[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 3454-3456]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAN

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I appreciate this opportunity to come to 
the floor to speak about a different subject but one which is imminent 
and necessary for us to consider; that is, the current Iranian 
sanctions issue.
  Back in 2007, when Iran had ``only'' about 700 centrifuges spinning 
to enrich uranium, we--and by ``we,'' I mean nearly the entire 
international community--determined that the behavior by the Iranian 
regime was simply too dangerous to tolerate. The U.N. Security Council 
began the process of passing a series of resolutions demanding that 
Iran stop enriching uranium entirely. The United States, led by many 
here in the Senate, began the very careful and painstaking process of 
amassing an international coalition to back increasingly tough 
sanctions, all aimed explicitly at forcing the Iranian regime to end 
enrichment activities.
  The reason for this was because we believed a nuclear weapons-capable 
or -armed Iran posed an imminent threat not just to the Middle East but 
to the world community. That was the consensus agreed to by the world 
community and supported by resolution after

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resolution from the Security Council of the United Nations and by 
proclamations by not only our country but by countries around the 
world.
  The entire effort had, for some years, been devoted entirely to 
ending uranium enrichment activities. The consensus was that nuclear 
weapon possession or capability posed unacceptable consequences. Now 
that goal is nowhere in sight. Neither the interim agreement currently 
being employed, nor the administration, nor any of the negotiating 
partners even refer to these resolutions or this multiyear strategy of 
achieving the objective we set out to accomplish. The objective was 
that Iran would cease enrichment of uranium, which could be used to 
achieve nuclear weapons capability. This goal has suddenly been totally 
abandoned.
  The current interim agreement explicitly concedes to the Iranians 
their right to continue enrichment activities with only meager 
limitations, all of which can be reversed by the mullahs in Iran in an 
instant. The mullahs in Iran boast publicly of this great negotiating 
victory for them, which goes against everything we have been trying to 
do for the past 6 or 7 years.
  It seems unassailable that Iran came to the negotiating table at long 
last directly as a consequence of the hardship that was achieved by 
these international economic sanctions that were imposed on this 
regime. They resisted coming to the negotiating table until these 
sanctions really started to hit home.
  But what is equally clear is that the regime wants sanctions relief 
and has sought this interim deal to accomplish it--and unfortunately, 
we have given it to them. And what do we get in return? What we get in 
return is having negotiated away our very core purpose for doing this 
in the first place. Instead of using our leverage to continue the 
progress we had made to bring Iran to cease uranium enrichment, we 
blunted our very best leverage and our very best tool. Instead of 
pressing our long-term advantage, we have begun to relieve the pressure 
on Iran to cease their efforts to gain nuclear weapon capability. And 
why have we abandoned our goal to stop uranium enrichment? Because the 
Iranian negotiating team has told us they would never tolerate an end 
to their long, expensive path to an enrichment industry.
  So here is my central conviction on this matter: If those on the 
other side of the table tell us in advance that our long-held 
conviction and purpose is asking too much, instead of meekly complying 
with their request, then we must increase pressure until they change 
their minds, not abandon our own goal because it is perceived as too 
tough.
  So what have we bought with this interim agreement? According to the 
Bipartisan Policy Center, of which I used to be a part, the main 
practical consequence of this claimed ``freezing'' is that the time 
Iran now needs to produce a critical mass of highly enriched uranium--
20 kilograms--with current centrifuges has gone from an estimated 59 
days to 63 days. What did we gain from the agreement? Four days--four 
days longer that it will take Iran, once they flip the switch, to get 
highly enriched uranium, which allows them nuclear capability.
  It seems clear that among Iran's principal objectives now is to break 
apart the strong international consensus we have worked so hard over so 
many years to forge. Prospects for Iran to do so look pretty darned 
good. Clearly Iran has not lived up to what they agreed to do or what 
we asked them to do. But there seems to be no prospect in place for our 
returning to sanctions unless the Senate, on a bipartisan basis--and 
there is bipartisan support for this--is able to impose the next round 
of sanctions should this interim agreement not achieve its objectives. 
Yet we are currently being blocked from bringing this legislation to 
the floor.
  I repeat: This is bipartisan legislation led by Senator Menendez of 
New Jersey and those who have been actively engaged and involved. But 
now we are being asked to stand down. We are not even given a chance to 
exercise our vote on this, which we are attempting to add to the 
pending legislation here. Again, delay, delay, delay is putting us in a 
position of essentially conceding to the Iranians what they want and 
giving them the opportunity to continue to pursue their quest for 
nuclear weapons capability.
  Obviously, for them, it is just fine if they can turn the protracted 
uncertainty and gradual sanctions relief into a series of lesser 
agreements. But for us, more interim agreements will mean our allies 
will become accustomed to these gradual changes and the increasing 
commerce in Iranian oil. They will become less inclined to again 
reverse course almost regardless of Iranian actions. Following that 
prolonged process, we confront a stronger Iran but a weaker 
international coalition opposed to Iranian nuclear ambitions. Iranian 
ambitions and capabilities will grow, our efforts to halt the Iranian 
quest for nuclear capability will diminish, and we will then be left 
with a choice of containing or taking military action against a 
nuclear-capable, if not nuclear-armed, Iran.
  The President has said repeatedly that ``containment'' is not an 
option. It is not for me either. Since he also said military force is 
an option, it seems clear to me this current course is more likely to 
bring us to that stark point than to a negotiated settlement.
  We must be determined to do what we can in the Senate to prevent us 
from reaching that point. Not only must we refocus our government and 
other friendly governments on the need to eliminate Iran's nuclear 
infrastructure in any final agreement--no matter how difficult that 
might be--we must also oppose Iran's likely intentions to prolong the 
negotiation process intended to continue to weaken our coalition.
  The Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act that I have cosponsored will give 
us great leverage in doing that. It will make it clear that the Senate 
will not support playing Iran's game any longer than we already have.
  I deeply regret that we are not being given the opportunity to debate 
this issue before the American people and among ourselves, that we are 
not allowed to have a vote in the Senate as to whether our current 
policy that this administration is pursuing is the right policy to 
achieve the goal which we all agreed to.
  The last four Presidents--two Democrats and two Republicans--have 
declaratively said: A nuclear-capable Iran is unacceptable. President 
Obama has stated that over and over. Yet here we are engaged in a 
process that advances that prospect.
  We are put at a disadvantage, and we are giving away the one tool 
that has brought Iran to the negotiating table. They have trumpeted 
publicly about how they have outsmarted us and outnegotiated us and 
achieved what they wanted to achieve and diminished our opportunity to 
achieve what the world community wants to achieve. We will rue the day 
that we almost had Iran to the point where we could have achieved our 
goal but stepped back and conceded to their promise and commitment to 
continue to enrich, to continue to add centrifuges, and to continue 
their pursuit of nuclear weapons capability.
  If Iran is armed with nuclear weapons, it will pose unimaginable 
consequences to us. There has been total agreement on that among the 
world's Nations. Yet here we stand at the moment of decision--right 
when we, in a sense, had them where we wanted to get them, and we 
conceded that.
  I deeply regret that we have not been able to move forward with these 
additional sanctions to be employed if--in this first interim 
agreement--Iran does not live up to the objectives and goals which we 
have demanded.
  With that, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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