[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 19040-19042]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




     NOMINATION OF FRANK ROSE AND OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE 
  DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON PROPOSED EUROPEAN UNION CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
                         OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES

 Mr. VITTER. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned by proposals 
for arms control plans related to missile defense and outer space arms, 
including the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities, which the 
Obama administration has embraced. These plans were confirmed by Rose 
Gottemoeller, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, during a House subcommittee hearing last week. 
I firmly believe any international agreement on a code of conduct for 
space should be submitted for Senate advice and consent as part of its 
treaty powers, and not be an ``executive agreement'' that sidesteps 
that process.
  I have engaged with the State Department to ensure that this 
agreement will not be a unilateral act and that it will be fully 
presented to Congress before moving forward. I strongly believe, given 
the importance of this issue, that the U.S. Senate should be consulted 
as part of their advice and consent role in any decision to move 
forward.
  I ask to have printed in the Record at the end of my remarks official 
letters and correspondence with the nominee, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State, Frank Rose that demonstrate three important points. First, 
due to serious ongoing concerns related to national security, the 
administration has not pursued plans to propose the negotiation of a 
debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium at this time; second, that 
any decision to subscribe to a code in the future will not in any way 
constrain our national security-related activities in space or ability 
to protect the U.S. or allies; third, and most importantly, that the 
Senate will be given access to the details surrounding any plan once 
and if any format is determined, and again before any agreement is 
entered.
  Space is vital to our national security, and we must maintain the 
ability to use satellites and various missile capabilities. In 
particular, space is of critical importance to our national 
intelligence and warfighting capabilities. The development of anti-
satellite capabilities by countries such as China and Russia is well 
documented, as in the example of China successfully testing a direct-
ascent, anti-satellite SC-19 missile against one of its own satellites.
  It is vital that the United States ensure we are not restricting 
activity in ways that put our security at risk. Members of Congress 
have been clear in their view that they see ample disadvantage to such 
a code for the United States; according to assessments by the uniformed 
military, implementation of this code would result in real world 
operational impacts. Congress has previously voted to limit 
international agreements concerning outer space activities. Section 913 
of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310, 
states that any agreement will have no legally binding effect or basis 
for limiting the activities of the United States in outer space, and it 
requires certification that any such agreement will be equitable, 
enhance national security, and have no militarily significant impact on 
the ability of the United States to conduct military or intelligence 
activities in space.
  There are several key areas that the administration must resolve 
before moving forward on pursuing any decision. Pentagon officials have 
long expressed concern that the arms initiative will be exploited by 
states such as China and Russia to constrain U.S. missile defenses, 
while both states continue to develop their own advanced missile 
defenses. In 2007, the Department of Defense concluded that the 
progress in addressing the vulnerability of U.S. space assets has not 
kept pace with growing threat capabilities; consequently, the 
vulnerability of our space assets continues to grow. Additionally, a 
previous U.S. Commission to Assess United States National Security 
Space Management and Organization released a report that predicted that 
future warfare in space was a ``virtual certainty'' and urged the 
United States to begin to develop the means both to deter and defend 
against attacks on its space assets, and to mount offensive operations 
to deny the use of space to potential adversaries. To do otherwise, the 
commission warned, would invite a ``space Pearl Harbor.''
  Further troubling, a 2014 Department of Defense report noted that 
China is ``developing a multi-dimensional program to improve its 
capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by 
adversaries during times of crisis or conflict,'' including 
``destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors.'' To protect 
against these types of attacks, the Department of Defense's ongoing 
policy is aimed at retaining the capabilities to respond at the time 
and place of our choosing. Any effort to move forward must address our 
national security needs and Congressional concerns.
  Therefore, any State Department effort to move forward with a code or 
a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium should fully overcome 
existing concerns and ensure the plan does not undermine current 
Department of Defense policy, U.S. capabilities, or congressional 
concerns. Our growing dependence on space makes it fundamental to U.S. 
national security interests. I remain extremely concerned by what 
appears to be previous endeavors by the administration to avoid 
addressing space policy concerns and potential administration efforts 
to bypass Congress.
  While I am pleased at the assurances that Mr. Rose has provided and 
that relevant offices will engage with Congress if a path forward is 
agreed upon, I remain extremely concerned about the decision to 
negotiate a measure using past measures such as the European Union's 
Code of Conduct as a starting point. Russia has demonstrated its 
willingness to break its agreements, as seen with the ongoing violation 
of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We need to 
improve our capacity to understand what is going on in space, and we 
need to ensure we are adequately capable of deterring the growing 
number of countries that are pursuing weapons capable of targeting U.S. 
satellites.
  While necessary, the development of transparency and confidence-
building measures and behavioral norms promoting responsible space 
operations should not come at the expense of America's national 
security. The President's own Space Policy released in 2010 states: 
``The United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure 
the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the 
inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and 
attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of 
allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to 
attack them.'' With a growing number of states acquiring the ability to 
degrade or destroy U.S. space capabilities, the probability that space 
systems will come under attack in a future crisis or conflict is ever 
increasing. The State Department cannot have the attitude that they are 
going to go it alone. The United States cannot afford it.
  The material is as follows:


[[Page 19041]]




                                Congress of the United States,

                                Washington, DC, November 12, 2014.
     Mr. Frank Rose,
     Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense 
         Policy,
     U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.
       Dear Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rose: We write to 
     ask for your clarification regarding the Administration's 
     space arms control posture. Like you, we are deeply concerned 
     by the rising threats of anti-satellite weapons in the hands 
     of states like the People's Republic of China. That said, we 
     believe the Administration would do better to focus on real 
     solutions to these threats, as opposed to more feel good 
     measures like the European Union's (EU) Code of Conduct for 
     Outer Space activities or other similar measures.
       We are concerned by proposals for outer space arms control, 
     including the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities, 
     which the Administration has embraced. We see no advantage to 
     such a Code for the United States; according to assessments 
     by the uniformed military, implementation of this code would 
     result in real world operational impacts. The product of this 
     equation demands the opposition of the entire United States 
     government.
       With the languishing of that Code, we fear a new threat to 
     our ability to protect U.S. outer space capabilities, and, 
     perhaps even to develop our missile defenses. We seek your 
     understanding of the Administration's position on space arms 
     control, specifically, the ``debris generating kinetic energy 
     ASAT testing moratorium'' which, as we have been informed, 
     you proposed to U.S. allies. We are unfamiliar with any such 
     proposal having been coordinated with the Department of 
     Defense or the uniformed military, and therefore we ask for 
     your answers to the following questions:
       1) Please indicate the date, and by which Department 
     official, the State Department Circular 175 request was 
     signed. What was the scope of this Circ-175 and has the 
     Department determined if this moratorium would be submitted 
     to the Senate for its advice and consent?
       2) If this Circ-175 will not be submitted to the Senate, on 
     what basis would such an international agreement be 
     negotiated and to what end?
       3) Please detail the potential implications for United 
     States space and missile defense activities. How would such 
     an agreement protect our ability to fully develop our missile 
     defenses, including our test and targets program?
       4) Please further detail how such agreement will ensure 
     full freedom of action for the United States to take needed 
     defensive and other action in space.
       5) Please provide the Joint Staff assessment of impacts to 
     military operations you obtained before discussing this 
     moratorium with our allies.
       6) Please detail the specific allies with which you have 
     discussed this moratorium and the respective dates of 
     discussion. Please further detail which State Department 
     official authorized these discussions.
       We appreciate your prompt responses to these questions.
           Sincerely,
     David Vitter,
       United States Senator.
     Doug Lamborn,
       Member of Congress.
                                  ____



                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                Washington, DC, November 17, 2014.
       Dear Senator Vitter: Thank you for your letter of November 
     12 regarding the Administration's efforts to enhance the 
     security and sustainability of the outer space environment.
       The Administration is deeply concerned about the 
     development of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities by 
     countries like China and Russia. In response to this 
     increasing threat, the Department of State is pursuing a 
     comprehensive approach to space security, including the 
     development of bilateral and multilateral transparency and 
     confidence building measures (TCBMs) such as the 
     International Code of Conduct, development of international 
     long-term sustainability guidelines by the UN Committee on 
     the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and other measures. The 
     Administration believes that pragmatic TCBMs like the Code 
     are a much more effective way to ensure the long-term 
     security of the space environment as compared to 
     fundamentally flawed space arms control proposals like the 
     Russian-Chinese sponsored Prevention of Placement of Weapons 
     in Outer Space Treaty.
       The United States has made clear to our partners that we 
     will not enter into a code of conduct, or other agreement, 
     that in any way constrains our national security-related 
     activities in space or our ability to protect the United 
     States and our allies. We have worked closely with our 
     colleagues in the Defense Department and Intelligence 
     Community to ensure that the Code does not have any adverse 
     impact on U.S. operations, including the development and 
     testing of missile defenses. The Department, in coordination 
     with the interagency, provided a series of briefings to 
     Congress on the Administration's decision-making process 
     regarding our willingness to work with our European allies to 
     help craft a Code that would benefit U.S. national security. 
     We are available to provide updates at any time.
       The Administration has been clear that we are open to space 
     arms control proposals. However, any such proposal would need 
     to meet the criteria as outlined in the President's 2010 
     National Space Policy (NSP)--that it be effectively 
     verifiable, equitable, and in the interests of the United 
     States and its allies. At this time, the Administration has 
     made no decision to propose the negotiation of a debris-
     generating ASAT testing moratorium, and therefore, no C-175 
     request has been signed. If a decision were made to move 
     forward with a proposal in the future, we would work closely 
     with the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community to 
     ensure there were no adverse operational impacts from our 
     efforts, especially on our missile defense and space systems. 
     Furthermore, while we discuss a wide variety of space 
     security issues with allies--including the potential for a 
     Code of Conduct and ways to address the development of ASAT 
     systems--we have not made a specific proposal to allies for 
     negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium.
       The Department is fully committed to closely coordinating 
     all diplomatic space security proposals within the U.S. 
     interagency. We would not table a proposal that had not 
     received full U.S. Government approval and took into account 
     all agencies' perspectives.
       Should you wish to have further discussions on this issue, 
     the Administration would be happy to assemble an interagency 
     team to meet with you to provide further background on our 
     efforts, and answer any additional questions you may have.
       We hope this information is useful. Please do not hesitate 
     to contact us if we can be of further assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Julia Frifield,
     Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
                                  ____



                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                Washington, DC, December 10, 2014.
       Dear Senator Vitter: In response to follow-up questions 
     from your staff, we would like to provide the following 
     clarifications about our efforts to promote the security and 
     long-term sustainability of the outer space environment.
       As I noted in my letter of November 12, 2014, the 
     Administration is seriously concerned about the development 
     of anti-satellite capabilities by countries like China. We 
     believe that effective diplomatic efforts are a critical tool 
     in the United States' comprehensive response to countering 
     this threat. At the same time, we recognize your concerns and 
     want to assure you that we share them. We have made every 
     effort to ensure that our diplomatic efforts to promote the 
     security and sustainability of outer space do not have an 
     adverse impact on our national security activities, 
     especially on our missile defense and space systems.
       The administration has no plans to propose the negotiation 
     of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium at this time. 
     Moreover, there has been no consideration as to what format 
     we would seek for any proposed debris-generating ASAT testing 
     moratorium. As a result, no C-175 package has been prepared.
       Currently, our diplomatic focus is on the development of an 
     International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities. At 
     this time, the European Union is considering its next steps 
     on the Code. As we stated in 2012, the United States has 
     decided to work with the European Union and other nations to 
     help develop a code which can help maintain the long-term 
     sustainability, safety, stability and security of outer space 
     by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of outer 
     space. Since the text of the Code has not been finalized, the 
     Administration has made no decision on whether to subscribe 
     to the Code. Only after the text is finalized and open for 
     subscription will the Administration consider whether to 
     subscribe to the Code. Such a decision will be made only 
     after it received full U.S. Government approval that takes 
     into account perspectives from all departments and agencies.
       As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in 
     January 2012, the United States will not sign-up to a Code of 
     Conduct that any way constrains our national security-related 
     activities in space or our ability to protect the United 
     States or our allies. If the United States were to make a 
     decision to subscribe to a Code in the future, it would be 
     implemented in a way that is fully consistent with this 
     statement.
       Let me also assure you that we are in close contact with 
     our Department of Defense and Intelligence Community 
     colleagues on the development of the Code to ensure the Code 
     does not have any adverse impacts on U.S. operations, 
     including the development and testing of missile defenses.
       Should you wish to have further discussions on this issue, 
     we would be prepared to assemble an interagency team to meet 
     with you or your staff. Please do not hesitate to contact us 
     if we can be of further assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Julia Frifield,
     Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
                                  ____



                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                Washington, DC, December 11, 2014.
       Dear Senator Vitter: I wanted to follow-up with regarding 
     the conversation I had with your staff regarding a potential 
     debris generating anti-satellite (ASAT) testing

[[Page 19042]]

     moratorium and the European Union's proposed International 
     Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
       As Assistant Secretary of State Julia Frifield noted in her 
     December 10, 2014, letter to you, the Administration has no 
     plans to propose the negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT 
     testing moratorium at this time. Should we determine to 
     pursue such an agreement in the future, I pledge to keep you 
     and your staff informed, including on the form of which a 
     potential agreement might take.
       With regard to the Code of Conduct, it is my understanding 
     that there are no implementation issues for the Department of 
     Defense related to the current draft of the Code. That said, 
     only after the text of the Code is finalized will we have a 
     full understanding of any potential implementation issues. 
     Therefore, we continue to be in close contact with our 
     colleagues at the Department of Defense and the Intelligence 
     Community to ensure that our efforts to promote the security 
     and sustainability of outer space do not have an adverse 
     impact on our national security activities, especially on our 
     missile defense and national security space systems.
       Before a final decision is made to subscribe to the Code, 
     the Department, along with our interagency colleagues, will 
     make sure to provide a briefing, including relevant materials 
     such as the text of the Code and other materials, to you and 
     the relevant committees on the terms of the agreement, its 
     implementation, and any other issues of interest.
       I appreciate your interest in these issues. Please do not 
     hesitate to reach out to me or my staff in the future with 
     any questions you may have.
           Regards,

                                                Frank A. Rose,

                               Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
     Space and Defense Policy.

                          ____________________