[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 159 (2013), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 6602-6608]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                 SYRIA

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today I and my colleagues are here to 
speak about Syria. The strategic and humanitarian costs of this 
conflict continue to be devastating, not just for the people of Syria 
but for vital American interests. As today's Washington Post editorial 
makes clear, nearly all of the terrible consequences that those opposed 
to intervention predicted would happen if we intervened in Syria have 
happened because we have not.
  There is mounting evidence that chemical weapons have been used by 
the Asad regime. As many of our colleagues have noted--including 
Senator Feinstein, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee--
President Obama's redline on Syria has been crossed. But instead of 
acting, the Obama administration has called for additional evidence to 
be collected by U.N. investigators who have not yet set foot in Syria 
and probably never will. In the absence of more robust action, I fear 
it will not be long before Asad takes this delay as an invitation to 
use chemical weapons again on an even larger scale.
  Moreover, as I have said before, by drawing a redline on chemical 
weapons, the President actually gave the Asad regime a green light to 
use every other weapon in his arsenal with impunity. More than 70,000 
Syrians have been killed indiscriminately with snipers, artillery, 
helicopter gunships, fighter jets, and even ballistic missiles. Indeed, 
according to a recent Human Rights Watch report, more than 4,300 
civilians have been killed by Syria's airstrikes alone since July 2012.
  At the same time, Iran and its proxy Hezbollah are building a network 
of militias inside Syria and the al-Qaida-aligned al-Nusra Front has 
gained unprecedented strength on the ground. According to estimates 
published in the media, some believe there were no more than a few 
hundred al-Nusra fighters in Syria last year, but today it is widely 
believed there could be thousands of extremist fighters inside Syria. 
They are gaining strength by the day because they are the best, most 
experienced fighters. They are well-funded and are providing 
humanitarian assistance in the parts of Syria where people need it 
most.
  At the same time, this conflict is having increasingly devastating 
consequences to the security and stability of our allies and partners 
in Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. The U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees has characterized the situation in Syria as 
an ``existential threat'' for Lebanon, where the government estimates 
that 1 million Syrians have entered the country--1 million Syrians have 
entered the country of Lebanon--which has a population of just over 4 
million. Similarly, over the past 2 years, more than 500,000 Syrians 
have flooded into Jordan, a country of only 6 million people. Consider 
for a moment that in proportional terms this would be equivalent to 26 
million refugees, or the entire population of Texas, suddenly crossing 
our own borders.
  In short, Syria is becoming a failed state in the heart of the Middle 
East overrun by thousands of al-Qaida-affiliated fighters, with 
possibly tons of chemical weapons, and poised to ignite a wider 
sectarian conflict that could profoundly destabilize the region.
  Yesterday brought news that the administration plans to organize, 
together with Russia, an international peace conference later this 
month to seek a negotiated settlement to the war in Syria. All of us--
all of us--are in favor of such a political resolution to this 
conflict. No one wants to see this conflict turn into a fight to the 
death and total victory for one side or the other. We all want to work 
toward a political settlement that forms a new governing structure in 
Syria reflective of the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people.
  But let's be realistic. One of the lessons of the past 2 years is 
that such a negotiated settlement will not be possible in Syria until 
the balance of power shifts more decisively against Asad and those 
around him. Until Asad, as well as his Iranian, Hezbollah, and Russian 
backers no longer believe they are winning, what incentive do they have 
to come to the table and make a deal? This is what two well-meaning 
United Nations senior envoys have already learned.
  Yes, Syrian opposition forces are gaining strength and territory on 
the ground. But Asad still has air power--a decisive factor in that 
climate, in that terrain--ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and a 
host of other advanced weaponry, and he is using all of it. 
Furthermore, today's news reports that Russia has agreed to sell an 
advanced air defense system to the Asad regime should lead us once 
again to ask ourselves whether the path to peace in Syria runs through 
Moscow.
  I know Americans are war-weary and eager to focus on our domestic and 
economic problems and not foreign affairs. I also know the situation in 
Syria is complex and there are no ideal options. But the basic choice 
we face is not complicated: Do the costs of inaction outweigh the costs 
of action? I believe they do.
  No one should think the United States has to act alone, put boots on 
the ground, or destroy every Syrian air defense system to make a 
difference for the better in Syria. We have more limited options at our 
disposal, including

[[Page 6603]]

limited military options, that can make a positive impact on this 
crisis.
  We could, for example, organize an overt and large-scale operation to 
train and arm well-vetted Syrian opposition forces--a course of action 
that was recommended last year by President Obama's entire national 
security team. I am encouraged that Senator Menendez, the chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, has introduced legislation this week 
on this very issue and that he is speaking out about the need for more 
robust action in Syria, including addressing Asad's air power.
  As several key leaders in our own military have pointed out in 
testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee over the past several 
months--from Gen. James Mattis to ADM James Stavridis--we have the 
capacity--we have the capacity--to significantly weaken both the Asad 
regime's air power and its increasing use of ballistic missiles, which 
pose significant risks as delivery vehicles for chemical weapons.
  To address this threat, we could use our precision strike 
capabilities to target Asad's aircraft and Scud missile launchers on 
the ground without our pilots having to fly into the teeth of Syria's 
air defenses. Similar weapons could be used to selectively destroy 
artillery pieces and make Asad's forces think twice about remaining at 
their posts. We could use the Patriot missile batteries outside of 
Syria to help protect safe zones inside Syria from Asad's aerial 
bombing and missile attacks.
  Would any of these options immediately end the conflict? Probably 
not. But they could save innocent lives in Syria. They could give the 
moderate opposition a better chance to succeed in marginalizing radical 
actors and eventually provide security and responsible governance in 
Syria after Asad falls. However, the longer we wait, the worse the 
situation gets and the tougher it will be to confront, as we will 
inevitably be forced to do sooner or later.
  I am encouraged that a consensus is emerging and many of our 
colleagues--Democrats and Republicans alike--share this view. I note 
the leadership of Senator Levin, the chairman of our Armed Services 
Committee, whom I joined in writing a letter to President Obama urging 
him to take more active steps in Syria. I also note the important voice 
Senator Bob Casey has lent to this debate and ask unanimous consent 
that his op-ed printed last week in the Huffington Post, ``Time to Act 
in Syria''--which calls for consideration of more options, including 
cruise missile strikes to neutralize the Syrian Air Force--be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Huffington Post, May 9, 2013]

                          Time to Act in Syria

                             (By Bob Casey)

       Last week, I joined a bipartisan group of senators to ask 
     the President whether the Assad regime has used chemical 
     weapons. The administration's response suggests mounting 
     evidence of chemical weapons underscores the imperative that 
     the United States stand with the people of Syria during this 
     critical period.
       The fall of Assad is not only good for Syria, but will deal 
     a significant blow to Iran and Hezbollah. Degrading the 
     destructive power of Iran and Hezbollah is in the national 
     security interests of the United States--Bashar al-Assad is a 
     key link between them.
       In March, Senator Rubio and I offered legislation that 
     could offer a path forward. Since that time, several senators 
     have cosponsored the measure including Senators Kirk, Coons, 
     Klobuchar, Levin, Cardin, Boxer and Shaheen. This legislation 
     would provide support to the armed and political opposition, 
     increase humanitarian aid to Syrians inside the country and 
     to refugees in neighboring states. This bill also lays the 
     groundwork to address the immense humanitarian and political 
     challenges in the post-Assad era.
       A political transition to a government that reflects the 
     will of the Syrian people is in the core interests of the 
     United States in the region. I have made the case 
     consistently that the U.S. should lead efforts to support the 
     moderate Syrian armed and political opposition. I have also 
     said that the U.S. should consider measures that would hamper 
     the ability of the Syrian Air Force to conduct aerial attacks 
     on civilians, including cruise missile strikes on Syrian Air 
     Force planes as they sit on the tarmac [Foreign Policy 2/27/
     13]. In addition, the U.S., working with Turkey and NATO, 
     should use Patriot missile batteries to provide cover for 
     Syrians living in the northern part of the country who are 
     subjected to SCUD missile attacks.
       Any U.S. action should not result in U.S. boots on the 
     ground.
       It is time to act in the interests of our security in the 
     region. Decisive action by the U.S. and our allies could help 
     to tip the balance so that Syria can begin a transition 
     process. Absent constructive engagement by the U.S., I am 
     very concerned that the killing in Syria will continue and 
     extremists will play an increasingly influential role in 
     determining that country's future, resulting in very negative 
     implications for the region.

  Mr. McCAIN. Let me conclude with one final thought. For America, our 
interests are our values and our values are our interests. The moral 
dimension cannot be lost from our foreign policy. If ever a case should 
remind us of this, it is Syria.
  Leon Wieseltier captured this point powerfully in the New Republic 
this week:

       Seventy thousand people have died in the Syrian war, most 
     of them at the hands of their ruler. Since this number has 
     appeared in the papers for many months, the actual number 
     must be much higher. The slaughter is unceasing. But the 
     debate about American intervention is increasingly conducted 
     in ``realist'' terms: the threat to American interests posed 
     by jihadism in Syria, the intrigues of Iran and Hezbollah, 
     the rattling of Israel, the ruination of Jordan and Lebanon 
     and Iraq. They are all good reasons for the president of the 
     United States to act like the president of the United States. 
     But wouldn't the prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocidal 
     war be reason enough? Is the death of scores and even 
     hundreds of thousands, and the displacement of millions, less 
     significant for American policy, and less quickening? The 
     moral dimension must be restored to our deliberations, the 
     moral sting, or else Obama, for all his talk about 
     conscience, will have presided over a terrible mutilation of 
     American discourse: the severance of conscience from action.

  Nearly two decades ago, I worked with Democratic and Republican 
colleagues in Congress to support President Clinton as he led America 
to do the right thing in stopping mass atrocities in Bosnia. The 
question for another President today, and for all Americans, is whether 
we will again answer the desperate pleas for rescue that are made 
uniquely to us, as the United States of America.
  I, first, would ask both of my colleagues one question, if it would 
be all right. There is news today that the Secretary of State wants to 
convene a conference, including the Russians, in order to try to bring 
about a resolution at the same time we read reports that the Russians 
are selling Syria the most advanced weapons. I guess I would ask my 
colleague from South Carolina and then Senator Levin because I know he 
has a statement.
  Mr. GRAHAM. That would be a big contradiction.
  I will just yield to Senator Levin to answer the question and make 
his opening statement.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank, first of all, the Senator from 
Arizona for the leadership he has taken on the question of Syria. In 
answer to the question, to the best of my ability, at least, it would 
not be the first time Russia has taken an inconsistent position. What I 
am hoping is that the additional military pressure on Asad, which we 
are all calling for this morning, would help put pressure on Russia to 
understand, if that military pressure is forthcoming, that they should 
participate in the political solution. I do not know that we can stop 
them, as much as we would all wish to, from taking the inconsistent 
position that they have, but I believe--and I think the Senator from 
Arizona would probably agree, but he can speak for himself, obviously--
that if President Obama does as we are urging him to do, which is find 
a way to put additional military pressure on Asad, that would be an 
important sign to Russia that: OK, join in a solution. You participated 
enough in the problem already. Join in the solution.
  They are inconsistent. But I think our goal of trying to get more 
military pressure on Asad is very consistent with the idea that maybe 
there will be a political solution, but if there is, it will be 
promoted by military pressure on Asad and his understanding of that 
fact.

[[Page 6604]]

  The worsening situation in Syria and the snowballing plight of 
millions in the region requires a response.
  Since nonviolent demonstrations demanding democratic change began in 
Syria in March of 2011, Bashar Asad and his clique of supporters have 
unleashed a massacre that has claimed the lives of at least 70,000 
Syrians, displaced more than 4 million people across a region that 
already suffers from a massive refugee population, sparked a civil war 
with a multitude of divergent ethnic groups and religious sects, and 
placed the security of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile--which is one 
of the world's largest--at risk of falling into the hands of terrorist 
groups.
  Despite the impact of this horrific campaign, Asad's commitment to 
continuing the fight appears unwavering. One must look no further than 
the increasingly indiscriminate tactics with which he conducts his 
campaign. In recent months, in addition to Asad's possible use of 
chemical weapons, he has increased his reliance on airstrikes, Scud 
missiles, rockets, mortar shells, and artillery to terrorize and to 
kill civilians.
  Asad's ability to conduct this campaign is enabled by two actors--
Iran and Russia. Iran's financial, personnel, and materiel support have 
been critical to ensuring Asad's military remains operable and that the 
impact of defections is mitigated with reinforcements. Russia's support 
to Syria's more advanced military weaponry, most notably air defense 
systems, is critical to Asad's continued ability to project power into 
areas of the country he no longer controls.
  To add further complexity to the situation, al-Nusra Front, an al-
Qaida offshoot, continues to spread its influence in some areas of 
Syria. Its presence is of concern and countering its spread needs to be 
a priority. It is also critical that we ensure that countries in the 
region that are seeking to force an end to the Asad regime are not 
enabling and enhancing the capabilities of violent extremists who will 
ultimately turn their weapons on moderate Syrians and on religious 
minorities in Syria, such as the Syrian Christians.
  The combination of these circumstances in Syria demonstrates that the 
status quo is unacceptable and that time is not on our side. Many 
officials in Washington share this sentiment but in the same breath 
remind us that the situation in Syria is complex, volatile, and 
asymmetric; Syria's Government institutions are crumbling, which could 
create a dangerous vacuum; any action by the United States or the West, 
even if it is with our Arab partners, risks significant escalation; and 
that any security vacuum could be filled by Islamist extremists.
  I have supported, and I will continue to support, the President's 
contributions to provide humanitarian relief to the Syrian people 
throughout the region, as well as the additional assistance he has 
pledged to Jordan to help with the devastating impact of this conflict 
on that country.
  But it is essential that the United States, working with our allies 
in the region, step up the military pressure on the Asad regime--of 
course, doing so in a carefully thought out and regionally supported 
way.
  Certainly, there are significant challenges to any plan of action in 
Syria. But we not only have to figure out the consequences of any 
action, we also have to figure out the consequences of not taking 
additional actions. In my view, the facts on the ground make the 
consequences of inaction too great, and it is time for the United 
States and our allies to use ways to alter the course of events in 
Syria by increasing the military pressure on Asad until he can see that 
his current course is not sustainable.
  Taking steps to add military pressure on Asad will also provide 
backing to Secretary Kerry's efforts to bring the Russians into the 
dialog politically, which is aimed at leading to Asad's departure. I 
commend Secretary Kerry for his efforts to bring Russia into that 
dialog.
  At the same time, of course, we condemn Russia's support for the Asad 
regime. I happen to feel very strongly that even though we are 
condemning, and should condemn, Russia's support for the Asad regime, 
it is still in our interest that Russia participate in putting pressure 
on Asad politically to depart, if Secretary Kerry can possibly do so.
  I have joined Senator McCain recently in writing to President Obama, 
urging the President to consider supporting a number of efforts, 
including the creation by Turkey of a safe zone inside Syria along its 
border, the deployment of our Patriot batteries closer to that border 
in order to protect populations in that safe zone and to neutralize any 
Syrian planes that threaten it and also to provide weapons to vetted 
elements of the opposition in Syria. These actions--raising the 
military pressure on Asad--will send the critical message to Asad that 
he is going to go one way or the other.
  The Armed Services Committee, which I chair, recently held an open 
hearing on the situation in Syria and the Defense Department's efforts 
to plan for a full range of possible options to respond to the 
contingencies in Syria. Our committee is set to receive a classified 
briefing on Syria next week. I intend to raise these issues with our 
witnesses at that briefing. I know Senator McCain and Senator Graham 
and others are also going to forcefully raise these issues with those 
witnesses at that briefing and to urge them to carry the message back 
to the administration that it is time to up the military pressure on 
Asad.
  I thank Senator McCain and others who are participating in this 
discussion.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I wish to join with my distinguished 
colleagues in our collective call for a greater engagement. I start 
off, as I always do in many years in Congress between the House and the 
Senate, with two questions: What is in the national interests of the 
United States? What is in the national security interests of the United 
States? The answer to those two questions is, in essence, how I 
determine my views, my advocacy, my votes, and the policies I want to 
pursue.
  There are vital U.S. interests engaged in Syria. First, of course, 
there is a humanitarian crisis, probably the most significant 
humanitarian crisis at this moment--70,000 dead and climbing, 4 million 
displaced. That is, of course, an urgent call. Beyond that we have 
large chemical weapon stockpiles that potentially can fall into the 
wrong hands. Some have, by a whole host of public reports, already been 
used against the Syrian people. Unless you believe that somehow the 
rebels have in their possession chemical weapons, then this largely has 
to be from Asad. He has used them. I think once you use them, you are 
willing to use them even in greater quantities. That is a real concern.
  The Syrian State could collapse. That would leave a safe heaven for 
terrorists, constituting a new threat to the region. You already have 
al-Qaida affiliated al-Nusra, you have Hezbollah, you have the Iranian 
Guard. You have the opportunity for a safe heaven for terrorists 
constituting a new threat to the region with broader implications for 
our own security.
  The refugee crisis and sectarian violence spread instability 
throughout the region. The King of Jordan was here 2 weeks ago and sat 
with our committee. He made it very clear, his population has already 
increased by 20 percent. At the rate it is going, the population of 
Jordan could double. That is not sustainable for the kingdom. This is 
one of the countries that has been one of our most significant and 
faithful allies, and a constructive ally in the region. We cannot 
afford for that ally to ultimately find itself in a position in which 
it could very well collapse. We look at all of that.
  Finally, there could be no more strategic setback to Iran--which this 
body has spoken collectively and in a bipartisan united fashion to stop 
its march toward nuclear weapons--than to have the Asad regime 
collapse. That would be a tremendous setback to Iran and would cause a 
disruption in the terror

[[Page 6605]]

pipeline between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
  These are just some of the vital national security interests of the 
United States in changing the tide. Under the present set of 
circumstances, Asad believes he is winning. For so long, as he believes 
he is winning, he will continue the course he is on. There has to be a 
change in the tipping point.
  After 2 years I believe there are those in the opposition--rebels we 
can and have thoroughly vetted--we can assist in trying to change that 
tipping point. If you have a monopoly on air power and on artillery, 
then the reality is you will not see a change on the ground.
  So the legislation I have introduced and am working with colleagues 
on begins to move us in a different direction. It is to seek to arm 
thoroughly vetted elements of the Syrian opposition so we can change 
the tipping point. It is to, of course, continue to provide 
humanitarian assistance and at the same time work for the assistance of 
a transition fund to help those rebels that are already controlling 
parts of the civilian population to help them administrate there and 
prepare for the future.
  The key point is unless we change the dynamics on the ground, we will 
not have a change in the regime. So long as the regime can continue to 
bomb its citizens indiscriminately--and if the reports, as we have seen 
from various countries, including our own, suggest that Asad has used 
chemical weapons against his own citizens--that is only an invitation 
to allow him to continue to do it unless we act.
  I am willing to consider other options. I know my colleague, Senator 
McCain, very distinguished in this field, has suggested others. I am 
willing to consider those as well. But I think, finally, we strengthen 
the hand of the administration and Secretary Kerry. We all want to see 
a politically, diplomatically achieved solution. But in the absence of 
changing the calculus not only of Asad but of his supporters who have 
propped him up, unless they believe he will fall, I am not sure we have 
changed the calculus for the political opportunity to take place and 
the diplomacy to be effective.
  I think these efforts strengthen the hand of the administration, 
create a parallel track that if diplomacy fails, we will have an 
opportunity to pursue our vital national interests and security 
interests, end the humanitarian tragedy, and create the type of 
stability we want to see in the region. I appreciate my colleague 
bringing us together on the floor of the Senate. I look forward to 
continuing to work with him.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the distinguished chairman. May I say, it has 
been a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to serve on the 
Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Menendez is the chairman. 
I think his stewardship of that committee has been outstanding. I 
appreciate the very articulate argument the chairman just presented, 
including the strategic dimension of this whole issue which sometimes 
in our--particularly, when you focus so much on the humanitarian side, 
the strategic interest of the fall of Bashar Al-Asad is something which 
I think adds another dimension. I thank the Senator and chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I would just like to echo what Senator 
McCain said about Senator Menendez. I would like to, for the record, 
note that the tide of war in Syria changed today because of what is 
happening on the floor of the Senate. That may be hard for people to 
understand, but I really do not think so.
  How do you change the tide of battle? You make it certain to the 
world that Asad will go, and you provide hope to those who are fighting 
him that they will prevail. I would suggest that a bipartisan consensus 
is forming in the Senate that now is the time to do more, not less, 
when it comes to Syria, including arming the rebels--the right rebels, 
the right opposition, with the right weapons, which will eventually 
change the tide of battle.
  So to those who have been following this debate about Syria, to those 
who have been in the fight trying to topple this regime, I cannot 
stress to you how important today is in your cause. When you get 
Senator Levin and Senator Menendez, two institutional, important 
figures because of their chairmanships, but beyond that, important 
because of who they are and what they bring to every debate around 
national security, combined with Senator McCain and others, you have 
turned the tide in Washington.
  As to Senator McCain, he has been talking in the most eloquent terms 
for at least a couple of years about stopping this war in Syria, ending 
the Asad regime and replacing it with something better. He has been 
right, as he usually is. But now is not the time to look backward, it 
is to look forward.
  I think an effort by the Senate and the House to acknowledge that the 
tide of war needs to change and we should be bolder in our support for 
the opposition is going to increase the likelihood of a peaceful 
solution through diplomacy.
  The Russians have to know, after today, if they know anything about 
American politics, the game has changed when it comes to Asad, and this 
is a monumental sea change in terms of the war in Syria by having four 
Senators who care about such matters of foreign policy to speak out and 
say we will support arming the rebels and being more involved 
militarily.
  To the opposition, this is a great day for you. To Asad, this seals 
your fate.
  Now, what do we do and how do we do it? It will not all end tomorrow 
because of this colloquy today, but we are well on the way to ending 
this war. Here is the choice: The current regime, which is evil to the 
core, and the imperfect opposition, which has been infected by radical 
Islam--you can fix the second one; you cannot fix the first. It is that 
simple to me.
  The sooner the war ends the better, not only for saving people in 
Syria from further slaughter, but preventing what I think would be an 
erosion of our national security interests in four areas. If this war 
goes 6 more months, a failed state will emerge in Syria. It will be so 
fractured you cannot put it back together.
  The 6,000 al-Qaida associated fighters will grow in number, and there 
will be a safe haven in Syria like there was in Afghanistan. That is 
not good for us. Unlike Afghanistan, there is enough chemical weapons 
in Syria to kill thousands if not millions of Americans and people who 
are our allies. I worry greatly not only that chemical weapons have 
been used in Syria on the opposition by the regime, but those same 
chemical weapons will be used in the future by radical Islamists 
against us.
  The next bomb that goes off in America may have more than nails and 
glass in it. The only reason millions of Americans or thousands of 
Americans, hundreds of thousands have not been killed by radical 
Islamists is they cannot get the weapons to kill that many of us. They 
would if they could.
  I have never seen a better opportunity for radical Islamists to get 
ahold of weapons of mass destruction than I see in Syria today. Every 
day that goes by their opportunity to acquire some of these weapons 
grows dramatically. If you ask me what I worry the most about with 
Syria and why we should get involved, it is for that very reason. If 
these weapons get compromised, they are going to fall into the hands of 
the people who will use them against us, and to believe otherwise would 
be incredibly naive.
  Jordan. Probably the most stabilizing figure in the Mideast in these 
dangerous times is the King of Jordan. His country is being overrun by 
refugees. If this war goes on 6 more months, that is probably the end 
of his kingdom because it will create economic chaos and political 
instability. He will be a victim of the civil war in Syria, and it will 
have monumental consequences for our national security.
  As we talk about Syria and chemical weapons falling into radical 
Islamists' hands, we are dealing with a radical regime in Iran that is 
marching toward building a nuclear weapon. If you think the ayatollahs 
in Iran are trying to

[[Page 6606]]

build a nuclear powerplant at the bottom of a mountain, you are wrong. 
They are trying to build a nuclear weapon to ensure their 
survivability. God only knows what they would do with nuclear 
technology. But if you believe what they say, they would wipe Israel 
off the map, and we would be next. I tend to believe what they say.
  If you allow Syria to continue to deteriorate and have a hands-off 
policy toward Asad, then I think you are sending the worst possible 
signal to Iran. As Senator Levin said, really the only ally Iran has 
today is Asad in Syria. How can we convince the Iranians we are serious 
about their nuclear problem when we do not seem to be very serious 
about Asad using chemical weapons against his own people? What a 
terrible signal to send at one of the most important times.
  I would end with this thought: This bipartisan consensus that is 
emerging today is going to pay great dividends. It is going to be 
helpful to the President. We can end this war sooner rather than later. 
But no matter what happens, there is going to be a second war in Syria, 
unfortunately.
  That second war is going to be between radical Islamists who want to 
turn Syria into some kind of al-Qaida-inspired state, and the 
overwhelming majority of Syrians who want to live a better life and be 
our friends, not our enemies.
  This war will occur after the fall of Asad. But it will end the right 
way. The sooner we get the first war over, the shorter the second war 
will be. I think we can bring this war to a close without boots on the 
ground. The sooner we act the better.
  One last thought. To the opposition, you would be helping your cause 
if you would let the world know that you do not want Asad's chemical 
weapons; that the new Syria will not be a state that wants weapons of 
mass destruction; that you would agree these weapons should be 
controlled by the international community and destroyed; that you would 
agree to an international force coming on the ground with your blessing 
the day after Asad falls to secure these weapons and destroy them for 
all time. I think you would be helping your cause.
  So I say to Senator McCain, I really appreciate his leadership for a 
couple of years. But persistence does matter in politics and all things 
that are important. I think the Senator's persistence is paying off.
  I say to Senator Menendez and Senator Levin, what they have done 
today joining up in a bipartisan fashion is going to pay great 
dividends for our own national security interests. The way forward is 
pretty clear.
  I say to President Obama, we want to be your ally. We want to be your 
supporter. We want you to get more involved, not less. We realize it is 
hard. We realize there are risks no matter what we do. But as Senator 
McCain said before, the risk of doing nothing by continuing on the 
current track is far greater than getting involved in ending the war 
sooner.
  Mr. McCAIN. Can I just ask one question of my colleague? I understand 
recently he made a trip to the Middle East. There is nothing like 
seeing the terrible consequences of war. I understand the Senator 
visited a refugee camp.
  Maybe for the benefit of our colleagues the Senator could take a 
minute to describe the horrible conditions people who have now been 
made refugees have been subjected to and their failure to understand 
why we won't be able to be of more assistance to them.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Senator for his question. It was one of the 
most compelling trips I have ever made to the Middle East. We went to 
Turkey, Jordan, and we went to a refugee camp in Jordan. Some 40,000 
Syrian children are now in Jordanian schools. The burden on Jordan is 
immense, but when you talk to the people in the camps, what they have 
gone through and what their loved ones have gone through is 
heartbreaking.
  From a national point of view, once you visit the camps, you 
understand what is at stake. They tell you about radical Islamists 
moving in. They want no part of them but at the end of the day they are 
having more influence because we are not in the fight. You can do this 
without boots on the ground.
  The most chilling thing they tell us, which Senator McCain, has been 
echoing for a long time, is their children are watching the United 
States. Like it or not, we have the reputation in the world that we can 
do almost anything.
  Well, we can't do almost anything, but we are seen as a force for 
good. The people in Syria are beside themselves wondering where is 
America. America, to them, is an idea. They want to be like us because 
it means freedom, and it means economic opportunity. It means having a 
say about your children's future. They are dumbfounded that we are not 
more involved, given the stakes that exist in Syria. They tell us 
without any hesitation that the young people of Syria will remember 
this moment. They will hold this against us. I think I know what the 
Senator is telling us.
  Here is the good news: There is still time to act. It doesn't have to 
end that way. The conditions in Syria are horrible. The refugee camps 
were beyond imagination. The U.N. is doing a great job, but they are 
running out of money. Jordan is about to fall if we don't stop this 
war.
  From a human point of view, we have got to get this war over and 
America needs to be seen as part of the solution, not part of the 
problem. From a national security point of view, Syria is going to 
become a nightmare for the whole world, including the United States.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in 
the Record a Washington Post editorial entitled ``Repercussions Of 
Inaction,'' a Wall Street Journal article, ``U.S. Is Warned Russia 
Plans Syria Arms Sale,'' and, finally, a piece by Leon Wieseltier that 
is in the Washington Diarist.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, May 9, 2013]

                     The Repercussions of Inaction

                              (Editorial)

       There are grave risks in continuing the current U.S. policy 
     toward Syria.
       Opponents of U.S. intervention in Syria are adept at citing 
     the risks of a more aggressive U.S. effort to bring down the 
     regime of Bashar al-Assad. Weapons given to rebel fighters 
     might end up in the hands of extremists, the skeptics say. 
     U.S. air attacks or the creation of a no-fly zone would be 
     challenged by formidable air defenses. U.S. intervention 
     might increase the risk that the regime would resort to 
     chemical weapons.
       Above all, say the anti-interventionists, direct or even 
     indirect U.S. engagement in the fighting would make Syria an 
     American problem, saddling a war-weary country with another 
     difficult, expensive and possibly unworkable nation-building 
     mission.
       These are serious objections, though we believe that some 
     of the risks, such as the spread of weapons to jihadists, can 
     be mitigated, while others, such as the strength of Syrian 
     air defenses, have been exaggerated. Our greater concern is 
     about the side of the discussion critics of intervention 
     usually leave out--which is the risks that are incurred by 
     failing to intervene.
       What will unfold in Syria if the Obama administration 
     persists with its policy of providing humanitarian and other 
     non-lethal aid while standing back from the fighting? The 
     most likely scenario is that Syria fractures along sectarian 
     lines. An al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, is already 
     consolidating control over a swath of northeastern Syria; 
     remnants of the regime, backed by Shiite fighters from 
     Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, could take over a strip of the 
     western coastline.
       Such a splintering would almost certainly spread the 
     sectarian warfare to Iraq and Lebanon, as it has to some 
     extent already. That could cause the collapse of the Iraqi 
     political system that was the legacy of the U.S. mission 
     there. Chemical weapons stocks now controlled by the Assad 
     regime would be up for grabs, probably forcing further 
     interventions by Israel in order to prevent their acquisition 
     by Hezbollah or al-Qaeda. Jordan, the most fragile U.S. ally 
     in the Middle East, could collapse under the weight of Syrian 
     refugees. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which have been imploring 
     the Obama administration to take steps to end the war, could 
     conclude that the United States is no longer a reliable ally.
       Of course, some of these consequences may come about 
     whatever the United States does. But the best way of 
     preventing them is to quickly tip the military balance 
     against the Assad regime--something that would probably 
     require an air campaign as well as arms

[[Page 6607]]

     for the moderate opposition. If the regime's fighting 
     strength is decisively broken it might still be possible to 
     force out the Assads and negotiate a political transition, as 
     Secretary of State John F. Kerry aspires to do. For now, with 
     the regime convinced it is winning, there is no such chance--
     and with each passing month Syria's breakup comes closer to 
     reality.
       In short, there are substantial risks for the United States 
     if it intervenes in Syria but also grave dangers in its 
     present policy. On Tuesday President Obama said his job was 
     to ``constantly measure'' what actions were in the best U.S. 
     interest. It's not an easy calculus, to be sure. But for two 
     years, as Mr. Obama has heeded the warnings about U.S. 
     engagement, the situation in Syria has grown more dangerous 
     to U.S. interests. There are no good options, as everyone 
     likes to say. But it's becoming increasingly clear that the 
     greatest risk to the United States lies in failing to take 
     decisive action to end the Assad regime.
                                  ____


              [From the Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2013]

              U.S. Is Warned Russia Plans Syria Arms Sale

           (By Jay Solomon, Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes)

       Washington.--Israel has warned the U.S. that a Russian deal 
     is imminent to sell advanced ground-to-air missile systems to 
     Syria, weapons that would significantly boost the regime's 
     ability to stave off intervention in its civil war.
       U.S. officials said on Wednesday that they are analyzing 
     the information Israel provided about the suspected sale of 
     S-300 missile batteries to Syria, but wouldn't comment on 
     whether they believed such a transfer was near.
       Russian officials didn't immediately return requests to 
     comment. The Russian Embassy in Washington has said its 
     policy is not to comment on arms sales or transfers between 
     Russia and other countries.
       The government of President Bashar al-Assad has been 
     seeking to purchase S-300 missile batteries--which can 
     intercept both manned aircraft and guided missiles--from 
     Moscow going back to the George W. Bush administration, U.S. 
     officials said. Western nations have lobbied President 
     Vladimir Putin's government not to go ahead with the sale. If 
     Syria were to acquire and deploy the systems, it would make 
     any international intervention in Syria far more complicated, 
     according to U.S. and Middle East-based officials.
       According to the information the Israelis provided in 
     recent days, Syria has been making payments on a 2010 
     agreement with Moscow to buy four batteries for $900 million. 
     They cite financial transactions from the Syrian government, 
     including one made this year through Russia's foreign-
     development bank, known as the VEB.
       The package includes six launchers and 144 operational 
     missiles, each with a range of 125 miles, according to the 
     information the Israelis provided. The first shipment could 
     come over the next three months, according to the Israelis' 
     information, and be concluded by the end of the year. Russia 
     is also expected to send two instruction teams to train 
     Syria's military in operating the missile system, the 
     Israelis say.
       Russia has been Mr. Assad's most important international 
     backer, outside of Iran, since the conflict in Syria started 
     in March 2011, and supplies Syria with arms, funding and 
     fuel. Russia maintains a naval port in Syria, its only outlet 
     to the Mediterranean. Moscow also has publicly voiced worries 
     that a collapsed Syria could fuel Islamist activities in its 
     restive Caucasus regions.
       Secretary of State John Kerry met with Mr. Putin on Tuesday 
     in Moscow. The leaders said they would stage an international 
     conference this month aimed at ending the civil war. U.S. 
     officials couldn't say whether Messrs. Kerry and Putin or 
     their teams discussed the arms sale.
       British Prime Minister David Cameron is scheduled to visit 
     Mr. Putin in Russia on Friday. The White House on Wednesday 
     said Mr. Cameron would visit Washington on Monday to discuss 
     issues including Syria's civil war and counterterrorism, plus 
     trade and economic issues, with President Barack Obama.
       The Obama administration has argued that Mr. Assad has to 
     leave office as part of a political transition in Damascus. 
     The Kremlin has maintained that he retains a large base of 
     support and should be included in negotiations over a future 
     Syrian government.
       Should Mr. Putin's government go ahead with the sale, it 
     would mark a significant escalation in the battle between 
     Moscow and Washington over Syria. U.S. officials said they 
     believe Russian technicians are already helping maintain the 
     existing Syrian air-defense units.
       The first air-defense deals between Russia and Syria date 
     back decades. Russia in recent years has stepped up shipments 
     to modernize Syria's targeting systems and make the air 
     defenses mobile, and therefore much more difficult for 
     Israel--and the U.S.--to overcome.
       According to a U.S. intelligence assessment, Russia began 
     shipping SA-22 Pantsir-S1 units to Syria in 2008. The system, 
     a combination of surface-to-air missiles and 30mm 
     antiaircraft guns, has a digital targeting system and is 
     mounted on a combat vehicle, making it easy to move. Syria 
     has 36 of the vehicles, according to the assessment.
       In 2009, the Russians started upgrading Syria's outdated 
     analog SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems, turning them into 
     the SA-26 Pechora-2M system, which is mobile and digital, 
     equipped with missiles with an operational range of 17 miles, 
     according to the assessment.
       The U.S. is particularly worried about another modernized 
     system Moscow provides--the SA-5. With an operational range 
     of 175 miles, SA-5 missiles could take out U.S. planes flying 
     from Cyprus, a key North Atlantic Treaty Organization base 
     that was used during Libya operations and would likely be 
     vital in any Syrian operation.
       The U.S. has stealth aircraft and ship-based, precision-
     guided missiles that could take out key air-defense sites. 
     Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
     has privately told the White House that shutting down the 
     system could require weeks of bombing, putting U.S. fighter 
     pilots in peril and diverting military resources from other 
     priorities.
       According to an analysis by the U.S. military's Joint 
     Staff, Syrian air defenses are nearly five times more 
     sophisticated than what existed in Libya before the NATO 
     launched its air campaign there in 2011. Syrian air defenses 
     are about 10 times more sophisticated than the system the 
     U.S. and its allies faced in Serbia.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Diarist, May 7, 2013]

                                 Stung!

                          (By Leon Wieseltier)

       A reporter who visited the White House last week brought 
     back the news that the criticism of President Obama's 
     immobility about the Syrian disaster has ``begun to sting.'' 
     Good.Something got through. The president's sophistries about 
     his ``red line'' helped, of course: he spoke his way into a 
     predicament that he cannot speak his way out of, thereby 
     damaging the article of faith about the magical powers of his 
     speech. The press is full of reports that our policy may be 
     changing, that we may finally supply weapons to rebels we can 
     ideologically support, that we have identified such rebels 
     under the leadership of General Salim Idris, and so on. ``We 
     are on an upward trajectory,'' a White House official told 
     another reporter about these second thoughts, which only a 
     short while ago it would have considered a downward 
     trajectory. Obama, somewhat embarrassed by the implication 
     that for two years he may have been in error about one of the 
     most consequential crises of his presidency, is having the 
     White House rehearse its old admonition about caution (its 
     chin-stroking Kissingerian term for a doctrinaire timidity), 
     but still something may be stirring. The Syrian use of sarin 
     and the Israeli airstrikes (which were miraculously unimpeded 
     by the mythical power of Assad's air defenses) seem to have 
     concentrated the West Wing mind. Is Obama being stung into 
     action? I do not really believe it--his interventionism runs 
     deep, philosophically and temperamentally; but in any event 
     it is not too early to record a few lessons that can be 
     extracted from this fiasco.
       The bitterness of belatedness. There is nothing we know 
     about Assad now that we did not know a year ago and longer. 
     Not even his use of chemical weapons changes our 
     understanding of him. His strategy in this crisis has always 
     been to transform a democratic rebellion into a sectarian 
     war, and his method for doing so has been to commit crimes 
     against humanity. In the two years of American quiescence the 
     Syrian situation has become only more dire, so that those who 
     now plead that there are no perfect options are right. But 
     there are imperfect options, which is often all that the 
     Hobbesian life of nations anyway allows: we can still create 
     pro-Western elements in the struggle for Syria after Assad, 
     and deny Al Qaeda a government in Damascus, and stem the tide 
     of the refugees that is shaking the entire region. But the 
     road to a democratic Syria is now much longer and more 
     twisted than it had to be. I say this not only in 
     recrimination, but also because Obama's failure to act 
     swiftly in the Syrian crisis reiterates one of the regular 
     mistakes of American presidents after the cold war, which is 
     to refuse to treat an emergency like an emergency. In many 
     problems of statecraft, patience is a virtue and 
     judiciousness the beginning of wisdom; but not in all. There 
     are gross outrages against justice, such as the butchery of 
     civilians, that must be acted against without delay or they 
     have not been properly understood. Confronted by this degree 
     of urgency, the difference between success and failure is 
     time. Why do we have to keep rediscovering this? Must the 
     learning curve of presidents always cost many thousands of 
     lives? Has anyone at the White House read Samantha Power's 
     book?
       The cult of the exit strategy. A ``senior American official 
     who is involved in Syria policy'' plaintively said this to 
     Dexter Filkins of The New Yorker: ``People on the Hill ask 
     me, `Why can't we do a no-fly zone? Why can't we do military 
     strikes?' Of course we can do these things. The issue is, 
     where will it stop?'' The answer is, we don't know. But is 
     the gift of prophecy really a requirement for historical 
     action? Must we know

[[Page 6608]]

     the ending at the beginning? If so, then nobody would start a 
     business, or a book, or a medical treatment, or a love 
     affair, let alone an invasion of Normandy Beach. We can have 
     certainty about our objectives but not about our 
     circumstances. The most serious action is often 
     improvisatory, though its purposes should always be clear. 
     The prestige of ``the exit strategy'' in our culture is 
     another American attempt to deny the contingency of 
     experience and assert mastery over what cannot be mastered--
     in this instance, it is American control-freakishness applied 
     to the use of American force. But we often engage with what 
     we cannot master. No outcomes are assured, except perhaps 
     when we do nothing. We do not need to control the realm in 
     which we need to take action; we need only to have strong and 
     defensible reasons and strong and defensible means, and to 
     keep our wits, our analytical abilities, about us. After all, 
     there are many ways, good and bad, to end a military 
     commitment, as Obama himself has shown. All this talk of 
     exiting is designed only to inhibit us from entering. Like 
     its cousin ``the slippery slope,'' ``the exit strategy'' is 
     demagoguery masquerading as prudence.
       The eclipse of humanitarianism. Seventy thousand people 
     have died in the Syrian war, most of them at the hands of 
     their ruler. Since this number has appeared in the papers for 
     many months, the actual number must be much higher. The 
     slaughter is unceasing. But the debate about American 
     intervention is increasingly conducted in ``realist'' terms: 
     the threat to American interests posed by jihadism in Syria, 
     the intrigues of Iran and Hezbollah, the rattling of Israel, 
     the ruination of Jordan and Lebanon and Iraq. Those are all 
     good reasons for the president of the United States to act 
     like the president of the United States. But wouldn't the 
     prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocidal war be reason 
     enough? Is the death of scores and even hundreds of 
     thousands, and the displacement of millions, less significant 
     for American policy, and less quickening? The moral dimension 
     must be restored to our deliberations, the moral sting, or 
     else Obama, for all his talk about conscience, will have 
     presided over a terrible mutilation of American discourse: 
     the severance of conscience from action.

  Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleagues. I yield.

                          ____________________