[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 12]
[House]
[Page 17399]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 THE FAA'S REPORT ON THE RESPONSE TO THE SABOTAGE AND FIRE AT CHICAGO 
                                 CENTER

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Foster) for 5 minutes.
  Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Speaker, it is far too common for Members of Congress 
to come to the floor of this Chamber to weave their narrative of 
incompetent Federal bureaucracies, lazy and unresponsive members of the 
unionized Federal workforce, and greedy and irresponsible Federal 
contractors. I rise today to tell a very different story.
  On September 26, 2014, commercial flights in nearly every airport 
around this country were delayed or canceled after the Chicago Air 
Route Traffic Control Center, also known as Chicago Center, in Aurora, 
Illinois, was disabled in an act of sabotage by a disturbed individual.
  A fire destroyed the communications equipment that processes flight 
plan data and enabled air traffic controllers at the facility to 
communicate with pilots in the 91,000 square miles of airspace for 
which they are responsible. This could have led to a tragic loss of 
life. However, due to the efforts of controllers at Chicago Center and 
adjacent air traffic control facilities, all planes in the air when 
Chicago Center lost communications were landed safely.
  Nearly 200 of the controllers at Chicago Center then traveled to 12 
air traffic control towers and terminal radar approach controls 
throughout the Midwest to help direct air traffic. At the same time, 
technicians, mechanics, and electricians were working around the clock 
to replace damaged equipment and restore the Chicago Center facilities.
  In total, they replaced 10 miles of cable, dozens of racks of 
computers, and 835 communication circuits to restore the center's voice 
communications, radar flight planning, and weather capabilities.
  As a scientist who has installed giant experiments and accelerators 
on tight time scales, I respect what they have accomplished. 
Professional restoration crews also removed fire, soot, smoke, and 
water damage from the affected areas, and all of this was accomplished 
in just over 2 weeks.
  Mr. Speaker, despite significant challenges, Chicago airports were 
able to operate at more than 90 percent capacity within days of the 
fire. One week after the fire, Administrator Huerta visited Chicago 
Center with me and my colleagues in the Senate to assess the progress 
of the restoration.
  While it was clear that the damage had been extensive, I drew 
confidence from what I saw. Everyone understood what they needed to do 
for the sake of the traveling public. They set an aggressive schedule 
for repairs, and they kept it.
  The air traffic controllers, FAA employees, and contractors who 
responded to this crisis performed admirably and deserve our sincere 
thanks and appreciation. Under difficult circumstances, members of the 
National Air Traffic Controllers Association from throughout the 
Midwest rose to the challenge and kept the flying public safe. Within 4 
days of the fire, O'Hare Airport regained its title as the busiest 
airport in the world.
  I would like to say a special thank you to Toby Hauck, the Chicago 
Center NATCA Facility Representative; Gerry Waloszyk, the Chicago 
Center PASS facility Representative; Bill Cound, the Chicago Center Air 
Traffic Manager; Mike Paulsen, the Chicago Center Technical Operations 
Group Manager; and everyone else who worked to restore Chicago Center. 
Because of all of you, by October 13, repairs were completed, and 
Chicago Center returned to full capacity.
  Mr. Speaker, important lessons have been learned, that the fire that 
crippled Chicago Center not only affected flights departing and 
arriving in the Midwest, but also those flying through Chicago's 
airspace to reach their destinations.
  Between Friday and Sunday, more than 3,000 flights were canceled at 
O'Hare alone. The estimated cost to the airlines has been reported to 
be more than $350 million in total. However, what made this crisis 
unique wasn't the number of delays or cancelled flights. It was that 
just one person was able to disrupt the travel plans of so many 
thousands of people.
  The systems that protect the flying public must be made more robust. 
Although the fundamental redundancy had been built into the system--the 
ability for nearby radar systems to see into the Chicago airspace--the 
FAA must and is improving contingency plans to restore service much 
faster than it was able to do.
  In the long term, the best way to ensure the safety and reliability 
of the National Airspace System is to facilitate the transition to the 
NextGen air traffic transportation system.
  Mr. Speaker, currently, the ground-based radar system is the 
foundation of the National Airspace System. NextGen will rely on GPS 
satellites that are more accurate than ground-based radar. It will also 
include a transition from radio voice communications to a digital 
network that is similar to the mobile phone service. This transition to 
NextGen will enable air traffic controllers to reestablish air traffic 
control services much more quickly after this type of disaster.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in commending the FAA's 
response team on a job well done and to support the President's request 
for full funding for implementing NextGen in the 114th Congress.

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