[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 4]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 5939-5940]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




       IN MEMORY OF THE LIFE AND SERVICE OF DR. JAMES SCHLESINGER

                                  _____
                                 

                            HON. MIKE ROGERS

                               of alabama

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, April 8, 2014

  Mr. ROGERS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, it is with great sadness that I 
reflect on the recent passing of a great American servant and defender, 
Mr. James Schlesinger. While I am sure that I don't need to enumerate 
each of his many accomplishments in the service of his nation--Chairman 
of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, 
Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy--I would like to spend a 
moment reflecting on his remarkable service to the national security of 
the American people.
  When I took over at the beginning of this Congress as the Chairman of 
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which oversees, among other vital 
national programs, the nation's nuclear forces, I knew that I needed to 
find the best of this nation's leaders to seek their advice and 
counsel. Of course, Dr. Schlesinger was at the top of this list. I was 
grateful that despite struggles with his health, he took the time to 
come and conduct a seminar for my colleagues on the subcommittee and 
me. We are able to better do our important work because of the ground 
he tread in his lifetime of service and because of the counsel he lent 
us selflessly.
  As the former Secretary told us, ``[n]uclear weapons are used every 
day . . . to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the 
allies to whom we offer protection.'' These are true words from the man 
the Wall Street Journal referred to as the ``Yoda'' of nuclear 
deterrence.
  Mr. Speaker, we've lost a great advocate for this country's security. 
But, we are fortunate that we have his example and his work to guide 
us. Never more than today do we realize the value in what James 
Schlesinger stood for across his 85 years. We thank God that we live in 
a nation led and protected by such men as Dr. Schlesinger. I take the 
liberty of speaking for the whole House when I say to his family, thank 
you for allowing him to spend his life in service to his country.
  I submit a Wall Street Journal op-ed (``Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-
Free World'', July 13, 2009) and an obituary that appeared on the same 
page on March 28th.

             [From the Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009]

                 Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World

                        (By Melanie Kirkpatrick)

       ``Nuclear weapons are used every day.'' So says former 
     Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at 
     his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene 
     setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-
     fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's 
     explaining--concepts that were seemingly ignored in this 
     week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and 
     Dmitry Medvedev.
       We use nuclear weapons every day, Mr. Schlesinger goes on 
     to explain, ``to deter our potential foes and provide 
     reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection.''
       Mr. Obama likes to talk about his vision of a nuclear-free 
     world, and in Moscow he and Mr. Medvedev signed an agreement 
     setting targets for sweeping reductions in the world's 
     largest nuclear arsenals. Reflecting on the hour I spent with 
     Mr. Schlesinger, I can't help but think: Do we really want to 
     do this?
       For nuclear strategists, Mr. Schlesinger is Yoda, the 
     master of their universe. In addition to being a former 
     defense secretary (Nixon and Ford), he is a former energy 
     secretary (Carter) and former director of central 
     intelligence (Nixon). He has been studying the U.S. nuclear 
     posture since the early 1960s, when he was at the RAND 
     Corporation, a California think tank that often does research 
     for the U.S. government. He's the expert whom Defense 
     Secretary Robert Gates called on last year to lead an 
     investigation into the Air Force's mishandling of nuclear 
     weapons after nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly 
     flown across the country on a B-52 and nuclear fuses were 
     accidentally shipped to Taiwan. Most recently, he's vice 
     chairman of a bipartisan congressional commission that in May 
     issued an urgent warning about the need to maintain a strong 
     U.S. deterrent.
       But above all, Mr. Schlesinger is a nuclear realist. Are we 
     heading toward a nuclear-free world anytime soon? He shoots 
     back a one-word answer: ``No.'' I keep silent, hoping he will 
     go on. ``We will need a strong deterrent,'' he finally says, 
     ``and that is measured at least in decades--in my judgment, 
     in fact, more or less in perpetuity. The notion that we can 
     abolish nuclear weapons reflects on a combination of American 
     utopianism and American parochialism. . . . It's like the 
     [1929] Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of 
     national policy. . . . It's not based upon an understanding 
     of reality.''
       In other words: Go ahead and wish for a nuclear-free world, 
     but pray that you don't get what you wish for. A world 
     without nukes would be even more dangerous than a world with 
     them, Mr. Schlesinger argues.
       ``If, by some miracle, we were able to eliminate nuclear 
     weapons,'' he says, ``what we would have is a number of 
     countries sitting around with breakout capabilities or rumors 
     of breakout capabilities--for intimidation purposes . . . and 
     finally, probably, a number of small clandestine 
     stockpiles.'' This would make the U.S. more vulnerable.
       Mr. Schlesinger makes the case for a strong U.S. deterrent. 
     Yes, the Cold War has ended and, yes, while ``we worry about 
     Russia's nuclear posture to some degree, it is not just as 
     prominent as it once was.'' The U.S. still needs to deter 
     Russia, which has the largest nuclear capability of any 
     potential adversary, and the Chinese, who have a modest (and 
     growing) capability. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has no 
     influence on North Korea or Iran, he says, or on nonstate 
     actors. ``They're not going to be deterred by the possibility 
     of a nuclear response to actions that they might take,'' he 
     says.
       Mr. Schlesinger refers to the unanimous conclusion of the 
     bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 
     of the United States, which he co-led with Chairman William 
     Perry. The commission ``strongly'' recommended that further 
     discussions with the Russians on arms control are 
     ``desirable,'' he says, and that ``we should proceed with 
     negotiations on an extension of the START Treaty.'' That's 
     what Mr. Obama set in motion in Moscow this week. The pact--
     whose full name is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty--
     expires in December. But what's the hurry? Mr. Schlesinger 
     warns about rushing to agree on cuts. ``The treaty . . . can 
     be extended for five years. And, if need be, I would extend 
     it for five years.''
       There's another compelling reason for a strong U.S. 
     deterrent: the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which protects more 
     than 30 allies worldwide. ``If we were only protecting the 
     North American continent,'' he says, ``we could do so with 
     far fewer weapons than we have at present in the stockpile.'' 
     But a principal aim of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is ``to 
     provide the necessary reassurance to our allies, both in Asia 
     and in Europe.'' That includes ``our new NATO allies such as 
     Poland and the Baltic States,'' which, he notes dryly, 
     continue to be concerned about their Russian neighbor. 
     ``Indeed, they inform us regularly that they understand the 
     Russians far better than do we.''
       The congressional commission warned of a coming ``tipping 
     point'' in proliferation, when more nations might decide to 
     go nuclear if they were to lose confidence in the U.S. 
     deterrent, or in Washington's will to use it. If U.S. allies 
     lose confidence in Washington's ability to protect them, 
     they'll kick off a new nuclear arms race.
       That's a reason Mr. Schlesinger wants to bring Japan into 
     the nuclear conversation. ``One of the recommendations of the 
     commission is that we start to have a dialogue with the 
     Japanese about strategic capabilities in order both to help 
     enlighten them and to provide reassurance that they will be 
     protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In the past, that has 
     not been the case. Japan never was seriously threatened by 
     Soviet capabilities and that the Soviets looked westward 
     largely is a threat against Western Europe. But now that the 
     Chinese forces have been growing into the many hundreds of 
     weapons, we think that it's necessary to talk to the Japanese 
     in the same way that we have talked to the Europeans over the 
     years.''
       He reminds me of the comment of Japanese political leader 
     Ichiro Ozawa, who said in 2002 that it would be ``easy'' for 
     Japan to make nuclear warheads and that it had enough 
     plutonium to make several thousand weapons. ``When one 
     contemplates a number like that,'' Mr. Schlesinger says, 
     ``one sees that a substantial role in nonproliferation has 
     been the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Without that, some and 
     perhaps a fair number of our allies would feel the necessity 
     of having their own nuclear capabilities.''

[[Page 5940]]

       He worries about ``contagion'' in the Middle East, whereby 
     countries will decide to go nuclear if Iran does. ``We've 
     long talked about Iran as a tipping point,'' he says, ``in 
     that it might induce Turkey, which has long been protected 
     under NATO, Egypt [and] Saudi Arabia to respond in kind. 
     There has been talk about extending the nuclear umbrella to 
     the Middle East in the event that the Iranians are successful 
     in developing that capacity.''
       Mr. Schlesinger expresses concerns, too, about the safety 
     and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, all of which are 
     more than 20 years old. ``I am worried about the reliability 
     of the weapons . . . as time passes. Not this year, not next 
     year, but as time passes and the stockpile ages.'' There is a 
     worry, too, about the ``intellectual infrastructure,'' he 
     says, as Americans who know how to make nuclear weapons 
     either retire or die. And he notes that the ``physical 
     infrastructure'' is now ``well over 60 years'' old. Some of 
     it ``comes out of the Manhattan Project.''
       The U.S. is the only major nuclear power that is not 
     modernizing its weapons. ``The Russians have a shelf life for 
     their weapons of about 10 years so they are continually 
     replacing'' them. The British and the French ``stay up to 
     date.'' And the Chinese and the Indians ``continue to add to 
     their stockpiles.'' But in the U.S., Congress won't even so 
     much as fund R&D for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. ``The 
     RRW has become a toxic term on Capitol Hill,'' Mr. 
     Schlesinger says. Give it a new name, he seems to be 
     suggesting, and try again to get Congress to fund it. ``We 
     need to be much more vigorous about life-extension programs'' 
     for the weapons.
       Finally, we chat about Mr. Schlesinger's nearly half-
     century as a nuclear strategist. Are we living in a world 
     where the use of nuclear weapons is more likely than it was 
     back then? ``The likelihood of a nuclear exchange has 
     substantially gone away,'' he says. That's the good news. 
     ``However, the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack on 
     the United States'' is greater.
       During his RAND years, in the 1960s, Mr. Schlesinger 
     recalls that ``we were working on mitigating the possible 
     effects [of a nuclear attack] through civil defense, which, 
     may I say parenthetically, we should be working on now with 
     respect, certainly, to the possibility of a terrorist weapon 
     used against the United States. . . . We should have a much 
     more rapid response capability. . . . We're not as well 
     organized as we should be to respond.''
       Mr. Schlesinger sees another difference between now and 
     when he started in this business: ``Public interest in our 
     strategic posture has faded over the decades,'' he says. ``In 
     the Cold War, it was a most prominent subject. Now, much of 
     the public is barely interested in it. And that has been true 
     of the Congress as well,'' creating what he delicately refers 
     to as ``something of a stalemate in expenditures.''
       He's raising the alarm. Congress, the administration and 
     Americans ignore it at their peril.
                                  ____


             [From The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 28, 2014]

James R. Schlesinger: A Defense Strategist Without Illusions About the 
                            World's Threats

       One can only imagine the wry, bemused expression that would 
     have passed across former Defense Secretary James R. 
     Schlesinger at the irony of his death this past week at age 
     85. Jim Schlesinger, the ultimate Cold Warrior, left the 
     public stage at the moment his successors in Washington are 
     arguing among themselves whether Vladimir Putin of Russia, 
     with some 50,000 troops arrayed on Ukraine's border and a 
     nuclear weapons arsenal in his pocket, is or is not a threat 
     to the interests of the United States.
       The phrase ``he does not suffer fools gladly'' wasn't 
     invented for Jim Schlesinger, though some in the Washington 
     policy-making fraternity could have been forgiven for 
     thinking so. Nuclear strategist, defense secretary to 
     Presidents Nixon and Ford and then the first secretary of 
     energy under Jimmy Carter, Schlesinger puffed on an ever-
     present pipe and offered unvarnished and sometimes 
     uncomfortable advice through some of the most difficult 
     events of the Cold War era.
       Equivocation wasn't a word he recognized. In the 1973 Arab-
     Israeli war, with the Soviet Union supplying some of the Arab 
     countries, the Schlesinger Defense Department airlifted 
     supplies to Israel, a U.S. ally.
       Above all, Schlesinger believed that the U.S. should do 
     nothing to put its preeminence in national security at risk. 
     He pushed hard for increased military spending and voiced 
     doubts about the terms of nuclear-arms negotiations with the 
     Soviet Union in the 1970s.
       He believed in the idea of military deterrence, and that 
     included the U.S. nuclear deterrent. In a typically blunt 
     assertion during a Weekend Interview with the Journal in 
     2009, Schlesinger said, ``Nuclear weapons are used every 
     day.'' They are used ``to deter our potential foes and 
     provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer our 
     protection.''
       Schlesinger's robust clarity about the nature of threat and 
     adversaries is out of favor in Washington these days. 
     Foreign-policy tastes now run more toward ``nuance.'' Jim 
     Schlesinger, a card-carrying economist, had nothing against 
     nuance. He simply wanted to do whatever is necessary to make 
     sure the U.S. never ended up on the wrong side of it. That 
     point of view is missed.

                          ____________________