[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 158 (2012), Part 8]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 10846]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  THE TUAREG REVOLT AND THE MALI COUP

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                         Friday, June 29, 2012

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, this morning, my subcommittee 
held a hearing to examine current U.S. policy and U.S. policy options 
in response to the recent military coup in Mali and the larger revolt 
of the Tuareg people in northern Mali.
  The Tuaregs have been in conflict with the central government in 
Bamako, Mali, for many years, but following the service of some Tuaregs 
as mercenaries for the late Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, the acquisition 
of more sophisticated weapons from the Libyan conflict and increasing 
ties to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, they now pose a danger not 
only to Mali, but also to Algeria, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and 
perhaps even Nigeria.
  Meanwhile, Mali, in recent years a model of African democracy, now 
finds itself struggling to resurrect democratic governance and put the 
military back in its proper role as part of government. The downfall of 
Mali's democracy could have a negative impact on the future of Mali, as 
well as the entire Sahel region of Africa.
  Amadou Toumani Toure--popularly known as ATT--led a military coup in 
1991 that created a transitional government and resulted in democratic 
elections in 1992. Mali's growing reputation for democratic rule was 
enhanced in 2002, when President Alpha Oumar Konare, having served the 
two terms permitted under the constitution, stepped down, and ATT, 
running as an independent and leveraging his reputation as Mali's 
``soldier of democracy,'' was elected president.
  Unfortunately, two issues eroded ATT's initial popularity. The first 
was a political system in which there appears to have been incentives 
for corruption. Certainly there was a growing public perception that 
the system was corrupt. The second was popular anger toward the 
government's handling of the Tuareg rebellion in the North. Weeks of 
protests at the government response to the northern rebellion dropped 
ATT's popularity to a new low.
  On March 21, mutinying Malian soldiers, displeased with the 
management of the Tuareg rebellion, attacked several locations in the 
capital, Bamako, including the presidential palace, state television, 
and military barracks. The soldiers said they had formed the National 
Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State and declared the 
following day that they had overthrown the government. This forced ATT 
into hiding.
  As a consequence of the instability following the coup, Mali's three 
largest northern cities--Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu--were overrun by the 
rebels on three consecutive days. On April 5, after the capture of the 
town of Douentza, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA) said that it had accomplished its goals and called off its 
offensive. The following day, it proclaimed independence of their 
homeland Azawad from Mali. The Islamist group Ansar al-Dine was later a 
part of the rebellion, claiming control of vast swaths of territory, 
although this control was disputed by the MNLA. On May 26, the MNLA and 
Ansar al-Dine announced that they had signed a pact to join their 
respective territories and form an Islamic state.
  Will this alliance last? Perhaps not. The MNLA is an offshoot of a 
previous nationalist political movement and is dedicated to a separate 
homeland for the Tuaregs and Moors who comprise its membership. Ansar 
al-Dine, whose name means ``Defenders of Faith,'' is an Islamist group 
believed to have links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other 
Islamist groups. Ansar al-Dine is dedicated to establishing sharia 
law--not only in Azawad, but also in the rest of Mali as well. Disputes 
between the two groups already have resulted in gunfire involving the 
supposed allies.
  As we held this hearing today, the Economic Community of West African 
States, the African Union and the United Nations were discussing the 
viability of a peacekeeping mission in Mali. Such a mission would look 
to secure and protect civilian institutions and help restructure the 
Mali military. However, it also will focus on the situation in the 
North, which will be a tremendously sensitive matter, especially if the 
mission of the peacekeeping force is to retake territory from the MNLA 
and Ansar al-Dine.
  To add further to the problematic nature of a response to the Mali 
coup and the Tuareg revolt, there is the matter of providing 
humanitarian aid to the 210,000 Malian refugees in Niger, Mauritania, 
Burkina Faso and Algeria. Another 167,000 Malians are internally 
displaced. Many of them are in remote areas and are difficult to reach 
with food and medical supplies. There is the question of how effective 
our aid efforts will be in such a challenging situation.
  But no matter how difficult this matter is to address, there are too 
many people affected for the United States to fail to provide 
leadership in the effort to solve this political-social crisis.

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