[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 158 (2012), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 13010-13015]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a 
message from the House with respect to H.R. 1905.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       Resolved, that the House agree to the amendment of the 
     Senate to the bill (H.R. 1905) entitled ``An Act to 
     strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling 
     Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other 
     threatening activities, and for other purposes'', with an 
     amendment.

  Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. President, I rise in strong support 
of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, our 
legislation which embodies a bipartisan, bicameral agreement to 
reconcile the current Senate and House-passed versions of Iran 
sanctions legislation. Once implemented, this comprehensive new set of 
sanctions will help dramatically to increase the pressure on Iranian 
government leaders to abandon their illicit nuclear activities and 
support for terrorism. This bill passed the House of Representatives by 
an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 421 to 6 earlier this evening. I 
hope all of my colleagues will join me in supporting it so that it can 
be adopted by the Senate and signed into law by the President as soon 
as possible.
  So far, in the sputtering P5+1 negotiations, Iran has shown no clear 
signs of a willingness to work with the international community to 
engage in a serious way on nuclear issues. It remains to be seen 
whether Iran will ultimately be willing to work towards progress on the 
central issues at upcoming negotiating sessions, or whether the 
meetings will simply be another in a series of stalling actions to buy 
time to enrich additional uranium and further fortify their nuclear 
program. That is why I think it necessary to intensify the pressure, 
and move forward quickly now on this new package that leaves no doubts 
about U.S. resolve on this issue. As we all recognize, economic 
sanctions are not an end: they are a means to an end. That end is to 
apply enough pressure to secure agreement from Iran's leaders to fully, 
completely and verifiably abandon their illicit nuclear activities.
  Isolated diplomatically, economically, and otherwise, Iran must 
understand that the patience of the international community is fast 
running out. With these new sanctions, including those targeted at the 
I-R-G-C, we are pressing Iran's military and political leaders to make 
a clear choice. They can end the suppression of their people, come 
clean on their nuclear program, suspend enrichment, and stop supporting 
terrorist activities around the globe. Or they can continue to face 
sustained multilateral economic and diplomatic pressure, and deepen 
their international isolation.
  This legislation is based on the Senate bill which passed with 
unanimous support in May. It incorporates new measures from Democrats 
and Republicans in the House and Senate. The sanctions contained in 
this bill reach more deeply into Iran's energy sector than ever before, 
and build on the sweeping banking sanctions Congress enacted 2 years 
ago to reach to insurance, shipping, trade, finance and other sectors, 
targeting those who help to bolster Iranian government revenues which 
support their illicit nuclear activities.
  As I have said before, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is the 
most pressing foreign policy challenge we face, and we must continue to 
do all we can--politically, economically, and diplomatically--to avoid 
that result. In recent months, we have seen increased signs that the 
Iranian regime is feeling the pressure of existing sanctions. Their 
currency has plummeted, their trade revenues have been sharply 
curtailed, and they are under increasing pressure from the oil 
sanctions regime currently in place. With passage of this bill, we are 
taking another significant step to block the remaining avenues for the 
Iranians to fund their illicit behavior and evade sanctions. The bill 
also requires sanctions on those who purchase new Iranian sovereign 
debt, thereby further limiting the regime's ability to finance its 
illicit activities.
  In addition, there are substantial new sanctions for anyone who 
engages in joint ventures with the National Iranian Oil Company, NIOC; 
provides insurance or re-insurance to the National Iranian Oil Company 
or the National Iranian Tanker Company, NITC; helps Iran evade oil 
sanctions through reflagging or other means; or sells, leases, or 
otherwise provides oil tankers to Iran, unless they are from a country 
that is sharply reducing its oil purchases from Iran.
  The bill also expands sanctions against Iranian and Syrian officials 
for human rights abuses, including against those who engage in 
censorship, jamming and monitoring of communications, and tracking of 
Internet use by ordinary Iranian citizens.
  Many of my colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, have helped us 
get to this point. I want to particularly thank Chairman Ros-Lehtinen 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Without her help, we would not 
be here. I also want to thank my colleagues, including Senator 
Menendez,

[[Page 13011]]

who crafted many of its original provisions, and Senators Schumer, 
Gillibrand, Lautenberg, Brown, Kyl, Lieberman, and others who 
contributed their ideas. I also want to thank Majority Leader Reid for 
his tireless efforts to enact a strong comprehensive sanctions bill.
  Finally, I want to thank the staff who crafted the details of this 
bill, and worked long hours in intensive discussions over the last 
several weeks to get it done. They include Patrick Grant, Steve Kroll, 
Georgina Cannon, Ingianni Acosta and Colin McGinnis of my Committee 
staff; Dr. Yleem Poblete, Matt Zweig, and Ari Friedman of Chairman Ros-
Lehtinen's staff; John O'Hara and Andrew Olmem of Senator Shelby's 
staff, and Shanna Winters, Dr. Richard Kessler, and Alan Makovsky of 
Ranking Member Berman's staff.
  All told, when enacted this bill and other efforts by the President 
will significantly increase pressure on Iran to abandon its illicit 
nuclear activities. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record a detailed summary of the bill. I urge all my colleagues to 
support this measure.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

        Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012


                       Section-by-Section Summary

       Sec. 1--Short Title, Table of Contents
       Sec. 2--Definitions: Provides that the definitions of key 
     terms (``appropriate congressional committees,'' and 
     ``knowingly,'') will be those found in the Iran Sanctions Act 
     (ISA) of 1996, as amended, and that the definition of 
     ``United States person'' will be that found in the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (CISADA). Also defines ``financial transaction,'' 
     to mean any transfer of value involving a financial 
     institution, including precious metals and various swaps, 
     futures, and other activities.
       Sec. 101--Enforcement of Multilateral Sanctions Regime and 
     Expansion and Implementation of Sanctions: States the sense 
     of Congress that (i) the goal of compelling Iran to abandon 
     its efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capacity can be 
     effectively achieved through a comprehensive policy that 
     includes expansion and vigorous implementation and 
     enforcement of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against 
     Iran, diplomacy, and military planning and options, 
     consistent with the President's 2012 State of the Union 
     Address; and (ii) that intensified efforts to counter Iranian 
     sanctions evasion are necessary.
       Sec. 102--Diplomatic Efforts to Expand Multilateral 
     Sanctions Regime: Urges efforts by the US to expand the UN 
     sanctions regime to include (i) imposing additional travel 
     restrictions on Iranian officials responsible for human 
     rights violations, the development of Iran's nuclear and 
     ballistic missile programs, and Iran's support for terrorism; 
     (ii) withdrawing sea- and airport landing rights for Iran 
     Shipping Lines and Iran Air, for their role in nuclear 
     proliferation and illegal arms sales; (iii) expanding the 
     range of sanctions imposed on Iran by US allies; (iv) 
     expanding sanctions to limit Iran's petroleum development and 
     imports of refined petroleum products; and (v) accelerating 
     US diplomatic and economic efforts to help allies reduce 
     their dependence on Iranian crude oil and other petroleum 
     products. Requires periodic reporting to Congress on the 
     status of such efforts.
       Sec. 201--Expansion of Sanctions with Respect to Iran's 
     Energy Sector: Makes a number of substantial changes in and 
     additions to ISA's energy sanctions. These include (i) 
     increasing the number of required sanctions from three to 
     five; (ii) making sanctionable certain construction of 
     transportation infrastructure to support delivery of 
     domestically refined petroleum in Iran; (iii) making 
     sanctionable certain barter transactions, and the purchase or 
     facilitation of Iranian debt issued after the date of 
     enactment, that contribute to Iran's ability to import 
     refined petroleum products; (iv) extending ISA sanctions to 
     persons knowingly participating in petroleum resources joint 
     ventures established on or after January 1, 2002, anywhere in 
     the world in which Iran's government is a substantial partner 
     or investor; an exception is provided for ventures terminated 
     within 180 days of enactment; (v) extending ISA sanctions to 
     those providing certain goods and services (including 
     construction of certain infrastructure) that support Iran's 
     ability to develop its petroleum resources; and (vi) 
     extending ISA sanctions to support for Iran's domestic 
     production of petrochemical products.
       Sec. 202--Imposition of Sanctions for Transportation of 
     Crude Oil from Iran and Evasion of Sanctions by Shipping 
     Companies: Requires imposition of at least five ISA sanctions 
     on a person who owns or operates a vessel that within 90 days 
     after the date of enactment is used to transport crude oil 
     from Iran to another country; applies only if the President 
     makes a determination, under the NDAA, that there is a 
     sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from 
     countries other than Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum 
     to significantly reduce their purchases from Iran; an 
     exception is provided for transportation of crude oil from 
     Iran to countries that are exempt from NDAA sanctions because 
     they are significantly reducing such purchases. Also applies 
     at least five ISA sanctions to persons that own or operate a 
     vessel that conceals the Iranian origin of crude oil or 
     refined petroleum products transported on the vessel, 
     including by permitting the operator of the vessel to suspend 
     the vessel's satellite tracking devices, or by obscuring or 
     concealing the ownership by the government of Iran, or other 
     entities owned or controlled by Iran. Ships involved could be 
     barred from US ports for up to two years.
       Sec. 203--Expansion of Sanctions with Respect to the 
     Development by Iran of WMDs: Requires imposition of five or 
     more ISA sanctions on persons who export, transfer, or 
     otherwise facilitate the transshipment of goods, services, 
     technology or other items and know or should have known this 
     action would materially contribute to the ability of Iran to 
     develop WMDs. Also requires ISA sanctions to be imposed 
     (subject to certain conditions) on persons who knowingly 
     participate in joint ventures with Iran's government, Iranian 
     firms, or persons acting for or on behalf of Iran's 
     government, in the mining, production or transportation of 
     uranium anywhere in the world. Exempts persons if they 
     withdraw from such joint ventures within six months after 
     date of enactment.
       Sec. 204--Expansion of Sanctions Available under the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996: Expands the current menu of sanctions 
     available to the President under ISA, to include a 
     prohibition on any US person from investing in or purchasing 
     significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a 
     sanctioned person, an exclusion from the United States of 
     aliens who are corporate officers, principals or controlling 
     shareholders in a sanctioned firm, and application of 
     applicable ISA sanctions to the CEO or other principal 
     executive officers (or persons performing similar functions) 
     of a sanctioned firm, which could include a freeze of their 
     US assets.
       Sec. 205--Modification of Waiver Standard under the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996: Revises the standard under section 9 
     of ISA for waivers of sanctions by the President (i) to 
     require that energy-related sanctions can only be waived if 
     waiver is essential to the national security interests of the 
     United States; (ii) require that WMD-related sanctions can 
     only be waived if waiver is ``vital to the national security 
     interests of the United States; (iii) to eliminate the 
     ``permanent'' waiver in prior law and replace it with a one-
     year renewable waiver; and (iv) to clarify that all waivers 
     must be on a case-by-case basis.
       Sec. 206--Briefings on Implementation of the Iran Sanctions 
     Act of 1996: Amends ISA to require briefings by the Secretary 
     of State to the appropriate congressional committees on ISA 
     implementation.
       Sec. 207--Expansion of Definitions under the Iran Sanctions 
     Act of 1996: Adds definitions of ``credible information,'' 
     ``petrochemical product,'' and ``services.'' ``Credible 
     information'' includes public announcements by persons that 
     they are engaged in certain activities, including those made 
     in a report to stockholders, and may include announcements by 
     the Government of Iran, and reports from the General 
     Accountability Office (GAO), the Energy Information 
     Administration, the Congressional Research Service, or other 
     reputable governmental organizations, or trade or industry 
     publications. ``Petrochemical product'' is defined consistent 
     with Executive Order 13590. ``Services'' include software, 
     hardware, financial, professional consulting, engineering, 
     specialized energy information services, and others.
       Sec. 208--Sense of Congress on Iran's Energy Sector: States 
     the sense of Congress that Iran's energy sector remains a 
     zone of proliferation concern, since the Iranian Government 
     continues to divert substantial revenue from petroleum sales 
     to finance its illicit nuclear and missile activities, and 
     that the President should apply the full range of ISA 
     sanctions to address the threat posed by Iran.
       Sec. 211--Sanctions for Shipping WMD or Terrorism-Related 
     Materials to or from Iran: Requires the blocking of assets 
     of, and imposes other sanctions on, persons who knowingly 
     sell, lease, or provide ships, insurance or reinsurance, or 
     other shipping services, for transportation of goods that 
     materially contribute to Iran's WMD program or its terrorism-
     related activities. Applies as well to parents of the persons 
     involved if they knew or should have known of the 
     sanctionable activity and to any of subsidiaries or 
     affiliates of the persons involved that knowingly 
     participated in the activity. Permits the President to waive 
     sanctions in cases ``vital to the national security 
     interest,'' but requires a report to Congress regarding the 
     use of such a waiver; the President must, in any event, 
     submit a report to Congress identifying operators of vessels 
     and other persons that conduct or facilitate significant 
     financial transactions that manage Iranian ports designated 
     for IEEPA sanctions.

[[Page 13012]]

       Sec. 212--Imposition of Sanctions for Provision of 
     Underwriting Services or Insurance or Reinsurance for NIOC 
     and NITC: Requires five or more ISA sanctions against 
     companies providing underwriting services, insurance, or 
     reinsurance to National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the 
     National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) or a successor entity 
     to either company. Provides an exemption for persons 
     providing such services for activities relating to the 
     provision of food, medicine, and medical devices or 
     humanitarian assistance to Iran.
       Sec. 213--Imposition of Sanctions for Purchase, 
     Subscription to, or Facilitation of the Issuance of Iran 
     Sovereign Debt: Requires the imposition of five or more ISA 
     sanctions on persons the President determines knowingly 
     purchase, subscribe to, or facilitate the issuance of Iranian 
     sovereign debt, or debt of an entity owned or controlled by 
     the Iranian Government, issued on or after the date of 
     enactment.
       Sec. 214--Imposition of Sanctions on Subsidiaries and 
     Agents of UN-Sanctioned Persons: Amends CISADA to ensure that 
     US financial sanctions imposed on UN-designated entities 
     reach those persons acting on behalf of, at the direction of, 
     or owned or controlled by, the designated entities. Requires 
     the Treasury Department to revise its regulations within 90 
     days of enactment to implement the change.
       Sec. 215--Imposition of Sanctions for Transactions with 
     Persons Sanctioned for Certain Activities Relating to 
     Terrorism or Proliferation of WMD: Extends CISADA to impose 
     sanctions on a foreign financial institution that facilitates 
     a significant transaction or transactions or provides 
     significant services not only to certain designated financial 
     institutions but also to designated persons whose property or 
     interests in property are blocked based on their connection 
     to Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or 
     support of terrorism.
       Sec. 216--Expansion of Mandatory Sanctions with Respect to 
     Financial Institutions that Engage in Certain Activities 
     Relating to Iran: Requires the Treasury Secretary to revise 
     regulations under Section 104 of CISADA to apply rules 
     cutting off access to the U.S. financial institutions to 
     foreign financial institutions knowingly facilitating, 
     participating or assisting in, or acting on behalf of or as 
     an intermediary, in connection with financial activities 
     involving designated Iranian banks, whether or not the 
     transactions are directly with those banks..
       Sec. 217--Continuation of Sanction for the Government of 
     Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and Sanctions Evaders: 
     Requires that various sanctions imposed by Executive Order, 
     including blocking the property of the Government of Iran and 
     Iranian financial institutions, imposing penalties on foreign 
     sanction evaders, and blocking the property of the CBI, will 
     remain in effect until the President certifies that Iran and 
     the CBI have ceased to support terrorism and Iranian 
     development of WMD.
       Sec. 218--Liability of Parent Companies for Violations of 
     Sanctions by Foreign Subsidiaries: Requires the imposition of 
     civil penalties under the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (IEEPA) of up to twice the amount of the relevant 
     transaction, on US parent companies for the activities of 
     their foreign subsidiaries which, if undertaken by a US 
     person or in the United States, would violate US sanctions 
     law. Subsidiaries are defined as those entities in which a US 
     person holds more than fifty percent equity interest or a 
     majority of the seats on the board, or that a US person 
     otherwise controls. Covers activities under the current US 
     trade embargo with Iran and would apply regardless of whether 
     the subsidiary was established to circumvent US sanctions.
       Sec. 219--Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosures on 
     Certain Activities in Iran: Amends the Securities and 
     Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers whose stock is traded 
     on US stock exchanges to disclose whether they or their 
     affiliates have knowingly engaged in activities (i) described 
     in section 5 of ISA (energy sector activity); (ii) described 
     in 104(c)(2) or (d)(1) of CISADA (related to foreign 
     financial institutions who facilitate WMD/terrorism, money 
     laundering, IRGC activity, and other violations); (iii) in 
     105A(b)(2) of CISADA (related transfer of weapons and other 
     technologies to Iran likely to be used for human rights 
     abuses); (iv) involving persons whose property is blocked for 
     WMD/terrorism and; (v) involving persons or entities in the 
     government of Iran (without the authorization of a Federal 
     department or agency). Provides for periodic public 
     disclosure of such information, and communication of that 
     information by the SEC to Congress and the President. 
     Requires the President to initiate an investigation into the 
     possible imposition of sanctions as specified, and to make a 
     sanctions determination within six months.
       Sec. 220--Reports on, and Authorization of Imposition of 
     Sanctions with Respect to, the Provision of Specialized 
     Financial Messaging Services to the Central Bank of Iran and 
     Other Sanctioned Iranian Financial Institutions: States the 
     sense of Congress that specialized financial messaging 
     services are a critical link to the international financial 
     system; requires the Secretary of the Treasury to report 
     periodically listing the persons who provide such services to 
     the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian banks that have been 
     designated for involvement in WMD or support for terror, and 
     assessing efforts to cut off the direct provision of such 
     services to such institutions. Authorizes the imposition of 
     sanctions under CISADA or IEEPA on persons continuing to 
     provide such services to the CBI or such other Iranian 
     institutions, subject to an exception for persons subject to 
     foreign sanctions regimes that require them to cut off 
     services to a substantially similar group of Iranian 
     institutions.
       Sec. 221--Identification and Immigration Restrictions on 
     Senior Iranian Officials and their Family Members: Requires 
     the identification of and denial of visa requests to senior 
     officials, including the Supreme Leader, the President, 
     members of the Assembly of Experts, senior members of the 
     Intelligence Ministry of Iran, and senior members of the IRGC 
     that are involved in nuclear proliferation, support 
     international terrorism or the commission of serious human 
     rights abuses against citizens of Iran. Also includes their 
     family members. Provides for Presidential waiver if essential 
     to the national interest or if necessary to meet our UN 
     obligations; requires a report to Congress regarding the use 
     of such a waiver.
       Sec. 222--Sense of Congress and Rule of Construction 
     Relating to Certain Authorities of State and Local 
     Governments: States the sense of Congress that the US should 
     support actions by States or local governments, within their 
     authority, including determining how investment assets are 
     valued for financial institutions safety and soundness 
     purposes, that are consistent with and in furtherance of this 
     Act. Amends CISADA to state that it shall not be construed to 
     abridge the authority of a State to issue and enforce rules 
     governing the safety, soundness, and solvency of a financial 
     institution subject to its jurisdiction or the business of 
     insurance pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
       Sec. 223--GAO Reports on Foreign Investment in Iran's 
     Energy Sector: Mandates reports from GAO on foreign 
     investment in Iran's energy sector, exporters of refined 
     petroleum products to Iran, entities providing shipping and 
     insurance services to Iran, Iranian energy joint ventures 
     worldwide, and countries where gasoline and refined petroleum 
     products exported to Iran are produced or refined.
       Sec. 224--Expanded Reporting on Iran's Crude Oil and 
     Refined Petroleum Products: Amends section 110(b) of CISADA 
     to require additional reporting by the President on the 
     volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imported 
     to and exported from Iran, the persons selling and 
     transporting crude oil and refined petroleum products, the 
     countries with primary jurisdiction over those persons and 
     the countries in which those products were refined, the 
     sources of financing for such imports and the involvement of 
     foreign persons in efforts to assist Iran in developing its 
     oil and gas production capacity, importing advanced 
     technology to upgrade existing Iranian refineries, converting 
     existing chemical plants to petroleum refineries, and 
     maintaining, upgrading or expanding refineries or 
     constructing new refineries.
       Sec. 301--Identifications and Sanctions on Iran 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps Officials, Agents, and Affiliates: 
     Requires the President to identify, and designate for 
     sanctions, officials, affiliates and agents of the IRGC 
     within 90 days of enactment, and periodically thereafter; 
     designation requires exclusion of such persons from the 
     United States, and imposition of sanctions related to WMD 
     under IEEPA, including freezing their assets and otherwise 
     isolating them financially. Also, outlines priorities for 
     investigating certain foreign persons, entities, and 
     transactions in assessing connections to the IRGC. Requires 
     the President to report on designations and provides for a 
     waiver if vital to the national security interest of the US.
       Sec. 302--Identification and Sanctions on Foreign Persons 
     Supporting IRGC: Subjects foreign persons to ISA sanctions if 
     those persons knowingly provide material assistance to, or 
     engage in any significant transaction--including barter 
     transactions--with officials of the IRGC, its agents or 
     affiliates. Requires imposition of similar sanctions against 
     those persons who engage in significant transactions with UN-
     sanctioned persons, those acting for or on their behalf, or 
     those owned or controlled by them. Provides for additional 
     sanctions under IEEPA as the President deems appropriate. 
     Requires the President to report on designations and waivers, 
     as applicable. Waiver is available if essential to the 
     national security interests of the US.
       Sec. 303--Identification and Sanctions on Foreign 
     Government Agencies Carrying Out Activities or Transactions 
     with Certain Iran-Affiliated Persons: Requires the President, 
     within 120 days and every 180 days thereafter, to submit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
     identifies each agency of the government of a foreign 
     country, other than Iran, that the President determines 
     knowingly and materially supported a foreign person that is 
     an official, agent, or affiliate of IRGC designated pursuant 
     to IEEPA or various UN Resolutions.

[[Page 13013]]

     Provides authority for the President to impose various 
     measures described in the section, such as denying assistance 
     under the Foreign Assistance Act or proscribing certain US 
     loans to the agency involved.
       Sec. 304--Rule of Construction: Clarifies that sections 301 
     to 303 sanctions do not limit the President's authority to 
     designate persons for sanction under IEEPA.
       Sec. 311--Expansion of US Procurement Ban to Foreign 
     Persons who Interact with the IRGC: Requires certification by 
     prospective US government contractors (for contract 
     solicitations issued beginning 120 days from the date of 
     enactment) that neither they nor their subsidiaries have 
     engaged in significant economic transactions with designated 
     IRGC officials, agents, or affiliates. Waiver is also 
     amended, so that it is available if ``essential to the 
     national security interests.'' Establishes a minimum 
     procurement ban penalty of two years for violators.
       Sec. 312--Sanctions Determinations on NIOC and NITC: Amends 
     CISADA to require the Secretary of the Treasury to determine 
     and notify Congress whether the National Iranian Oil Company 
     (NIOC) and the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) are 
     agents or affiliates of the IRGC. If found to be IRGC 
     entities, sanctions apply to transactions or relevant 
     financial services for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum 
     products from the NIOC or NITC, but only if the President 
     determines that there exists a sufficient supply of petroleum 
     from countries other than Iran to permit purchasers to 
     significantly reduce in volume their purchases from Iran. 
     Provides for an exception to financial institutions of a 
     country that is significantly reducing its purchases of 
     Iranian petroleum or petroleum products within specified 
     periods which track those provided for in section 1245 of the 
     FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.
       Sec. 401--Sanctions on those Complicit in Human Rights 
     Abuses: States the sense of Congress that the Supreme Leader, 
     senior members of the Intelligence Ministry, senior members 
     of the IRGC and paramilitary groups, and other Ministers, are 
     responsible for directing and controlling serious human 
     rights abuses against the Iranian people and should be 
     included on the list of persons responsible for or complicit 
     in those abuses and subject to property blocking and other 
     CISADA 105 sanctions. Requires a report to appropriate 
     congressional committees within 180 days detailing the 
     involvement of the persons mentioned above in human rights 
     abuses against the citizens of Iran.
       Sec. 402--Sanctions on those Transferring to Iran Certain 
     Goods or Technologies: Imposes sanctions provided for in 
     CISADA, including a visa ban and property blocking/asset 
     freeze, on persons and firms which supply Iran with equipment 
     and technologies including weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas 
     and other riot control equipment, and jamming, monitoring and 
     surveillance equipment which the President determines are 
     likely to be used by Iranian officials to commit human rights 
     abuses. Requires the President to maintain and update lists 
     of such persons who commit human rights abuses, submit 
     updated lists to Congress, and make the unclassified portion 
     of those lists public. Requires the President to report on 
     designations and waivers, as applicable.
       Sec. 403--Sanctions on those Engaging in Censorship and 
     Repression in Iran: States the sense of Congress that 
     satellite service providers and other entities that directly 
     provide satellite service to the Iranian government or its 
     entities should cease to provide such service unless the 
     government ceases its activities intended to jam or restrict 
     the signals and the US should address the illegal jamming 
     through voice and vote at the UN International 
     Telecommunications Union. Requires imposition of sanctions as 
     in section 401 against individuals and firms found to have 
     engaged in censorship or curtailment of the rights of freedom 
     of expression or assembly of Iran's citizens.
       Sec. 411--Codification of Sanctions with Respect to Human 
     Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Using 
     Information Technology: Codifies Executive Order 13606, 
     Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the United 
     States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights 
     Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information 
     Technology.
       Sec. 412--Clarification of Sensitive Technologies for 
     Purposes of Procurement Ban under CISADA: Requires the 
     Secretary of State to issue guidelines, within 90 days of the 
     date of enactment, describing technologies that may be 
     considered ``sensitive technologies'' for the purposes of 
     Sec. 106 of CISADA, with special attention to new 
     technologies, determine the types of technology that enable 
     Iran's indigenous capabilities to disrupt and monitor 
     information and communications, and review the guidelines no 
     less than once each year, adding items to the guidelines as 
     necessary.
       Sec. 413--Expedited Processing of Human Rights, 
     Humanitarian, and Democracy Aid: Requires the Office of 
     Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department to 
     establish a 90-day process to expedite processing of US Iran-
     related humanitarian, human rights and democratization aid by 
     entities receiving funds from the State Department; the 
     Broadcasting Board of Governors; and other federal agencies. 
     Requires the State Department to conduct a foreign policy 
     review within 30 days of request submission. Provides for 
     additional time for processing of applications involving 
     certain specified sensitive goods and technology, and 
     requests involving extraordinary circumstances.
       Sec. 414--Comprehensive Strategy to Promote Internet 
     Freedom in Iran: Requires the Administration to devise a 
     comprehensive strategy and report to Congress on how best to 
     assist Iran's citizens in freely and safely accessing the 
     Internet, developing counter-censorship technologies, 
     expanding access to ``surrogate'' programming including Voice 
     of America's Persian News Network, and Radio FARDA inside 
     Iran, and taking other similar measures.
       Sec. 415--Statement of Policy on Political Prisoners: 
     Declares the policy of the US to expand efforts to identify, 
     assist, and protect prisoners of conscience in Iran, 
     intensify work to abolish Iranian human rights violations, 
     and publicly call for the release of political prisoners, as 
     appropriate.
       Sec. 501--Exclusion of Certain Iranian Students from the 
     US: Requires the Secretary of State to deny visas and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude certain Iranian 
     university students who may seek to come to the U.S. to study 
     to prepare for work in Iran's energy sector or in fields 
     related to its nuclear program, including nuclear sciences or 
     nuclear engineering.
       Sec. 502--Interests in Financial Assets of Iran: Makes 
     certain blocked assets available for execution to satisfy any 
     judgment or judgments to the extent of any compensatory 
     damages against Iran for state-sponsored terrorism, so long 
     as the court determines that Iran has an equitable title to 
     or beneficial interest in those assets (subject to an 
     exception for certain custodial interests), and the court 
     also determines that no one possesses a constitutionally-
     protected interest in the blocked assets under the Fifth 
     Amendment.
       Sec. 503--Technical Corrections: Reaffirms longstanding US 
     policy allowing sale of certain licensed agricultural 
     commodities to Iran by amending the National Defense 
     Authorization Act to allow for continued payments related to 
     such commodities. Adjusts date of delivery of EIA reports.
       Sec. 504--Expansion of NDAA Sanctions: Amends the NDAA to 
     provide that financial institutions located in countries that 
     have been exempted because they are significantly reducing 
     their reliance on Iranian oil may continue to do business 
     with the Central Bank of Iran only for petroleum transactions 
     and limited bilateral trade between Iran and those countries; 
     for the first time treats state-owned banks (other than 
     central banks) as subject to the same sanctions rules as 
     foreign private banks; provides incentives for 
     ``significantly reducing'' countries to reduce to zero; 
     clarifies that ``significantly reducing'' includes a 
     reduction in price or volume toward a complete cessation of 
     crude oil imports; ties termination date to termination 
     certification in CISADA. Makes other technical corrections.
       Sec. 505--Report on Natural Gas Exports from Iran: Requires 
     the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration to 
     submit a report to Congress and the President within 60 days 
     on Iran's natural gas sector, including an assessment of 
     exports of Iranian natural gas, identification of countries 
     purchasing the most Iranian natural gas, assessment of 
     alternative supplies available to those countries, and 
     assessment of the impact a reduction on exports would have on 
     global supplies and pricing. Requires the President to submit 
     a report to Congress within 60 days of receiving the EIA 
     report, and using the information it contains to provide 
     analysis and recommendations on the revenues received by Iran 
     from its natural gas exports and whether further steps should 
     be taken to limit such revenues.
       Sec. 506--Report on Membership of Iran in International 
     Organizations: Requires the Secretary of State to submit a 
     report to Congress listing the international organizations of 
     which Iran is a member and detailing the amount the US 
     contributes to each such organization annually.
       Sec. 507--Sense of Congress on Exportation of Goods, 
     Services, and Technologies for Aircraft Produced in the US: 
     States the sense of Congress that licenses to export or re-
     export goods, services, or technologies for aircraft produced 
     in the US should be provided, in the case of Iran, only in 
     situations where such licenses are essential and in a manner 
     consistent with US laws and foreign policy goals.
       Sec. 601--Implementation; Penalties: Provides the President 
     with the necessary procedural tools to administer the 
     provisions of the new law, including subpoena and other 
     enforcement authorities for specified provisions of the bill.
       Sec. 602--Applicability to Authorized Intelligence 
     Activities: Provides a general exemption for authorized 
     intelligence activities of the U.S.
       Sec. 603--Applicability to Certain Natural Gas Projects: 
     Contains special conditions for a project outside Iran of 
     substantial importance to U.S. national interests and 
     European energy security interests and energy independence 
     from the Government of the Russian Federation.

[[Page 13014]]

       Sec. 604--Rule of Construction: Provides that nothing in 
     this Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an 
     authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.
       Sec. 605--Termination: Provides for termination of some 
     provisions of the new law if the President certifies as 
     required in CISADA that Iran has ceased its support for 
     terrorism and ceased efforts to pursue, acquire or develop 
     weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and 
     ballistic missile launch technology, and has verifiably 
     dismantled its WMD.
       Sec. 701--Short Title for Title VII: The ``Syria Human 
     Rights Accountability Act of 2012.''
       Sec. 702--Sanctions on those Responsible for Human Rights 
     Abuses of Syria's Citizens: Requires the President to 
     identify within 90 days, and sanction under IEEPA, officials 
     of the Syrian government or those acting on their behalf who 
     are complicit in or responsible for the commission of serious 
     human rights abuses against Syria's citizens, regardless of 
     whether the abuses occurred in Syria.
       Sec. 703--Sanctions on those Transferring to Syria 
     Technologies for Human Rights Abuses: Requires the President 
     to identify and sanction persons determined to have engaged 
     in the transfer of technologies--including weapons, rubber 
     bullets, tear gas and other riot control equipment, and 
     jamming, monitoring and surveillance equipment--which the 
     President determines are likely to be used by Syrian 
     officials to commit human rights abuses or restrict the free 
     flow of information in Syria. Provides for exceptions where a 
     person has agreed to stop providing such technologies, and 
     agreed not to knowingly provide such technologies in the 
     future. Requires the President to report on designations and 
     waivers, where applicable, and to update the list 
     periodically.
       Sec. 704--Sanctions on those Engaging in Censorship and 
     Repression in Syria: Requires the President to identify and 
     report to Congress within 90 days of enactment those persons 
     and firms found to have engaged in censorship or repression 
     of the rights of freedom of expression or assembly of Syria's 
     citizens, and impose sanctions under IEEPA on such persons. 
     Requires periodic updating of the list, and public access via 
     the websites of the Departments of State and Treasury.
       Sec. 705--Waiver: Provides for Presidential national 
     security interest waiver for Syria provisions; requires a 
     report to Congress on the reasons for the waiver.
       Sec. 706--Termination: Provides for termination of the 
     Syria provisions if the President certifies that certain 
     conditions are met.


                            Parent Companies

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today to engage in a colloquy 
with my friend, the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, regarding HR 1905, the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. I want to thank the 
chairman for crafting a strong sanctions package that includes language 
I authored to close a loophole in current law that allows foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies to continue doing business with Iran 
without imposing any penalties on their U.S. parent companies. We must 
close this loophole once and for all, and I am pleased the Chairman 
agrees with me.
  Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I thank Senator Lautenberg for his 
longstanding leadership on this issue. As I have previously noted, it 
is long past time for foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to end 
their business in Iran. That is already happening due to US and 
international pressure on the business and financial sectors, and this 
new provision will accelerate that process. Firms realize the huge 
risks such activity poses, reputationally and otherwise, to their 
companies. I note that it is already a violation of U.S. law for U.S. 
subsidiaries to engage in sanctionable activity in Iran's energy sector 
and certain other activities under U.S. sanctions laws. It is also a 
violation of U.S. trade law for a U.S. firm to do business of any kind 
in Iran via a subsidiary that it directs. The balance that has been 
struck in prior law is to focus only on the activity of U.S. companies. 
Foreign subsidiaries are not, by definition, U.S. companies, and your 
provision takes a major new step forward in this area of the law. I 
agree with you that the way we have addressed this issue authorizing 
for the first time penalties on U.S. parents if their foreign 
subsidiaries engages in an activity that would be sanctionable if 
committed by a U.S. person--is a sound and responsible one, and will 
hopefully shut down this activity once and for all.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the chairman agree that the language in the bill 
currently under consideration would apply the same penalties that can 
be imposed on U.S. companies that directly violate the U.S. trade ban 
to those U.S. parent companies whose foreign subsidiaries are doing 
business with Iran?
  Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. The bill would authorize the imposition 
of similar civil penalties on such U.S. parent companies.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the chairman also agree that this language 
subjects to penalties U.S. parent companies if their foreign 
subsidiaries knew or should have known that the subsidiary was directly 
or indirectly doing business with an Iranian entity, even if it was the 
case that the parent companies were not actually aware of the activity 
of the subsidiary?
  Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I agree this legislation mandates 
penalties on a U.S. parent company if its foreign subsidiary has 
knowledge or should have had knowledge that the subsidiary was doing 
prohibited business with Iran, even if the U.S. parent company has no 
knowledge of these transactions.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. And does the chairman agree that this requirement 
that the foreign subsidiary knew or should have known that they were 
doing business with Iran relates only to the actual business 
transaction and does not require that the subsidiary had or should have 
had knowledge of current U.S. sanctions law in order to place penalties 
on the U.S. parent company?
  Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Yes. That is my intent.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank Chairman Johnson for all of his work on this 
important Iran sanctions package. Iran continues to defy numerous 
United Nations Security Council resolutions. It funds Hamas, Hezbollah, 
and other terrorist organizations, and it commits severe human rights 
abuses against its own people. We must do everything we can to place as 
much pressure on the Iranian regime as possible to change its behavior, 
and I am pleased that we have finally closed this loophole in current 
law and put U.S. companies on notice that they will be held responsible 
for the activities of their subsidiaries with respect to Iran.
  Mr. REID. I move to concur in the House amendment, and I believe the 
Senate is ready to act on this motion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the motion to reconsider be 
laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate and that any 
statements related to this bill be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Humanitarian trade, including 
agricultural commodities, food, medicine and medical products has long 
been specifically exempted by Congress from successive rounds of Iran 
sanctions legislation, as long as such trade is licensed by the 
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC.
  With the sharp drop in the value of Iran's currency, and the 
worsening economic situation in Iran, it is becoming more apparent that 
U.S. financial sanctions targeting Iran's banking sector are causing 
increased concern among U.S. and other businesses, and banks of our 
allies engaged in such trade.
  The fear is that engaging in humanitarian trade in the current 
sanctions environment might lead to sanctions for legitimately licensed 
humanitarian trade. We must underscore with other countries and their 
banks that humanitarian trade with Iran is not subject to sanctions if 
it is appropriately licensed by OFAC.
  This has been a concern since the Senate first considered this bill 
and this concern still remains. It is not and has not been the intent 
of U.S. policy to harm the Iranian people by prohibiting humanitarian 
trade that is licensed by the U.S. Treasury Department, and we should 
do all we can to avoid this outcome. OFAC consistently issues many 
licenses, both general and specific, for this type of trade.
  The practical financing difficulties arising today between banks and 
those

[[Page 13015]]

engaging in licensed humanitarian trade can be best addressed by U.S. 
government officials, who should do more to make it clear that no U.S. 
sanctions will be imposed against third-country banks that facilitate 
OFAC-licensed or exempted humanitarian trade. The Administration must 
continue to make this clear in public statements, in private meetings 
with foreign financial institutions, and elsewhere as appropriate. 
Misinterpretation of U.S. law, among foreign financial institutions, 
should no longer deny the people of Iran the benefit of OFAC-approved 
humanitarian trade.
  Mr. REID. I am pleased that the Senate has just passed the final 
version of the Iran Sanctions legislation.
  I want to thank Senators Johnson, Shelby and Menendez for their 
leadership and all of their hard work getting this bill completed.
  At a time when Iran continues to defy the international community 
with its nuclear weapons program, it is critical we continue to tighten 
our sanctions regime.
  This legislation expands our existing sanctions on Iran's energy 
sector, and imposes new sanctions targeting shipping and insurance.
  Iran continues to try to evade existing sanctions. But this 
legislation, in combination with newly announced measures by the Obama 
administration, closes loopholes and stops the use of front companies 
or financial institutions to get around international sanctions.
  Our current sanctions, and a recent European Union ban on purchasing 
Iranian oil, have already had an impact.
  In spite of the rhetoric coming out of Iran, the regime is clearly 
feeling the heat.
  Oil exports are down by 50 percent, and the Iranian currency has lost 
nearly 40 percent of its value.
  Iranian tankers full of oil are crowding the waters around Iran, 
acting as floating storage facilities for oil the rogue nation cannot 
sell.
  Over the past year, I have come to the floor many times urging 
passage of this measure.
  I am pleased we have finally completed this important work.
  There is no time to waste, as the Iranian regime continues to 
threaten our ally Israel and the national security of the United 
States.

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