[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 6]
[House]
[Pages 8936-8953]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  0915
                            USA FREEDOM ACT

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 590, I call 
up the bill (H.R. 3361) to reform the authorities of the Federal 
Government to require the production of certain business records, 
conduct electronic surveillance, use pen registers and trap and trace 
devices, and use other forms of information gathering for foreign 
intelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal purposes, and for other 
purposes, as amended, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 590, in lieu of 
the amendments in the nature of a substitute recommended by the 
Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence printed in the bill, the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in part B of House Report 113-460 is adopted, and 
the bill, as amended, is considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 3361

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) SHORT TITLE.--This Act may be cited as the ``USA 
     FREEDOM Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:
       Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
       Sec. 2. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
           Act of 1978.

                 TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS REFORMS

       Sec. 101. Additional requirements for call detail records.
       Sec. 102. Emergency authority.
       Sec. 103. Prohibition on bulk collection of tangible 
           things.
       Sec. 104. Judicial review of minimization procedures for 
           the production of tangible things.
       Sec. 105. Liability protection.
       Sec. 106. Compensation for assistance.
       Sec. 107. Definitions.
       Sec. 108. Inspector general reports on business records 
           orders.
       Sec. 109. Effective date.
       Sec. 110. Rule of construction.

      TITLE II--FISA PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE REFORM

       Sec. 201. Prohibition on bulk collection.
       Sec. 202. Privacy procedures.

   TITLE III--FISA ACQUISITIONS TARGETING PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                             STATES REFORMS

       Sec. 301. Minimization procedures.
       Sec. 302. Limits on use of unlawfully obtained information.

       TITLE IV--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORMS

       Sec. 401. Appointment of amicus curiae.
       Sec. 402. Declassification of decisions, orders, and 
           opinions.

                TITLE V--NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REFORM

       Sec. 501. Prohibition on bulk collection.

         TITLE VI--FISA TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

       Sec. 601. Additional reporting on orders requiring 
           production of business records.
       Sec. 602. Business records compliance reports to Congress.
       Sec. 603. Annual reports by the Government on orders 
           entered.
       Sec. 604. Public reporting by persons subject to FISA 
           orders.
       Sec. 605. Reporting requirements for decisions of the 
           Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
       Sec. 606. Submission of reports under FISA.

                           TITLE VII--SUNSETS

       Sec. 701. Sunsets.

     SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                   ACT OF 1978.

       Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this 
     Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an 
     amendment to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision, 
     the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or 
     other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
                 TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS REFORMS

     SEC. 101. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CALL DETAIL RECORDS.

       (a) Application.--Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``a 
     statement'' and inserting ``in the case of an application 
     other than an application described in subparagraph (C) 
     (including an application for the production of call detail 
     records other than in the manner described in subparagraph 
     (C)), a statement''; and
       (B) in clause (iii), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as 
     subparagraphs (B) and (D), respectively; and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) (as so 
     redesignated) the following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) in the case of an application for the production on a 
     daily basis of call detail records created before, on, or 
     after the date of the application relating to an authorized 
     investigation (other than a threat assessment) conducted in 
     accordance with subsection (a)(2) to protect against 
     international terrorism, a statement of facts showing that--
       ``(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the call 
     detail records sought to be produced based on the specific 
     selection term required under subparagraph (A) are relevant 
     to such investigation; and
       ``(ii) there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, 
     articulable suspicion that such specific selection term is 
     associated with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
     power; and''.
       (b) Order.--Section 501(c)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(2)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(F) in the case of an application described in subsection 
     (b)(2)(C), shall--
       ``(i) authorize the production on a daily basis of call 
     detail records for a period not to exceed 180 days;
       ``(ii) provide that an order for such production may be 
     extended upon application under subsection (b) and the 
     judicial finding under paragraph (1);
       ``(iii) provide that the Government may require the prompt 
     production of call detail records--

       ``(I) using the specific selection term that satisfies the 
     standard required under subsection (b)(2)(C)(ii) as the basis 
     for production; and
       ``(II) using call detail records with a direct connection 
     to such specific selection term as the basis for production 
     of a second set of call detail records;

       ``(iv) provide that, when produced, such records be in a 
     form that will be useful to the Government;
       ``(v) direct each person the Government directs to produce 
     call detail records under the order to furnish the Government 
     forthwith all information, facilities, or technical 
     assistance necessary to accomplish the production in such a 
     manner as will protect the secrecy of the production and 
     produce a minimum of interference with the services that such 
     person is providing to each subject of the production; and
       ``(vi) direct the Government to--

       ``(I) adopt minimization procedures that require the prompt 
     destruction of all call detail records produced under the 
     order that the Government determines are not foreign 
     intelligence information; and
       ``(II) destroy all call detail records produced under the 
     order as prescribed by such procedures.''.

     SEC. 102. EMERGENCY AUTHORITY.

       (a) Authority.--Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(i) Emergency Authority for Production of Tangible 
     Things.--
       ``(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, 
     the Attorney General may require the emergency production of 
     tangible things if the Attorney General--
       ``(A) reasonably determines that an emergency situation 
     requires the production of tangible things before an order 
     authorizing such production can with due diligence be 
     obtained;
       ``(B) reasonably determines that the factual basis for the 
     issuance of an order under this section to approve such 
     production of tangible things exists;
       ``(C) informs, either personally or through a designee, a 
     judge having jurisdiction under this section at the time the 
     Attorney General requires the emergency production of 
     tangible things that the decision has been made to employ the 
     authority under this subsection; and
       ``(D) makes an application in accordance with this section 
     to a judge having jurisdiction under this section as soon as 
     practicable, but not later than 7 days after the Attorney 
     General requires the emergency production of tangible things 
     under this subsection.
       ``(2) If the Attorney General authorizes the emergency 
     production of tangible things under paragraph (1), the 
     Attorney General shall require that the minimization 
     procedures required by this section for the issuance of a 
     judicial order be followed.
       ``(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving the 
     production of tangible things under this subsection, the 
     production shall terminate when the information sought is 
     obtained, when the

[[Page 8937]]

     application for the order is denied, or after the expiration 
     of 7 days from the time the Attorney General begins requiring 
     the emergency production of such tangible things, whichever 
     is earliest.
       ``(4) A denial of the application made under this 
     subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.
       ``(5) If such application for approval is denied, or in any 
     other case where the production of tangible things is 
     terminated and no order is issued approving the production, 
     no information obtained or evidence derived from such 
     production shall be received in evidence or otherwise 
     disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or 
     before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, 
     regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
     the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, 
     and no information concerning any United States person 
     acquired from such production shall subsequently be used or 
     disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or 
     employees without the consent of such person, except with the 
     approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates 
     a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
       ``(6) The Attorney General shall assess compliance with the 
     requirements of paragraph (5).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 
     1861(d)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``pursuant to an order'' and inserting ``pursuant to an order 
     issued or an emergency production required'';
       (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``such order'' and 
     inserting ``such order or such emergency production''; and
       (C) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``the order'' and 
     inserting ``the order or the emergency production''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``an order'' and 
     inserting ``an order or emergency production''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``an order'' and 
     inserting ``an order or emergency production''.

     SEC. 103. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS.

       (a) Application.--Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)), 
     as amended by section 101(a) of this Act, is further amended 
     by inserting before subparagraph (B), as redesignated by such 
     section 101(a) of this Act, the following new subparagraph:
       ``(A) a specific selection term to be used as the basis for 
     the production of the tangible things sought;''.
       (b) Order.--Section 501(c) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking the semicolon and 
     inserting ``, including each specific selection term to be 
     used as the basis for the production;''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) No order issued under this subsection may authorize 
     the collection of tangible things without the use of a 
     specific selection term that meets the requirements of 
     subsection (b)(2).''.

     SEC. 104. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR THE 
                   PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS.

       Section 501(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(1)) is amended by 
     inserting after ``subsections (a) and (b)'' the following: 
     ``and that the minimization procedures submitted in 
     accordance with subsection (b)(2)(D) meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under subsection (g)''.

     SEC. 105. LIABILITY PROTECTION.

       Section 501(e) (50 U.S.C. 1861(e)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(e)(1) No cause of action shall lie in any court against 
     a person who--
       ``(A) produces tangible things or provides information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance pursuant to an order 
     issued or an emergency production required under this 
     section; or
       ``(B) otherwise provides technical assistance to the 
     Government under this section or to implement the amendments 
     made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act.
       ``(2) A production or provision of information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance described in paragraph (1) shall not 
     be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any 
     other proceeding or context.''.

     SEC. 106. COMPENSATION FOR ASSISTANCE.

       Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as amended by section 102 of 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(j) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate a 
     person for reasonable expenses incurred for--
       ``(1) producing tangible things or providing information, 
     facilities, or assistance in accordance with an order issued 
     with respect to an application described in subsection 
     (b)(2)(C) or an emergency production under subsection (i) 
     that, to comply with subsection (i)(1)(D), requires an 
     application described in subsection (b)(2)(C); or
       ``(2) otherwise providing technical assistance to the 
     Government under this section or to implement the amendments 
     made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act.''.

     SEC. 107. DEFINITIONS.

       Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as amended by section 106 of 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(k) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Call detail record.--The term `call detail record'--
       ``(A) means session identifying information (including 
     originating or terminating telephone number, International 
     Mobile Subscriber Identity number, or International Mobile 
     Station Equipment Identity number), a telephone calling card 
     number, or the time or duration of a call; and
       ``(B) does not include--
       ``(i) the contents of any communication (as defined in 
     section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code);
       ``(ii) the name, address, or financial information of a 
     subscriber or customer; or
       ``(iii) cell site location information.
       ``(2) Specific selection term.--The term `specific 
     selection term' means a discrete term, such as a term 
     specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, 
     or device, used by the Government to limit the scope of the 
     information or tangible things sought pursuant to the statute 
     authorizing the provision of such information or tangible 
     things to the Government.''.

     SEC. 108. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS ON BUSINESS RECORDS 
                   ORDERS.

       Section 106A of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
     Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-177; 120 Stat. 
     200) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``and calendar years 
     2012 through 2014'' after ``2006'';
       (B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3);
       (C) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
     (2) and (3), respectively; and
       (D) in paragraph (3) (as so redesignated)--
       (i) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) with respect to calendar years 2012 through 2014, an 
     examination of the minimization procedures used in relation 
     to orders under section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) and whether the 
     minimization procedures adequately protect the constitutional 
     rights of United States persons;''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``(as such term is 
     defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))'';
       (2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(3) Calendar years 2012 through 2014.--Not later than 
     December 31, 2015, the Inspector General of the Department of 
     Justice shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report 
     containing the results of the audit conducted under 
     subsection (a) for calendar years 2012 through 2014.'';
       (3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections 
     (e) and (f), respectively;
       (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d) Intelligence Assessment.--
       ``(1) In general.--For the period beginning on January 1, 
     2012, and ending on December 31, 2014, the Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community shall assess--
       ``(A) the importance of the information acquired under 
     title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) to the activities of the 
     intelligence community;
       ``(B) the manner in which that information was collected, 
     retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the intelligence 
     community;
       ``(C) the minimization procedures used by elements of the 
     intelligence community under such title and whether the 
     minimization procedures adequately protect the constitutional 
     rights of United States persons; and
       ``(D) any minimization procedures proposed by an element of 
     the intelligence community under such title that were 
     modified or denied by the court established under section 
     103(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)).
       ``(2) Submission date for assessment.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date on which the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice submits the report required under 
     subsection (c)(3), the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report 
     containing the results of the assessment for calendar years 
     2012 through 2014.'';
       (5) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (3)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``a report under subsection (c)(1) or 
     (c)(2)'' and inserting ``any report under subsection (c) or 
     (d)''; and
       (ii) by striking ``Inspector General of the Department of 
     Justice'' and inserting ``Inspector General of the Department 
     of Justice, the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community, and any Inspector General of an element of the 
     intelligence community that prepares a report to assist the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Justice or the 
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in complying 
     with the requirements of this section''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the reports submitted 
     under subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2)'' and inserting ``any 
     report submitted under subsection (c) or (d)'';
       (6) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (3)--
       (A) by striking ``The reports submitted under subsections 
     (c)(1) and (c)(2)'' and inserting ``Each report submitted 
     under subsection (c)''; and
       (B) by striking ``subsection (d)(2)'' and inserting 
     ``subsection (e)(2)''; and
       (7) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

[[Page 8938]]

       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence 
     community' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
       ``(2) United states person.--The term `United States 
     person' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1801).''.

     SEC. 109. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       (a) In General.--The amendments made by sections 101 
     through 103 shall take effect on the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
     construed to alter or eliminate the authority of the 
     Government to obtain an order under title V of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et 
     seq.) as in effect prior to the effective date described in 
     subsection (a) during the period ending on such effective 
     date.

     SEC. 110. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the 
     production of the contents (as such term is defined in 
     section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code) of any 
     electronic communication from an electronic communication 
     service provider (as such term is defined in section 
     701(b)(4) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4)) under title V of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et 
     seq.).
      TITLE II--FISA PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE REFORM

     SEC. 201. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION.

       (a) Prohibition.--Section 402(c) (50 U.S.C. 1842(c)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting 
     a semicolon; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) a specific selection term to be used as the basis for 
     selecting the telephone line or other facility to which the 
     pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or 
     applied; and''.
       (b) Definition.--Section 401 (50 U.S.C. 1841) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) The term `specific selection term' has the meaning 
     given the term in section 501.''.

     SEC. 202. PRIVACY PROCEDURES.

       (a) In General.--Section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(h) The Attorney General shall ensure that appropriate 
     policies and procedures are in place to safeguard nonpublicly 
     available information concerning United States persons that 
     is collected through the use of a pen register or trap and 
     trace device installed under this section. Such policies and 
     procedures shall, to the maximum extent practicable and 
     consistent with the need to protect national security, 
     include protections for the collection, retention, and use of 
     information concerning United States persons.''.
       (b) Emergency Authority.--Section 403 (50 U.S.C. 1843) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Information collected through the use of a pen 
     register or trap and device installed under this section 
     shall be subject to the policies and procedures required 
     under section 402(h).''.
   TITLE III--FISA ACQUISITIONS TARGETING PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                             STATES REFORMS

     SEC. 301. MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES.

       Section 702(e)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(e)(1)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``that meet'' and inserting the following: 
     ``that--
       ``(A) meet'';
       (2) in subparagraph (A) (as designated by paragraph (1) of 
     this section), by striking the period and inserting ``; 
     and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) consistent with such definition--
       ``(i) minimize the acquisition, and prohibit the retention 
     and dissemination, of any communication as to which the 
     sender and all intended recipients are determined to be 
     located in the United States at the time of acquisition, 
     consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, 
     produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information; 
     and
       ``(ii) prohibit the use of any discrete communication that 
     is not to, from, or about the target of an acquisition and is 
     to or from an identifiable United States person or a person 
     reasonably believed to be located in the United States, 
     except to protect against an immediate threat to human 
     life.''.

     SEC. 302. LIMITS ON USE OF UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED INFORMATION.

       Section 702(i)(3) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)(3)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) Limitation on use of information.--
       ``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), to 
     the extent the Court orders a correction of a deficiency in a 
     certification or procedures under subparagraph (B), no 
     information obtained or evidence derived pursuant to the part 
     of the certification or procedures that has been identified 
     by the Court as deficient concerning any United States person 
     shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any 
     trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, 
     grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, 
     legislative committee, or other authority of the United 
     States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no 
     information concerning any United States person acquired 
     pursuant to such part of such certification shall 
     subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by 
     Federal officers or employees without the consent of the 
     United States person, except with the approval of the 
     Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of 
     death or serious bodily harm to any person.
       ``(ii) Exception.--If the Government corrects any 
     deficiency identified by the order of the Court under 
     subparagraph (B), the Court may permit the use or disclosure 
     of information obtained before the date of the correction 
     under such minimization procedures as the Court shall 
     establish for purposes of this clause.''.
       TITLE IV--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORMS

     SEC. 401. APPOINTMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE.

       Section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subsection:
       ``(i) Amicus Curiae.--
       ``(1) Authorization.--A court established under subsection 
     (a) or (b), consistent with the requirement of subsection (c) 
     and any other statutory requirement that the court act 
     expeditiously or within a stated time--
       ``(A) shall appoint an individual to serve as amicus curiae 
     to assist such court in the consideration of any application 
     for an order or review that, in the opinion of the court, 
     presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law, 
     unless the court issues a written finding that such 
     appointment is not appropriate; and
       ``(B) may appoint an individual to serve as amicus curiae 
     in any other instance as such court deems appropriate.
       ``(2) Designation.--The presiding judges of the courts 
     established under subsections (a) and (b) shall jointly 
     designate not less than 5 individuals to be eligible to serve 
     as amicus curiae. Such individuals shall be persons who 
     possess expertise in privacy and civil liberties, 
     intelligence collection, telecommunications, or any other 
     area that may lend legal or technical expertise to the courts 
     and who have been determined by appropriate executive branch 
     officials to be eligible for access to classified 
     information.
       ``(3) Duties.--An individual appointed to serve as amicus 
     curiae under paragraph (1) shall carry out the duties 
     assigned by the appointing court. Such court may authorize 
     the individual appointed to serve as amicus curiae to review 
     any application, certification, petition, motion, or other 
     submission that the court determines is relevant to the 
     duties assigned by the court.
       ``(4) Notification.--The presiding judges of the courts 
     established under subsections (a) and (b) shall notify the 
     Attorney General of each exercise of the authority to appoint 
     an individual to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (1).
       ``(5) Assistance.--A court established under subsection (a) 
     or (b) may request and receive (including on a non-
     reimbursable basis) the assistance of the executive branch in 
     the implementation of this subsection.
       ``(6) Administration.--A court established under subsection 
     (a) or (b) may provide for the designation, appointment, 
     removal, training, or other support for an individual 
     appointed to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (1) in a 
     manner that is not inconsistent with this subsection.''.

     SEC. 402. DECLASSIFICATION OF DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND 
                   OPINIONS.

       (a) Declassification.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.) is 
     amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``REPORTING REQUIREMENT'' 
     and inserting ``OVERSIGHT''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 602. DECLASSIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS, 
                   ORDERS, AND OPINIONS.

       ``(a) Declassification Required.--Subject to subsection 
     (b), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
     with the Attorney General, shall conduct a declassification 
     review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (as defined in 
     section 601(e)) that includes a significant construction or 
     interpretation of any provision of this Act, including a 
     construction or interpretation of the term `specific 
     selection term', and, consistent with that review, make 
     publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each 
     such decision, order, or opinion.
       ``(b) Redacted Form.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, may 
     satisfy the requirement under subsection (a) to make a 
     decision, order, or opinion described in such subsection 
     publicly available to the greatest extent practicable by 
     making such decision, order, or opinion publicly available in 
     redacted form.
       ``(c) National Security Waiver.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, may 
     waive the requirement to declassify and make publicly 
     available a particular decision, order, or opinion under 
     subsection (a) if--
       ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, determines that a 
     waiver of such requirement is necessary to protect the 
     national security of the United States or properly classified 
     intelligence sources or methods; and
       ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence makes publicly 
     available an unclassified statement prepared by the Attorney 
     General, in consultation with the Director of National 
     Intelligence--

[[Page 8939]]

       ``(A) summarizing the significant construction or 
     interpretation of a provision under this Act; and
       ``(B) that specifies that the statement has been prepared 
     by the Attorney General and constitutes no part of the 
     opinion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in 
     the first section is amended--
       (1) by striking the item relating to title VI and inserting 
     the following new item:

                      ``TITLE VI--OVERSIGHT''; and

       (2) by inserting after the item relating to section 601 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 602. Declassification of significant decisions, orders, and 
              opinions.''.
                TITLE V--NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REFORM

     SEC. 501. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION.

       (a) Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and 
     Transactional Records.--Section 2709(b) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) 
     by striking ``may'' and inserting ``may, using a specific 
     selection term as the basis for a request''.
       (b) Access to Financial Records for Certain Intelligence 
     and Protective Purposes.--Section 1114(a)(2) of the Right to 
     Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(2)) is 
     amended by striking the period and inserting ``and a specific 
     selection term to be used as the basis for the production and 
     disclosure of financial records.''.
       (c) Disclosures to FBI of Certain Consumer Records for 
     Counterintelligence Purposes.--Section 626(a) of the Fair 
     Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u(a)) is amended by 
     striking ``that information,'' and inserting ``that 
     information that includes a specific selection term to be 
     used as the basis for the production of that information,''.
       (d) Disclosures to Governmental Agencies for 
     Counterterrorism Purposes of Consumer Reports.--Section 
     627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v(a)) 
     is amended by striking ``analysis.'' and inserting ``analysis 
     and a specific selection term to be used as the basis for the 
     production of such information.''.
       (e) Definitions.--
       (1) Counterintelligence access to telephone toll and 
     transactional records.--Section 2709 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(g) Specific Selection Term Defined.--In this section, 
     the term `specific selection term' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
       (2) Access to financial records for certain intelligence 
     and protective purposes.--Section 1114 of the Right to 
     Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) In this section, the term `specific selection term' 
     has the meaning given the term in section 501 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
       (3) Disclosures to fbi of certain consumer records for 
     counterintelligence purposes.--Section 626 of the Fair Credit 
     Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subsection:
       ``(n) Specific Selection Term Defined.--In this section, 
     the term `specific selection term' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
       (4) Disclosures to governmental agencies for 
     counterterrorism purposes of consumer reports.--Section 627 
     of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v) is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(g) Specific Selection Term Defined.--In this section, 
     the term `specific selection term' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
         TITLE VI--FISA TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

     SEC. 601. ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON ORDERS REQUIRING PRODUCTION 
                   OF BUSINESS RECORDS.

       Section 502(b) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as 
     paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting before paragraph (5) (as so redesignated) 
     the following new paragraphs:
       ``(1) the total number of applications described in section 
     501(b)(2)(B) made for orders approving requests for the 
     production of tangible things;
       ``(2) the total number of such orders either granted, 
     modified, or denied;
       ``(3) the total number of applications described in section 
     501(b)(2)(C) made for orders approving requests for the 
     production of call detail records;
       ``(4) the total number of such orders either granted, 
     modified, or denied;''.

     SEC. 602. BUSINESS RECORDS COMPLIANCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       Section 502(b) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)), as amended by section 
     601 of this Act, is further amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) as 
     paragraphs (2) through (8), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting before paragraph (2) (as so redesignated) 
     the following new paragraph:
       ``(1) a summary of all compliance reviews conducted by the 
     Federal Government of the production of tangible things under 
     section 501;''.

     SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT ON ORDERS ENTERED.

       (a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.), as 
     amended by section 402 of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORT ON ORDERS ENTERED.

       ``(a) Report by Director of the Administrative Office of 
     the United States Courts.--The Director of the Administrative 
     Office of the United States Courts shall annually submit to 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the Senate and, subject to a 
     declassification review by the Attorney General and Director 
     of National Intelligence, make publicly available on an 
     Internet website--
       ``(1) the number of orders entered under each of sections 
     105, 304, 402, 501, 702, 703, and 704;
       ``(2) the number of orders modified under each of those 
     sections;
       ``(3) the number of orders denied under each of those 
     sections; and
       ``(4) the number of appointments of an individual to serve 
     as amicus curiae under section 103, including the name of 
     each individual appointed to serve as amicus curiae.
       ``(b) Report by Director of National Intelligence.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall annually make 
     publicly available a report that identifies, for the 
     preceding 12-month period--
       ``(1) the total number of orders issued pursuant titles I 
     and III and sections 703 and 704 and the estimated number of 
     targets affected by such orders;
       ``(2) the total number of orders issued pursuant to section 
     702 and the estimated number of targets affected by such 
     orders;
       ``(3) the total number of orders issued pursuant to title 
     IV and the estimated number of targets affected by such 
     orders;
       ``(4) the total number of orders issued pursuant to 
     applications made under section 501(b)(2)(B) and the 
     estimated number of targets affected by such orders;
       ``(5) the total number of orders issued pursuant to 
     applications made under section 501(b)(2)(C) and the 
     estimated number of targets affected by such orders; and
       ``(6) the total number of national Security letters issued 
     and the number of requests for information contained within 
     such national security letters.
       ``(c) National Security Letter Defined.--The term `national 
     security letter' means any of the following provisions:
       ``(1) Section 2709 of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(2) Section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial 
     Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A)).
       ``(3) Subsection (a) or (b) of section 626 of the Fair 
     Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u(a), 1681u(b)).
       ``(4) Section 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 
     U.S.C. 1681v(a)).''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in 
     the first section, as amended by section 402 of this Act, is 
     further amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 602, as added by such section 402, the following new 
     item:

``Sec. 603. Annual report on orders entered.''.

     SEC. 604. PUBLIC REPORTING BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO FISA ORDERS.

       (a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.), as 
     amended by section 603 of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 604. PUBLIC REPORTING BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO ORDERS.

       ``(a) Reporting.--A person may semiannually publicly report 
     the following information with respect to the preceding half 
     year using one of the following structures:
       ``(1) Subject to subsection (b), a report that aggregates 
     the number of orders or national security letters the person 
     was required to comply with in the following separate 
     categories:
       ``(A) The number of national security letters received, 
     reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
       ``(B) The number of customer accounts affected by national 
     security letters, reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-
     999.
       ``(C) The number of orders under this Act for content, 
     reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
       ``(D) With respect to content orders under this Act, in 
     bands of 1000 starting with 0-999, the number of customer 
     accounts affected under orders under title I;
       ``(E) The number of orders under this Act for non-content, 
     reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
       ``(F) With respect to non-content orders under this Act, in 
     bands of 1000 starting with 0-999, the number of customer 
     accounts affected under orders under--
       ``(i) title IV;
       ``(ii) title V with respect to applications described in 
     section 501(b)(2)(B); and
       ``(iii) title V with respect to applications described in 
     section 501(b)(2)(C).
       ``(2) A report that aggregates the number of orders, 
     directives, or national security letters the person was 
     required to comply with in the following separate categories:
       ``(A) The total number of all national security process 
     received, including all national security letters and orders 
     or directives under this Act, reported as a single number in 
     a band of 0-249 and thereafter in bands of 250.

[[Page 8940]]

       ``(B) The total number of customer selectors targeted under 
     all national security process received, including all 
     national security letters and orders or directives under this 
     Act, reported as a single number in a band of 0-249 and 
     thereafter in bands of 250.
       ``(3) Subject to subsection (b), a report that aggregates 
     the number of orders or national security letters the person 
     was required to comply with in the following separate 
     categories:
       ``(A) The number of national security letters received, 
     reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
       ``(B) The number of customer accounts affected by national 
     security letters, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-
     499.
       ``(C) The number of orders under this Act for content, 
     reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
       ``(D) The number of customer selectors targeted under such 
     orders, in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
       ``(E) The number of orders under this Act for non-content, 
     reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
       ``(F) The number of customer selectors targeted under such 
     orders, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
       ``(b) Period of Time Covered by Reports.--With respect to a 
     report described in paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection (a), 
     such report shall only include information--
       ``(1) except as provided in paragraph (2), for the period 
     of time ending on the date that is at least 180 days before 
     the date of the publication of such report; and
       ``(2) with respect to an order under this Act or national 
     security letter received with respect to a platform, product, 
     or service for which a person did not previously receive such 
     an order or national security letter (not including an 
     enhancement to or iteration of an existing publicly available 
     platform, product, or service), for the period of time ending 
     on the date that is at least 2 years before the date of the 
     publication of such report.
       ``(c) Other Forms of Agreed to Publication.--Nothing in 
     this section shall be construed to prohibit the Government 
     and any person from jointly agreeing to the publication of 
     information referred to in this subsection in a time, form, 
     or manner other than as described in this section.
       ``(d) National Security Letter Defined.--The term `national 
     security letter' has the meaning given the term in section 
     603.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in 
     the first section, as amended by section 603 of this Act, is 
     further amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 603, as added by section 603 of this Act, the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 604. Public reporting by persons subject to orders.''.

     SEC. 605. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR DECISIONS OF THE FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT.

       Section 601(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1871(c)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(1) not later than 45 days after the date on which the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issues a decision, 
     order, or opinion, including any denial or modification of an 
     application under this Act, that includes a significant 
     construction or interpretation of any provision of this Act 
     or results in a change of application of any provision of 
     this Act or a new application of any provision of this Act, a 
     copy of such decision, order, or opinion and any pleadings, 
     applications, or memoranda of law associated with such 
     decision, order, or opinion; and''.

     SEC. 606. SUBMISSION OF REPORTS UNDER FISA.

       (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 108(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 
     1808(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate,'' and inserting ``the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
     Senate''.
       (b) Physical Searches.--Section 306 (50 U.S.C. 1826) is 
     amended--
       (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate,'' and inserting 
     ``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the Senate''; and
       (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives''.
       (c) Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices.--Section 
     406(b) (50 U.S.C. 1846(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period and inserting 
     a semicolon; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(4) each department or agency on behalf of which the 
     Government has made application for orders approving the use 
     of pen registers or trap and trace devices under this title; 
     and
       ``(5) for each department or agency described in paragraph 
     (4), a breakdown of the numbers required by paragraphs (1), 
     (2), and (3).''.
       (d) Access to Certain Business Records and Other Tangible 
     Things.--Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 1862(a)) is amended by 
     striking ``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
     Senate'' and inserting ``Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committees 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
     Senate''.
                           TITLE VII--SUNSETS

     SEC. 701. SUNSETS.

       (a) USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
     2005.--Section 102(b)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
     Reauthorization Act of 2005 (50 U.S.C. 1805 note) is amended 
     by striking ``June 1, 2015'' and inserting ``December 31, 
     2017''.
       (b) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004.--Section 6001(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is 
     amended by striking ``June 1, 2015'' and inserting ``December 
     31, 2017''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill shall be debatable for 1 hour, with 
40 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking 
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 20 minutes 
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member 
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 20 minutes. The gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Ruppersberger) each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.


                             General Leave

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 3361.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  From the founding of the American Republic, this country has been 
engaged in a profound debate about the limits of government. In the 
Federalist Papers, the Founders argued passionately for a Federal 
Government that would protect the American people from foreign threats.
  At the same time, the Founders struggled to create a structure to 
contain and control that government in order to protect the God-given 
rights of the American people. They carefully crafted the Constitution 
and Bill of Rights to accomplish these two different, yet 
complementary, goals.
  In essence, this debate has illuminated the exceptionality of the 
United States. The ceaseless effort to restrain the reach of government 
is in our DNA as Americans. And for 225 years, we have refused to 
accept the idea that in order to have national security, we must 
sacrifice our personal freedoms.
  Some, however, think these goals are in conflict with one another 
following last year's unauthorized disclosure of the National Security 
Agency's data collection programs operated under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA.
  Today, the House will consider legislation that once again proves 
that American liberty and security are not mutually exclusive. We can 
protect both Americans' civil liberties and our national security 
without compromising either one.
  For nearly a year, the House Judiciary Committee has studied this 
issue in detail. We have held multiple hearings, consulted the Obama 
administration, and worked across party lines to produce bipartisan 
legislation to ensure these programs protect our national security and 
our individual freedoms.
  This bill, the USA FREEDOM Act, was unanimously approved by both the 
House Judiciary Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. The USA FREEDOM Act makes clear that the government 
cannot indiscriminately acquire Americans' call detail records and 
creates a new, narrowly tailored process for the collection of these 
records.
  Specifically, the USA FREEDOM Act ends bulk collection by keeping 
Americans' phone records in the hands of providers and requiring the 
government to

[[Page 8941]]

get the permission of the court to request information from providers, 
using a specific selection term in their request to the court. That 
limits the scope of information collected. For example, the government 
would have to identify a specific person or account as part of any 
request for information or tangible things.
  Furthermore, the USA FREEDOM Act bans bulk collection not just for 
the controversial telephone metadata program, but for all of section 
215 authorities, as well as NSL letters and pen register, trap and 
trace devices. These limitations will protect Americans' records of all 
types, including medical records, email records, telephone records, and 
firearms purchase records, among many others.
  At the same time, the USA FREEDOM Act ensures that the Federal 
Government will continue to have the tools it needs to identify and 
intercept terrorist attacks. The bill preserves the traditional 
operational use of these important authorities by the FBI and other 
intelligence agencies. It provides needed emergency authority to 
national security officials if there is an immediate national security 
threat, but still requires the government to obtain Court approval of 
an application within 7 days.
  The USA FREEDOM Act increases the transparency of our intelligence-
gathering programs by creating an amicus curiae in the FISA Court. This 
amicus will be chosen from a panel of legal experts to help ensure the 
court adequately considers privacy concerns and the constitutional 
rights of Americans when reviewing the government's request for 
records.
  It also requires the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of each decision, 
order, or opinion of the court that includes a significant construction 
or interpretation of the law and mandates that the government report 
the number of orders issued, modified, or denied by the court annually.
  Last year's national security leaks have also had a commercial and 
financial impact on American technology companies that have provided 
these records. They have experienced backlash from both American and 
foreign consumers and have had their competitive standing in the global 
marketplace damaged. In January of this year, the Justice Department 
entered into a settlement with several companies to permit new ways to 
report data concerning requests for customer information under FISA. 
The USA FREEDOM Act builds on upon this settlement, allowing tech 
companies to publicly report national security requests from the 
government to inform their American and foreign customers.
  From beginning to end, this is a carefully crafted, bipartisan bill.
  I would like to thank the sponsor of this legislation, Crime 
Subcommittee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner, full committee Ranking Member 
John Conyers, Intellectual Property Subcommittee Ranking Member Jerry 
Nadler, and Crime Subcommittee Ranking Member Bobby Scott for working 
together with me on this important bipartisan legislation. I also want 
to thank the staff of these Members for the many hours, weeks, and 
months of hard work they put into this effort.
  Furthermore, I would like to thank my staff--Caroline Lynch, the 
chief counsel of the Crime Subcommittee, and Sam Ramer--for their long 
hours and steadfast dedication to this legislation. And I might add 
that Sam Ramer is going to be missed by the committee as he moves on to 
take a new responsibility in the private sector, but he wanted to be 
sure that he could be present today for the completion of the passage 
of this legislation through the House. I thank Sam and Caroline for 
their long and dedicated hours put into making sure that this was a 
finely crafted piece of legislation.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in support of the USA FREEDOM Act. The version of the bill 
pending before us today is not a perfect vehicle. There is more that we 
can do and must do to ensure, as the Fourth Amendment requires, ``The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.''
  But let me be clear. The compromise bill before us today is a 
significant improvement over the status quo. It is a good bill. Now, 
with this legislation, we stand poised to end domestic bulk collection 
across the board--in section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, in the pen 
register authority, and in the national security letter statutes--by 
requiring the use of a ``specific selection term'' before the 
government may obtain information or tangible things.
  This legislation will create a panel of experts from which the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can draw expertise and 
questions involving privacy, civil liberties, and technology. It will 
also require the court to disclose every significant opinion it issues, 
because in this country there should be no such thing as secret law. 
And we have accomplished all these things while providing President 
Obama with his requested authority for the limited, prospective 
collection of call detail records.
  Any bill we might have offered on this subject would have been 
imperfect, but we have been careful to include the critical safeguards 
in this legislation. With the additional reporting, declassification, 
and transparency requirements laid out in the measure before us, we 
believe the government would be hard-pressed to attempt to expand its 
surveillance authorities beyond the narrow intent of this legislation.
  As the administration stated yesterday in a formal statement of 
policy, the USA FREEDOM Act ``prohibits bulk collection.'' This is our 
intent, and we will hold the current and future administrations to this 
intent.
  In closing, I want to thank Chairman Goodlatte, Mr. Sensenbrenner of 
Wisconsin, Mr. Nadler of New York, and Mr. Scott of Virginia for their 
tireless leadership on this issue. I also want to express appreciation 
to Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their 
willingness to work with us to reach this point.
  The House is poised to approve the first significant rollback of any 
aspect of government surveillance since the passage of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. We must seize this opportunity, 
and so I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3361.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3361, the USA FREEDOM Act, is intended to provide 
strong, concrete limits that prevent mass and untargeted collection of 
records and information using domestic intelligence authorities, 
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the intelligence pen/trap statute, and 
national security letters. The USA FREEDOM Act is designed to prevent 
bulk collection on a nationwide scale and other broad collection of 
information that pertains to large numbers of people who share an 
identifier. The substitute amendment's definition of ``specific 
selection term'' is an integral part of our effort to end, and prevent, 
such broad collection. The identifiers that fit this definition should 
be narrowly construed to further this goal.
  Under the bill, a specific selection term is defined as, ``a discrete 
term, such as a term specifically identifying a person, entity, 
account, address, or device, used by the Government to limit the scope 
of the information or tangible things sought pursuant to the statute 
authorizing the provision of such information or tangible thing to the 
government.''
  This definition includes a non-exclusive list of discrete 
identifiers--person, entity, account, address, device--that are 
associated with a specific person or a very small group of people. The 
list is non-exclusive because there may be other discrete identifiers 
that pertain only to a specific person or a small group. Using an 
illustrative list rather than an exhaustive list provides necessary 
flexibility in choosing selection terms that identify particular people 
or small groups, and is not intended to permit collection of 
information about large numbers of people who may have some tie to an 
identifier. For example, a ``specific selection term'' includes the 
phone number associated with a target's cell phone and the phone number 
of his home landline he shares with the rest of his family, but not an 
area code shared by thousands or millions.
  The substitute amendment includes ``device'' and ``address'' among 
the illustrative examples of specific selection terms. Use of

[[Page 8942]]

these examples is not intended to permit large scale collection. They 
were added to broaden the type of specific identifiers that could be 
employed, not to permit broad collection of information that pertains 
to vast numbers of people. In both cases, these terms apply to a 
personal identifier--a personal device or address--in which the 
``device'' or ``address'' takes the place of another unique identifier, 
such as a name or account.
  For example, the IMEI number of cell phone identifies that ``device'' 
and is an appropriate selection term because the device is associated 
with a specific person. However, the IP address of an Internet router 
that acts as a hub for thousands of email users, while it identifies a 
specific device, does not qualify as a specific selection term because 
the records associated it with pertain to so many people. Similarly, an 
``address'' could serve as a selection term permitting the government 
to name the physical address of a home, but not an IP address shared by 
thousands of Internet users. To use a selection term in a manner that 
would sweep up the records that pertain to dozens, hundreds, or 
thousands of individuals is exactly the type of mass surveillance that 
this legislation is designed to prevent.
  The USA FREEDOM Act is intended to stop both bulk and ``bulky'' 
collection, and I expect it to fulfill this function as a critical 
safeguard to Americans' privacy.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
  I neglected to add another key member of the committee, Congressman 
Randy Forbes of Virginia, a member of the Judiciary Committee who has 
also been a key bipartisan member of this negotiation.
  At this time, it is my pleasure to yield 6 minutes to the gentleman 
from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the chairman of the Crime, 
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee and the 
chief sponsor of this legislation.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the House for 
bringing the USA FREEDOM Act to the floor today.
  I was the chairman of the Judiciary Committee on September 11, 2001. 
In the wake of that tragedy, the committee passed the PATRIOT Act with 
unanimous, bipartisan support. The bill easily passed in both the House 
and the Senate, and President George W. Bush signed it into law.
  I believe the PATRIOT Act made America safer by enhancing the 
government's ability to find and stop terrorist attacks. We were 
careful to maintain the civil liberties that distinguish us from our 
enemies. We are here today because the government misapplied the law 
and upset the balance between privacy and security that we had fought 
to preserve 13 years ago.
  In a feat of legal gymnastics, the administration convinced the FISA 
Court that, because some records in the universe of every phone call 
Americans made might be relevant to counterterrorism, the entire 
universe of calls must be relevant. That decision opened the floodgates 
to a practice of bulk collection that Congress never intended when the 
PATRIOT Act was passed.

                              {time}  0930

  Senator Leahy and I introduced the USA FREEDOM Act to end bulk 
collection, increase transparency, and to reestablish a proper balance 
between privacy and security. After months of input and negotiations--
in a historic echo of its vote on the PATRIOT Act--the Judiciary 
Committee unanimously passed the FREEDOM Act.
  The challenge we faced was to draft legislation that was tight enough 
to avoid abuse without infringing on the core functions of law 
enforcement and intelligence collection. Perfect is rarely possible in 
politics, and this bill is no exception.
  In order to preserve core operations of the intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies, the administration insisted on broadening certain 
authorities and lessening certain restrictions. Some of the changes 
raise justifiable concerns, and I don't blame people for losing trust 
in their government, because the government has violated their trust.
  Let me be clear: I wish this bill did more. To my colleagues who 
lament the changes, I agree with you. To privacy groups who are upset 
about lost provisions, I share your disappointment. The negotiations 
for this bill were intense, and we have to make compromises, but this 
bill still does deserve support. Don't let the perfect become the enemy 
of the good. Today, we have the opportunity to make a powerful 
statement: Congress does not support bulk collection.
  The days of the NSA indiscriminately vacuuming up more data than it 
can store will end with the USA FREEDOM Act. After the FREEDOM Act 
passes, we will have a law that expresses Congress' unambiguous intent 
to end bulk collection of Americans' data across all surveillance 
authorities.
  The bill requires that, in addition to existing restrictions, the 
government must use a specific selection term as the basis for 
collecting foreign intelligence information. And maybe more 
importantly, after this bill becomes law, we will have critical 
transparency provisions to ensure that, if the government again 
violates our trust, Congress and the public will know about it and will 
be able to do something about it.
  The FREEDOM Act gives private companies greater discretion to 
disclose their cooperation with the government. These disclosures give 
the companies increased autonomy and will alert the public to the 
extent of data collection. The bill also requires public notification 
of any FISC decision that contains a significant construction of law--
expressly including interpretations of the ``specific selection term.'' 
This is the end of secret laws. If the administration abuses the intent 
of the bill, everyone will know.
  That is why the FREEDOM Act will succeed. It bans bulk collection and 
ensures disclosure of attempts to dilute it. Today's vote is a first 
vote is the first step--and not a final step--in our efforts to reform 
surveillance. It gives us the tools to ensure that Congress and the 
public can provide an adequate check on the government. In a post-
FREEDOM Act world, we have turned the tables on the NSA and can say to 
them: ``We are watching you.'' And we will.
  I want to thank Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers and 
Congressmen Scott, Nadler and Forbes of Virginia for all their hard 
work. I also want to thank the staff for so many long hours. I cannot 
overstate the amount of collective sweat and tears that my chief of 
staff, Bart Forsyth, Caroline Lynch, Sam Ramer, Aaron Hiller, Heather 
Sawyer, and Joe Graupensperger put into this bill.
  But most of all, I want to thank my wife. Cheryl has always been the 
world's largest and loudest advocate for the preservation of civil 
rights. She encouraged, supported--and some might say demanded--that I 
lead this effort. There is no question that we would not be here today 
for this historic vote on the USA FREEDOM Act if it weren't for her.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), the ranking member of the 
Intellectual Property Subcommittee.
  Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, today we have the first chance in more than a decade to 
finally place some real limits on the sweeping, unwarranted--and at 
times unlawful--government surveillance that many of us have fought 
against for years.
  First and foremost--and as the administration acknowledges in its 
Statement of Administration Policy--this bill will end bulk collection 
under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and will ensure that the 
government is also prohibited from using its National Security Letter 
authority, or pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, for bulk 
collection. It does so by requiring the government to identify a 
specific selection term--something like a person's name, or an account 
or telephone number--as the basis for obtaining information. This term 
must limit the scope of records collected to those that are 
``relevant'' to an authorized investigation, which requires a 
reasonable relationship between the particular records and the subjects 
of a terrorism investigation.

[[Page 8943]]

  I share the concerns that the current definition of ``specific 
selection term'' may still allow overbroad collection. But given the 
``presumptively relevant'' categories that Congress has already 
identified in section 215--and because the bill will now require 
participation of an amicus in the FISA Court who can argue against an 
overly broad reading of the law--the government would not be permitted 
to, for example, use an entire telephone area code or an Internet 
router to collect and warehouse records just because a terrorist 
suspect might be using a phone in that area code or sending 
communications that might traverse that router.
  Moreover, to the extent the FISA Court ever construes a specific 
selection term too broadly, other reforms in the bill ensure that 
Congress and the American people would know about it immediately and 
could rein them in.
  These changes are quite significant, as are the new restrictions to 
the use of FISA section 702, which allows the NSA to target persons 
located outside the United States.
  The USA FREEDOM Act on the floor today certainly does not give us 
everything we want or need. It is the product of heated negotiations 
across party and committee lines and with the intelligence community. 
It is far from perfect, but it is an important step forward, and we 
will work to fix remaining problems and strengthen the bill as it moves 
through the Senate. But a ``no'' vote on this bill today may mean no 
reform at all, thus leaving in place the framework that could lead to 
the continued dragnet surveillance of our citizens. This must end. This 
still makes critically important changes that we should all support. 
That is why I will vote for it and why I urge everyone else to vote for 
it.
  With that, I want to thank Congressmen Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte, 
Conyers, Scott, and Forbes, and all the staff members who worked on 
this bill.
  This is a signal occasion. It is the first real progress we will have 
made--not enough--but a really good first step.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) who has worked so hard on this.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding. I join the author of the bill, the gentleman from Wisconsin 
and chair of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, Mr. 
Sensenbrenner; my colleague from Virginia, the chair of the full 
committee, Mr. Goodlatte; the gentleman from Michigan and ranking 
member, Mr. Conyers; Mr. Nadler; and my colleague from Virginia (Mr. 
Forbes) for proposing this amended version of the USA FREEDOM Act. I 
commend my colleagues for working together to develop a bipartisan 
approach to addressing some of the shortcomings in our foreign 
intelligence surveillance statutes.
  As recent revelations about the way that some of these statutes have 
been used have come to light, members of the Judiciary Committee, which 
has primary jurisdiction over the statutes, studied the issues, 
proposed solutions, and worked together to find a way forward. We have 
also worked with our colleagues from the Intelligence Committee to find 
common ground in order to bring meaningful surveillance reform to the 
floor today.
  The bill, as amended, addresses abuses, enhances privacy protections, 
provides more rigorous review of critical questions of legal 
interpretation, and increases transparency so our citizens will know 
what is being decided and done in their name.
  While the administration has already indicated that it will change 
its procedures, to paraphrase President Reagan, I think the best course 
is to ``trust but codify.''
  While this version of the USA FREEDOM Act does not accomplish all 
that we had hoped for, it is, in fact, a significant step in the right 
direction. I therefore urge my colleagues to support the legislation.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. CONYERS. I am pleased now to yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady 
from California (Ms. Lofgren).
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I certainly respect the role that Mr. 
Sensenbrenner has played in this and honor him and his wife, Cheryl, 
for their commitment to freedom. But I must oppose the FREEDOM Act that 
is on the floor today.
  This is not the bill that was reported out of the Judiciary Committee 
unanimously. I voted for that bill not because it was perfect but 
because it was a step in the right direction. After the bill was 
reported out, changes were made without the knowledge of the committee 
members, and I think the result is a bill that actually will not end 
bulk collections, regretfully.
  As Mr. Scott has said, our job is not to trust, but to codify. And if 
you take a look at the selection changes made in the bill, it would 
allow for bulk collection should the NSA do so. Further, I would note 
that the transparency provisions have also been weakened. The 702 
section would no longer be reportable by companies who receive orders, 
and instead of the Attorney General noting decisions that change the 
law, it is now sent over to the Director of National Intelligence.
  Regrettably, we have learned that if we leave any ambiguity in the 
law, the intelligence agency will run a truck right through that 
ambiguity. And I think that is why all the civil liberties groups have 
withdrawn their support from this bill: the ACLU, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, CDT, Open Technology. I would add that 
FreedomWorks and other libertarian groups have also pulled their 
support. Companies like Facebook and Google have also pulled their 
support of the bill.
  Now, I hope that we will defeat this bill and come back together--
because we do work together well here in the Judiciary Committee--and 
fix the problems that were created, I think, at the insistence of the 
administration and give honor to Mr. Sensenbrenner's original bill that 
had 151 members cosponsoring it.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds simply to point 
out two things. First of all, as the gentleman from Wisconsin has 
noted, this legislation is an effort to bring together widely disparate 
points of view about how to both maximize our national security and our 
civil liberties. And there are those outside groups that were just 
referenced who would like to see more than the language that they were 
able to obtain in this bill. But I think it is very important for 
everyone to know that while those groups--some groups--have withdrawn 
their support for the bill, they do not oppose the bill, and that is a 
very important distinction for Members to understand.
  Mr. Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King), a member of the Judiciary 
Committee.
  Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee for yielding to me, and I want to also thank the 
efforts of the Judiciary Committee and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence for the broad and intense work they have done on this 
bill.
  The USA FREEDOM Act starts with the right concept, and that is that 
the civil liberties of Americans were at risk. Even though we have very 
few examples of people being victimized by it, there is not a level of 
comfort in this country. And so the move to block the Federal 
Government from storing metadata and still allow for them to be able to 
set up under a FISA warrant a query through privately held data is the 
right way to go. It is a conclusion that I drew early on in the many 
hearings that I have been to, both classified and unclassified 
hearings.
  I quizzed the witnesses, and I put my mark down on those committee 
hearings, but what happened was the process moved quickly, and over a 
weekend there was an intense job to write a bill that turned into a 
substitute amendment, and a debate in the Judiciary Committee referred 
over to the Select Committee on Intel. Both committees acted quickly. I 
offered an amendment

[[Page 8944]]

before the Judiciary Committee. It was voted on. But I have to say 
that, in my opinion, it was not considered in a fashion that would have 
allowed for the full judgment of the Judiciary Committee to weigh in.
  My amendment is set up so it allows for the intelligence community to 
negotiate with the telecoms--the telecommunications providers--for a 
period of time longer than is today required by the FCC.

                              {time}  0945

  I think it is not possible for anyone who supports this bill to argue 
that it makes us safer. It protects our civil liberties more, but there 
is a window beyond the FCC requirements that I would like to see be 
available on something other than a voluntary basis.
  I wanted to come here to this floor and put my marker down on that 
concern, that we should not sacrifice the security in America and we 
should protect the civil liberties of Americans. We can do that at the 
same time. I think this bill falls somewhat short; although the 
underlying concept of the bill, I do support.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), a very active member of the 
Judiciary Committee.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time, and I thank the ranking member and the chairman for this 
work.
  I also thank Mr. Sensenbrenner, who we have worked with from the 
first stages of the PATRIOT Act, when the Judiciary Committee passed it 
out on a bipartisan basis after that terrible and heinous act of 
terror. Unfortunately, it was changed.
  Today, I want to announce that megadata collection as we know it has 
ended. That is a major tribute to the American people, and the 
Judiciary Committee and the Intelligence Committee heard them.
  More importantly, the Intelligence Committee and the Judiciary 
Committee stand united. Can we do more? Should there have been an open 
rule or a number of other amendments that Members wanted? Yes. I 
believe in participatory democracy.
  Today, we end bulk collection under the PATRIOT Act section 215. We 
can always do better. Today, we prevent the bulk collection under FISA 
pen register and National Security Letter authorities and vow to the 
American people that we increase the transparency.
  Let me make it very clear, when we first discussed and debated the 
PATRIOT Act, reverse targeting, to me, was heinous. It means that it 
captured an innocent American person as we were looking for someone who 
happened to be a terrorist.
  Today, in this bill, we have any communications as to which the 
sender and all intended recipients are determined to be located in the 
United States and prohibit the use of any discrete, nontarget 
communication that is determined to be to or from a United States 
person or a person who appears to be located in the United States, 
except to protect against an immediate threat to harm. It is 
eliminated. Reverse targeting is no longer.
  In addition, I introduced a bill some time ago called the FISA Court 
and Sunshine Act of 2013. In that bill, it required the Attorney 
General to disclose each decision, order, or opinion of the FISA Court, 
allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority the 
government is claiming under the PATRIOT Act and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct surveillance needed to keep 
Americans safe.
  I am pleased that, in section 402 and 604 of the USA FREEDOM Act, it 
requires the Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of 
each decision, order, or opinion. It opens it up to the American 
people. That includes a significant construction of interpretation of 
the law and to submit to Congress within 45 days.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentlelady.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman.
  As indicated, the bill specifically contains an explicit prohibition 
on bulk collection of tangible things pursuant to section 215. The 
FREEDOM Act provides that section 215 may be used only where specific 
selection term is provided as the basis for the production of tangible 
things.
  Clearly, we worked very hard to contain what was an amoeba that would 
not end. Finally, I believe section 301 of the bill, as I indicated, 
was included, as it was in my amendment in H.R. 3773.
  Let me conclude by simply saying that the Bill of Rights lives. The 
Bill of Rights is for the American people, both the right to freedom, 
both the right in essence to privacy, and our respect for the gathering 
of intelligence to protect us from terrorists.
  This bill, the USA FREEDOM Act, is indeed an enormous step forward. 
Let us work together to move us even more, but today, we end megadata 
collecting as we know it.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe we have made a giant step forward for civil 
liberties, respect for the integrity of the American people, and their 
right to freedom, as well as for the protecting of all of us from 
terror.
  Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and a co-
sponsor, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3361, the ``USA Freedom 
Act,'' which is short for ``Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and 
Online Monitoring Act.''
  The USA Freedom Act is the House's unified response to the 
unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in 
June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from 
Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers, which 
was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot 
Act.
  Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering 
operation was swift and negative.
  There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large 
percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of 
this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of 
magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil 
liberties of American citizens.
  To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National 
Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this 
program. According to the DNI, the information acquired under this 
program did not include the content of any communications or the 
identity of any subscriber.
  The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the 
Court's order is telephony metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed 
and length of calls.''
  The assurance given by the DNI, to put it mildly, was not very 
reassuring.
  In response, many Members of Congress, including the Ranking Member 
Conyers, and Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in 
response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of 
the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA 
Patriot Act and subsequent amendments.
  For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine 
Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that much needed transparency 
without compromising national security to the decisions, orders, and 
opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or ``FISA 
Court.''
  Specifically, my bill would require the Attorney General to disclose 
each decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority 
the government is claiming under the PATRIOT Act and Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to 
keep Americans safe.
  I am pleased that these requirements are incorporated in substantial 
part as Sections 402 and 604 of the USA Freedom Act, which requires the 
Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of each decision, 
order, or opinion of the FISA court that includes a significant 
construction or interpretation of law and to submit a report to 
Congress within 45 days.
  I also am pleased that the bill before us contains an explicit 
prohibition on bulk collection of tangible things pursuant to Section 
215 authority. Instead, the USA Freedom Act provides that Section 215 
may only be used where a specific selection term is provided as the 
basis for the production of tangible things.
  Another important improvement is that the bill's prohibition on 
domestic bulk collection, as

[[Page 8945]]

well as its criteria for specifying the information to be collected, 
applies not only to Section 215 surveillance activities but also to 
other law enforcement communications interception authorities, such as 
national security letters.
  Finally, I strongly support the USA Freedom Act because Section 301 
of the bill continues the prohibition against ``reverse targeting,'' 
which became law when an earlier Jackson Lee Amendment was included in 
H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007.
  ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this 
Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the 
arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government 
targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to 
collect information on certain U.S. persons.
  One of the main concerns of libertarians and classical conservatives, 
as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, in giving 
expanded authority to the executive branch was the temptation of 
national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be 
difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it.
  The Jackson Lee Amendment, codified in Section 301 of the USA Freedom 
Act, reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse 
targeting by requiring the Administration to obtain a regular, 
individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the 
surveillance is a person in the United States.
  In retaining the prohibition on reverse targeting, Section 301 
achieves honors the Constitution by requiring the government to obtain 
a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an 
acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person 
reasonably believed to be located in the United States.''
  I should that nothing in Section 301 requires the Government to 
obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that 
they might pick up a call into or from the United States.
  Rather, a FISA order is required only where there is a particular, 
known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign 
target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such 
that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire 
that person's communications.
  Mr. Speaker, while the bill before is a good bill, it is not perfect. 
No legislation ever is.
  In particular, my preference would have been to retain the provision 
in the bill as originally introduced establishing an Office of the 
Special Advocate to vigorously advocate in support of legal 
interpretations that protect individual privacy and civil liberties.
  As initially contemplated, the Office of the Special Advocate would 
be authorized to participate in proceedings before the FISA Court and 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, and to request 
reconsiderations of FISA Court decisions and participate in appeals and 
reviews.
  Regrettably, the provision establishing the Office of the Special 
Advocate fell victim to a compromise and replaced with a provision 
authorizing both the FISA court and the FISA Court of Review, if they 
deem it necessary, to appoint an individual to serve as amicus curiae 
in a case involving a novel or significant interpretation of law.
  Under this arrangement, the presiding judges of the courts must 
designate five individuals eligible to serve in that position who 
possess expertise in privacy and civil liberties, intelligence 
collection, telecommunications or any other area that may lend legal or 
technical expertise to the courts.
  The Office of the Special Advocate arrangement in my opinion is 
superior because it provides for mandatory participation of the public 
advocate rather than the discretionary involvement of court designated 
amicus curiae provided in the bill before us.
  Mr. Speaker, as I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 
2007, nearly two centuries ago, Alexis DeTocqueville, who remains the 
most astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason 
democracies invariably prevail in any military conflict is because 
democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages 
those traits that are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, 
courage, and a love of justice.
  I ask unanimous consent to include in the Record a copy of that op-
ed.
  I support the USA Freedom Act because it will help keep us true to 
the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance between our cherished 
liberty and smart security.
  I urge my colleagues to support the USA Freedom Act.

                    NSA Reform Takes Its First Steps

       The USA FREEDOM Act takes steps to:
       End bulk collection under Patriot Act Section 215. The bill 
     requires the government to show the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court that the specific records it seeks from 
     phone companies pertain to a specific email address, account 
     number or other ``selection term'' before it can demand a 
     customer's personal information. It creates a new collection 
     authority for call records but takes meaningful steps to 
     ensure that such records are not vacuumed up wholesale, as 
     was happening under the secret programs revealed by Edward 
     Snowden.
       Prevent bulk collection under FISA pen register and 
     National Security Letter authorities. The bill also requires 
     the government to use a ``selection term'' that uniquely 
     describes its surveillance target and serves as the basis for 
     collecting information from a telephone line, facility, or 
     other account. This would help ensure that the government 
     won't use pen registers and National Security Letters as 
     convenient substitutes for the 215 program.
       Increase transparency. Finally, the bill requires the 
     government to provide to Congress and to the public 
     additional reporting on its surveillance programs, while 
     enabling companies who receive national security 
     informational requests to more fully inform customers about 
     the extent to which the government is collecting their data. 
     Additional governmental reporting requirements and more 
     particularized third party reporting authorities, however, 
     are needed in order to ensure that Congress and the public 
     have the information they need to perform truly robust 
     oversight.
       While the bill makes significant reforms to U.S. 
     surveillance law, Congress clearly chose not to let the 
     perfect be the enemy of the good. And, to be clear, more work 
     needs to be done. Some of the additional reforms we are 
     calling for, which were in the original USA FREEDOM Act, 
     include:
       Ensuring that judges in the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court (FISC) have the authority to determine 
     whether an application passes legal muster and do not return 
     to being mere rubber stamps.
       Limiting the circumstances under which the government can 
     gather records more than one ``hop'' out from a target to 
     help ensure Americans' information is not unnecessarily swept 
     up.
       Closing the ``back door'' search loophole in the FISA 
     Amendments Act to prevent the government from searching 
     information collected under Section 702 of FISA for the U.S. 
     persons' communications content.

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to 
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Holding), a member of the 
Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. HOLDING. Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday, the State Department 
acknowledged that terrorist attacks worldwide have increased by more 
than 43 percent last year, killing nearly 18,000 people. The odds are 
rising that we will be hit here in the United States. That is why 
balanced legislation that protects civil liberties and keeps Americans 
safe is so important, and the USA FREEDOM Act does just that.
  I rise in support of the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, bipartisan 
legislation that reforms our intelligence-gathering programs while, 
importantly, preserving operational capabilities that protect national 
security.
  This legislation will make sure that Americans are protected at a 
time when the world is a more dangerous place than when the PATRIOT Act 
itself was enacted into law.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Honda).
  Mr. HONDA. Mr. Speaker, I want to add my thanks to the work that has 
been done up to now. I became an original cosponsor of the USA FREEDOM 
Act because I was disturbed about the revelations of surveillance 
programs.
  The bill was a good step toward balancing security and privacy, but 
this amendment does not. It leaves open the possibility that bulk 
surveillance could still continue, and it no longer protects the public 
through a special advocate in the FISA Court.
  I am disappointed that this popular, bipartisan bill has been so 
drastically weakened. I can no longer support it.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I recognize the 
work that Mr. Sensenbrenner, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Goodlatte, Mr. Scott, and 
others have put into this, but it still falls woefully short.
  This legislation still allows the government to collect everything 
they want against Americans, to treat Americans as suspects first and 
citizens second.

[[Page 8946]]

  It still allows decisions about whom to target and how aggressively 
to go after acquaintances of acquaintances of targets, to be made by 
mid-level employees, not Federal judges.
  Most important, the fundamental decisions under this will be made 
against a weak, inferior standard that does not reach probable cause, 
so that the government can spy on people based on weak suspicions and 
not on legally established probable cause. Now, my friends say: don't 
let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
  The perfect? How can anyone here vote for legislation that doesn't 
uphold the constitutional standard of probable cause? Probable cause 
has been well-established in law for two centuries, to keep Americans 
secure by keeping intelligence and enforcement officers focused on real 
threats, not on vague suspicions or wild-goose chases.
  A decade ago, there was a major change in the relationship between 
Americans and their government. This bill does not correct it.
  Mr. Speaker, I recognize the work that Mr. Sensenbrenner, Mr. 
Conyers, Mr. Goodlatte, Mr. Scott, and others have put into this, but 
the bill before us still falls woefully short of what is required to 
correct the abuses brought to light over the last year.
  This legislation still allows the government to collect everything 
they want against Americans--to treat Americans as suspects first and 
citizens second. It still allows decisions about whom to target, and 
how aggressively to go after acquaintances of acquaintances of targets, 
to be made by mid-level intelligence community employees, not federal 
judges. This so-called ``two-hops'' surveillance casts a very wide net 
that can reach millions of people.
  Most important, the fundamental decisions made under the authorities 
provided in this bill will be made using a weak, inferior standard that 
does not reach the probable cause standard. In other words, the 
government can spy on people based on weak suspicions and not on 
legally established probable cause.
  Now, my friends say, ``Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the 
good.'' The perfect? How could anyone here vote for legislation that 
doesn't uphold the constitutional standard of probable cause?
  Probable cause has been well established in law for two centuries to 
keep Americans secure by keeping intelligence and enforcement officers 
focused on real threats, not on vague suspicions or wild-goose chases. 
Indeed, the debate over adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution was 
about raising the standard for the government's legal interaction with 
its citizens, not lowering it as we are now. That standard for the 
behavior of intelligence and law enforcement officers is not archaic. 
The power of the government to oppress individuals based on false 
suspicions is not less, but greater, than when the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights were written.
  The bill also fails to deal with some of the most important abuses 
revealed over the last year. It provides no protection for national 
security whistleblowers, whose revelations over the last decade are the 
only reason why we are finally having such a public debate on this 
issue. The secrecy of the Intelligence Community is so complete that 
Congress will never be able to have meaningful oversight without 
whistleblowers from within the community, and rarely will they speak up 
without some protection against firing or worse. And human nature has 
not changed. The propensity for investigators to let their suspicions 
get the better of them is as great as it ever was--even well 
intentioned investigators.
  The bill also allows the government to continue surreptitiously to 
compromise encryption and privacy technology built into American 
electronics and software products, putting at direct risk America's hi-
tech business sector and the jobs it provides.
  A decade ago there was a major change in the relationship between 
Americans and their government. This bill does not correct it. Members 
should reject this badly flawed bill and the House leadership should 
allow an open debate on a real surveillance reform bill.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute to respond to the 
gentleman from New Jersey.
  A number of the things the gentleman has stated are simply not 
accurate. First of all, the selectors all have to be approved by court 
order.
  Secondly, it is important for everyone to understand that the 
information gathered is targeted to foreign nationals, not to American 
citizens.
  Thirdly, the increased transparency that is created by this 
legislation, both in the FISA Court itself and with the fact that the 
data is now going to be required to be retained by the companies that 
own the data and not held by the government, provides extra assurance 
that, if some kind of massive data collection grab were attempted by 
the government, it would be exposed, as Mr. Nadler pointed out earlier.
  Finally, the special selectors language that was carefully worked out 
in a bipartisan manner carefully limits the ability of people to gather 
data. It has to be based upon discrete requests, and discretion has a 
meaning in the law.
  It has to be limited to identifiable persons or things, and it has to 
be done in such a way that the court approves it.
  Mr. HOLT. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I would be happy to yield.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I yield myself 30 seconds and yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. HOLT. Is it not correct that this bill does not invoke the 
probable cause standard?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. This is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, and 
probable cause has never applied. It has never applied. The gentleman 
is attempting to change the law if he thinks that.
  Mr. HOLT. Will the gentleman yield further?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I yield further to the gentleman.
  Mr. HOLT. Is there any American who doesn't think that this is a 
search, when it comes to gathering, by any common understanding?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, when it comes to 
gathering information about foreign nationals who are deemed to pose a 
national security threat to the United States, the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply, and a court must still order the particular selectors 
that are used.
  The gentleman's characterization is inaccurate.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), a senior member of the committee.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I have heard arguments against this bill, 
and all of them amount to one argument: the bill doesn't go far enough.
  I agree. It doesn't, but it is rarely a good argument against a bill 
to say it doesn't go far enough, if it goes a long way towards solving 
a real problem.
  This bill will end bulk collection. It will end it under section 215. 
It will end it under trace and trap, and it will end it under NSLs. 
Without this bill--and I hope it is strengthened in the Senate--we will 
have no chance to end bulk collection, and the current framework which 
allows the dragnet surveillance of our citizens will continue.
  I wish this bill were stronger, but it is what we are able to get 
now. It is a major step forward, and not to pass this bill now would be 
to say to the NSA: Continue what you are doing, we are placing no 
restrictions on you beyond what the law already has.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  I wanted to take this opportunity to thank staff on both sides of the 
aisle for the hard work that went into drafting the bill and the many 
compromises that were reached when we went into the final product.
  In addition to Caroline Lynch and Sam Ramer with Chairman Goodlatte, 
Bart Forsyth with Mr. Sensenbrenner, our own staff, Aaron Hiller, Joe 
Graupensperger, Heather Sawyer, all deserve appropriate credit and 
praise for the many late nights and long weekends that they spent 
working on the public's behalf on this critical legislation.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I have only one speaker 
remaining, and I am prepared to close our portion of the remarks if the 
gentleman is prepared to close.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself an additional 1 minute, and 
it is to clarify the term ``specific selection term'' because the 
definition of specific

[[Page 8947]]

selection term that appears in the compromise bill is imperfect, but 
the USA FREEDOM Act still ends bulk collection. That is why we are 
here.
  Under the act, the government may not obtain information or tangible 
things under section 215, the FISA pen register authority, or the 
National Security Letter statutes without using a ``specific selection 
term'' as the basis for production.

                              {time}  1000

  Critics are correct. This is not as clean or straightforward as the 
definition approved by both the Intelligence Committee and Judiciary 
Committee. Nothing in the definition explicitly prohibits the 
government from using a very broad selection term like ``area code 
202'' or ``the entire eastern seaboard.'' But that concern is largely 
theoretical; the type of collection is not likely to be of use to the 
government.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 3 minutes 
remaining. The gentleman from Virginia has 2\1/4\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the definition of ``specific selection 
term'' includes a phrase pursuant to the statute authorizing the 
provision of information, and that is intended to keep the definition 
within the four corners of the statute.
  There will now be an amicus in the court to argue that expansive 
readings of this text--like the reading that took ``relevance'' in 
section 215 to mean ``all call detail records''--are inconsistent with 
the plain meaning of the law.
  Under this bill, any FISA Court opinion that interprets this 
definition must be declassified and released to the public within 45 
days. If the government tries to expand this authority, the public will 
know it in short order.
  The House is poised to approve the first significant rollback of any 
aspect of government surveillance since the passage of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. We must seize this opportunity. 
If this bill is not approved today, we are giving our intelligence 
people and NSA a green light to go ahead, and I cannot imagine that 
happening in this body.
  I support H.R. 3361 and yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Eighty-six years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, in his dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States: ``The makers of our Constitution undertook 
to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They 
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings, 
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure, 
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the 
government, the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized men.''
  After the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001, the country was 
determined not to allow such an attack to occur again. The changes we 
made then to our intelligence laws helped keep us safe from implacable 
enemies. Today, we renew our commitment to our Nation's security and to 
the safety of the American people.
  We also make this pledge: that the United States of America will 
remain a nation whose government answers to the will of the people. 
This country must be what it always has been: a beacon of freedom to 
the world; a place where the principles of the Founders, including the 
commitment to individual liberties, will continue to live, protected 
and nourished for future generations.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I 
might consume.
  I would like to begin by recognizing Chairman Goodlatte, Mr. 
Sensenbrenner, the other judiciary committee sponsors, and Leader 
Cantor for all their hard work and continuing to forge a compromise 
with the Intelligence Committee that enacts meaningful change to FISA 
while preserving operational capabilities.
  It is commendable that we have found a responsible legislative 
solution to address concerns about the bulk telephone metadata program 
so that we may move forward on other national security legislative 
priorities. Our obligation to protect this country should not be held 
hostage by the actions of a traitor or traitors who leaked classified 
information that puts our troops in the field at risk or those who 
fearmonger and spread mistruth and misinformation to further their own 
misguided agenda.
  Following the criminal disclosures of intelligence information last 
June, the section 215 telephone metadata program has been the subject 
of intense and often inaccurate criticism. The bulk telephone metadata 
program is legal, overseen, and effective at saving American lives. No 
review has found anything other than that. All three branches of 
government oversee this program, including Congress, the FISC, 
inspectors general and internal compliance and privacy and civil 
liberties offices in the executive branch agencies.
  Despite the effectiveness of the program and immense safeguards on 
the data, many Americans and many Members of this body still have 
concerns about a potential for abuse. Remember, the whole debate here 
has been about the potential for abuse, not that abuse had occurred. 
The legislation we are considering today is designed to address those 
concerns and reflect hundreds of hours of Member and staff work to 
negotiate a workable compromise.
  In March, the Intelligence Committee ranking member, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, and I introduced legislation that was designed to 
accomplish these main priorities. We committed to ending bulk metadata 
collection for communications and other types of records. We committed 
to providing more targeted, narrow authorities so as not to put America 
at risk. We committed to provide an even more robust judicial review 
than exists today and process for that program. We committed to 
providing more transparency into the FISA process and the decisions of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The revised USA FREEDOM 
Act accomplishes the same goals as well.
  The USA FREEDOM Act provides the meaningful change to the telephone 
metadata that Members of the House have been seeking. If we had the 
fortune of having a Commander in Chief firmly dedicated to the 
preservation of this program, we may have been able to protect it in 
its entirety. With that not being the case, and I believe this is a 
workable compromise that protects the core function of a 
counterterrorism program we know has saved lives around the world, I 
urge Members to support this legislation.
  I want to thank all of those who came together to forge something 
that has been certainly a difficult process along the way. At the end 
of the day, something important happened here: a better understanding 
of the threats by, I think, more Members of Congress that pose every 
single day to the lives of American citizens by terror groups around 
the world. That rise in threat level is getting worse. The matrix for 
that threat level is getting worse.
  It was important as we forged and, I think, met the concerns of so 
many and educated, I think, many on the misinformation that was out 
there, that we protect the core capability to detect if a foreign 
terrorist on foreign soil is making a call to the United States to 
further advance their goals of killing Americans. I think we 
accomplished that today. It is not the bill I would have written 
completely, but I think we protected those operational concerns and met 
the concerns for those who had a mistrust of that metadata being locked 
away with the National Security Agency.
  With that, I look forward to a thoughtful debate and reserve the 
balance of my time, Mr. Speaker.

[[Page 8948]]

  Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Goodlatte, 
Mr. Sensenbrenner, the other Judiciary Committee sponsors, and Leader 
Cantor for all of their hard work coming to a compromise with the 
Intelligence Committee that enacts meaningful change to FISA while 
preserving operational capabilities.
  It is commendable that we have found a responsible legislative 
solution to address concerns about the bulk telephone metadata program 
so that we may move forward on other national security legislative 
priorities. Our obligation to protect this country should not be held 
hostage by the actions of traitors who leak classified information that 
puts our troops in the field at risk or those who fear-monger and 
spread mistruth to further their own misguided agenda.
  Following the criminal disclosures of intelligence information last 
June, the Section 215 telephone metadata program has been the subject 
of intense, and often inaccurate, criticism. The bulk telephone 
metadata program is legal, overseen, and effective at saving American 
lives. All three branches of government oversee this program, including 
Congress, inspectors general, and internal compliance and privacy and 
civil liberties offices in executive branch agencies.
  Despite the effectiveness of the program, and the immense safeguards 
on the data, many Americans and many Members of this body still have 
concerns about a potential for abuse. The legislation we are 
considering today is designed to address those concerns and reflects 
hundreds of hours of Member and staff work to negotiate a workable 
compromise.
  In March, Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Ruppersberger and I 
introduced legislation that was designed to accomplish these main 
priorities: We committed to ending bulk metadata collection of 
communications and other types of records. We committed to providing 
more targeted, narrow authorities so as not to put America at risk. We 
committed to providing an even more robust judicial review process for 
the program. And we committed to providing more transparency into the 
FISA process and the decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court. The revised USA Freedom Act accomplishes the same goals, as 
well.
  This legislation is intended to prohibit ``bulk'' collection 
activities under the authorities in question. ``Bulk'' collection means 
the indiscriminate acquisition of information or tangible things. It 
does not mean the acquisition of a large number of communications 
records or other tangible things. Rather, the prohibition applies to 
the use of these authorities to engage in indiscriminate or ``bulk'' 
data collection. These changes are intended to respond to concerns that 
these authorities could be used to permit a bulk data collection 
``loophole.''
  The bill bans bulk collection by introducing the requirement for a 
``specific selection term.'' The ban on bulk collection, however, is 
not intended to limit acquisition of information through the 
traditional, targeted types of FISA or National Security Letters. The 
list of examples of what may constitute a specific selection term is 
non exhaustive, and we anticipate there will be other forms of 
discriminants than those contained in the legislation.
  The legislation also creates a new mechanism for obtaining call 
detail records on a continuing basis for up to 180 days to protect 
against international terrorism. The legislation is not intended to 
affect any current uses of Section 501 outside of the bulk context, 
including for records related to foreign intelligence information not 
concerning a U.S. person and clandestine intelligence activities.
  We also assured that the language we are considering today permits a 
return of two hops to include using records identified by the 
government as the basis for the second hop. Additionally, it is 
important that when records are produced to the government they are 
produced in a form that will be useful--meaning that the government can 
set conditions on their production, including by determining the format 
and manner for production. This does not, however, mandate that 
companies change their business practices to store data in any 
particular form.
  The USA Freedom Act provides the meaningful change to the telephone 
metadata program that Members of the House have been seeking. If we had 
the fortune of having a Commander in Chief firmly dedicated to the 
preservation of this program as is, we may have been able to protect it 
in its entirety. With that not being the case, I believe this is a 
workable compromise that protects the core function of a 
counterterrorism program we know has saved lives around the world.
  I urge Members to support this legislation.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA 
FREEDOM Act, and I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
  On May 8, the House Intelligence Committee passed out of the 
committee the bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act, the identical bill that the 
Judiciary Committee passed out of committee on May 7.
  I especially want to thank Chairman Rogers for his years of 
leadership on the House Intelligence Committee. I also want to thank 
Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, and also Congressman 
Sensenbrenner and the staff of our Intelligence and Judiciary 
Committees for the hard work they did on this bill. We have worked 
together in a bipartisan manner, and we have come a long way.
  After our committee markups, Chairman Rogers and I have continued to 
work with the Judiciary Committee and the administration to iron out 
some remaining issues, which we have done and which is represented in 
the current bill.
  The bill represents the productive efforts of bipartisanship and 
working together for the American people. Just yesterday, the 
administration stated that it ``strongly supports'' passage of our 
bill. Again, the administration said that it ``strongly supports'' 
passage of our bill. It also stated that the USA FREEDOM Act ``ensures 
our intelligence and law enforcement professionals have the authorities 
they need to protect the Nation, while further ensuring that 
individuals' privacy is appropriately protected.''
  The USA FREEDOM Act contains important measures to increase 
transparency and enhance privacy while maintaining an important 
national security tool.
  First, we have ended bulk collection of telephone metadata and 
ensured the court reviews each and every search application. The big 
database up at the National Security Agency that contains phone numbers 
of millions of Americans will go away. It will be replaced with a 
tailored, narrow process that allows the government to search only for 
specific connections to suspected terrorists to keep us safe here at 
home. There is an important emergency exception when there isn't time 
to get prior approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
also know as FISC.
  Second, we have required expanded reporting for court decisions to 
improve transparency without threatening sources and methods.
  Third, we are creating an advocate to provide outside expertise for 
significant matters before the FISA Court.
  Fourth, we have established a declassification review process of 
court opinions to ensure the public has access to our national security 
legal rulings in a manner that still protects our sources and methods.
  The USA FREEDOM Act is critical to our country's safety and our 
intelligence community. It is a focused, logical bill that will let us 
protect our citizens from terrorist attacks through important legal 
tools while strengthening civil liberties.
  I was opposed to the original USA FREEDOM Act because it set too high 
a standard for intelligence collection. In short, it would have 
threatened America's safety by cutting off the building blocks of 
foreign intelligence investigations. We have worked together in a 
bipartisan manner and created a solid bill.
  Now, it ends bulk collection of all metadata by the government. Those 
that say this bill will legalize bulk collection are wrong. They are 
trying to scare you by making you think there are monsters under the 
bed. There aren't. We end all collection of metadata records. I am 
again saying read the bill. That is what the bill says. There is 
nothing else in the bill. It is direct, and it states that we will end 
all bulk collection by the government.
  The USA FREEDOM Act includes the necessary checks and balances across 
all three branches of government. It protects our Nation while also 
protecting Americans' privacy and civil liberties.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

[[Page 8949]]

  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM Act. I yield 
myself as much time as I may consume.
  On May 8th, the House Intelligence Committee favorably reported the 
bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act--the same bill that the Judiciary Committee 
favorably reported on May 7th.
  I especially want to thank Chairman Rogers for his years of 
leadership here on the House Intelligence Committee. I also want to 
thank Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, and the staff of 
our Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. We have worked together in a 
bipartisan manner, and we have come a long way.
  After our Committee markups, Chairman Rogers and I have continued to 
work with the Judiciary Committee and the Administration to iron out 
some remaining issues, which we have done, and which is represented in 
the current bill. This bill represents the productive efforts of 
bipartisanship and working together for the American people.
  Just yesterday, the Administration stated that it ``strongly 
supports'' passage of our bill. As the Administration further stated, 
our bill ``ensures our intelligence and law enforcement professionals 
have the authorities they need to protect the Nation, while further 
ensuring that individuals' privacy is appropriately protected when 
these authorities are employed.''
  The USA FREEDOM Act contains important measures to increase 
transparency and enhance privacy while maintaining an important 
national security tool.
  First, we have ended bulk collection of telephone metadata. ``Bulk'' 
collection means the/indiscriminate acquisition of information or 
tangible things. It does not mean the acquisition of a large number of 
communications records or other tangible things. Rather, the 
prohibition applies to the use of these authorities to engage in 
indiscriminate or ``bulk'' data collection.
  There is also an emergency exception when there isn't time to get 
prior approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court--also 
known as the FISC.
  Second, we have required expanded reporting for FISC decisions to 
improve transparency to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees 
without threatening sources and methods.
  Third, we are creating an advocate to provide the FISC with outside 
expertise for matters before the FISA Court. Importantly, we are doing 
this without infringing on any constitutional provisions or operational 
processes.
  Fourth, we have established a declassification review process of FISC 
opinions, to ensure that the public has access to our national security 
legal rulings, while having procedures in place to ensure that our 
sources and methods continue to be protected.
  The USA FREEDOM Act is critical to our Intelligence Community and to 
our country's safety.
  It is a focused, logical bill that will let us protect our citizens 
from terrorist attacks and protect their civil liberties while 
maintaining important legal tools.
  For instance, our bill is not intended to impact the current scope or 
use of FISA or National Security Letters, outside the context of bulk 
data collection, that are traditionally used for national security 
investigations. Notably, the introduction of the term ``specific 
selection term'' is not intended to limit the types of information and 
tangible things that the government is currently able to collect under 
FISA or National Security Letter statutes. These changes are 
prophylactic and intended to respond to concerns that these authorities 
could be used to permit bulk data collection.
  Furthermore, the legislation is not intended to limit the government 
to use a single ``specific selection term'' in an application under 
FISA or a National Security Letter. The government may use multiple 
``specific selection terms'' in a single FISA application or a National 
Security Letter. For example, the government may request in a single 
FISA application or National Security Letter information or tangible 
things relating to multiple persons, entities, accounts, addresses or 
devices that are relevant to a pending investigation. Similarly, the 
government may, in a single FISA application or National Security 
Letter, use multiple ``specific selection terms''--such a date and 
premises--to further narrow the scope of production by a provider.
  Our bill also ensures that America can protect Americans' privacy 
interests while at the same time being able to adapt to evolving 
national security threats and terrorists' use of ever-changing 
technology and capabilities to evade detection.
  In particular, Section 501(c)(2)(F)(iii) provides for two hops--in 
other words, the Government will be able to obtain the call detail 
records in direct contact with a reasonable, articulable suspicion (or, 
RAS)-approved seed--this is the first hop--and then, using those call 
detail records or ones the Government identifies itself, obtain the 
second hop call detail records.
  The legislation also creates a new mechanism for obtaining call 
detail records on a continuing basis for up to 180 days when there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the records are relevant to an 
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism and 
there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the records are 
associated with a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power. The 
legislation is not intended to affect any current uses of Section 501 
outside the bulk collection context, including the use of Section 501 
to obtain specified call detail records related to foreign intelligence 
information not concerning a U.S. person, clandestine intelligence 
activities, or international terrorism.
  I believe that our bill has made real improvements in the way our 
intelligence collection operates and in improving FISA to achieve even 
greater privacy and civil liberties protections.
  I was opposed to the original USA FREEDOM Act because it put up too 
many legal hurdles that would have impeded our national security. In 
short, it would have threatened America's safety by effectively cutting 
off the building blocks of foreign intelligence investigations.
  But we have worked together in a bipartisan manner, and we have come 
a long way Additionally, since our Committee markups, Chairman Rogers 
and I have continued to work with the Judiciary Committee and the 
Administration to iron out some remaining issues, which we have done, 
and which is represented in the current bill.
  The USA FREEDOM Act includes the necessary checks and balances across 
all three branches of government and strikes the correct balance that 
is so critical to protecting our nation, while also protecting 
Americans' privacy and civil liberties.

                              {time}  1015

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
LoBiondo), who has been incredibly important, not only on forming this 
piece of legislation to find the right balance, but his work across 
North Africa on Boko Haram before it was even popular in bringing 
attention and resources to important intelligence problems around the 
world in difficult places, a good friend, a great Member, and a great 
patriot.
  Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, let me start out by thanking my colleagues 
for bringing together an incredibly complicated, difficult issue that 
probably as recently as a couple of months ago no one thought possible. 
Tremendous, tremendous accolades to Chairman Rogers, to Mr. 
Ruppersberger, to Mr. Sensenbrenner, to Mr. Conyers on a whole host of 
issues that, again, are critically important to our Nation.
  You have heard the chairman and Mr. Ruppersberger outline some of the 
key portions of this, but I think it is critically important to stress 
that the protection of Americans civil liberties must always be a top 
priority and always will be a top priority. This bipartisan bill 
underscores the importance of that while keeping our Nation safe.
  The USA FREEDOM Act increases transparency. That is something that 
people have demanded: increased transparency to the American people, 
and it allows for greater oversight, something else that we listened to 
that people wanted to see.
  It firmly, as Mr. Ruppersberger and Mr. Rogers have stated, ends bulk 
collection of records. This is critically important.
  It reforms the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISC, to 
ensure greater checks and balances are placed in such sensitive 
national security programs.
  But as we discuss this, let's not miss the bigger picture. I have had 
the opportunity to see firsthand in some pretty dark and remote places 
on the Earth how our enemies are plotting not just on a daily basis, 
but on a minute-by-minute basis of how to find a chink in our armor, 
how can they find some gap which will allow them to attack our 
homeland, to attack our citizens. This is a constant and ongoing 
threat.
  This bill strikes a balance to allow that transparency for civil 
liberties while it underscores the ability of our

[[Page 8950]]

intelligence community to be able to do their job. And having been, as 
Mr. Rogers indicated, firsthand in some very remote places on the 
Earth, we have got some incredibly dedicated people who are putting 
their lives at risk every day to protect this country.
  This is a good bill. Let's pass it.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman 
from Illinois, Ms. Jan Schakowsky, a very important member of our 
Intelligence Committee, who focuses very strongly on issues of privacy 
and constitutional rights and people's rights.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of the USA FREEDOM Act 
and a member of Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I have been 
committed to reforming these laws.
  No bill is perfect, including this one. The USA FREEDOM Act we are 
voting on today is quite different from the original bill I 
cosponsored. It has changed significantly from the version recently 
passed by the House Intelligence and Judiciary Committees.
  On its path to the floor, several of the bills' proposed reforms have 
been watered down and many of us would like to see stronger more 
meaningful change.
  However, we must not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, and I 
want to congratulate all those who have been part of this bipartisan 
compromise.
  The bill we are considering today includes real reforms, and the 
intent of Congress is clear: we are putting an end to the bulk 
collection of metadata, establishing meaningful prior judicial review, 
and ensuring that important FISA Court decisions are declassified for 
public consumption. These reforms are important, and future 
interpretations of FISA must reflect our intentions here today.
  I support the act, and I look forward to the opportunity to continue 
to work with my colleagues to make even more improvements in the 
future.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Reed) to engage in a colloquy.
  Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to commend your efforts, along 
with those of the Judiciary Committee, in bringing this legislation to 
the floor of the House. As you and I have met and discussed on numerous 
occasions, along with my good friend from Indiana (Mr. Stutzman), this 
issue is important to not only many of my constituents back in western 
New York, but also to our country.
  Provisions in this bill, such as the reforms made to bulk data 
collection and enhanced declassification requirements, are specific 
ideas that were shared with me by constituents in western New York and 
brought to here, Washington, D.C.
  As you know, I am happy to report, through our work with you, these 
provisions were incorporated into this legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, as this bill moves forward, I hope I have your 
commitment to continue to work together to assure that a balance 
between national security and the protection of our personal freedoms 
is achieved.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the 
gentleman from New York for his diligent work on this issue since last 
summer. Mr. Reed's work, along with that of Mr. Stutzman from Indiana, 
was critical to ensuring that we struck the right balance on this 
legislation. We would not have been able to find that sweet spot that 
got us to such a strong bipartisan agreement without input from these 
and other Members interested in finding a solution. Again, I want to 
thank the gentleman from New York for his interest, his time, and his 
effort to help be a part of the forging of this important piece of 
legislation.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), an expert in cybersecurity. For the 
years I have been in Congress, I have worked with Mr. Langevin on this 
issue.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM Act.
  I want to thank and congratulate all those who had a hand in crafting 
the legislation before us, particularly Chairman Rogers and Ranking 
Member Ruppersberger.
  Changes to our national security program should not be taken lightly, 
and this compromise legislation is the result of vigorous debate and 
careful consideration. As Chairman Rogers pointed out, with all the 
reviews and investigations that have taken place with respect to the 
bulk collection program, no violations of law were found. But there was 
concern that there could be abuses in the future, and the American 
people wanted a better balance to be struck between national security 
and protecting privacy and civil liberties and more accountability. 
Many of my constituents have expressed concerns about the sanctity of 
their civil liberties, and I share their concern. I firmly believe that 
this legislation protects that privacy by ending bulk metadata 
collection while still safeguarding our national security.
  I am particularly pleased that this legislation includes provisions 
very similar to those that I championed in the Intelligence Committee 
which allow the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to appoint an 
independent advocate with legal or technical expertise in the field, 
such as privacy and civil liberties, intelligence collection, 
telecommunication, cyber, or any other area of law necessary in order 
to ensure independent checks on government surveillance within the 
court's process.
  With that, I urge my colleagues to support the bill.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I want to briefly thank Mr. 
Langevin, who has done not only incredible work on this particular 
bill, but his work on cybersecurity should make Americans proud of his 
effort to move that ball down the field. Without his expertise on these 
matters, the United States would be a little worse off when it comes to 
national security. I want to thank the gentleman for his work on this 
bill and his work on cyber and other national security issues.
  I continue I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff), a very important member of our committee 
who does his homework and has really helped me a lot and advised me on 
a lot of issues that are important to our committee.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the USA FREEDOM Act. This bill ends 
the bulk collection of American's telephone records and puts in place 
reforms to surveillance authorities to protect privacy and increased 
transparency.
  I have long advocated that the telephone metadata program should end 
in favor of a system in which telecommunications providers retain their 
own records so they can be queried based on a court-approved, 
reasonable, articulable suspicion standard. That is precisely what this 
bill puts in place. It allows us to keep the capabilities that we need 
to protect the Nation from terrorist plots while protecting privacy and 
civil liberties.
  There are remaining ways that the bill can be improved, and I hope as 
it heads to the Senate there will be opportunities to do so. In 
particular, I would like to see provisions to introduce an adversarial 
process in the FISA Court. The FISA Court and the public trust would 
benefit from an independent advocate in the limited number of cases 
that call for significant statutory interpretation or novel legal 
issues. I hope that the Senate will include such provisions, which 
would be both wise and constitutionally sound.
  With that, I urge a ``yes'' vote, and I compliment my chair and 
ranking member on the extraordinary job they have done.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Gallego).
  Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Speaker, I serve on the House Armed Services 
Committee, and through that assignment I

[[Page 8951]]

have had the opportunity to spend a lot of time with soldiers, airmen, 
marines, sailors, and their families.
  Like all Americans, I certainly want our sons and daughters to be 
safe when we send them into harm's way. We want to take as much care of 
them as we possibly can.
  The media has talked some about some of the documents that were 
released by Mr. Snowden, but there were at one point 7 million 
documents that were released. Many of these documents didn't even 
relate to the NSA. When those files are disclosed in the press and they 
are disclosed to our adversaries that naturally puts our sons and 
daughters in harm's way. It should say something that the first place 
you go is China and the second place you go is Russia. That should say 
something to the American people.
  This Memorial Day, I want the American people to focus on those men 
and women, our country's sons and daughters, who have honorably served 
our Nation and have stood by their brothers in arms and protected one 
another as we have asked them to fight for us.
  Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for your work on this 
legislation.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close, and I yield 
myself such time as I may consume.
  The USA FREEDOM Act is a bipartisan compromise that is strongly 
supported by the administration.
  Our bill protects privacy and civil liberties while also protecting 
national security.
  I urge members to support the USA FREEDOM Act. Nothing in this bill 
will legalize bulk collection. Unfortunately, there are those Members 
that are saying this will legalize bulk collection. It is clear that 
this bill--read the bill--states: there will be no more bulk collection 
by the government. That is what the bill says, end of story.
  This bill balances the issue of taking care and protecting our 
country from people and individuals who want to kill us and attack us 
and our allies. But yet it also does what is so important to Americans: 
to make sure that we protect our constitutional rights and our privacy. 
It is a balance--it is Republicans, Democrats, left, right, in the 
middle--coming together and doing what is right for this country. This 
is what this body should do. We are asking for a ``yes'' vote on the 
USA FREEDOM Act.
  Also, in closing, I want to acknowledge the leadership of Chairman 
Rogers and his important leadership that has allowed us to get to this 
level, the Judiciary Committee, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member 
Conyers, and also Mr. Sensenbrenner.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  In the comity of the moment, with all the love extended and the group 
hugs and the high fives, I think it is important to America to 
understand how much effort--how proud I think they should be about the 
intensity of the debate and discussion over what this bill looks like 
because I believe everybody involved in this cares about civil 
liberties and privacy; they do, wherever you fall on it. And I do 
believe that everybody who is involved in this cares about our national 
security.

                              {time}  1030

  This debate--this fierce, intense debate--that happened off of this 
floor in committees, in negotiations over every word and every 
paragraph and every period, resulted in the bill that you see before us 
today that did get bipartisan support and buy-in for a very critical 
issue: at the end of the day, the national security of the United 
States and the public's trust in the intelligence agencies, which have 
the responsibility each and every day, in some very dangerous places 
around the world, to collect the information that keeps America safe.
  At the end of this, I hope that people take away from this debate 
that those who believed that the first round of negotiations meant that 
our national security was in peril and those who believed in the first 
round of negotiations that our civil liberties and privacy were in 
peril found that right balance today. It is that important for our 
country.
  Mr. Speaker, I only bring that up, and I thank all of those 
involved--the Republicans and Democrats on the Judiciary, the 
Republicans and Democrats on the Intel Committee, and all of those who 
were involved in this negotiation.
  I think they have done America a favor today, and they have brought 
back the institutional notion of negotiation and intensity of debate 
that brings us to a better place today. I think this bill is a result 
of that. America should be proud.
  Now, we can move forward on other national security priorities that 
will serve to protect Americans' and our allies' lives around the 
world.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly vote for H.R. 3361. I do 
so because I recognize that important authorities which help keep our 
people safe expire next year and that there is a significant chance 
that those authorities may not be renewed. I also recognize that the 
abuse of government power by the Obama Administration has damaged the 
trust that the American people have even in the military and civilian 
professionals at the National Security Agency. An orchestrated campaign 
of distortions and half-truths has called NSA's trustworthiness into 
question for too many Americans.
  That is unfortunate and unfair. The men and women at NSA have had 
more than a decade of remarkable success, not only in protecting our 
country from another 9/11-type attack, but supporting our warfighters 
on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. While few 
Americans will ever learn the details of their accomplishments, we all 
benefit from their hard work, dedication to their mission, and 
professionalism.
  We should be clear-eyed about the effects of this bill. It makes it 
harder to gather the information necessary to stop terrorism; it means 
that it will take longer to find the essential connections of terrorist 
networks; and this bill makes it less likely, hopefully only slightly 
less likely, that we will stop future terrorist attacks. But there is 
no doubt that America will be less safe from terrorist attack after 
this bill takes effect than it is today.
  Apparently, that result is inevitable if we are to prevent even worse 
damage to our country's security and our people's safety. So, I vote 
today to minimize the damage to our national security while maintaining 
respect and gratitude for the men and women in the military, 
intelligence community, and law enforcement who dedicate their lives to 
keeping us all safe.
  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, government should protect our liberties, not 
violate them. Individuals and businesses alike must be able to trust 
their government to work for them--not spy on them. The NSA's bulk 
collection of Americans' phone records threatens our constitutional 
liberties.
  We have the opportunity to pass legislation that both limits the 
reach of the NSA and provides the transparency to lawmakers and the 
American people necessary to prevent abusive practices from happening 
again. We have the opportunity to begin to restore the trust of the 
American people.
  The original and committee-passed versions of the USA FREEDOM Act 
struck a careful balance between our liberty and our security, 
providing the reforms necessary to restore trust. I was proud to be an 
original co-sponsor of this bill, and commend Representative Jim 
Sensenbrenner and Chairman Bob Goodlatte for their work to protect our 
civil liberties.
  Unfortunately, the floor-version of the USA FREEDOM Act falls short 
of our goal.
  This legislation would still allow for the mass collection of 
information. The committee-passed legislation required court orders to 
be based on ``specific-selection terms''--which was defined as a 
``person, entity or account.'' The floor version broadens the scope of 
``specific-selection term'' by defining it as a ``discrete term.'' This 
ambiguous legal phrase does not have defined limitations, and could 
capture millions of individuals' information.
  The existing data collection programs that were revealed to the 
American people within the last year are unacceptable, and we must not 
only legislate stronger safeguards for intelligence gathering but must 
vigorously conduct oversight to prevent constitutional intrusions by 
big government. Of the few transparency

[[Page 8952]]

requirements left in the bill, significant construction of law made by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) would be reviewed 
for declassification to the American people. However, the floor version 
of the bill transfers the authority to conduct declassification to the 
Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper. Last year, Director 
Clapper lied under oath to Congress when asked about the existence of 
programs that collect data on millions of Americans. I cannot in good 
conscious support legislation that would place the responsibility of 
transparency with a government official who has already violated the 
trust of the American people.
  For these reasons, I will not support the floor version of the USA 
FREEDOM Act. I hope that my colleagues and I will be able to come 
together to enact reforms the American people deserve.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, today, I rise in reluctant 
opposition to H.R. 3361, the USA FREEDOM Act, which I cosponsored at 
introduction. I am troubled by the changes that were made to the bill 
behind closed doors that stripped key protections and opened the door 
to bulk collection. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
found the NSA's bulk collection of metadata to be illegal and called 
for it to be stopped. The legislation before us today includes language 
that raises the specter of the programs continuing in some limited 
form. This is not what the law or the American people demand.
  I had intended to support the USA FREEDOM Act, which at introduction 
would have brought an end to the NSA's bulk metadata program, however, 
changes that were made to the measure, outside of the committee 
process, behind closed doors, at the insistence of the NSA undercut the 
bill. In its current form, the ban on bulk collection is watered down 
and potentially exploitable by proponents of these programs. In the 
original bill, the phrase ``specific selection term'' was narrowly-
defined as ``a term used to uniquely describe a person, entity or 
account.'' In the version before us today, that definition was 
significantly re-written to allow the list of potential selection terms 
to be so open-ended as to encompass whole area codes or ZIP codes. In 
effect, bulk collection could continue under this definition.
  I am also troubled that H.R. 3361 no longer includes language to 
establish an independent public advocate. Such a position is essential 
to give voice to ordinary Americans in the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC), which sets the legal parameters for NSA 
surveillance. The absence of such a position means that the FISC will 
continue to hear only from the government. There would be no one to 
stand up before the court and challenge the government's legal 
positions on what surveillance is permissible and represent the 
American public, whose data is being collected.
  The arguments for ending the NSA's bulk metadata programs are strong 
one. Since it came to light last year that the NSA had assembled a 
database that includes calls made by nearly every American since 2007, 
many of us have asked tough questions about whether it was 
constitutional or even effective as a counterterrorism tool. A January 
2014 Pew Research poll found that 70 percent of Americans believe they 
should not have to give up their privacy in order to be safe from 
terrorism with a majority expressing disapproval of the NSA 
surveillance program outright. The record on the effectiveness of these 
programs is scant. Before his recent retirement, NSA Director General 
Keith Alexander testified before Congress that these bulk collection 
programs foiled ``one or perhaps two'' terrorist plots against the 
United States but provided no further detail. The Director of National 
Intelligence, James Clapper, has stated that the number of prevented 
plots is not an appropriate metric to measure whether the programs are 
necessary or useful.
  I had hoped we could come together and act on the recommendations of 
the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and 
end what the Board determined to be illegal programs. Unfortunately, 
what we have before us does not bring about the changes in the law that 
would be necessary. I appreciate that some of my colleagues will vote 
for this measure to move the ball forward and get the issue before the 
Senate. There's certainly a case to be made for such an approach but 
given that the proponents of these programs have repeatedly exploited 
ambiguities in the law to advance their own ambitions, I cannot stand 
by and let the measure pass, in its current form.
  For these reasons, I reluctantly oppose H.R. 3361.
  Ms. BONAMICI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3361, the USA 
FREEDOM Act, as amended. Although I was a cosponsor of the USA Freedom 
Act as originally written, the bill we voted on today was changed 
substantially before being brought to the floor. I am very concerned 
with the short time frame members had to consider this sweeping 
legislation, which was negotiated behind closed doors and would not do 
enough to protect Americans from government surveillance.
  I support ending the bulk collection of Americans' communications, 
secret interpretations of law by the FISA Court, and ``reverse 
targeting'' of Americans by the intelligence agencies. Although H.R. 
3361 is an improvement over current law, the House should negotiate a 
stronger bill in a transparent process through regular order that will 
do more to protect Americans' privacy.
  I encourage the Senate to make much needed changes to this bill and 
send back a real reform package that does a better job of protecting 
privacy and is consistent with the expectations of our constituents.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3361, 
the USA Freedom Act.
  I want to commend Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 
Conyers, and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for crafting a compromise 
bill--and taking into account many of the recommendations offered by 
the Presidents' Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies--that will strengthen the privacy and civil liberties of 
all Americans. At the same time, the USA Freedom Act will ensure that 
our nation continues to have the necessary and appropriate tools to 
protect our country from those who would seek to do us harm.
  This legislation represents an important first step in reforming many 
of the powers that the National Security Agency (NSA) currently has at 
its disposal. Specifically, it would end the government's bulk 
collection of phone metadata and other tangible records through the use 
of Section 215, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen 
registers, and National Security letters. It would also increase 
transparency and oversight within our surveillance operations by 
requiring the government to disclose the number of requests made for 
call records under the new collection process and provide Congress a 
summary of compliance records related to the use of Section 215.
  Another significant change is that for the first time, every request 
made by the NSA for specific call records must be reviewed on a case-
by-case basis by the FISA court. This improved oversight is something I 
have advocated for and I am pleased it was included in this bill.
  While this bill is an improvement over current practices, it still 
falls short of what is needed to ensure adequate privacy protections. I 
am disappointed that the bill does not establish a Citizens Advocate to 
represent citizens' privacy interests at the secret FISA Court 
proceedings. Last December, Representative Jim Jordan and I introduced 
bipartisan legislation to create such a position. I was pleased when 
the earlier versions of this bill adopted a similar provision. 
Unfortunately, Section 401 of H.R. 3361 has since been weakened and 
only provides for a panel of advisors to be employed at the discretion 
of the FISC.
  I also have concerns that last minute changes have the potential to 
create a backdoor loophole where the government can continue to collect 
vast amounts of phone metadata under certain circumstances. It is my 
hope that the Senate will strengthen the bill we voted on today by 
reinstituting the Special Advocate under Section 401, and more narrowly 
defining what constitutes a ``discrete term''.
  Despite these reservations, the USA Freedom Act represents real 
progress and a departure from the untenable status quo. It ensures that 
the intelligence and law enforcement community have the necessary tools 
they need to protect our nation, but it does so in a manner that is 
consistent with the fundamental principles in our Constitution to 
protect the civil liberties of all Americans.
  Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Speaker, although I ultimately voted in favor of this 
bill, H.R. 3361, the USA Freedom Act, like all legislation, it is not 
perfect. I, however, recognize that that without the reforms in H.R. 
3361, the government's bulk collection of phone metadata and other 
records would continue absent necessary modifications. More reforms to 
these programs are necessary, and I am looking forward to continuing to 
implement them to protect individual liberties as well as national 
security.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 590, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

[[Page 8953]]

  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 303, 
nays 121, not voting 7, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 230]

                               YEAS--303

     Aderholt
     Amodei
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barber
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barrow (GA)
     Beatty
     Benishek
     Bera (CA)
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Brown (FL)
     Brownley (CA)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman
     Cohen
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Conaway
     Connolly
     Conyers
     Cook
     Cooper
     Costa
     Cotton
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Rodney
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dingell
     Duckworth
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers
     Engel
     Enyart
     Esty
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frankel (FL)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garcia
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gingrey (GA)
     Goodlatte
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Grimm
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hall
     Harper
     Hartzler
     Hastings (WA)
     Heck (NV)
     Heck (WA)
     Hensarling
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Holding
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Huffman
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Jackson Lee
     Jenkins
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jolly
     Joyce
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kirkpatrick
     Kline
     Kuster
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     Latta
     Levin
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan Grisham (NM)
     Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
     Lynch
     Maloney, Carolyn
     Maloney, Sean
     Marino
     Matheson
     McAllister
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McDermott
     McHenry
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Meng
     Messer
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Moore
     Moran
     Mullin
     Murphy (FL)
     Murphy (PA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters (CA)
     Peters (MI)
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pittenger
     Pitts
     Pocan
     Pompeo
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Rice (SC)
     Rigell
     Roby
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruiz
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schock
     Schrader
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Sewell (AL)
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sinema
     Sires
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Southerland
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Titus
     Tsongas
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Van Hollen
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Williams
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (IN)

                               NAYS--121

     Amash
     Barton
     Becerra
     Bentivolio
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Brady (PA)
     Broun (GA)
     Burgess
     Campbell
     Capuano
     Cardenas
     Cartwright
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Daines
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DelBene
     DesJarlais
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duncan (SC)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleming
     Foster
     Gabbard
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gibson
     Gohmert
     Gosar
     Graves (GA)
     Grayson
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Hahn
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harris
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinojosa
     Holt
     Honda
     Horsford
     Huelskamp
     Issa
     Jeffries
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Labrador
     Lee (CA)
     Lewis
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lummis
     Maffei
     Marchant
     Massie
     Matsui
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McGovern
     Meadows
     Miller, George
     Mulvaney
     Neal
     Negrete McLeod
     Nolan
     O'Rourke
     Owens
     Pallone
     Perry
     Pingree (ME)
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Posey
     Ribble
     Roe (TN)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rothfus
     Ryan (OH)
     Salmon
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanford
     Schweikert
     Serrano
     Shea-Porter
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Stockman
     Stutzman
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Terry
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walorski
     Walz
     Waxman
     Weber (TX)
     Welch
     Yarmuth
     Yoho

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Bass
     Duffy
     Miller, Gary
     Richmond
     Rush
     Schwartz
     Slaughter

                              {time}  1103

  Messrs. DANNY DAVIS of Illinois, ROHRABACHER, ISSA, BRADY of 
Pennsylvania, WELCH, TONKO, FITZPATRICK, SERRANO, CUMMINGS, MAFFEI, 
ELLISON, and LOWENTHAL changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York, Messrs. HIMES, COLE, LYNCH, Ms. 
MOORE, Messrs. LaMALFA and DeSANTIS changed their vote from ``nay'' to 
``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________