[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 159 (2013), Part 13]
[House]
[Pages 18686-18688]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                    IT IS TIME TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern) for 5 minutes.
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, the time has come for our military to 
leave Afghanistan. Afghan President Karzai's refusal to sign the 
bilateral security agreement should be the last straw in putting an end 
to what is becoming America's longest war.
  After more than 12 years, hundreds of billions of dollars, and over 
2,100 American servicemen and -women killed in combat, it is time to 
bring all of our

[[Page 18687]]

troops home now. In poll after poll, the American people have made it 
clear that they want our troops home. Certainly, our brave men and 
women in uniform and their families have done everything that we have 
asked of them and more. We must not ask them to continue to fight, 
bleed, and die in Afghanistan for another 10 or 12 years to support a 
government more interested in extorting America and ripping off our tax 
dollars than working with us to strengthen its own security.
  Mr. Speaker, President Obama needs to turn this interminable conflict 
over to the Afghans. As of yesterday, 2,153 members of our Armed Forces 
have died in Afghanistan since 2001; another 19,526 have been wounded; 
and every Member of this Chamber knows that tens of thousands of our 
troops have returned home with invisible wounds to their minds and 
spirits. Suicide rates among our veterans are among the highest ever, 
and they continue to climb. For many, the care required to help heal 
these wounds will last a lifetime.
  It is estimated that health care and veteran benefits for the men and 
women deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan will cost trillions of dollars. 
In both human and fiscal terms, we simply cannot afford to waste more 
lives and dollars in Afghanistan.
  The President has not made a case about how any number of troops 
remaining in Afghanistan after 2014 can improve the confidence of 
Afghan forces when our current greater and more intensive engagement 
over the past decade has not been able to do so. It is completely 
unclear whether the April elections will improve the Afghan Government, 
given its ingrown corruption, sectarian divisions, and Taliban 
insurgency. There are no compelling reasons to remain.
  We need to turn Afghanistan over to the Afghans now, not 10 years 
from now. We need to bring our troops home by no later than the end of 
2014, just as President Obama promised. If this is the so-called ``zero 
option,'' then it is the best option. We do not need to keep another 
10,000 to 12,000 American troops in Afghanistan for another 10 years at 
the cost of about $80 billion or more each year. They will continue to 
be in harm's way; they will continue to be carrying out dangerous 
operations; they will continue to be wounded body and soul; and they 
will continue to be killed.
  For what? So one of the most corrupt governments in the world can 
continue living off of our blood and treasure? So military contractors 
can continue lining their pockets? We are cutting programs right and 
left in the budget, but we are supposed to keep pouring tens of 
billions of dollars into Afghanistan for another decade? All of it is 
borrowed money charged to our national credit card. I say enough is 
enough.
  In June, 305 Members of this House voted in support of an amendment 
that I offered along with Congressmen Walter Jones and Adam Smith to 
bring our troops home by the end of 2014 and to accelerate that process 
if possible. It clearly stated that if the President determined to keep 
U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014, then Congress should vote on 
authorizing that mission. Senators Merkley and Lee were ready to offer 
a similar amendment in the Senate when the defense bill was to be taken 
up over there. They had more than a dozen bipartisan cosponsors on 
their amendment.
  Instead, the FY14 NDAA went into conference negotiations without 
debate by the full Senate. In those negotiations, the principal Senate 
conferees demanded that the House amendment be completely watered down. 
The conference language only requires the President to ``consult'' with 
Congress about any post-2014 deployment of troops. That is worthless. 
It is absolutely worthless, Mr. Speaker. We don't need consultation. 
What we need is a vote. I call on Speaker Boehner and Leader Pelosi to 
take seriously the call of 305 Members of this House and schedule a 
vote next year on keeping thousands of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. 
Whether or not you support such a decision, the House needs to vote on 
it.
  It is time for us in Congress to do our job. It is time we stop 
asking our troops and their families to sacrifice their lives in a war 
that has outlived its purpose. It is time to bring our troops home. It 
is time to get out of Afghanistan.

                [From the New York Times, Nov. 23, 2013]

                    The Long Goodbye in Afghanistan

                        (By the Editorial Board)

       From his first campaign for the White House, President 
     Obama has vowed to end more than a decade of war, bring the 
     troops home and put America on a less militaristic footing. 
     He has reduced the forces in Afghanistan from about 100,000 
     in 2010 to about 47,000 today and has promised that all 
     American and international combat forces will be out by the 
     end of 2014.
       But he has also indicated that a residual force of American 
     troops will remain in Afghanistan to train Afghan security 
     forces and engage in counterterrorism missions. In all this 
     time, he has not made a clear and cogent case for any 
     particular number of troops or explained how a residual force 
     can improve the competency of Afghan forces when a much 
     broader and intensive American engagement over the last 
     decade has not.
       Yet last week the Obama administration announced that it 
     had reached an agreement with Afghanistan on a long-term 
     bilateral security arrangement that, officials say, would 
     allow up to 12,000 mostly American troops to be in that 
     country until 2024 and perhaps beyond--without Mr. Obama 
     offering any serious accounting to the American people for 
     maintaining a sizable military commitment there or offering a 
     clue to when, if ever, it might conclude.
       The administration's focus, instead, has been on whether an 
     Afghan tribal council and the Afghan Parliament will formally 
     approve the pact and whether President Hamid Karzai will sign 
     it.
       Even now, key details of the security agreement are 
     unclear. Mr. Karzai has spoken about a force of 10,000 to 
     15,000 American and NATO troops; President Obama has not yet 
     announced a figure, but officials have talked of 8,000 to 
     12,000.
       Officials have said the troops' main role will be to 
     continue to train and assist the 350,000-member Afghan 
     security force. The capability of the Afghan security force 
     has improved, but it still cannot defend the country even 
     after a $43 billion American investment in weaponry and 
     training. Proponents of a residual force also argue that it 
     is needed to protect Kabul, to prove that the United States 
     is not abandoning Afghanistan and to pressure the Taliban to 
     negotiate a political settlement, which military commanders 
     say is the only path to stability. In addition, since 
     Afghanistan cannot finance its security apparatus, American 
     officials say Congress is unlikely to keep paying for the 
     Afghan Army and police, at a cost that could range from $4 
     billion to $6 billion per year, unless Americans are there to 
     verify that the money is properly spent.
       The American forces are also expected to conduct 
     counterterrorism missions when needed. The draft agreement 
     allows United States Special Operations forces to have leeway 
     to conduct antiterrorism raids on private Afghan homes. As 
     Mr. Obama's letter to Mr. Karzai says, American troops will 
     be able to carry out the raids only under ``extraordinary 
     circumstances involving urgent risk to life and limb of U.S. 
     nationals.'' (Under current protocol, Afghan troops take the 
     lead in entering homes.) The pact also gives American 
     soldiers immunity from Afghan prosecution for actions taken 
     in the course of their duties. The failure to reach agreement 
     on this immunity issue blocked a long-term security deal 
     between the United States and Iraq and led to the final 
     withdrawal of troops there.
       President Obama said in May that the United States needs to 
     ``work with the Afghan government to train security forces, 
     and sustain a counterterrorism force, which ensures that Al 
     Qaeda can never again establish a safe haven to launch 
     attacks against us or our allies.'' Managing a productive 
     relationship with Afghanistan has always been difficult with 
     Mr. Karzai, who is an unpredictable, even dangerous reed on 
     which to build a cooperative future. And it is unclear if 
     Afghanistan, driven by corruption, sectarian divisions and 
     the Taliban insurgency can have any better governance when 
     elections are held next April.
       Mr. Karzai's long record of duplicitous behavior is just 
     one of the many reasons it is tempting, after a decade of war 
     and tremendous cost in lives and money, to argue that America 
     should just wash its hands of Afghanistan. There is something 
     unseemly about the United States having to cajole him into a 
     military alliance that is intended to benefit his fragile 
     country.
       Regardless of what he, the tribal council and the Afghan 
     Parliament decide, President Obama still has to make a case 
     for the deal to the American people.
                                  ____


                     [From Politico, Dec. 8, 2013]

                          Call Karzai's Bluff

          (By John Paul Schnapper-Casteras and Lawrence Korb)

       When Chuck Hagel, the U.S. secretary of defense, touched 
     down in Afghanistan on Saturday for an unannounced visit to 
     U.S.

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     troops and Afghan officials, it was telling that he had no 
     plans to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
       The snub appears deliberate; it reflects American 
     frustration with Karzai's recent decision to place fresh 
     obstacles in front of a stalled security pact with the United 
     States. Among other new conditions, Karzai threatened to 
     delay ratification until after April and demanded that 
     Washington engage the Taliban and release certain detainees 
     from the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Tensions rose 
     further after a U.S. drone strike killed civilians in Helmand 
     province, provoking this outburst from Karzai: ``For as long 
     as such arbitrary acts and oppression of foreign forces 
     continue, the security agreement with the United States will 
     not be signed.''
       It's time to play hardball. If Washington has any chance of 
     de-escalating the situation, it should look to the lessons of 
     negotiating a similar agreement in Iraq and prepare in 
     earnest for the ``zero option'' leaving no troops in 
     Afghanistan after 2014. Hagel's visit, unfortunately, has the 
     potential to reinforce two unhealthy facets of Karzai's 
     thinking: bolstering his fears that the United States seeks 
     to undermine Afghan sovereignty, and underscoring his belief 
     that he--and Afghanistan--occupies a place of strategic 
     preeminence in American policymakers' minds.
       The lessons from Baghdad are instructive. Soon after the 
     Iraq invasion, Washington tried to negotiate a comparable 
     accord, known as a Status of Forces Agreement, that 
     authorized the presence of troops and defined their status 
     and role. But interim Iraqi leaders recoiled, citing 
     sovereignty and legitimacy concerns. Instead, coalition 
     officials summarily granted themselves de facto SOFA rights--
     a provisional measure that actually lasted for years and 
     caused major blowback after contractors killed civilians and 
     were subsequently shielded from prosecution. When SOFA talks 
     reopened in 2008, they were so contentious and destabilizing 
     that some policymakers murmured about ``replacing'' Iraq's 
     Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In late 2008, the George W. 
     Bush administration eventually secured a three-year deal 
     after substantial compromises: Troops would withdraw first 
     from cities and then Iraq entirely, and would nominally be 
     subject to shared jurisdiction. As that agreement neared its 
     conclusion, the Obama administration put forward another SOFA 
     that would have authorized a residual U.S. military presence 
     past 2012. But the negotiations were profoundly divisive, and 
     the Obama administration eventually gave up and proceeded 
     with a complete withdrawal.
       Afghanistan bears striking similarities. Interim Afghan 
     officials one agreed to a de facto SOFA via a two-page 
     diplomatic ``note.'' In 2005, Karzai planned to offer a full-
     fledged agreement--but after a 2008 airstrike caused numerous 
     civilian casualties, he insisted on a reassessment of foreign 
     forces and a SOFA similar to Iraq's. By 2012, Washington and 
     Kabul had hammered out some high-level goals and reopened 
     SOFA talks, but controversy quickly ensued, particularly 
     surrounding issues of jurisdiction, village/night raids and 
     security guarantees. After months of negotiations and a 
     personal intervention by Secretary of State John Kerry last 
     month, it appeared that a deal was finally done. Karzai 
     convened a loya jirga of 2,500 tribal elders to vote on the 
     SOFA, which somewhat unexpectedly approved it. But then 
     Karzai added new conditions and re-escalated his rhetoric.
       There's little mystery here: Karzai has taken a page out of 
     Maliki's playbook. His move holds three lessons for 
     Washington:
       The zero option is real. Karzai apparently dismisses the 
     seriousness of a full U.S. withdrawal, recently smirking at 
     the prospect. Washington should now prepare for this option 
     in earnest--both to call Karzai's bluff and also because it 
     increasingly appears to be the only feasible course. The 
     White House should immediately ask the Pentagon to update its 
     plans, particularly since some officials there have 
     anonymously disavowed the practicality of the zero option. 
     Washington should also begin negotiating expanded access 
     rights in neighboring countries and consider reallocating 
     naval assets in the area to facilitate and compensate for 
     withdrawal of ground forces.
       All politics is local. Analysts are widely baffled about 
     what now motivates Karzai--perhaps some combination of 
     political and legacy concerns, with a dash of the paranoid 
     and erratic. But if anything will sway Karzai, it is likely 
     domestic political pressure. In Iraq, several spoilers lined 
     up--against the SOFA. Afghanistan is different. Outside of 
     the Taliban, the SOFA enjoys much greater local support--
     including among elders and members of Karzai's Cabinet, some 
     of whom publicly disagree with his latest demands and have 
     threatened to quit. Washington should stay closely attuned to 
     local political movements and work all back channels to build 
     and amplify support for the SOFA in the coming weeks.
       Look for a face-saving resolution. Karzai clearly cares 
     deeply about the SOFA, however misplaced his actions, so 
     providing him a graceful means of de-escalation is important. 
     While some policymakers have staunchly insisted that Karzai 
     must sign the accord, sheer adamancy failed in the final days 
     of Iraq's SOFA. Indeed, if Karzai is seeking to prove his 
     independence from Washington, then publicly insisting that he 
     obey U.S. diktats is not necessarily helpful. It would be 
     better to look for a few relatively harmless concessions to 
     offer Karzai, or frame discussions so as to allow him to fall 
     back upon the loya jirga's decision.
       But ultimately, the United States needs to be ready to walk 
     away. The aim of U.S. policy is not to keep troops in 
     Afghanistan indefinitely--the goal is to cooperate on 
     security in mutually beneficial and comparatively modest 
     ways, and that can be done without boots on the ground. If 
     Karzai is unwilling to accept reasonable terms that his own 
     negotiators and loya jirga have approved, then the United 
     States should prepare to protect its interests through other 
     means. At this point, the zero option is entirely realistic 
     and might even yield more favorable negotiating terms with 
     Karzai's successor.

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