[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 159 (2013), Part 12]
[House]
[Page 17575]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              TALK TO IRAN

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff) for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, for much of the past decade, Iran's nuclear 
weapons development program has been a top national security concern 
for the United States. An Iran armed with nuclear weapons, capable of 
threatening Israel and other regional states, would touch off a nuclear 
arms race in the world's most volatile region.
  For this reason, I have pressed for ever-increasing sanctions to 
isolate Iran from the global economy and have supported a policy that 
leaves all options on the table, including military force. The stakes 
are too high to risk any miscalculation of our resolve by Iran's 
leaders.
  In pushing for ever more punitive sanctions, I have held out the hope 
that increased economic pressure might force Iran to give up its 
nuclear weapons ambition and rejoin the community of nations. Now we 
are at a moment in the standoff with Tehran that will test that 
assumption.
  In repeated statements since his election as Iran's new President in 
June, Hassan Rouhani expressed interest in exploring a negotiated end 
to the sanctions in exchange for walking back its nuclear program. 
While the first Geneva meeting did not lead to a breakthrough on an 
interim deal, the parties reportedly came close and will be reconvening 
today for a second round.
  Some have called on the Senate to continue work on a new round of 
sanctions that was passed by the House with my support earlier this 
year. Advocates of this approach say that sanctions brought us to this 
point, and increased pressure during the negotiations will improve the 
likelihood of success at the bargaining table.
  I disagree.
  President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry have asked for more time 
to test Iran's willingness to enter into a tough and verifiable 
agreement, and I think we should give it to them.
  I am pleased to see reports that there appears to be a bipartisan 
agreement in the Senate that we will hold off for now. We will know 
soon enough if the Iranian regime is serious about a new direction in 
its nuclear program and in its relationship with the West. If it is 
not, there will be ample opportunity to tighten the stranglehold on 
Iran's economy, and further sanctions will have my full support.
  Some have warned that any relaxation of sanctions in an interim deal 
risks unraveling the whole sanctions regime. This is not an illusory 
concern, and for this reason, any partial lifting of the freeze on 
Iranian assets must be quickly reversible if the Iranians balk on a 
final deal; but the absence of an interim deal is also problematic if 
it means another 6 months of Iranian enrichment. The Iranians must be 
made to understand that, if they walk away or cheat, the sanctions will 
be tightened to the point of strangulation--and the international 
community must be prepared to make good on that threat.
  I have no illusions about the character of the Iranian regime; nor do 
I trust it. I do not believe that we can look into Rouhani's eyes and 
see the truth, let alone his soul. Even if Rouhani were serious about 
his intentions, there is no guarantee that Iran's Supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, would bless any agreement that forces Iran to 
verifiably foreswear the development of the bomb.
  Ultimately, this is not about trust. It is not about making 
concessions to Iran or awarding the mullahs for thwarting the will of 
the international community for many years. It is about seizing the 
opportunity to see whether we can end Iran's nuclear weapons program 
without resorting to military action; and if we cannot, no doubt it 
will remain that the United States made every effort to resolve this 
grave threat diplomatically.
  No negotiation is without risk, and the Iranians' track record is 
cause for great skepticism. The administration must not accept a bad 
deal, but neither should it be prevented from testing whether it can 
obtain a good deal that advances our security interests and those of 
our allies.
  Yitzhak Rabin, the former Israeli Prime Minister who signed the Oslo 
Accords two decades ago, once noted:

       You make peace with your enemies, not the Queen of Holland.

  I agree and urge us to give diplomacy a chance.

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