[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 159 (2013), Part 12]
[House]
[Pages 17045-17056]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  LAWSUIT ABUSE REDUCTION ACT OF 2013

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 403, I 
call up the bill (H.R. 2655) to amend rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to improve attorney accountability, and for other 
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 403, the bill 
is considered read.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 2655

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act 
     of 2013''.

     SEC. 2. ATTORNEY ACCOUNTABILITY.

       (a) Sanctions Under Rule 11.--Rule 11(c) of the Federal 
     Rules of Civil Procedure is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may'' and inserting 
     ``shall'';
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Rule 5'' and all that 
     follows through ``motion.'' and inserting ``Rule 5.''; and
       (3) in paragraph (4), by striking ``situated'' and all that 
     follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting 
     ``situated, and to compensate the parties that were injured 
     by such conduct. Subject to the limitations in paragraph (5), 
     the sanction shall consist of an order to pay to the party or 
     parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred as a 
     direct result of the violation, including reasonable 
     attorneys' fees and costs. The court may also impose 
     additional appropriate sanctions, such as striking the 
     pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a 
     nonmonetary nature, or, if warranted for effective 
     deterrence, an order directing payment of a penalty into the 
     court.''.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or an 
     amendment made by this Act shall be construed to bar or 
     impede the assertion or development of new claims, defenses, 
     or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including 
     civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United 
     States.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) 
and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.


                             General Leave

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend 
their remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 2655, currently 
under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  H.R. 2655, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, would restore mandatory 
sanctions for frivolous lawsuits filed in Federal Court.
  Many Americans may not realize it, but today, under what is called 
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no 
requirement that those who file frivolous lawsuits pay for the 
unjustified legal costs they impose on their victims. As a result, the 
current rule 11 goes largely unenforced. When there is no guarantee of 
compensation, the victims of frivolous lawsuits have little incentive 
to spend even more money to pursue additional litigation to have the 
case declared frivolous.
  H.R. 2655 would finally provide light at the end of the tunnel for 
the victims of frivolous lawsuits by requiring sanctions against those 
who file them, sanctions that include paying their victims the full 
cost of their reasonable expenses incurred as a direct result of the 
rule 11 violation, including attorneys' fees.
  The bill also strikes the current provision in rule 11 that allows 
lawyers to avoid sanctions by making frivolous claims and demands by 
simply withdrawing them within 21 days. This change eliminates the 
``free pass'' lawyers now have to file frivolous lawsuits in Federal 
Court.
  To be clear, under rule 11, a lawsuit is frivolous if it is presented 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, 
or needlessly increase the cost of litigation if it is not warranted by 
existing law or if the factual contentions have no evidentiary support. 
In other words, a lawsuit will only be found frivolous if it has no 
basis in law or fact.
  Yet the current lack of mandatory sanctions leads to the regular 
filing of lawsuits that are clearly baseless. For example, in just the 
last year, a small business owner was sued for violations of Federal 
regulations in a parking lot that he doesn't own or lease. A woman had 
her car repossessed and then filed a $5 million Federal lawsuit for the 
half tank of gas she had left in the car.

                              {time}  1315

  A high school teacher sued a school district claiming it 
discriminated

[[Page 17046]]

against her because she has a phobia--a fear of young children. Her 
case was dismissed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but 
that didn't prevent her from filing a Federal lawsuit.
  These real yet absurd cases have real-life consequences for their 
victims who have to shell out thousands of dollars just to respond to 
frivolous pleadings, endure sleepless nights, and spend time away from 
their family, work, and customers. Let's not forget that the victims of 
frivolous lawsuits are real victims.
  Do any of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle claim that 
judges should have the discretion to deny damage awards to victims of 
legal wrongs proved in court? If not, why should judges have the 
discretion to deny damage awards to victims of frivolous lawsuits who 
prove in court that the case against them was frivolous?
  It is difficult to see how a vote against the bill before us today 
could be interpreted as anything other than a denial that victims of 
frivolous lawsuits are indeed real victims. But indeed they are real 
victims, and they deserve to be guaranteed compensation when they prove 
the claims against them are frivolous in court.
  Let's also remember that the victims of lawsuit abuse are not just 
those who are actually sued. Rather, we all suffer under a system in 
which innocent Americans everywhere live under the constant fear of a 
potentially bankrupting frivolous lawsuit.
  As the former chairman of The Home Depot Company has written:

       An unpredictable legal system casts a shadow over every 
     plan and investment. It is devastating for start-ups. The 
     cost of even one ill-timed abusive lawsuit can bankrupt a 
     growing company and cost hundreds of thousands of jobs.

  The prevalence of frivolous lawsuits is reflected in the absurd 
warning labels companies must place on their products to limit their 
liability. A 5-inch brass fishing lure with three hooks is labeled, 
``Harmful if swallowed.'' A vanishing fabric marker with disappearing 
ink warns it should not be used as a writing instrument for signing 
checks or any legal documents. A label on a Scooter says, ``Warning: 
This product moves when used.'' A household iron contains the warning, 
``Never iron clothes while they are being worn.'' And a cardboard sun 
shield that keeps sun off the dashboard warns, ``Do not drive with sun 
shade up.''
  The potential for frivolous lawsuits are behind all these absurd 
warning labels which, while humorous in their own way, serve as a 
warning to us about what the world will increasingly look like if we 
don't make the rules more fair.
  Today, absurd lawsuits can sometimes bring sanctions against those 
who filed them; but even when they do, the current rules result in far 
too little compensation for the victims of the frivolous lawsuit.
  In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama said:

       I'm willing to look at other ideas to rein in frivolous 
     lawsuits.

  Well, I hope the President has time to read this one-page bill and 
lend his support to a proposal that would significantly reduce the 
burden of frivolous litigation on innocent Americans.
  I thank the former chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
Congressman Lamar Smith, for introducing this simple, commonsense 
legislation that would do so much to prevent lawsuit abuse and restore 
Americans' confidence in the legal system.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I rise in opposition to H.R. 2655. I suggest that what we are doing 
here this afternoon will turn the clock back to a time when the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure discouraged civil rights cases, limited 
judicial discretion, and permitted satellite litigation to run wild. I 
repeat, we may turn the clock back to a time when the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure discouraged civil rights cases, limited judicial 
discretion, and permitted satellite litigation to run wild.
  And here is how it accomplishes it, by undoing the 1993 amendments to 
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by: one, restricting 
judicial discretion; two, requiring mandatory sanctions for even 
unintentional violations; and three, eliminating the current rule's 21-
day safe harbor provision, which has been so beneficial to our Federal 
court system.
  And so to put it as simply as possible, H.R. 2655 will have a 
disastrous impact on the administration of justice.
  Now, how would this bill chill legitimate civil rights litigation?
  Civil rights cases often concern novel issues which made them 
particularly susceptible to rule 11 before the 1993 amendments. I hope 
all the Members of this body appreciate how significant this is and the 
important history that was made during that earlier period of time.
  For example, a 1991 Federal Judicial Center study found that the 
incidence of rule 11 motions was ``higher in civil rights cases than in 
some other types of cases.''
  Another study showed that, while civil rights cases comprised about 
11 percent of Federal cases filed, more than 22 percent of the cases in 
which sanctions had been imposed were civil rights cases.
  This legislation will also substantially increase the amount, cost, 
and intensity of civil litigation and create more grounds for 
unnecessary delay and harassment in the courtroom. Experts in civil 
procedure are virtually unanimous on this point.
  By allowing rule 11 to be used as a tool to impose court costs on the 
other side, the 1983 version spawned a virtual cottage industry of rule 
11 litigation. Each party had a financial incentive to tie up the other 
in rule 11 proceedings.
  Professor Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell University has demonstrated 
that roughly one-third of all Federal lawsuits were burdened by 
satellite litigation during the period when this prior version of the 
rule was in effect. Attorneys had a double duty, he argued: ``one to 
try the case, and the other to try the opposing counsel.''
  In recognition of these problems, the Judicial Conference amended the 
rule in 1993 to its present form. And so we should realize that we have 
the support and appreciate the constructive assistance of many of these 
organizations: the American Bar Association, the Alliance for Justice, 
the Consumer Federation of America, the National Consumer Law Center, 
the National Consumers League, Public Citizen, and the United States 
Public Interest Research Group, among others.
  In addition, the legislation is opposed by the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, the principal policymaking body for the judicial 
branch charged with proposing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure under the careful, deliberate process outlined in the Rules 
Enabling Act.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

         Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
           Judicial Conference of the United States,
                                    Washington, DC, July 23, 2013.
     Hon. John Conyers, Jr.
     Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Conyers: We write to present the views 
     of the Judicial Conference Rules Committees on H.R. 2655, the 
     Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2013.
       As the current chairs of the Judicial Conference's 
     Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure (the 
     ``Standing Rules Committee'') and the Advisory Committee on 
     the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the ``Advisory 
     Committee''), we oppose H.R. 2655, which seeks to reduce 
     lawsuit abuse by amending Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
     Civil Procedure. The bill would reinstate a mandatory 
     sanctions provision of Rule 11 that was adopted in 1983 and 
     eliminated in 1993. The bill would also eliminate a provision 
     adopted in 1993 to allow a party to withdraw challenged 
     pleadings on a voluntary basis, without the costs and delay 
     to the challenging party of seeking and obtaining a court 
     order. The concerns we express are the same concerns 
     expressed by the Judicial Conference in 2004 and 2005, and by 
     the Standing Rules Committee and Advisory Committee in 2011, 
     when similar legislation was introduced.
       We greatly appreciate, and share, the desire to improve the 
     civil justice system in our federal courts, including by 
     reducing

[[Page 17047]]

     frivolous filings. But legislation that would restore the 
     1983 version of Rule 11 by undoing the 1993 amendments would 
     create a ``cure'' far worse than the problem it is meant to 
     solve. Such legislation also contravenes the longstanding 
     Judicial Conference policy opposing direct amendment of the 
     federal rules by legislation instead of through the careful, 
     deliberate process Congress established in the Rules Enabling 
     Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2071-2077.
       The 1993 changes followed years of examination and were 
     made on the Judicial Conference's strong recommendation, with 
     the Supreme Court's approval, and after congressional review. 
     The 1983 provision for mandatory sanctions was eliminated 
     because it did not provide meaningful relief from the 
     litigation behavior it was meant to address, and instead 
     generated wasteful satellite litigation that had little to do 
     with the merits of cases and that added to the time and costs 
     of litigation.
       The 1983 version of Rule 11 required sanctions for every 
     violation of the rule. This mandatory sanctions provision 
     quickly became a tool of abuse in civil litigation. Seeking 
     to use mandatory sanctions to their advantage, aggressive 
     lawyers filed motions for Rule 11 sanctions in response to 
     virtually every filing in a civil case. Much time and money 
     was spent in Rule 11 battles that had everything to do with 
     strategic gamesmanship and little to do with underlying 
     claims. Rule 11 motions came to be met with counter-motions 
     that sought Rule 11 sanctions for making the original Rule 11 
     motion.
       The 1983 version of Rule 11 spawned thousands of court 
     decisions unrelated to the merits of the cases, sowed discord 
     in the bar, and generated widespread criticism. As letters 
     from the Judicial Conference commenting on proposed 
     legislation similar to H.R. 2655 pointed out, some of the 
     serious problems caused by the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 
     included:
       1. creating a significant incentive to file unmeritorious 
     Rule 11 motions by providing a greater possibility of 
     receiving money;
       2. engendering potential conflicts of interest between 
     clients and their lawyers;
       3. exacerbating tensions between lawyers; and
       4. providing a disincentive to abandon or withdraw a 
     pleading or claim that lacked merit--thereby admitting error 
     and risking sanctions--even after determining that it no 
     longer was supportable in law or fact.
       The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 were designed to remedy the 
     major problems with the rule, strike a fair balance between 
     competing interests, and allow parties and courts to focus on 
     the merits of the underlying cases rather than on Rule 11 
     motions. Since 1993, the rule has established a safe harbor, 
     providing a party 21 days within which to withdraw a 
     particular claim or defense before sanctions can be imposed. 
     If the party fails to withdraw an allegedly frivolous claim 
     or defense within the 21 days, a court may impose sanctions, 
     including assessing reasonable attorney fees. The 1983 
     version of Rule 11 authorized a court to sanction discovery-
     related abuse under Rule 11, Rule 26(g), or Rule 37, which 
     created confusion. Under the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, 
     sanctioning of discovery-related abuse is limited to Rules 26 
     and 37, which provide for sanctions that include awards of 
     reasonable attorney fees.
       The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 culminated a long, critical 
     examination of the rule begun four years earlier. The 
     Advisory Committee reviewed a significant number of empirical 
     studies of the 1983 version of Rule 11, including three 
     separate studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 
     1985, 1988, and 1991, a Third Circuit Task Force report on 
     Rule 11 in 1989, and a New York State Bar Committee report in 
     1987.
       After reviewing the literature and empirical studies of 
     problems caused by the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, the 
     Advisory Committee issued in 1990 a preliminary call for 
     general comment on the operation and effect of the rule. The 
     response was substantial and clearly called for a change in 
     the rule. The Advisory Committee concluded that the cost-
     shifting in Rule 11 created an incentive for too many 
     unnecessary Rule 11 motions. Amendments to Rule 11 were 
     drafted by the Advisory Committee, approved by the Standing 
     Rules Committee, and approved by the Judicial Conference. The 
     Supreme Court promulgated and transmitted the amendments to 
     Congress in May 1993 after extensive scrutiny and debate by 
     the bench, bar, and public in accordance with the Rules 
     Enabling Act process.
       Experience with the amended rule since 1993 has 
     demonstrated a marked decline in Rule 11 satellite litigation 
     without any noticeable increase in frivolous filings. In June 
     1995, the Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of 1,130 
     lawyers and 148 judges on the effects of the 1993 Rule 11 
     amendments. About 580 attorneys and 120 judges responded. The 
     Center found general satisfaction with the amended rule. It 
     also found that a majority of the judges and lawyers did not 
     favor a provision that would require mandatory sanctions when 
     the rule is violated.
       In 2005, the Federal Judicial Center surveyed federal trial 
     judges to get a clearer picture of how the revised Rule 11 
     was operating. A copy of the study is enclosed. The study 
     showed that judges on the front lines--those who must contend 
     with frivolous litigation and apply Rule 11--strongly believe 
     that the current rule works well. The study's findings 
     include the following highlights:
       More than 80 percent of the 278 district judges surveyed 
     indicated that ``Rule 11 is needed and it is just right as it 
     now stands'';
       87 percent prefer the existing Rule 11 to the 1983 version 
     or the version proposed by legislation (e.g., H.R. 4571 (the 
     Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004) or H.R. 420 (the Lawsuit 
     Abuse Reduction Act of 2005));
       85 percent strongly or moderately support Rule 11's safe 
     harbor provisions;
       91 percent oppose the proposed requirement that sanctions 
     be imposed for every Rule 11 violation;
       84 percent disagree with the proposition that an award of 
     attorney fees should be mandatory for every Rule 11 
     violation;
       85 percent believe that the amount of groundless civil 
     litigation has not grown since the promulgation of the 1993 
     rule (for judges commissioned before 1992) or since their 
     first year as a federal district judge (for judges 
     commissioned after January 1, 1992), with 12 percent noting 
     that such litigation has not been a problem, 19 percent 
     noting that such litigation decreased during their tenure on 
     the federal bench, and 54 percent noting that such litigation 
     has remained relatively constant; and
       72 percent believe that addressing sanctions for discovery 
     abuse in Rules 26(g) and 37 is better than in Rule 11.
       The findings of the Federal Judicial Center underscore the 
     judiciary's united opposition to legislation amending Rule 
     11. Lawyers share this view. In 2005, the American Bar 
     Association issued a resolution opposing a proposed bill 
     similar to H.R. 2655.
       Minimizing frivolous filings is, of course, vital. But 
     there is no need to reinstate the 1983 version of Rule 11 to 
     work toward this goal. Judges have many tools available to 
     respond to, and deter, frivolous pleadings. Those tools 
     include 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(e), which requires courts to 
     dismiss cases brought in forma pauperis that the court 
     determines are frivolous or malicious or fail to state a 
     claim, and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915A, which requires courts to 
     dismiss prisoner complaints against governmental entities, 
     officers, or employees that are frivolous, malicious, or fail 
     to state a claim. Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes courts to dismiss 
     pleadings that fail to state a claim on which relief can be 
     granted. Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code 
     authorizes sanctions against lawyers for ``unreasonably and 
     vexatiously'' multiplying the proceedings in any case. And 
     the present version of Rule 11 itself provides an effective, 
     balanced tool, without the problems and satellite litigation 
     the 1983 version created.
       In May 2010, the Advisory Committee held a major conference 
     on civil litigation, examining the problems of costs and 
     delay--which encompass frivolous filings--and potential ways 
     to improve the system. The Conference encouraged, and 
     generated, a broad spectrum of criticisms by lawyers, 
     litigants (including businesses and governmental entities), 
     judges, and academics of the current approaches to federal 
     civil cases, including the rules, and proposals for change. 
     Conspicuous in their absence were any criticism of Rule 11 or 
     any proposal to restore the 1983 version of the rule. Three 
     years after the Conference, the Advisory Committee and 
     Standing Rules Committee have approved publication of rules 
     amendments designed to respond to suggestions made at the 
     Conference on new means of reducing cost and delay in civil 
     litigation and enhancing practical access to the federal 
     courts. These three years of intense work did not find any 
     reason to consider Rule 11 amendments.
       Undoing the 1993 Rule 11 amendments would frustrate the 
     purpose and intent of the Rules Enabling Act. Congress 
     designed the Rules Enabling Act process in 1934 and reformed 
     it in 1988 to produce the best rules possible by ensuring 
     broad public participation and thorough review by the bench, 
     the bar, and the academy. The Act charges the judiciary with 
     the task of neutral, independent, and thorough analysis of 
     the rules and their operation. The Rules Committees are 
     dedicated to extensive study and analysis of the rules, 
     including empirical research, so that they can propose rules 
     that will best serve the American justice system and will not 
     produce unintended consequences. Experience has shown that 
     this process works well.
       In summary, experience, research, and thoughtful 
     deliberation have shown that there is no need to reinstate 
     the 1983 version of Rule 11 that proved contentious and 
     costly to litigants and diverted so much time and energy of 
     the bar and bench. Doing so would add to, not improve, the 
     problems of costs and delay that we are working to address. 
     We urge you on behalf of the Rules Committees to not adopt 
     the proposed legislation amending Rule 11.
       Thank you for considering the Rules Committees' views. We 
     look forward to continuing to work together to ensure that 
     our civil justice system is working well to fulfill its vital 
     role. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact 
     Benjamin Robinson, Deputy Rules Officer and Counsel, at 202-
     502-1820.
           Sincerely,
     Jeffrey S. Sutton,

[[Page 17048]]

       U.S. Circuit Judge, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice 
     and Procedure.
     David G. Campbell,
       U.S. District Judge, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil 
     Rules.

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to 
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks), the 
chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman for 
yielding me this time. I also want to express my appreciation to 
Chairman Goodlatte and Chairman Smith for both introducing and bringing 
forth this simple but important and much-needed legislation.
  Madam Speaker, in order to stop lawsuit abuse, promote jobs in the 
economy, and restore basic fairness to our civil justice system, rule 
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be amended.
  Rule 11 provides for one of the most basic requirements for 
litigation in Federal court: that papers filed with a Federal district 
court must be based on both the facts and the law. In other words, rule 
11 imposes on attorneys the very modest obligation to undertake a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and law underlying a claim before 
filing it.
  This is a simple requirement, Madam Speaker, but one that both sides 
to a lawsuit must abide by if we are to have a properly functioning 
Federal court system. Unfortunately, the current version of rule 11 
permits attorneys to file a lawsuit first and then try to back up their 
claims with law and fact later. This is because, under the current 
rules, failure to comply with rule 11 does not necessarily result in 
the imposition of sanctions.
  The fact that litigants can violate rule 11 without penalty 
significantly reduces the deterrent effect of rule 11, which harms the 
integrity of the Federal courts and leads to both plaintiffs and 
defendants being forced to respond to frivolous claims and arguments. 
The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act corrects this flaw by requiring that 
Federal district court judges impose sanctions when rule 11 is 
violated.
  Mandatory sanctions will more strongly discourage litigants from 
knowingly making frivolous claims in Federal court. It will also 
relieve litigants from the financial burden of having to respond to 
frivolous claims, as the legislation requires those who violate rule 11 
to reimburse the opposing party for reasonable expenses incurred as a 
direct result of the violation.
  Additionally, the legislation eliminates rule 11's 21-day safe 
harbor, which currently gives litigants a free pass to make frivolous 
claims so long as they withdraw those claims if the opposing side 
objects.
  According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the goal of the 
rules is to ensure that every action and proceeding in Federal court be 
determined in a ``just, speedy, and inexpensive'' manner. Madam 
Speaker, I believe that this goal is best served through mandatory 
sanctions for violating this simple requirement of rule 11 that every 
filing be based on both the law and the facts.
  So I urge my colleagues to support the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act to 
restore mandatory sanctions to rule 11.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased now to yield such time as he 
may consume to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), 
a senior member of the House Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 2655, 
the so-called Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act. Unfortunately, rather than 
reduce abusive litigation, this bill will have just the opposite 
effect.
  We don't need to speculate about the disastrous effect of this 
legislation because we know from experience just what a fiasco it will 
be. The rule this legislation would restore was in effect from 1983 
until 1993. It was a disaster.
  After a decade with this rule, the Judicial Conference, the 
rulemaking body for the Federal judiciary, rightly rejected it in favor 
of the rule we have today. In fact, this legislation goes even beyond 
the text of the 1983 rule, broadening the flawed mandatory sanctions 
even further.
  Worse still, the Judiciary Committee has not made even the pretense 
of considering this very radical change in civil procedure with any 
care. In fact, no hearings have been held on this legislation in this 
Congress.
  The process, or lack of it, demonstrates the wisdom of the Rules 
Enabling Act, in which Congress gave the Judicial Conference the 
responsibility for reviewing court rules and proposing changes. They 
have done this job admirably, expending years of careful study to 
existing rules, how they are functioning, and the implications of any 
proposed changes.
  While the sponsor has expressed the desire to limit unnecessary 
litigation, the experience with the old rule 11, which this bill would 
restore, was the exact opposite. Rule 11 litigation became a routine 
part of civil litigation, infecting one-third of all cases. Rather than 
serving as a disincentive, the old rule 11 actually made the system 
even more litigious and more costly.

                              {time}  1330

  In the decade following the 1983 amendments, which this bill would 
restore, there were almost 7,000 reported rule 11 cases, becoming part 
of approximately one-third of all Federal lawsuits. Many civil cases, 
one-third, became two cases: one case on the merits and the other on 
dueling rule 11 complaints.
  Madam Speaker, it is rare in life that you get a controlled 
scientific experiment, but we had one here from 1983 to 1993. We saw 
the results, and they were disastrous, and only incautious people try 
to repeat disastrous scientific experiments.
  The drain on the courts' and the parties' resources caused the 
Judicial Conference to revisit the rule and to adopt the changes that 
this bill would undo. In a July 23, 2013, letter to Chairman Goodlatte 
and Ranking Member Conyers, Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and chair of the Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure and Judge David Campbell of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Arizona and chair of the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules said:

       Experience, research, and thoughtful deliberation have 
     shown that there is no need to reinstate the 1983 version of 
     rule 11 that proved contentious and costly to litigants and 
     diverted so much time and energy of the bar and bench. Doing 
     so would add to, not improve, the problems of costs and delay 
     that we are working to address. We urge you on behalf of the 
     Rules Committee to not adopt the proposed legislation 
     amending rule 11.

  I might add that, in committee, the majority quoted a survey of 
judges from 1993 saying that we shouldn't change the rules then. Today, 
the judges very much are very glad we changed the rule because they 
have lived under both systems.
  Madam Speaker, in addition to all these considerations of costs, the 
bill would hinder the evolution of the common law. One way the common 
law evolves is by people making claims in court, especially in civil 
rights cases. Civil rights cases often involve an argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of a new law, and often they have relied upon novel legal 
theories that are particularly susceptible to someone claiming that 
they are abusive or frivolous. Had the provisions of this bill been in 
place at the time, they could have discouraged a number of landmark 
civil right cases, including BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION of Topeka, and 
they could prevent new cases from ever being considered. Perhaps that 
is why all the civil rights groups, all the consumer rights groups 
oppose this bill.
  Madam Speaker, the courts have ample authority to sanction conduct 
that undermines the integrity of our legal system, but this legislation 
is the wrong solution in search of a problem. By taking us back to a 
time when rule 11 actually promoted routine, costly, and unnecessary 
litigation, this bill is a cure worse than the disease. We know what 
this rule does, and the courts rightly rejected it 20 years ago. We

[[Page 17049]]

should benefit from that experience, not repeat the scientific 
experiment, and reject this legislation.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 5 minutes to 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith), the former chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee and the chief sponsor of this legislation.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Madam Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Goodlatte 
for yielding me time and for also bringing the bill to the House floor 
today, and for all of his hard work on this legislation.
  The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, known as LARA, is only 1-1/2 pages 
long, but it would prevent the filing of hundreds of thousands of pages 
of privileged lawsuits in Federal court.
  For example, in recent years, frivolous lawsuits have been filed 
against The Weather Channel for failing to accurately predict storms, 
against television shows people claimed were too scary, and against 
fast-food companies because inactive children gained weight.
  Frivolous lawsuits have become too common in our society. Lawyers who 
bring these cases have everything to gain and nothing to lose under 
current rules, which permit plaintiffs' lawyers to file frivolous 
suits, no matter how absurd the claims, with no penalty whatsoever. 
Meanwhile, defendants are faced with years of litigation and 
substantial attorneys' fees.
  These cases, and many like them, have wrongly cost innocent 
individuals and business owners their reputations and their hard-earned 
dollars. According to the research firm Towers Perrin, the annual 
direct cost of American tort litigation now exceeds $260 billion a 
year, or over $850 billion per person in America.
  Before 1993, it was mandatory for judges to impose sanctions, such as 
orders to pay for the other side's legal expenses, when lawyers filed 
frivolous lawsuits. Then the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, an obscure 
branch of the courts, made penalties optional. This needs to be 
reversed by Congress.
  As Chairman Goodlatte noted, even President Obama has expressed a 
willingness to limit frivolous lawsuits. If the President is serious 
about stopping these meritless claims, he will support mandatory 
sanctions for frivolous lawsuits to avoid making frivolous promises.
  LARA requires lawyers who file frivolous lawsuits to pay the 
attorneys' fees and court costs for innocent defendants. Further, LARA 
expressly provides that no changes ``shall be construed to bar or 
impede the assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or 
remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights 
laws or under the Constitution of the United States.'' So civil rights 
law would not be affected in any way by LARA.
  Opponents often argue that reinstating mandatory sanctions for 
frivolous lawsuits impedes judicial discretion, but this is not true. 
Under LARA, judges retain the discretion to determine whether or not a 
claim is frivolous. If a judge determines at their discretion that a 
claim is frivolous, they must award sanctions. This ensures that 
victims of frivolous lawsuits obtain compensation, but the decision to 
find a claim frivolous remains with the judge.
  LARA applies to both plaintiffs and defendants. It applies to cases 
brought by individuals, as well as by businesses, including business 
claims filed to harass competitors and illicitly gain market share.
  The American people are looking for solutions to obvious problems to 
lawsuit abuse. LARA restores accountability to our legal system by 
reinstating mandatory sanctions for attorneys who file frivolous 
lawsuits. Though it will not stop all lawsuit abuse, LARA encourages 
attorneys to think twice before filing a frivolous lawsuit.
  I thank Chairman Goodlatte again for bringing this much-needed 
legislation to the House floor, and I ask my colleagues who oppose 
frivolous lawsuits and who want to protect hardworking Americans from 
false claims to support the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act.
  Madam Speaker, I want to make one other point, and this goes to the 
earlier discussion we just had about judicial surveys.
  751 Federal judges responded to the 1990 survey in which they 
overwhelmingly supported a rule 11 with mandatory sanctions. In the 
2005 survey, only 278 judges responded, and over half of the judges who 
responded to the 2005 survey had no experience whatsoever under the 
stronger rule 11 because they were appointed to the bench after 1992. 
So the 2005 survey tells us very little about how judges comparatively 
view the stronger versus the weaker rule 11.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am now pleased to yield as much time as 
she may consume to the gentlewoman from Houston, Texas (Ms. Jackson 
Lee), a senior active member of the House Judiciary Committee.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, let me thank the gentleman for his 
outstanding leadership of this committee, and let me thank the manager 
as well. This is an important initiative. Using the time to be able to 
speak to the Members is very important, and I am glad to have been 
given the courtesy of being yielded as much time, and I will use it 
efficiently for this particular legislation.
  This is another gift to large, prosperous, and threatening entities 
against a single plaintiff, the plaintiff who secures a lawyer, who is 
attempting to create the scales of justice and to balance, if you will, 
the needs of that individual plaintiff, those small plaintiffs, those 
collective plaintiffs who are seeking justice.
  It is a fact that the threat of lawsuits is not a concern of small 
businesses, as has been represented. A 2008 study by the National 
Federation of Independent Business indicated that the biggest threat 
facing small businesses was other concerns and was not costs and 
frequency of lawsuits. That was No. 65. They have other issues that we 
should be concerned about.
  It is a fact that judges support the current version of the rule, and 
rule 11 is just one of many tools that judges use. It is not the only 
tool to be able to be responsive to someone who may be abusing the 
system.
  Remember, we are here to perpetuate justice, and justice has scales. 
In many instances, that scale is tipped towards the one with the most 
money, the deepest pockets, and the longest time to wear you out as a 
plaintiff.
  Let me refresh my colleagues' minds and understanding of the Federal 
system, that tort cases are a very small percentage of that civil 
docket. So this is not an instance. Many of these cases are filed in 
State court, these personal injury cases, these cases dealing with 
large damages because people have been injured because of bad products 
and other matters.
  Here we have a bill looking for a problem. In actuality, LARA will 
increase, not decrease, litigation, and you can see the spiking that 
occurred. The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act would return rule 11 to the 
1983 version. Litigation spiked after the 1983 amendment to rule 11. 
From 1982 to the peak in 1991, satellite litigation increased by more 
than 10,000 percent. Here we go with a gift to those who are truly 
litigious.
  Just as we have been on the floor of the House pounding the 
Affordable Care Act because cancelation letters have been sent--they 
haven't been sent by Republicans. They haven't been sent by Democrats. 
They haven't been sent by Health and Human Services. They haven't been 
sent by people who are committed to making sure every American has 
health insurance. They have been sent by fat-cat insurance companies 
who are sending cancelation letters.
  Here we go again, the scale of justice imbalanced. Again, the same 
problem: the mother, the single parent, the family waiting to get on 
the Affordable Care Act. In the normal course of the process, they get 
a cancelation letter. What an unnecessary act. That letter could have 
been that they were modifying their insurance, but there go the big 
guys again. You haven't heard one single sound coming out of the mouths 
of insurance companies to answer the question of why did they send the 
letters, and here we are on the floor of the House making it even 
worse.

[[Page 17050]]

  Under the LARA regime, with mandatory sanctions and no opportunity to 
correct mistakes, the parties to a lawsuit have every incentive to file 
rule 11 complaints and seek court costs and legal fees, and to defend 
against such actions to the bitter end. This is a dynamic that should 
not happen. We should allow a pullback. We should allow a correction. 
All we are doing is just throwing them over the cliff and under the 
bus.
  The changes would create a disincentive to abandon or withdraw a 
pleading or claim that lacks merit and thereby admit error after 
determining that it no longer was supportable by law or fact. As I have 
indicated, we have seen this kind since 1983 spike.
  I have another statistic. Rule 11 cases spiked to 7,000 during the 
decade following the 1983 rule. So when a lawyer wants to do right with 
his client, the little guys, then, of course, they are blocked from 
solving the problems.
  They use horror stories like demand letters, where a lawyer writes a 
letter demanding compensation in order to get a potential defendant to 
settle without having to file suit. That is not covered by rule 11. As 
far as I know, that is not an illegal procedure to engage in 
discussion, to be able to resolve the matter before going to a costly 
lawsuit. Again, that is the little guy's tool. So you are going to beat 
up on the little guy--the construction worker that falls because of 
violations of OSHA rules, or the person that works in a chicken plant 
who has carpal tunnel syndrome because there were no appropriate rest 
times for them to get off of the line, and you are going to make the 
argument that this is right for justice.
  Madam Speaker, this graph speaks for itself. This will add an extra 
burden of cost to those who are trying to find a way for Lady Justice's 
scales to be balanced. My belief, under the Sixth Amendment, the right 
to counsel, and many other aspects of the Bill of Rights, is that the 
Founding Fathers believed that justice should be rendered regardless of 
your race, color or creed, regardless of whether you were an indentured 
servant, regardless of whether or not you came in Pilgrims' Pride or 
came in some other matter.

                              {time}  1345

  Rule 11 completely disputes that concept of justice. I am appalled 
that we are here at this point today, and it equates to the fat-cat 
insurance companies who have decided to send out letters when they well 
knew that this was a process that would work ongoing in their 
modification that could be noted to those recipients that their 
insurance was not going away, it was only going to be made better. I 
would like to make the justice system better.
  I thank the gentleman for his time, and I would like to make sure 
that the little guy has an opportunity to walk into any court of the 
United States of America and stand tall and feel that the judge, no 
matter what size his pocketbook is, will give him as much credence and 
respect as the big guys coming in with millions, maybe billions, to 
make sure he does not or she does not win justice in the court.
  Today I would ask our colleagues to vote for fairness for Lady 
Justice and to vote against this initiative and this legislation.
  Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2655, The Lawsuit Abuse 
Reduction Act--a flawed piece of legislation and a step backwards.
  It amazes me that we did not learn the lesson from the ten years we 
had under the 1983 mandatory version of Rule 11. H.R. 2655 and its 
Senate companion S. 1288, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, known as 
LARA, would amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure by 
replacing the current version of the Rule, which has been in effect 
since 1993, with the 1983 version of Rule 11. Based on what we have 
seen it is quite likely that the effect of this bill if enacted would 
be to increase litigation costs due to the filing of sanction motions--
leading to more delay.
  The bill should be called ``The Lacking All Rational Analysis Act of 
2013,'' because any impartial look would inform that this bill is 
unnecessary and a waste of time.
  Congress should reject this measure, which would force the federal 
judiciary to enforce a rule that legal scholars, judges, and lawyers 
agree was a complete failure. LARA would increase litigation, 
unnecessarily meddle with the authority of the federal judiciary, and 
disproportionately affect plaintiffs, especially plaintiffs in civil 
rights cases.
  Encourages satellite litigation. For the 10 years that mandatory 
sanctions were in effect, litigation surrounding Rule 11 significantly 
increased. Any time a party filed a Rule 11 motion--because judges had 
no discretion and were forced to issue a sanction for even the smallest 
violation of the Rule--a countermotion would be immediately filed and a 
whole side or ``satellite'' litigation business erupted. Congress does 
not need to be in the business of promoting more paper wars amongst 
attorneys.
  Threatens an independent judiciary. Since 1993, Rule 11 has been 
discretionary rather than mandatory.
  Under current Rule 11, judges are able to use their discretion to 
assess the complex nature of a case, and evaluate potential violations 
of the rule and issue sanctions accordingly. This appropriately leaves 
the determination of whether or not sanctions should be imposed for a 
violation of Rule 11 to the judges who hear the cases, and not 
Congress. Perhaps it is time that we allow judges to do their jobs and 
then we can move on to comprehensive immigration reform, tax reform, 
and other prudent legislative initiatives that the American people 
would like us to do.
  Jeopardizes civil rights cases. Sanctions were more often imposed 
against plaintiffs than defendants and more often imposed against 
plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases, primarily in civil rights and 
certain kinds of discrimination cases. A leading study on this issue 
showed that although civil rights cases made up 11.4% of federal cases 
filed, 22.7% of the cases in which sanctions had been imposed were 
civil rights cases. Unfortunately Madam Speaker, we are not at a time 
in our nation's great history where we can upend the law and make the 
filing of civil rights cases prohibitive. As we have seen recently with 
such appalling examples such as the Trayvon Martin case--we have a long 
way to go--and the civil rights bar should not cringe in fear at the 
thought of filing a case to do justice.
  I urge my colleagues to reject this legislation.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, I did not think that, when I came down here today to 
debate this 1-page bill for Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, it would 
somehow get linked with the more than 2,000-page monstrosity popularly 
known, or unpopularly known, as ObamaCare, and told that somehow the 
promise that was made over and over and over again, that if you like 
the health insurance you have, you can keep it, was not the fault of 
the legislation itself, and the people making that promise, but was, 
rather, the fault of the insurance companies who have to deal with this 
more than 2,000-page monstrosity, and the more than 20,000 pages of 
regulations that have been written, and have to rewrite virtually every 
insurance policy for health care in America because of the mandates and 
the regulations that are in that legislation; and somehow, the more 
than 4 million Americans, almost all of whom are the little guys, as I 
have just heard referenced, that somehow this is the fault of the 
insurance companies who are doing what they have been required to do 
under the law, and that is to make changes in the law that necessitates 
changing all of their policies, that necessitates making sure that 
things that are mandated by the law are included in their coverage, 
whether the people who had the policies that they liked could afford 
these new changes or not.
  So many, many Americans are forced, by this legislation, to seek new 
health insurance, in some cases, far more expensive, and they can't 
afford it. But somehow that is made out to be the fault of the 
insurance companies, not the people who wrote the law, voted for the 
law, and then are implementing the law in spite of promises that were 
made that cannot be kept, not by insurance companies who are abiding by 
the law, but by others.
  Now, to compare that to this legislation, which is a 1-page modest 
bill, to ensure that people who are the victims of frivolous lawsuits 
and fraudulent lawsuits cannot have justice in our Federal judicial 
system, I think, is just plain wrong.
  And the chart that has just been displayed regarding rule 11 filings 
during

[[Page 17051]]

the 1983-1993 period, when there was an increase in the number of 
hearings related to rule 11, that is a spike for justice. That is a 
spike for the increased opportunity for people who have been subjected 
to some of the most outrageous lawsuits that were described by the 
gentleman from Texas, that were described in my opening remarks, and 
that is their opportunity to seek real justice.
  That is what this bill is all about, reinstating a spike for justice 
for the little guy, for the small business person, the individual who 
finds himself subject to a lawsuit under some of the most ridiculous 
circumstances you can imagine and saying, you know what, my life has 
been turned upside down by this lawsuit. I am not getting sleep at 
night. I am having to spend thousands or tens of thousands or even 
hundreds of thousands of dollars on attorneys. I am having to do things 
to change the way I live my life, and it is all because of something 
that was frivolous and fraudulent, and now I am seeking to have some 
redress, some redress for that wrong that was done.
  That is the very basic principle of the American jurisprudence 
system, that people, when they are harmed, have the right to go to 
court and seek redress of their grievances. And that is exactly what 
this provision in this law does under rule 11. It says that if the 
court finds that the lawsuit is frivolous, then there is a mandatory 
requirement that the individual who is the victim of that frivolous 
lawsuit should recover losses.
  That is, indeed, what this legislation is all about, and I am proud 
to support it.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. The gentleman is very kind to yield.
  Very briefly, let me say it is about policy and process. The 
gentleman knows that most of America is very happy about the changes in 
the Affordable Care Act to get them out of the junk insurance policies 
that they have had.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Reclaiming my time, if that were the case, then I 
don't think the President would have unilaterally delayed for 1 year 
the employer mandate where the vast majority of Americans are.
  Imagine if this bill had taken effect as originally planned, and all 
of the employers in America, looking at their insurance policies for 
their employees, were also having to tell their employees that they 
could no longer afford to provide insurance or they are going to 
provide a different plan, or the employee had to pay more money, or the 
employee was being put into the exchanges, all of those things would be 
significant, serious problems.
  But we digress from the importance of this legislation right here, 
which is something that we can join together, in a bipartisan way, to 
see that we have justice in our judicial system when people are 
unfairly sued, unfairly subject to frivolous or fraudulent lawsuits.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield an additional 2 
minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman very much.
  Madam Speaker, let me be very clear. I want to say to the gentleman 
from Virginia that I would venture to say that those attacks on 
frivolous lawsuits are the big guys against the little guys, who had 
very legitimate and good intentions. It may be their resources were 
limited, and so they have to be subjected to a rule 11 on a perfectly 
legitimate litigation to be called frivolous.
  The other point that I was making is that there is something between 
process and policy. I will stand again to say that the policy of making 
better health plans and better and healthier Americans is supported by 
all.
  The process that I challenge is that the big insurance companies 
decided to use the process of cancelation letters, not letters that 
said modify. They decided to use their big authority to be able to 
undermine a policy of lifting the boats of all Americans for good 
health.
  That is what I see rule 11 as. I see that as undermining the basic 
scales of justice. It says to get back money for frivolous lawsuits. 
Well, the frivolous lawsuits may be on one individual or a group of 
small individuals who feel that they have been harmed. They may have 
lost. They may be in the midst of pleadings, but they don't have the 
resources to file a rule 11. So what happens is those who want to be 
punitive will use a rule 11.
  I think a judge can make determinations under the present system, and 
so the spiking that we are talking about is a spiking of rule 11 
filings. That is more litigation. That is more litigation. That is what 
we are suggesting that we don't want.
  And this response and respect that the President and others are 
giving, all of us want to give respect to the mishap that has been 
created by the insurance companies. And so, fine. The President is 
giving respect to the constituents because his bottom line is to make 
sure all uninsured Americans, like the 6 million in the State of Texas, 
get the opportunity to be insured.
  Let me thank the gentleman for the time. I believe that we are going 
down the wrong path for rule 11.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure now to yield 4 minutes 
to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Cartwright).
  Mr. CARTWRIGHT. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.
  Madam Speaker, I come here as a freshman in this Congress. I come 
from northeastern Pennsylvania, my first time involved in the political 
theater. And I tell you, Madam Speaker, that I have plied my entire 
adult life in the civil courts. I have handled all manner of civil 
cases on behalf of defendants, on behalf of plaintiffs, on behalf of 
people, on behalf of companies. I have seen the whole spectrum of civil 
litigation; and I have been doing that, both before and after the 
repeal of the mandatory LARA provision in 1993, so I am as qualified as 
anybody in this Chamber to speak to the merits of this so-called 
lawsuit abuse reduction bill.
  It is a bill that should fail; and I say this, not just because it 
tends to shut the door further on consumers seeking justice in the 
court system of the United States, but because it also reinstates a 
rule that has already been seen to be misapplied, to be misplaced, to 
be a bad rule.
  In 1993, we abandoned this rule for a reason. It wasn't because we 
pulled it out of thin air, the idea to abandon this mandatory sanctions 
under rule 11 rule. It is because of the experience.
  The gentlelady from Texas held up the chart. You saw the spiking in 
rule 11 filings. That wasn't because people were out diligently 
cleaning up the mess in civil courts. It is because they were 
encouraged to make those filings because of the mandatory nature of the 
rule. They felt like their clients expected them to file for rule 11 if 
they won a motion or if they won a case, and it led to enormous 
increases in unnecessary, what we call satellite litigation.
  It was the Federal judges who complained to the Judicial Conference. 
They went to the Supreme Court, and Congress ultimately decided, in its 
wisdom, to abrogate that rule and abandoned it because of all of this 
wasteful litigation that was going on.
  We had a Federal judge outside of Philadelphia, United States 
District Judge Robert Gawthrop, who saw so much of it he added a 
nickname to this rule 11 litigation that people felt compelled to file. 
He called it ``zombie litigation.'' He called it zombie litigation, and 
he was enormously relieved when, in 1993, this Congress did away with 
it.
  Current law allows judges to punish frivolous filings; and, on 
occasion, frivolous things happen in court, and the judges don't like 
them and they have the power to punish them. And it is within their 
discretion that they do that.
  We like discretion to be vested in Federal judges. We are careful 
about selecting Federal judges. We vet Federal judges. We interview 
Federal

[[Page 17052]]

judges. We actually confirm them here on Capitol Hill to make sure that 
they have sound discretion and good sense; and it is best left to the 
sound discretion and good sense of Federal judges to handle the 
situation when someone goes overboard with a filing.
  This is us here now trying to fix a problem that doesn't exist. The 
National Center for State Courts--make no mistake, tort cases 
constitute 5 percent of filings in civil court. It is debt collection, 
it is breach of contracts cases that take up 70 percent.
  From 1999-2008, tort case filings in State courts in the United 
States dropped 25 percent. Dropped to 2008. And this is all after the 
abrogation of the mandatory rule 11 rule.

                              {time}  1400

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
  Mr. CARTWRIGHT. What this bill is really after is simply to make 
people afraid to go to court to assert their rights, to assert their 
voting rights, to assert their workplace safety rights, to assert the 
rights guaranteed them under the United States Constitution. This bill 
makes them afraid to go to court to assert their rights, and that is 
why I urge my fellow Members, Madam Speaker, to vote against this bill.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CARTWRIGHT. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I would ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania, what 
other sorts of legal claims should a victim be able to prove in court 
but be denied damages by the judge?
  Mr. CARTWRIGHT. I am not sure what the gentleman is referring to.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, you are in court. You have got a frivolous 
lawsuit. The court finds it is a frivolous lawsuit. You prove that you 
are the victim of that legal claim and you prove it in court, yet you 
can be denied damages by the judge.
  What other legal remedy, what other legal claim would the gentleman 
cite other than frivolous lawsuits where that would be the case? Are 
there any others?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gardner). The time of the gentleman has 
again expired.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute, and I would be 
happy to yield to the gentleman to respond.
  Mr. CARTWRIGHT. I thank the gentleman.
  The answer is this: we don't have idiots as Federal judges in this 
country. If a Federal judge sees a situation where somebody is really 
acting egregiously, really abusing the system, really filing a 
frivolous case, then that Federal judge just about uniformly will 
sanction the guilty party. We see that over and over and over. What we 
are doing here is imposing a cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all remedy 
that the judges don't like. It adds to increased litigation, and it is 
unnecessary and expensive litigation.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, I thank the gentleman for his comment.
  And I would just point out that I practiced law during the time that 
the mandatory sanctions were in place in Federal court and found that 
it was a very good environment to do so. I was then elected to Congress 
and got here and found that, lo and behold, a small panel of judges 
changed that rule without looking at the evidence of a survey of 
Federal judges where 751 Federal judges found that an overwhelming 
majority believed--
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Federal judges found that an overwhelming majority of Federal judges 
believed, based on their experience under both a weaker and stronger 
rule 11, that a stronger rule 11 did not impede development of the law, 
95 percent; the benefits of the rule outweighed any additional 
requirement of judicial time, 71.9 percent; the stronger version of 
rule 11 had a positive effect on litigation in the Federal courts, 81 
percent; and the rule should be retained in its then current form. What 
we are attempting to reinstate into the law, 80.4 percent supported 
retaining the then-current mandatory sanctions under the law.
  Mr. Speaker, this is about seeking real justice, and the fact of the 
matter is that, just like a judge could not deny well-founded damages 
in a lawsuit brought by an individual under a valid legal claim of any 
other kind, they should not be able to have the discretion to deny any 
damages when a frivolous lawsuit is proven and the expenses of having 
to undertake the defense of that frivolous lawsuit are made. And yet 
time after time after time today, people do not even bother to do it 
anymore because of the low, low, low record of granting damages in 
findings of frivolous lawsuits since it was made discretionary, and the 
mandatory provision should be reinstated in the law.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Florida, Ted Deutch, a very effective member of the 
House Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my good friend from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
  Mr. Speaker, make no mistake, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act is 
little more than a GOP effort to turn back the clock on civil rights, 
on consumer protections, and on justice in America. I urge my 
colleagues to vote against it.
  To most people, what this bill is sounds harmless. It reinstates the 
1983 version of rule 11 in our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Indeed, this legislation is full of legal jargon and obscure technical 
language. But the American people still need to know why it is that the 
majority wants to go back to 1983 so badly. They want to reinstate the 
1983 rule for the very reason it was taken away in the first place: it 
unfairly disadvantaged consumers, employees, and other ordinary 
Americans that tried to take on big corporations in our court system.
  The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act doesn't stop frivolous lawsuits; it 
only makes it easier for corporations to file frivolous lawsuits for 
the sole purpose of delaying the legal process and driving up the cost 
of litigation. These tactics aim to make the price of justice too 
expensive for ordinary Americans, especially in cases involving 
consumer and civil rights.
  You don't have to take my word for it. Studies have shown that civil 
rights and discrimination cases made up just 11.4 percent of the 
Federal court docket but 22 percent of the cases derailed by this rule. 
History has shown us that the 1983 version of rule 11 will further 
disadvantage everyday people with legitimate claims against 
corporations with deep pockets.
  Mr. Speaker, the current rule was developed by a judicial panel and 
embraced by judges across the country. They are the ones who hear the 
cases. They are the ones who receive and consider the unique facts of 
each case. They are the ones who are in the position to make the 
decision whether the landmark civil rights and consumer rights cases of 
our time should go forward in our legal process, not the United States 
House of Representatives.
  I ask my colleagues to stand up for everyday Americans' access to 
justice. Vote ``no'' on this bad bill.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I will continue to reserve the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Ladies and gentlemen, as we see now, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act 
will turn back the clock to a time when the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure discouraged civil rights cases and permitted satellite 
litigation to run wild.
  I want to point out, in closing, that this is now the second day this 
week that the House is considering legislation aimed at solving a 
nonexistent problem that has little or no chance of seeing the light of 
day in the other body and is solely aimed at limiting access to justice 
for victims of egregious harms.
  Just as I asked yesterday, who actually supports this legislation? 
Why are we putting their interests ahead of victims'? And why are we 
engaged in this

[[Page 17053]]

charade when there are real problems facing our Nation that our 
constituents are still waiting for us to address?
  With just 13 legislative days left this year, we still haven't 
considered immigration reform. We haven't passed a budget. We haven't 
considered a single piece of legislation that will create jobs and put 
America back to work. So really, whose interest is this House concerned 
with today? I urge my colleagues, oppose this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that my friend and colleague from Michigan 
(Mr. Conyers), the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, raised 
the important issue of civil rights. It is absolutely important. And I 
share his concern that individuals who believe that their civil rights 
have been infringed in any way have the opportunity to bring actions in 
Federal court as long as those actions are not frivolous or based upon 
fraud. In fact, looking back during the time when we had mandatory 
sanctions from 1983 to 1993, the Federal Judicial Center, in its study, 
found that the imposition rate of sanctions in civil rights cases was 
not out of line with that in any other type of case.
  Now, we have not rested there. When the committee marked up this 
legislation, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) offered a 
bipartisan amendment which was added to the bill at the very end. I 
said it was a one-page bill. I am actually slightly mistaken. It is a 
one-and-a-third-page bill. And the one-third page that was added reads 
this way:

       Rule of Construction--Nothing in this Act or an amendment 
     made by this Act shall be construed to bar or impede the 
     assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies 
     under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights 
     laws, or under the Constitution of the United States.

  So this measure is carefully crafted to make sure that we are not 
harming people's rights to seek legitimate redress of grievances in our 
courts. What it is designed to do is to eliminate frivolous and 
fraudulent lawsuits. And from the evidence of the survey of Federal 
judges who worked for 10 years under the rule that we would instate 
again with the passage of this legislation, the overwhelming majority 
of them said they would not change the rule, and it is unfortunate that 
a small committee chose to move forward to make that change 
notwithstanding.
  I would add, too, that those who claim that this is not about the 
little guy are overlooking the fact that small businesses are affected 
by frivolous lawsuits all the time. And the National Federation of 
Independent Business, which bills itself as ``the voice of small 
business'' and which represents hundreds of thousands of small 
businesses all across America, endorses this legislation. In fact, they 
wrote to us and said that 84 percent of National Federation of 
Independent Business members agree that attorneys should face mandatory 
sanctions if they bring forth a frivolous lawsuit. The NFIB urges you 
to support final passage of H.R. 2655 and will consider it an NFIB key 
vote in the 113th Congress.
  So in terms of the little guy--both the small business person and the 
individual--this legislation is designed to protect individuals against 
frivolous or fraudulent lawsuits. And, as I pointed out in my dialogue 
with another Member a little while ago, I don't believe anybody can 
come forward and give me any other example where a legal claim is 
validly brought in court and the victim is able to prove that wrong was 
perpetrated and prove that there are damages resulting from that wrong 
and yet be denied those damages by the judge. I challenge anybody to 
come forward and show me that.
  So why, if you have a process that says under rule 11--which it did 
say at one time and would say again with the passage of this 
legislation--that you have a right to a process to show and establish 
that a lawsuit is frivolous, why after you have done that wouldn't it 
be mandatory that the process take one step further and assess the 
appropriate amount of damages that would be due and owing that victim 
of that abusive lawsuit that suffers in all the same ways that other 
people suffer when they are the victim of abusive actions of other 
kinds that result in actions being brought in court?
  So I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in 
strong opposition to H.R. 2655, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act (LARA). 
This deceptively-named bill would roll back Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure by removing a judge's discretion to impose 
sanctions against any party that files a frivolous lawsuit.
  The language in H.R. 2655 is based upon long-discredited procedural 
requirements, previously rejected by the American Bar Association and 
the Judicial Conference of the United States. An overwhelming majority 
of the legal community reject the underlying principles behind the 1983 
version of Rule 11. In fact, according to a survey conducted by the 
Federal Judicial Center, 87 percent of federal district judges prefer 
the current version of Rule 11 over the old version. Further, 91 
percent of these judges oppose the requirements specifically found in 
H.R. 2655.
  Mr. Speaker, I have grave concerns about H.R. 2655 and the impact it 
would have on civil rights cases all across the country. History has 
shown us that mandatory sanctions can be used as a tool against 
legitimate plaintiffs in civil rights cases. Passage of H.R. 2655 would 
revive this abuse, and actually prolong litigation--not reduce it. I 
urge all of my colleagues to oppose this legislation so that we can get 
back to working on issues that the American people truly care about.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2655, the 
misleadingly-named ``Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act.'' This legislation 
would amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
reinstate a previous, failed version of the rule that was in place from 
1983-1993.
  Rule 11 allows for the imposition of sanctions on the plaintiff in a 
civil case if it is determined that a claim lacks sufficient evidence. 
Currently, Rule 11 allows judges to exercise discretion in determining 
when to impose these sanctions. This bill, H.R. 2655, mirrors the 
policy from 1983-1993, when Rule 11 was amended to mandate that 
sanctions be automatically applied regardless of the specific 
circumstance of a Rule 11 violation. This policy erodes judicial 
discretion by forcing judges to apply sanctions in every instance of a 
violation regardless of the merits. The effect of this change was--and 
would be under H.R. 2655--disastrous for our judicial system and 
victims alike. For this reason, the Judicial Conference, the American 
Bar Association, and the American Association for Justice all strongly 
oppose this legislation.
  As the Judicial Conference Chairs wrote to Judiciary Committee 
Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr. in July, from 1983-1993, the ``. . . 
mandatory sanctions provision quickly became a tool of abuse in civil 
litigation. Seeking to use mandatory sanctions to their advantage, 
aggressive lawyers filed motions for Rule 11 sanctions in response to 
virtually every filing in a civil case. Much time and money was spent 
in Rule 11 battles that had everything to do with strategic 
gamesmanship and little to do with underlying claims.'' The Judicial 
Conference also points out that the 1993 rule changes that corrected 
this misguided policy ``. . . followed years of examination and were 
made on the Judicial Conference's strong recommendation, with the 
Supreme Court's approval, and after congressional review.''
  Unfortunately, we are wasting precious legislative days in this 
Congress re-litigating this already-solved issue. All empirical 
evidence from the 1983-1993 existence of the mandatory sanctions points 
to increased litigation costs and a distraction from the administering 
of justice.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 2655.
  Mr. HUFFMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2655, the so-
called ``Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act.''
  This is a misleading title and a misleading bill. A plaintiff 
courageously seeking to stand up to civil rights violations, equal 
protections violations, or voting rights infringement IS NOT abusing 
anything: she's exercising her rights enshrined in the Constitution.
  When I practiced law in California, I know that those I represented--
from victims of workplace discrimination to women athlete scholars 
looking for equal opportunities--would have been hurt by this bill, and 
their cases may never have been heard.
  Ordering sanctions should be at the discretion of the judge, not 
Congress. This bill would reverse the good judgment and counsel of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States and the Supreme Court, both of 
which recommended the change twenty years ago.

[[Page 17054]]

  Our Courts are a great equalizer; the courtroom is often the only 
place that a plaintiff can find a fair and equal footing with 
employers, corporations, and even their government.
  This bill would have a chilling effect on the ability of Americans to 
find justice for civil rights violations, employment discrimination 
claims, privacy suits, equal protection violations, voting rights 
claims, consumer protection claims, and so much more.
  The changes proposed in this bill would negatively impact cases where 
the bulk of the evidence rests with one party, disproportionately 
impacting plaintiffs in civil rights and consumer protection 
litigation.
  This bill would also negatively impact civil cases that involve new 
legal theories, meaning that landmark cases in our nation's history may 
never have made it to the Supreme Court; cases like Brown v. Board of 
Education, Griswald v. Connecticut, Massachusetts v. EPA.
  If my colleagues are serious about reforming the legal system, I 
would be very interested in working with them. There are abusive 
litigation tactics by both plaintiffs and defendants, and we could work 
in a responsible, bipartisan manner to address those. But this bill is 
not a serious attempt to level the playing field or to curb real 
abuses. Instead, it puts Congress' thumb on one side of the scale of 
justice.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 403, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                           Motion to Recommit

  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the 
desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. I am opposed to H.R. 2655.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Lewis moves to recommit the bill H.R. 2655 to the 
     Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report the 
     same back to the House forthwith, with the following 
     amendment:
       Add, at the end of the bill, the following:

     SEC. 3. PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS AND PREVENTING 
                   DISCRIMINATION.

       This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall not 
     apply in the case of any action brought under--
       (1) civil rights laws, including any case alleging 
     discrimination based on sex, race, age, or other forms of 
     discrimination; or
       (2) the Constitution.

                              {time}  1415

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Georgia is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
  Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Speaker, this is the final amendment to the bill. It 
will not kill the bill or send it back to committee. If adopted, the 
bill will immediately proceed to final passage, as amended.
  My motion is similar to an amendment offered by my good friend, 
Ranking Member Conyers, during the committee markup. It simply excludes 
civil rights cases from this act.
  My amendment makes it crystal clear that discrimination based on sex, 
race, age, or other forms of discrimination will not be subjected to 
lengthy, expensive sanctions. People should have a right to seek 
redress to petition the courts to act. For an individual to be able to 
take legal action based on discrimination because of age, race, color, 
gender, or sexual orientation is not senseless. It is not frivolous or 
silly. They are exercising their sacred right to work to make our union 
stronger and better for generations to come.
  Mr. Speaker, I am not sure that my friends and colleagues in this 
body fully understand the importance of my amendment.
  Civil rights lawsuits are unique because they push the judiciary to 
review, question, consider, and update our Nation's commitment--our 
constitutional duty--to respect the dignity and the worth of every 
human being. These cases inspire our judicial system to explore and 
develop new legal theories and standards.
  There is no doubt that legislation like H.R. 2655 would have slowed 
down many historic legal successes of the 20th century. Civil rights 
landmarks like BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION would have taken another 10 
years. Rights to marital privacy could have been debated for who knows 
how long. Blacks and Whites would not have been free to marry. Same-sex 
couples would not have been able to love each other. Decisions 
guaranteeing freedom of the press and First Amendment protections could 
be ongoing.
  Civil rights legal progress would have been even slower if this act 
was the law of the land 60, 50, or even 20 years ago. Our judicial 
system of thoughtful, deliberative, constant review makes our history--
our progress, our commitment to justice--a model for nations around the 
world.
  This effort has been tried already. It does not work. My amendment 
corrects the greatest injustice of this bill.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support my commonsense change to this 
seriously flawed legislation. This amendment is the right thing to do, 
the fair thing to do. It is the just thing to do.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition to the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this motion 
because the base bill makes sanctions for filing frivolous lawsuits in 
Federal court mandatory.
  Under rule 11, a lawsuit is frivolous if it is presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation, if it is not warranted by 
existing law, or if the factual contentions have no evidentiary 
support. In other words, a lawsuit will only be found frivolous if it 
has no basis in law or fact. As soon as the judge finds that any claim 
of any kind is founded in law or fact, then no claim for damages 
because of a frivolous lawsuit would lie.
  Who here thinks that lawyers should be able to avoid any penalty when 
the lawsuit they file is found by a Federal judge to have been simply 
filed to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase 
the cost of litigation? Or, when the Federal judge finds that the 
lawsuit is not warranted by existing law or to have no evidentiary 
support?
  If you think lawyers should be able to get off scot-free when they 
file those sorts of frivolous lawsuits, vote for this motion to 
recommit. If you agree with me that the victims of frivolous lawsuits 
are real victims and that they have to shell out thousands of dollars, 
endure sleepless nights, and spend time away from their family, work, 
and customers just to respond to frivolous pleadings, then you must 
oppose this motion to recommit.
  When Business Week wrote an extensive article on what the most 
effective legal reforms would be, it stated what is needed are 
``penalties that sting.'' As Business Week recommended:

       Give judges stronger tools to punish renegade lawyers. 
     Before 1993, it was mandatory for judges to impose sanctions 
     such as public censures, fines, or orders to pay for the 
     other side's legal expenses on lawyers who filed frivolous 
     lawsuits. Then the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, an obscure 
     branch of the courts, made penalties optional. This needs to 
     be reversed . . . by Congress.

  H.R. 2655, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, would do just that.
  The specific language of the motion to recommit means that it 
literally immunizes from sanctions frivolous civil rights claims. That 
doesn't further civil rights; that sets them back, because the only 
claims that sanctions could be issued on would be claims for which 
there is no basis in law or fact.
  That does not advance the cause.
  I would add that the language in the motion to recommit adds, ``shall 
not apply in the case of any action brought under, one, civil rights 
laws, and two, the Constitution.'' That second provision, the 
Constitution, means that the motion to recommit covers every single 
lawsuit brought in any United States court in the land and any Federal 
court, and so it goes well beyond what is the stated intent of the 
motion to recommit.

[[Page 17055]]

  A better way to look at this is to look at what the Federal Judicial 
Center found in its study when it looked at the imposition of the 
mandatory sanctions under rule 11 that existed from 1983 to 1993. It 
found that the imposition rate of sanctions in civil rights cases was 
not out of line with that in any other type of cases.
  Furthermore, when this bill was drafted for this Congress--a very 
narrowly drafted bill, just 1\1/3\ pages long--we added a rule of 
construction for specific protection for valid, legitimate civil rights 
lawsuits that are based in law or fact.
  It says in the rule of construction, as I said earlier:

       Nothing in this act or an amendment made by this act shall 
     be construed to bar or impede the assertion or development of 
     new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or 
     local laws, including civil rights laws or under the 
     Constitution of the United States.

  That is the proper way to protect civil rights litigation. 
Meritorious civil litigation founded in law or in fact. That indeed is 
what the legislation does, and that is why the House should reject the 
motion to recommit and pass the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by 
5-minute votes on passage of the bill, if ordered; and adoption of the 
motion to instruct on H.R. 3080.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 197, 
nays 225, not voting 8, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 580]

                               YEAS--197

     Andrews
     Barber
     Barrow (GA)
     Bass
     Beatty
     Becerra
     Bera (CA)
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brownley (CA)
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardenas
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duckworth
     Duncan (TN)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Engel
     Enyart
     Eshoo
     Esty
     Farr
     Fattah
     Foster
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garcia
     Grayson
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hanabusa
     Hastings (FL)
     Heck (WA)
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinojosa
     Holt
     Honda
     Horsford
     Hoyer
     Huffman
     Israel
     Jackson Lee
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kind
     Kirkpatrick
     Kuster
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan Grisham (NM)
     Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
     Lynch
     Maffei
     Maloney, Carolyn
     Maloney, Sean
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Meng
     Michaud
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Murphy (FL)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Negrete McLeod
     Nolan
     O'Rourke
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters (CA)
     Peters (MI)
     Peterson
     Pingree (ME)
     Pocan
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Richmond
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Sinema
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Titus
     Tonko
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--225

     Aderholt
     Amash
     Amodei
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Benishek
     Bentivolio
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Broun (GA)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Burgess
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Coble
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Conaway
     Cook
     Cotton
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Daines
     Davis, Rodney
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Ellmers
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grimm
     Guthrie
     Hall
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (WA)
     Heck (NV)
     Hensarling
     Holding
     Hudson
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Joyce
     Kelly (PA)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Labrador
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Lankford
     Latham
     Latta
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Marchant
     Marino
     Massie
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McHenry
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Messer
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mullin
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Petri
     Pittenger
     Pitts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Radel
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rice (SC)
     Rigell
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ryan (WI)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scalise
     Schock
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Southerland
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Stockman
     Stutzman
     Terry
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walorski
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Campbell
     Grijalva
     Herrera Beutler
     Jones
     Kaptur
     McCarthy (NY)
     Perry
     Rush

                              {time}  1452

  Messrs. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania and CALVERT changed their vote from 
``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Ms. SPEIER and Mr. TIERNEY changed their vote from ``nay'' to 
``yea.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. PERRY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 2655--Motion to Recommit; I 
was off-site and my staff was unable to contact me regarding the vote 
due to a inoperative telephone. Had I been present, I would have voted 
``no.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 228, 
nays 195, not voting 7, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 581]

                               AYES--228

     Aderholt
     Amash
     Amodei
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Benishek
     Bentivolio
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Burgess
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Coble
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Conaway
     Cook
     Cotton
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Daines
     Davis, Rodney
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers

[[Page 17056]]


     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Griffin (AR)
     Grimm
     Guthrie
     Hall
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (WA)
     Heck (NV)
     Hensarling
     Holding
     Hudson
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Joyce
     Kelly (PA)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Labrador
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Lankford
     Latham
     Latta
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Marchant
     Marino
     Massie
     Matheson
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McHenry
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Messer
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mullin
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Perry
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pittenger
     Pitts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Radel
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rice (SC)
     Rigell
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ryan (WI)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scalise
     Schock
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Southerland
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Stockman
     Stutzman
     Terry
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walorski
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IN)

                               NOES--195

     Andrews
     Barber
     Barrow (GA)
     Bass
     Beatty
     Becerra
     Bera (CA)
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brownley (CA)
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardenas
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duckworth
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Engel
     Enyart
     Eshoo
     Esty
     Farr
     Fattah
     Foster
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garcia
     Grayson
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hanabusa
     Hastings (FL)
     Heck (WA)
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinojosa
     Holt
     Honda
     Horsford
     Hoyer
     Huffman
     Israel
     Jackson Lee
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kind
     Kirkpatrick
     Kuster
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan Grisham (NM)
     Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
     Lynch
     Maffei
     Maloney, Carolyn
     Maloney, Sean
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Meng
     Michaud
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Murphy (FL)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Negrete McLeod
     O'Rourke
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters (CA)
     Peters (MI)
     Pingree (ME)
     Pocan
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Richmond
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Sinema
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Titus
     Tonko
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Campbell
     Herrera Beutler
     Jones
     Kaptur
     McCarthy (NY)
     Nolan
     Rush

                              {time}  1502

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated against:
  Mr. NOLAN. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 581, I was inadvertently 
detained and missed the vote. Had I been present, I would have voted 
``no.''

                          ____________________