[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 160 (2014), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Page 70]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       BUDGET ACT SECTION 114(c)

  Mrs. MURRAY. Madam President, I rise to enter into a colloquy with 
the Senator from Ohio, Mr. Portman, to discuss section 114(c) of the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, which establishes a deficit-neutral 
reserve fund to replace sequestration.
  Before I turn to Senator Portman for his questions, I would like to 
note that the Senate has relied on reserve funds for nearly 30 years to 
help it carry out its priorities as part of the annual budget process. 
In fact, during debate on the 2014 budget resolution, the Senate 
considered or filed over 300 reserve funds. These included multiple 
amendments from Members of both parties to create new reserve funds. 
This particular reserve fund, section 114(c), was included and voted on 
as part of both the Senate Budget Committee-reported resolution and the 
Senate-passed budget resolution.
  I would now like to turn to my colleague for his questions.
  Mr. PORTMAN. I would like to thank the chairman of the Budget 
Committee for the opportunity to engage in this colloquy with her. As I 
understand it, the intent of the reserve fund under section 114(c) is 
to be available to adjust certain budgetary levels for deficit-neutral 
legislation that would replace sequestration. Do I have that correct?
  Mrs. MURRAY. Yes, the bipartisan budget agreement reached between the 
House and Senate replaces some of the sequester cuts that otherwise 
would occur in 2014 and 2015. By avoiding sequestration and reaching 
agreement on bipartisan funding levels for 2014 and 2015, this 
agreement will provide relief to our families, servicemembers, and the 
economy. Sequestration, however, continues to remain in place, 
unmodified, for fiscal years 2016 through 2021. Assuming legislation 
met the necessary requirements specified in section 114(c), this 
reserve fund would be available to further address the harmful effects 
of sequestration.
  Mr. PORTMAN. I thank the chairman for her response. There is a 
concern that the reserve fund in section 114(c) could deprive the 
minority of an opportunity to require 60 votes for legislation that 
would modify the statutory limits on discretionary spending and pay for 
some or all of that cost with new revenue. Is that concern accurate?
  Mrs. MURRAY. I thank the Senator for his question. No, that concern 
is not accurate. While a useful tool to help the Senate carry out its 
priorities under the budget process, a reserve fund is limited in what 
it allows me to do, in my capacity as chairman of the Budget Committee. 
In general, for legislation that meets the required criteria, reserve 
funds allow me to revise the levels adopted in a budget resolution and 
enforced in the Senate, such as committee allocations and the budgetary 
aggregates.
  A reserve fund, however, does not have any impact on the standing 
rules of the Senate, including the cloture process and the need for 60 
votes to end debate. Nothing in the Bipartisan Budget Act would change 
that process.
  A reserve fund also does not waive budget points of order. I can use 
a reserve fund to revise the committee allocations and budgetary 
aggregates, such that legislation that meets the criteria of the 
reserve fund, including deficit neutrality, can be brought into 
compliance with the allocations and aggregates. But, it does not allow 
me to waive budget points of order that still may lie against the 
legislation following the reserve fund adjustment. Budget points of 
order generally can only be waived by unanimous consent or with 60 
votes. Nothing in the Bipartisan Budget Act would change that.
  Further, the Senator from Ohio proposed the specific hypothetical 
example of legislation that would increase the statutory limits on 
discretionary spending and offset some or all of those costs with new 
revenue. Recognizing this is a hypothetical scenario, I believe in that 
situation the legislation would be subject to a 60-vote point of order 
for violating section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act, which 
creates a point of order against legislation dealing with matters 
within the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee that has not been 
reported out of the Budget Committee. Ultimately, the Parliamentarian 
of the Senate determines whether points of order under section 306 lie 
against legislation, but legislation to alter the statutory limits in 
discretionary spending has historically been within the jurisdiction of 
the Budget Committee. A reserve fund would have no impact on a section 
306 point of order and nothing in the Bipartisan Budget Act would 
change that.
  In addition, legislation increasing the statutory caps on 
discretionary spending above the existing levels, as the Senator from 
Ohio outlines in his question, would also violate section 312(b) of the 
Congressional Budget Act, which prohibits consideration of legislation 
that would exceed any of the statutory limits on discretionary 
spending. The reserve fund in 114(c), like other reserve funds, deals 
only with Senate enforcement and would have no impact on that point of 
order. Again, nothing in the Bipartisan Budget Act would change that.
  Finally, I would suggest to my colleague that legislation originating 
in the Senate rather than in the House of Representatives that raises 
revenue would likely be subject to a ``blue slip'' and returned back to 
the Senate by the House of Representatives. Again, nothing in the 
Bipartisan Budget Act would change that process.
  Mr. PORTMAN. I thank the Chairman for her answer. I understand that 
we were discussing a hypothetical example. I thank her for engaging 
with me in this colloquy.

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