[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 17330-17332]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




      SSCI STUDY OF THE CIA'S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I rise today as the vice chairman of 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to respond to the public 
release of the declassified version of the executive summary and 
findings and conclusions from the committee's study of the CIA's 
detention and interrogation program.
  This is not a pleasant duty for me. During my 4 years as the vice 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have enjoyed an excellent 
relationship with our chairman, Senator Dianne Feinstein. We have 
worked closely to conduct strong bipartisan oversight of the U.S. 
intelligence community, including the passage and enactment of 
significant national security legislation. However, this particular 
study has been one of the very, very few areas where we have never been 
able to see eye-to-eye.
  Putting this report out today is going to have significant 
consequences. In addition to reopening a number of old wounds both 
domestically and internationally, it could be used to incite unrest and 
even attacks against our servicemembers, other personnel overseas, and 
our international partners. This report could also stoke additional 
mistreatment or death for American or other Western captives overseas. 
It will endanger CIA personnel, sources, and future intelligence 
operations. This report will damage our relationship with several 
significant international counterterrorism partners at a time when we 
can least afford it. Even worse, despite the fact that the 
administration and many in the majority are aware of these 
consequences, they have chosen to release the report today.
  The United States today is faced with a wide array of security 
challenges across the globe, including in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, 
Iraq, Yemen, north Africa, Somalia, Ukraine, and the list goes on. 
Instead of focusing on the problems right in front of us, the majority 
side of the Intelligence Committee has spent the last 5 years and over 
$40 million focused on a program that effectively ended over 8 years 
ago, while the world around us burns.
  In March 2009, when the committee first undertook the study, I was 
the only member of the Intelligence Committee who voted against moving 
forward with it. I believed then, as I still do today, that vital 
committee and intelligence community resources would be squandered over 
a debate that Congress, the executive branch, and the Supreme Court had 
already settled. This issue has been investigated or reviewed 
extensively by the executive branch, including criminal investigations 
by the Department of Justice, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as other entities.
  Congress has passed two separate acts directly related to detention 
and interrogation issues--specifically, the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The executive branch 
terminated the CIA program and directed that future interrogations be 
conducted in accordance with the U.S. Army Field Manual on 
Interrogation. Also, the Supreme Court decided Rasul v. Bush in 2004, 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in 2004, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, as well as 
Boumediene v. Bush in 2008, all of which established that detainees 
were entitled to habeas corpus review and identified certain 
deficiencies in both the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military 
Commissions Act.
  By the time I became the vice chairman, the minority had already 
withdrawn from active participation in the study as a result of 
Attorney General Holder's decision to reopen the criminal inquiry 
related to the interrogation of certain detainees in the CIA's 
detention program. This unfortunate decision deprived the committee of 
the ability to interview key witnesses who participated in the CIA 
program and essentially limited the committee's study to the review of 
a cold documentary record. Now, how can any credible investigation take 
place without interviewing witnesses? This is a 6,000-page report, and 
not one single witness was ever interviewed in this study being done. 
This is a poor excuse for the type of oversight the Congress should be 
conducting.
  There is no doubt that the CIA's detention and interrogation 
program--which was hastily executed in the aftermath of the worst 
terrorist attack in our Nation's history--had flaws. The CIA has 
admitted as much in its June 27, 2013, response to the study. There is 
also no doubt that there were instances in which CIA interrogators 
exceeded their authorities and certain detainees may have suffered as a 
result. However, the executive summary and findings and conclusions 
released today contain a disturbing number of factual and analytical 
errors. These factual and analytical shortfalls ultimately led to an 
unacceptable number of incorrect claims and invalid conclusions that I 
cannot endorse.
  The study essentially refuses to admit that CIA detainees--especially 
CIA detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques--provided 
intelligence information which helped the U.S. Government and its 
allies to neutralize numerous terrorist threats. On its face, this 
refusal does not make sense given the vast amount of information gained 
from these interrogations, the thousands of intelligence reports that 
were generated as a result of them, the capture of additional 
terrorists, and the disruption of the plots those captured terrorists 
were planning.
  Instead of acknowledging these realities, the study adopts an 
analytical approach designed to obscure the value of the intelligence 
obtained from the program. For example, the study falsely claims that 
the use of enhanced interrogation techniques played ``no role'' in the 
identification of Jose Padilla because Abu Zubaydah, a senior member of 
Al Qaeda with direct ties to Osama bin Laden, provided the information 
about Padilla during an interrogation by FBI agents who were 
``exclusively'' using what is called ``rapport-building'' techniques 
against him more than 3 months prior to the CIA's ``use of DOJ-approved 
enhanced interrogation techniques.'' What the study ignores, however, 
is the fact that Abu Zubaydah's earlier interrogation in April of 2002 
actually did involve the use of interrogation techniques that were 
later included in the list of enhanced interrogation techniques. 
Specifically, the facts demonstrate that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to 
``around the clock'' interrogation that included more than 4 days of 
dietary manipulation, nudity, and more than 126 hours--which is about 5 
days--of sleep deprivation during a 136-hour period by the time the

[[Page 17331]]

FBI finished up the 8.5-hour interrogation shift in which Abu Zubaydah 
finally yielded the identification of Jose Padilla. So during a 5-day 
time period, Abu Zubaydah got less than 10 hours of sleep, yet the 
majority does not acknowledge that this was an enhanced interrogation. 
In light of these facts, the study's claims that the FBI was
exclusively using ``rapport-building'' techniques is nothing short of 
being dishonest.
  More important, the actionable intelligence gleaned from the enhanced 
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that started in April of 2002 served as 
the foundation for the capture of additional terrorists and the 
disruption of the plots those captured terrorists were planning. His 
information was also used to gather additional actionable intelligence 
from these newly captured terrorists, which in turn led to a series of 
successful capture operations and plot disruptions. By the study's own 
count, the numerous interrogations of Abu Zubaydah resulted in 766 
sole-source disseminated intelligence reports. That is an awful lot of 
actionable intelligence collected under the CIA program that this study 
tries to quietly sweep under the carpet in an effort to support its 
false headline that the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques 
was not effective.
  The study also overlooks several crucial intelligence successes that 
prevented terror attacks against the United States and our allies 
around the world. Al Qaeda-affiliated extremists subjected to the 
program's enhanced interrogation techniques made admissions that led to 
the identification of the man responsible for plotting the September 11 
attacks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, or KSM.
  The program also helped stop terrorist attacks in the U.S. homeland 
and against our military forces overseas. Al Qaeda affiliate Abu 
Zubaydah's statements to interrogators led to the identification of 
Jose Padilla--an Al Qaeda operative tasked with conducting a terrorist 
attack inside the United States. The interrogation of KSM and Guleed 
Hassan Ahmed disrupted Al Qaeda's plotting against Camp Lemonier in 
Djibouti, a critical base of operations in the war on terror in Africa 
and at that time home to some 1,600 U.S. military personnel. There is 
no telling how many lives this program saved in those particular 
interrogations alone.
  Intelligence gathered under the detention and interrogation program 
also prevented terrorist attacks on our allies in the United Kingdom. 
Terrorist plots against London's Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf--a 
major London financial center--were disrupted because key conspirators 
were apprehended and questioned on the basis of intelligence gathered 
using several interrogation techniques, including enhanced 
interrogation techniques.
  Finally, information from detainees held in the program was critical 
to ascertaining the true significance of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, the Al 
Qaeda facilitator who served as Osama bin Laden's personal courier and 
the man who ultimately lead CIA intelligence analysts and the Navy 
Seals to bin Laden himself.
  For anyone interested in a nice, chronological survey of the 
significant intelligence gained from the program and how it was used to 
capture additional terrorists and disrupt terrorist plots, I would 
invite my colleagues to read two pages of our minority views. Pages 96 
and 97 delineate exactly a chronology of significant intelligence that 
allowed for the takedown of individuals.
  It seems as though the study takes every opportunity to unfairly 
portray the CIA in the worst light possible, presupposing improper 
motivations and the most detestable behavior at every turn. The very 
enemies whom the program helped keep at bay for all of those years, as 
well as adversarial nations, will be able to exploit what is 
essentially a dangerously insightful and instructive treasure trove of 
information about our intelligence operations. I am all for pointing 
out and correcting problems with the intelligence community and I have 
been very outspoken on some of them, but I prefer our oversight be 
conducted quietly and in a manner that does not jeopardize the national 
security of the United States.
  Ultimately, our minority views examined eight of the study's most 
problematic conclusions, many of which attack the CIA's integrity and 
credibility in developing and implementing the program. These 
problematic claims and conclusions created the false impression that 
the CIA was actively misleading policymakers and impeding the 
counterterrorism efforts of other Federal Government agencies during 
the program's operation. We found these claims and conclusions were 
largely not supported by the documentary record and were based upon 
flawed reasoning.
  Specifically, we found that:
  No. 1, the CIA's detention and interrogation program was effective 
and produced valuable and actionable intelligence.
  No. 2, most of the CIA's claims of effectiveness with respect to the 
use of EITs were accurate.
  No. 3, the CIA attempted to keep the Congress informed of its 
activities and did so on a regular basis. As a member of the committee, 
I can attest to that.
  No. 4, the CIA did not impede White House oversight. The White House 
was very involved in doing oversight of the program.
  No. 5, the CIA was not responsible nor did it have control over 
sharing or dissemination of information to other executive branch 
agencies or to members of the Principals Committee.
  No. 6, many of the study's claims about the CIA providing inaccurate 
information to the Department of Justice were themselves totally 
inaccurate.
  No. 7, the CIA did not significantly impede oversight by the CIA 
Office of the Inspector General.
  No. 8, the White House determined that the CIA would have the lead on 
dealing with the media regarding detainees.
  These findings are not meant as a defense of the CIA. The CIA is 
fully capable of defending its own actions, and I know it will do so. 
Rather, these findings are a critique of certain aspects of this 
particular study. As a general rule, I want our committee findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations to be unassailable in every 
investigation we conduct. Unfortunately, that didn't happen, and I am 
very concerned about the unintended consequences that will result from 
the study's erroneous and inflammatory conclusions.
  I imagine some members of the media may choose to repeat the study's 
false headlines contained in the report without checking the underlying 
facts. By doing so they will only be damaging their own credibility. I 
invite anyone who reads the study's executive summary and findings and 
conclusions to pay particular attention to how often the text uses 
absolutes, such as ``played no role,'' ``no connection'' or ``no 
indication.'' Please then read our minority views to find the clear 
counter examples that disprove most of these absolute claims. I suspect 
the readers who make this effort will be disappointed, as I was, that 
this study makes so many inaccurate claims and conclusions.
  Our minority views also explain how this study was crippled by 
numerous procedural irregularities that hampered the committee's 
ability to conduct a fair and objective review of the CIA's detention 
and interrogation program. These procedural defects resulted in a 
premature committee vote in December of 2012 to approve the study 
before the text was adequately reviewed by the committee membership or 
subjected to a routine fact check by the intelligence community.
  Typically, once a Senate committee report has been approved, staff 
are only authorized to make technical and conforming changes. The 
executive summary and findings and conclusions released this week have 
undergone such extensive and unprecedented revisions since the study 
was approved back in December of 2012 that the traditional concept of 
technical and conforming changes has now been rendered meaningless. 
Amazingly, the majority made significant changes in the substance of 
the study for months after it was voted on by the committee. In 
addition, after we submitted our minority views, the majority staff 
then went back and

[[Page 17332]]

made a few changes to specifically correct some of the more blatant 
errors that we identified in the views and that the CIA identified in 
their review. While I am pleased our views led to some minor 
improvements in the study, those untimely changes required us to add 
text explaining the validity of our initial conclusions and criticisms. 
Simply put, the documents released today are very different from the 
documents that were approved almost exactly 2 years ago by the 
committee at the end of the last Congress on a partisan basis.
  Another significant weakness of this study is its disregard of the 
context under which the CIA's detention and interrogation program was 
developed. It is critical to remember that the intelligence community 
was inundated by a surge of terrorist threat reporting after the 
September 11 attacks. The fear of a follow-on attack was pervasive, and 
it was genuine. The Nation was traumatized by the horrific murders of 
nearly 3,000 Americans and at the CIA there was no greater imperative 
than stopping another attack from happening. This context is entirely 
absent from the study.
  In addition, everyone must remember that the CIA was directed to 
conduct this program by the President. I have spoken with a number of 
CIA officers over the years who remember the contentious debates about 
the program at the time it was being considered, but at the end of the 
day the Agency did what the President directed them to do under the 
color of law and based upon opinions issued and updated by the 
Department of Justice.
  Many of my colleagues continue to discuss the brutality of many of 
the enhanced interrogation techniques. I agree that waterboarding, 
which only occurred against three detainees, is particularly severe. 
Many of the other techniques were not. By comparison, KSM, who was one 
of the detainees who was subjected to waterboarding, personally 
beheaded Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, and a number of 
other U.S. citizens have been tortured and beheaded by Al Qaeda-
inspired groups since.
  In my opinion, the current threat level posed by ISIL and other Al 
Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups may be greater today than what we 
faced prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. They are better funded, 
better equipped, and have recruited hundreds of terrorists who have 
American as well as European passports. ISIL terrorists are using 
social media to encourage new recruits to conduct ``lone wolf'' attacks 
in their home countries such as the United States. They are murdering 
and beheading captured hostages and planning terrorist attacks against 
U.S. citizens.
  In light of these significant threats, the President is still 
attempting to make good on a misguided campaign promise to close down 
Guantanamo Bay. It doesn't seem to matter to him that we are now down 
to the worst of the worst or that his own review groups have strongly 
recommended against the release of these remaining terrorists. Instead, 
he has returned to the pre-9/11 practice of treating terrorists like 
ordinary criminals. We are reading terrorists their Miranda rights 
instead of conducting extended intelligence interrogations to develop 
actionable intelligence that might lead to additional captures or plot 
disruptions.
  I think we would be better off if we were to return to a mindset 
where we attempt to capture the enemy and use authorized interrogation 
techniques to obtain the actionable intelligence information needed to 
neutralize these dangerous terrorist organizations. While there is no 
doubt there were indeed moments during the CIA detention and 
interrogation program where interrogators exceeded their authorized 
limits, such instances were relatively few and far between.
  In this, my last week of service on the floor of the U.S. Senate and 
as the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I wish to thank the 
men and women of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community and 
the members of our Armed Forces who have served us so well since the 9/
11 terrorist attacks. Their efforts and their sacrifices have not gone 
unnoticed. I will be forever grateful for their patriotic service to 
our beloved country. May God bless them all and may God bless the 
United States of America.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

                          ____________________