[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 11140-11141]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. LEVIN. Recent events in Iraq have created great concern. The 
territorial gains by the ISIL, a violent extremist group, are not just 
a threat to Iraq's security but a security challenge to the entire 
region, and indeed to the United States. By its words and deeds, ISIL 
has made clear that it is deeply hostile to American interests and to 
universal values of freedom and human rights. That hostility can easily 
translate into plans and threats against us.
  Faced by these developments, President Obama's decision to send a 
small number of U.S. military advisers is prudent. They will help 
assess the situation on the ground, they will support Iraqi efforts to 
defeat the Islamic militants Iraq faces, and help the Iraqis make best 
use of the intelligence support we are providing.
  The President is right to say that U.S. troops will not return to 
ground combat in Iraq. The President is also right to say it is not our 
place to choose Iraq's leaders, because doing so is only likely to feed 
distrust and suspicion, and there is already too much of that in Iraq 
and in the Middle East.
  What we can do is promote moves toward the political unity that is so 
essential for Iraq if it is going to weather the crisis and make 
progress toward a stable, democratic society. The problem in Iraq has 
not been a lack of direct U.S. military involvement but, rather, a lack 
of inclusiveness on the part of Iraqi leaders. That is why I believe we 
should not consider any direct action on our part, such as air strikes, 
unless three very specific conditions have been met:
  First, that our military leaders tell us we have effective options 
that can help change the momentum on the ground in Iraq. In other 
words, only if our military leaders believe we can identify high-value 
targets--that striking them could have a measurable impact on the 
ability of the Iraqi security forces to stop and reverse the advances 
of the ISIL on the ground, and that we can strike them with minimal 
risk of civilian casualties and without dragging us further into the 
conflict.
  Second, any additional military action on our part should come only 
with the clear public support of our friends and allies in the region--
particularly moderate Arab leaders of neighboring countries. The United 
States has engaged in a comprehensive diplomatic effort to coordinate 
our response with Iraq's neighbors. If our strategy is to have the 
effect we want, it is essential that we have broad support in the 
region.
  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we should not act unless 
leaders of all elements of Iraqi society--Shia, Sunni, Kurds, and 
religious minorities--join together in a formal request for more direct 
support.
  There is an obvious need for Iraqi leaders to form an inclusive unity 
government for their country's long-term success. But that process is 
likely to

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take some time, weeks or even months. But a unified formal statement 
requesting our further military assistance would be an important signal 
that Iraq's leaders understand the need to come together.
  It could not only be a sign that additional action on our part would 
be effective but also could be an important step toward creation of a 
national unity government.
  So far, the signs that Iraqi leaders are prepared to take the steps 
they need to take are mixed at best. Prime Minister Maliki, who has too 
often governed in a sectarian and authoritarian manner, delivered a 
speech recently in which he said national unity is essential to 
confront ISIL--which is true--but then he signaled little willingness 
to reach out to other groups. A number of prominent Shia leaders 
portrayed the conflict in starkly sectarian terms, and Shia militias, 
including those under the control of Moktada al-Sadr, have marched 
through the streets of Baghdad. There is little doubt also that Iran is 
pursuing its own sectarian agenda in the region. Some Iraqi Sunni 
leaders too have made statements that promote sectarian interests over 
the common good, and there are also fears that the Kurdish minority may 
exploit the situation. But on the other hand there have also been some 
signs that the Iraqi leaders recognize the need to confront the ISIL 
threat not as Sunnis or Shia or Kurds but together as Iraqis.
  Iraq's most influential Shia clerk, Ali Sistani, has called on all 
Iraqis ``to exercise the highest degree of restraint and work on 
strengthening the bonds of love between each other, and to avoid any 
kind of sectarian behavior that may affect the unity of the Iraqi 
nation,'' spreading the message that ``this army [the Iraqi Army] does 
not belong to the Shia. It belongs to all of Iraq. It is for the Shia, 
the Sunni, the Kurds and the Christians.'' That is the message from Ali 
Sistani--a very powerful message and a unifying message in contrast to 
the messages that should come, for instance, from Mr. Sadr.
  The United States has national security interests in Iraq, but 
further military involvement there will not serve those interests 
unless Iraq begins to move toward the inclusiveness and unity that is 
necessary if our involvement is to have a positive impact. Put another 
way, we cannot save Iraqis from themselves. Only if Iraq's leaders 
begin to unify their nation can help from us really matter.
  The ISIL is a vicious enemy. It is also the common enemy of all 
Iraqis--of all Iraqis and of Iraq's neighbors. If this vicious common 
enemy cannot unite Iraqis in a common cause, than our assistance, 
including airstrikes, won't matter. Only a unified Iraq governed by 
elected leaders who seek to rule in the interest of all their people 
can stand up to this threat.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.

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