[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 11799-11805]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              LAWFUL USES OF ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME DOMAINS

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed 
to immediate consideration of Calendar No. 380, S. Res. 412.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the resolution by title.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A resolution (S. Res. 412) reaffirming the strong support 
     of the United States Government for freedom of navigation and 
     other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the 
     Asia-Pacific region, and for the peaceful diplomatic 
     resolution of outstanding territorial and maritime claims and 
     disputes.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the 
resolution, which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, with amendments and an amendment to the preamble.
  (The part of the resolution intended to be stricken is shown in 
boldface brackets and the part of the resolution intended to be 
inserted is shown in italic.)
  (The part of the preamble to be inserted is shown in italic.)

                              S. Res. 412

       Whereas Asia-Pacific's maritime domains, which include both 
     the sea and airspace above the domains, are critical to the 
     region's prosperity, stability, and security, including 
     global commerce;
       Whereas the United States is a longstanding Asia-Pacific 
     power and has a national interest in maintaining freedom of 
     operations in international waters and airspace both in the 
     Asia-Pacific region and around the world;
       Whereas, for over 60 years, the United States Government, 
     alongside United States allies and partners, has played an 
     instrumental role in maintaining stability in the Asia-
     Pacific, including safeguarding the prosperity and economic 
     growth and development of the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas the United States, from the earliest days of the 
     Republic, has had a deep and abiding national security 
     interest in freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, 
     respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce, 
     including in the East China and South China Seas;
       Whereas the United States alliance relationships in the 
     region, including with Japan, Korea, Australia, the 
     Philippines, and Thailand, are at the heart of United States 
     policy and engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and share a 
     common approach to supporting the maintenance of peace and 
     stability, freedom of navigation, and other internationally 
     lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas territorial and maritime claims must be derived 
     from land features and otherwise comport with international 
     law;
       Whereas the United States Government has a clear interest 
     in encouraging and supporting the nations of the region to 
     work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes 
     and is firmly opposed to coercion, intimidation, threats, or 
     the use of force;
       Whereas the South China Sea contains great natural 
     resources, and their stewardship and responsible use offers 
     immense potential benefit for generations to come;
       Whereas the United States is not a claimant party in either 
     the East China or South China Seas, but does have an interest 
     in the peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputed claims in 
     accordance with international law, in freedom of operations, 
     and in the free-flow of commerce free of coercion, 
     intimidation, or the use of force;
       Whereas the United States supports the obligation of all 
     members of the United Nations to seek to resolve disputes by 
     peaceful means;
       Whereas freedom of navigation and other lawful uses of sea 
     and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region are embodied in 
     international law, not granted by certain states to others;
       Whereas, on November 23, 2013, the People's Republic of 
     China unilaterally and without prior consultations with the 
     United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea or other nations 
     of the Asia-Pacific region, declared an Air Defense 
     Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, also 
     announcing that all aircraft entering the PRC's self-declared 
     ADIZ, even if they do not intend to enter Chinese territorial 
     airspace, would have to submit flight plans, maintain radio 
     contact, and follow directions from the Chinese Ministry of 
     National Defense or face ``emergency defensive measures'';
       Whereas the ``rules of engagement'' declared by China, 
     including the ``emergency defensive measures'', are in 
     violation of the concept of ``due regard for the safety of 
     civil aviation'' under the Chicago Convention of the 
     International Civil Aviation Organization's Chicago 
     Convention and thereby are a departure from accepted 
     practice;
       Whereas the Chicago Convention of the International Civil 
     Aviation Organization distinguishes between civilian aircraft 
     and state aircraft and provides for the specific obligations 
     of state parties, consistent with customary law, to ``refrain 
     from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft 
     in flight and . . . in case of interception, the lives of 
     persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be 
     endangered'';
       Whereas international civil aviation is regulated by 
     international agreements, including standards and regulations 
     set by ICAO for aviation safety, security, efficiency and 
     regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection;
       Whereas, in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent 
     passage, the United States does not recognize the right of a 
     coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state 
     aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does 
     the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state 
     aircraft not intending to enter United States airspace;
       Whereas the United States Government expressed profound 
     concerns with China's unilateral, provocative, dangerous, and 
     destabilizing declaration of such a zone, including the 
     potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations by 
     aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace;
       Whereas the People's Republic of China's declaration of an 
     ADIZ in the East China Sea will not alter how the United 
     States Government conducts operations in the region or the 
     unwavering United States commitment to peace, security and 
     stability in the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas the Government of Japan expressed deep concern 
     about the People's Republic of China's declaration of such a 
     zone, regarding it as an effort to unduly infringe upon the 
     freedom of flight in international airspace and to change the 
     status quo that could escalate tensions and potentially cause 
     unintentional consequences in the East China Sea;
       Whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea has 
     expressed concern over China's declared ADIZ, and on December 
     9, 2013, announced an adjustment to its longstanding Air 
     Defense Identification Zone, which does

[[Page 11800]]

     not encompass territory administered by another country, and 
     did so only after undertaking a deliberate process of 
     consultations with the United States, Japan, and China;
       Whereas the Government of the Philippines has stressed that 
     China's declared ADIZ seeks to transfer an entire air zone 
     into Chinese domestic airspace, infringes on freedom of 
     flight in international airspace, and compromises the safety 
     of civil aviation and the national security of affected 
     states, and has called on China to ensure that its actions do 
     not jeopardize regional security and stability;
       Whereas, on November 26, 2013, the Government of Australia 
     made clear in a statement its opposition to any coercive or 
     unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China 
     Sea;
       Whereas, on March 10, 2014, the United States Government 
     and the Government of Japan jointly submitted a letter to the 
     ICAO Secretariat regarding the issue of freedom of overflight 
     by civil aircraft in international airspace and the effective 
     management of civil air traffic within allocated Flight 
     Information Regions (FIR);
       Whereas Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in a 
     hearing before the Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs 
     on February 18, 2014, stated, ``We have firmly told China we 
     will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone 
     if it is adopted in the South China Sea. And the signal we 
     have received thus far is, China does not plan to adopt a 
     similar Zone in the South China Sea.'';
       Whereas over half the world's merchant tonnage flows 
     through the South China Sea, and over 15,000,000 barrels of 
     oil per day transit the Strait of Malacca, fueling economic 
     growth and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas the increasing frequency and assertiveness of 
     patrols and competing regulations over disputed territory and 
     maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the 
     East China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk 
     of confrontation;
       Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
     has promoted multilateral talks on disputed areas without 
     settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with 
     China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
     the South China Sea that committed all parties to those 
     territorial disputes to ``reaffirm their respect for and 
     commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight 
     above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally 
     recognized principles of international law'' and to ``resolve 
     their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful 
     means, without resorting to the threat or use of force'';
       Whereas ASEAN and China committed in 2002 to develop an 
     effective Code of Conduct when they adopted the Declaration 
     on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, yet 
     negotiations are irregular and little progress has been made;
       Whereas, in recent years, there have been numerous 
     dangerous and destabilizing incidents in waters near the 
     coasts of the Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam;
       Whereas the United States Government is deeply concerned 
     about unilateral actions by any claimant seeking to change 
     the status quo through the use of coercion, intimidation, or 
     military force, including the continued restrictions on 
     access to Scarborough Reef and pressure on long-standing 
     Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the 
     People's Republic of China; actions by any state to prevent 
     any other state from exercising its sovereign rights to the 
     resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
     continental shelf by making claims to those areas that have 
     no support in international law; declarations of 
     administrative and military districts in contested areas in 
     the South China Sea; and the imposition of new fishing 
     regulations covering disputed areas, which have raised 
     tensions in the region;
       Whereas international law is important to safeguard the 
     rights and freedoms of all states in the Asia-Pacific region, 
     and the lack of clarity in accordance with international law 
     by claimants with regard to their South China Sea claims can 
     create uncertainty, insecurity, and instability;
       Whereas the United States Government opposes the use of 
     intimidation, coercion, or force to assert a territorial 
     claim in the South China Sea;
       Whereas claims in the South China Sea must accord with 
     international law, and those that are not derived from land 
     features are fundamentally flawed;
       Whereas ASEAN issued Six-Point Principles on the South 
     China Sea on July 20, 2012, whereby ASEAN's Foreign Ministers 
     reiterated and reaffirmed ``the commitment of ASEAN Member 
     States to: . . . 1. the full implementation of the 
     Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
     (2002); . . . 2. the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
     Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
     (2011); . . . 3. the early conclusion of a Regional Code of 
     Conduct in the South China Sea; . . . 4. the full respect of 
     the universally recognized principles of International Law, 
     including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
     the Sea (UNCLOS); . . . 5. the continued exercise of self-
     restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and . . . 6. 
     the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with 
     universally recognized principles of International Law, 
     including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
     the Sea (UNCLOS).'';
       Whereas, in 2013, the Republic of the Philippines properly 
     exercised its rights to peaceful settlement mechanisms with 
     the filing of arbitration case under Article 287 and Annex 
     VII of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to 
     achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the dispute, and 
     the United States hopes that all parties in any dispute 
     ultimately abide by the rulings of internationally recognized 
     dispute-settlement bodies;
       Whereas China and Japan are the world's second and third 
     largest economies, and have a shared interest in preserving 
     stable maritime domains to continue to support economic 
     growth;
       Whereas there has been an unprecedented increase in 
     dangerous activities by Chinese maritime agencies in areas 
     near the Senkaku islands, including between 6 and 25 ships of 
     the Government of China intruding into the Japanese 
     territorial sea each month since September 2012, between 26 
     and 124 ships entering the ``contiguous zone'' in the same 
     time period, and 9 ships intruding into the territorial sea 
     and 33 ships entering in the contiguous zone in February 
     2014;
       Whereas, although the United States Government does not 
     take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku 
     Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they 
     are under the administration of Japan and opposes any 
     unilateral actions that would seek to undermine such 
     administration;
       Whereas the United States Senate has previously affirmed 
     that the unilateral actions of a third party will not affect 
     the United States acknowledgment of the administration of 
     Japan over the Senkaku Islands;
       Whereas the United States remains committed under the 
     Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to respond to any 
     armed attack in the territories under the administration of 
     Japan, has urged all parties to take steps to prevent 
     incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means, 
     and commends the Government of Japan for its restrained 
     approach in this regard;
       Whereas both the United States and the People's Republic of 
     China are parties to and are obligated to observe the rules 
     of the Convention on the International Regulations for 
     Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
     (COLREGs);
       Whereas, on December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully 
     operating in international waters in the South China Sea when 
     a People's Liberation Army Navy vessel reportedly crossed its 
     bow at a distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the 
     water, forcing the USS Cowpens to take evasive action to 
     avoid a collision;
       Whereas the reported actions taken by the People's 
     Liberation Army Navy vessel in the USS Cowpens' incident, as 
     publicly reported, appear contrary to the international legal 
     obligations of the People's Republic of China under COLREGs;
       Whereas, on May 1, 2014, the People's Republic of China's 
     state-owned energy company, CNOOC, placed its deepwater semi-
     submersible drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981), 
     accompanied by over 25 Chinese ships, in Block 143, 120 
     nautical miles off Vietnam's coastline;
       Whereas, from May 1 to May 9, 2014, the number of Chinese 
     vessels escorting HD-981 increased to more than 80, including 
     seven military ships, which aggressively patrolled and 
     intimidated Vietnamese Coast Guard ships in violation of 
     COLREGS, reportedly intentionally rammed multiple Vietnamese 
     vessels, and used helicopters and water cannons to obstruct 
     others;
       Whereas, on May 5, 2014, vessels from the Maritime Safety 
     Administration of China (MSAC) established an exclusion zone 
     with a radius of three nautical miles around HD-981, which 
     undermines maritime safety in the area and is in violation of 
     universally recognized principles of International Law, 
     including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
     the Sea (UNCLOS);
       Whereas China's territorial claims and associated maritime 
     actions in support of the drilling activity that HD-981 
     commenced on May 1, 2014, have not been clarified under 
     international law, including as defined by the 1982 United 
     Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, constitute a 
     unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force, and 
     appear to be in violation of the 2002 Declaration on the 
     Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea;
       Whereas, on January 19, 1998, the United States and 
     People's Republic of China signed the Military Maritime 
     Consultative Agreement, creating a mechanism for consultation 
     and coordination on operational safety issues in the maritime 
     domain between the United States and the People's Republic of 
     China;
       Whereas the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, inaugurated in 
     1988 and comprising the navies of Australia, Brunei, 
     Cambodia, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
     New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the People's Republic of 
     China, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Russian 
     Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States, 
     and Vietnam, whose countries all border the Pacific Ocean 
     region, provides a forum where leaders of regional navies can

[[Page 11801]]

     meet to discuss cooperative initiatives, discuss regional and 
     global maritime issues, and undertake exercises to strengthen 
     norms and practices that contribute to operational safety, 
     including protocols for unexpected encounters at sea, common 
     ways of communication, common ways of operating, and common 
     ways of engagement;
       Whereas, Japan and the People's Republic of China sought to 
     negotiate a Maritime Communications Mechanism between the 
     defense authorities and a Maritime Search and Rescue 
     Agreement and agreed in principle to these agreements to 
     address operational safety on the maritime domains but failed 
     to sign them;
       Whereas the Changi Command and Control Center in Singapore 
     provides a platform for all the countries of the Western 
     Pacific to share information on what kind of contact at sea 
     and to provide a common operational picture for the region;
       Whereas 2014 commemorates the 35th anniversary of 
     normalization of diplomatic relations between the United 
     States and the People's Republic of China, and the United 
     States welcomes the development of a peaceful and prosperous 
     China that becomes a responsible international stakeholder, 
     the government of which respects international norms, 
     international laws, international institutions, and 
     international rules; enhances security and peace; and seeks 
     to advance relations between the United States and China; and
       Whereas ASEAN plays an important role, in partnership with 
     others in the regional and international community, in 
     addressing maritime security issues in the Asia-Pacific 
     region and the Indian Ocean, including open access to the 
     maritime domain of Asia; Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE.

       The Senate--
       (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of 
     force to impede freedom of operations in international 
     airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the 
     status quo or to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region;
       (2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China 
     to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air 
     Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is contrary to 
     freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to 
     refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in 
     the Asia-Pacific region[; and];
       (3) commends the Governments of Japan and of the Republic 
     of Korea for their restraint, and commends the Government of 
     the Republic of Korea for engaging in a deliberate process of 
     consultations with the United States, Japan and China prior 
     to announcing its adjustment of its Air Defense 
     Identification Zone on December 9, 2013, and for its 
     commitment to implement this adjusted Air Defense 
     Identification Zone (ADIZ) in a manner consistent with 
     international practice and respect for the freedom of 
     overflight and other internationally lawful uses of 
     international airspace; and
       (4) calls on the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China to withdraw its HD-981 drilling rig and associated 
     maritime forces from their current positions, to refrain from 
     maritime maneuvers contrary to COLREGS, and to return 
     immediately to the status quo as it existed before May 1, 
     2014. 

     SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States to--
       (1) reaffirm its unwavering commitment and support for 
     allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including 
     longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the 
     United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and that 
     Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty 
     applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
       (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and 
     lawful use of the sea that belong to all nations;
       (3) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
     destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or 
     efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed 
     claims;
       (4) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, 
     coercion, or force;
       (5) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in 
     accordance with international law;
       (6) support efforts by ASEAN and the People's Republic of 
     China to develop an effective Code of Conduct, including the 
     ``early harvest'' of agreed-upon elements in the Code of 
     Conduct that can be implemented immediately;
       (7) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules 
     and guidelines, including the International Regulations for 
     Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
     (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation 
     between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of 
     other countries, including the People's Republic of China;
       (8) support the development of regional institutions and 
     bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense 
     Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the 
     expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation 
     in the region and reinforce the role of international law;
       (9) encourage the adoption of mechanisms such as hotlines 
     or emergency procedures for preventing incidents in sensitive 
     areas, managing them if they occur, and preventing disputes 
     from escalating;
       (10) fully support the rights of claimants to exercise 
     rights they may have to avail themselves of peaceful dispute 
     settlement mechanisms;
       (11) encourage claimants not to undertake new unilateral 
     attempts to change the status quo since the signing of the 
     2002 Declaration of Conduct, including not asserting 
     administrative measures or controls in disputed areas in the 
     South China Sea;
       (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other 
     countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and 
     capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States 
     Government to explore the development of appropriate 
     multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in 
     the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid 
     destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous 
     activities; and
       (13) assure the continuity of operations by the United 
     States in the Asia-Pacific region, including, when 
     appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to 
     reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in 
     international waters and airspace in accordance with 
     established principles and practices of international law.

  Mr. REID. I further ask that the committee-reported amendments to the 
resolution be agreed to; the Menendez amendment to the resolution, 
which is at the desk, be agreed to; the Paul amendment, which is at the 
desk, be agreed to; the resolution, as amended, be agreed to; further, 
that the committee-reported amendment to the preamble be agreed to; the 
Menendez amendment to the preamble, which is at the desk, be agreed to; 
the preamble, as amended, be agreed to; and finally, the motions to 
reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table, with no 
intervening action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The committee-reported amendments were agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3553) was agreed to, as follows:

               (Purpose: To make a technical correction)

         On page 13, line 24, strike ``HD-981'' and insert ``Hai 
     Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981)''.
  The amendment (No. 3554) was agreed to, as follows:

(Purpose: To clarify that nothing in the resolution shall be construed 
         as a declaration of war or authorization to use force)

       At the end, add the following:

     SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as a 
     declaration of war or authorization to use force.
  The resolution (S. Res. 412), as amended, was agreed to.
  The committee-reported amendment to the preamble was agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3555) was agreed to, as follows:

                   (Purpose: To improve the preamble)

       Beginning in the thirteenth whereas clause of the preamble, 
     strike ``Organization's'' and all that follows through ``Law 
     of the Sea'' in the forty-seventh whereas clause and insert 
     the following: ``Organization and thereby are a departure 
     from accepted practice;
       Whereas the Chicago Convention of the International Civil 
     Aviation Organization distinguishes between civilian aircraft 
     and state aircraft and provides for the specific obligations 
     of state parties, consistent with customary law, to ``refrain 
     from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft 
     in flight and . . . in case of interception, the lives of 
     persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be 
     endangered'';
       Whereas international civil aviation is regulated by 
     international agreements, including standards and regulations 
     set by ICAO for aviation safety, security, efficiency and 
     regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection;
       Whereas, in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent 
     passage, the United States does not recognize the right of a 
     coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state 
     aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does 
     the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state 
     aircraft not intending to enter United States airspace;
       Whereas the United States Government expressed profound 
     concerns with China's unilateral, provocative, dangerous, and 
     destabilizing declaration of such a zone, including the 
     potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations by 
     aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace;
       Whereas the People's Republic of China's declaration of an 
     ADIZ in the East China Sea will not alter how the United 
     States Government conducts operations in the region or the 
     unwavering United States commitment to peace, security and 
     stability in the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas the Government of Japan expressed deep concern 
     about the People's Republic of China's declaration of such a 
     zone, regarding it as an effort to unduly infringe upon the 
     freedom of flight in international

[[Page 11802]]

     airspace and to change the status quo that could escalate 
     tensions and potentially cause unintentional consequences in 
     the East China Sea;
       Whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea has 
     expressed concern over China's declared ADIZ, and on December 
     9, 2013, announced an adjustment to its longstanding Air 
     Defense Identification Zone, which does not encompass 
     territory administered by another country, and did so only 
     after undertaking a deliberate process of consultations with 
     the United States, Japan, and China;
       Whereas the Government of the Philippines has stressed that 
     China's declared ADIZ seeks to transfer an entire air zone 
     into Chinese domestic airspace, infringes on freedom of 
     flight in international airspace, and compromises the safety 
     of civil aviation and the national security of affected 
     states, and has called on China to ensure that its actions do 
     not jeopardize regional security and stability;
       Whereas, on November 26, 2013, the Government of Australia 
     made clear in a statement its opposition to any coercive or 
     unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China 
     Sea;
       Whereas, on March 10, 2014, the United States Government 
     and the Government of Japan jointly submitted a letter to the 
     ICAO Secretariat regarding the issue of freedom of overflight 
     by civil aircraft in international airspace and the effective 
     management of civil air traffic within allocated Flight 
     Information Regions (FIR);
       Whereas Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in a 
     hearing before the Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs 
     on February 18, 2014, stated, ``We have firmly told China we 
     will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone 
     if it is adopted in the South China Sea. And the signal we 
     have received thus far is, China does not plan to adopt a 
     similar Zone in the South China Sea.'';
       Whereas over half the world's merchant tonnage flows 
     through the South China Sea, and over 15,000,000 barrels of 
     oil per day transit the Strait of Malacca, fueling economic 
     growth and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas the increasing frequency and assertiveness of 
     patrols and competing regulations over disputed territory and 
     maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the 
     East China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk 
     of confrontation;
       Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
     has promoted multilateral talks on disputed areas without 
     settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with 
     China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
     the South China Sea that committed all parties to those 
     territorial disputes to ``reaffirm their respect for and 
     commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight 
     above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally 
     recognized principles of international law'' and to ``resolve 
     their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful 
     means, without resorting to the threat or use of force'';
       Whereas ASEAN and China committed in 2002 to develop an 
     effective Code of Conduct when they adopted the Declaration 
     on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, yet 
     negotiations are irregular and little progress has been made;
       Whereas, in recent years, there have been numerous 
     dangerous and destabilizing incidents in waters near the 
     coasts of the Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam;
       Whereas the United States Government is deeply concerned 
     about unilateral actions by any claimant seeking to change 
     the status quo through the use of coercion, intimidation, or 
     military force, including the continued restrictions on 
     access to Scarborough Reef and pressure on long-standing 
     Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the 
     People's Republic of China; actions by any state to prevent 
     any other state from exercising its sovereign rights to the 
     resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
     continental shelf by making claims to those areas that have 
     no support in international law; declarations of 
     administrative and military districts in contested areas in 
     the South China Sea; and the imposition of new fishing 
     regulations covering disputed areas, which have raised 
     tensions in the region;
       Whereas international law is important to safeguard the 
     rights and freedoms of all states in the Asia-Pacific region, 
     and the lack of clarity in accordance with international law 
     by claimants with regard to their South China Sea claims can 
     create uncertainty, insecurity, and instability;
       Whereas the United States Government opposes the use of 
     intimidation, coercion, or force to assert a territorial 
     claim in the South China Sea;
       Whereas claims in the South China Sea must accord with 
     international law, and those that are not derived from land 
     features are fundamentally flawed;
       Whereas ASEAN issued Six-Point Principles on the South 
     China Sea on July 20, 2012, whereby ASEAN's Foreign Ministers 
     reiterated and reaffirmed ``the commitment of ASEAN Member 
     States to: . . . 1. the full implementation of the 
     Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
     (2002); . . . 2. the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
     Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
     (2011); . . . 3. the early conclusion of a Regional Code of 
     Conduct in the South China Sea; . . . 4. the full respect of 
     the universally recognized principles of International Law, 
     including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
     the Sea (UNCLOS); . . . 5. the continued exercise of self-
     restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and . . . 6. 
     the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with 
     universally recognized principles of International Law, 
     including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
     the Sea (UNCLOS).'';
       Whereas, in 2013, the Republic of the Philippines properly 
     exercised its rights to peaceful settlement mechanisms with 
     the filing of arbitration case under Article 287 and Annex 
     VII of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to 
     achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the dispute, and 
     the United States hopes that all parties in any dispute 
     ultimately abide by the rulings of internationally recognized 
     dispute-settlement bodies;
       Whereas China and Japan are the world's second and third 
     largest economies, and have a shared interest in preserving 
     stable maritime domains to continue to support economic 
     growth;
       Whereas there has been an unprecedented increase in 
     dangerous activities by Chinese maritime agencies in areas 
     near the Senkaku islands, including between 6 and 25 ships of 
     the Government of China intruding into the Japanese 
     territorial sea each month since September 2012, between 26 
     and 124 ships entering the ``contiguous zone'' in the same 
     time period, and 9 ships intruding into the territorial sea 
     and 33 ships entering in the contiguous zone in February 
     2014;
       Whereas, although the United States Government does not 
     take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku 
     Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they 
     are under the administration of Japan and opposes any 
     unilateral actions that would seek to undermine such 
     administration;
       Whereas the United States Senate has previously affirmed 
     that the unilateral actions of a third party will not affect 
     the United States acknowledgment of the administration of 
     Japan over the Senkaku Islands;
       Whereas the United States remains committed under the 
     Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to respond to any 
     armed attack in the territories under the administration of 
     Japan, has urged all parties to take steps to prevent 
     incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means, 
     and commends the Government of Japan for its restrained 
     approach in this regard;
       Whereas both the United States and the People's Republic of 
     China are parties to and are obligated to observe the rules 
     of the Convention on the International Regulations for 
     Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
     (COLREGs);
       Whereas, on December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully 
     operating in international waters in the South China Sea when 
     a People's Liberation Army Navy vessel reportedly crossed its 
     bow at a distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the 
     water, forcing the USS Cowpens to take evasive action to 
     avoid a collision;
       Whereas the reported actions taken by the People's 
     Liberation Army Navy vessel in the USS Cowpens' incident, as 
     publicly reported, appear contrary to the international legal 
     obligations of the People's Republic of China under COLREGs;
       Whereas, on May 1, 2014, the People's Republic of China's 
     state-owned energy company, CNOOC, placed its deepwater semi-
     submersible drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981), 
     accompanied by over 25 Chinese ships, in Block 143, 120 
     nautical miles off Vietnam's coastline;
       Whereas, from May 1 to May 9, 2014, the number of Chinese 
     vessels escorting Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981) increased to 
     more than 80, including seven military ships, which 
     aggressively patrolled and intimidated Vietnamese Coast Guard 
     ships in violation of COLREGS, reportedly intentionally 
     rammed multiple Vietnamese vessels, and used helicopters and 
     water cannons to obstruct others;
       Whereas, on May 5, 2014, vessels from the Maritime Safety 
     Administration of China (MSAC) established an exclusion zone 
     with a radius of three nautical miles around Hai Yang Shi You 
     981 (HD-981), which undermines maritime safety in the area 
     and is in violation of universally recognized principles of 
     international law;
       Whereas China's territorial claims and associated maritime 
     actions in support of the drilling activity that Hai Yang Shi 
     You 981 (HD-981) commenced on May 1, 2014, have not been 
     clarified under international law
  The preamble, as amended, was agreed to.
  (The Resolution (S. Res. 412), as amended, with its preamble, as 
amended, reads as follows:)

                              S. Res. 412

       Whereas Asia-Pacific's maritime domains, which include both 
     the sea and airspace above the domains, are critical to the 
     region's prosperity, stability, and security, including 
     global commerce;
       Whereas the United States is a longstanding Asia-Pacific 
     power and has a national interest in maintaining freedom of 
     operations in international waters and airspace

[[Page 11803]]

     both in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world;
       Whereas for over 60 years, the United States Government, 
     alongside United States allies and partners, has played an 
     instrumental role in maintaining stability in the Asia-
     Pacific, including safeguarding the prosperity and economic 
     growth and development of the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas the United States, from the earliest days of the 
     Republic, has had a deep and abiding national security 
     interest in freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, 
     respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce, 
     including in the East China and South China Seas;
       Whereas the United States alliance relationships in the 
     region, including with Japan, Korea, Australia, the 
     Philippines, and Thailand, are at the heart of United States 
     policy and engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and share a 
     common approach to supporting the maintenance of peace and 
     stability, freedom of navigation, and other internationally 
     lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas territorial and maritime claims must be derived 
     from land features and otherwise comport with international 
     law;
       Whereas the United States Government has a clear interest 
     in encouraging and supporting the nations of the region to 
     work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes 
     and is firmly opposed to coercion, intimidation, threats, or 
     the use of force;
       Whereas the South China Sea contains great natural 
     resources, and their stewardship and responsible use offers 
     immense potential benefit for generations to come;
       Whereas the United States is not a claimant party in either 
     the East China or South China Seas, but does have an interest 
     in the peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputed claims in 
     accordance with international law, in freedom of operations, 
     and in the free-flow of commerce free of coercion, 
     intimidation, or the use of force;
       Whereas the United States supports the obligation of all 
     members of the United Nations to seek to resolve disputes by 
     peaceful means;
       Whereas freedom of navigation and other lawful uses of sea 
     and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region are embodied in 
     international law, not granted by certain states to others;
       Whereas, on November 23, 2013, the People's Republic of 
     China unilaterally and without prior consultations with the 
     United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea or other nations 
     of the Asia-Pacific region, declared an Air Defense 
     Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, also 
     announcing that all aircraft entering the PRC's self-declared 
     ADIZ, even if they do not intend to enter Chinese territorial 
     airspace, would have to submit flight plans, maintain radio 
     contact, and follow directions from the Chinese Ministry of 
     National Defense or face ``emergency defensive measures'';
       Whereas the ``rules of engagement'' declared by China, 
     including the ``emergency defensive measures'', are in 
     violation of the concept of ``due regard for the safety of 
     civil aviation'' under the Chicago Convention of the 
     International Civil Aviation Organization and thereby are a 
     departure from accepted practice;
       Whereas the Chicago Convention of the International Civil 
     Aviation Organization distinguishes between civilian aircraft 
     and state aircraft and provides for the specific obligations 
     of state parties, consistent with customary law, to ``refrain 
     from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft 
     in flight and . . . in case of interception, the lives of 
     persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be 
     endangered'';
       Whereas international civil aviation is regulated by 
     international agreements, including standards and regulations 
     set by ICAO for aviation safety, security, efficiency and 
     regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection;
       Whereas, in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent 
     passage, the United States does not recognize the right of a 
     coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state 
     aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does 
     the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state 
     aircraft not intending to enter United States airspace;
       Whereas the United States Government expressed profound 
     concerns with China's unilateral, provocative, dangerous, and 
     destabilizing declaration of such a zone, including the 
     potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations by 
     aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace;
       Whereas the People's Republic of China's declaration of an 
     ADIZ in the East China Sea will not alter how the United 
     States Government conducts operations in the region or the 
     unwavering United States commitment to peace, security and 
     stability in the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas the Government of Japan expressed deep concern 
     about the People's Republic of China's declaration of such a 
     zone, regarding it as an effort to unduly infringe upon the 
     freedom of flight in international airspace and to change the 
     status quo that could escalate tensions and potentially cause 
     unintentional consequences in the East China Sea;
       Whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea has 
     expressed concern over China's declared ADIZ, and on December 
     9, 2013, announced an adjustment to its longstanding Air 
     Defense Identification Zone, which does not encompass 
     territory administered by another country, and did so only 
     after undertaking a deliberate process of consultations with 
     the United States, Japan, and China;
       Whereas the Government of the Philippines has stressed that 
     China's declared ADIZ seeks to transfer an entire air zone 
     into Chinese domestic airspace, infringes on freedom of 
     flight in international airspace, and compromises the safety 
     of civil aviation and the national security of affected 
     states, and has called on China to ensure that its actions do 
     not jeopardize regional security and stability;
       Whereas, on November 26, 2013, the Government of Australia 
     made clear in a statement its opposition to any coercive or 
     unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China 
     Sea;
       Whereas, on March 10, 2014, the United States Government 
     and the Government of Japan jointly submitted a letter to the 
     ICAO Secretariat regarding the issue of freedom of overflight 
     by civil aircraft in international airspace and the effective 
     management of civil air traffic within allocated Flight 
     Information Regions (FIR);
       Whereas Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in a 
     hearing before the Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs 
     on February 18, 2014, stated, ``We have firmly told China we 
     will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone 
     if it is adopted in the South China Sea. And the signal we 
     have received thus far is, China does not plan to adopt a 
     similar Zone in the South China Sea.'';
       Whereas over half the world's merchant tonnage flows 
     through the South China Sea, and over 15,000,000 barrels of 
     oil per day transit the Strait of Malacca, fueling economic 
     growth and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
       Whereas the increasing frequency and assertiveness of 
     patrols and competing regulations over disputed territory and 
     maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the 
     East China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk 
     of confrontation;
       Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
     has promoted multilateral talks on disputed areas without 
     settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with 
     China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
     the South China Sea that committed all parties to those 
     territorial disputes to ``reaffirm their respect for and 
     commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight 
     above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally 
     recognized principles of international law'' and to ``resolve 
     their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful 
     means, without resorting to the threat or use of force'';
       Whereas ASEAN and China committed in 2002 to develop an 
     effective Code of Conduct when they adopted the Declaration 
     on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, yet 
     negotiations are irregular and little progress has been made;
       Whereas in recent years, there have been numerous dangerous 
     and destabilizing incidents in waters near the coasts of the 
     Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam;
       Whereas the United States Government is deeply concerned 
     about unilateral actions by any claimant seeking to change 
     the status quo through the use of coercion, intimidation, or 
     military force, including the continued restrictions on 
     access to Scarborough Reef and pressure on long-standing 
     Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the 
     People's Republic of China; actions by any state to prevent 
     any other state from exercising its sovereign rights to the 
     resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
     continental shelf by making claims to those areas that have 
     no support in international law; declarations of 
     administrative and military districts in contested areas in 
     the South China Sea; and the imposition of new fishing 
     regulations covering disputed areas, which have raised 
     tensions in the region;
       Whereas international law is important to safeguard the 
     rights and freedoms of all states in the Asia-Pacific region, 
     and the lack of clarity in accordance with international law 
     by claimants with regard to their South China Sea claims can 
     create uncertainty, insecurity, and instability;
       Whereas the United States Government opposes the use of 
     intimidation, coercion, or force to assert a territorial 
     claim in the South China Sea;
       Whereas claims in the South China Sea must accord with 
     international law, and those that are not derived from land 
     features are fundamentally flawed;
       Whereas ASEAN issued Six-Point Principles on the South 
     China Sea on July 20, 2012, whereby ASEAN's Foreign Ministers 
     reiterated and reaffirmed ``the commitment of ASEAN Member 
     States to: . . . 1. the full implementation of the 
     Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
     (2002); . . . 2. the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
     Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
     (2011); . . . 3. the early conclusion of a Regional Code of 
     Conduct in the South China Sea; . . . 4. the full respect of 
     the universally recognized principles of International Law, 
     including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law

[[Page 11804]]

     of the Sea (UNCLOS); . . . 5. the continued exercise of self-
     restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and . . . 6. 
     the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with 
     universally recognized principles of International Law, 
     including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
     the Sea (UNCLOS).'';
       Whereas, in 2013, the Republic of the Philippines properly 
     exercised its rights to peaceful settlement mechanisms with 
     the filing of arbitration case under Article 287 and Annex 
     VII of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to 
     achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the dispute, and 
     the United States hopes that all parties in any dispute 
     ultimately abide by the rulings of internationally recognized 
     dispute-settlement bodies;
       Whereas China and Japan are the world's second and third 
     largest economies, and have a shared interest in preserving 
     stable maritime domains to continue to support economic 
     growth;
       Whereas there has been an unprecedented increase in 
     dangerous activities by Chinese maritime agencies in areas 
     near the Senkaku islands, including between 6 and 25 ships of 
     the Government of China intruding into the Japanese 
     territorial sea each month since September 2012, between 26 
     and 124 ships entering the ``contiguous zone'' in the same 
     time period, and 9 ships intruding into the territorial sea 
     and 33 ships entering in the contiguous zone in February 
     2014;
       Whereas although the United States Government does not take 
     a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku 
     Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they 
     are under the administration of Japan and opposes any 
     unilateral actions that would seek to undermine such 
     administration;
       Whereas the United States Senate has previously affirmed 
     that the unilateral actions of a third party will not affect 
     the United States acknowledgment of the administration of 
     Japan over the Senkaku Islands;
       Whereas the United States remains committed under the 
     Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to respond to any 
     armed attack in the territories under the administration of 
     Japan, has urged all parties to take steps to prevent 
     incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means, 
     and commends the Government of Japan for its restrained 
     approach in this regard;
       Whereas both the United States and the People's Republic of 
     China are parties to and are obligated to observe the rules 
     of the Convention on the International Regulations for 
     Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
     (COLREGs);
       Whereas, on December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully 
     operating in international waters in the South China Sea when 
     a People's Liberation Army Navy vessel reportedly crossed its 
     bow at a distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the 
     water, forcing the USS Cowpens to take evasive action to 
     avoid a collision;
       Whereas the reported actions taken by the People's 
     Liberation Army Navy vessel in the USS Cowpens' incident, as 
     publicly reported, appear contrary to the international legal 
     obligations of the People's Republic of China under COLREGs;
       Whereas, on May 1, 2014, the People's Republic of China's 
     state-owned energy company, CNOOC, placed its deepwater semi-
     submersible drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981), 
     accompanied by over 25 Chinese ships, in Block 143, 120 
     nautical miles off Vietnam's coastline;
       Whereas from May 1 to May 9, 2014, the number of Chinese 
     vessels escorting Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981) increased to 
     more than 80, including seven military ships, which 
     aggressively patrolled and intimidated Vietnamese Coast Guard 
     ships in violation of COLREGS, reportedly intentionally 
     rammed multiple Vietnamese vessels, and used helicopters and 
     water cannons to obstruct others;
       Whereas, on May 5, 2014, vessels from the Maritime Safety 
     Administration of China (MSAC) established an exclusion zone 
     with a radius of three nautical miles around Hai Yang Shi You 
     981 (HD-981), which undermines maritime safety in the area 
     and is in violation of universally recognized principles of 
     international law;
       Whereas China's territorial claims and associated maritime 
     actions in support of the drilling activity that Hai Yang Shi 
     You 981 (HD-981) commenced on May 1, 2014, have not been 
     clarified under international law, constitute a unilateral 
     attempt to change the status quo by force, and appear to be 
     in violation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of 
     Parties in the South China Sea;
       Whereas, on January 19, 1998, the United States and 
     People's Republic of China signed the Military Maritime 
     Consultative Agreement, creating a mechanism for consultation 
     and coordination on operational safety issues in the maritime 
     domain between the United States and the People's Republic of 
     China;
       Whereas the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, inaugurated in 
     1988 and comprising the navies of Australia, Brunei, 
     Cambodia, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
     New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the People's Republic of 
     China, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Russian 
     Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States, 
     and Vietnam, whose countries all border the Pacific Ocean 
     region, provides a forum where leaders of regional navies can 
     meet to discuss cooperative initiatives, discuss regional and 
     global maritime issues, and undertake exercises to strengthen 
     norms and practices that contribute to operational safety, 
     including protocols for unexpected encounters at sea, common 
     ways of communication, common ways of operating, and common 
     ways of engagement;
       Whereas Japan and the People's Republic of China sought to 
     negotiate a Maritime Communications Mechanism between the 
     defense authorities and a Maritime Search and Rescue 
     Agreement and agreed in principle to these agreements to 
     address operational safety on the maritime domains but failed 
     to sign them;
       Whereas the Changi Command and Control Center in Singapore 
     provides a platform for all the countries of the Western 
     Pacific to share information on what kind of contact at sea 
     and to provide a common operational picture for the region;
       Whereas 2014 commemorates the 35th anniversary of 
     normalization of diplomatic relations between the United 
     States and the People's Republic of China, and the United 
     States welcomes the development of a peaceful and prosperous 
     China that becomes a responsible international stakeholder, 
     the government of which respects international norms, 
     international laws, international institutions, and 
     international rules; enhances security and peace; and seeks 
     to advance relations between the United States and China; and
       Whereas ASEAN plays an important role, in partnership with 
     others in the regional and international community, in 
     addressing maritime security issues in the Asia-Pacific 
     region and the Indian Ocean, including open access to the 
     maritime domain of Asia; Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE.

       The Senate--
       (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of 
     force to impede freedom of operations in international 
     airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the 
     status quo or to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region;
       (2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China 
     to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air 
     Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is contrary to 
     freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to 
     refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in 
     the Asia-Pacific region;
       (3) commends the Governments of Japan and of the Republic 
     of Korea for their restraint, and commends the Government of 
     the Republic of Korea for engaging in a deliberate process of 
     consultations with the United States, Japan and China prior 
     to announcing its adjustment of its Air Defense 
     Identification Zone on December 9, 2013, and for its 
     commitment to implement this adjusted Air Defense 
     Identification Zone (ADIZ) in a manner consistent with 
     international practice and respect for the freedom of 
     overflight and other internationally lawful uses of 
     international airspace; and
       (4) calls on the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China to withdraw its Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981) drilling 
     rig and associated maritime forces from their current 
     positions, to refrain from maritime maneuvers contrary to 
     COLREGS, and to return immediately to the status quo as it 
     existed before May 1, 2014.

     SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States to--
       (1) reaffirm its unwavering commitment and support for 
     allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including 
     longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the 
     United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and that 
     Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty 
     applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
       (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and 
     lawful use of the sea that belong to all nations;
       (3) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
     destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or 
     efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed 
     claims;
       (4) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, 
     coercion, or force;
       (5) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in 
     accordance with international law;
       (6) support efforts by ASEAN and the People's Republic of 
     China to develop an effective Code of Conduct, including the 
     ``early harvest'' of agreed-upon elements in the Code of 
     Conduct that can be implemented immediately;
       (7) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules 
     and guidelines, including the International Regulations for 
     Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
     (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation 
     between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of 
     other countries, including the People's Republic of China;
       (8) support the development of regional institutions and 
     bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense 
     Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the 
     expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation 
     in the region and reinforce the role of international law;

[[Page 11805]]

       (9) encourage the adoption of mechanisms such as hotlines 
     or emergency procedures for preventing incidents in sensitive 
     areas, managing them if they occur, and preventing disputes 
     from escalating;
       (10) fully support the rights of claimants to exercise 
     rights they may have to avail themselves of peaceful dispute 
     settlement mechanisms;
       (11) encourage claimants not to undertake new unilateral 
     attempts to change the status quo since the signing of the 
     2002 Declaration of Conduct, including not asserting 
     administrative measures or controls in disputed areas in the 
     South China Sea;
       (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other 
     countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and 
     capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States 
     Government to explore the development of appropriate 
     multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in 
     the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid 
     destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous 
     activities; and
       (13) assure the continuity of operations by the United 
     States in the Asia-Pacific region, including, when 
     appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to 
     reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in 
     international waters and airspace in accordance with 
     established principles and practices of international law.

     SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as a 
     declaration of war or authorization to use force.

                          ____________________