[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 158 (2012), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 13081-13111]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree 
to the resolution (H. Res. 750) providing for the concurrence by the 
House in the Senate amendment to H.R. 1905, with an amendment.
  The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
  The text of the resolution is as follows:

                              H. Res. 750

       Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution the 
     bill (H.R. 1905) entitled ``An Act to strengthen Iran 
     sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon 
     its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening 
     activities, and for other purposes.'', with the Senate 
     amendment thereto, shall be considered to have been taken 
     from the Speaker's table to the end that the Senate amendment 
     thereto be, and the same is hereby, agreed to with the 
     following amendment:
       In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the 
     amendment of the Senate, insert the following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

  TITLE I--EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO 
                                  IRAN

Sec. 101. Sense of Congress on enforcement of multilateral sanctions 
              regime and expansion and implementation of sanctions 
              laws.
Sec. 102. Diplomatic efforts to expand multilateral sanctions regime.

TITLE II--EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN 
        AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN

        Subtitle A--Expansion of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

Sec. 201. Expansion of sanctions with respect to the energy sector of 
              Iran.
Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to transportation of 
              crude oil from Iran and evasion of sanctions by shipping 
              companies.
Sec. 203. Expansion of sanctions with respect to development by Iran of 
              weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 204. Expansion of sanctions available under the Iran Sanctions Act 
              of 1996.
Sec. 205. Modification of waiver standard under the Iran Sanctions Act 
              of 1996.
Sec. 206. Briefings on implementation of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
              1996.
Sec. 207. Expansion of definitions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 
              1996.
Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on energy sector of Iran.

   Subtitle B--Additional Measures Relating to Sanctions Against Iran

Sec. 211. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the provision of 
              vessels or shipping services to transport certain goods 
              related to proliferation or terrorism activities to Iran.
Sec. 212. Imposition of sanctions with respect to provision of 
              underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the 
              National Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian 
              Tanker Company.
Sec. 213. Imposition of sanctions with respect to purchase, 
              subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of 
              Iranian sovereign debt.
Sec. 214. Imposition of sanctions with respect to subsidiaries and 
              agents of persons sanctioned by United Nations Security 
              Council resolutions.
Sec. 215. Imposition of sanctions with respect to transactions with 
              persons sanctioned for certain activities relating to 
              terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass 
              destruction.
Sec. 216. Expansion of, and reports on, mandatory sanctions with 
              respect to financial institutions that engage in certain 
              activities relating to Iran.
Sec. 217. Continuation in effect of sanctions with respect to the 
              Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and 
              sanctions evaders.
Sec. 218. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by 
              foreign subsidiaries.
Sec. 219. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
              relating to sanctionable activities.
Sec. 220. Reports on, and authorization of imposition of sanctions with 
              respect to, the provision of specialized financial 
              messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and other 
              sanctioned Iranian financial institutions.
Sec. 221. Identification of, and immigration restrictions on, senior 
              officials of the Government of Iran and their family 
              members.
Sec. 222. Sense of Congress and rule of construction relating to 
              certain authorities of State and local governments.
Sec. 223. Government Accountability Office report on foreign entities 
              that invest in the energy sector of Iran or export 
              refined petroleum products to Iran.
Sec. 224. Reporting on the importation to and exportation from Iran of 
              crude oil and refined petroleum products.

 TITLE III--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

     Subtitle A--Identification of, and Sanctions With Respect to, 
 Officials, Agents, Affiliates, and Supporters of Iran's Revolutionary 
                Guard Corps and Other Sanctioned Persons

Sec. 301. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect 
              to, officials, agents, and affiliates of Iran's 
              Revolutionary Guard Corps.

[[Page 13082]]

Sec. 302. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect 
              to, persons that support or conduct certain transactions 
              with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or other sanctioned 
              persons.
Sec. 303. Identification of, and imposition of measures with respect 
              to, foreign government agencies carrying out activities 
              or transactions with certain Iran-affiliated persons.
Sec. 304. Rule of construction.

Subtitle B--Additional Measures Relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard 
                                 Corps

Sec. 311. Expansion of procurement prohibition to foreign persons that 
              engage in certain transactions with Iran's Revolutionary 
              Guard Corps.
Sec. 312. Determinations of whether the National Iranian Oil Company 
              and the National Iranian Tanker Company are agents or 
              affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

       TITLE IV--MEASURES RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN

 Subtitle A--Expansion of Sanctions Relating to Human Rights Abuses in 
                                  Iran

Sec. 401. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for or 
              complicit in human rights abuses committed against 
              citizens of Iran or their family members after the June 
              12, 2009, elections in Iran.
Sec. 402. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of goods 
              or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to 
              commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage in 
              censorship or other related activities against citizens 
              of Iran.

        Subtitle B--Additional Measures to Promote Human Rights

Sec. 411. Codification of sanctions with respect to grave human rights 
              abuses by the governments of Iran and Syria using 
              information technology.
Sec. 412. Clarification of sensitive technologies for purposes of 
              procurement ban under Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
              Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.
Sec. 413. Expedited consideration of requests for authorization of 
              certain human rights-, humanitarian-, and democracy-
              related activities with respect to Iran.
Sec. 414. Comprehensive strategy to promote Internet freedom and access 
              to information in Iran.
Sec. 415. Statement of policy on political prisoners.

                         TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 501. Exclusion of citizens of Iran seeking education relating to 
              the nuclear and energy sectors of Iran.
Sec. 502. Interests in certain financial assets of Iran.
Sec. 503. Technical correction to section 1245 of the National Defense 
              Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
Sec. 504. Expansion of sanctions under section 1245 of the National 
              Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
Sec. 505. Reports on natural gas exports from Iran.
Sec. 506. Report on membership of Iran in international organizations.
Sec. 507. Sense of Congress on exportation of goods, services, and 
              technologies for aircraft produced in the United States.

                      TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 601. Implementation; penalties.
Sec. 602. Applicability to certain intelligence activities.
Sec. 603. Applicability to certain natural gas projects.
Sec. 604. Rule of construction with respect to use of force against 
              Iran and Syria.
Sec. 605. Termination.

   TITLE VII--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SYRIA

Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons who 
              are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses 
              committed against citizens of Syria or their family 
              members.
Sec. 703. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of goods 
              or technologies to Syria that are likely to be used to 
              commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 704. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage in 
              censorship or other forms of repression in Syria.
Sec. 705. Waiver.
Sec. 706. Termination.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       Except as otherwise specifically provided, in this Act:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (2) Financial transaction.--The term ``financial 
     transaction'' means any transfer of value involving a 
     financial institution, including the transfer of forwards, 
     futures, options, swaps, or precious metals, including gold, 
     silver, platinum, and palladium.
       (3) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (4) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of 
     the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511).

  TITLE I--EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO 
                                  IRAN

     SEC. 101. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL 
                   SANCTIONS REGIME AND EXPANSION AND 
                   IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the goal of compelling 
     Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons 
     capability and other threatening activities can be 
     effectively achieved through a comprehensive policy that 
     includes economic sanctions, diplomacy, and military 
     planning, capabilities and options, and that this objective 
     is consistent with the one stated by President Barack Obama 
     in the 2012 State of the Union Address: ``Let there be no 
     doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a 
     nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to 
     achieve that goal''. Among the economic measures to be taken 
     are--
       (1) prompt enforcement of the current multilateral 
     sanctions regime with respect to Iran;
       (2) full, timely, and vigorous implementation of all 
     sanctions enacted into law, including sanctions imposed or 
     expanded by this Act or amendments made by this Act, 
     through--
       (A) intensified monitoring by the President and the 
     designees of the President, including the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, the Secretary of State, and senior officials in the 
     intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)), as 
     appropriate;
       (B) more extensive use of extraordinary authorities 
     provided for under the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and other sanctions laws;
       (C) reallocation of resources to provide the personnel 
     necessary, within the Department of the Treasury, the 
     Department of State, and the Department of Commerce, and, 
     where appropriate, the intelligence community, to apply and 
     enforce sanctions; and
       (D) expanded cooperation with international sanctions 
     enforcement efforts;
       (3) urgent consideration of the expansion of existing 
     sanctions with respect to such areas as--
       (A) the provision of energy-related services to Iran;
       (B) the provision of insurance and reinsurance services to 
     Iran;
       (C) the provision of shipping services to Iran; and
       (D) those Iranian financial institutions not yet designated 
     for the imposition of sanctions that may be acting as 
     intermediaries for Iranian financial institutions that are 
     designated for the imposition of sanctions; and
       (4) a focus on countering Iran's efforts to evade 
     sanctions, including--
       (A) the activities of telecommunications, Internet, and 
     satellite service providers, in and outside of Iran, to 
     ensure that such providers are not participating in or 
     facilitating, directly or indirectly, the evasion of the 
     sanctions regime with respect to Iran or violations of the 
     human rights of the people of Iran;
       (B) the activities of financial institutions or other 
     businesses or government agencies, in or outside of Iran, not 
     yet designated for the imposition of sanctions; and
       (C) urgent and ongoing evaluation of Iran's energy, 
     national security, financial, and telecommunications sectors, 
     to gauge the effects of, and possible defects in, particular 
     sanctions, with prompt efforts to correct any gaps in the 
     existing sanctions regime with respect to Iran.

     SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO EXPAND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS 
                   REGIME.

       (a) Multilateral Negotiations.--Congress urges the 
     President to intensify diplomatic efforts, both in 
     appropriate international fora such as the United Nations and 
     bilaterally with allies of the United States, for the purpose 
     of--
       (1) expanding the United Nations Security Council sanctions 
     regime to include--
       (A) a prohibition on the issuance of visas to any official 
     of the Government of Iran who is involved in--
       (i) human rights violations in or outside of Iran;
       (ii) the development of a nuclear weapons program and a 
     ballistic missile capability in Iran; or
       (iii) support by the Government of Iran for terrorist 
     organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah; and
       (B) a requirement that each member country of the United 
     Nations--
       (i) prohibit the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 
     from landing at seaports, and cargo flights of Iran Air from 
     landing at airports, in that country because of the role of 
     those organizations in proliferation and illegal arms sales; 
     and
       (ii) apply the prohibitions described in clause (i) to 
     other Iranian entities designated for the

[[Page 13083]]

     imposition of sanctions on or after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act;
       (2) expanding the range of sanctions imposed with respect 
     to Iran by allies of the United States;
       (3) expanding efforts to limit the development of petroleum 
     resources and the importation of refined petroleum products 
     by Iran;
       (4) developing additional initiatives to--
       (A) increase the production of crude oil in countries other 
     than Iran; and
       (B) assist countries that purchase or otherwise obtain 
     crude oil or petroleum products from Iran to eliminate their 
     dependence on crude oil and petroleum products from Iran; and
       (5) eliminating the revenue generated by the Government of 
     Iran from the sale of petrochemical products produced in Iran 
     to other countries.
       (b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on the extent to which 
     diplomatic efforts described in subsection (a) have been 
     successful that includes--
       (1) an identification of the countries that have agreed to 
     impose sanctions or take other measures to further the policy 
     set forth in subsection (a);
       (2) the extent of the implementation and enforcement of 
     those sanctions or other measures by those countries;
       (3) the criteria the President uses to determine whether a 
     country has significantly reduced its crude oil purchases 
     from Iran pursuant to section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended by 
     section 504, including considerations of reductions both in 
     terms of volume and price;
       (4) an identification of the countries that have not agreed 
     to impose such sanctions or measures, including such 
     countries granted exceptions for significant reductions in 
     crude oil purchases pursuant to such section 1245(d)(4)(D);
       (5) recommendations for additional measures that the United 
     States could take to further diplomatic efforts described in 
     subsection (a); and
       (6) the disposition of any decision with respect to 
     sanctions imposed with respect to Iran by the World Trade 
     Organization or its predecessor organization.

TITLE II--EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN 
        AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN

        Subtitle A--Expansion of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

     SEC. 201. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ENERGY 
                   SECTOR OF IRAN.

       Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 
     104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``With Respect 
     to'' and all that follows through ``to Iran'' and inserting 
     ``Relating to the Energy Sector of Iran'';
       (2) in paragraph (1)(A)--
       (A) by striking ``3 or more'' and inserting ``5 or more''; 
     and
       (B) by striking ``the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010'' and inserting 
     ``the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
     2012'';
       (3) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) by striking ``3 or more'' and inserting ``5 or more''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010'' and inserting 
     ``the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
     2012''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting before the period at 
     the end the following: ``or directly associated 
     infrastructure, including construction of port facilities, 
     railways, and roads, the primary use of which is to support 
     the delivery of refined petroleum products'';
       (4) in paragraph (3)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) by striking ``3 or more'' and inserting ``5 or more''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010'' and inserting 
     ``the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
     2012''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (B)--
       (i) in clause (ii), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(iv) bartering or contracting by which goods are 
     exchanged for goods, including the insurance or reinsurance 
     of such exchanges; or
       ``(v) purchasing, subscribing to, or facilitating the 
     issuance of sovereign debt of the Government of Iran, 
     including governmental bonds, issued on or after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
     Rights Act of 2012.''; and
       (5) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) Joint ventures with iran relating to developing 
     petroleum resources.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B) 
     or subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of 
     the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a 
     person if the President determines that the person knowingly 
     participates, on or after the date of the enactment of the 
     Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, in 
     a joint venture with respect to the development of petroleum 
     resources outside of Iran if--
       ``(i) the joint venture is established on or after January 
     1, 2002; and
       ``(ii)(I) the Government of Iran is a substantial partner 
     or investor in the joint venture; or
       ``(II) Iran could, through a direct operational role in the 
     joint venture or by other means, receive technological 
     knowledge or equipment not previously available to Iran that 
     could directly and significantly contribute to the 
     enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources 
     in Iran.
       ``(B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with 
     respect to participation in a joint venture established on or 
     after January 1, 2002, and before the date of the enactment 
     of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
     2012, if the person participating in the joint venture 
     terminates that participation not later than the date that is 
     180 days after such date of enactment.
       ``(5) Support for the development of petroleum resources 
     and refined petroleum products in iran.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), 
     the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions 
     described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person knowingly, on or after 
     the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and 
     Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, sells, leases, or provides to 
     Iran goods, services, technology, or support described in 
     subparagraph (B)--
       ``(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or 
     more; or
       ``(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate 
     fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.
       ``(B) Goods, services, technology, or support described.--
     Goods, services, technology, or support described in this 
     subparagraph are goods, services, technology, or support that 
     could directly and significantly contribute to the 
     maintenance or enhancement of Iran's--
       ``(i) ability to develop petroleum resources located in 
     Iran; or
       ``(ii) domestic production of refined petroleum products, 
     including any direct and significant assistance with respect 
     to the construction, modernization, or repair of petroleum 
     refineries or directly associated infrastructure, including 
     construction of port facilities, railways, and roads, the 
     primary use of which is to support the delivery of refined 
     petroleum products.
       ``(6) Development and purchase of petrochemical products 
     from iran.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), 
     the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions 
     described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person knowingly, on or after 
     the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and 
     Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, sells, leases, or provides to 
     Iran goods, services, technology, or support described in 
     subparagraph (B)--
       ``(i) any of which has a fair market value of $250,000 or 
     more; or
       ``(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate 
     fair market value of $1,000,000 or more.
       ``(B) Goods, services, technology, or support described.--
     Goods, services, technology, or support described in this 
     subparagraph are goods, services, technology, or support that 
     could directly and significantly contribute to the 
     maintenance or expansion of Iran's domestic production of 
     petrochemical products.''.

     SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL FROM IRAN AND 
                   EVASION OF SANCTIONS BY SHIPPING COMPANIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996, as amended by section 201, is further amended by adding 
     at the end the following:
       ``(7) Transportation of crude oil from iran.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), 
     the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions 
     described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that--
       ``(i) the person is a controlling beneficial owner of, or 
     otherwise owns, operates, or controls, or insures, a vessel 
     that, on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
     Rights Act of 2012, was used to transport crude oil from Iran 
     to another country; and
       ``(ii)(I) in the case of a person that is a controlling 
     beneficial owner of the vessel, the person had actual 
     knowledge the vessel was so used; or
       ``(II) in the case of a person that otherwise owns, 
     operates, or controls, or insures, the vessel, the person 
     knew or should have known the vessel was so used.
       ``(B) Applicability of sanctions.--
       ``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), 
     subparagraph (A) shall apply with respect to the 
     transportation of crude oil from Iran only if a determination 
     of the President under section 1245(d)(4)(B) of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513a(d)(4)(B)) that there is a sufficient supply of 
     petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other 
     than Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum and petroleum 
     products from Iran to reduce significantly their purchases 
     from Iran is in effect at the time of the transportation of 
     the crude oil.
       ``(ii) Exception for certain countries.--Subparagraph (A) 
     shall not apply with respect to the transportation of crude 
     oil from Iran to a country to which the exception under 
     paragraph (4)(D) of section 1245(d) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012

[[Page 13084]]

     (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) to the imposition of sanctions under 
     paragraph (1) of that section applies at the time of the 
     transportation of the crude oil.
       ``(8) Concealing iranian origin of crude oil and refined 
     petroleum products.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), 
     the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions 
     described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person is a controlling 
     beneficial owner, or otherwise owns, operates, or controls, a 
     vessel that, on or after the date that is 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
     Human Rights Act of 2012, is used, with actual knowledge in 
     the case of a person that is a controlling beneficial owner 
     or knowingly in the case of a person that otherwise owns, 
     operates, or controls the vessel, in a manner that conceals 
     the Iranian origin of crude oil or refined petroleum products 
     transported on the vessel, including by--
       ``(i) permitting the operator of the vessel to suspend the 
     operation of the vessel's satellite tracking device; or
       ``(ii) obscuring or concealing the ownership, operation, or 
     control of the vessel by--

       ``(I) the Government of Iran;
       ``(II) the National Iranian Tanker Company or the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran Shipping Lines; or
       ``(III) any other entity determined by the President to be 
     owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or an entity 
     specified in subclause (II).

       ``(B) Additional sanction.--Subject to such regulations as 
     the President may prescribe and in addition to the sanctions 
     imposed under subparagraph (A), the President may prohibit a 
     vessel owned, operated, or controlled by a person, including 
     a controlling beneficial owner, with respect to which the 
     President has imposed sanctions under that subparagraph and 
     that was used for the activity for which the President 
     imposed those sanctions from landing at a port in the United 
     States for a period of not more than 2 years after the date 
     on which the President imposed those sanctions.
       ``(C) Vessels identified by the office of foreign assets 
     control.--For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), a person 
     shall be deemed to have actual knowledge that a vessel is 
     owned, operated, or controlled by the Government of Iran or 
     an entity specified in subclause (II) or (III) of 
     subparagraph (A)(ii) if the International Maritime 
     Organization vessel registration identification for the 
     vessel is--
       ``(i) included on a list of specially designated nationals 
     and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign 
     Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for 
     activities with respect to Iran; and
       ``(ii) identified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
     as a vessel in which the Government of Iran or any entity 
     specified in subclause (II) or (III) of subparagraph (A)(ii) 
     has an interest.
       ``(D) Definition of iranian origin.--For purposes of 
     subparagraph (A), the term `Iranian origin' means--
       ``(i) with respect to crude oil, that the crude oil was 
     extracted in Iran; and
       ``(ii) with respect to a refined petroleum product, that 
     the refined petroleum product was produced or refined in 
     Iran.
       ``(9) Exception for provision of underwriting services and 
     insurance and reinsurance.--The President may not impose 
     sanctions under paragraph (7) or (8) with respect to a person 
     that provides underwriting services or insurance or 
     reinsurance if the President determines that the person has 
     exercised due diligence in establishing and enforcing 
     official policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that 
     the person does not provide underwriting services or 
     insurance or reinsurance for the transportation of crude oil 
     or refined petroleum products from Iran in a manner for which 
     sanctions may be imposed under either such paragraph.''.
       (b) Regulations and Guidelines.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall prescribe such regulations or guidelines as are 
     necessary to implement paragraphs (7), (8), and (9) of 
     section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as added by 
     this section, including such regulations or guidelines as are 
     necessary to implement subparagraph (B) of such paragraph 
     (8).

     SEC. 203. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT 
                   BY IRAN OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

       (a) In General.--Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
       (2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
       ``(1) Exports, transfers, and transshipments.--Except as 
     provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or 
     more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect 
     to a person if the President determines that the person--
       ``(A) on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, exported 
     or transferred, or permitted or otherwise facilitated the 
     transshipment of, any goods, services, technology, or other 
     items to any other person; and
       ``(B) knew or should have known that--
       ``(i) the export, transfer, or transshipment of the goods, 
     services, technology, or other items would likely result in 
     another person exporting, transferring, transshipping, or 
     otherwise providing the goods, services, technology, or other 
     items to Iran; and
       ``(ii) the export, transfer, transshipment, or other 
     provision of the goods, services, technology, or other items 
     to Iran would contribute materially to the ability of Iran 
     to--

       ``(I) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear 
     weapons or related technologies; or
       ``(II) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types 
     of advanced conventional weapons.

       ``(2) Joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or 
     transportation of uranium.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B) 
     or subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of 
     the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a 
     person if the President determines that the person knowingly 
     participated, on or after the date of the enactment of the 
     Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, in 
     a joint venture that involves any activity relating to the 
     mining, production, or transportation of uranium--
       ``(i)(I) established on or after February 2, 2012; and
       ``(II) with--

       ``(aa) the Government of Iran;
       ``(bb) an entity incorporated in Iran or subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the Government of Iran; or
       ``(cc) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, 
     or owned or controlled by, the Government of Iran or an 
     entity described in item (bb); or

       ``(ii)(I) established before February 2, 2012;
       ``(II) with the Government of Iran, an entity described in 
     item (bb) of clause (i)(II), or a person described in item 
     (cc) of that clause; and
       ``(III) through which--

       ``(aa) uranium is transferred directly to Iran or 
     indirectly to Iran through a third country;
       ``(bb) the Government of Iran receives significant revenue; 
     or
       ``(cc) Iran could, through a direct operational role or by 
     other means, receive technological knowledge or equipment not 
     previously available to Iran that could contribute materially 
     to the ability of Iran to develop nuclear weapons or related 
     technologies.

       ``(B) Applicability of sanctions.--Subparagraph (A) shall 
     not apply with respect to participation in a joint venture 
     established before the date of the enactment of the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 if the 
     person participating in the joint venture terminates that 
     participation not later than the date that is 180 days after 
     such date of enactment.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, 
     as amended by this section and sections 201 and 202, is 
     further amended--
       (1) in section 5--
       (A) in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), as redesignated by 
     subsection (a)(1) of this section--
       (i) by striking ``paragraph (1)'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``paragraph (1) or (2)''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (F)--

       (I) by striking ``that paragraph'' and inserting 
     ``paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be''; and
       (II) by striking ``the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010'' and inserting 
     ``the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
     2012'';

       (B) in subsection (c)--
       (i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``subsections (a) and (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (a) 
     and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b)''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (a) or 
     (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (a) or paragraph (1) or 
     (2) of subsection (b)''; and
       (C) in subsection (f)--
       (i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``subsection (a) or (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (a) 
     or paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b)''; and
       (ii) by redesignating paragraphs (6) and (7) as paragraphs 
     (5) and (6), respectively; and
       (2) in section 9, by striking ``section 5(a) or 5(b)(1)'' 
     each place it appears and inserting ``subsection (a) or 
     paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b) of section 5''.

     SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS AVAILABLE UNDER THE IRAN 
                   SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.

       (a) In General.--Section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (12); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following:
       ``(9) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned 
     person.--The President may, pursuant to such regulations or 
     guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     United States person from investing in or purchasing 
     significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a 
     sanctioned person.
       ``(10) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President may 
     direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United 
     States, any alien that the President determines is a 
     corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a 
     controlling interest in, a sanctioned person.
       ``(11) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The 
     President may impose on the principal executive officer or 
     officers of any sanctioned person, or on persons performing 
     similar functions and with similar authorities as such 
     officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this 
     subsection.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on the date of

[[Page 13085]]

     the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to 
     activities described in subsections (a) and (b) of section 5 
     of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this title, 
     commenced on or after such date of enactment.

     SEC. 205. MODIFICATION OF WAIVER STANDARD UNDER THE IRAN 
                   SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.

       Section 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended 
     by section 203, is further amended by striking paragraph (1) 
     and inserting the following:
       ``(1) Authority.--
       ``(A) Sanctions relating to the energy sector of iran.--The 
     President may waive, on a case-by-case basis and for a period 
     of not more than one year, the requirement in section 5(a) to 
     impose a sanction or sanctions on a person described in 
     section 5(c), and may waive the continued imposition of a 
     sanction or sanctions under subsection (b) of this section, 
     30 days or more after the President determines and so reports 
     to the appropriate congressional committees that it is 
     essential to the national security interests of the United 
     States to exercise such waiver authority.
       ``(B) Sanctions relating to development of weapons of mass 
     destruction or other military capabilities.--The President 
     may waive, on a case-by-case basis and for a period of not 
     more than one year, the requirement in paragraph (1) or (2) 
     of section 5(b) to impose a sanction or sanctions on a person 
     described in section 5(c), and may waive the continued 
     imposition of a sanction or sanctions under subsection (b) of 
     this section, 30 days or more after the President determines 
     and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees 
     that it is vital to the national security interests of the 
     United States to exercise such waiver authority.
       ``(C) Renewal of waivers.--The President may renew, on a 
     case-by-case basis, a waiver with respect to a person under 
     subparagraph (A) or (B) for additional one-year periods if, 
     not later than 30 days before the waiver expires, the 
     President makes the determination and submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees the report described in 
     subparagraph (A) or (B), as applicable.''.

     SEC. 206. BRIEFINGS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN SANCTIONS 
                   ACT OF 1996.

       Section 4 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 
     104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(f) Briefings on Implementation.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and every 120 days 
     thereafter, the President, acting through the Secretary of 
     State, shall provide to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a comprehensive briefing on efforts to implement 
     this Act.''.

     SEC. 207. EXPANSION OF DEFINITIONS UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS 
                   ACT OF 1996.

       (a) In General.--Section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (17) and (18) as paragraphs 
     (20) and (21), respectively;
       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (15) and (16) as paragraphs 
     (17) and (18), respectively;
       (3) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (14) as 
     paragraphs (5) through (15), respectively;
       (4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
       ``(4) Credible information.--The term `credible 
     information', with respect to a person--
       ``(A) includes--
       ``(i) a public announcement by the person that the person 
     has engaged in an activity described in subsection (a) or (b) 
     of section 5; and
       ``(ii) information set forth in a report to stockholders of 
     the person indicating that the person has engaged in such an 
     activity; and
       ``(B) may include, in the discretion of the President--
       ``(i) an announcement by the Government of Iran that the 
     person has engaged in such an activity; or
       ``(ii) information indicating that the person has engaged 
     in such an activity that is set forth in--

       ``(I) a report of the Government Accountability Office, the 
     Energy Information Administration, or the Congressional 
     Research Service; or
       ``(II) a report or publication of a similarly reputable 
     governmental organization or trade or industry 
     organization.'';

       (5) by inserting after paragraph (15), as redesignated by 
     paragraph (3), the following:
       ``(16) Petrochemical product.--The term `petrochemical 
     product' includes any aromatic, olefin, or synthesis gas, and 
     any derivative of such a gas, including ethylene, propylene, 
     butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and 
     urea.''; and
       (6) by inserting after paragraph (18), as redesignated by 
     paragraph (2), the following:
       ``(19) Services.--The term `services' includes software, 
     hardware, financial, professional consulting, engineering, 
     and specialized energy information services, energy-related 
     technical assistance, and maintenance and repairs.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act 
     and apply with respect to activities described in subsections 
     (a) and (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, 
     as amended by this title, commenced on or after such date of 
     enactment.

     SEC. 208. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the energy sector of Iran remains a zone of 
     proliferation concern since the Government of Iran continues 
     to divert substantial revenues derived from sales of 
     petroleum resources to finance its illicit nuclear and 
     missile activities; and
       (2) the President should apply the full range of sanctions 
     under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, 
     to address the threat posed by the Government of Iran.

   Subtitle B--Additional Measures Relating to Sanctions Against Iran

     SEC. 211. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 
                   PROVISION OF VESSELS OR SHIPPING SERVICES TO 
                   TRANSPORT CERTAIN GOODS RELATED TO 
                   PROLIFERATION OR TERRORISM ACTIVITIES TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (c), if 
     the President determines that a person, on or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, knowingly sells, leases, or 
     provides a vessel or provides insurance or reinsurance or any 
     other shipping service for the transportation to or from Iran 
     of goods that could materially contribute to the activities 
     of the Government of Iran with respect to the proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction or support for acts of 
     international terrorism, the President shall, pursuant to 
     Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to 
     blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction 
     proliferators and their supporters) or Executive Order 13224 
     (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and 
     prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to 
     commit, or support terrorism), or otherwise pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property 
     and interests in property of the persons specified in 
     subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       (b) Persons Specified.--The persons specified in this 
     subsection are--
       (1) the person that sold, leased, or provided a vessel or 
     provided insurance or reinsurance or another shipping service 
     described in subsection (a); and
       (2) any person that--
       (A) is a successor entity to the person referred to in 
     paragraph (1);
       (B) owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph 
     (1), if the person that owns or controls the person referred 
     to in paragraph (1) had actual knowledge or should have known 
     that the person referred to in paragraph (1) sold, leased, or 
     provided the vessel or provided the insurance or reinsurance 
     or other shipping service; or
       (C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or 
     control with, the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the 
     person owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or 
     control with (as the case may be), the person referred to in 
     paragraph (1) knowingly engaged in the sale, lease, or 
     provision of the vessel or the provision of the insurance or 
     reinsurance or other shipping service.
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement to 
     impose sanctions with respect to a person under subsection 
     (a) on or after the date that is 30 days after the 
     President--
       (1) determines that such a waiver is vital to the national 
     security interests of the United States; and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report that contains the reasons for that determination.
       (d) Report Required.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary 
     of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report identifying operators of vessels and 
     other persons that conduct or facilitate significant 
     financial transactions with persons that manage ports in Iran 
     that have been designated for the imposition of sanctions 
     pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       (2) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to limit the authority of the President to 
     designate persons for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to 
     Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to the 
     blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction 
     proliferators and their supporters) or Executive Order 13224 
     (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and 
     prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to 
     commit, or support terrorism), or otherwise pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.).

     SEC. 212. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PROVISION 
                   OF UNDERWRITING SERVICES OR INSURANCE OR 
                   REINSURANCE FOR THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL 
                   COMPANY OR THE NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), not 
     later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions 
     described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, 
     as amended by section 204, with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person knowingly, on or after 
     such date of enactment, provides underwriting services or 
     insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil 
     Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, or a successor 
     entity to either such company.

[[Page 13086]]

       (b) Exceptions.--
       (1) Underwriters and insurance providers exercising due 
     diligence.--The President is authorized not to impose 
     sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person that 
     provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance if 
     the President determines that the person has exercised due 
     diligence in establishing and enforcing official policies, 
     procedures, and controls to ensure that the person does not 
     provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for 
     the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker 
     Company, or a successor entity to either such company.
       (2) Food; medicine; humanitarian assistance.--The President 
     may not impose sanctions under subsection (a) for the 
     provision of underwriting services or insurance or 
     reinsurance for any activity relating solely to--
       (A) the provision of agricultural commodities, food, 
     medicine, or medical devices to Iran; or
       (B) the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people 
     of Iran.
       (3) Termination period.--The President is authorized not to 
     impose sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a 
     person if the President receives reliable assurances that the 
     person will terminate the provision of underwriting services 
     or insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil 
     Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and any 
     successor entity to either such company, not later than the 
     date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural 
     commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
       (2) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the 
     meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the 
     Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       (3) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given 
     the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, 
     and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       (d) Application of Provisions of Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996.--The following provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996, as amended by this Act, apply with respect to the 
     imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) to the same 
     extent that such provisions apply with respect to the 
     imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996:
       (1) Subsection (c) of section 4.
       (2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
       (3) Section 8.
       (4) Section 9.
       (5) Section 11.
       (6) Section 12.
       (7) Subsection (b) of section 13.
       (8) Section 14.
       (e) Rule of Construction and Implementation.--Nothing in 
     this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the 
     President to impose sanctions pursuant to the Iran Sanctions 
     Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), 
     section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a), or any other provision of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 213. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PURCHASE, 
                   SUBSCRIPTION TO, OR FACILITATION OF THE 
                   ISSUANCE OF IRANIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT.

       (a) In General.--The President shall impose 5 or more of 
     the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions 
     Act of 1996, as amended by section 204, with respect to a 
     person if the President determines that the person knowingly, 
     on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, purchases, 
     subscribes to, or facilitates the issuance of--
       (1) sovereign debt of the Government of Iran issued on or 
     after such date of enactment, including governmental bonds; 
     or
       (2) debt of any entity owned or controlled by the 
     Government of Iran issued on or after such date of enactment, 
     including bonds.
       (b) Application of Provisions of Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996.--The following provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996, as amended by this Act, apply with respect to the 
     imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) to the same 
     extent that such provisions apply with respect to the 
     imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996:
       (1) Subsection (c) of section 4.
       (2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
       (3) Section 8.
       (4) Section 9.
       (5) Section 11.
       (6) Section 12.
       (7) Subsection (b) of section 13.
       (8) Section 14.

     SEC. 214. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   SUBSIDIARIES AND AGENTS OF PERSONS SANCTIONED 
                   BY UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 104(c)(2)(B) of the Comprehensive 
     Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
     (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(B)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``of a person subject'' and inserting the 
     following: ``of--
       ``(i) a person subject'';
       (2) in clause (i), as designated by paragraph (1), by 
     striking the semicolon and inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, 
     or owned or controlled by, a person described in clause 
     (i);''.
       (b) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall make such revisions to the regulations prescribed under 
     section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) 
     as are necessary to carry out the amendments made by 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 215. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS SANCTIONED FOR 
                   CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO TERRORISM OR 
                   PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

       (a) In General.--Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) is amended in the 
     matter preceding subclause (I) by striking ``financial 
     institution'' and inserting ``person''.
       (b) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall make such revisions to the regulations prescribed under 
     section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) 
     as are necessary to carry out the amendment made by 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 216. EXPANSION OF, AND REPORTS ON, MANDATORY SANCTIONS 
                   WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT 
                   ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et 
     seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104 the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 104A. EXPANSION OF, AND REPORTS ON, MANDATORY 
                   SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL 
                   INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

       ``(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
     Rights Act of 2012, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     revise the regulations prescribed under section 104(c)(1) to 
     apply to a foreign financial institution described in 
     subsection (b) to the same extent and in the same manner as 
     those regulations apply to a foreign financial institution 
     that the Secretary of the Treasury finds knowingly engages in 
     an activity described in section 104(c)(2).
       ``(b) Foreign Financial Institutions Described.--A foreign 
     financial institution described in this subsection is a 
     foreign financial institution, including an Iranian financial 
     institution, that the Secretary of the Treasury finds--
       ``(1) knowingly facilitates, or participates or assists in, 
     an activity described in section 104(c)(2), including by 
     acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or as an 
     intermediary for, or otherwise assisting, another person with 
     respect to the activity;
       ``(2) attempts or conspires to facilitate or participate in 
     such an activity; or
       ``(3) is owned or controlled by a foreign financial 
     institution that the Secretary finds knowingly engages in 
     such an activity.
       ``(c) Reports Required.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
     Rights Act of 2012, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report that contains a detailed 
     description of--
       ``(A) the effect of the regulations prescribed under 
     section 104(c)(1) on the financial system and economy of Iran 
     and capital flows to and from Iran; and
       ``(B) the ways in which funds move into and out of 
     financial institutions described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii), 
     with specific attention to the use of other Iranian financial 
     institutions and other foreign financial institutions to 
     receive and transfer funds for financial institutions 
     described in that section.
       ``(2) Form of report.--Each report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
     contain a classified annex.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Financial institution.--The term `financial 
     institution' means a financial institution specified in 
     subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), 
     (J), (K), (M), (N), (R), or (Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of 
     title 31, United States Code.
       ``(2) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign 
     financial institution' has the meaning of that term as 
     determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to 
     section 104(i).
       ``(3) Iranian financial institution.--The term `Iranian 
     financial institution' means--
       ``(A) a financial institution organized under the laws of 
     Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran, including a foreign 
     branch of such an institution;
       ``(B) a financial institution located in Iran;
       ``(C) a financial institution, wherever located, owned or 
     controlled by the Government of Iran; and
       ``(D) a financial institution, wherever located, owned or 
     controlled by a financial institution described in 
     subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 is amended by inserting after the item relating 
     to section 104 the following:

``Sec. 104A. Expansion of, and reports on, mandatory sanctions with 
              respect to financial institutions that engage in certain 
              activities.''.

[[Page 13087]]



     SEC. 217. CONTINUATION IN EFFECT OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, THE CENTRAL BANK OF 
                   IRAN, AND SANCTIONS EVADERS.

       (a) Sanctions Relating to Blocking of Property of the 
     Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions.--
     United States sanctions with respect to Iran provided for in 
     Executive Order 13599 (77 Fed. Reg. 6659), as in effect on 
     the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall 
     remain in effect until the date that is 90 days after the 
     date on which the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees the certification described in 
     subsection (d).
       (b) Sanctions Relating to Foreign Sanctions Evaders.--
     United States sanctions with respect to Iran provided for in 
     Executive Order 13608 (77 Fed. Reg. 26409), as in effect on 
     the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall 
     remain in effect until the date that is 30 days after the 
     date on which the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees the certification described in 
     section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8551(a)).
       (c) Continuation of Sanctions With Respect to the Central 
     Bank of Iran.--In addition to the sanctions referred to in 
     subsection (a), the President shall continue to apply to the 
     Central Bank of Iran sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), 
     including blocking of property and restrictions or 
     prohibitions on financial transactions and the exportation of 
     property, until the date that is 90 days after the date on 
     which the President submits to Congress the certification 
     described in subsection (d).
       (d) Certification Described.--
       (1) In general.--The certification described in this 
     subsection is the certification of the President to Congress 
     that the Central Bank of Iran is not--
       (A) providing financial services in support of, or 
     otherwise facilitating, the ability of Iran to--
       (i) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear 
     weapons, or related technologies;
       (ii) construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear 
     facilities that could aid Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear 
     capability; or
       (iii) acquire or develop ballistic missiles, cruise 
     missiles, or destabilizing types and amounts of conventional 
     weapons; or
       (B) facilitating transactions or providing financial 
     services for--
       (i) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
       (ii) financial institutions the property or interests in 
     property of which are blocked pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) in 
     connection with--

       (I) Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or 
     delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; or
       (II) Iran's support for international terrorism.

       (2) Submission to congress.--
       (A) In general.--The President shall submit the 
     certification described in paragraph (1) to the appropriate 
     congressional committees in writing and shall include a 
     justification for the certification.
       (B) Form of certification.--The certification described in 
     paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
     contain a classified annex.
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.) or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et 
     seq.).

     SEC. 218. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
                   SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership, 
     association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other 
     organization.
       (2) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means, 
     with respect to an entity--
       (A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by 
     vote or value in the entity;
       (B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors 
     of the entity; or
       (C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions of the entity.
       (b) Prohibition.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall prohibit an 
     entity owned or controlled by a United States person and 
     established or maintained outside the United States from 
     knowingly engaging in any transaction directly or indirectly 
     with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the Government of Iran that would be 
     prohibited by an order or regulation issued pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.) if the transaction were engaged in by a United 
     States person or in the United States.
       (c) Civil Penalty.--The civil penalties provided for in 
     section 206(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(b)) shall apply to a United States person 
     to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that 
     commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that 
     Act if an entity owned or controlled by the United States 
     person and established or maintained outside the United 
     States violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, 
     or causes a violation of any order or regulation issued to 
     implement subsection (b).
       (d) Applicability.--Subsection (c) shall not apply with 
     respect to a transaction described in subsection (b) by an 
     entity owned or controlled by a United States person and 
     established or maintained outside the United States if the 
     United States person divests or terminates its business with 
     the entity not later than the date that is 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 219. DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
                   COMMISSION RELATING TO SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act 
     of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(r) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to Iran.--
       ``(1) In general.--Each issuer required to file an annual 
     or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in 
     that report the information required by paragraph (2) if, 
     during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any 
     affiliate of the issuer--
       ``(A) knowingly engaged in an activity described in 
     subsection (a) or (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act 
     of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note);
       ``(B) knowingly engaged in an activity described in 
     subsection (c)(2) of section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8513) or a transaction described in subsection (d)(1) 
     of that section;
       ``(C) knowingly engaged in an activity described in section 
     105A(b)(2) of that Act; or
       ``(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or dealing with--
       ``(i) any person the property and interests in property of 
     which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. 
     Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting 
     transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or 
     support terrorism);
       ``(ii) any person the property and interests in property of 
     which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. 
     Reg. 38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of 
     mass destruction proliferators and their supporters); or
       ``(iii) any person or entity identified under section 
     560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to 
     the definition of the Government of Iran) without the 
     specific authorization of a Federal department or agency.
       ``(2) Information required.--If an issuer or an affiliate 
     of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in 
     paragraph (1), the issuer shall disclose a detailed 
     description of each such activity, including--
       ``(A) the nature and extent of the activity;
       ``(B) the gross revenues and net profits, if any, 
     attributable to the activity; and
       ``(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as 
     the case may be) intends to continue the activity.
       ``(3) Notice of disclosures.--If an issuer reports under 
     paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer 
     has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that 
     paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the 
     Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report 
     under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that 
     activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report 
     that identifies the issuer and contains the information 
     required by paragraph (2).
       ``(4) Public disclosure of information.--Upon receiving a 
     notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report 
     includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph 
     (1), the Commission shall promptly--
       ``(A) transmit the report to--
       ``(i) the President;
       ``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee 
     on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
       ``(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
     Senate; and
       ``(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and 
     the notice available to the public by posting the information 
     on the Internet website of the Commission.
       ``(5) Investigations.--Upon receiving a report under 
     paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity 
     described in paragraph (1) (other than an activity described 
     in subparagraph (D)(iii) of that paragraph), the President 
     shall--
       ``(A) initiate an investigation into the possible 
     imposition of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
     (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), section 104 or 
     105A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010, an Executive Order specified in 
     clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D), or any other 
     provision of law relating to the imposition of sanctions with 
     respect to Iran, as applicable; and
       ``(B) not later than 180 days after initiating such an 
     investigation, make a determination with respect to whether 
     sanctions should be imposed with respect to the issuer or the 
     affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).
       ``(6) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection shall 
     terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which 
     the President makes the certification described in section 
     401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
     and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect with respect to reports required to be 
     filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the 
     date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

[[Page 13088]]



     SEC. 220. REPORTS ON, AND AUTHORIZATION OF IMPOSITION OF 
                   SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, THE PROVISION OF 
                   SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES TO THE 
                   CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN AND OTHER SANCTIONED 
                   IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) providers of specialized financial messaging services 
     are a critical link to the international financial system;
       (2) the European Union is to be commended for strengthening 
     the multilateral sanctions regime against Iran by deciding 
     that specialized financial messaging services may not be 
     provided to the Central Bank of Iran and other sanctioned 
     Iranian financial institutions by persons subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the European Union; and
       (3) the loss of access by sanctioned Iranian financial 
     institutions to specialized financial messaging services must 
     be maintained.
       (b) Reports Required.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report that contains--
       (A) a list of all persons that the Secretary has identified 
     that directly provide specialized financial messaging 
     services to, or enable or facilitate direct or indirect 
     access to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of 
     Iran or a financial institution described in section 
     104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)); and
       (B) a detailed assessment of the status of efforts by the 
     Secretary to end the direct provision of such messaging 
     services to, and the enabling or facilitation of direct or 
     indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central 
     Bank of Iran or a financial institution described in that 
     section.
       (2) Enabling or facilitation of access to specialized 
     financial messaging services through intermediary financial 
     institutions.--For purposes of paragraph (1) and subsection 
     (c), enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to 
     specialized financial messaging services for the Central Bank 
     of Iran or a financial institution described in section 
     104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) includes doing so by serving as an 
     intermediary financial institution with access to such 
     messaging services.
       (3) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Authorization of Imposition of Sanctions.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), if, 
     on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, a person continues to knowingly and 
     directly provide specialized financial messaging services to, 
     or knowingly enable or facilitate direct or indirect access 
     to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or a 
     financial institution described in paragraph (2)(E)(ii) of 
     section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513(c)), the President may impose sanctions pursuant to that 
     section or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to the person.
       (2) Exception.--The President may not impose sanctions 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) with respect to a person for 
     directly providing specialized financial messaging services 
     to, or enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to 
     such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or a 
     financial institution described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) 
     of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) if--
       (A) the person is subject to a sanctions regime under its 
     governing foreign law that requires it to eliminate the 
     knowing provision of such messaging services to, and the 
     knowing enabling and facilitation of direct or indirect 
     access to such messaging services for--
       (i) the Central Bank of Iran; and
       (ii) a group of Iranian financial institutions identified 
     under such governing foreign law for purposes of that 
     sanctions regime if the President determines that--

       (I) the group is substantially similar to the group of 
     financial institutions described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) 
     of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)); and
       (II) the differences between those groups of financial 
     institutions do not adversely affect the national interest of 
     the United States; and

       (B) the person has, pursuant to that sanctions regime, 
     terminated the knowing provision of such messaging services 
     to, and the knowing enabling and facilitation of direct or 
     indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central 
     Bank of Iran and each Iranian financial institution 
     identified under such governing foreign law for purposes of 
     that sanctions regime.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.) or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et 
     seq.).

     SEC. 221. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS ON, 
                   SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND 
                   THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.

       (a) Identification.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall publish a list of each individual the 
     President determines is--
       (1) a senior official of the Government of Iran described 
     in subsection (b) that is involved in Iran's--
       (A) illicit nuclear activities or proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass 
     destruction;
       (B) support for international terrorism; or
       (C) commission of serious human rights abuses against 
     citizens of Iran or their family members; or
       (2) a family member of such an official.
       (b) Senior Officials of the Government of Iran Described.--
     A senior official of the Government of Iran described in this 
     subsection is any senior official of that Government, 
     including--
       (1) the Supreme Leader of Iran;
       (2) the President of Iran;
       (3) a member of the Cabinet of the Government of Iran;
       (4) a member of the Assembly of Experts;
       (5) a senior member of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran; 
     or
       (6) a senior member of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, 
     including a senior member of a paramilitary organization such 
     as Ansar-e-Hezbollah or Basij-e Motaz'afin.
       (c) Exclusion From United States.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (d), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, 
     and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the 
     United States, any alien who is on the list required by 
     subsection (a).
       (d) Exception To Comply With United Nations Headquarters 
     Agreement.--Subsection (c) shall not apply to an individual 
     if admitting the individual to the United States is necessary 
     to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement 
     between the United Nations and the United States of America 
     regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June 
     26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, and other 
     applicable international obligations.
       (e) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
     subsection (a) or (c) with respect to an individual if the 
     President--
       (1) determines that such a waiver is essential to the 
     national interests of the United States; and
       (2) not less than 7 days before the waiver takes effect, 
     notifies Congress of the waiver and the reason for the 
     waiver.

     SEC. 222. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND RULE OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING 
                   TO CERTAIN AUTHORITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL 
                   GOVERNMENTS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should support actions by States or local 
     governments that are within their authority, including 
     determining how investment assets are valued for purposes of 
     safety and soundness of financial institutions and insurers, 
     that are consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes 
     of this Act and other Acts that are amended by this Act.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Section 202 of the Comprehensive 
     Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
     (22 U.S.C. 8532) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(j) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or any 
     other provision of law authorizing sanctions with respect to 
     Iran shall be construed to abridge the authority of a State 
     to issue and enforce rules governing the safety, soundness, 
     and solvency of a financial institution subject to its 
     jurisdiction or the business of insurance pursuant to the Act 
     of March 9, 1945 (15 U.S.C. 1011 et seq.) (commonly known as 
     the `McCarran-Ferguson Act').''.

     SEC. 223. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT ON FOREIGN 
                   ENTITIES THAT INVEST IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF 
                   IRAN OR EXPORT REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO 
                   IRAN.

       (a) Initial Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report--
       (A) listing all foreign investors in the energy sector of 
     Iran during the period specified in paragraph (2), 
     including--
       (i) entities that exported gasoline and other refined 
     petroleum products to Iran;
       (ii) entities involved in providing refined petroleum 
     products to Iran, including--

       (I) entities that provided ships to transport refined 
     petroleum products to Iran; and
       (II) entities that provided insurance or reinsurance for 
     shipments of refined petroleum products to Iran; and

       (iii) entities involved in commercial transactions of any 
     kind, including joint ventures anywhere in the world, with 
     Iranian energy companies; and
       (B) identifying the countries in which gasoline and other 
     refined petroleum products exported to Iran during the period 
     specified in paragraph (2) were produced or refined.
       (2) Period specified.--The period specified in this 
     paragraph is the period beginning on January 1, 2009, and 
     ending on the date that is 150 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (b) Updated Report.--Not later than one year after 
     submitting the report required by subsection (a), the 
     Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report containing the 
     matters required in the report under subsection (a)(1) for 
     the one-year period beginning

[[Page 13089]]

     on the date that is 30 days before the date on which the 
     preceding report was required to be submitted by this 
     section.

     SEC. 224. REPORTING ON THE IMPORTATION TO AND EXPORTATION 
                   FROM IRAN OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED PETROLEUM 
                   PRODUCTS.

       Section 110(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8518(b)) is amended by striking ``a report containing the 
     matters'' and all that follows through the period at the end 
     and inserting the following: ``a report, covering the 180-day 
     period beginning on the date that is 30 days before the date 
     on which the preceding report was required to be submitted by 
     this section, that--
       ``(1) contains the matters required in the report under 
     subsection (a)(1); and
       ``(2) identifies--
       ``(A) the volume of crude oil and refined petroleum 
     products imported to and exported from Iran (including 
     through swaps and similar arrangements);
       ``(B) the persons selling and transporting crude oil and 
     refined petroleum products described in subparagraph (A), the 
     countries with primary jurisdiction over those persons, and 
     the countries in which those products were refined;
       ``(C) the sources of financing for imports to Iran of crude 
     oil and refined petroleum products described in subparagraph 
     (A); and
       ``(D) the involvement of foreign persons in efforts to 
     assist Iran in--
       ``(i) developing upstream oil and gas production capacity;
       ``(ii) importing advanced technology to upgrade existing 
     Iranian refineries;
       ``(iii) converting existing chemical plants to petroleum 
     refineries; or
       ``(iv) maintaining, upgrading, or expanding existing 
     refineries or constructing new refineries.''.

 TITLE III--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

     Subtitle A--Identification of, and Sanctions With Respect to, 
 Officials, Agents, Affiliates, and Supporters of Iran's Revolutionary 
                Guard Corps and Other Sanctioned Persons

     SEC. 301. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH 
                   RESPECT TO, OFFICIALS, AGENTS, AND AFFILIATES 
                   OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the 
     President shall--
       (1) identify foreign persons that are officials, agents, or 
     affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; and
       (2) for each foreign person identified under paragraph (1) 
     that is not already designated for the imposition of 
     sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)--
       (A) designate that foreign person for the imposition of 
     sanctions pursuant to that Act; and
       (B) block and prohibit all transactions in all property and 
     interests in property of that foreign person if such property 
     and interests in property are in the United States, come 
     within the United States, or are or come within the 
     possession or control of a United States person.
       (b) Priority for Investigation.--In identifying foreign 
     persons pursuant to subsection (a)(1) as officials, agents, 
     or affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, the 
     President shall give priority to investigating--
       (1) foreign persons or entities identified under section 
     560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to 
     the definition of the Government of Iran); and
       (2) foreign persons for which there is a reasonable basis 
     to find that the person has conducted or attempted to conduct 
     one or more sensitive transactions or activities described in 
     subsection (c).
       (c) Sensitive Transactions and Activities Described.--A 
     sensitive transaction or activity described in this 
     subsection is--
       (1) a financial transaction or series of transactions 
     valued at more than $1,000,000 in the aggregate in any 12-
     month period involving a non-Iranian financial institution;
       (2) a transaction to facilitate the manufacture, 
     importation, exportation, or transfer of items needed for the 
     development by Iran of nuclear, chemical, biological, or 
     advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles;
       (3) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement, 
     or sale of goods, services, and technology relating to Iran's 
     energy sector, including a transaction relating to the 
     development of the energy resources of Iran, the exportation 
     of petroleum products from Iran, the importation of refined 
     petroleum to Iran, or the development of refining capacity 
     available to Iran;
       (4) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement, 
     or sale of goods, services, and technology relating to Iran's 
     petrochemical sector; or
       (5) a transaction relating to the procurement of sensitive 
     technologies (as defined in section 106(c) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515(c))).
       (d) Exclusion From United States.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of 
     State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien who, 
     on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is a 
     foreign person designated pursuant to subsection (a) for the 
     imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       (2) Regulatory exceptions to comply with international 
     obligations.--The requirement to deny visas to and exclude 
     aliens from the United States pursuant to paragraph (1) shall 
     be subject to such regulations as the President may 
     prescribe, including regulatory exceptions to permit the 
     United States to comply with the Agreement between the United 
     Nations and the United States of America regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and 
     entered into force November 21, 1947, and other applicable 
     international obligations.
       (e) Waiver of Imposition of Sanctions.--
       (1) In general.--The President may waive the application of 
     subsection (a) or (d) with respect to a foreign person if the 
     President--
       (A) determines that it is vital to the national security 
     interests of the United States to do so; and
       (B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report that--
       (i) identifies the foreign person with respect to which the 
     waiver applies; and
       (ii) sets forth the reasons for the determination.
       (2) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph 
     (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
     contain a classified annex.
       (f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to remove any sanction of the United States in 
     force with respect to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as of 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 302. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH 
                   RESPECT TO, PERSONS THAT SUPPORT OR CONDUCT 
                   CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY 
                   GUARD CORPS OR OTHER SANCTIONED PERSONS.

       (a) Identification.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report identifying foreign persons that the 
     President determines, on or after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, knowingly--
       (A) materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, 
     material, or technological support for, or goods or services 
     in support of, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its 
     officials, agents, or affiliates the property and interests 
     in property of which are blocked pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.);
       (B) engage in a significant transaction or transactions 
     with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its 
     officials, agents, or affiliates--
       (i) the property and interests in property of which are 
     blocked pursuant to that Act; or
       (ii) that are identified under section 301(a)(1) or 
     pursuant to paragraph (4)(A) of section 104(c) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010, as added by section 312; or
       (C) engage in a significant transaction or transactions 
     with--
       (i) a person subject to financial sanctions pursuant to 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 
     (2007), 1803 (2008), or 1929 (2010), or any other resolution 
     that is adopted by the Security Council and imposes sanctions 
     with respect to Iran or modifies such sanctions; or
       (ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, 
     or owned or controlled by, a person described in clause (i).
       (2) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (3) Barter transactions.--For purposes of paragraph (1), 
     the term ``transaction'' includes a barter transaction.
       (b) Imposition of Sanctions.--If the President determines 
     under subsection (a)(1) that a foreign person has knowingly 
     engaged in an activity described in that subsection, the 
     President--
       (1) shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in 
     section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by 
     section 204; and
       (2) may impose additional sanctions pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.) with respect to the person.
       (c) Termination.--The President may terminate a sanction 
     imposed with respect to a foreign person pursuant to 
     subsection (b) if the President determines that the person--
       (1) no longer engages in the activity for which the 
     sanction was imposed; and
       (2) has provided assurances to the President that the 
     person will not engage in any activity described in 
     subsection (a)(1) in the future.
       (d) Waiver of Imposition of Sanctions.--
       (1) In general.--The President may waive the imposition of 
     sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a foreign 
     person if the President--
       (A)(i) determines that the person has ceased the activity 
     for which sanctions would otherwise be imposed and has taken 
     measures to prevent a recurrence of the activity; or
       (ii) determines that it is essential to the national 
     security interests of the United States to do so; and
       (B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report that--
       (i) identifies the foreign person with respect to which the 
     waiver applies;
       (ii) describes the activity that would otherwise subject 
     the foreign person to the imposition of sanctions under 
     subsection (b); and

[[Page 13090]]

       (iii) sets forth the reasons for the determination.
       (2) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph 
     (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
     contain a classified annex.
       (e) Waiver of Identifications and Designations.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle and 
     subject to paragraph (2), the President shall not be required 
     to make any identification of a foreign person under 
     subsection (a) or any identification or designation of a 
     foreign person under section 301(a) if the President--
       (1) determines that doing so would cause damage to the 
     national security of the United States; and
       (2) notifies the appropriate congressional committees of 
     the exercise of the authority provided under this subsection.
       (f) Application of Provisions of Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996.--The following provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996, as amended by this Act, apply with respect to the 
     imposition under subsection (b)(1) of sanctions relating to 
     activities described in subsection (a)(1) to the same extent 
     that such provisions apply with respect to the imposition of 
     sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996:
       (1) Subsections (c) and (e) of section 4.
       (2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
       (3) Section 8.
       (4) Section 9.
       (5) Section 11.
       (6) Section 12.
       (7) Subsection (b) of section 13.
       (8) Section 14.

     SEC. 303. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF MEASURES WITH 
                   RESPECT TO, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
                   CARRYING OUT ACTIVITIES OR TRANSACTIONS WITH 
                   CERTAIN IRAN-AFFILIATED PERSONS.

       (a) Identification.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report that identifies each agency of the 
     government of a foreign country (other than Iran) that the 
     President determines knowingly and materially assisted, 
     sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological 
     support for, or goods or services in support of, or knowingly 
     and materially engaged in a significant transaction with, any 
     person described in paragraph (2).
       (2) Person described.--A person described in this paragraph 
     is--
       (A) a foreign person that is an official, agent, or 
     affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps that is 
     designated for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.);
       (B) a foreign person that is designated and subject to 
     financial sanctions pursuant to--
       (i) the Annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     1737 (2006);
       (ii) Annex I of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     1747 (2007);
       (iii) Annex I, II, or III of United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 1803 (2008);
       (iv) Annex I, II, or III of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 1929 (2010); or
       (v) any subsequent and related United Nations Security 
     Council resolution, or any annex thereto, that imposes new 
     sanctions with respect to Iran or modifies existing sanctions 
     with respect to Iran; or
       (C) a foreign person that the agency knows is acting on 
     behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, 
     a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       (3) Form of report.--Each report submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (b) Imposition of Measures.--
       (1) In general.--The President may impose any of the 
     following measures with respect to an agency identified 
     pursuant to subsection (a) if the President determines that 
     the assistance, exports, or other support to be prohibited by 
     reason of the imposition of the measures have contributed and 
     would otherwise directly or indirectly contribute to the 
     agency's capability to continue the activities or 
     transactions for which the agency has been identified 
     pursuant to subsection (a):
       (A) No assistance may be provided to the agency under the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or 
     the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) other 
     than humanitarian assistance or the provision of food or 
     other agricultural commodities.
       (B) No sales of any defense articles, defense services, or 
     design and construction services under the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) may be made to the 
     agency.
       (C) No licenses for export of any item on the United States 
     Munitions List that include the agency as a party to the 
     license may be granted.
       (D) No exports may be permitted to the agency of any goods 
     or technologies controlled for national security reasons 
     under the Export Administration Regulations, except that such 
     prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject to the 
     reporting requirements of title V of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional 
     oversight of intelligence activities).
       (E) The United States shall oppose any loan or financial or 
     technical assistance to the agency by international financial 
     institutions in accordance with section 701 of the 
     International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).
       (F) The United States shall deny to the agency any credit 
     or financial assistance by any department, agency, or 
     instrumentality of the United States Government, except that 
     this paragraph shall not apply--
       (i) to any transaction subject to the reporting 
     requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional oversight 
     of intelligence activities);
       (ii) to the provision of medicines, medical equipment, and 
     humanitarian assistance; or
       (iii) to any credit, credit guarantee, or financial 
     assistance provided by the Department of Agriculture to 
     support the purchase of food or other agricultural 
     commodities.
       (G) Additional restrictions as may be imposed pursuant to 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.).
       (2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
     be construed to impose measures with respect to programs 
     under section 1501 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2632 note) and programs under 
     the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501 et seq).
       (c) Termination.--The President may terminate any measures 
     imposed with respect to an agency pursuant to subsection (b) 
     if the President determines and notifies the appropriate 
     congressional committees that--
       (1)(A) a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
     subsection (a)(2) with respect to which the agency is 
     carrying out activities or transactions is no longer 
     designated pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection 
     (a)(2); or
       (B) any person described in subparagraph (C) of subsection 
     (a)(2) with respect to which the agency is carrying out 
     activities or transactions is no longer acting on behalf of 
     or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, any person 
     described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2);
       (2) the agency is no longer carrying out activities or 
     transactions for which the measures were imposed and has 
     provided assurances to the United States Government that the 
     agency will not carry out the activities or transactions in 
     the future; or
       (3) it is essential to the national security interest of 
     the United States to terminate such measures.
       (d) Waiver.--If the President does not impose one or more 
     measures described in subsection (b) with respect to an 
     agency identified in the report required by subsection (a), 
     the President shall include in the subsequent report an 
     explanation as to why the President did not impose such 
     measures.
       (e) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 
     Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and 
     Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (f) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to 
     activities and transactions described in subsection (a) that 
     are carried out on or after the later of--
       (1) the date that is 45 days after such date of enactment; 
     or
       (2) the date that is 45 days after a person is designated 
     as described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2).

     SEC. 304. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to limit the 
     authority of the President to designate foreign persons for 
     the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

Subtitle B--Additional Measures Relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard 
                                 Corps

     SEC. 311. EXPANSION OF PROCUREMENT PROHIBITION TO FOREIGN 
                   PERSONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS 
                   WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

       (a) In General.--Section 6(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act 
     of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``Not later than 90 days'' and inserting 
     the following:
       ``(A) Certifications relating to activities described in 
     section 5.--Not later than 90 days''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Certifications relating to transactions with iran's 
     revolutionary guard corps.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
     Human Rights Act of 2012, the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
     shall be revised to require a certification from each person 
     that is a prospective contractor that the person, and any 
     person owned or controlled by the person, does not knowingly 
     engage in a significant transaction or transactions with 
     Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its officials, 
     agents, or affiliates the property and interests in property 
     of which are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Section 6(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as 
     amended by subsection (a), is further amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), as designated by 
     subsection (a)(1), by striking ``issued pursuant to section 
     25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 
     421)'';

[[Page 13091]]

       (B) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A)--

       (I) by striking ``the revision'' and inserting ``the 
     applicable revision''; and
       (II) by striking ``not more than 3 years'' and inserting 
     ``not less than 2 years''; and

       (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``issued pursuant to 
     section 25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act 
     (41 U.S.C. 421)'';
       (C) in paragraph (5), by striking ``in the national 
     interest'' and inserting ``essential to the national security 
     interests'';
       (D) by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
       ``(6) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Executive agency.--The term `executive agency' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41, 
     United States Code.
       ``(B) Federal acquisition regulation.--The term `Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation' means the regulation issued pursuant 
     to section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code.''; and
       (E) in paragraph (7)--
       (i) by striking ``The revisions to the Federal Acquisition 
     Regulation required under paragraph (1)'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(A) Certifications relating to activities described in 
     section 5.--The revisions to the Federal Acquisition 
     Regulation required under paragraph (1)(A)''; and
       (ii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Certifications relating to transactions with iran's 
     revolutionary guard corps.--The revisions to the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation required under paragraph (1)(B) shall 
     apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are 
     issued on or after the date that is 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
     Rights Act of 2012.''.
       (2) Section 101(3) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8511(3)) is amended by striking ``section 4 of the Office of 
     Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403)'' and 
     inserting ``section 133 of title 41, United States Code''.

     SEC. 312. DETERMINATIONS OF WHETHER THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL 
                   COMPANY AND THE NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY 
                   ARE AGENTS OR AFFILIATES OF IRAN'S 
                   REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian 
     Tanker Company are not only owned and controlled by the 
     Government of Iran but that those companies provide 
     significant support to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and 
     its affiliates.
       (b) Determinations.--Section 104(c) of the Comprehensive 
     Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
     (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(4) Determinations regarding nioc and nitc.--
       ``(A) Determinations.--For purposes of paragraph (2)(E), 
     the Secretary of the Treasury shall, not later than 45 days 
     after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012--
       ``(i) determine whether the NIOC or the NITC is an agent or 
     affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; and
       ``(ii) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report on the determinations made under clause (i), together 
     with the reasons for those determinations.
       ``(B) Form of report.--A report submitted under 
     subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclassified form 
     but may contain a classified annex.
       ``(C) Applicability with respect to petroleum 
     transactions.--
       ``(i) Application of sanctions.--Except as provided in 
     clause (ii), if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that 
     the NIOC or the NITC is a person described in clause (i) or 
     (ii) of paragraph (2)(E), the regulations prescribed under 
     paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to a significant 
     transaction or transactions or significant financial services 
     knowingly facilitated or provided by a foreign financial 
     institution for the NIOC or the NITC, as applicable, for the 
     purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran, only 
     if a determination of the President under section 
     1245(d)(4)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(B)) that there is a 
     sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products 
     produced in countries other than Iran to permit purchasers of 
     petroleum and petroleum products from Iran to reduce 
     significantly their purchases from Iran is in effect at the 
     time of the transaction or the provision of the service.
       ``(ii) Exception for certain countries.--If the Secretary 
     of the Treasury determines that the NIOC or the NITC is a 
     person described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (2)(E), 
     the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall not 
     apply to a significant transaction or transactions or 
     significant financial services knowingly facilitated or 
     provided by a foreign financial institution for the NIOC or 
     the NITC, as applicable, for the purchase of petroleum or 
     petroleum products from Iran if an exception under paragraph 
     (4)(D) of section 1245(d) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) 
     applies to the country with primary jurisdiction over the 
     foreign financial institution at the time of the transaction 
     or the provision of the service.
       ``(iii) Rule of construction.--The exceptions in clauses 
     (i) and (ii) shall not be construed to limit the authority of 
     the Secretary of the Treasury to impose sanctions pursuant to 
     the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) for an 
     activity described in paragraph (2) to the extent the 
     activity would meet the criteria described in that paragraph 
     in the absence of the involvement of the NIOC or the NITC.
       ``(D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
       ``(i) NIOC.--The term `NIOC' means the National Iranian Oil 
     Company.
       ``(ii) NITC.--The term `NITC' means the National Iranian 
     Tanker Company.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Waiver.--Section 104(f) of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8513(f)) is amended by inserting ``or section 104A'' 
     after ``subsection (c)''.
       (2) Classified information.--Section 104(g) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(g)) is amended by striking 
     ``subsection (c)(1)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1) or (4) of 
     subsection (c) or section 104A'' both places it appears.
       (d) Applicability.--
       (1) In general.--If an exception to sanctions described in 
     clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (4)(C) of section 104(c) of 
     the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010, as added by subsection (b), applies 
     to a person that engages in a transaction described in 
     paragraph (2) at the time of the transaction, the President 
     is authorized not to impose sanctions with respect to the 
     transaction under--
       (A) section 302(b)(1);
       (B) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by 
     section 216; or
       (C) any other applicable provision of law authorizing the 
     imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran.
       (2) Transaction described.--A transaction described in this 
     paragraph is a transaction--
       (A) solely for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum 
     products from Iran; and
       (B) for which sanctions may be imposed solely as a result 
     of the involvement of the National Iranian Oil Company or the 
     National Iranian Tanker Company in the transaction under--
       (i) section 302(b)(1);
       (ii) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by 
     section 216; or
       (iii) any other applicable provision of law authorizing the 
     imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran.

       TITLE IV--MEASURES RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN

 Subtitle A--Expansion of Sanctions Relating to Human Rights Abuses in 
                                  Iran

     SEC. 401. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS 
                   RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN OR 
                   THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS AFTER THE JUNE 12, 2009, 
                   ELECTIONS IN IRAN.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the Supreme Leader of Iran, the President of Iran, senior 
     members of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran, senior members 
     of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ansar-e-Hezbollah and 
     Basij-e-Mostaz'afin, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior, 
     Justice, and Telecommunications are ultimately responsible 
     for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing a pattern 
     and practice of serious human rights abuses against the 
     Iranian people, and thus the President should include such 
     persons on the list of persons who are responsible for or 
     complicit in committing serious human rights abuses and 
     subject to sanctions pursuant to section 105 of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514).
       (b) Report.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     detailed report with respect to whether each person described 
     in subsection (a) is responsible for or complicit in, or 
     responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing 
     the commission of serious human rights abuses against 
     citizens of Iran or their family members on or after June 12, 
     2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran. For 
     any such person who is not included in such report, the 
     Secretary of State should describe in the report the reasons 
     why the person was not included, including information on 
     whether sufficient credible evidence of responsibility for 
     such abuses was found.
       (2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       (3) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 402. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 
                   TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN THAT 
                   ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   ABUSES.

       (a) In General.--The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et 
     seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105 the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 105A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 
                   TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN THAT 
                   ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   ABUSES.

       ``(a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions in 
     accordance with subsection (c) with

[[Page 13092]]

     respect to each person on the list required by subsection 
     (b).
       ``(b) List.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
     Rights Act of 2012, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that 
     the President determines have knowingly engaged in an 
     activity described in paragraph (2) on or after such date of 
     enactment.
       ``(2) Activity described.--
       ``(A) In general.--A person engages in an activity 
     described in this paragraph if the person--
       ``(i) transfers, or facilitates the transfer of, goods or 
     technologies described in subparagraph (C) to Iran, any 
     entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject 
     to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran, or any 
     national of Iran, for use in or with respect to Iran; or
       ``(ii) provides services (including services relating to 
     hardware, software, and specialized information, and 
     professional consulting, engineering, and support services) 
     with respect to goods or technologies described in 
     subparagraph (C) after such goods or technologies are 
     transferred to Iran.
       ``(B) Applicability to contracts and other agreements.--A 
     person engages in an activity described in subparagraph (A) 
     without regard to whether the activity is carried out 
     pursuant to a contract or other agreement entered into 
     before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.
       ``(C) Goods or technologies described.--Goods or 
     technologies described in this subparagraph are goods or 
     technologies that the President determines are likely to be 
     used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies or 
     instrumentalities (or by any other person on behalf of the 
     Government of Iran or any of such agencies or 
     instrumentalities) to commit serious human rights abuses 
     against the people of Iran, including--
       ``(i) firearms or ammunition (as those terms are defined in 
     section 921 of title 18, United States Code), rubber bullets, 
     police batons, pepper or chemical sprays, stun grenades, 
     electroshock weapons, tear gas, water cannons, or 
     surveillance technology; or
       ``(ii) sensitive technology (as defined in section 106(c)).
       ``(3) Special rule to allow for termination of sanctionable 
     activity.--The President shall not be required to include a 
     person on the list required by paragraph (1) if the President 
     certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that--
       ``(A) the person is no longer engaging in, or has taken 
     significant verifiable steps toward stopping, the activity 
     described in paragraph (2) for which the President would 
     otherwise have included the person on the list; and
       ``(B) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in any activity 
     described in paragraph (2) in the future.
       ``(4) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees an updated list under 
     paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) each time the President is required to submit an 
     updated list to those committees under section 105(b)(2)(A); 
     and
       ``(B) as new information becomes available.
       ``(5) Form of report; public availability.--
       ``(A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       ``(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the 
     list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the 
     public and posted on the websites of the Department of the 
     Treasury and the Department of State.
       ``(c) Application of Sanctions.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the President 
     shall impose sanctions described in section 105(c) with 
     respect to a person on the list required by subsection (b).
       ``(2) Transfers to iran's revolutionary guard corps.--In 
     the case of a person on the list required by subsection (b) 
     for transferring, or facilitating the transfer of, goods or 
     technologies described in subsection (b)(2)(C) to Iran's 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps, or providing services with respect 
     to such goods or technologies after such goods or 
     technologies are transferred to Iran's Revolutionary Guard 
     Corps, the President shall--
       ``(A) impose sanctions described in section 105(c) with 
     respect to the person; and
       ``(B) impose such other sanctions from among the sanctions 
     described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
     (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as the President 
     determines appropriate.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 is amended by inserting after the item relating 
     to section 105 the following:

``Sec. 105A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of 
              goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used 
              to commit human rights abuses.''.

     SEC. 403. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO 
                   ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER RELATED 
                   ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) satellite service providers and other entities that 
     have direct contractual arrangements to provide satellite 
     services to the Government of Iran or entities owned or 
     controlled by that Government should cease providing 
     broadcast services to that Government and those entities 
     unless that Government ceases activities intended to jam or 
     restrict satellite signals; and
       (2) the United States should address the illegal jamming of 
     satellite signals by the Government of Iran through the voice 
     and vote of the United States in the United Nations 
     International Telecommunications Union.
       (b) Imposition of Sanctions.--The Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), as amended by section 402, is further 
     amended by inserting after section 105A the following:

     SEC. 105B. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS 
                   WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER RELATED 
                   ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN.

       ``(a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions 
     described in section 105(c) with respect to each person on 
     the list required by subsection (b).
       ``(b) List of Persons Who Engage in Censorship.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
     Rights Act of 2012, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that 
     the President determines have, on or after June 12, 2009, 
     engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to 
     Iran that--
       ``(A) prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom 
     of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran; or
       ``(B) limit access to print or broadcast media, including 
     the facilitation or support of intentional frequency 
     manipulation by the Government of Iran or an entity owned or 
     controlled by that Government that would jam or restrict an 
     international signal.
       ``(2) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees an updated list under 
     paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) each time the President is required to submit an 
     updated list to those committees under section 105(b)(2)(A); 
     and
       ``(B) as new information becomes available.
       ``(3) Form of report; public availability.--
       ``(A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       ``(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the 
     list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the 
     public and posted on the websites of the Department of the 
     Treasury and the Department of State.''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010, as amended by section 402, is further amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 105A the 
     following:

``Sec. 105B. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage 
              in censorship or other related activities against 
              citizens of Iran.''.
       (d) Conforming Amendments.--Section 401(b)(1) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(b)(1)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``, 105A(a), or 105B(a)'' after 
     ``105(a)''; and
       (2) by inserting ``, 105A(b), or 105B(b)'' after 
     ``105(b)''.

        Subtitle B--Additional Measures to Promote Human Rights

     SEC. 411. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO GRAVE 
                   HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN 
                   AND SYRIA USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.

       United States sanctions with respect to Iran and Syria 
     provided for in Executive Order 13606 (77 Fed. Reg. 24571), 
     as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, shall remain in effect--
       (1) with respect to Iran, until the date that is 30 days 
     after the date on which the President submits to Congress the 
     certification described in section 401(a) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)); and
       (2) with respect to Syria, until the date on which the 
     provisions of and sanctions imposed pursuant to title VII 
     terminate pursuant to section 706.

     SEC. 412. CLARIFICATION OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
                   PURPOSES OF PROCUREMENT BAN UNDER COMPREHENSIVE 
                   IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT 
                   ACT OF 2010.

       The Secretary of State shall--
       (1) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, issue guidelines to further describe the 
     technologies that may be considered ``sensitive technology'' 
     for purposes of section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8515), with special attention to new forms of 
     sophisticated jamming, monitoring, and surveillance 
     technology relating to mobile telecommunications and the 
     Internet, and publish those guidelines in the Federal 
     Register;
       (2) determine the types of technologies that enable any 
     indigenous capabilities that Iran has to disrupt and monitor 
     information and communications in that country, and consider 
     adding descriptions of those items to the guidelines; and
       (3) periodically review, but in no case less than once each 
     year, the guidelines and, if necessary, amend the guidelines 
     on the basis of technological developments and new 
     information regarding transfers of technologies to Iran

[[Page 13093]]

     and the development of Iran's indigenous capabilities to 
     disrupt and monitor information and communications in Iran.

     SEC. 413. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR 
                   AUTHORIZATION OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS-, 
                   HUMANITARIAN-, AND DEMOCRACY-RELATED ACTIVITIES 
                   WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.

       (a) Requirement.--The Office of Foreign Assets Control, in 
     consultation with the Department of State, shall establish an 
     expedited process for the consideration of complete requests 
     for authorization to engage in human rights-, humanitarian-, 
     or democracy-related activities relating to Iran that are 
     submitted by--
       (1) entities receiving funds from the Department of State 
     to engage in the proposed activity;
       (2) the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and
       (3) other appropriate agencies of the United States 
     Government.
       (b) Procedures.--Requests for authorization under 
     subsection (a) shall be submitted to the Office of Foreign 
     Assets Control in conformance with the Office's regulations, 
     including section 501.801 of title 31, Code of Federal 
     Regulations (commonly known as the Reporting, Procedures and 
     Penalties Regulations). Applicants shall fully disclose the 
     parties to the transactions as well as describe the 
     activities to be undertaken. License applications involving 
     the exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, or 
     software to Iran shall include a copy of an official 
     Commodity Classification issued by the Department of 
     Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, as part of the 
     license application.
       (c) Foreign Policy Review.--The Department of State shall 
     complete a foreign policy review of a request for 
     authorization under subsection (a) not later than 30 days 
     after the request is referred to the Department by the Office 
     of Foreign Assets Control.
       (d) License Determinations.--License determinations for 
     complete requests for authorization under subsection (a) 
     shall be made not later than 90 days after receipt by the 
     Office of Foreign Assets Control, with the following 
     exceptions:
       (1) Any requests involving the exportation or reexportation 
     to Iran of goods, technology, or software listed on the 
     Commerce Control List maintained pursuant to part 774 of 
     title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, shall be processed in 
     a manner consistent with the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation 
     Act of 1992 (title XVI of Public Law 102-484) and other 
     applicable provisions of law.
       (2) Any other requests presenting unusual or extraordinary 
     circumstances.
       (e) Regulations.--The Secretary of the Treasury may 
     prescribe such regulations as are appropriate to carry out 
     this section.

     SEC. 414. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM 
                   AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN IRAN.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of other Federal 
     agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a comprehensive strategy to--
       (1) assist the people of Iran to produce, access, and share 
     information freely and safely via the Internet, including in 
     Farsi and regional languages;
       (2) support the development of counter-censorship 
     technologies that enable the citizens of Iran to undertake 
     Internet activities without interference from the Government 
     of Iran;
       (3) increase the capabilities and availability of secure 
     mobile and other communications through connective technology 
     among human rights and democracy activists in Iran;
       (4) provide resources for digital safety training for media 
     and academic and civil society organizations in Iran;
       (5) provide accurate and substantive Internet content in 
     local languages in Iran;
       (6) increase emergency resources for the most vulnerable 
     human rights advocates seeking to organize, share 
     information, and support human rights in Iran;
       (7) expand surrogate radio, television, live stream, and 
     social network communications inside Iran, including--
       (A) by expanding Voice of America's Persian News Network 
     and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Radio Farda to provide 
     hourly live news update programming and breaking news 
     coverage capability 24 hours a day and 7 days a week; and
       (B) by assisting telecommunications and software companies 
     that are United States persons to comply with the export 
     licensing requirements of the United States for the purpose 
     of expanding such communications inside Iran;
       (8) expand activities to safely assist and train human 
     rights, civil society, and democracy activists in Iran to 
     operate effectively and securely;
       (9) identify and utilize all available resources to 
     overcome attempts by the Government of Iran to jam or 
     otherwise deny international satellite broadcasting signals;
       (10) expand worldwide United States embassy and consulate 
     programming for and outreach to Iranian dissident 
     communities;
       (11) expand access to proxy servers for democracy activists 
     in Iran; and
       (12) discourage telecommunications and software companies 
     from facilitating Internet censorship by the Government of 
     Iran.

     SEC. 415. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON POLITICAL PRISONERS.

       It shall be the policy of the United States--
       (1) to support efforts to research and identify prisoners 
     of conscience and cases of human rights abuses in Iran;
       (2) to offer refugee status or political asylum in the 
     United States to political dissidents in Iran if requested 
     and consistent with the laws and national security interests 
     of the United States;
       (3) to offer to assist, through the United Nations High 
     Commissioner for Refugees, with the relocation of such 
     political prisoners to other countries if requested, as 
     appropriate and with appropriate consideration for the 
     national security interests of the United States; and
       (4) to publicly call for the release of Iranian dissidents 
     by name and raise awareness with respect to individual cases 
     of Iranian dissidents and prisoners of conscience, as 
     appropriate and if requested by the dissidents or prisoners 
     themselves or their families.

                         TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS

     SEC. 501. EXCLUSION OF CITIZENS OF IRAN SEEKING EDUCATION 
                   RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR AND ENERGY SECTORS OF 
                   IRAN.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall deny a visa 
     to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from 
     the United States, any alien who is a citizen of Iran that 
     the Secretary of State determines seeks to enter the United 
     States to participate in coursework at an institution of 
     higher education (as defined in section 101(a) of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) to prepare the 
     alien for a career in the energy sector of Iran or in nuclear 
     science or nuclear engineering or a related field in Iran.
       (b) Applicability.--Subsection (a) applies with respect to 
     visa applications filed on or after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.

     SEC. 502. INTERESTS IN CERTAIN FINANCIAL ASSETS OF IRAN.

       (a) Interests in Blocked Assets.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, including any provision of law 
     relating to sovereign immunity, and preempting any 
     inconsistent provision of State law, a financial asset that 
     is--
       (A) held in the United States for a foreign securities 
     intermediary doing business in the United States,
       (B) a blocked asset (whether or not subsequently unblocked) 
     that is property described in subsection (b), and
       (C) equal in value to a financial asset of Iran, including 
     an asset of the central bank or monetary authority of the 
     Government of Iran or any agency or instrumentality of that 
     Government, that such foreign securities intermediary or a 
     related intermediary holds abroad,

     shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of 
     execution in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of 
     any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for 
     personal injury or death caused by an act of torture, 
     extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage-taking, 
     or the provision of material support or resources for such an 
     act.
       (2) Court determination required.--In order to ensure that 
     Iran is held accountable for paying the judgments described 
     in paragraph (1) and in furtherance of the broader goals of 
     this Act to sanction Iran, prior to an award turning over any 
     asset pursuant to execution or attachment in aid of execution 
     with respect to any judgments against Iran described in 
     paragraph (1), the court shall determine whether Iran holds 
     equitable title to, or the beneficial interest in, the assets 
     described in subsection (b) and that no other person 
     possesses a constitutionally protected interest in the assets 
     described in subsection (b) under the Fifth Amendment to the 
     Constitution of the United States. To the extent the court 
     determines that a person other than Iran holds--
       (A) equitable title to, or a beneficial interest in, the 
     assets described in subsection (b) (excluding a custodial 
     interest of a foreign securities intermediary or a related 
     intermediary that holds the assets abroad for the benefit of 
     Iran), or
       (B) a constitutionally protected interest in the assets 
     described in subsection (b),
     such assets shall be available only for execution or 
     attachment in aid of execution to the extent of Iran's 
     equitable title or beneficial interest therein and to the 
     extent such execution or attachment does not infringe upon 
     such constitutionally protected interest.
       (b) Financial Assets Described.--The financial assets 
     described in this section are the financial assets that are 
     identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United 
     States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
     in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case 
     No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG), that were restrained by 
     restraining notices and levies secured by the plaintiffs in 
     those proceedings, as modified by court order dated June 27, 
     2008, and extended by court orders dated June 23, 2009, May 
     10, 2010, and June 11, 2010, so long as such assets remain 
     restrained by court order.
       (c) Rules of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed--
       (1) to affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right 
     to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a terrorist 
     party in any proceedings other than proceedings referred to 
     in subsection (b); or
       (2) to apply to assets other than the assets described in 
     subsection (b), or to preempt State law, including the 
     Uniform Commercial Code, except as expressly provided in 
     subsection (a)(1).
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Blocked asset.--The term ``blocked asset''--
       (A) means any asset seized or frozen by the United States 
     under section 5(b) of the Trading

[[Page 13094]]

     With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)) or under section 202 
     or 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 and 1702); and
       (B) does not include property that--
       (i) is subject to a license issued by the United States 
     Government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or 
     to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
     in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of 
     the license has been specifically required by a provision of 
     law other than the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) or the United Nations 
     Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or
       (ii) is property subject to the Vienna Convention on 
     Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular 
     Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and 
     immunities under the laws of the United States, and is being 
     used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.
       (2) Financial asset; securities intermediary.--The terms 
     ``financial asset'' and ``securities intermediary'' have the 
     meanings given those terms in the Uniform Commercial Code, 
     but the former includes cash.
       (3) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' means the Government of Iran, 
     including the central bank or monetary authority of that 
     Government and any agency or instrumentality of that 
     Government.
       (4) Person.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
     entity.
       (B) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership, 
     association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, 
     subgroup, or other organization.
       (5) Terrorist party.--The term ``terrorist party'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 201(d) of the Terrorism 
     Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 note).
       (6) United states.--The term ``United States'' includes all 
     territory and waters, continental, or insular, subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the United States.
       (e) Technical Changes to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
     Act.--
       (1) Title 28, united states code.--Section 1610 of title 
     28, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(7), by inserting after ``section 
     1605A'' the following: ``or section 1605(a)(7) (as such 
     section was in effect on January 27, 2008)''; and
       (B) in subsection (b)--
       (i) in paragraph (2)--

       (I) by striking ``(5), 1605(b), or 1605A'' and inserting 
     ``(5) or 1605(b)''; and
       (II) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, 
     or''; and

       (ii) by adding after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency 
     or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of section 1605A 
     of this chapter or section 1605(a)(7) of this chapter (as 
     such section was in effect on January 27, 2008), regardless 
     of whether the property is or was involved in the act upon 
     which the claim is based.''.
       (2) Terrorism risk insurance act of 2002.--Section 201(a) 
     of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 
     note) is amended by striking ``section 1605(a)(7)'' and 
     inserting ``section 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was 
     in effect on January 27, 2008)''.

     SEC. 503. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO SECTION 1245 OF THE 
                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
                   YEAR 2012.

       (a) Exception for Sales of Agricultural Commodities.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1245(d)(2) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513a(d)(2)) is amended--
       (A) in the paragraph heading, by inserting ``agricultural 
     commodities,'' after ``sales of''; and
       (B) in the text, by inserting ``agricultural commodities,'' 
     after ``sale of''.
       (2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1) 
     shall take effect as if included in the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 
     125 Stat. 1298).
       (b) Report of Energy Information Administration.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1245(d)(4)(A) of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513a(d)(4)(A)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``60 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter'' and inserting 
     ``October 25, 2012, and the last Thursday of every other 
     month thereafter''; and
       (B) by striking ``60-day period'' and inserting ``2-month 
     period''.
       (2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1) 
     shall take effect on September 1, 2012.

     SEC. 504. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER SECTION 1245 OF THE 
                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
                   YEAR 2012.

       (a) In General.--Section 1245 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a), as 
     amended by section 503, is further amended--
       (1) in subsection (d)--
       (A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``a foreign financial 
     institution owned or controlled by the government of a 
     foreign country, including''; and
       (B) in paragraph (4)(D)--
       (i) by striking ``Sanctions imposed'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(i) In general.--Sanctions imposed'';
       (ii) in clause (i), as designated by clause (i) of this 
     subparagraph--

       (I) by striking ``a foreign financial institution'' and 
     inserting ``a financial transaction described in clause (ii) 
     conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial 
     institution'';
       (II) by striking ``institution has significantly'' and 
     inserting ``institution--
       ``(I) has significantly reduced'';
       (III) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     or''; and
       (IV) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(II) in the case of a country that has previously 
     received an exception under this subparagraph, has, after 
     receiving the exception, reduced its crude oil purchases from 
     Iran to zero.''; and

       (iii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(ii) Financial transactions described.--A financial 
     transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial 
     institution is described in this clause if--

       ``(I) the financial transaction is only for trade in goods 
     or services between the country with primary jurisdiction 
     over the foreign financial institution and Iran; and
       ``(II) any funds owed to Iran as a result of such trade are 
     credited to an account located in the country with primary 
     jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution.'';

       (2) in subsection (h)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) Significant reductions.--The terms `reduce 
     significantly', `significant reduction', and `significantly 
     reduced', with respect to purchases from Iran of petroleum 
     and petroleum products, include a reduction in such purchases 
     in terms of price or volume toward a complete cessation of 
     such purchases.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) Termination.--The provisions of this section shall 
     terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which 
     the President submits to Congress the certification described 
     in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8551(a)).''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by paragraphs (1) 
     and (2) of subsection (a) shall apply with respect to 
     financial transactions conducted or facilitated on or after 
     the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 505. REPORTS ON NATURAL GAS EXPORTS FROM IRAN.

       (a) Report by Energy Information Administration.--Not later 
     than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Administrator of the Energy Information Administration shall 
     submit to the President and the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on the natural gas sector of Iran that 
     includes--
       (1) an assessment of exports of natural gas from Iran;
       (2) an identification of the countries that purchase the 
     most natural gas from Iran;
       (3) an assessment of alternative supplies of natural gas 
     available to those countries;
       (4) an assessment of the impact a reduction in exports of 
     natural gas from Iran would have on global natural gas 
     supplies and the price of natural gas, especially in 
     countries identified under paragraph (2); and
       (5) such other information as the Administrator considers 
     appropriate.
       (b) Report by President.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after receiving the 
     report required by subsection (a), the President shall, 
     relying on information in that report, submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that includes--
       (A) an assessment of--
       (i) the extent to which revenues from exports of natural 
     gas from Iran are still enriching the Government of Iran;
       (ii) whether a sanctions regime similar to the sanctions 
     regime imposed with respect to purchases of petroleum and 
     petroleum products from Iran pursuant to section 1245 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as 
     amended by sections 503 and 504, or other measures could be 
     applied effectively to exports of natural gas from Iran;
       (iii) the geostrategic implications of a reduction in 
     exports of natural gas from Iran, including the impact of 
     such a reduction on the countries identified under subsection 
     (a)(2);
       (iv) alternative supplies of natural gas available to those 
     countries; and
       (v) the impact a reduction in exports of natural gas from 
     Iran would have on global natural gas supplies and the price 
     of natural gas and the impact, if any, on swap arrangements 
     for natural gas in place between Iran and neighboring 
     countries; and
       (B) specific recommendations with respect to measures 
     designed to limit the revenue received by the Government of 
     Iran from exports of natural gas; and
       (C) any other information the President considers 
     appropriate.
       (2) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 506. REPORT ON MEMBERSHIP OF IRAN IN INTERNATIONAL 
                   ORGANIZATIONS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and not later than September 1 of each year 
     thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report listing the 
     international organizations of which Iran is a member and 
     detailing the amount that the United

[[Page 13095]]

     States contributes to each such organization on an annual 
     basis.

     SEC. 507. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPORTATION OF GOODS, 
                   SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR AIRCRAFT 
                   PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES.

       It is the sense of Congress that licenses to export or 
     reexport goods, services, or technologies for aircraft 
     produced in the United States should be provided only in 
     situations in which such licenses are truly essential and in 
     a manner consistent with the laws and foreign policy goals of 
     the United States.

                      TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 601. IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.

       (a) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 
     and 1704) to carry out--
       (1) sections 211, 212, 213, 217, 218, 220, 312, and 411, 
     subtitle A of title III, and title VII;
       (2) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by 
     section 312; and
       (3) sections 105A and 105B of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as 
     added by subtitle A of title IV.
       (b) Penalties.--
       (1) In general.--The penalties provided for in subsections 
     (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person 
     that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or 
     causes a violation of a provision specified in paragraph (2) 
     of this subsection, or an order or regulation prescribed 
     under such a provision, to the same extent that such 
     penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act 
     described in section 206(a) of that Act.
       (2) Provisions specified.--The provisions specified in this 
     paragraph are the following:
       (A) Sections 211, 212, 213, and 220, subtitle A of title 
     III, and title VII.
       (B) Sections 105A and 105B of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as 
     added by subtitle A of title IV.

     SEC. 602. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act 
     shall apply to the authorized intelligence activities of the 
     United States.

     SEC. 603. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN NATURAL GAS PROJECTS.

       (a) Exception for Certain Natural Gas Projects.--Nothing in 
     this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall apply to 
     any activity relating to a project--
       (1) for the development of natural gas and the construction 
     and operation of a pipeline to transport natural gas from 
     Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe;
       (2) that provides to Turkey and countries in Europe energy 
     security and energy independence from the Government of the 
     Russian Federation and other governments with jurisdiction 
     over persons subject to sanctions imposed under this Act or 
     amendments made by this Act; and
       (3) that was initiated before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act pursuant to a production- sharing agreement, or an 
     ancillary agreement necessary to further a production-sharing 
     agreement, entered into with, or a license granted by, the 
     government of a country other than Iran before such date of 
     enactment.
       (b) Termination of Exception.--
       (1) In general.--The exception under subsection (a) shall 
     not apply with respect to a project described in that 
     subsection on or after the date on which the President 
     certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that--
       (A) the percentage of the equity interest in the project 
     held by or on behalf of an entity described in paragraph (2) 
     has increased relative to the percentage of the equity 
     interest in the project held by or on behalf of such an 
     entity on January 1, 2002; or
       (B) an entity described in paragraph (2) has assumed an 
     operational role in the project.
       (2) Entity described.--An entity described in this 
     paragraph is--
       (A) an entity--
       (i) owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or 
     identified under section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal 
     Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of 
     Iran); or
       (ii) organized under the laws of Iran or with the 
     participation or approval of the Government of Iran;
       (B) an entity owned or controlled by an entity described in 
     subparagraph (A); or
       (C) a successor entity to an entity described in 
     subparagraph (A).

     SEC. 604. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO USE OF FORCE 
                   AGAINST IRAN AND SYRIA.

       Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act 
     shall be construed as a declaration of war or an 
     authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.

     SEC. 605. TERMINATION.

       (a) In General.--The provisions of sections 211, 212, 213, 
     218, 220, 221, and 501, title I, and subtitle A of title III 
     shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on 
     which the President makes the certification described in 
     section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8551(a)).
       (b) Amendment to Termination Date of Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.--
     Section 401(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8551(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``, and verifiably 
     dismantled its,'' after ``development of''.

   TITLE VII--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SYRIA

     SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Syria Human Rights 
     Accountability Act of 2012''.

     SEC. 702. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
                   PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN 
                   HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS 
                   OF SYRIA OR THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.

       (a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions 
     described in subsection (c) with respect to each person on 
     the list required by subsection (b).
       (b) List of Persons Who Are Responsible for or Complicit in 
     Certain Human Rights Abuses.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a list of persons who 
     are officials of the Government of Syria or persons acting on 
     behalf of that Government that the President determines, 
     based on credible evidence, are responsible for or complicit 
     in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise 
     directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses 
     against citizens of Syria or their family members, regardless 
     of whether such abuses occurred in Syria.
       (2) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees an updated list under 
     paragraph (1)--
       (A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and
       (B) as new information becomes available.
       (3) Form of report; public availability.--
       (A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       (B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the 
     list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the 
     public and posted on the websites of the Department of the 
     Treasury and the Department of State.
       (4) Consideration of data from other countries and 
     nongovernmental organizations.--In preparing the list 
     required by paragraph (1), the President shall consider 
     credible data already obtained by other countries and 
     nongovernmental organizations, including organizations in 
     Syria, that monitor the human rights abuses of the Government 
     of Syria.
       (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), 
     including blocking of property and restrictions or 
     prohibitions on financial transactions and the exportation of 
     property, subject to such regulations as the President may 
     prescribe.

     SEC. 703. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 
                   TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO SYRIA THAT 
                   ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   ABUSES.

       (a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions 
     described in section 702(c) with respect to--
       (1) each person on the list required by subsection (b); and
       (2) any person that--
       (A) is a successor entity to a person on the list;
       (B) owns or controls a person on the list, if the person 
     that owns or controls the person on the list had actual 
     knowledge or should have known that the person on the list 
     engaged in the activity described in subsection (b)(2) for 
     which the person was included in the list; or
       (C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or 
     control with, the person on the list, if the person owned or 
     controlled by, or under common ownership or control with (as 
     the case may be), the person on the list knowingly engaged in 
     the activity described in subsection (b)(2) for which the 
     person was included in the list.
       (b) List.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that 
     the President determines have knowingly engaged in an 
     activity described in paragraph (2) on or after such date of 
     enactment.
       (2) Activity described.--
       (A) In general.--A person engages in an activity described 
     in this paragraph if the person--
       (i) transfers, or facilitates the transfer of, goods or 
     technologies described in subparagraph (C) to Syria; or
       (ii) provides services with respect to goods or 
     technologies described in subparagraph (C) after such goods 
     or technologies are transferred to Syria.
       (B) Applicability to contracts and other agreements.--A 
     person engages in an activity described in subparagraph (A) 
     without regard to whether the activity is carried out 
     pursuant to a contract or other agreement entered into 
     before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (C) Goods or technologies described.--Goods or technologies 
     described in this subparagraph are goods or technologies that 
     the President determines are likely to be used by the 
     Government of Syria or any of its agencies or 
     instrumentalities to commit human rights abuses against the 
     people of Syria, including--
       (i) firearms or ammunition (as those terms are defined in 
     section 921 of title 18, United States

[[Page 13096]]

     Code), rubber bullets, police batons, pepper or chemical 
     sprays, stun grenades, electroshock weapons, tear gas, water 
     cannons, or surveillance technology; or
       (ii) sensitive technology.
       (D) Sensitive technology defined.--
       (i) In general.--For purposes of subparagraph (C), the term 
     ``sensitive technology'' means hardware, software, 
     telecommunications equipment, or any other technology, that 
     the President determines is to be used specifically--

       (I) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in 
     Syria; or
       (II) to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of 
     the people of Syria.

       (ii) Exception.--The term ``sensitive technology'' does not 
     include information or informational materials the 
     exportation of which the President does not have the 
     authority to regulate or prohibit pursuant to section 
     203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)).
       (3) Special rule to allow for termination of sanctionable 
     activity.--The President shall not be required to include a 
     person on the list required by paragraph (1) if the President 
     certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that--
       (A) the person is no longer engaging in, or has taken 
     significant verifiable steps toward stopping, the activity 
     described in paragraph (2) for which the President would 
     otherwise have included the person on the list; and
       (B) the President has received reliable assurances that the 
     person will not knowingly engage in any activity described in 
     paragraph (2) in the future.
       (4) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees an updated list under 
     paragraph (1)--
       (A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and
       (B) as new information becomes available.
       (5) Form of report; public availability.--
       (A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       (B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the 
     list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the 
     public and posted on the websites of the Department of the 
     Treasury and the Department of State.

     SEC. 704. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO 
                   ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER FORMS OF 
                   REPRESSION IN SYRIA.

       (a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions 
     described in section 702(c) with respect to each person on 
     the list required by subsection (b).
       (b) List of Persons Who Engage in Censorship.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that 
     the President determines have engaged in censorship, or 
     activities relating to censorship, in a manner that 
     prohibits, limits, or penalizes the legitimate exercise of 
     freedom of expression by citizens of Syria.
       (2) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees an updated list under 
     paragraph (1)--
       (A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and
       (B) as new information becomes available.
       (3) Form of report; public availability.--
       (A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       (B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the 
     list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the 
     public and posted on the websites of the Department of the 
     Treasury and the Department of State.

     SEC. 705. WAIVER.

       The President may waive the requirement to include a person 
     on a list required by section 702, 703, or 704 or to impose 
     sanctions pursuant to any such section if the President--
       (1) determines that such a waiver is in the national 
     security interests of the United States; and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report on the reasons for that determination.

     SEC. 706. TERMINATION.

       (a) In General.--The provisions of this title and any 
     sanctions imposed pursuant to this title shall terminate on 
     the date on which the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees--
       (1) the certification described in subsection (b); and
       (2) a certification that--
       (A) the Government of Syria is democratically elected and 
     representative of the people of Syria; or
       (B) a legitimate transitional government of Syria is in 
     place.
       (b) Certification Described.--A certification described in 
     this subsection is a certification by the President that the 
     Government of Syria--
       (1) has unconditionally released all political prisoners;
       (2) has ceased its practices of violence, unlawful 
     detention, torture, and abuse of citizens of Syria engaged in 
     peaceful political activity;
       (3) has ceased its practice of procuring sensitive 
     technology designed to restrict the free flow of unbiased 
     information in Syria, or to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise 
     restrict the right of citizens of Syria to freedom of 
     expression;
       (4) has ceased providing support for foreign terrorist 
     organizations and no longer allows such organizations, 
     including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to 
     maintain facilities in territory under the control of the 
     Government of Syria; and
       (5) has ceased the development and deployment of medium- 
     and long-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles;
       (6) is not pursuing or engaged in the research, 
     development, acquisition, production, transfer, or deployment 
     of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, and has provided 
     credible assurances that it will not engage in such 
     activities in the future; and
       (7) has agreed to allow the United Nations and other 
     international observers to verify that the Government of 
     Syria is not engaging in such activities and to assess the 
     credibility of the assurances provided by that Government.
       (c) Suspension of Sanctions After Election of Democratic 
     Government.--If the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees the certification described in 
     subsection (a)(2), the President may suspend the provisions 
     of this title and any sanctions imposed under this title for 
     not more than 180 days to allow time for a certification 
     described in subsection (b) to be submitted.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Berman) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, by prior agreement with the gentleman 
from California, who will do the same, I would like to yield 5 minutes 
of my time to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) and ask unanimous 
consent that he be allowed to control those 5 minutes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, are we 
apportioning that 5 minutes from each side?
  Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. At the point where I am recognized, I will be also 
seeking unanimous consent for the same kind of referral of time to your 
control.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I withdraw my reservation.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would also yield 5 minutes of my time to 
the gentleman from Ohio and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to 
control those 5 minutes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks 
and to include extraneous material on the measure under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I have spoken on this floor many times about the Iranian 
threat and the need for action to stop it, but ultimately we will all 
be judged by a simple question: Did we stop Iran from getting a nuclear 
weapons capability? If the answer is ``no,'' if we fail, then nothing 
else matters. If we fail, it would be of no comfort to the American 
people whose security and future would be put in danger. If we fail, it 
would be of no comfort to our ally, Israel, whose very existence would 
be put in danger.
  History is full of avoidable tragedies, of foolish countries that 
have allowed their enemies to prepare to destroy them. The entire world 
now is fully aware of Iran's true intention. Now is the time to take a 
stand. As Sir Winston Churchill said:

       You ask, What is our aim? I can answer with one word: 
     victory. For without victory, there is no survival.

  To get us on that path to victory, Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues 
to render their full support to the Iran Threat Reduction and the Syria 
Human Rights

[[Page 13097]]

Act of 2012, a bicameral, bipartisan agreement that represents the 
strongest set of sanctions ever put in place against the regime in 
Tehran. It blacklists virtually all of Iran's energy, financial, and 
transportation sectors, and cuts off companies that keep doing business 
with Iran from access to our markets in the United States.
  This legislation also imposes sanctions to prevent Iran from 
repatriating any proceeds from its oil sales, depriving the Iranian 
regime of 80 percent of its hard currency earnings and half of the 
funds that support its budget. This bill also imposes tough new 
sanctions on the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian 
Tanker Company, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It also 
targets Iran's use of barter transactions to bypass sanctions, the 
provisions of insurance to Iran's energy sector. It also targets 
provisions of specialized financial messaging services to the Central 
Bank of Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, in 1995, the late former Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher said:

       In terms of its organization, programs, procurement, and 
     covert activities, Iran is pursuing the classic route to 
     nuclear weapons, which has been followed by almost all states 
     that have recently sought a nuclear capability.

  That was in 1995.
  Secretary Christopher added:

       There is no room for complacency.

  Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in '96. That law, now 
called the Iran Sanctions Act, sought to target Iran's economic 
lifeline--its energy sector--and denied Tehran the financial resources 
to pursue its nuclear ambitions, to sponsor violent Islamic groups, and 
to dominate the region.

                              {time}  1430

  Regrettably, just a couple years after enactment of that law, the 
Clinton administration issued a blanket waiver of energy sector 
sanctions that has been continued by successive administrations.
  In 1996, U.S. concerns were not shared by our allies in Europe and 
Asia, who argued that trade, dialogue, and engagement toward the 
Iranian regime would succeed in moderating Tehran's behavior. This 
allowed the Iranian threat to flourish.
  However, Congress continued to develop new legislative 
countermeasures in the form of the Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006 and 
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 
2010 to address these Iranian threats and to hold the regime 
accountable for its human rights violations, for its state sponsorship 
of violent extremists, and for its pursuit of a nuclear capability.
  We have analyzed Iranian reaction and behavior in response to these 
new sanctions. We have looked at what steps our allies have undertaken 
and considered the actions, or the paralysis, of the United Nations. 
But most importantly, Mr. Speaker, we have intensified our response as 
the Iranian threat has evolved and grown.
  We know that ``the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.'' But far 
more than vigilance is needed in this case.
  Which brings us to the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights 
Act, which we are considering today. This bipartisan, bicameral 
agreement seeks to tighten the choke hold on the regime beyond anything 
that has been done before. It sends a clear message that the American 
people, through their elected representatives, are fully committed to 
using every economic and political lever at their disposal to prevent 
Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.
  Through this bill, we declare that the Iranian energy sector is off 
limits, and it blacklists any related unauthorized dealings. It will 
undermine Iran's ability to repatriate the revenues it receives from 
the sale of crude oil, depriving Iran of hard currency earnings and 
funds needed to sustain its nuclear program. It prevents the purchasing 
of Iranian sovereign debt, thereby further limiting the regime's 
ability to finance its illicit activities. It also expands sanctions 
against Iranian and Syrian officials for human rights abuses, 
particularly those facilitated by computer and network disruption, 
monitoring, and tracking by those governments.
  Yet we should be under no illusions, Mr. Speaker, that this 
legislation is a magic wand that we wave, and we will resolve the 
problem overnight. Sanctions have helped to knock the regime off 
balance. But unless the executive branch fully implements these 
measures immediately, the regime is likely to regain its footing and 
further speed up its nuclear march. So let us act now to stop that 
march.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, the threat posed by the Iranian regime is not just a 
threat to the United States, or to our allies, or to the Iranian 
people.
  The Iranian regime is also a threat to the Syrian people, because of 
Iran's close ties and assistance, including weapons that have helped 
the regime in Syria to slaughter thousands.
  Like Iran, Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism that poses a threat 
to the U.S., to our ally Israel, and to other responsible nations.
  I hope to be back on the House floor in the near future with the 
Syria Freedom Support Act to address the totality of the Syrian threat, 
but today we stand ready to hold the Assad regime accountable for its 
gross human rights violations.
  Today, we seek to ensure that neither of these brutal regimes has 
access to resources that would enable them to perpetuate their cruelty.
  Those allies who, 16 years ago, wanted to engage and continue 
business as usual with Iran and who, until just a few years ago, were 
proposing expanded trade agreements with the Assad regime in Syria, 
have awaken to take a stand against the threatening activities of these 
pariah states.
  Congress must carry out its responsibility to the American people and 
overwhelmingly adopt the bicameral, bipartisan agreement we are 
considering today.
  I urge the President to quickly sign it into law and immediately and 
fully implement the sanctions it contains.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), a national leader on the issue of 
nonproliferation and human rights and particularly our efforts to stop 
Iran's nuclear weapons program, the Democratic whip of the House.
  Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman from California for yielding.
  First, I want to rise and thank Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for 
her continuing leadership and focus on this important issue, as she 
does on so many other issues as well.
  Mr. Speaker, let me thank my friend, the gentleman from California 
and ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Berman. His 
leadership on this issue in Congress is second to none, and I commend 
him for his work.
  This is a bill I expect will pass with overwhelming support in both 
parties and for good reason. Iran cannot be allowed to develop a 
nuclear weapon. America's policy, as President Obama has stated, is 
prevention, not containment.
  We have many tools at our disposal to prevent Iran from obtaining 
nuclear weapons technology. While President Obama is keeping all 
options on the table, the best diplomatic tool we have to deter Iran is 
the sanctions regime his administration has expanded along with our 
allies in Europe and elsewhere. These sanctions have already had a 
significant effect, and Iran continues to face the prospect of severe 
economic repercussions if they fail to abandon their nuclear weapons 
plan.
  President Obama deserves credit for his tough stances. The new 
sanctions this legislation would impose target entities conducting 
business with Iran's insurance, energy, and shipping sectors. As a 
result of prohibitions on repatriating oil revenues, these sanctions 
would deny Iran 80 percent of its hard currency earnings. Iran's 
banking sector, including its central bank, is already sanctioned, a 
result of the Iranian Government's financial support for terrorism in 
the region and around the world.
  There is no better evidence why this bill is so important than the 
fact that 2 weeks ago, a terrorist attack in Bulgaria killed six 
innocent civilians, five of them vacationing Israelis. There have been 
numerous press reports linking Iran to that attack.

[[Page 13098]]

  As long as Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons, call for the 
destruction of Israel, and provide arms to terror groups like Hamas and 
Hezbollah, it will face the consequences in the form of sanctions, 
isolation, and the continuing reality of the option of military action.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. BERMAN. I am pleased to yield the gentleman an additional 30 
seconds.
  Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman.
  The United States continues to stand strongly with our ally Israel. 
And I am proud to have led an effort earlier this year with the 
majority leader to strengthen U.S.-Israel military and intelligence 
relations.
  I urge all of my colleagues to unite behind this bill, just as we did 
behind that one. A nuclear-armed Iran is not an option for the Middle 
East, for the international community, and for the United States.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas, Congressman Ron Paul, an American patriot, someone who has 
been relentless in his efforts to stop America from blundering into 
foreign adventures.
  Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I think this bill would be better named if we called it ``Obsession 
with Iran Act of 2012'' because this is what we continue to be doing--
obsess with Iran and the idea that Iran is a threat to our national 
security.
  Iran happens to be a Third World nation. They have no significant 
navy, air force, intercontinental ballistic missiles. The IAEA and our 
CIA say they are not on the verge of a nuclear weapon.
  It's so similar to what we went through in the early part of this 
last decade where we were beating the war drums to go to war against 
Iraq. And it was all a facade. There was no danger from Iraq. So this 
is what we're doing, beating the war drums once again.
  Since the bill has come back from the conference, if we are to deal 
with civil liberties in Syria--well, I happen to be a civil 
libertarian. I am very concerned about civil liberties. But let me tell 
you, this bill is not going to do anything to enhance the civil 
liberties of the individuals in Syria.
  If we were really interested in civil liberties, why wouldn't we look 
to ourselves? Why wouldn't we look to the things we do here? What about 
our warrantless searches under the PATRIOT Act? What about the policy 
of assassination, assassinating American citizens? What about arrests 
by the military, the National Defense Authorization Act? What about the 
drone warfare that we go on? Do you think we are protecting civil 
liberties by arbitrarily dropping drones or threatening to drop drones 
anyplace in the world, with innocent people dying?
  If we want to really care about civil liberties in Syria, why don't 
we care about the secret prisons we have and the history of torture 
that we have had in this country?
  What about the fact that kill lists are being made by the executive 
branch of government, and we sit idly by and approve of it by saying 
nothing, and the American people put up with it, and we march in this 
direction, marching into a determination to have another war?
  When you put sanctions on a country, it's an act of war, and that is 
what this is all about. The first thing you do when war breaks out 
between two countries is you put sanctions on them. You blockade the 
country. So this is an act of war.
  What would we do if somebody blockaded and put sanctions on us and 
prevented the importation of any product of this country? We would be 
furious. We would declare war. We would go to war.

                              {time}  1440

  So we are the antagonists. We're over there poking our nose and 
poking our nose in other people's affairs, just looking for a chance to 
start another war. First it's Syria and then Iran. We have too many 
wars. We need to stop the wars. We don't have the money to fight these 
wars any longer.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Turner), a member of our Committee on 
Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. TURNER of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 
1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. I 
would like to applaud Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen's tireless effort on this 
legislation to ensure that Iran's terrorist regime does not threaten 
the security of the United States and our greatest ally in the Middle 
East, Israel.
  I'm sure many of you remember that Iran was found by a Federal court 
to have been directly involved in both the 1983 attacks on the marine 
barracks in Beirut which killed 241 soldiers and the Khobar Towers 
bombing in Saudi Arabia where a suicide bomber killed 14 airmen. The 
victims and their families won a judgment in court against the Iranian 
Government, but have had difficulty enforcing it because Iran could 
hide behind sovereign immunity.
  I introduced H.R. 4070, which is now part of this bill, to change a 
specific part of Federal law to allow assets seized from the Iranian 
Government to be allocated to the Beirut and Khobar Towers families to 
recover the judgments owed to them. It is time that Iran is held 
accountable for their involvement in the deaths of our soldiers.
  I'm proud to say that this provision is truly bipartisan. My 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle stand together against Iran. By 
passing this bill today, we offer the victims' families the justice 
that they have long been denied.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 750, and I 
yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
  The bill before us today marks a significant step forward in our 
sanctions effort against the Iranian regime and its illicit nuclear 
program, the sanctions effort which even Tehran acknowledges is already 
having a stressful impact on Iran's economy. I want to commend my 
colleague, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for her work on this legislation; and 
I'm proud to be the bill's chief cosponsor in the House.
  Building on previous sanctions, this bill adds to what the gentlelady 
and I set out to do when we introduced it. For example, through further 
limiting transitions with the Central Bank of Iran, an initiative I 
originated, this legislation restricts Iran's ability to repatriate the 
revenue it receives from its diminishing oil sales. It includes 
provisions that clamp down on Iran's oil exports by targeting the 
National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company; 
and it expands sanctions on Iranian shipping, insurance, and financing 
in the energy sector.
  The bill also increases sanctions on transactions with Iran's Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, the spearhead of Iran's nuclear 
proliferation and terrorism effort and the dominant player in the 
Iranian economy. Further, at my suggestion, this bill now includes a 
measure which expands CISADA sanctions beyond financial institutions to 
include more than 200 additional individuals and companies that have 
been linked to Iran's nuclear weapons of mass destruction and terrorism 
programs.
  And of critical importance, this bill vastly strengthens sanctions on 
both Iranian and Syrian human rights abusers. These provisions are very 
important, but the Iranians should not be fooled into thinking this is 
the last word on sanctions. Far from it.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to call on the administration to 
implement the authorities we have given them, fully and without delay. 
Iran's nuclear clock is ticking, and time is not on our side. The 
actions the executive branch took yesterday, including the first-ever 
CISADA sanctions on foreign banks--more than 2 years after CISADA 
became law--are a good beginning, but Iran's nuclear weapons program 
continues apace. Every day, it is enriching more uranium and at higher 
levels.
  The only hope we have for a peaceful solution is to apply enough 
pressure to ensure that Iran ends its nuclear weapons program. The bill 
before us and the action the administration has taken applies 
significantly more pressure; but

[[Page 13099]]

let there be no doubt, there is more we can do and more that we will do 
if Iran doesn't end its nuclear weapons program verifiably and 
completely. We have more work to do.

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     ADMINISTRATION GMBH; FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FIRST OCEAN 
     ADMINISTRATION GMBH; FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FIRST PERSIA 
     EQUITY FUND; FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FOURTH OCEAN 
     ADMINISTRATION GMBH; FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; Frosch, 
     Daniel; FULMEN GROUP; GALLIOT MARITIME INC; GHEZEL AYAGH, 
     Alireza; GLOBAL INTERFACE COMPANY INC.; GOLPARVAR, 
     Gholamhossein; GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; Good Luck 
     Shipping.
       GREAT METHOD LIMITED; GREAT OCEAN SHIPPING SERVICES 
     (L.L.C.); HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO; HIGHER INSTITUTE OF 
     APPLIED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY 
     LIMITED; HTTS HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST AND SHIPPING, GMBH; IDEAL 
     SUCCESS INVESTMENTS LIMITED; INDUS MARITIME INC; 
     International General Resourcing; IRAN AIR; IRAN AIRCRAFT 
     MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIAL COMPANY; IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY 
     COMPANY; IRAN COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES; IRAN ELECTRONICS 
     INDUSTRIES; IRAN O MISR SHIPPING COMPANY; IRANAIR TOURS; 
     IRINVESTSHIP LTD.; IRISL (MALTA) LIMITED; IRISL (UK) LTD.; 
     IRISL CHINA SHIPPING CO., LTD.
       IRISL EUROPE GMBH; IRISL MARINE SERVICES & ENGINEERING 
     COMPANY; IRISL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CO.; IRITAL SHIPPING SRL 
     COMPANY; ISI MARITIME LIMITED; ISIM AMIN LIMITED; ISIM ATR 
     LIMITED; ISIM OLIVE LIMITED;ISIM SAT LIMITED; ISIM SEA 
     CHARIOT LIMITED; ISIM SEA CRESCENT LIMITED; ISIM SININ 
     LIMITED; ISIM TAJ MAHAL LIMITED; ISIM TOUR LIMITED; ISLAMIC 
     REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES; JAFARI, Mani; JAFARI, Milad; 
     JAFARI, Mohammad Javad; JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS; KAVERI MARITIME 
     INC.
       KERMAN SHIPPING CO LTD; KHALILI, Jamshid; KHAZAR SEA 
     SHIPPING LINES; KOHAS AG; LANCELIN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; 
     LEADING MARITIME PTE. LTD.; LERCH, Gotthard; LOGISTIC SMART 
     LIMITED; LOWESWATER LIMITED; M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES; MACHINE 
     PARDAZAN CO.; MACPAR MAKINA SAN VE TIC A.S.; Malek Ashtar 
     University; MALEKI, Naser; MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY LTD.; 
     MARANER HOLDINGS LIMITED; MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED; MAZANDARAN 
     CEMENT COMPANY; MAZANDARAN TEXTILE COMPANY; MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
       MELODIOUS MARITIME INC; MILL DENE LIMITED; MINISTRY OF 
     DEFENSE FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS; Ministry of Defense 
     Logistics Export; MODALITY LIMITED; MOGHADDAMI FARD, 
     Mohammad; MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INC; MULTIMAT IC VE DIS 
     TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MUNITIONS INDUSTRY 
     DEPARTMENT; NABIPOUR, Ghasem; NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING 
     GMBH & CO. KG; NATIONAL STANDARDS AND CALIBRATION LABORATORY; 
     NEKA NOVIN; NEUMAN LIMITED; NEW DESIRE LIMITED; NINTH OCEAN 
     ADMINISTRATION GMBH; NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; NOOR AFZAR 
     GOSTAR COMPANY; OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH; PACIFIC 
     SHIPPING DMCEST.
       PAJAND, Mohammad Hadi; PARTNER CENTURY LIMITED; PARTO SANAT 
     CO.; PAYA PARTOV CO.; PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD.; PEARL ENERGY 
     SERVICES, SA; PEARL SHIP MANAGEMENT L.L.C.; QANNADI, 
     Mohammad; Rabiee, Hamid Reza; RISHI MARITIME INC; ROYAL-MED 
     SHIPPING AGENCY LTD; SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LIMITED; SAFIRAN 
     PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY; SANDFORD GROUP LIMITED; 
     SARKANDI, Ahmad; SCIENTIFIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTER; 
     SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; SECOND ECONOMIC 
     COMMITTEE; SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; SECOND OCEAN 
     GMBH & CO. KG.
       SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. 
     KG; SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIES GROUP; SHAHID BAKERI 
     INDUSTRIAL GROUP; SHAHID SATTARI INDUSTRIES; SHALLON LIMITED; 
     SHERE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES 
     COMPANY; SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; SHOMAL CEMENT 
     COMPANY; SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO.; SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS 
     LIMITED; SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD.; SIXTH OCEAN 
     ADMINISTRATION GMBH; SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; SMART DAY 
     HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED; SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP 
     MANAGEMENT COMPANY; SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED; STARRY SHINE 
     INTERNATIONAL LIMITED; STEIGER, Jakob.
       STEP A.S.; SYSTEM WISE LIMITED; TAFAZOLI, Ahmad; TAHIR, 
     Buhary Seyed Abu; TALAI, Mohamad; TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; 
     THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY; THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION 
     GMBH; THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. 
     KG; TONGHAM SHIPPING CO LTD; TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED; TOP 
     PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED; TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING 
     CORPORATION; TRADE TREASURE LIMITED.
       TRANS MERITS CO. LTD.; TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LIMITED; 
     TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. 
     KG; UPPERCOURT SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; VAHIDI, Ahmad; 
     Value-Added Services Laboratory; VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE CO 
     SSK; VOBSTER SHIPPING COMPANY LTD; WISSER, Gerhard; WOKING 
     SHIPPING INVESTMENTS LIMITED; YASA PART; ZADEH, Hassan Jalil.

  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.
  What this is doing is essentially stopping any kind of a negotiated 
deal and putting us on a path towards war with Iran. You know, it is 
likely that any negotiated deal that would prevent a nuclear-armed Iran 
would provide for Iranian enrichment for peaceful purposes under the 
framework of the nuclear nonproliferation weapons treaty with strict 
safeguards and inspections. So we're taking a path here that guarantees 
that we're put on a glide slope right to war. Why are we doing this, we 
don't have enough wars in this country? We aren't involved in enough 
places around the world in war?
  This is a bad resolution.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'd like to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), who is our subcommittee chairman 
on Middle East and South Asia of our Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentlelady for yielding and I thank her for 
her very strong support and leadership on this particular issue and on 
so many issues in this Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this well-crafted legislation which 
significantly ratchets up pressure on the regime in Tehran, as well as 
all those who support or enable its dangerous quest for a nuclear 
weapons capability. As we stand here today, Iran's centrifuges continue 
to spin and the regime inches closer to that very end. If allowed to 
cross that threshold, untold consequences would surely follow.
  Iran, which former President George W. Bush aptly called the 
``world's primary state sponsor of terror,'' would no doubt feel 
emboldened in its meddling in the internal affairs of our gulf allies 
and in threats to U.S. global and regional interests. Questions of 
rationality aside, the regime would also have the ability to follow 
through on its repeated threats to eradicate the State of Israel. Iran 
cannot be allowed to acquire this capability, and I believe that this 
legislation may very well significantly enhance pressure on the regime.
  The nuclear program is, however, a symptom of the disease rather than 
the disease itself. A nuclear program is not in and of itself what 
makes this particular regime so nefarious. Rather, it

[[Page 13100]]

is the perverse nature of the regime that makes the nuclear program so 
dangerous. And there can be no doubt that the regime in Tehran is a 
blight upon the Iranian people and on the region, and, in fact, on the 
whole world. To speak of the nuclear program independently of the 
regime which pursues it is in effect putting the cart before the horse.
  But this legislation does not fall into that trap. In addition to 
targeting the nuclear program, H.R. 1905 puts significant pressure on 
the regime for its horrific human rights abuses and supports the 
oppressed Iranian people in their fight for freedom.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of this critical legislation, and I want 
to once again thank the distinguished chairwoman, Ms. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen from Florida, for her leadership on this issue. She has been 
pushing and pushing and pushing against this corrupt Iranian regime for 
such a long time, and to do right by our ally Israel, and ultimately to 
do what is in the best interest of the people of the United States as 
well. It is in nobody's interest to have a nuclear Iran, and so I want 
to thank her for her leadership.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking member of the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation and Trade.

                              {time}  1450

  Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I want to thank the chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee for 
her work on this bill and for reaching an agreement with the Senate 
Banking Committee, and I rise in strong support of this measure.
  I especially want to thank the chairman for working with me on title 
III of this bill, as it reflects several years of our work together. 
Title III targets the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and began its life 
as H.R. 2379, then designated the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Designation Implementation Act, which I introduced along with the 
chairman in May of 2009.
  These provisions impose tough secondary sanctions against any person, 
including foreign companies, that conduct any significant transaction 
with the IRGC or any of its designated fronts and affiliates. The IRGC, 
through its support of Hezbollah and its direct action, has much blood 
on its hands.
  I want to thank the chairman and her staff for including section 303, 
which applies sanctions to countries and governments--not just 
companies--that conduct transactions or provide support for the IRGC 
and for provisions which indicate that if you want to be a Federal 
contractor, you must certify that you do not do prohibited business 
with the IRGC.
  This bill also includes important provisions I first proposed in the 
Stop Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program Act that will provide sanctions 
against those who lend money to the Iranian Government. It includes 
another provision I authored which will implement sanctions against 
those firms that give the Iranian Government the technologies for 
surveillance and repression of their own people.
  This is not the final act, literally or figuratively. What we've done 
so far is not enough to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program. We 
ought to stay in session and pass even more sanctions against Iran.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include for the Record a statement by 
the Friends Committee on National Legislation, which says that the new 
sanctions push the U.S. and Iran closer to war.

New Iran Sanctions Push U.S., Iran Closer Toward War--Friends Committee 
                        on National Legislation

       Washington, DC.--FCNL's Lobbyist on Middle East issues Kate 
     Gould issued the following statement opposing the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905) that 
     could reach the House floor as early as today:
       The Friends Committee on National Legislation strongly 
     opposes the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
     of 2012 (H.R. 1905). We believe this legislation would 
     undermine human rights in Iran and cripple the accountability 
     of the diplomatic process now underway to prevent a nuclear-
     armed Iran, pushing the U.S. and Iran closer toward a 
     devastating war.
       War is the ultimate human rights violation, and this bill 
     lays the groundwork for war by escalating the scale of 
     economic warfare that Congress would impose on ordinary 
     Iranian citizens. As in the case of the decades of U.S. and 
     U.N. sanctions against Iraq that culminated in a U.S. 
     invasion of that country, economic warfare punishes 
     civilians, emboldens hardliners in Iran's regime, and 
     forecloses diplomatic options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran 
     and war.


                      Punishing Iranian Civilians

       FCNL and ten other national advocacy and religious 
     organizations from the human rights and peace and security 
     community wrote to Senator Tim Johnson, Chair of the Senate 
     Banking Committee, last week to oppose this bill, and to 
     highlight the importance of keeping channels open for 
     Iranians to have access to food, medicine, and other 
     humanitarian goods and services.
       Ordinary Iranians already face tremendous difficulties in 
     accessing basic medicine under sanctions. For example, this 
     week, the board of directors of the Iranian Hemophilia 
     Society informed the World Federation of Hemophilia that the 
     lives of tens of thousands of children are being endangered 
     by the lack of proper drugs, as a consequence of 
     international sanctions.
       The Iranian Hemophilia Society notes that U.S. and 
     international sanctions technically do not ban medical goods. 
     Yet, despite the `humanitarian exemption' in U.S. sanctions 
     laws, medicine is not getting in to Iran because the 
     ``sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Iran and the 
     country's other financial institutions have severely 
     disrupted the purchase and transfer of medical goods.''
       The humanitarian exemption is of profound importance, as 
     the U.S. business community and humanitarian organizations 
     have pointed out. We are relieved that this legislation does 
     not directly prohibit Iranians from accessing food, medicine, 
     and humanitarian trade. However, if the Iranian civilian 
     economy is destroyed by sanctions, then millions of Iranians 
     will be deprived of their livelihoods, and unable to purchase 
     the food, medicine, and other goods that the humanitarian 
     exemption is supposed to protect. Further destabilization of 
     the Iranian currency and decimation of the Iranian economy 
     will push Iran closer to the state of Iraq when it was under 
     sanctions. During that time, UNICEF estimated that U.N. 
     sanctions contributed to the deaths of half a million 
     children.


                     Emboldening Hardliners in Iran

       This bill would embolden hardliners in the Iranian regime, 
     at the expense of the civilians who will overwhelmingly bear 
     the brunt of these sanctions. Just as Saddam Hussein never 
     missed a meal under the decades of sanctions against Iraq, 
     top Iranian officials will not have difficulty accessing food 
     and medicine. National security expert Fareed Zakaria has 
     noted that the U.S./U.N. sanctions' ``basic effect has been 
     to weaken civil society and strengthen the state'', and that 
     ``the other effects of the sanctions has been that larger and 
     larger parts of the economy are now controlled by Iran's 
     Revolutionary Guard--the elite corps of the armed forces.''


       Foreclosing Diplomatic Options, Laying Groundwork for War

       As countless U.S. and Israeli security officials have 
     pointed out, diplomacy is the single most effective way to 
     prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran. This bill would be a 
     setback to achieving a near-term diplomatic resolution of the 
     standoff over Iran's nuclear program, foreclosing diplomatic 
     options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and a devastating 
     war.
       This bill would tie the President's hands, eroding the 
     little flexibility that Congress normally allows the 
     executive branch to conduct negotiations with Iran and allow 
     for sanctions relief in exchange for serious, verifiable 
     Iranian concessions. We are particularly concerned about 
     section 217, which effectively endorses regime change. The 
     provision would prohibit the President from lifting sanctions 
     against the Central Bank of Iran unless Iran agrees to a host 
     of conditions that the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot 
     reasonably be expected to agree to.
       As veteran intelligence officer Paul Pillar has pointed 
     out, requiring Iran to end efforts to ``acquire or develop 
     ballistic missiles'', [section 217 (d)(1)(A)(iii)] ``goes 
     beyond any United Nations resolutions on Iran, which talk 
     about nuclear capability of missiles, and even beyond 
     anything ever demanded of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, for which 
     range limits were imposed. It would be understandable if 
     Tehran reads such language as further evidence that the 
     United States is not interested in any negotiated agreement 
     but instead only in regime change.''
       The bill even requires the President to certify that Iran 
     does not ``construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear 
     facilities that could aid Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear 
     capability'' [section 217 (d)(1)(A)(ii.)]: in order to lift 
     sanctions against Iran's Central Bank. It appears that 
     Congress is requiring that broad indiscriminate sanctions 
     remain in place unless Iran surrenders its nuclear program 
     entirely, even if it is a verifiably peace program.

[[Page 13101]]

       FCNL strongly urges members of Congress to speak out and 
     vote against this broad, indiscriminate sanctions legislation 
     on the House floor today.

  I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Representative 
Ron Paul.
  Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I'm still rather impressed with the obsession over a weapon that does 
not exist and no concern whatsoever about many nuclear weapons that are 
held by countries that never even joined the nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty.
  It's called for in the debate that Iran should end all its nuclear 
programs, but they're permitted to have the nuclear program under the 
nonproliferation treaty. And the other countries that have weapons, 
including the countries that hold the weapons that came from the Soviet 
system, it seems like that would be a much greater danger.
  The investigation by either the U.N. or by our CAs has never 
indicated that they have ever enriched above 20 percent. And they said 
they won't even do it to 20 percent if the West would cooperate and 
sell them this material. They said, we don't need it, but we need 20 
percent enrichment for nuclear isotopes, medical isotopes. So our 
refusal to deal with them prompts them to take up enrichment to 25 
percent; 5 percent, of course, is what they're allowed to do for 
nuclear energies.
  But this idea that we can badger people and then defy the law, what 
we're asking them to do, to close down their program, is you're asking 
them to defy international law. They agreed to this. They have a right 
to do this under this treaty. And for us to come and say, well, they 
must quit it, I think it really is very close to an obsession on a 
country that is incapable of attacking us, or attacking--they don't 
have a history of invading their neighboring countries. The last time 
they were at war was with Iraq, and we bugged Iraq to go into Iran.
  So I find this very distressing that the obsession continues. I find 
it very, very upsetting that this vote will, of course, be 
overwhelmingly in support of correcting the civil liberties of Syria 
and making Iran toe the line and give up on something that they're 
permitted to do. A vote for this, in my opinion, in time will show that 
it's just one more step to another war that we don't need.
  We have not been provoked. They are not a threat to our national 
security, and we should not be doing this. We've been doing it too 
long. For the last 10, 15 years we have been just obsessed with this 
idea that we go to war and try to solve all the problems of the world; 
and at the same time, it is bankrupting us.
  I strongly urge a ``no'' vote on this resolution.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), who is the chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I want to start here by commending Chairman 
Ros-Lehtinen for this sustained focus on Iran that she has had for 
many, many years. I also want to thank Ranking Member Berman for the 
strong pressure that he has put on the regime in Iran, as well.
  Recently, we had the administration fighting hard against bipartisan 
sanctions targeting the Central Bank of Iran. But what I want to point 
out is that in a bipartisan way here, Congress insisted on, and today 
the administration touts, the impact of sanctions on Iran's economy.
  Here is the point I'd like to make: we'd be in a much better position 
if the executive branch, both Republicans and Democrats--right now we 
have the problem with the Obama administration's slow-walking this; but 
had they been more willing to work with Congress to craft tougher 
sanctions earlier, we'd be in a lot better position right now. The 
bill's stepped-up penalties on those cooperating with Iran's energy and 
shipping sectors, frankly, that's the Achilles' heel that we should be 
aiming at.
  Very importantly, this bill also includes a human rights title to go 
after those abusing Iran's citizens. Let's let Iranians know that we 
are on their side and we are going to focus on those crimes against 
humanity and on the brutal regime opposing them. It's a regime that 
beats and that imprisons--I've talked to some of these victims--and 
that often rapes its own people in order to try to impose its will. 
It's a regime that executes political prisoners by the hundreds.
  Congress is increasing the pressure. Many of us, certainly the 
chairman, would like to go further. Iran's centrifuges are spinning, 
but this progress here today deserves support.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my friend from 
Florida (Mr. Deutch), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
author of the bill which declares Iran's energy sector a zone of 
proliferation.
  Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to recognize Chairman 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Howard Berman for their 
extraordinary leadership and their tireless work to bring forward a 
bipartisan and bicameral bill. I thank you for working with me to 
include several of my provisions in this legislation, including the 
Iran Transparency and Accountability Act, a measure that will, for the 
first time, require companies to disclose their business with Iran on 
SEC filings and for the first time create a public listing of these 
disclosures to clearly and definitively let the American people know 
which companies continue to support the illicit nuclear weapons program 
of Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
significantly expands sanctions against the Iranian regime and those 
who, in the face of united international opposition, continue to 
contribute to Iran's quest for nuclear weapons.
  This bill sends one clear message to the entire world: if you do 
virtually any business in the Iranian energy sector--the financial 
lifeline of this regime's nuclear program--you will be subject to 
sanctions.
  Today, the United States Congress takes U.S. sanctions policy to an 
unprecedented level. By sending this legislation to the President's 
desk, Congress can initiate an unprecedented crackdown on the Iranian 
regime. But our work does not end here. These punishing sanctions are a 
means to an end; and we cannot, for one moment, take our eye off the 
endgame--halting Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon.
  Again, I thank the chairman and ranking member for their leadership. 
I urge my colleagues to support this important bill. Now is the time to 
stand for human rights in Iran and Syria. Now is the time. Now is the 
time to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include for the Record a publication 
from the International Civil Society Action Network, ``What the Women 
Say: Killing Them Softly: The Stark Impact of Sanctions on the Lives of 
Ordinary Iranians.''

What the Women Say: Killing Them Softly: The Stark Impact of Sanctions 
         on the Lives of Ordinary Iranians--Brief 3: July 2012

       The unprecedented, devastating and counterproductive impact 
     of sanctions, coupled with the on-and-off threat of war, is 
     an ever-growing reality in the lives of ordinary Iranians. 
     For the generation of Iranians whose childhood was punctured 
     by nightly bombings, fear of chemical attacks, and eight 
     years of death and destruction resulting from the Iran-Iraq 
     war, the current state of uncertainty, prospects of hardship 
     and unraveling of the lives they rebuilt is overwhelming.
       In New York, London, Washington and Brussels the rationale 
     for sanctions vary. Central to the case is the notion that 
     only crippling sanctions can slow Iran's nuclear program and 
     bring about change. A number of the sanctions also target 
     state institutions and individuals implicated in human rights 
     violations. Regardless of their political leanings, among 
     western leaders, policymakers and pundits, no one denies that 
     economic sanctions are blunt instruments that typically harm 
     the civilian population far more than the state. Western 
     policy makers, however, respond that `this is the price that 
     has to be paid'--the questions of price for what, how much, 
     how long and by whom are left hanging.
       Iranians have the answers. The earliest sanctions imposed 
     in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution 
     (and American hostage taking) had less direct impact on the 
     public. But since 1995, when the

[[Page 13102]]

     Clinton Administration honed in on the oil and gas sector to 
     the current day where the banking and financial sectors have 
     been targeted, private enterprise and ordinary citizens are 
     the primary and overwhelming victims. Needless to say, they 
     are skeptical of western politicians or institutions that 
     claim to care about the well being, human rights or 
     aspirations of the Iranian populace.
       It is not uncommon for Iranians in every walk of life to 
     recall the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), when the Western world 
     was complicit with Saddam's Iraq and its use of chemical 
     weapons. With the impact of current sanctions seeping into 
     every day life now, many Iranians consider them to be a 
     profoundly insidious and destructive force and source of 
     basic human rights violations, affecting a wide cross section 
     of Iranians.
       As one women's rights activist stated, ``the international 
     community's sole focus on the nuclear issue has resulted in 
     the adoption of policies that inflict great damage on the 
     Iranian people, civil society and women. Militarization of 
     the environment will prompt repressive state policies and the 
     possibility of promoting reform in Iran will diminish.''
       Iranians' wariness of the international community, however, 
     has not quelled criticism of their own government. They have 
     neither an appetite for war nor for the bellicose language of 
     the state. They criticize the government's mishandling of the 
     economy in recent years. They balk at the continued 
     imposition of social restrictions. Those involved in civil 
     rights activism including students, workers, women and 
     leaders from ethnic groups and religious minority communities 
     are among the first to feel the endless pressures and 
     limitations imposed on them. Not least because the sanctions 
     and threat of war allow the state to invoke ``a state of 
     emergency'' and in so doing suppress critics and voices of 
     dissent.
       In its ongoing series of MENA region `What the Women Say' 
     briefs, ICAN provides a gendered analysis of the impact of 
     sanctions, echoing the voices and experiences of Iranians, 
     particularly women's rights activists, regarding the social, 
     economic, political and security consequences. At a time when 
     the United States, the European Union and others are 
     heralding their national action plans on women, peace and 
     security that highlight the need for women's protection in 
     times of crisis and their participation in conflict 
     prevention and peacemaking, this brief offers the 
     international community recommendations on limiting the 
     immediate and long-term damage being wrought on women, 
     Iranian society and ultimately regional security.


  1. Current sanctions cut deep and wide into the social and economic 
                       life of ordinary Iranians

       Iranians know war and they know sanctions. The experiences 
     of women, men, the elderly and the young who lived through 
     the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war are rarely recounted 
     today, but the long term impact is still evident. Though 
     their plight is rarely discussed, women of child bearing age 
     and soldiers exposed to chemical warfare still suffer from 
     complex health problems. Similarly the thousands of men 
     handicapped by landmines and war wounds are rarely a topic of 
     conversation. Another long term impact has been the rise of 
     female headed households in part due to war deaths among men.
       Throughout the 1980s war years, Iranians also suffered from 
     sanctions and lived under a strict rations policy. But it was 
     a very different society then. Some 50 percent of Iranians 
     lived in rural areas and were largely self sufficient through 
     domestic agricultural production. The sanctions too were 
     limited to key sectors pertaining to military equipment. As a 
     result the public impact was less evident. International 
     trade relations were sustained including with the U.S. 
     private sector. Today only 29 percent of Iranians live in 
     rural areas. Continued migration to urban areas has led to 
     the expansion of cities and their peripheries. The majority 
     of migrants eke out their living in the service industry and 
     informal economy on the margins of cities. The sanctions 
     regime is doing most damage to those who are already 
     vulnerable--the urban poor. As the pressures increase, 
     economic class and social divisions are also being 
     exacerbated.
       2010 sanctions choking insurance and shipping sectors with 
     implications for public health: Sanctions introduced in the 
     summer of 2010 directly targeted insurance companies that 
     insured Iranian shipping involved in the import and export of 
     products. Despite denials by proponents of the sanctions 
     regime, this round of sanctions directly affected the 
     availability of foreign-made medication and other healthcare 
     products to Iranians including vitamins for children and 
     pregnant women and sanitary products. The implication for 
     serious illnesses including cancer is particularly profound. 
     As one women's rights activists recounted, ``foreign made 
     medicine became difficult to find in 2010, and with the 
     intensification of sanctions this trend has continued. 
     Domestically produced drugs, which are dependent on imported 
     ingredients, are also more expensive and difficult to find.'' 
     Others echo this experience. ``Many Iranians can no longer 
     afford the high cost of cancer treatment drugs that have 
     become hard to find,'' says the daughter of a female cancer 
     patient. ``Family members have to go from one hospital to 
     another and to multiple pharmacies to find and then purchase 
     the medicines at high costs for the treatment and life of 
     their family members. Patients with poorer prognoses or those 
     who cannot afford it are forgoing treatments and opting for 
     an early death so they don't burden their families 
     financially.''
       Sanctions targeting Iran's oil and gas sector were also 
     intensified in 2010, through limiting or ending the sale of 
     gasoline products to Iran. In anticipation, the Iranian 
     government initiated a number of steps including ending of 
     subsidies for gasoline, rationing gasoline and increasing 
     domestic refining processes. As a result, the price increase 
     has been significant, with unrationed gasoline costing 4000 
     Rials per liter in 2009 and projected to increase to 8000 
     Rials in 2012. Free market prices for gasoline are currently 
     at 7000 Rials per liter. Additionally the quality of the 
     domestic product is much lower than imports, according to 
     experts.
       One significant impact of the increased use of domestically 
     produced gasoline has been a noticeable decline in air 
     quality, particularly in Tehran. Reports note that Tehran's 
     air quality, which was already poor, has worsened 
     significantly since gasoline imports were sanctioned. Even 
     the New York Times report explained the connection between 
     the ban on gasoline imports, the push to use domestically 
     produced gasoline and the rapid air quality deterioration:
       ``According to e-mails circulated to industry experts . . . 
     lran's new supply of domestic gasoline may contain high 
     levels of aromatics--more than twice the level permitted by 
     Iranian law. Burning aromatics in car engines produces 
     exhaust packed with high concentrations of ``floating 
     particles'' or ``particulates'' that, added to the typical 
     smog caused by nitrous oxides and ozone, can cause a range of 
     health problems, from headaches and dizziness to more serious 
     cardiac and respiratory complaints.'''
       In the same year, Mohsen Nariman, MP from Babol said, ``air 
     pollution is on the rise at an unusual rate and it seems that 
     one of the main causes is the substandard gasoline that is 
     being used in Tehran.'' One newspaper, the Hamshahri Daily, 
     reported that 310 persons died per day as a result of poor 
     air quality in Tehran in the months of October and November 
     2011. The cause of death included increased respiratory 
     complications, heart attacks and stroke.
       Unprecedented banking sanctions targeting Iranians in all 
     areas of life: The banking sanctions that went into effect in 
     December 2011 have also wreaked havoc in people's lives. The 
     Iranian Rial has almost halved in value against the US dollar 
     and other currencies. With memories of the Iran-Iraq war 
     still fresh for many Iranians, across Tehran and other 
     cities, people, including shopkeepers and merchants reacted 
     by hoarding products. Consequently the price of a wide range 
     of goods and products including foodstuffs rose between 20-
     100 percent, and continues to fluctuate.
       The knock-on effect is evident in all areas of life. While 
     incomes have not increased, rents have doubled in some areas 
     of the city. The price of bread--a staple of the Iranian diet 
     especially for the poor--has increased by some 1500% in the 
     past 2 years, in part due to the removal of state subsidies. 
     The uncertainty is causing stagnation for the private sector, 
     while some businessmen point out that companies affiliated 
     with the state are exploiting the situation as they have 
     access to government exchange rates. Sanctions were imposed 
     to prevent a nuclear weapons program. Instead, as one 
     commentator notes, the price of manure has risen.
       Iranian students studying abroad have also been impacted 
     seriously. Many are being forced to give up their education 
     as their families can no longer afford the tuition. Some UK 
     universities are refusing to register Iranian students 
     because they cannot prove that they can transfer the 
     necessary fees. But the sanctions--or the way that banks and 
     other bodies currently interpret them--make it impossible for 
     most Iranian students to do so.
       In addition countless Iranians who have relatives living in 
     the EU and US and those who travel for medical treatment have 
     become entangled in the vast banking sanctions net. Thousands 
     have personal bank accounts and savings in western banks, 
     some dating back decades. Now they are being forced to shut 
     down their accounts and find themselves caught in a financial 
     no-man's land; being forced to close existing accounts, while 
     barred from transferring their savings to other accounts 
     internationally or in Iran.
       In effect the banking sanctions are forcing massive 
     reliance on a cash based economy, making already vulnerable 
     Iranians dependent on black marketeers for the transfer of 
     funds to cover educational, health or other legitimate costs. 
     It is also fostering the rise of informal power structures 
     and contributing to the lack of accountability and 
     transparency. Even the Iranian Vice President has 
     acknowledged this development, stating, ``in the framework of 
     these sanctions we [the Iranian government] have to begin 
     negotiations with goods traffickers near the borders and use 
     them to buy products which are included in the sanctions.''
       Not surprisingly many Iranians are left questioning if the 
     banking sanctions are intent on forcing Iran's rulers to come 
     to the

[[Page 13103]]

     negotiating table or if Iranian society and the country's 
     infrastructure at large are being deliberately targeted and 
     weakened. The timing of the intensification of sanctions is 
     particularly questionable. Iranian observers, notably civil 
     and political activists are asking whether sanctions are in 
     fact intent on balancing power in the region in favor of 
     regimes that ``despite their authoritarian nature accommodate 
     the west and its security agenda in the Middle East, at a 
     time when revolutions may threaten the existing security 
     dynamics in the region.''
       In an interview with Radio Farda, Mehrdad Emadi, Economic 
     Consultant to the EU, stressed the destructive nature of 
     these sanctions, noting:
       ``This particular form of sanctioning a nation has been 
     unprecedented in the history of the world. The only similar 
     type of sanctions, were implemented for a short period of 
     time, and were intended to prevent the illegal transfer of 
     funds by Qaddafi within the framework of the activities of 
     Libya's Central Bank. But even during that time, [the 
     sanctions] weren't implemented in this fashion [as we see 
     against Iran's Central Bank], . . . not all the transactions 
     of the Libyan Central Bank were sanctioned and the sanctions 
     focused only on the illegal transfer of funds and money 
     laundering . . . [The Iranian sanctions] are not related to a 
     specific sector or industry nor to business entities or 
     specific individuals. In this framework, all monetary 
     transactions, currency transactions and business credit 
     accounts for imports as well as exports and for the coverage 
     and payment of insurance, which in every country falls under 
     the responsibilities of the Central Bank of that country, 
     will be made illegal in Iran. Iran's Central Bank will no 
     longer be able to carry-out these duties, because it has now 
     been identified as a center for money laundering. In this 
     framework, international corporations, governmental 
     organizations, non-governmental bodies or security 
     organizations will no longer be able to transfer funds or 
     open credit lines for trade, using the Central Bank.''
       In the same interview, Hossein Mansour, a UK-based 
     economist offered a bleaker analysis, noting, ``the negative 
     impact on Iran's economy, especially in the long run, will 
     only be addressed with the expenditure of billions of dollars 
     and after several generations, and will be devastating for 
     the infrastructure of the Iranian economy.''


  2. Women are bearing the brunt of the economic and social impact of 
                               sanctions

       Women are especially affected by the economic fall out of 
     the sanctions. They are being pushed out of the job market 
     and bearing the brunt of increased unemployment. Women's 
     rights experts recognize socio-economic pattern emerging 
     similar to those in Iraq when sanctions were imposed. In Iraq 
     sanctions and the ensuing poverty resulted in the withdrawal 
     of girls from education and increases in child marriage 
     (families were forced to marry off their young daughters to 
     reduce the number of mouths to feed). Iranian girls are at 
     risk of similar developments.'' Moreover, women's rights 
     experts believe that the externally imposed sanctions will 
     allow conservatives to further their regressive social agenda 
     by relegating women back to the domestic sphere, limiting 
     their access to education and the job market and couching it 
     as an attempt to increase male employment.
       Despite significant societal changes, Iran remains a male 
     dominated culture, reinforced by the government's 
     conservative ideology that considers men as the heads of 
     households and primary breadwinners. Programs in line with 
     this ideology, seeking to relegate women to the home as wives 
     and mothers only have been stepped up in recent years.
       Indirect and immeasurable consequences of sanctions: 
     stifling women's education, a key engine of socio-political 
     change: Women's rights activists are also wary of the 
     indirect impact of sanctions--and the manipulation of the 
     economic hardships by conservatives--on women's access to 
     higher education. Educated women from middle and traditional 
     working classes across rural and urban areas, among the rich 
     and the poor, have been the primary engine of socio-political 
     change in Iran. The demand for equal rights and equal socio-
     political, economic and cultural rights permeates every level 
     of society. From the outset of the Islamic republic, the 
     status of women has been a critical and contentious issue. In 
     2003, conservatives proposed the imposition of quotas to 
     limit women's access to higher education and the measures 
     were briefly implemented across some medical fields in the 
     2004 national university entrance exams. Massive outcry among 
     students and women's rights activists forced the withdrawal 
     of the quotas.
       Conservatives have not backed down however. They continue 
     to argue that when women are more educated than men, 
     traditional family values are undermined, as women prefer to 
     marry at an older age, seek similarly educated (or more 
     educated spouses) and have higher expectations. These 
     traditionalists also posit that women in the work force take 
     away men's jobs. Concerns about the impact of women being 
     more educated than men have prompted some conservative 
     lawmakers to reinstate quotas limiting women's participation 
     in higher education. Women and student's rights activists 
     believe that during President Ahmadinejad's second term the 
     quotas have been introduced with greater zeal and less 
     accountability. They coincide with the intensification of 
     sanctions and increased economic hardships. As the economic 
     situation worsens, women's access to higher education, will 
     likely endure further limitations. Even school age girls are 
     at risk as economic pressures may force families to make 
     choices and opt for boys' schooling. This may lead to 
     diminished literacy rates among girls in the near future.
       In effect, the marginalization of women from education and 
     employment enables extreme conservatives to kill many birds 
     with one stone. They prevent a high rate of women's entry 
     into the public space (via universities). They eliminate 
     women from the economy and job market, particularly, higher 
     earning and more influential positions. They sustain and 
     revive the power imbalance between women and men, as women 
     will have fewer choices in life, limited control of resources 
     and become (and remain) more economically dependent on men at 
     greater rates than already exist. Ultimately they may quash 
     the force of women's demands--the next generation's voices--
     for progressive change in society at large. As one 
     conservative member of parliament and staunch supporter of 
     limiting women's presence in university has put it: ``when 
     women can't travel to far away cities without the permission 
     of their husbands, their expertise has no impact on improving 
     the situation of the country!''
       There is also a significant reduction in women's share of 
     the national budget. In the past for example, housewives 
     received national insurance, but this has been eliminated, 
     while the military budget has doubled for next year.
       Downturns in domestic production, increases male 
     unemployment and violence against women: There are also more 
     insidious effects, difficult to quantify but increasingly 
     evident. The sanctions have caused massive downturns in 
     domestic production. The fledgling private sector is unable 
     to import the necessary raw materials for manufacturing. The 
     banking sanctions are causing a virtual standstill in imports 
     and exports by legitimate businesses. Even domestic 
     agriculture will lose its markets.
       Meanwhile those with political connections are exploiting 
     the situation often by importing cheaper Chinese products. 
     This downward trend in domestic production will give rise to 
     lower wages, increase unemployment among men and women and 
     ultimately put pressure on families. As evident in other 
     settings, women will bear the brunt of dealing with their 
     unemployed spouses and the men of the family within the home. 
     These new dynamics are likely to lead to increased incidences 
     of domestic violence and family conflicts, as men's inability 
     to live up to social expectations can lead to depression and 
     attacks on women. Reduction in family income inevitably is 
     forcing women to find new sources of income. Their coping 
     strategies will likely include cutting back on their own 
     health, wellbeing and dietary needs to provide for their 
     dependents. As in other countries, for the most vulnerable, 
     poverty will likely lead to risky survival strategies 
     including child labor and sex work--informal sectors which 
     have expanded in Iran in recent years.
       The most vulnerable are at the greatest risk: Afghan 
     refugee women and children: Vulnerable groups, such as Afghan 
     refugees and migrants who have been living in Iran legally 
     and illegally as a result of decades of war and unrest in 
     their own country, are also at greater risk. The situation is 
     most severe for Afghan women and children refugees or Iranian 
     women married to Afghan men and their children who do not 
     have identity cards. The intensification of government 
     crackdowns and forced repatriation programs, against Afghans 
     (including their Iranian wives and children) with illegal 
     status in Iran, has already had a negative impact on the 
     livelihood of these groups, but as the economy has worsened 
     the hostility they face from Iranian society and the 
     government has also increased. Afghans have been targeted 
     with segregation programs in public spaces and are facing 
     increased state and other forms of violence, while their 
     access to income and jobs has also been severely limited. 
     Comprising a large percent of those employed in the informal 
     sector as household help, street peddlers and in the service 
     industry Afghan women and children are at risk of facing 
     worsening working conditions and abuse in their place of 
     employment.


  3. Independent civil society and civic activism are among the first 
              casualties of current international policies

       Many of the men and women who founded and run Iran's civil 
     rights movements including human rights and women's rights 
     activists, workers unions and journalists spent their 
     childhood or young adulthood at war. They have tasted and 
     experienced the impact of war and sanctions on a personal 
     level. They are also fierce advocates of international human 
     rights and humanitarian norms and ideals.
       The public outpouring in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 
     presidential elections prompted the state to impose heavy 
     security measures against civic actors. But debilitating 
     sanctions coupled with the daily rhetoric of war has elevated 
     national security

[[Page 13104]]

     concerns and further diminished the state's tolerance of 
     dissent internally. Activists are regularly accused of 
     working in concert with the west to destroy the Islamic 
     Republic. The uncertainty and fear has also affected the 
     public's receptivity to social activism. It is seen as a 
     secondary issue compared to the urgent realities of poverty 
     and prospect of war.
       The sanctions are having a long-term negative impact on the 
     source of societal change in Iran. The urban middle class 
     that has historically played a central role in creating 
     change and promoting progress in Iran are key casualties of 
     the sanctions regime. Many civil society organizations and 
     charities survive on the basis of voluntary activism and 
     support. But facing economic uncertainty, many people are 
     retreating from public voluntary work. Even the most 
     committed have less time, as they are working longer hours 
     and often at multiple jobs to meet their economic needs. 
     Moreover with private enterprise in demise, more people will 
     become dependent on the state and thus unable and fearful of 
     engaging in civil activism. Additionally, sanctions and in 
     particular the limitations placed on transfer of funds, has 
     created serious impediments for charity organizations engaged 
     in health and medical services, education efforts, support 
     for orphans and disadvantaged women and children to carry-out 
     their work. Many of these organizations have ceased their 
     activities.
       Sanctions are isolating Iranians from international forums: 
     Beyond the economic impact, civil society, including the 
     women's movement in Iran has been further isolated from their 
     international counterparts, as a result of the sanctions. 
     Security challenges imposed by their own government already 
     curtail civil society's ability to attend regional and 
     international conferences, workshops and other events. But 
     the policies of other governments further complicate their 
     lives. Visas that Iranian passport holders need to travel 
     internationally, take considerable amount of time and 
     resources. The new banking sanctions have ended the 
     possibility of financial exchanges, while the falling price 
     of the Rial has increased the financial burden for those 
     activists who want to participate in conferences and training 
     opportunities. Activists, like regular Iranians, cannot use 
     banks to transfer funds for conference participation, hotel 
     reservations, or to attend courses abroad. Finally, for years 
     despite state restrictions, activists have used the internet 
     as a critical tool for communication. But the sanctions 
     policies have led many large hardware and software 
     manufacturers in the United States to deny services and 
     products to Iranians. Thus just when contact with and 
     solidarity from the outside world are most needed, Iranians 
     are faced with the greatest level of isolation.


4. What Women Do: resilience, courage, voices of peace and a window to 
                               the future

       Women's rights activists have never had it easy. They have 
     fought against an assault on their legal and political rights 
     as well as their demand for equal opportunities in the 
     economic, social and cultural life of the country. In 2006, 
     when a group of women initiated the Million Signatures 
     Campaign to demand the reform of laws that discriminate 
     against women, they immediately faced state scrutiny and 
     obstruction. The movement thrived however, transcending age, 
     economic, rural, urban and even political and religious 
     divisions to draw in a mix of volunteers. Using new and old 
     media, improvised street theater and small group education 
     and outreach initiatives they raised public awareness about 
     the impact of gender based discriminatory laws and called on 
     people to sign up and join their campaign in favor of legal 
     changes. Despite security pressures the movement elevated 
     issues of gender equality to the national level both 
     politically and within wider society.
       After the summer of 2009, and the mass post-election 
     protests, women's rights activists faced increased 
     restrictions as the space for dissent became ever more 
     limited. With the rise of sanctions and ratcheting up of the 
     war rhetoric, these activists are under immense pressure to 
     become silent and conform. Countless social and political 
     activists have been imprisoned and or forced into exile. 
     Students--female and male have been expelled from 
     universities because of their civil activism. Under these 
     circumstances, with economic hardships and prospects of yet 
     another devastating war, longterm planning and the 
     development of sustainable programs to maintain the gains 
     already made and push for basic rights are increasingly 
     difficult, if not impossible.
       Women's Demands: no sanctions, no war, talk it out! Despite 
     these pressures, the Iranian women's movement has not been 
     silenced. The call against war, in favor of a negotiated 
     settlement, and an end to sanctions has become a primary 
     issue for many, despite the risks they incur. They are using 
     every opportunity to send their message to the world.
       Women's rights activists now living outside of Iran draw on 
     international platforms to echo the concerns and voices of 
     their counterparts inside the country. Meanwhile, despite the 
     risks, women in Iran have not been silenced either. One 
     group, the Mothers for Peace, representing different sectors 
     and ideologies began its activities in 2008, with the aim of 
     preventing war and violence in the country and promoting 
     peace regionally. They, along with other women's groups, have 
     issued several statements opposing the possibility of war. 
     Echoing this, in 2011, on the International Day to Fight 
     Violence Against Women (November 25th), another group of 
     Iranian activists issued their antiwar and violence 
     statement, noting:
       ``We a group of women's rights activists in Iran, are 
     worried about the increasing violence against women and 
     children [that is the result] of the polarized and hostile 
     atmosphere [and] dead-end national and international politics 
     of tension and violence. As a result of these policies, 
     violence against women and children infiltrates the deepest 
     social and political and familial layers of Iranian 
     society.''
       On March 8, 2012, in honor of International Women's Day, 
     several activists involved in the One Million Signatures 
     Campaign recorded video messages opposing war. They reject 
     the official narratives that often pose the problems in the 
     terms of good and evil, just and unjust, and call on all 
     sides--including their own government--to engage in 
     constructive dialogue rather than the rhetoric of war and 
     threats.


Recommendations to the international community, particularly the US and 
                           European countries

       Fundamentally rethink policy on Iran:
       1. End the sanctions policy against Iran. Recognize that 
     sanctions as a general rule have a poor record of influencing 
     the behavior of states and in many situations have severely 
     harming the population at large, particularly vulnerable 
     groups and democratic movements. Ninety-nine percent of the 
     current sanctions against Iran are too broad to impact the 
     behavior of the government, instead they target the 
     population.
       2. Sanctions are not a substitute for war. they are a step 
     closer to war. Failed sanctions will only work to strengthen 
     the position of those advocating for another war in the 
     region. Resolve to address the differences in a mutually 
     respectful manner immediately.
       3. Recognize that sanctions weaken society not the state. 
     Iranian society is already witnessing the emergence of 
     radical groups. As one women's rights activist notes, in 
     countries of this region, including Iran, growing gaps 
     between the rich and poor do not make governments vulnerable, 
     rather they make the population vulnerable to increased 
     radicalization against the West as a way of coping with 
     humiliation. In border areas, where poverty is severe, we 
     already witness the increasing influence of terrorist groups. 
     If this trend continues we will be faced with a weakened 
     Iranian society--at risk of being radicalized, with 
     detrimental consequences for regional security in the medium 
     and long term.
       4. Recognize that sanctions undermine women's security and 
     empowerment. The US and EU have been strong proponents of the 
     global women, peace and security agenda with the development 
     of priorities and action plans to ensure women's empowerment. 
     But sanctions undermine and contravene these policies. The 
     contradictory nature of US and EU rhetoric, policies and 
     actions increase the Iranian public's suspicion about them, 
     and credence to charges of hypocrisy.
       On negotiations with the Iranian government:
       5. Engage Iran on the full range of issues. including 
     regional security, economic issues. human rights, culture. 
     etc. Incentives, especially those that reduce the hardship of 
     ordinary Iranians, should be put forth to encourage a 
     peaceful settlement to the disputes of the international 
     community with Iran.
       6. Call for the inclusion of civil society in engagement 
     with Iran. Should Iran and the international community reach 
     an agreement that would allow for negotiations and dialogue 
     on a wider set of issues, civil society, including women's 
     groups, human rights groups and peace activists, should 
     participate.
       On immediate steps for redressing the impact of sanctions 
     on ordinary citizens:
       7. Do not force an entire nation to adopt nontransparent 
     means of financial transactions. Revise the banking sanctions 
     so that ordinary people are not caught in them. Specifically, 
     adopt measures to facilitate the transfer of funds by 
     ordinary Iranian citizens and Iranians with dual nationality 
     (EU, US, UK etc) for travel, tuition, and medical care, in 
     the case of sale of property, inheritance or for other 
     personal and familial purposes. Forcing Iranians to move 
     toward a cash economy reduces transparency and fosters the 
     growth of shadowy actors.
       8. Address the adverse healthcare impact of sanctions 
     immediately. Sanctions including limitations impacting the 
     import of medicines, medical equipment and forced usage of 
     substandard gasoline are affecting people's health and lives. 
     These issues should be investigated and alleviated 
     immediately with cooperation between the US, European and 
     Iranian governments.
       9. Help ease and enable visa applications for Iranians 
     seeking to visit relatives. Throughout the EU, US, Canada and 
     Australia there are millions of citizens of Iranian descent. 
     They have elderly parents and relatives living in Iran who 
     visit them regularly. Visas for relatives should be expedited 
     and offered for longer periods.

[[Page 13105]]


       10. Encourage student visas and conference attendance. 
     Student visas and visas for conference participation should 
     be processed more quickly and with less financial burden on 
     applicants.
       11. Facilitate free and safe access to the internet to help 
     foster independent civil society. Sanctions have severely 
     limited Iranian civil society's safe access to the internet 
     including necessary software and hardware. The international 
     community should help provide this access and limit the 
     imposition of sanctions in this sector.

                              {time}  1500

  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.
  The Senate Banking Committee summarized this bill by saying that it 
``aims to prevent Iran from repatriating any of the revenue from sale 
of its crude oil, depriving Iran of hard currency earnings and funds to 
run its state budget.''
  Spoken plainly, this bill would destroy the Iranian economy and 
further hurt the Iranian people that we claim to support. Iranians are 
already suffering under stifling sanctions as they experience rising 
food prices and lack of access to basic medicine. For example, the 
sanctions against the Iranian banking sector have greatly diminished 
the value of Iranian currency and have a negative effect on nearly 
every aspect of the lives of ordinary Iranians. The price of rent, 
education, and bread have all increased.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Dold), an esteemed member of the Committee 
on Financial Services.
  Mr. DOLD. I certainly want to thank the chairwoman for her leadership 
on this very important issue. I also want to thank the ranking member 
for his bipartisan leadership as well.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that a nuclear-armed Iran is actually the 
greatest threat we have to our own national security here at home. This 
issue is not a right versus left issue; this is a right versus wrong 
issue.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation is significant in its seriousness and 
its scope. By blacklisting virtually all of Iran's energy, banking, and 
transportation sectors, and specifically targeting those who enable 
Iran's attempted evasion of sanctions, this legislation sends a 
powerful signal to the Iranian regime that they should not ever 
question the resolve of the United States Congress to do what is 
necessary to confront Iran's illicit nuclear ambitions.
  This legislation is the product of bipartisan efforts and hard work 
of many people, and I certainly appreciate Chairman Ros-Lehtinen's and 
Ranking Member Berman's focus to try to get this passed as quickly as 
possible.
  I'm pleased to have contributed to strengthening this sanctions 
package with bipartisan proposals that I introduced with Representative 
Deutch from Florida, whom we just heard from, that declare the Iranian 
energy sector a ``zone of proliferation concern,'' and which will 
enhance the human rights portion of the bill.
  I also want to note the significant contributions by Senator Mark 
Kirk, who has been a consistent champion and leader on the forcefulness 
of Iran sanctions.
  I look forward to this legislation's passage today and implementation 
with urgency by the administration, and I look to continue to work with 
my colleagues in Congress on this issue until we can affirm that the 
Iranian regime is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
  I urge adoption of this resolution and for the immediate 
implementation by this administration.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm very pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman who organized the Iran Working Group 7 or 8 years ago to 
focus congressional attention on the looming threat of a nuclear Iran, 
my friend from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
  Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the chairlady from Florida and my friend from 
California for recognizing some grave and serious points.
  First, they recognize that on the 11th of September of 2001, 19 
people armed with airplane tickets and box cutters wreaked havoc on the 
United States of America. They recognize that a group of people with a 
small, improvised nuclear device could wreak havoc far worse than that 
on the Mall that stands in front of this building or on Times Square.
  Weapons these days are not just delivered by intercontinental 
ballistic missiles; they can be delivered by U-Haul trucks or by other 
means. This is the essential threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation to 
the United States.
  The choice that we face is whether we should take concerted action to 
prevent that threat or whether we shouldn't. I commend the chairlady 
and my friend from California for choosing to unify this Congress, this 
country with the rest of the world with the proposition that we should 
present the Iranian leadership with a choice. If they decide to abandon 
their nuclear weapons program--which they illicitly concealed for 25 
years--if they agree to live under international protocols, then the 
sanctions that have been imposed will be lifted and we can move forward 
toward peace and progress. But if they do not, they will most certainly 
suffer the consequences of a deteriorating economy and problems within 
their social structure.
  We have made our choice to stand united in favor of these strong 
sanctions. We are presenting the Iranians with their choice. Let us 
hope and pray they make a choice for peace and renewed prosperity.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.
  We went to war against Iraq under the assumption they had weapons of 
mass destruction. Iran doesn't have weapons of mass destruction.
  One of the problems with this bill is that it effectively states that 
sanctions on Iran's Central Bank would not be lifted unless there's a 
regime change. So we're bringing a whole new dimension here. It's about 
even more than nuclear weapons; now we're talking about regime change, 
because this resolution creates a new requirement for the termination 
of sanctions that are dependent on the cessation of the Central Bank's 
financing of the Revolutionary Guard, and it imposes new restrictions 
on the President's ability to waive sanctions.
  So, what are we doing here? Setting the stage for another war. Regime 
change, and then upping the bar for Iran and essentially laying the 
groundwork for a conflict.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close.
  Mr. BERMAN. I'm very pleased to yield 1 minute to a former member of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, my friend from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank the ranking member and the 
chairwoman of this committee for bringing us together.
  I don't like sanctions, Mr. Speaker, but I rise in strong support of 
this legislation. And when I say that, I understand what sanctions can 
do to women and children and families. In fact, I'm reminded of a 
debate on apartheid and sanctions in South Africa. That debate was a 
question of whether you undermine that nation. But we saw what happened 
with sanctions when we came together as a Nation to bring down the 
dastardly structure of apartheid.
  Iran, right now today, can stop this legislation by shedding itself 
of all signs of building a nuclear weapon. The regime change is not by 
war. This bill does not suggest war. It means that voluntarily, by 
election, their government can change. But what I believe is most 
important is that we recognize, having seen that fallen woman bleeding 
in the street, that human rights abuses are massive. They're massive in 
their influence on Iraq, where they're influencing the treatment of 
residents of Camp Ashraf. That must stop.
  So this legislation is crucial because it impacts the human rights 
abuses, it indicates that there is no giving on a nuclear weapon, and 
it gives Iran, right now today, the ability to stop this legislation 
and sanctions by owning up to eliminating any sign of a nuclear 
weaponization, treating its people with dignity, and responding to the 
needs of the people in Camp Ashraf.
  I support the legislation enthusiastically.

[[Page 13106]]


  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Collectively, the provisions in this bill move the goalpost from 
negotiations over Iran's nuclear enrichment program to regime change. I 
just want to point out that the record of our country on regime change 
isn't all that good. Yes, we knocked out Saddam Hussein under the lie 
that he had weapons of mass destruction, and now al Qaeda is all over 
Iraq.
  So, what are we about here? We're setting the stage for another war 
where we syphon the revenue out of this country, send it to war 
machines, can't meet our own needs. Since when does Iran achieve 
greater importance than our own country? That's what I want to know. I 
want somebody to explain that to me.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, could I get another indication of the time 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 4\1/2\ 
minutes remaining; the gentleman from Ohio has 3 minutes remaining; the 
gentlewoman from Florida has 30 seconds remaining.
  Mr. BERMAN. In this case, I'm pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, a longtime 
member and leader on the Foreign Affairs Committee and a very active 
legislator on the issue before us today--that is, the effort to stop 
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon--my friend from New York (Mr. 
Engel).
  Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for yielding to me, and I rise in strong 
support of this legislation.
  I am glad that the Senate and the House finally came together on this 
very, very important bill.

                              {time}  1510

  This bill has very, very strong support, as you can tell, on both 
sides of the aisle, and the reason it does is because Iran has proven 
itself to be a very, very dangerous player.
  Iran is the leading supporter of terrorism in the world. Iran 
supplies and supports the terrorist group Hezbollah in Lebanon. And, in 
fact, now we see what's going on in Syria. And if it was not for Iran, 
Assad would not be able to continue his brutal ways and his murdering 
of his own people. Right now, as we talk, there are Iranian guards 
fighting on the side of Assad in Syria, and Iran chooses to be, and 
continues to be, a rogue nation.
  Iran must not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. She has lied to 
the world consistently in talking about her purposes of the weapon, but 
Iran is not fooling anybody.
  And so what these sanctions do is hits at Iran's oil and natural gas 
sectors, making it very, very difficult for them to launder money and 
making it very, very difficult to continue their repressive ways.
  The world has spoken. This isn't only the United States. These are 
countries all over the world. And unfortunately, or the blocking of 
some vetoes in the United Nations, there would already be sanctions in 
Iran.
  So I urge my colleagues to support this. I think there's a reason why 
virtually every Member of Congress on both sides of the aisle supports 
it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
  These sanctions are hurting ordinary people in Iran. I pointed out 
earlier, matters like the price of rent, bread--Americans can 
understand that--education, all of these things are increasing. And 
these sanctions then directly undermine Iran's civil society by giving 
the regime a chance to crack down even harder on internal dissent. 
These sanctions will ensure that those crackdowns continue.
  Ordinary Iranians are struggling simply to make ends meet under this 
sanctions regime that already exists. They cannot afford to suspend the 
time necessary to participate in social movements which provide basic 
social services to push for democratic change in their country.
  Are these the intended effects that we wish to have on the Iranian 
people and Iranian Americans?
  And if not, passing this kind of a broad, indiscriminate sanctions 
bill sends the wrong message.If the sanctions imposed on Iraq are any 
precedent, we know that sanctions are not an effective tool in 
promoting or supporting domestic democracy movements.
  We also know those sanctions did not prevent an unnecessary and 
wasteful war with Iraq. In effect, the expansion of the broad and 
indiscriminate sanctions, including this legislation, hurts our ability 
to negotiate with Iran, imposes long-term harm detrimental to the 
Iranian people.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I 
have no further requests for time.
  And I'd like to just raise a couple of the issues that my friends, 
Mr. Paul from Texas and Mr. Kucinich from Ohio, have put forth in the 
context of opposition to this bill.
  This is not the next step to war. This is the alternative to war. 
Iran having a nuclear weapon is unacceptable for many, many reasons:
  It means the end of the nonproliferation regime;
  It means countries all through that part of the world will seek their 
own nuclear weapons;
  It raises the specter of nuclear weapons being passed on and dirty 
bombs being passed on to terrorists, and there is nothing in the 
comments of the regime that could let one relax and think they would 
never be the first to use those nuclear weapons.
  That is unacceptable. Our alternatives are either war or finding a 
diplomatic resolution of their nuclear weapons program, the end of that 
program.
  They've been found, not by the White House, not by some Vulcans in 
foreign policy, but by the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council, over and 
over again, to have violated their obligations under the 
nonproliferation treaty to which they are a signatory. They don't 
ratify the additional protocols. They move ahead with enrichment plants 
that they don't need for a peaceful weapons program.
  They do not have a right to enrich. You could argue they have a right 
to a nuclear energy program, but not a right to enrich. They conceal 
information in violation of their treaty obligations.
  This is, hopefully, the final step, but if not we will have to 
intensify the sanctions to achieve that diplomatic program.
  And Iran is not some bucolic, peace-loving state that has never done 
anything against its neighbors. Everyone knows that Hezbollah is a 
direct foreign agent of Iran that gets its funding, its training, and 
its sponsorship and its directions from Iran.
  We know what they've done to the marines in Lebanon. We've known what 
they tried to do to the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington. We know 
that in Delhi and in Bulgaria and a number of other capitals around the 
world, their effort to commit terrorist acts against Israeli diplomats 
and Israeli citizens. Their record as a state sponsor of terror is the 
largest and most impactful in the world.
  They are pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. It is our obligation 
to do every measure we have to stop them from getting that, and we want 
to do it peacefully. This strategy that we are embarked on is an effort 
to find a way to do this without resorting to war, and I urge my 
colleagues to stand strongly behind this bill.
  This is the alternative. It is the only feasible alternative. 
Otherwise, we are faced with two very dismal prospects: a military 
action or an Iran with nuclear weapons and all that means.
  I urge an ``aye'' vote.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
  Sanctions are a form of war in this case, and it will lead to war. 
And remember, we're not talking about--some time ago we were talking 
about if Iran would have a nuclear weapon, but then the bar's been 
lowered to say nuclear weapon capability. And now the game's being 
changed to say not just nuclear weapon capability, but we want regime 
change as well.
  I mean, if this isn't a prescription for war, then I didn't 
participate in the debate in this House of Representatives

[[Page 13107]]

in October of 2002 warning this Congress, chapter and verse, that Iraq 
had no weapons of mass destruction, no role with al Qaeda in 9/11, did 
not have any intention or capability of attacking the United States. 
This is a version of that debate all over again.
  I mean, come on. What are we doing here? Why is this more important 
than our country?
  You know, our postal service is going into default tonight, a 
manufactured default, mind it. No debate on the House floor about this 
today, but an attempt to manufacture a war with Iran.
  What are we about?
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  I will retain my time to close, so if Mr. Kucinich could wrap up his 
part of the debate, we can conclude.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask how much time remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute 
remaining.
  Mr. KUCINICH. And how much time does the gentlelady have?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida has 30 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
  This legislation also requires the President to impose sanctions on 
those who are responsible for or are complicit in certain human rights 
abuses in Syria, but it fails to acknowledge that our own country and a 
number of our allies are actively participating and stoking the 
violence on the ground. Divisions and infighting within the various 
militias operating on the ground are already occurring. And we also 
read that al Qaeda's also been involved in Syria.
  So, look, we have to get serious about what America's purpose is in 
the world. It's not to be a heavy foot. It's not to proliferate wars 
all over.
  The first thing we have to do is take care of things here at home: 
jobs for all, health care for all, education for all, retirement 
security for all. When we can do those kinds of things, then we can 
pretend that we can be the policeman of the world. But until we've done 
that, we don't have any right to go all around the world trying to tell 
people how to live.
  And we can settle this matter with Iran without war. We can settle it 
through diplomacy. Diplomacy. It would be real interesting to try it. 
And we ought to support any efforts of the Obama administration to use 
diplomacy here. Let's not use this political climate to push us into a 
war.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1520

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.
  I would like to recognize the commitment, the dedication and tireless 
efforts of the members of our House Foreign Affairs Committee family, 
particularly of our staff director, Dr. Yleem Poblete, who Ranking 
Member Berman once described as driving a hard bargain. Just ask her 
hubby, Jason. Also, thanks to Matt Zweig and Ari Fridman.
  Thanks to Chairman Johnson of the Senate Banking Committee and to his 
staff, particularly Colin McGinnis, Patrick Grant and Steve Kroll, as 
well as Ranking Member Shelby and his staff.
  A strong and warm thanks and big hug to my good friend Mr. Berman--
the ranking member--and to his staff, particularly Shanna Winters, Alan 
Makovsky and Ed Rice, as well as minority staff director Richard 
Kessler.
  I would like to thank Senators Menendez and Mark Kirk and the 
critical Representatives, Deutch, Sherman and Dold.
  Let's stop Iran before it's too late. Let's pass this bill. I yield 
back the balance of my time.

                                         House of Representatives,


                             Committee on Energy and Commerce,

                                    Washington, DC, July 30, 2012.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     Rayburn, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I write concerning the House-
     Senate negotiations on H.R. 1905, an Act to strengthen Iran 
     sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon 
     its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening 
     activities, and for other purposes. I understand the House 
     and Senate have reached an agreement on provisions related to 
     an Energy Information Administration report on Iran's natural 
     gas sector.
       I wanted to notify you that the Committee on Energy and 
     Commerce will forgo action on this House-Senate compromise 
     language so that the bill may proceed expeditiously to the 
     House floor for consideration. This is done with the 
     understanding that the Committee is not waiving any of its 
     jurisdiction on this or similar legislation.
       I would appreciate your response confirming this 
     understanding with respect to this provision of the House-
     Senate compromise to H.R. 1905, and I ask that a copy of our 
     exchange of letters on this matter be included in the 
     Congressional Record during its consideration on the House 
     floor.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Fred Upton,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 30, 2012.
     Hon. Fred Upton,
     Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
     Rayburn, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Upton: Thank you for your letter concerning 
     H.R. 1905, an Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the 
     purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear 
     weapons and other threatening activities, and for other 
     purposes.
       I appreciate your Committee's decision to forgo action on 
     the House-Senate compromise text so that it may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House floor. I acknowledge that your 
     decision in this case does not represent the waiver of any of 
     your jurisdiction over this bill or similar legislation.
       I will place a copy of your letter and this reply into the 
     Congressional Record during House consideration of the Senate 
     amendment to H.R. 1905.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
                                                         Chairman.

  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1905, 
the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. This bill 
is a critical effort to tighten sanctions against the Tehran regime, 
and to increase pressure to force the government to abandon its pursuit 
of nuclear weapons.
  Iran's nuclear ambitions pose a grave threat to the United States, to 
regional stability in the Middle East, and to the entire international 
community. Both President Obama and the United States Congress have 
unequivocally stated that Iran must not be permitted to develop nuclear 
weapons.
  On his visit to the Middle East this week, U.S. Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta stated that ``sanctions are having a serious impact in 
terms of the economy in Iran.'' Iran is now struggling to conduct 
international trade, losing markets and trading partners. Its currency 
has lost over half of its value.
  Meanwhile, the administration continues to expand sanctions against 
Tehran. Earlier this week, President Obama signed an executive order to 
extend sanctions to anyone, using any method of payment, who purchases 
Iranian crude oil--preventing Iran from circumventing sanctions by 
using bartering and other unconventional payment options. It also 
expanded sanctions on buyers of Iranian petrochemical products, and 
authorized penalties for entities seeking to evade U.S. sanctions. Also 
this week, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Bank of Kunlun in China and 
Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq for providing financial services to Iranian 
banks.
  Today, Congress is acting to further tighten the economic noose on 
the Iranian regime. The bill under consideration today, H.R. 1905, 
strengthens and expands existing sanctions, banning any commercial 
activities with Iran's oil and natural gas sector, including helping 
Iran ship its oil under the flag of another nation. This bill increases 
sanctions targeting entities involved with the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps and sanctions human rights offenders.
  When coupled with existing sanctions, today's bill represents the 
strongest-ever effort to financially isolate Iran. This is critical, 
because we must persuade the Tehran government to abandon its pursuit 
of nuclear weapons. I strongly support utilizing our entire diplomatic 
and economic arsenal to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear 
weapons.
  Today's bill is a critical step towards increasing pressure on the 
Iranian government. I urge my colleagues to join me in strongly 
supporting this legislation.
  Mr. REED. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to reaffirm my support for 
sanctions to be placed upon Iran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamenei 
are once again stressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles within Iran's borders and we must take swift and 
strong actions against these measures.
  Iran is not just a threat to the United States, but to all free 
countries around the globe. As

[[Page 13108]]

a country that harbors terrorists, foreign leaders must stay vigilant 
and recognize Iran's practices as a national security concern.
  Lastly, we must stand up against the human rights abuses the Iranian 
regime is supporting. Its citizens have continually been sheltered from 
outside information and ideas due to strict governmental control. We 
need to inform the regime that the Iranian citizens deserve the basic 
human rights as laid out by the United Nations. I am proud to support 
H.R. 1905 and I encourage the President to sign this into law promptly.
  Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the 
conference report to H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
Human Rights Act of 2012. This bipartisan legislation represents the 
strongest set of sanctions to isolate any country in the world during 
peacetime.
  It is imperative that our nation takes all steps necessary to isolate 
Iran, force them to end their dangerous pursuit of nuclear weapons, and 
secure that the regime in Teheran will no longer be a threat to peace 
and prosperity in the Middle East.
  Once this legislation is passed and signed into law, virtually all of 
Iran's energy, financial, and transportation sectors would be subject 
to U.S. sanctions. Companies conducting business in these industries 
would face the possibility of losing access to U.S. markets.
  I also applaud the inclusion of sanctions against human rights 
abusers in Iran and Syria in this legislation. The deplorable actions 
by the political and military leaders in Iran and Syria against their 
own people must come to an immediate halt and deserve global 
condemnation.
  Important allies, such as the European Union, Canada, Australia, 
Japan, South Korea, India, and Israel, have joined the American people 
in enacting sanctions against Iran.
  It is important that this Chamber say with a strong, unified voice 
that we stand with Israel during these difficult times.
  As co-chair of the Democratic Israel Working Group, I call on Members 
from both sides of the aisle to vote in support of this bipartisan 
resolution.
  I would also like to take a moment to thank the President for his 
leadership on sanctions on Iran. Yesterday, President Obama signed an 
Executive Order that imposes new sanctions against the Iranian energy 
and petrochemical sectors, as well as sanctions against those who are 
providing material support to the National Iranian Oil Company, 
Naftiran Intertrade Company, or the Central Bank of Iran. These 
measures will help strengthen the existing sanctions regime and bring 
Iran that much closer to ending its heedless quest for nuclear weapons.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support 
of the House amendment to the previous Senate amendment to H.R. 1905. 
In his 2002 State of the Union Address, former President George H.W. 
Bush said that Iran was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and 
exporting terror. A decade later, Iran's global threat is greater than 
ever.
  We are currently embroiled in a standoff with Iran over its pursuit 
of nuclear capability. We find ourselves on the brink of conflict over 
potential Iranian armed interference with oil and other shipments 
through the Strait of Hormuz and its persistent threats against Israel. 
Even prior to 9-11, Hezbollah, supported by Iran, was responsible for 
more American deaths around the world than any other terrorist 
organization. Since 2001, Iran has embarked on more direct efforts to 
harm American interests as evidenced by last year's foiled Iranian-
backed assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador to the United 
States.
  The current state of Iranian sanctions clearly has not worked to 
reduce Tehran's threat to global peace. That's why we need the enhanced 
approach this legislation will take in countering efforts by Iran to 
evade the impact of international sanctions. H.R. 1905 as amended 
tightens reporting on countries violating sanctions on these countries 
and strengthens measures against those who would aid and abet these 
disturbers of global peace.
  It also effectively blacklists Iran's energy sector and anyone doing 
business with it. By preventing Iran from repatriating the proceeds 
from its oil sales, this rogue government will be deprived of 80 
percent of its hard currency earning and half of the funds used to 
support its national budget.
  Iran has used many tricks to subvert current sanctions--from oil for 
gold swaps to selling energy bonds to other trading and bartering 
schemes. They have been successful because there are governments who 
care more for making profit from doing business in Iran than in 
preventing threats to world peace. International efforts to rein in the 
nuclear ambitions of Iran have been stymied particularly by China.
  Despite expressing formal support for United Nations Security Council 
sanctions against Iran since 2005, China has stepped in where other 
nations have curtailed trade with Iran. China's Bank of Kunlun and the 
Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq have facilitated transactions worth millions 
of dollars for Iranian banks already under sanctions. Stronger 
sanctions will make such unsavory alliances more difficult. This is why 
the reformulated bill we consider today is so vital in eliminating to 
the extent possible all avenues for Iran's allies to play enabler to 
its nuclear ambitions and to its patronage of terrorist operations.
  I want to congratulate House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee Chairman Tim Johnson and other members for their hard work in 
crafting a bipartisan, bicameral bill that works.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, the Iranian nuclear threat is a daunting and 
dangerous challenge. With Iran stalling diplomatic talks, adding 
enrichment centrifuges, and continuing work at unmonitored enrichment 
sites, there is frustration and alarm that time may be running out. But 
time has not run out and if we are to avert a military confrontation 
with Iran over its nuclear weapons ambitions, we must make use of every 
opportunity to pressure Iran to change course. This bill achieves that 
goal with sanctions that are deeper and stronger than any we have ever 
seen.
  Without a doubt sanctions against Iran are having a powerful impact. 
In the last year alone, exports of Iranian oil have dropped by sixty 
percent. The value of Iran's currency has plummeted by more than one-
third. Full tankers are idling in Iranian harbors unable to sell crude 
in the world market. Although Iran has attempted to work around the 
sanctions by reflagging vessels and hiding transactions, the shell game 
isn't sustainable. Sanctions announced by President Obama in recent 
days and weeks and those authorized in the bill before us today will 
tighten the grip.
  Our message to Iran is loud and clear--there is no escaping 
accountability. The consequences of defying the international community 
and continuing an illegal nuclear program are severe and they will be 
gravely worse if the Iranian government continues on its current 
course.
  This bill is our third round of congressional sanctions legislation 
since the Obama Administration successfully galvanized U.N. Security 
Council support for multilateral sanctions against the Iranian nuclear 
program in June 2010. Together with sanctions enacted in July 2010 and 
December 2011, the sanctions in the bill before us today reinforce the 
message to countries, companies and financial institutions that now is 
not the time for business as usual with Iran.
  The bill gives the Administration an array of new tools to shore up 
international resolve. It has sharp enforcement mechanisms to help 
enlist other countries in the effort to starve the Iranian nuclear 
program of cash flows from Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the 
National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and 
other Iranian banks, businesses and government entities being used to 
funnel money into nuclear activities.
  The bill also expands sanctions against Iranian and Syrian officials 
responsible for human rights abuses by using electronic monitoring and 
tracking of regime opposition and specifically targets the paramilitary 
organizations that have been most insidious in terrorizing democracy 
activists.
  But what this bill does not do is authorize war with Iran. In fact, 
the bill explicitly says so. I want to underscore that point, because 
the motivation of the sanctions is to pressure Iranian leaders to abide 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency's demands and negotiate in 
good faith and to avoid a military escalation.
  As President Obama has stated clearly, the United States does not 
have a policy of containment. All options are the on the table if Iran 
does not change course. By passing this legislation we will continue to 
leave no stone unturned in our determination to try and achieve a 
diplomatic resolution to this crisis.
  Mr. BACA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1905.
  Today, it is vital that the U.S. sends a strong message to the 
Iranian government.
  A nuclear capable Iran is our greatest security threat in a region 
currently defined by conflict, chaos, and uncertainty.
  We must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons through any and 
all means necessary.
  There needs to be strong economic sanctions and focused diplomatic 
efforts.
  As a nation it is also essential to prepare a strategy in the event 
that sanctions and diplomatic efforts are not successful.

[[Page 13109]]

  Allowing Iran to become a nuclear threat is not an acceptable 
outcome.
  That is why we must pass H.R. 1905, which increases the economic 
pressure on Iran's leadership to abandon their illicit efforts to 
develop a nuclear weapon.
  Iran has the power to threaten and provoke regional allies without 
consequence.
  We must stand with our allies in these dangerous and challenging 
times to prevent a nuclear capable Iran.
  We must pass H.R. 1905 before it is too late for sanctions and 
diplomacy to reduce the Iranian threat.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference 
agreement for H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, a bill of which I am a cosponsor. In addition to 
imposing sanctions on anyone found to be guilty of committing or 
contributing to the repression or abuse of the human rights of the 
Syrian people, this measure also continues the congressional efforts to 
apply pressure to the government of Iran for its nuclear enrichment 
activities.
  Mr. Speaker, yesterday the president announced the application of new 
sanctions on the Iranian oil industry and on Chinese and Iraqi banks 
for helping Iran to circumvent the global sanctions regime. These 
sanctions are a part of an escalating series of penalties against Iran. 
In June, the U.S. imposed a round of sanctions targeting any foreign 
country that buys Iranian oil. Then, in early July, the EU, a major 
market for Iranian oil, put in place a complete embargo of oil imports 
from the country.
  Since the effort began, Iranian oil production has declined by a 
million barrels a day, its exports have fallen by about 50 percent and 
its currency has plunged more than 40 percent against the dollar. 
Today, the House meets to further tighten the sanctions on Iran's 
energy, shipping and insurance sectors. This package of sanctions will 
be the most comprehensive passed to date. Virtually all of Iran's 
energy, financial, and transportation sectors will be subject to U.S. 
sanctions and any company that does business in these sectors will run 
the risk of losing access to U.S. markets.
  The economic sanctions imposed on Iran have succeeded in bringing the 
Iranians to the negotiating table. It remains to be seen whether the 
Iranians are simply engaged in stall-tactics or are willing to end 
their effort to produce weapons-grade nuclear material.
  As President Obama has made clear, it is unacceptable for Iran to 
develop a nuclear weapon. The U.N. Security Council has passed numerous 
resolutions demanding that Iran comply with the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty and suspend its nuclear enrichment activities. 
The IAEA has repeatedly found Iran to be in violation of the U.N. 
resolutions.
  A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave threat to the State of 
Israel, a country the President of Iran has stated should ``be wiped 
off the map.'' A nuclear Iran could also trigger a nuclear-arms race in 
the Middle East that would further destabilize an already volatile 
region. It is in the national security interests of the United States 
to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
  By most accounts, the sanctions passed by Congress have ratcheted up 
pressure on the Iranian government. But Iran continues to increase its 
stockpile of enriched uranium. This bi-partisan measure is necessary to 
give the President additional tools to penalize the Iranian regime for 
its continual refusal to heed the objections of the international 
community.
  I encourage my colleagues to join me in support of this conference 
agreement.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the amended version of 
H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction & Syria Human Rights Act.
  I am a co-sponsor of and voted for the original version of this bill 
when it was on the House floor in December 2011. Since that time, the 
bill has been refined in the Senate with language designed to 
essentially paralyze Iran's oil sector, which has already seen its oil 
exports fall by 60 percent as a result of sanctions imposed to date. 
The improved bill before us even more broadly targets Iran's oil sector 
and anyone who tries to do business with Iran in this area. It will 
prevent the Central Bank of Iran from repatriating funds from the sale 
of oil as part of bilateral trade agreements Iran may have with other 
nations. Indeed, prior sanctions passed by this Congress have caused 
India and Turkey to deny Iranian banks licenses to set up branches in 
those nations. Finally, this bill includes sanctions targeting Syrian 
officials responsible for the massacres in that nation since the Syrian 
people began their uprising more than 18 months ago.
  These are important steps we must take as part of a strategy to use 
every means available to compel Iran to meet its international 
obligations. Iran must renounce any effort to acquire nuclear weapons, 
and that claim must be verified through thorough, intrusive on-site 
inspections and monitoring.
  I should also note that yesterday, President Obama announced a fresh 
set of sanctions against Iran's energy and petrochemical sectors based 
on existing sanctions law and his own authority as president. As 
President Obama noted this week, ``The United States remains committed 
to a diplomatic solution, but the onus is on Iran to abide by its 
international obligations. If the Iranian government continues its 
defiance, there should be no doubt that the United States and our 
partners will continue to impose increasing consequences.'' The 
government of Iran should understand that Congress, on a bipartisan 
basis, is sending the same message by passing H.R. 1905. I urge my 
colleagues to join me in supporting this bill.
  Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Senate 
amendment to H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act. This bipartisan 
legislation is critical to the protection of the American people and 
our allies around the world.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe it is imperative that the United States take 
the lead in opposing Iran's effort to produce nuclear weapons. Such a 
development would introduce an intolerable and destabilizing element 
into one of the world's most volatile regions. The discovery of a plot 
to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States on American 
soil is but a reminder of the urgent need for the United States to take 
forceful and effective action to ensure that Iran does not succeed in 
developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
  In, Congress passed H.R. 2194, the Iran Sanctions, Accountability and 
Divestment Act, which at the time were the most comprehensive sanctions 
ever imposed on Iran by the United States. But more needs to be done.
  While current sanctions on Iran have impeded Iran's ability to 
successfully develop a nuclear weapon, most experts agree that Iran 
will have nuclear capabilities in the next two to three years if 
tougher sanctions are not imposed. According to a report released by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has a stockpile of low-
enriched uranium that if further enriched could produce three nuclear 
weapons.
  Last year, I wrote to Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Berman, 
Leader Pelosi, and Speaker Boehner urging them to bring before the 
House legislation imposing sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran. 
Shortly thereafter, I was very encouraged and pleased that the 
Committee reported favorably and the House passed H.R. 1905.
  H.R. 1905 strongly reflects the demands of the international 
community that tougher sanctions must be placed on Iranian leaders to 
end their nuclear program. H.R. 1905 increases sanctions on human 
rights violators in Iran, imposes tougher sanctions on the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and codifies U.S. policy to prevent 
Iran from developing unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles. 
This bill takes steps to peacefully thwart Iran's nuclear aspirations.
  During the markup of this bill, an amendment offered by Ranking 
Member Berman to strengthen sanctions against Iran's Central Bank was 
unanimously agreed to. The Berman Amendment strengthens H.R. 1905 by 
inserting language that directs the President to determine whether the 
Central Bank of Iran is engaged in sanctionable activity.
  By sanctioning the Central Bank of Iran, the United States would set 
a strong example for countries around the world that depend on a 
geopolitically stable Middle East for their own security and 
prosperity. Imposing tougher sanctions on the Iranian economy will 
demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate Iran's 
continued refusal to end their nuclear enrichment program.
  Specifically, the Berman Amendment directs the President of the 
United States to determine whether the Central Bank of Iran has: (1) 
assisted Iran's VVMD or missile programs, including proliferation of 
WMD to other governments; (2) financed Iran's procurement of advanced 
conventional weapons; (3) provided financial services for the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps; or (4) facilitated Iran's support of 
international terrorism.
  Should the President make the determination that the Central Bank of 
Iran is involved in any of these areas, the bill requires him to apply 
sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The 
President will have 30 days to make this determination. These sanctions 
would ensure that any foreign bank involved in significant transactions 
with the Central Bank of Iran is excluded from doing business with the 
U.S.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill also includes Title WI, entitled the ``Syria 
Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012.'' I support the inclusion of 
this title. What began as a peaceful stand

[[Page 13110]]

against tyranny has degenerated into the bloodiest movement of the Arab 
Spring. According to the International Red Cross more than 16,00o 
people have been killed in the conflict and the violence has increased 
substantially in the past few weeks.
  This is why Title VII of this bill is necessary. It builds upon 
efforts to bring about a peaceful and swift resolution by
  (1) requiring the President to identify within 90 days and impose 
sanctions on officials of the Syrian government or those acting on 
their behalf who are complicit in or responsible for the commission of 
serious human rights abuses against Syria's citizens, regardless of 
whether the abuses occurred in Syria;
  (2) imposing sanctions on anyone who transfers equipment or 
technologies including weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas and other riot 
equipment, and jamming, monitoring and surveillance equipment which the 
President determines are likely to be used by Syrian officials to 
commit human rights abuses, and
  (3) imposing sanctions on anyone who engages in censorship, or 
activities relating to censorship, in a manner that prohibits, limits, 
or penalizes the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression by 
citizens of Syria.
  Mr. Speaker, history has taught us that strong sanctions can bring 
about peaceful change. A generation ago, Congress passed the Anti-
Apartheid Act which led to the end of the apartheid regime and brought 
about a peaceful revolution resulting in the new democratic South 
Africa.
  H.R. 1905 will help to refocus our efforts on appropriately 
addressing these critical issues. Leaders in the Iranian and Syrian 
governments have shown repeatedly that they are unwilling to comply 
with international demands.
  For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I strongly support H.R. 1905 and the 
Senate amendments. I urge my colleagues to join me in voting to pass 
this bill.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1905, the 
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. This is yet 
another broad and indiscriminate sanctions bill that will only serve to 
hurt ordinary Iranian people, undermine their democracy movement and 
further tie the hands of the President and his team in their efforts to 
achieve a diplomatic resolution over its nuclear program.
  Proponents of this bill believe that tightening sanctions on Iran 
will bring us closer to a diplomatic solution with Iran. We only need 
to look to the latest round of failed talks to recognize that these 
sanctions achieved the exact opposite response. U.S. negotiators lacked 
the flexibility they needed to secure Iranian concessions through the 
freezing of certain sanctions.
  I strongly support Section 604 of this bill which makes clear that 
nothing in this bill shall be construed as a declaration of war or an 
authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria. Yet this bill 
would further undermine and thwart the most effective tool we have to 
ensure that the United States does not get sucked into a war with Iran: 
diplomacy.


          The Effects of Sanctions on Ordinary Iranian People

  The Senate Banking Committee summarized this bill by saying that it 
``aims to prevent Iran from repatriating any of the revenue from sale 
of its crude oil, depriving Iran of hard currency earnings and funds to 
run its state budget.'' Spoken plainly, this bill will destroy the 
Iranian economy and further hurt the Iranian people that we claim to 
support. Iranians are already suffering under stifling sanctions as 
they experience rising food prices and a lack of access to basic 
medicine.
  For example, the sanctions against the Iranian banking sector have 
greatly diminished the value of Iranian currency and have had a 
negative effect on nearly every aspect of the lives of ordinary 
Iranians: the price of rent, education and bread have all increased. 
Rather than having the sanctions weaken the Iranian regime, they are 
weakening the Iranian people and their ability to make a living or 
pursue an education.
  A recent publication by the International Civil Society Action 
Network (ICAN) quotes an Iranian women's rights activist as saying that 
``The international community's sole focus on the nuclear issue has 
resulted in the adoption of policies that greatly inflict damage on the 
Iranian people, civil society and women. Militarization of the 
environment will prompt repressive state policies and the possibility 
of promoting reform in Iran will diminish.''
  The report further highlights that the sanctions this Congress pushed 
``directly affected the availability of foreign-made medication and 
other healthcare products including vitamins for children and pregnant 
women. . . .'' It points out that these sanctions are ``doing the most 
damage to those who are already vulnerable--the urban poor.''
  Iranian-Americans are even facing discrimination here in the United 
States. Several Iranian-Americans were recently prevented from buying 
an iPhone or other Apple products simply because of their ethnicity. 
Such discriminatory treatment is emblematic of the unintended effects 
of sanctions.


                 Undermining the Iranian Civil Society

  These sanctions directly undermine Iran's civil society by giving the 
regime an excuse to crack down even harder on internal dissent. These 
sanctions will ensure that this continues to happen. With many ordinary 
Iranians struggling to simply make ends meet under our sanctions 
regime, they cannot afford to or spend the time necessary participating 
in social movements which provide basic social services or to push for 
democratic change in their country. Are these the intended effects we 
wish to have on the Iranian people or Iranian-Americans? If not, 
passing another broad and indiscriminate sanctions bill sends the wrong 
message.
  If the sanctions the U.S. imposed on Iraq are any precedent, we know 
that sanctions are not an effective tool in promoting or supporting 
domestic democracy movements. We also know that those sanctions did not 
prevent an unnecessary and wasteful war with Iraq.
  In effect, the expansion of the broad and indiscriminate sanctions 
included in this legislation hurts our ability to negotiate with Iran 
and imposes long-term detrimental harm on the Iranian people. It 
detracts from the real human rights abuses currently occurring in Iran 
by allowing the regime to deflect blame on the United States and its 
allies.


        Supporting Regime Change and Tying the President's hands

  Section 217 in this bill effectively states that sanctions on Iran's 
central bank would not be lifted unless there is regime change. It does 
this by creating new requirements for the termination of sanctions that 
are dependent on the cessation of the Central Bank's financing of the 
Revolutionary Guard. Section 205 imposes new restrictions on the 
President's ability to waive certain sanctions. Collectively, these 
provisions have moved the goal post from negotiations over Iran's 
nuclear enrichment program to regime change. The U.S. record on 
successful regime changes is not impressive.
  The National Iranian American Council has pointed out that this 
legislation ``imposes collective punishment on the Iranian people by 
seeking to destroy the Iranian economy. The goal is to bankrupt Iran, 
and cause hyperinflation by destroying the value of Iran's currency, 
the rial.''
  If your goal is to punish the Iranian people, undermine their brave 
efforts to push for democracy, and thwart our sensitive and critical 
negotiations, then support this bill. If not, I urge you to join me in 
opposing this legislation.


              Syria Sanctions Included in This Legislation

  This legislation also requires the President to impose sanctions on 
actors that are responsible for or complicit in certain human rights 
abuses in Syria.
  This legislation fails to acknowledge that the United States and a 
number of our allies are actively participating in stoking the violence 
on the ground, including through the arming and support of Syrian rebel 
groups. Divisions and in-fighting within the various militias operating 
on the ground are already occurring. If our own intelligence agencies 
are unable to fully grasp what is transpiring on the ground in Syria, 
we can be sure that these targeted sanctions will overlook other non-
state actors that are participating in human rights abuses.
  Recent reports also indicate that the instability and chaos in Syria 
has opened the door for fundamentalist groups to move in, including Al 
Qaeda. This threatens stability in the region as a whole and U.S. 
allies in the region, including Israel.
  We can all agree that the violence in Syria must end. But in order to 
do that, supporters on both sides of the conflict must cease providing 
either side with the tools to continue this bloody conflict.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, today, a time of heightened tensions in 
U.S.-Iran relations, I voted for the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, a balanced and serious approach 
towards ensuring Iran will never have nuclear weapons.
  Throughout my time in Congress, I have firmly opposed the use of 
indiscriminate sanctions as a blunt tool of foreign policy, one often 
more successful as political fodder than as leverage to effect positive 
change.
  The timing of previous Iran sanctions legislation was damaging, 
undermining the administration in the midst of complex, delicate 
discussions with Iran. Today, the circumstances have changed. 
Negotiations are stalled, and this legislation has been focused and 
toned-

[[Page 13111]]

down, making it an asset, not a liability, for the administration as it 
works to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
  A coherent and unified U.S. policy towards Iran is the best way to 
strengthen diplomacy, which remains the best, some say the only, way to 
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This revised legislation--
based on input from a broad coalition, including the White House--
brings coherence and focused pressure to the negotiating table.
  I commend Chairwoman Ros Lehtinen and Ranking Member Berman of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee for producing a bill that is based on 
policy, not politics. There were extreme voices pushing to include some 
very harsh language that, for example, would have made the few 
currently permitted humanitarian transactions with Iranian financial 
institutions illegal. To the benefit of the U.S. and innocent Iranian 
civilians, these provisions were left out.
  Another critical change to this legislation is language that 
clarifies in the Act is not an authorization of the use of force 
against Iran or Syria.
  The resolution would provide the administration with additional 
leverage for their broader diplomatic effort. Sanctions are effective 
when it is clear that if concessions are made, the other side has the 
ability to reciprocate by easing elements of the sanctions regime. This 
bill provides the administration with such flexibility.
  In the midst of negotiations yet to yield progress, focused sanctions 
that unite both Congress and the executive provides leverage that 
increases the likelihood of success, and an alternative to military 
action, which our nation can ill-afford and which I oppose.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend the 
rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 750.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

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