we 
are addressing today, he says that the motion is not worth considering. 
Apparently, he feels satisfied that the arrangement with regard to the 
IAEA has been satisfied.
  Let's also focus with the matter at hand, and the matter at hand is 
preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, instead of working on 
pointless partisan measures like this one and others we will be 
considering tomorrow.
  This entire piece of legislation that we have been debating is about 
accusations that the President did not comply with the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act. Even, as I said a moment ago, the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee does not believe that.
  Let's get back to the business of the people and stop wasting their 
money and wasting their time.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on this resolution, and I yield back the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I guess the point that I would begin by making is that Iran won't 
have to cheat like North Korea did to get close to a bomb, and that is 
because the essential restrictions on Iran's key bomb-making technology 
expire or, in the words of the agreement, sunset in 10 to 15 years.
  After these restrictions expire, Iran will be left with an 
internationally recognized industrial scale nuclear program. Iran could 
even legitimately enrich to levels near weapons-grade under the pretext 
of powering a nuclear navy. All these activities are permissible under 
the nonproliferation treaty, and all would be endorsed by this 
agreement.
  Indeed, to quote the President, President Obama said, of this 
agreement, in year 13, 14, 15, Iran's breakout times would have shrunk 
almost down to zero.
  A former State Department official testified to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee that this sunset clause is a disaster. It is a disaster as it 
will enable the leading state sponsor of terrorism to produce enough 
material for dozens of nuclear weapons, all under the terms of the 
agreement.
  As another expert witness pointed out, the bet that the 
administration is taking is that, in 10 to 15 years, we will have a 
kinder, gentler Iran. The agreement does not dismantle Iran's nuclear 
infrastructure. Iran doesn't have to dismantle any centrifuges or give 
up any of its nuclear facilities. Even Iran's once-secret facility at 
Fordo, buried under a mountain top, does stay open.

[[Page 13977]]

  Instead, the deal temporarily restricts elements of the program. It 
does do that. It restricts elements of the program, but it does it in 
exchange for something else that is permanent.
  What is permanent in this, as opposed to temporary? What is permanent 
is the sanctions relief. Key restrictions begin to expire after only 8 
years.
  If fully implemented, this agreement will destroy the Iran sanctions 
regime, which Congress has built up over decades, despite opposition 
from several administrations.
  I will remind the Members again, this was a hard-fought case over 
several administrations; and, in point of fact, in the prior Congress, 
myself and Eliot Engel had legislation which would have put additional 
pressure on Iran that passed here by a vote of 400-20.
  It was the administration and it was Secretary of State Kerry who 
made certain that that bill was bottled up in the Senate and could not 
see the light of day.
  Now, the billions in sanctions relief that Iran will get up front 
will support its terrorist activity, but those billions are just a 
downpayment, as this agreement reconnects Iran to the global economy.
  One of the things that bothers me most about this is that Iran is not 
a normal country with normal businessmen running those companies. When 
those companies were nationalized, they were turned over to the IRGC. 
They were turned over, basically, to the leaders in the military, and 
they were turned over to the clerics.
  As future contracts go forward with Iran, it is that entity that is 
going to be rewarded. It is going to have the political power.
  For those of us that hoped to see change in Iran, now the best 
connected people in Iran are going to be the IRGC leaders. If we think 
for a minute what that will mean for those that would like to see real 
change, I think we lost a historic opportunity here to put the kind of 
pressure that would have forced change, but we did not do that.
  In a major, last-minute concession--and this is the final point I 
would make--the President agreed to lift the U.N. arms embargo on Iran, 
and in 5 years, Iran will be able to buy conventional weapons and, in 8 
years, ballistic missiles.
  Russia and China want to sell these dangerous weapons to Iran, and 
that is why they pushed. That is why it was Russia pushing, at the 
eleventh hour, after we thought this agreement was done.
  The reason we were waiting those extra days is because Russia was 
running interference for Iran, saying: Oh, no, wait. We also want the 
arms embargo lifted, including the ICBM embargo lifted.
  As the Secretary of Defense of our country testified, the reason that 
we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that the ``I'' in 
ICBM stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability of 
flying from Iran to the United States.
  Ask yourself why Iran wants to build ICBMs, why it is that the 
Ayatollah says it is the duty of every military man to figure out how 
to help mass-produce ICBMs.
  Someone once asked President Kennedy the difference between our space 
program and the ICBM program that Russia was building at that time, and 
he quipped ``attitude.'' Kennedy's answer was ``attitude.''
  The answer here is that attitude counts for a lot, and the attitude 
in the regime, when they say they are not even going to be bound by 
this and are now going to transfer rockets and missiles to Hezbollah 
and Hamas, tells us a lot about their attitude.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, for years, the Congress, the President, 
our European partners, and the international community have imposed a 
series of tough economic sanctions on Iran with the goal of preventing 
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Those sanctions brought Iran to 
the negotiating table and I commend President Obama, Secretary Kerry, 
and the entire team, along with our P5+1 partners, for their efforts to 
negotiate an agreement to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon.
  The question for Members of Congress, who will vote on this 
agreement, is whether it achieves its stated goals. Given the 
importance of this question, I believe every Member of Congress has an 
obligation to thoroughly review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), consider the testimony presented at the Congressional 
hearings, and listen to competing views before reaching a final 
judgment.
  Since the JCPOA was submitted to Congress on July 19, 2015, I have 
carefully reviewed all of its terms, attended the classified briefings 
and numerous presentations, and reviewed the transcripts of all the 
hearings that have been held in both the House and the Senate. I have 
also met with opponents and supporters of the agreement. While I 
respect the opinions of those on both sides of this issue, I have 
concluded that this agreement advances the national security interests 
of the United States and all of our allies, including our partner 
Israel. This agreement is the best path to achieve our goal--that Iran 
never obtains a nuclear weapon. Indeed, I firmly believe that, should 
Congress block this agreement, we would undermine that goal, 
inadvertently weaken and isolate America, and strengthen Iran.
  The benefit of any agreement must be measured against the real-world 
consequences of no agreement. Many forget that when these negotiations 
began in earnest two years ago, Iran was a threshold nuclear weapons 
state and remains so until and unless this agreement is implemented. As 
Prime Minister Netanyahu warned at the United Nations in 2012, Iran was 
a few months away from having enough highly enriched uranium to produce 
its first bomb. Today, prior to the implementation of this agreement, 
it has a nuclear stockpile that, if further enriched, could produce up 
to 10 bombs. It currently has installed nearly 20,000 centrifuges that 
could convert that fuel into weapons material. Indeed, many analysts 
believe that the combination of Iran's nuclear stockpile and its 
centrifuges would allow it to produce enough weapons-grade nuclear 
material for a bomb in two months.
  In addition, Iran has been enriching some of its nuclear material at 
its deep underground reactor at Fordow, a very difficult target to hit 
militarily. Moreover, Iran was in the process of building a heavy-water 
reactor at Arak, which could generate plutonium to be used for a 
nuclear weapon. Finally, Iran has been operating for years under an 
inadequate verification regime that increases the risks of a covert 
program going undetected.
  This agreement blocks all of these paths to acquiring weapons-grade 
nuclear material and puts in place an inspection system that assures 
the detection of any violation and future dash to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. The Interim Agreement has already neutralized Iran's stockpile 
of highly enriched uranium that Prime Minister Netanyahu highlighted in 
his speech. This final agreement will significantly scale back the 
remainder of its program. Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium will be 
cut from 9,900 kg to 300 kg, and that remainder will be limited to low-
enriched uranium that cannot be used for a weapon. In addition, the 
agreement removes two-thirds of Iran's installed centrifuges. No 
enrichment activities may be conducted at Fordow for a period of 15 
years, and the facility at Arak will be permanently converted to one 
that does not produce weapons-grade plutonium.
  Taken together, these measures will extend the breakout time from 
about two months to at least a year and put in place layers of 
verification measures over different timelines, including some that 
remain in place permanently. It is generally agreed that these measures 
would allow us to detect any effort by Iran to use its current nuclear 
facilities--Natanz, Fordow, or Arak--to violate the agreement. The main 
criticism with respect to verification is that the agreement does not 
sufficiently guard against an effort by Iran to develop a secret 
uranium supply chain and enrichment capacity at a covert place. 
However, the reality is that the agreement permanently puts in place an 
inspection mechanism that is more rigorous than any previous arms 
control agreement and more stringent than the current system. The 
agreement ultimately requires inspections of any suspected Iranian 
nuclear site with the vote of the United States, Britain, France, 
Germany, and the European Union. Neither the Chinese nor the Russians 
can block such inspections in the face of a united Western front. Are 
we really better off without this verification regime than with it?
  In exchange for rolling back its nuclear program and accepting this 
verification regime, Iran will obtain relief from those sanctions that 
are tied to its nuclear program. However, that relief will only come 
after Iran has verifiably reduced its nuclear program as required. 
Moreover, if Iran backslides on those commitments, the sanctions will 
snap back into place. The

[[Page 13978]]

snapback procedure is triggered if the U.S. registers a formal 
complaint against Iran with the special commission created for that 
purpose. In addition, those U.S. sanctions that are not related to the 
Iranian nuclear program will remain in place, including U.S. sanctions 
related to Iran's human rights violations, support for terrorism, and 
missile program.
  There are some who oppose the agreement because it does not prevent 
Iran from engaging in adversarial actions throughout the Gulf, the 
Middle East, and elsewhere. That conduct, however, was never within the 
scope of these negotiations nor the objective of the international 
sanctions regime aimed at preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear 
weapon. President Reagan understood the distinction between changing 
behavior and achieving verifiable limits on weapons programs. He 
negotiated arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, not because 
he thought it would change the character of ``the Evil Empire'' but 
because limiting their nuclear arsenal was in the national security 
interests of the U.S. and our allies. That reality is also true today. 
An Iranian regime with nuclear capability would present a much greater 
threat to the region than an Iran without one. In fact, today, as a 
threshold nuclear weapons state, Iran wields more influence than it 
will under the constraints of this agreement. That is why our focus has 
appropriately been on reining in the Iranian nuclear program.
  The lifting of the sanctions will certainly give Iran additional 
resources to support its priorities. Given the political dynamic in 
Iran, some of those additional resources will likely be invested to 
improve the domestic standard of living. But even if all the resources 
were used to support their proxies in the region, respected regional 
observers agree that they are unlikely to make a significant strategic 
difference. Moreover, any effort by Iran to increase support for its 
proxies can be checked by the U.S. and our allies through 
countermeasures. Finally, it is clear that any alternative agreement 
opponents seek would also result in the lifting of the sanctions and 
freeing up these resources.
  In my view, opponents of the agreement have failed to demonstrate how 
we will be in a better position if Congress were to block it. Without 
an agreement, the Iranians will immediately revert to their status as a 
threshold nuclear weapons state. In other words, they immediately pose 
the threat that Prime Minister Netanyahu warned about in his U.N. 
speech. At the same time, the international consensus we have built for 
sanctions, which was already starting to fray, would begin to collapse 
entirely. We would be immediately left with the worst of all worlds--a 
threshold nuclear weapons state with diminished sanctions and little 
leverage for the United States.
  I disagree with the view that we can force the Iranians back to the 
negotiating table to get a better deal. All of our European partners 
have signed on to the current agreement. Consequently, the U.S. would 
be isolated in its quest to return to negotiations. And in the unlikely 
event that we somehow returned to negotiations, the critics have not 
presented a plausible scenario for achieving a better agreement in a 
world where fewer sanctions means less economic pressure.
  The bottom line is that if Congress were to block the agreement and 
the Iranians were to resume nuclear enrichment activities, the only way 
to stop them, at least temporarily, would be by military action. That 
would unleash significant negative consequences that could jeopardize 
American troops in the region, drag us into another ground war in the 
Middle East, and trigger unpredictable responses elsewhere. Moreover, 
the United States would be totally isolated from most of the world, 
including our Western partners. The folly of that go-it-alone military 
approach would be compounded by the fact that such action would only 
deal a temporary setback to an Iranian nuclear program. They would 
likely respond by putting their nuclear enrichment activities deeper 
underground and would likely be more determined than ever to build a 
nuclear arsenal.
  We don't have to take that path. This agreement will give us a long 
period of time to test the Iranians' compliance and assess their 
intentions. During that period, it will give us a treasure trove of 
information about the scope and capabilities of the limited Iranian 
nuclear program. Throughout that period and beyond, we reserve all of 
our options, including a military option, to respond to any Iranian 
attempt to break out and produce enough highly enriched material to 
make a bomb. But we will have two advantages over the situation as it 
is today--a more comprehensive verification regime to detect any 
violation and a much longer breakout period in which to respond.
  As former Secretary Clinton has indicated, the fact that we have 
successfully limited the scope of Iran's nuclear program does not mean 
we have limited its ambitions in the region. We must continue to work 
with our friends and allies to constantly contain and confront Iranian 
aggression in the region. The United States and Israel must always 
stand together to confront that threat. The fact remains that Iranian 
support for their terrorist proxy Hezbollah continues to destabilize 
Lebanon and poses a direct threat to Israel, as does its support for 
Hamas. We must do all we can to ensure that our ally Israel maintains 
its qualitative military edge in the region, including providing 
increased funding for Israel's Arrow anti-ballistic missile and Iron 
Dome anti-rocket systems. Consideration should also be given to 
previously denied weapons if a need for such enhanced capabilities 
arises. We must always remember that some of Iran's leaders have called 
for the destruction of Israel and we must never forget the awful past 
that teaches us not to ignore those threats.
  The threats Iran poses in the region are real. But all those threats 
are compounded by an Iran that is a threshold nuclear weapons state. 
This agreement will roll back the Iranian nuclear program and provide 
us with greater ability to detect and more time to respond to any 
future Iranian attempt to build a nuclear weapon.
  For all of the reasons given above, I've concluded that this is an 
historic agreement that should be supported by the Congress.
  Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I support the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement reached 
between the P5+1 nations and Iran.
  This month marks the 70th anniversary of the nuclear age. The dangers 
of nuclear war remain very real but the path to contain the nuclear 
demon has not been easy. The Iran Nuclear Agreement is the latest 
attempt to reduce the nuclear danger and perhaps one of the most 
complex set of issues ever confronted in shaping an international 
agreement.
  In my judgment this agreement enhances the security of the United 
States and reduces the likelihood of nuclear confrontation in the 
Mideast. Failure to accept the terms of this agreement, on the other 
hand, seems likely to either exclude the United States from a role in 
preventing nuclear proliferation in the Mideast as other nations move 
ahead without us or, more ominously, set the region on a path of 
escalating tensions. I believe either of those last two options are 
unacceptable, and reckless. With determination, patience and U.S. 
leadership, this agreement has the potential of opening the door to 
further agreements on non-nuclear security issues.
  No agreement is perfect and no agreement will fully satisfy everyone. 
Agreements negotiated with our adversaries by their nature mean that we 
are seeking to achieve our security goals by diplomatic means not by 
imposing our will by military means. U.S. security experts have 
expressed their support for the agreement as the best option as have 
our nation's nuclear experts. Leading Israeli security experts have 
also voiced their support as have the leaders of many leading U.S. 
Jewish organizations because of their concerns for Israel's security. 
Should our diplomatic efforts in this agreement fail to close the path 
to an Iranian nuclear weapon we would still be in a better position as 
to time and means to choose other options.
  I commend President Obama and Secretary Kerry for their leadership on 
this issue. The stakes for the United States, for the Mideast region 
and for the world are too high for us to miss this opportunity.
  Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this legislation 
to approve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The agreement is not 
in the best interest of our country and will have a lasting impact well 
beyond this Congress and Obama's presidency.
  It boggles the mind that we would put faith in a regime that is the 
world's leading state sponsor of terror and continues to openly 
destabilize the Middle East. Furthermore, this deal fails to establish 
acceptable consequences for violations, and financially strengthens the 
Iranian regime via international trade and technology assistance.
  This international gamble will adversely affect generations of 
Americans and Middle Easterners hoping to live in a more peaceful 
world.
  We must do everything we can to prevent implementation of this 
dangerous agreement, and remain firm by defending freedom and 
protecting American interests at home and abroad. That is why I urge my 
colleagues to vote against implementing this deal.
  Mr. COOK. Mr. Speaker, over the course of this debate, you're going 
to hear about the failures of this deal from members of both parties. 
You'll hear about how this deal fails to provide the ``anytime, 
anywhere'' inspections that the Administration promised. You'll hear 
about how it relies on Iran to self-inspect at military nuclear 
facilities such as Parchin. And

[[Page 13979]]

you'll hear about how Iran will get over a hundred billion dollars in 
immediate sanctions relief in exchange for a limited inspections regime 
that expires within 15 years. These are all important reasons to reject 
this deal, but I want to focus on something different: the character of 
the Iranian regime.
  The Islamic Republic of Iran's founding action 35 years ago was to 
declare war on the United States, violating all international laws and 
agreements by invading our embassy and taking our diplomats hostage. 
Since then, Iran has been complicit in the murders of thousands of our 
soldiers. Iran's Lebanese terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, murdered hundreds 
of Marines in Lebanon in the 1980s, and in the last decade, Iranian-
sponsored militias murdered thousands of American service members in 
Iraq. As we debate this deal today, Iran continues to hold American 
hostages. This is a regime that was born in terror and that exists to 
spread terror across the world.
  It's the character of the Iranian regime that makes its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons so dangerous. Countries like Japan have enough 
stockpiled plutonium for thousands of bombs, but because it doesn't 
sponsor terror or threaten its neighbors, no one is concerned with the 
Japanese nuclear power industry. An Iranian regime that espouses terror 
and threatens genocide can never be allowed to have a nuclear program, 
not today, not in ten years, not in a century.
  Iran's development of a nuclear weapon will have repercussions far 
beyond its own borders. Iran's terrorist allies are currently waging 
war against America's allies across the Middle East. Iranian proxies 
Hezbollah and Hamas continue to threaten Israel with tens of thousands 
of rockets, Iranian death squads in Iraq and Syria have killed tens of 
thousands of people, and Iranian backed rebels overthrew the pro-
American government of Yemen. This is not ancient history; this is all 
within the past year.
  Any deal that the United States signs must result in the 
dismantlement, destruction, and irreversible rollback of Iran's nuclear 
program. There is no acceptable level of enrichment for an Iran that 
sponsors terrorism and threatens its neighbors. If Iran won't accept a 
deal on these terms, then the United States should keep the sanctions 
in place and tighten them until they force the Iranian regime to its 
knees. Iran will never be a normal nation as long as its government is 
ruled by radicals whose ideology is terror. When Ronald Reagan was 
pursuing nuclear arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union, he 
famously operated under the principle of ``Trust, but verify.'' In 
contrast, this deal requires blind trust without any meaningful 
verification. It does nothing to change the character of the Iranian 
regime and instead counts on the good will of a terrorist state that 
openly proclaims ``Death to America.'' I refuse to trust the security 
of America and our allies to the Iranian regime's promises. I don't 
trust Iran and I cannot support this deal.
  Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor today to reiterate my 
deep-seated belief that the Iran nuclear deal is a dangerous mistake of 
historic proportions.
  On my recent trip to Israel, I learned firsthand how the Iranian 
regime will use this deal to further its terrorist ambitions and 
threaten the peace and security of the entire Middle East.
  Because of the unprecedented number of concessions offered to the 
Iranians by the Obama Administration, this deal will do little to 
prevent Iran from ultimately obtaining a nuclear weapon.
  In actuality, instead of averting Iran's quest for the bomb, this 
deal will speed other nations' desire for nuclear arsenals and provide 
one of our greatest enemies with the resources it desperately needs. 
Resources that Iran will turn around and use to fund attacks on our 
interests in the Middle East and beyond.
  We are providing our sworn enemy with the means to attack us, and all 
we get in exchange is a brief delay in their unending quest for a 
nuclear weapon.
  This terrible deal not only affords Iran legitimacy for a partial 
nuclear program at present, but allows them a full and unfettered 
program after 15 years.
  Mr. Speaker, under this deal, Iran will receive hundreds of billions 
of dollars in sanctions relief and be allowed access to advanced 
weaponry and ballistic missiles it can use to threaten its neighbors 
and the United States.
  Iran will be free to use the weapons and money provided by this 
agreement to fuel its terrorist aspirations around the region, 
threatening our ally Israel and further inflaming a region already in 
crisis.
  Under this deal, the world's number one sponsor of terrorism will 
suddenly have access to enormous resources that it can distribute to 
its allies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria.
  This is a completely unacceptable outcome for the United States, 
Israel, and our allies in the Middle East.
  Wagering the peace and security of the U.S., Israel and the world on 
the small chance that a hateful regime will suddenly see the error of 
its ways is not only wrong, it is dangerous.
  Mr. Speaker, the truth is that, no matter how much the President may 
wish it to be so, Iran's decades long record of terrorism, extremism 
and hate will not suddenly change simply because this deal has been 
signed.
  Our allies are almost uniformly opposed to this deal. On my recent 
trip to Israel, I had the honor and privilege of meeting with Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for over two hours.
  We discussed the Iran deal at length, and I came away even more 
convinced that this deal is not only foolhardy, it is dangerous.
  Prime Minister Netanyahu explained to us how the Obama Administration 
has sold out our Israeli allies to strike a deal with a murderous and 
untrustworthy Iranian regime.
  The President expects Congress to stand idly by and do nothing while 
he trades the security of the U.S. and its allies for a legacy-
burnishing accomplishment.
  He expects us to sit on the sidelines while his Administration offers 
one concession after another to the Iranians, and agrees on a deal that 
would endanger the stability of the entire Middle East and jeopardize 
U.S. national security.
  But that will not happen. We will not stand idly by while the 
American people's security is traded for some empty promises.
  A nuclear-armed Iran would start a new arms race in the Middle East 
and pose an intolerable threat to the national security of the United 
States and our allies, especially Israel.
  Mr. Speaker, for the sake of our children, and our children's 
children, we must face down this threat now before it is too late.
  I urge my colleagues to review this agreement with an eye towards 
history, towards the past, present and future of a region critical to 
America's national interests.
  Iran has a record of deception and hostility towards American 
interests, no amount of wishful thinking will change their core 
tendencies.
  Congress must use this opportunity to stand up for what is right.
  The United States must not capitulate in the face of persistent evil. 
We must stand together, united against the threat of a nuclear Iran, in 
order to guarantee a free and peaceful tomorrow.
  Ms. BONAMICI. Mr. Speaker, over the last several weeks I have been 
carefully considering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 
the agreement that is intended to prevent Iran from developing a 
nuclear weapon. There is no question that preventing Iran from ever 
developing a nuclear weapon is in the best interest of the United 
States, Israel and the Middle East, and the rest of the world. I favor 
diplomacy over military action whenever and wherever reasonably 
possible, and I strongly agree that an engaged and unified 
international community, led by the United States, is the best option 
to preserve peace by keeping close watch over a rogue state that seems 
to respond only when the world's major powers speak in one voice. It is 
through this lens, and with these goals, that I approached my analysis 
of the JCPOA and the potential consequences of Congress accepting or 
rejecting the agreement. I will vote to support the agreement and 
advocate for vigorous oversight and enforcement.
  To reach this decision, I carefully read the agreement, reviewed 
classified intelligence materials, and participated in both classified 
and unclassified briefings. I have spoken with President Obama, and 
I've heard thorough explanations from Secretary of State Kerry and 
Secretary of Energy Moniz. Knowledgeable critics of this agreement 
offered compelling arguments, which I considered in my analysis. I 
asked questions of the Administration and other experts and evaluated 
their responses. I have discussed the agreement with people from Iran 
and Israel, and others with deep ties to both nations. Constituents 
have offered significant input in letters, emails, phone calls, 
conversations, and at town hall meetings across Northwest Oregon. As I 
deliberated, I recalled my time visiting Israel, and always kept in 
mind my knowledge and understanding of how volatile the region is and 
what it's like to live under constant threat.
  Reaching this decision was not easy. The consequences of this 
agreement will shape the future of the region and the world. The 
complexity of the agreement, and the questions it raises about the 
future that cannot be answered irrefutably, contributed to the fervent, 
well-reasoned, and passionate opinions on all sides. Many people who I 
know and respect deeply have reached a different conclusion; I 
acknowledge their concerns but have

[[Page 13980]]

concluded that rejecting the deal will not diminish the possibility 
that Iran will obtain a nuclear weapon. In my assessment, if Congress 
rejects the agreement, it could result in a higher likelihood of Iran 
developing a nuclear weapon while at the same time diminishing the 
global leadership of the United States.
  Implementing the JCPOA, on the other hand, will preserve the 
principal role of the United States in dealing with Iran in the future, 
and it is our best chance to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Right now, without the agreement, the ``breakout time'' for Iran to 
acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapon is a mere 2-3 months. 
Under the JCPOA, the breakout time for at least the next decade will be 
extended to a year, and there will be no sanctions relief until that 
breakout time has been extended and Iran has taken multiple required 
steps and completion of those steps has been verified. These steps 
include reducing Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium by 97 percent, 
removing the core of the heavy water reactor and filling it with 
concrete, and submitting to ongoing inspections and continuous, 
unprecedented monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). Iran can only enrich uranium to 3.67 percent, a level far below 
the 90 percent range that is necessary to build a nuclear weapon. 
Sanctions ``snap back'' and can be reinstated if there is a violation. 
The JCPOA does not affect the existing U.S. bans on weapons sales, and, 
importantly, no option, including military force, is taken off the 
table.
  Like most negotiated agreements, however, the JCPOA is not perfect. 
Because of that, some suggest that we should reject the deal and bring 
the parties back to the table in an effort to make it better. But our 
negotiating partners agree that this is a deal worth pursuing, and I 
concur with many experts who say it would be a near impossibility to 
convince all parties to return to the table. Even then, it is not at 
all clear that the outcome of future negotiations would be better than 
the current agreement. Others have argued that the agreement is likely 
to fail given Iran's history of noncompliance. Yet throughout this 
process, no one has suggested that the Iranian government can be 
trusted. This is not a deal built on trust, but rather on verification. 
The agreement puts in place a comprehensive inspection regime, some of 
which is permanent, that will supplement the work of intelligence 
agencies and provide confidence that Iran could not dash for a nuclear 
weapon without being caught.
  Rather than reject the agreement, Congress should come together and 
commit to vigilance in holding Iran to every aspect of the JCPOA and to 
the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provides 
that Iran, as a signatory, is never allowed to develop a nuclear 
weapon. We should make clear--very clear--that anything short of strict 
compliance will result in the swift reimposition of sanctions. Working 
together in Congress and with other world leaders will give us the best 
chance to make sure that Iran complies with its obligations and the 
best chance to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. I support this bill.
  Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Speaker, I've travelled throughout Alabama's 2nd 
Congressional District the last few weeks and I've listened to the 
concerns expressed by those I represent. I want to clearly state my 
views on the President's proposed nuclear agreement with Iran.
  Many remain puzzled as to why we are negotiating in the first place 
with a regime that has a stated intent to destroy the United States and 
Israel. Remember that just days after this deal was reached, Iran's 
Supreme Leader applauded and encouraged a large crowd gathered in 
Tehran as it chanted ``Death to America!'' and ``Death to Israel!'' 
Also puzzling is, even if we are going to negotiate, why be so 
unwilling to walk away when our stated objectives fall one after the 
other?
  I share my constituents' frustration at a flawed, weak deal that 
seems to serve Iran's interests at the expense of our own.
  How is that? First, inspections are not ``anywhere, anytime'' like 
negotiators originally said would be a deal-breaking must. In fact, at 
certain sites the Iranians could have up to 24 days' notice before 
inspectors are allowed in. That's a joke. And, even then, Americans are 
prohibited from making unilateral inspections.
  Second, the ``snap back'' provisions the Administration points to as 
accountability mechanisms are weak by their own admission. Secretary 
Kerry and President Obama have repeatedly said that our unilateral 
economic sanctions don't work and put the United States at a 
disadvantage. Yet, the threat of those very sanctions ``snapping back'' 
into place is supposed to be the way we make sure Iran lives up to the 
agreement. They can't have it both ways. If our sanctions aren't strong 
enough on their own now, why would we rely on them as a way to hold 
Iran accountable in the future?
  Third, under this deal, as much as $150 billion would flow into 
Iran's coffers. Let's not kid ourselves to think that the world's 
foremost state sponsor of terrorism won't turn around and fund those 
who want to harm Americans and our allies. So, not only will we have 
paved the way for Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon and potentially 
initiated a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, but we will have 
strengthened the hand of this adversarial state while weakening our 
own.
  I will continue to work with my colleagues to point out these 
weaknesses and make those supporting the deal explain why to the 
American people.
  One silver lining is that the agreement is subject for review in the 
next administration because this is an executive agreement and not a 
treaty. Let's pray our next president doesn't adhere to a foreign 
policy doctrine of ``leading from behind.''
  Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of peace in the 
Middle East. Peace for our allies and friends in the region. Peace for 
the Iranian people. And sustainable peace for the United States.
  Throughout my 29 years of military service, I served during war and 
peace. Throughout the Cold War, we constantly trained to respond to and 
combat the greatest nuclear threat the world has ever faced: the Soviet 
Union. I deployed to Germany on what was effectively the front line, 
within walking distance of this grave threat. Afterwards, I fought in 
Desert Storm, with the Iraqi chemical and biological arsenal a threat 
at any moment. Finally, I deployed several more times to Iraq during 
the most recent war, fighting for stability against Islamic terrorists 
bent on death, chaos, and destruction.
  In each of these experiences, I found the best and worst in humanity, 
and was always working towards lasting peace and stability.
  I now have the honor to serve in the United States Congress, where I 
seek to prevent engagements in various regional conflicts, including 
those in Libya and Syria. I seek to bring a more democratic process to 
deploying American personnel into combat, which was the intent of the 
original 1973 War Powers Act. I take these positions because I know 
that the best and most responsible means of preventing conflict, or the 
exacerbation of conflict, is through strong diplomacy.
  Today, I continue to fight to keep the United States out of another 
war. I work to protect and keep safe our allies and friends throughout 
the Middle East and the world. This is why I say no to an agreement 
that will only make us and our allies less safe in both the short and 
long term. The Iranian regime is the same regime that calls for death 
to America and Israel. This is the same regime engaged in 
destabilization of Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. This is the 
same regime that funds the Assad regime in Syria which has used Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, killing hundreds of thousands of people. This is 
the same regime that funds terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, 
Hamas, and the Houthis. This is the same regime that directly funded, 
trained, and engaged in combat alongside radical Shiite militias that 
fought, injured, and killed American service men and women, including 
those under my command.
  This deal not only allows, but in fact tacitly approves, Iranian 
access to modern conventional arms within five years. Within eight 
years, it lifts the ban on access to ballistic missile technology. The 
deal also allows Iran to immediately access tens of billions of dollars 
through sanctions relief, ensuring the modernization of its depleted 
conventional military and support for its world-wide terror network. 
The deal seeks to eliminate the legislative sovereignty of the United 
States Congress, our states, and our municipalities when it comes to 
key aspects of our foreign policy. The deal does not permit anytime, 
anywhere inspections. The deal does not outline how inspections will 
take place. The deal does not stop nuclear research and development in 
Iran. The deal does not prohibit Iran from seeking and obtaining 
nuclear weapons either through cheating or after the expiration of the 
terms.
  I am afraid that this deal could hasten the pace to war, not end the 
threat of it. But this can be prevented. We can return to the 
negotiating table and engage from a position of strength. We can do so 
through stronger diplomacy; a more credible and consistent military 
posturing that does not appear haphazard and reactive; we can enact 
stronger sanctions, if needed; and finally, we must be willing to stick 
to a true red line and say no to a bad deal. I plead with my colleagues 
in the United States Congress, as well as President Obama, Secretary 
Kerry, and others in this Administration: do not go ahead with this 
ill-fated and weak deal that hurts our national and international 
security.

[[Page 13981]]


  Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Speaker, after careful study of public and 
classified information, extensive discussions with people on both sides 
of the issue, and much thought and deliberation, I have concluded that 
supporting the Iran nuclear agreement is the best option we have at 
this time to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons. That is why I am 
supporting H.R. 3461, the legislation approving the Iran agreement.
  While this agreement is not perfect, the deal provides unprecedented 
oversight and transparency over Iran's nuclear program that is not 
possible today. Furthermore, if the United States does not support the 
deal, I am concerned it could potentially isolate us from our partners 
who have given all indications that they are not prepared to walk away 
from this agreement.
  We know Iran cannot be trusted. Therefore, if this deal is approved, 
there is no question we must be vigilant to make sure Iran does not 
violate the terms of the agreement. If there are any indications Iran 
is violating the deal, immediate action must be taken. We must never 
allow Iran to move towards having a nuclear weapon, and we must never 
give up working with Israel and our other allies until we achieve peace 
and stability in the Middle East.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, today I stand in proud support of the 
international agreement reached by the P5+1 nations (France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and the United States) that is aimed 
at preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state. Preventing a 
nuclear arms race in the Middle East is essential to the security of 
the U.S., Israel, and the larger international community. It is why the 
U.S. led negotiations on this agreement and why this agreement has the 
unanimous support of the U.N. Security Council, over 90 nations, our 
Gulf state allies, and the world's largest powers.
  Under this agreement, Iran has committed to obligations that go far 
beyond the requirements of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The 
agreement will block every pathway to a bomb for at least 15 years. It 
will require Iran to eliminate 97 percent of its stockpile of enriched 
uranium, remove two-thirds of its installed centrifuges that enrich 
uranium as well as remove all the pipework and infrastructure that 
connects the centrifuges, and terminate the use of its advanced 
centrifuges to produce enriched uranium. Iran will be required to fill 
the core of the heavy water Arak reactor with concrete and repurpose it 
for peaceful purposes. Additionally the deal directs Iran to ship all 
spent fuel from the reactor out of the country, and prohibits Iran from 
building any new heavy water reactors. Experts say that these steps are 
not easily reversible and it would take Iran anywhere from 2 to 5 years 
to rebuild that infrastructure. Efforts to rebuild it would be detected 
within a few days.
  Under the agreement, Iran's uranium and plutonium manufacturing 
capabilities will be both severely limited and strictly monitored by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA will be granted 
around-the-clock access to Iran's uranium mills, mines, conversion 
facilities, centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities, making it 
nearly impossible for the Iranian government to violate their 
manufacturing restrictions. The IAEA will also have access to sites of 
concern where they believe unauthorized production to be taking place.
  If Iran fully complies with this agreement it will be an historic 
moment not only for the U.S. but for the rest of the world. If Iran 
violates the agreement, U.S., U.N., and E.U. sanctions will be snapped 
back into place. Further, all U.S. sanctions on Iran related to their 
involvement in terrorism and human rights abuses remain in place. All 
of the P5+1 partners understand that the U.S. will continue to strongly 
enforce these sanctions, including sanctions that impact non-U.S. 
entities.
  While I will not question the intentions of my colleagues, since we 
all have the same goal which is to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, some 
of the rhetoric in opposition to this agreement has been damaging, 
unhelpful, and at times absurd. Opponents of the agreement have called 
into question the integrity of the IAEA and their ability as the 
world's foremost independent organization on nuclear non-proliferation 
to do their work--for example, by claiming that the confidential 
nuclear safeguards agreement between the IAEA and Iran is a ``side 
deal'' and must be made available to the U.S. government. There is too 
much at stake and this debate merits a serious conversation based on 
facts. We need to move beyond the irresponsible, heated rhetoric and do 
what's necessary to assure that this agreement is successful, will not 
be violated by Iran, and ensuring that if violations occur there will 
be serious consequences.
  When this agreement is implemented Iran will be further away from the 
bomb than they are today. It will result in prolonging their timeline 
for creating a nuclear bomb from a matter of months to at least one 
year. Without the agreement, Iran would be able to continue their 
nuclear program unrestrained. If the U.S. walked away from the 
agreement, Iran would most likely ramp up their centrifuge production--
as they did after the U.S. imposed sanctions--which would surely spark 
a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
  Congress should play a supportive role in ensuring that the president 
can implement this agreement and provide oversight of Iran's 
compliance. Instead, my Republican colleagues are attempting to scuttle 
and undermine it, damaging U.S. credibility in the international 
community and creating a potentially dangerous security position for 
our nation. While I have not always agreed with President Obama's 
foreign policy choices I have fully supported his efforts to resolve 
the crisis over Iran's nuclear ambitions through diplomacy. The 
conclusion of this agreement demonstrates just how far the U.S. has 
come in repairing the damage wrought during the Bush administration. It 
proves that once again the U.S. can be trusted in working with both our 
allies and adversaries in navigating some of the world's most 
challenging security issues.
  The U.S. has nothing to lose by implementing this agreement--all 
options remain on the table, but we have a lot to lose if we walk away. 
Rejecting this agreement like some of my colleagues are advocating 
would take us back to some of the darkest years in U.S. history. 
Opponents of this agreement are using arguments put forth by Dick 
Cheney and Benjamin Netanyahu, two leading cheerleaders of the Iraq 
war--the worst U.S. foreign policy mistake in the history of our 
nation. Nobody wants to become further entangled in an endless war in 
the Middle East. The U.S. wasted more than $4 trillion on the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and spent more money rebuilding Afghanistan than 
we did on the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II. What 
have the results been? Afghanistan is still a mess and Iraq is rife 
with religious and ethnic strife and partially overrun by ISIS.
  Preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon would be a huge step 
forward in the most unstable and dangerous region of the world. 
Implementing this agreement is the only option and the best alternative 
available to taking military action.
  Lastly, I'm hopeful that the successful implementation of this 
agreement will lead to a permanent peaceful resolution to this matter 
and open up a new chapter in Iranian-U.S. relations. Iran's future is 
also at stake and there is a young Iranian population that would like 
to see better relations with the U.S. and a more open Iran. This 
agreement should not be viewed as an irreversible capitulation to Iran. 
It is the first step in what will be a very long and arduous road to 
resolving critical issues with Iran and ensuring a safer Middle East.
  Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, after careful review of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), analysis by experts pro and con, 
consultation with advocates from AIPAC, and prayerful consideration, I 
have concluded that the JCPOA is a strong, verifiable agreement which, 
if implemented, provides the best available option, short of military 
action, to prevent Iran from securing a nuclear weapon.
  Israel is our nation's closest friend in the Middle East and one of 
our nation's key allies. Our relationship is based on shared democratic 
values, mutual respect, and our Judeo-Christian heritage. I have 
witnessed first-hand Israel's remarkable culture, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and patriotism, especially when I traveled to the 
Holy Land.
  Drawing from my experience as a member of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Defense, and the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military 
Construction and Veterans' Affairs, I have an acute appreciation for 
the tremendous security challenges Israel and its people face as the 
nation seeks to survive and thrive in a very hostile neighborhood. 
Consequently, I have always supported funding for Israel's missile 
defense programs; a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict through direct and bilateral talks; and efforts such as the 
United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013 to promote 
closer military, scientific, and economic ties between our two 
countries.
  Moreover, I have consistently supported international sanctions 
against Iran, not merely to inflict economic hardships on the 
government and people of Iran because of their anti-American, anti-
Israeli, and anti-Semitic conduct, but to ultimately bring Iran to the 
negotiating table to deter its nuclear weapons program, which poses a 
real and grave threat to Israel, the United States, and the entire 
world.
  Because the threat of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon is so ominous, 
our country was

[[Page 13982]]

able to persuade a multitude of nations to join us, albeit reluctantly, 
in imposing these severe sanctions which have effectively brought Iran 
to the negotiation table regarding its nuclear weapons program. On July 
14, 2015, negotiators from Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Russia, and China, along with the European Union, 
announced completion of a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran--
the JCPOA.
  The JCPOA requires that the full extent of the Iran nuclear program 
will be under constant surveillance--24 hours a day, 7 days a week--by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for at least 15 years, 
which is the strongest nuclear non-proliferation monitoring agency 
anywhere in the world. Even after 15 years, Iran will be permanently 
obligated to follow all international Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty 
requirements. Monitoring of the most sensitive parts of Iran's nuclear 
program will continue indefinitely.
  The JCPOA affirms that under no circumstance will Iran ever seek, 
develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons. It also places severe 
restrictions on Iran's uranium enrichment facilities, dismantles its 
plutonium production capabilities, and provides the IAEA access to all 
known and potential covert sites.
  If Iran complies with the JCPOA, international sanctions will be 
lifted and Iranian funds frozen in foreign banks will be released. 
However, if Iran violates the agreement, sanctions will snap back into 
place and all options--including the use of military force--will remain 
available to the United States, Israel, and our allies to prevent Iran 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon. These options will only be 
strengthened by the intelligence gathered from the IAEA monitoring and 
inspections, as well as by the vast array of U.S. intelligence assets 
across the region and the world.
  The JCPOA is not perfect. Neither side got everything they wanted. 
And a skeptical international community has deep concerns about Iran's 
long and nefarious record of human rights violations, financing of 
terrorism, hostility to Israel and the United States, as well as its 
destabilizing role throughout the Middle East.
  Many Americans, Israelis, and other allies have serious doubts as to 
whether Iran will actually comply with the terms of the JCPOA, and 
believe Iran cannot be trusted. I share these concerns. But the JCPOA 
is not based on trust but on verification through constant monitoring.
  While intense inspections by the IAEA under the agreement are not 
sufficient to satisfy some critics, over 70 nuclear non-proliferation 
experts such as former Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar; Generals 
Brent Scrowcroft and Colin Powell; 29 top U.S. scientists; 440 Rabbis; 
more than 60 former Israeli Security Officials; over 50 Christian 
leaders; and more than 100 former U.S. Ambassadors have endorsed the 
agreement publicly. The United Nations Security Council voted 
unanimously to support the JCPOA as well.
  From a practical perspective, it makes little sense for the United 
States to walk away from the JCPOA given the broad diplomatic consensus 
and lack of reasonable alternatives to rolling back Iran's nuclear 
program. Our negotiating partners, who had reluctantly agreed to 
sanctions in the first place, have said in no uncertain terms that a 
better deal with Iran under current circumstances cannot be found. In 
fact, if the U.S. were to now reject the agreement, the broad 
international support currently in favor of sanctions would disappear, 
the guarantee of nuclear inspections would vanish, and our nation's 
diplomatic stature in the world would be greatly diminished.
  To be sure, it is vital that the JCPOA be backed by a strong 
commitment to ensuring that Iran remains in full compliance or face 
overwhelming military force. Current intelligence confirms that Iran is 
within months of developing nuclear weapons capability. Under no 
circumstances should Iran ever be allowed to pursue a nuclear weapon. 
Yet, before military action is pursued, I firmly believe that our 
nation must, as it has through the JCPOA, exhaust all of its diplomatic 
options and give peace a chance.
  In His Sermon on the Mount, Jesus Christ said: ``Blessed are the 
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.'' Waging 
peace is hard and requires far more than trust and good intentions. It 
requires verification and transparency, which this agreement more than 
provides. For these reasons, I will support the JCPOA and oppose the 
passage of any legislation disapproving of the agreement transmitted to 
Congress by the President relating to the nuclear program of Iran.
  Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Speaker, I'd like to begin with a couple quotes from 
the President about the agreement:
  ``There is nothing more important to our security and to the world's 
stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missiles.
  ``It does not rely on trust. Compliance will be certified by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.''
  Mr. Speaker, you would be forgiven if you thought I was quoting 
President Obama. However, I was quoting President Bill Clinton lauding 
his nuclear agreement with North Korea in 1994. Additionally he stated, 
``This agreement will help to achieve a longstanding and vital American 
objective: an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean 
Peninsula.''
  Mr. Speaker, we now know that reality turned out to be very 
different. Despite assurances from President Clinton, the North Koreans 
violated the deal, began a clandestine program to enrich uranium and in 
2006 conducted its first underground test of a nuclear weapon.
  Once again we are told by a Democrat President that an agreement will 
prevent an adversarial country from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We 
would be fools to believe that they will not violate the Obama 
agreement just as North Korea violated the Clinton agreement. The 
stakes here are even higher. Iran is a regime that will not hesitate to 
use nuclear weapons to achieve its long-stated goals: the destruction 
of both Israel and America.
  The Iran Nuclear Deal that was agreed to by President Obama is wholly 
inadequate and unacceptable. The deal gives up-front, permanent 
sanctions relief to the Iranian mullahs and allows Iran to have an 
internationally recognized nuclear program after 15 years that could 
quickly produce a nuclear weapon.
  Most laughable are the ``anytime, anywhere'' inspections. In fact, 
the agreement grants the Iranians 24 days to allow the IAEA access to 
undeclared nuclear facilities. This gives Iran ample opportunity to 
cheat and continue its march toward a nuclear weapon. We have also 
learned that the Iranians will be able to provide their own samples 
from their military base at Parchin to international inspectors. This 
is essentially asking the fox to guard the henhouse.
  I also have great concerns about what happens once sanctions are 
lifted and billions of dollars are flowing back into Iran. While the UN 
Security Council resolutions allegedly prevent Iran from shipping arms 
to terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and to Assad in 
Syria, nothing prevents them from sending money. In an incredibly 
dangerous concession, the U.S. even agreed to shorten the length of the 
arms embargo against Iran. There is no question that this will 
negatively impact regional stability as well as the U.S. Navy's access 
to the Persian Gulf. An article in the Washington Post pointed out that 
the funds available to Iran immediately upon implementation of this 
deal would equate to approximately 10% of its GDP. That would be 
equivalent to a $1.7 trillion injection into our economy.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not believe this agreement will prevent Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. I believe it will do just the opposite. In 
no way should a country that vows to wipe Israel off the map and chants 
``Death to America'' be allowed nuclear capabilities. Today marks a 
turning point for the future of one of our greatest allies, Israel. If 
this deal goes through, President Obama and Democrats in Congress will 
own the consequences of allowing the Iranian regime to become a nuclear 
power.
  We can and must have a better deal. A deal that truly allows for 
anytime/anywhere inspections. A deal that would keep restrictions on 
Iran's nuclear program for decades. A deal that forces Iran to end its 
missile development program. A deal that allows Iran truly limited 
enrichment capability. A deal that releases U.S. hostages in Iran. It 
is a catastrophic failure that President Obama did not insist on these 
provisions in the nuclear deal. We should be embarrassed that as the 
leader of the free world and the most powerful country on earth, this 
is the best deal President Obama could negotiate.
  We have been presented with a false choice of accepting this deal or 
going to war. We should reject this deal and return to work, not to 
war. We cannot allow the sanctions to be lifted, we must reject 
approval of the deal and we must have all the information--including 
side agreements--before the clock can begin on the deal. I urge my 
colleagues to stand with our ally Israel and with the American people. 
The consequences of these votes are truly life and death.
  Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, over the past two years, the U.S., Britain, 
France, Germany, China, and Russia have been negotiating with Iran in 
order to stop Iran's nuclear weapons capability. On July 14, the 
international coalition announced that an agreement had been reached. 
This week Congress will get a chance to vote on the agreement.

[[Page 13983]]

  I have carefully studied the text of the agreement, attended 
classified briefings, reviewed classified documents compiled by 
intelligence agencies, listened to the thoughts and concerns of 
Wisconsinites, and met with experts on both sides of the issue, 
including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a recent 
trip to Israel.
  Although the agreement is not a perfect solution to a complex 
problem, I believe the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is 
the best option to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Before 
negotiations began, Iran was steadily improving its nuclear weapon 
capability. It was estimated by our intelligence community that Iran 
was only a few months away from developing a bomb, which is 
unacceptable.
  Under terms of the agreement, Iran must significantly dismantle its 
nuclear program. Iran's uranium stockpile will be greatly reduced, its 
number of nuclear enrichment centrifuges cut by two thirds, and its 
advanced centrifuge research and development severely limited. A group 
of our nation's top nuclear scientists praised the technical terms of 
the agreement and argued that it provides assurance that Iran will not 
develop a nuclear weapon in the next decade.
  Iran's history of cheating on agreements, such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, has fostered an environment of distrust, which is 
why this agreement is based on ``distrust and verify.'' The agreement 
will be enforced and monitored by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) with our help and resources. The inspection regimen is 
unprecedented, and most experts believe that it would be very difficult 
for Iran to cheat without detection. Should Iran fail to comply with 
the agreement, the sanctions that forced Iran to the negotiating table 
will ``snap back'' into place. The president has made clear that no 
options are taken off the table under this agreement.
  The JCPOA is not perfect. I have serious concerns with some aspects 
of the agreement, especially the prospect of Iran receiving billions in 
sanctions relief that may be used for nefarious purposes. We must 
continue to enhance the security of Israel and other allies in the 
region. It is important to make it clear to Iran and the international 
community that Israel's security is our security.
  Given the rhetoric coming from some in Iran and its behavior in the 
region, Israel is understandably skeptical of any agreement with 
Iranian leaders. But after speaking to opponents of the agreement, 
including Netanyahu, I have yet to hear a viable alternative that will 
maintain an international coalition to continue economic sanctions or 
support preemptive military action if needed.
  It is easier to deal with an Iran without a nuclear weapon than 
trying to work backwards once Iran has manufactured a weapon. This 
agreement gives us the best opportunity to avoid military action and 
may accomplish our ultimate objective: to prevent Iran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon, protecting the security of our allies in the region, 
and avoiding a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following letter:

     Hon. John A. Boehner,
     Speaker of the House.
     Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
     Minority Leader.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     Majority Leader.
     Hon. Harry Reid,
     Minority Leader.
       Dear Representatives Boehner and Pelosi and Senators 
     McConnell and Reid: As you know, on July 14, 2015, the United 
     States and five other nations announced that a Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been reached with 
     Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. In our 
     judgment as former senior military officers, the agreement 
     will not have that effect. Removing sanctions on Iran and 
     releasing billions of dollars to its regime over the next ten 
     years is inimical to the security of Israel and the Middle 
     East. There is no credibility within JCPOA's inspection 
     process or the ability to snap back sanctions once lifted, 
     should Iran violate the agreement. In this and other 
     respects, the JCPOA would threaten the national security and 
     vital interests of the United States and, therefore, should 
     be disapproved by the Congress.
       The agreement as constructed does not ``cut off every 
     pathway'' for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. To the 
     contrary, it actually provides Iran with a legitimate path to 
     doing that simply by abiding by the deal. JCPOA allows all 
     the infrastructure the Iranians need for a nuclear bomb to be 
     preserved and enhanced. Notably, Iran is allowed to: continue 
     to enrich uranium; develop and test advanced centrifuges; and 
     continue work on its Arak heavy-water plutonium reactor. 
     Collectively, these concessions afford the Iranians, at 
     worst, a ready breakout option and, at best, an incipient 
     nuclear weapons capability a decade from now.
       The agreement is unverifiable. Under the terms of the JCPOA 
     and a secret side deal (to which the United States is not 
     privy), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be 
     responsible for inspections under such severe limitations as 
     to prevent them from reliably detecting Iranian cheating. For 
     example, if Iran and the inspectors are unable to reach an 
     accommodation with respect to a given site, the result could 
     be at least a 24-day delay in IAEA access. The agreement also 
     requires inspectors to inform Iran in writing as to the basis 
     for its concerns about an undeclared site, thus further 
     delaying access. Most importantly, these inspections do not 
     allow access to Iranian military facilities, the most likely 
     location of their nuclear weapons development efforts. In the 
     JCPOA process, there is substantial risk of U.S. intelligence 
     being compromised, since the IAEA often relies on our 
     sensitive data with respect to suspicious and/or prohibited 
     activity.
       While failing to assure prevention of Iran's nuclear 
     weapons development capabilities, the agreement provides by 
     some estimates $150 billion dollars or more to Iran in the 
     form of sanctions relief. As military officers, we find it 
     unconscionable that such a windfall could be given to a 
     regime that even the Obama administration has acknowledged 
     will use a portion of such funds to continue to support 
     terrorism in Israel, throughout the Middle East and globally, 
     whether directly or through proxies. These actions will be 
     made all the more deadly since the JCPOA will lift 
     international embargoes on Iran's access to advanced 
     conventional weapons and ballistic missile technology.
       In summary, this agreement will enable Iran to become far 
     more dangerous, render the Mideast still more unstable and 
     introduce new threats to American interests as well as our 
     allies. In our professional opinion, far from being an 
     alternative to war, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
     makes it likely that the war the Iranian regime has waged 
     against us since 1979 will continue, with far higher risks to 
     our national security interests. Accordingly, we urge the 
     Congress to reject this defective accord.
           Sincerely,
       Admiral David Architzel, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Stanley 
     R. Arthur, US Navy, Retired; General William Begert, US Air 
     Force, Retired; General J.B. Davis, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Admiral William A. Dougherty, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Leon 
     A. ``Bud'' Edney, US Navy, Retired; General Alfred G. Hansen, 
     US Air Force, Retired; Admiral Thomas Hayward, US Navy, 
     Retired; Admiral James Hogg, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Jerome 
     Johnson, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Timothy J. Keating, US 
     Navy, Retired; Admiral Robert J. Kelly, US Navy, Retired; 
     Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez, US Navy, Retired; Admiral James 
     A. ``Ace'' Lyons, US Navy, Retired; Admiral Richard Macke, US 
     Navy, Retired; Admiral Henry Mauz, US Navy, Retired; General 
     Lance Smith, US Air Force, Retired; Admiral Leighton Smith, 
     US Navy, Retired; Admiral William D. Smith, US Navy, Retired; 
     General Louis C. Wagner, Jr., US Army, Retired; Admiral Steve 
     White, US Navy, Retired; General Ronald W. Yates, US Air 
     Force, Retired.
       Lieutenant General Teddy G. Allen, US Army, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson, III, US Army, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Marcus A. Anderson, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Spence M. Armstrong, US Air Force, 
     Retired; Lieutenant General Harold W. Blot, US Marine Corps, 
     Retired; Vice Admiral Michael Bowman, US Navy, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General William G. ``Jerry'' Boykin, US Army, 
     Retired; Vice Admiral Edward S. Briggs, US Navy, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Richard E. ``Tex'' Brown III, US Air 
     Force, Retired; Lieutenant General William J. Campbell, US 
     Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral Edward Clexton, US Navy, 
     Retired; Vice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper, US Navy, Retired; 
     Vice Admiral William A. Dougherty, US Navy, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Brett Dula, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Gordon E. Fornell, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Thomas B. Goslin, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Earl Hailston, US Marine Corps, Retired; 
     Vice Admiral Bernard M. Kauderer, US Navy, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Timothy A. Kinnan, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Vice Admiral J.B. LaPlante, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral 
     Tony Less, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Bennett L. 
     Lewis, US Army, Retired; Vice Admiral Michael Malone, US 
     Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral John Mazach, US Navy, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General Fred McCorkle, US Marine Corps, Retired; 
     Vice Admiral Robert Monroe, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral 
     Jimmy Pappas, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral J. Theodore 
     Parker, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant General Garry L. Parks, 
     US Marine Corps, Retired; Lieutenant General Everett Pratt, 
     US Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral John Poindexter, US Navy, 
     Retired; Lieutenant General Clifford ``Ted'' Rees, Jr., US 
     Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral William Rowden, US Navy, 
     Retired; Vice Admiral Robert F. Schoultz, US Navy, Retired; 
     Lieutenant General E.G. ``Buck'' Shuler, Jr., US Air Force, 
     Retired; Lieutenant General Hubert ``Hugh'' G. Smith, US 
     Army, Retired.

[[Page 13984]]

       Vice Admiral Edward M. Straw, US Navy, Retired; Lieutenant 
     General David J. Teal, US Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral 
     D.C. ``Deese'' Thompson, US Coast Guard, Retired; Lieutenant 
     General William E. Thurman, US Air Force, Retired; Lieutenant 
     General Billy Tomas, US Army, Retired; Vice Admiral John 
     Totushek, US Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US 
     Navy, Retired; Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, US Navy, Retired; 
     Vice Admiral Timothy W. Wright, US Navy, Retired.
       Rear Admiral William V. Alford, Jr., US Navy, Retired; 
     Major General Thurman E. Anderson, US Army, Retired; Major 
     General Joseph T. Anderson, US Marine Corps, Retired; Rear 
     Admiral Philip Anselmo, US Navy, Retired; Major General Joe 
     Arbuckle, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral James W. Austin, US 
     Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral John R. Batzler, US Navy, 
     Retired; Rear Admiral John Bayless, US Navy, Retired; Major 
     General John Bianchi, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Donald 
     Vaux Boecker, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Jerry C. Breast, 
     US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Bruce B. Bremner, US Navy, 
     Retired; Major General Edward M. Browne, US Army, Retired; 
     Rear Admiral Thomas F. Brown III, US Navy, Retired; Rear 
     Admiral Lyle Bull, US Navy, Retired; Major General Bobby G. 
     Butcher, US Marine Corps, Retired; Rear Admiral Jay A. 
     Campbell, US Navy, Retired; Major General Henry D. 
     Canterbury, US Air Force, Retired; Major General Carroll D. 
     Childers, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Ronald L. 
     Christenson, US Navy, Retired; Major General John R.D. 
     Cleland, US Army, Retired; Major General Richard L. Comer, US 
     Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Jack Dantone, US Navy, 
     Retired; Major General William B. Davitte, US Air Force, 
     Retired; Major General James D. Delk, US Army, Retired; Major 
     General Felix Dupre, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral 
     Philip A. Dur, US Navy, Retired; Major General Neil L. 
     Eddins, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Paul Engel, US 
     Navy, Retired; Major General Vince Falter, US Army, Retired; 
     Rear Admiral James H. Flatley, US Navy, Retired.
       Major General Bobby O. Floyd, US Air Force, Retired; Major 
     General Paul Fratarangelo, US Marine Corps, Retired; Rear 
     Admiral Veronica ``Ronne'' Froman, US Navy, Retired; Rear 
     Admiral R. Byron Fuller, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Frank 
     Gallo, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Albert A. Gallotta, 
     Jr., US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral James Mac Gleim, US Navy, 
     Retired; Rear Admiral Robert H. Gormley, US Navy, Retired; 
     Rear Admiral William Gureck, US Navy, Retired; Major General 
     Gary L. Harrell, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Donald 
     Hickman, US Navy, Retired; Major General Geoffrey 
     Higginbotham, US Marine Corps, Retired; Major General Kent H. 
     Hillhouse, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Tim Hinkle, US 
     Navy, Retired; Major General Victor Joseph Hugo, US Army, 
     Retired; Major General James P. Hunt, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Rear Admiral Grady L. Jackson, US Navy, Retired; Major 
     General William K. James, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral 
     John M. ``Carlos'' Johnson, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral 
     Pierce J. Johnson, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Steven B. 
     Kantrowitz, US Navy, Retired; Major General Maurice W. 
     Kendall, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral Charles R. Kubic, US 
     Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Frederick L. Lewis, US Navy, 
     Retired; Major General John D. Logeman, Jr., US Air Force, 
     Retired; Major General Homer S. Long, Jr., US Army, Retired; 
     Major General Robert M. Marquette, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Rear Admiral Robert B. McClinton, US Navy, Retired; Rear 
     Admiral W. J. McDaniel, MD, US Navy, Retired; Major General 
     Keith W. Meurlin, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral 
     Terrence McKnight, US Navy, Retired; Major General John F. 
     Miller, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Major General Burton R. 
     Moore, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral David R. Morris, 
     US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Ed Nelson, Jr., US Coast 
     Guard, Retired; Major General George W. ``Nordie'' Norwood, 
     US Air Force, Retired; Major General Everett G. Odgers, US 
     Air Force, Retired.
       Rear Admiral Phillip R. Olson, US Navy, Retired; Rear 
     Admiral Robert S. Owens, US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral 
     Robert O. Passmore, US Navy, Retired; Major General Richard 
     E. Perraut, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral W.W. 
     Pickavance, Jr., US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral L.F. Picotte, 
     US Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Thomas J. Porter, US Navy, 
     Retired; Major General H. Douglas Robertson, US Army, 
     Retired; Rear Admiral W.J. Ryan, US Navy, Retired; Rear 
     Admiral Norman Saunders, US Coast Guard, Retired; Major 
     General John P. Schoeppner, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; Major 
     General Edison E. Scholes, US Army, Retired; Rear Admiral 
     Hugh P. Scott, US Navy, Retired; Major General Richard 
     Secord, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral James M. Seely, 
     US Navy, Retired; Major General Sidney Shachnow, US Army, 
     Retired; Rear Admiral William H. Shawcross, US Navy, Retired; 
     Rear Admiral Bob Shumaker, US Navy, Retired; Major General 
     Willie Studer, US Air Force, Retired; Major General Larry 
     Taylor, US Marine Corps, Retired; Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor, 
     US Navy, Retired; Major General Richard L. Testa, US Air 
     Force, Retired; Rear Admiral Robert P. Tiernan, US Navy, 
     Retired; Major General Paul E. Vallely, US Army, Retired; 
     Major General Kenneth W. Weir, US Marine Corps, Retired; 
     Major General John Welde, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral 
     James B. Whittaker, US Navy, Retired; Major General Geoffrey 
     P. Wiedeman, Jr., MD, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral H. 
     Denny Wisely, US Navy, Retired.
       Brigadier General John R. Allen, Jr., US Air Force, 
     Retired; Brigadier General John C. Arick, US Marine Corps, 
     Retired; Brigadier General Loring R. Astorino, US Air Force, 
     Retired; Rear Admiral Robert E. Besal, US Navy, Retired; 
     Brigadier General William Bloomer, US Marine Corps, Retired; 
     Brigadier General George P. Cole, Jr., US Air Force, Retired; 
     Brigadier General Richard A. Coleman, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Brigadier General James L. Crouch, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Rear Admiral Marianne B. Drew, US Navy, Retired; Brigadier 
     General Philip M. Drew, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier 
     General Larry K. Grundhauser, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Brigadier General Thomas W. Honeywill, US Air Force, Retired; 
     Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, US Army, Retired; Brigadier 
     General Stephen Lanning, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier 
     General Thomas J. Lennon, US Air Force, Retired; Rear Admiral 
     Bobby C. Lee, US Navy, Retired; Brigadier General Robert F. 
     Peksens, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Joe 
     Shaefer, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Graham E. 
     Shirley, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Stanley O. 
     Smith, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Hugh B. Tant 
     III, US Army, Retired; Brigadier General Michael Joseph 
     Tashjian, US Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General William 
     Tiernan, US Marine Corps, Retired; Brigadier General Roger W. 
     Scearce, US Army, Retired; Brigadier General Robert V. Woods, 
     US Air Force, Retired.
  Ms. PLASKETT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action.
  Over these summer months my colleagues and I have engaged in--what I 
believe has been--enormous thought, analysis, consultation, and 
heartfelt introspection in taking a position on a matter that may 
determine the safety of the Middle East, and the United States' 
continued leadership in the world. For several years our nation has 
spearheaded sanctions, which have brought Iran to the negotiating 
table, and our President has presented to our nation a path to peace. 
For the last 30 years, American-Iranian relations have been trapped in 
not only suspicion and mistrust, but intractability; denying us the 
ability to develop even an agreement as to how we will manage our and 
our allies' relationship and interests in Iran. As a nation of 
democracy, dignity and freedom, fought for and defended by ourselves 
and our allies, I believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) is the best means to protect and advance the best interests of 
our nation and those of our allies. I choose to support measures 
designed to build bridges to a future that may one day lead to peace.
  I fundamentally support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and 
commend Secretary John Kerry and Secretary Ernest Moniz for their 
leadership in these negotiations. We are not the only party to this 
Agreement and we are well aware that all other nations in the 
negotiation are ready and willing to sign the JCPOA. They are also 
ready to resume commercial relations with Iran, which will effectively 
remove economic sanctions, the stick which initially brought them to 
the table. Our leadership role demands that we follow through with the 
terms of this Agreement and continue to be at the helm of monitoring 
Iran. We must never walk away from our commitment to peace in the 
region and our alliance with Israel. If we walk away now, however, we 
have no voice. We isolate not only our leaders, but also our nation.
  No one believes this is a perfect outcome or that we have entered 
with complete faith in the other side. As a lawyer, I understand that 
no party is ever completely satisfied with agreements such as this. I 
am particularly concerned that the Agreement will require lifting the 
sanctions against Iran, which has been our main enforcement measure. 
Iran stands to recover approximately $100 billion once released from 
previously imposed sanctions. If we reject this deal, we waive any 
leverage to ensure the money is not used to advance a regime that would 
threaten our national and international security. I will work with my 
colleagues in Congress and the Administration as we ensure Iran abides 
by the terms of the Agreement and uses the money to promote economic 
stability globally and within the region.
  I have met with my constituents including those from both the Muslim 
and Jewish communities and am thankful for their thoughts on this 
subject, and even more so for their commitment to uplift the people of 
the Virgin Islands, our country and the world.

[[Page 13985]]

  Most important to this decision is my fear that military action would 
be the likely alternative to rejecting the Agreement, and my 
constituents--mostly underserved and unemployed minorities--will be the 
individuals to bear the brunt of the fight. As the Representative of a 
community that serves in our Nation's military in greater proportion 
than most communities on the mainland, and as a mother of three 
service-age sons, I cannot support this outcome.
  On this anniversary of the attack of September 11, 2001, and our 
nation's subsequent decision to enter war, we see that we must exhaust 
every option before entering war and suffering the casualties of such 
conflicts, which rob us of the most precious resource of our nation; 
our people. The alternative to not supporting the Agreement is not a 
viable option for our nation. We as leaders must work diligently for 
peace in the Middle East, and to ensure we protect the interests of 
Israel, our must trusted ally in the region.
  I believe that President Obama has secured enough votes in the Senate 
to advance the Agreement, and hope we in Washington will now focus on 
efforts towards addressing and improving our long-term infrastructure 
needs, maintaining our social safety net system, alleviating the 
continued inequities in this great country, and uplifting the lives of 
all Americans.
  Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Speaker, as the Ranking Member on the Defense 
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, I am acutely aware 
of the harmful influence the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies 
have on the security situation in the Greater Middle East. Simply put, 
Iran pursues policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and goals 
throughout the Middle East, often by enflaming sectarian tensions that 
are exploited by violent extremist elements in the region.
  However, despite my clear and deep mistrust of Iran, I firmly support 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This hard-fought 
multilateral agreement will severely limit Iran's nuclear ambitions, 
establish a verifiable and robust inspection regime, allow for the 
timely reinstatement of sanctions for violations of this agreement, and 
in no way limit U.S. military options. If fully implemented and 
rigorously enforced, the JCPOA will result in the removal of a source 
of risk and uncertainty within the region for the foreseeable future. I 
believe this will substantially increase the security for our nation 
and all of our regional allies.
  Under the JCPOA, Iran's access to nuclear material will be 
significantly curtailed from what we know exists today. Specifically, 
Iran will not produce or acquire either highly enriched uranium or 
weapons-grade plutonium for at least 15 years, and they will reduce 
their stockpile of low enriched uranium by 98 percent, from 12,000 
kilograms to 300 kilograms. Additionally, two-thirds of Iran's 
centrifuges will be removed from nuclear facilities, to be secured and 
constantly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
Also important to note is the commitment Iran has made under the 
agreement to not pursue certain research and development programs 
directly linked to the development of a nuclear weapon. All told, these 
restrictions significantly increase the amount of time Iran would need 
to produce enough fissile material for a weapon and to build a nuclear 
device.
  The agreement provides for the establishment of a verifiable and 
robust inspection system, including constant monitoring of Iran's known 
nuclear facilities throughout the entire chain of development, from the 
uranium mines to its centrifuges. Access to the supply chain makes it 
improbable that Iran could establish a covert nuclear program without 
detection. Further, the JCPOA ensures continuous monitoring of Iran's 
declared nuclear facilities and IAEA inspectors can request access to 
any location they suspect is involved with nuclear activities, 
including military sites. In anticipation of difficulties with access, 
the JCPOA contains a dispute resolution mechanism should Iran deny the 
IAEA access to any site. While the time allowed for the dispute 
resolution process has been criticized as too lengthy, I am certain any 
suspicious site will receive the full attention of U.S. observation 
assets during that period. Additionally, nuclear inspection experts 
express the utmost confidence that IAEA environmental sampling would 
detect the presence of any nuclear material.
  In order to receive new sanctions relief, Iran must satisfy IAEA 
demands about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, 
dismantle the vast majority of its uranium capability, and remove the 
core from the Arak reactor. To receive full relief from the remaining 
sanctions, Iran must continue meeting commitments for the years agreed 
to in the JCPOA. If the terms of the agreement are not met at any time, 
the JCPOA provides for the ability to re-impose both unilateral and 
multilateral nuclear-related sanctions. And notably, the agreement 
allows the U.S. and its European allies to re-impose United Nations 
sanctions over the objections of any member of the Security Council, 
including China or Russia.
  Further, the JCPOA only applies to nuclear-related sanctions. The 
United States will maintain several strong sanctions authorities due to 
Iran's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and for its abysmal 
record on human rights. For example, U.S. sanctions will continue to 
apply to several top-level officials in Iran's security apparatus, to 
the transfer of weapons of mass destruction technologies, missile 
technologies, and conventional weapons.
  Finally, the agreement in no way constrains the U.S. military options 
at our disposal, as has been repeatedly pointed out by General Martin 
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before 
Congress.
  I cannot argue that the JCPOA is perfect, and I share the frustration 
expressed by its opponents with its limited scope. In particular, I 
would have preferred if the agreement kept the constraints on Iran's 
nuclear program for longer periods of time, further reduced the number 
of operational centrifuges, did not allow for the future elimination of 
sanctions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, contained 
restrictions on Iran's use of the sanctions relief, and addressed the 
detention of American citizens in Iran. However, in any negotiation, 
especially one with many sovereign nations, each having their own 
economic and security considerations, some compromise is necessary. 
Critically, I believe the agreement reached accomplishes the goal of 
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
  I fundamentally disagree with those supporters of the deal who have 
stated that ``war'' will be the immediate result if the agreement is 
rejected, and find that opponents of the deal have only presented 
alternatives that are best described as delusional. Rather, I concur 
with the sentiments of my esteemed friend, and former Senator, Richard 
Lugar, who recently wrote that Congressional rejection of the Iran deal 
would, ``kill the last chance for Washington to reach a verifiable 
Iranian commitment not to build a nuclear weapon,'' and, ``destroy the 
effective coalition that brought Iran to the negotiating table.'' We 
cannot reasonably expect foreign nations, even our closest allies, to 
continue making costly sacrifices at our demand if the U.S. 
unilaterally withdraws from its commitment to the JCPOA. And I can say 
with some confidence that China and Russia will have no hesitation to 
resume trade with Iran if the agreement were rejected. Iran negotiated 
because of crippling sanctions and a unified international community, 
neither of which will exist should Congress reject this agreement.
  The ultimate success or failure of the JCPOA will be determined by 
time and verification based on Iranian behavior. However, it is vital 
for the duration of the agreement that the U.S. leads the international 
community to maintain focus on Iran's compliance and ensure that Iran 
does not undermine regional stability through other pathways, negating 
the security gains from this agreement. To accomplish this, we must 
remain steadfast in our commitments to all of our regional partners, 
including Israel, and help improve their capacity to counter Iran and 
mitigate the effects of their malign activity. Additionally, we must 
keep combining diplomacy, economic pressure, and the resolve to keep 
military options on the table.
  Assuming the agreement is affirmed, I ask all to constructively work 
to improve the security situation in the Middle East rather than using 
all their energy to undermine the agreement. We cannot rely on force of 
arms alone to bring lasting stability to any region of our world. And I 
hope that the exhaustive multilateral negotiations that led to the 
JCPOA will serve as a template for future U.S. and international 
engagement on other outstanding issues that have led to instability and 
violence in the region.
  Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my support for the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated by the 
Administration and under consideration by Congress. I believe that this 
agreement is the best way forward to prevent the Islamic Republic of 
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and provides the United States and 
our allies with mechanisms to monitor and verify Iran's nuclear 
program. The agreement has the support of the international community 
and it gives us the best opportunity to avoid direct military conflict 
with Iran. Many men and women from Guam have paid the ultimate 
sacrifice in support of our country across the world, but most 
especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Every lost or wounded servicemember 
is a constant reminder of the ultimate price we

[[Page 13986]]

pay when diplomacy fails or, worse, isn't attempted. As Guam's 
representative to Congress, I have a responsibility to my constituents 
to use my best judgment and to do what is necessary to avoid putting 
their lives at risk when there are other options to solve serious 
geopolitical challenges.
  As Congress debates the JCPOA, it is important to recognize that the 
effort to halt Iran's effort to obtain nuclear weapons was not a 
unilateral effort by the United States but rather a multilateral effort 
with other countries holding a vested interest in a nuclear-free Iran. 
To believe that these countries will agree to renegotiate the agreement 
ignores the political realities of the P5+1 countries. If Congress 
votes to reject this agreement, it would impede our ability to promote 
nuclear nonproliferation in the Middle East, and there are no 
guarantees that other nations, such as China and Russia, would continue 
to impose economic sanctions on Iran. This past weekend, regarding the 
other nations, former Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, ``. . . 
they're all going to be moving forward. We're going to be standing in 
the sidelines.'' The United States does not belong on the sidelines. We 
must recognize the political realities of this deal regardless of 
whether it is perfect or not. It is folly to believe that a better deal 
is out there if we reject the JCPOA.
  As the representative of the people of Guam, I understand the dangers 
when hostile nations are able to obtain nuclear weapons; my 
constituents live under threat that North Korea could develop nuclear 
weapons that directly threatens our island. While there are flaws in 
the agreement that was reached in 1994 with North Korea, I believe it 
is important that we give this deal a chance to be implemented. Though 
we always reserve the right to defend our nation, our allies, and our 
interests, our values dictate that the United States does not have to 
lead with the sword. Diplomacy is always preferable to a military 
solution. However, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter noted that military 
options remain viable should Iran violate the agreement. He wrote, ``. 
. . nothing in the Iran deal constrains the U.S. Defense Department in 
any way or its ability to carry out such a mission.''
  I have reviewed the agreement and have been briefed by Secretary of 
State John Kerry and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, who led the U.S. 
negotiating team. I find their explanations of the agreement's details 
and arguments in favor of its adoption to be compelling. While I cannot 
vote on the floor of the House of Representatives, it is my 
responsibility to make my position on an issue of such importance known 
to my constituents and to our nation. I support the JCPOA and urge my 
colleagues to reject efforts to play politics with our national 
security.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 412, the previous question is ordered on 
the resolution and on the preamble.
  The question is on the resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 245, 
nays 186, not voting 2, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 492]

                               YEAS--245

     Abraham
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Amash
     Amodei
     Babin
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Benishek
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (MI)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blum
     Bost
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brat
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Burgess
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Clawson (FL)
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Comstock
     Conaway
     Cook
     Costello (PA)
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Curbelo (FL)
     Davis, Rodney
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Dold
     Donovan
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers (NC)
     Emmer (MN)
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Garrett
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Griffith
     Grothman
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Hanna
     Hardy
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Heck (NV)
     Hensarling
     Herrera Beutler
     Hice, Jody B.
     Hill
     Holding
     Hudson
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurd (TX)
     Hurt (VA)
     Issa
     Jenkins (KS)
     Jenkins (WV)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jolly
     Jones
     Jordan
     Joyce
     Katko
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Knight
     Labrador
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Latta
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Loudermilk
     Love
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     MacArthur
     Marchant
     Marino
     Massie
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McHenry
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McSally
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Messer
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Moolenaar
     Mooney (WV)
     Mullin
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Neugebauer
     Newhouse
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Perry
     Pittenger
     Pitts
     Poe (TX)
     Poliquin
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price, Tom
     Ratcliffe
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rice (SC)
     Rigell
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney (FL)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Rouzer
     Royce
     Russell
     Ryan (WI)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scalise
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Stefanik
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Trott
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Walters, Mimi
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IA)
     Young (IN)
     Zeldin
     Zinke

                               NAYS--186

     Adams
     Aguilar
     Ashford
     Bass
     Beatty
     Becerra
     Bera
     Beyer
     Bishop (GA)
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brownley (CA)
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardenas
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     DeSaulnier
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Duckworth
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Esty
     Farr
     Fattah
     Foster
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Graham
     Grayson
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hastings
     Heck (WA)
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinojosa
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huffman
     Israel
     Jackson Lee
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kind
     Kirkpatrick
     Kuster
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lawrence
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis
     Lieu, Ted
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan Grisham (NM)
     Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
     Lynch
     Maloney, Sean
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Meng
     Moore
     Moulton
     Murphy (FL)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nolan
     Norcross
     O'Rourke
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rangel
     Rice (NY)
     Richmond
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrader
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Sherman
     Sinema
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takai
     Takano
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Tonko
     Torres
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters, Maxine
     Watson Coleman
     Welch
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Maloney, Carolyn
     Wilson (FL)
       

                              {time}  1722

  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated against:
  Ms. WILSON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 492, had I been 
present, I would have voted ``no.''

                          ____________________