[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 158 (2012), Part 13]
[House]
[Pages 18432-18439]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules 
and pass the bill (S. 3454) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2013 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
System, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                S. 3454

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 303. Non-reimbursable details.
Sec. 304. Automated insider threat detection program.
Sec. 305. Software licensing.
Sec. 306. Strategy for security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 307. Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 
              compliance.
Sec. 308. Subcontractor notification process.
Sec. 309. Modification of reporting schedule.
Sec. 310. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.

     TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Working capital fund amendments.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 501. Homeland Security Intelligence Program.
Sec. 502. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the 
              Research and Development Programs of the United States 
              Intelligence Community.
Sec. 503. Protecting the information technology supply chain of the 
              United States.
Sec. 504. Notification regarding the authorized public disclosure of 
              national intelligence.
Sec. 505. Technical amendments related to the Office of the Director of 
              National Intelligence.
Sec. 506. Technical amendment for definition of intelligence agency.
Sec. 507. Budgetary effects.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2013 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, 
     subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as 
     of September 30, 2013, for the conduct of the intelligence 
     activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through 
     (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill S. 
     3454 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability to committees of congress.--The classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) 
     shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate 
     portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     415c);
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number of positions for fiscal 
     year 2013 authorized by the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director 
     of National Intelligence determines that such action is 
     necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
     functions, except that the number of personnel employed in 
     excess of the number authorized under such section may not, 
     for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 
     percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under 
     such section for such element.
       (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment in--
       (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
       (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described 
     in subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2013 the sum of $540,721,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2014.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 835 positions as of 
     September 30, 2013. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
     United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are

[[Page 18433]]

     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2013 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for 
     advanced research and development shall remain available 
     until September 30, 2014.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2013, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2013 the sum of $514,000,000.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 303. NON-REIMBURSABLE DETAILS.

       Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 404h-1) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``two years.'' and inserting ``three 
     years.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end ``A non-reimbursable detail made 
     under this section shall not be considered an augmentation of 
     the appropriations of the receiving element of the 
     intelligence community.''.

     SEC. 304. AUTOMATED INSIDER THREAT DETECTION PROGRAM.

       Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 112-18; 50 U.S.C. 403-1 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``October 1, 2012,'' and 
     inserting ``October 1, 2013,''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``October 1, 2013,'' and 
     inserting ``October 1, 2014,''.

     SEC. 305. SOFTWARE LICENSING.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, each chief information officer for 
     an element of the intelligence community, in consultation 
     with the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
     Community, shall--
       (1) conduct an inventory of software licenses held by such 
     element, including utilized and unutilized licenses; and
       (2) report the results of such inventory to the Chief 
     Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
       (b) Reporting to Congress.--The Chief Information Officer 
     of the Intelligence Community shall--
       (1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, provide to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a copy of each report received by the Chief 
     Information Officer under subsection (a)(2), along with any 
     comments the Chief Information Officer wishes to provide; and
       (2) transmit any portion of a report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) involving a component of a department of the 
     United States Government to the committees of the Senate and 
     of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over such 
     department simultaneously with submission of such report to 
     the congressional intelligence committees.

     SEC. 306. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.

       (a) Strategy.--The President shall develop a strategy and a 
     schedule for carrying out the requirements of section 3001(d) 
     of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(d)). Such strategy and schedule shall 
     include--
       (1) a process for accomplishing the reciprocity required 
     under such section for a security clearance issued by a 
     department or agency of the Federal Government, including 
     reciprocity for security clearances that are issued to both 
     persons who are and who are not employees of the Federal 
     Government; and
       (2) a description of the specific circumstances under which 
     a department or agency of the Federal Government may not 
     recognize a security clearance issued by another department 
     or agency of the Federal Government.
       (b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall inform Congress of the strategy and schedule developed 
     under subsection (a).

     SEC. 307. IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 
                   2010 COMPLIANCE.

       (a) Plan for Compliance.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence, the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
     the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National 
     Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the 
     National Security Agency shall each develop a corrective 
     action plan, with major milestones, that delineates how the 
     Office of the Director of National Intelligence and each such 
     Agency will achieve compliance, not later than September 30, 
     2013, with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act 
     of 2010 (Public Law 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), and the 
     amendments made by that Act.
       (2) Submission to congress.--Not later than 45 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (A) each Director referred to in paragraph (1) shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees the corrective 
     action plan required by such paragraph; and
       (B) the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
     Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and 
     the Director of the National Security Agency shall each 
     submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives the corrective action plan required by 
     paragraph (1) with respect to the applicable Agency.
       (b) Review by Inspectors General.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the 
     completion of a corrective action plan required by subsection 
     (a)(1), the Inspector General of each Agency required to 
     develop such a plan, and in the case of the Director of 
     National Intelligence, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community, shall provide to the congressional 
     intelligence committees an assessment of such plan that 
     includes--
       (A) the assessment of the Inspector General of whether such 
     Agency or Office is or is not likely to reach compliance with 
     the requirements of the Improper Payments Elimination and 
     Recovery Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), 
     and the amendments made by that Act, by September 30, 2013; 
     and
       (B) the basis of the Inspector General for such assessment.
       (2) Additional submission of reviews of certain inspectors 
     general.--Not later than 45 days after the completion of a 
     corrective action plan required by subsection (a)(1), the 
     Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
     Inspector General of the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency, and the Inspector General of the National Security 
     Agency shall each submit to the Committee on Armed Services 
     of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     House of Representatives the assessment of the applicable 
     plan provided to the congressional intelligence committees 
     under paragraph (1).

     SEC. 308. SUBCONTRACTOR NOTIFICATION PROCESS.

       Not later than October 1, 2013, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report assessing the method by which contractors 
     at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of 
     the intelligence community are granted security clearances 
     and notified of classified contracting opportunities within 
     the Federal Government and recommendations for the 
     improvement of such method. Such report shall include--
       (1) an assessment of the current method by which 
     contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an 
     element of the intelligence community are notified of 
     classified contracting opportunities;
       (2) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the 
     overall effectiveness of the ability of the intelligence 
     community to identify appropriate contractors at any tier 
     under such a contract;
       (3) an assessment of the role the existing security 
     clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability 
     of the intelligence community to notify such contractors of 
     contracting opportunities;
       (4) an assessment of the role the current security 
     clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability 
     of contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with 
     an element of the intelligence community to execute 
     classified contracts;
       (5) a description of the method used by the Director of 
     National Intelligence for assessing the effectiveness of the 
     notification process of the intelligence community to produce 
     a talented pool of subcontractors;
       (6) a description of appropriate goals, schedules, 
     milestones, or metrics used to measure the effectiveness of 
     such notification process; and
       (7) recommendations for improving such notification 
     process.

     SEC. 309. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING SCHEDULE.

       (a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--
     Section 103H(k)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 403-3h(k)(1)(A)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``January 31 and July 31'' and inserting 
     ``October 31 and April 30''; and
       (2) by striking ``December 31 (of the preceding year) and 
     June 30,'' and inserting ``September 30 and March 31,''.
       (b) Inspector General for the Central Intelligence 
     Agency.--
       (1) In general.--Section 17(d)(1) of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)) is 
     amended--

[[Page 18434]]

       (A) by striking ``January 31 and July 31'' and inserting 
     ``October 31 and April 30'';
       (B) by striking ``December 31 (of the preceding year) and 
     June 30,'' and inserting ``September 30 and March 31,''; and
       (C) by striking ``Not later than the dates each year 
     provided for the transmittal of such reports in section 507 
     of the National Security Act of 1947,'' and inserting ``Not 
     later than 30 days after the date of the receipt of such 
     reports,''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--Section 507(b) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking paragraph (1); and
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), as 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively.

     SEC. 310. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Repeal of Reporting Requirements.--
       (1) Acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass 
     destruction and advanced conventional munitions.--Section 721 
     of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 
     (50 U.S.C. 2366) is repealed.
       (2) Safety and security of russian nuclear facilities and 
     nuclear military forces.--Section 114 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended--
       (A) by striking subsections (a) and (d); and
       (B) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (a) and (b), respectively.
       (3) Intelligence community business systems budget 
     information.--Section 506D of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-6) is amended by striking subsection 
     (e).
       (4) Measures to protect the identities of covert agents.--
     Title VI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421 
     et seq.) is amended--
       (A) by striking section 603; and
       (B) by redesignating sections 604, 605, and 606 as sections 
     603, 604, and 605, respectively.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Report submission dates.--Section 507 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) in paragraph (1)--

       (I) by striking subparagraphs (A), (C), and (D);
       (II) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (E), (F), (G), 
     (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and 
     (F), respectively; and
       (III) in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``section 114(c).'' and inserting ``section 114(a).''; and

       (ii) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
       ``(2) The date for the submittal to the congressional 
     intelligence committees of the annual report on the threat of 
     attack on the United States from weapons of mass destruction 
     required by section 114(b) shall be the date each year 
     provided in subsection (c)(1)(B).'';
       (B) in subsection (c)(1)(B), by striking ``each'' and 
     inserting ``the''; and
       (C) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``an'' and 
     inserting ``the''.
       (2) Table of contents of the national security act of 
     1947.--The table of contents in the first section of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the 
     items relating to sections 603, 604, 605, and 606 and 
     inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 603. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
``Sec. 604. Providing information to Congress.
``Sec. 605. Definitions.''.

     TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. WORKING CAPITAL FUND AMENDMENTS.

       Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended as follows:
       (1) In subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``program.'' and 
     inserting ``program; and''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) authorize such providers to make known their services 
     to the entities specified in section (a) through Government 
     communication channels.''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) The authority in paragraph (1)(D) does not include 
     the authority to distribute gifts or promotional items.''; 
     and
       (2) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (2)(E), by striking ``from the sale or 
     exchange of equipment or property of a central service 
     provider'' and inserting ``from the sale or exchange of 
     equipment, recyclable materials, or property of a central 
     service provider.''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection (f)(2)'' 
     and inserting ``subsections (b)(1)(D) and (f)(2)''.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 501. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       There is established within the Department of Homeland 
     Security a Homeland Security Intelligence Program. The 
     Homeland Security Intelligence Program constitutes the 
     intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Analysis of the Department that serve predominantly 
     departmental missions.

     SEC. 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF 
                   THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is 
     amended by striking ``Not later than one year after the date 
     on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant 
     to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2010,'' and inserting ``Not later than March 
     31, 2013,''.

     SEC. 503. PROTECTING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY CHAIN 
                   OF THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report that--
       (1) identifies foreign suppliers of information technology 
     (including equipment, software, and services) that are linked 
     directly or indirectly to a foreign government, including--
       (A) by ties to the military forces of a foreign government;
       (B) by ties to the intelligence services of a foreign 
     government; or
       (C) by being the beneficiaries of significant low interest 
     or no interest loans, loan forgiveness, or other support by a 
     foreign government; and
       (2) assesses the vulnerability to malicious activity, 
     including cyber crime or espionage, of the telecommunications 
     networks of the United States due to the presence of 
     technology produced by suppliers identified under paragraph 
     (1).
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Telecommunications Networks of the United States 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``telecommunications 
     networks of the United States'' includes--
       (1) telephone systems;
       (2) Internet systems;
       (3) fiber optic lines, including cable landings;
       (4) computer networks; and
       (5) smart grid technology under development by the 
     Department of Energy.

     SEC. 504. NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE AUTHORIZED PUBLIC 
                   DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Notification.--In the event of an authorized disclosure 
     of national intelligence or intelligence related to national 
     security to the persons or entities described in subsection 
     (b), the government official responsible for authorizing the 
     disclosure shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees on a timely basis a notification of the disclosure 
     if--
       (1) at the time of the disclosure--
       (A) such intelligence is classified; or
       (B) is declassified for the purpose of the disclosure; and
       (2) the disclosure will be made by an officer, employee, or 
     contractor of the Executive branch.
       (b) Persons or Entities Described.--The persons or entities 
     described in this subsection are as follows:
       (1) Media personnel.
       (2) Any person or entity, if the disclosure described in 
     subsection (a) is made with the intent or knowledge that such 
     information will be made publicly available.
       (c) Content.--Each notification required under subsection 
     (a) shall--
       (1) provide the specific title and authority of the 
     individual authorizing the disclosure;
       (2) if applicable, provide the specific title and authority 
     of the individual who authorized the declassification of the 
     intelligence disclosed; and
       (3) describe the intelligence disclosed, including the 
     classification of the intelligence prior to its disclosure or 
     declassification and the rationale for making the disclosure.
       (d) Exception.--The notification requirement in this 
     section does not apply to a disclosure made--
       (1) pursuant to any statutory requirement, including to 
     section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred 
     to as the ``Freedom of Information Act'');
       (2) in connection with a civil, criminal, or administrative 
     proceeding;
       (3) as a result of a declassification review process under 
     Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) or any successor 
     order; or
       (4) to any officer, employee, or contractor of the Federal 
     government or member of an advisory committee to an element 
     of the intelligence community who possesses an active 
     security clearance and a need to know the specific national 
     intelligence or intelligence related to national security, as 
     defined in section 3(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)).
       (e) Sunset.--The notification requirements of this section 
     shall cease to be effective for any disclosure described in 
     subsection (a) that occurs on or after the date that is one 
     year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE OFFICE OF THE 
                   DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Personnel Practices.--Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, 
     United States Code, is

[[Page 18435]]

     amended by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
       ``(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
     National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National 
     Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and
       ``(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency 
     or unit thereof the principal function of which is the 
     conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
     activities, provided that the determination be made prior to 
     a personnel action; or''.
       (b) Senior Executive Service.--Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of 
     title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``the 
     Office of the Director of National Intelligence,'' after 
     ``the Central Intelligence Agency,''.

     SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT FOR DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY.

       Section 606(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 426) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(5) The term `intelligence agency' means the elements of 
     the intelligence community, as that term is defined in 
     section 3(4).''.

     SEC. 507. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

       The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 
     complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall 
     be determined by reference to the latest statement titled 
     ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act, 
     submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the 
     Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such 
     statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Ruppersberger) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend 
their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill before us 
today.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here on New Year's 
Eve.
  I first wish to make an announcement with respect to the availability 
of the classified annex to the bill under consideration for the Members 
of the House. This is to reinforce a previous announcement I made to 
Members last evening.
  Madam Speaker, the classified Schedule of Authorizations and the 
classified annex accompanying the bill remain available for review by 
Members at the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence in room HVC-304 of the Capitol Visitor Center. The 
committee office will be open during regular business hours for the 
convenience of any Member who wishes to review this material prior to 
its consideration by the House.
  I recommend that Members wishing to review the classified annex 
contact the committee's director of security to arrange a time and date 
for that viewing. This will assure the availability of committee staff 
to assist Members who desire assistance during their review of these 
classified documents.
  Madam Speaker, I am pleased that the House is considering this 
intelligence authorization bill today, the last day of the year. If 
passed and enacted, this will be our third intelligence authorization 
bill since I assumed the chairmanship and my friend the gentleman from 
Maryland became the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee.
  In May, the House overwhelmingly passed, by a vote of 386-28, an 
intelligence authorization bill which is the same product as the bill 
that is before us today. I appreciate the ranking member's hard work on 
this year's bill and that of our colleagues in the Senate to achieve a 
bipartisan result between the two Chambers.

                              {time}  1030

  This is indeed a rare occurrence in this town these days, but this is 
truly a bipartisan, bicameral product that moves forward when it comes 
to protecting the United States and putting us in the best national 
security posture we could imagine.
  The intelligence authorization bill is vital to ensuring that our 
intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities they need to 
do their important work. The intelligence community plays a critical 
role in the war on terrorism and securing the country from the many 
threats that we face.
  The annual authorization bill, which funds U.S. intelligence 
activities spanning 17 agencies, is also a vital tool for congressional 
oversight of the intelligence community's classified activities. 
Effective and aggressive congressional oversight is essential to 
ensuring the continued success of our intelligence community, and 
therefore the safety of all citizens of the United States. The current 
challenging fiscal environment demands the accountability and financial 
oversight of our classified intelligence programs that can only come 
with an intelligence authorization bill.
  The FY 2013 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and 
provides for the development of future capabilities, all while 
achieving significant savings and ensuring intelligence agencies are 
being good stewards of our taxpayers' money.
  This year, the bill is significantly below last year's enacted budget 
but up modestly from the President's roughly $72 billion budget request 
for fiscal year 2013. It is also in line with the House budget 
resolution, which provides for a modest increase of defense activities 
above the President's budget.
  The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance 
on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly but important 
programs. The bill funds requirements of the men and women of the 
intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom 
directly support the war zones and are engaged in other dangerous 
operations designed to keep Americans safe.
  It provides oversight and authorization for vital intelligence 
activities, including the global counterwar on terrorism and efforts by 
the National Security Agency to defend us from advanced foreign state-
sponsored cyberthreats. And I can't tell you enough, Madam Speaker, how 
in this Chamber we have acted to stand up in the face of a growing 
cyberthreat not only to government networks but to private networks as 
well. We have, in a bipartisan way, given the first step on how we 
stand up our defenses here in the United States to protect us from 
nation-states like China and Russia--and now Iran--who seek to do us 
harm using the Internet. We will again aggressively pursue next year, 
with the help of my ranking member, actions needed, I believe, to 
protect the United States against what is the largest threat we face 
that we are not prepared to handle, and that is the growing threat of 
cyberattack and cyberespionage.
  Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also a 
critical, important mission of our intelligence community, and we made 
sure the resources were available to that end, as well as for global 
monitoring of foreign militaries and advanced weapons systems and 
tests, and for research and development of new technology to maintain 
our intelligence agencies' technological edge.
  And like the House-passed bill, this bill promotes operating 
efficiencies in a number of areas, particularly in information 
technology, the ground processing of satellite data, and the 
procurement and operation of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance platforms. The bill holds personnel levels, one of the 
first and biggest cost drivers, generally at last year's levels. Even 
so, the bill adds a limited number of new personnel positions for 
select, high-priority positions, such as FBI surveillance officers to 
keep watch on terrorists, and personnel for certain other programs that 
will increase cooperation and training with our foreign partners in the 
critically important role for our intelligence agencies as we move to 
protect ourselves from threats all around the world.
  The bill authorizes increased funding for intelligence collection 
programs, including increased counterintelligence to thwart foreign 
spies. It also increases funding for our intelligence

[[Page 18436]]

community's comparative advantage--cutting-edge research and 
development. This is an incredibly important investment for the United 
States. If we are going to continue to lead in the ability to detect 
before they can do harm to the United States, we have to make the 
investment in research and development of high-end technological 
advancement.
  While I cannot get into the specifics of a lot of these programs, 
it's important to mention them as we are going through the process each 
year in conducting oversight of intelligence activities and making 
funding recommendations that will help the community meet its mission 
in the most effective, fiscally responsible way.
  The bipartisan fiscal year 2013 intelligence authorization bill we 
are considering today preserves and advances national security and is 
also fiscally responsible. The secrecy that is a necessary part of this 
country's intelligence work requires that the congressional 
Intelligence Committees conduct strong and effective oversight on 
behalf of the American people and even our colleagues here in the 
House. That strong and effective oversight is impossible, however, 
without the advancement of these bills.
  I want to thank all of the members of the committee for their 
bipartisan effort to find agreement on a bill that saves money and 
moves forward smartly on protecting the interests of national security 
for the United States. I want to thank both of the staffs for working 
together to produce this bill. This truly is a collaborative effort 
both from staff and Members in this Chamber and in the Senate, proving 
that you can work in a bipartisan way to accomplish the best interests 
of the United States and, in this case, particularly when it comes to 
national security.
  One final note: I want to congratulate Mrs. Myrick on her years of 
great service to the Intelligence Committee. She will be leaving us 
this year. This will be her last authorization bill that she will 
participate in. I am pleased to see that a provision she championed in 
May concerning the protection of the United States information 
technology supply chain is included in this bill. She has done great 
work in her time with the committee, and she certainly will be missed. 
She has been a true champion of the national security interests of this 
country. She is a great friend of mine, and I wish her well in her new 
endeavors.
  I thank all who participated. I also want to take this opportunity to 
thank my chief counsel for celebrating his birthday today on the House 
floor with us on New Year's Eve day. I appreciate that very much.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I 
may consume.
  Before us today is the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2013. It's a good, bipartisan bill that gives our intelligence 
professionals the resources, capabilities, and authorities they need to 
keep us safe. And I also want to acknowledge the leadership of Chairman 
Rogers. His bipartisan leadership has helped us make the Intelligence 
Committee a committee that provides oversight to our intelligence 
agencies and gives them the resources that they need to protect our 
country. I also want to acknowledge the staff on both sides of the 
aisle who worked very closely to put this bill together.
  When Chairman Rogers and I took over leadership of the Intelligence 
Committee, we made a commitment to bipartisanship. We believe politics 
has no place in national security. The stakes are just too high. We 
also made a commitment to passing intelligence budgets that provide 
oversight to the intelligence community and give it important financial 
direction. Chairman Rogers and I also work closely with Chairwoman 
Dianne Feinstein and vice chair Saxby Chambliss of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, our counterparts in the Senate, so we can get 
things done.
  If this bill becomes law, it will be the third budget bill in a row 
passed since we took over leadership in January, 2011--a big change 
from the previous 6 years when we only passed one budget bill. This was 
an open, bipartisan process where we reached agreement on issues that 
will make this country safer and intelligence processes more efficient.
  We know we are facing tough economic times. This budget is slightly 
below the enacted levels of FY 2012. We made cuts where appropriate, 
eliminated redundancies, and pushed programs to come in on time and on 
budget.
  People ask me what keeps me up at night. Besides spicy food, I say 
weapons of mass destruction and a catastrophic cyberattack that shuts 
down our banking system, water supply, power grids or worse.
  This bill continues a substantial investment in cybersecurity that 
must be made to keep up with the cyberthreats of today and tomorrow. We 
also believe we must protect privacy and civil liberties when it comes 
to cybersecurity.
  Another priority is space. The bill promotes the commercial space 
industry by enhancing the government use of commercial imagery and 
commercial communications services. It requires the government to use 
commercial imagery to the maximum extent practicable.
  I believe competition is important to ensure we get high quality 
products while keeping costs down. It drives innovation and provides a 
much-needed insurance policy in case there are problems with other 
programs. And it does create jobs.
  The bill expanded our counterterrorism efforts to continue the fight 
against al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world. The bill also 
makes counterintelligence the priority it is. It makes strategic 
additions across the intelligence community. This will pay for 
surveillance, better supply chain security, and the counterintelligence 
analysts we need.
  The bill added resources to the intelligence community's global 
coverage initiatives to ensure the United States is capable and ready 
to address threats from any location around the world, especially in 
areas of strategic interest.

                              {time}  1040

  It authorizes the Department of Defense's new defense clandestine 
service to reorganize its human intelligence collection. It will be a 
part of the CIA's national clandestine service. The bill directed the 
Director of national intelligence to develop a centralized cloud for 
the entire intelligence community; advancing collaboration and further 
promoting efficiency; and it required the President to develop a 
strategy for security clearance, reciprocity, and a report on how to 
better protect our information technology across the global supply 
chain.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for FY 2012. When this bill was before the House in May, it passed by a 
bipartisan margin of 386-28. It's a good bipartisan bill that gives our 
intelligence professionals what they need to do their jobs and protect 
our Nation.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I inquire if the minority side 
has a list of speakers.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. At this time, we have one speaker. We're waiting 
for more; but if they don't come, we'll move on.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Then I will continue to reserve the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
Congressman from Ohio, Dennis Kucinich.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I thank my friend. And I want to thank both my friends, 
the chair and the ranking member, for the work that they do on 
intelligence. You make a commitment to this country, and I think the 
country is in good hands because of your work.
  I want to raise a question--and we've had some of these conversations 
between ourselves. I'm very concerned about the shift that's occurred 
in our national security policy where the Central Intelligence Agency 
has increasingly played a very powerful paramilitary role with the 
execution of drone strikes. Numerous studies have indicated that there 
are many innocent

[[Page 18437]]

civilians being killed by drone strikes. There's a lack of 
accountability here. There have been studies that suggest, for example 
in Yemen, that drone strikes are stirring up anti-American sentiment to 
the point where al Qaeda is actually being empowered.
  We really have to ask of the CIA, but even more than that, of our 
entire national security infrastructure, What's the game plan here? We 
see there have been changes in military policy where certain functions 
have been ceded to the CIA. We see changes in foreign policy where the 
State Department has let go of some of its functions. We know that the 
military has made an attempt with the Defense Intelligence Agency to 
try to become more actively involved as a separate organization. They 
were seeking 1,600 new spies.
  We have this architecture of national security which is so powerful, 
but I'm not sure that it's actually that effective. I don't question 
the effectiveness of our chair or our ranking member, but I do question 
the effectiveness of what we're doing.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I do question the effectiveness of this drone program, 
its adherence to international law or lack thereof, the intel gathering 
on targeted killings where we've seen reports of efforts of one group 
to target individuals and other groups as a way of trying to settle 
some scores between people so they put them up as a potential terrorist 
and they get marked on a list and executed. And as I mentioned earlier, 
the concern about civilian deaths.
  I think that the Central Intelligence Agency functions best in 
gathering intelligence, and we ought to support them in that regard. I 
was very concerned and expressed this on the floor about what happened 
in Benghazi. If we'd paid more attention to the CIA, we probably would 
still have some of our officials there alive. But that's gone and it's 
over. We have to recognize that putting the CIA more and more into a 
paramilitary position is not in the best interest of this country, I 
don't believe.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The gentleman and I have had these conversations, and I respect his 
position greatly and the work he does in Congress.
  I have some disagreements, and I'll tell you why--and I hope that the 
gentleman will consider voting for this bill today. The amount of 
oversight that the ranking member and I have increased on programs that 
may have concerns on behalf of Americans, because we have the same 
concerns. There are tools that America engages in, including air 
strikes. Air strikes have been something that we have used since we 
could figure out how to get something off the ground and throw 
something at the ground. They have been used as a tool. It's not a 
policy of the United States; it's a tool of the United States to make 
America safe.
  The amount of oversight that happens--and I will tell you this: if 
there is any air strike conducted that involves an enemy combatant of 
the United States outside the theater of direct combat, it gets 
reviewed by this committee. I am talking about every single one. That's 
an important thing. There are very strict reviews put on all of this 
material. There are very strict guidelines about how these air strikes 
may or may not occur, because we have that same feeling. If people lose 
faith in the ability of our intelligence services to do their work, 
then they will be ineffective, and, therefore, we will be less safe.
  Our argument has been we want that oversight, we want aggressive 
oversight, and we want thorough review. I can tell you--and I think 
you'd be proud--of the very work that we do on the committee to that 
end. We never really did covert-action reviews, except for 
sporadically. Now we do regularly, quarterly, and monthly covert-action 
reviews on this committee to make sure that we get it right, that they 
get it right.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I would be honored to yield to the gentleman 
from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I have no question about the commitment of the chair 
and the ranking member to proper oversight, but what I do question is 
that the proliferation of the drone strikes puts such an extraordinary 
burden on our own oversight capacities. I'm wondering, looking 
retrospectively at the number of civilian casualties that have 
occurred, the oversight--there's a decoupling of the oversight capacity 
from the consequences of the strikes, and that's the point that I'm 
making here.
  I would ask my friend going forward for the committee to be ever more 
vigilant on--if you're for these strikes and you are conducting the 
oversight, look at the consequences of civilian casualties to raise 
questions about the information that's being given you. That's the 
point that I'm making.
  With that, I thank my friend for yielding.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I appreciate that, and I reclaim my time.
  I think this is very important. Again, I personally review and the 
committee reviews the material that comes to these committees.
  There are many in the world who have political agendas about civilian 
casualties. I can tell you to rest assured that that is a point of 
review for any activity--I'm talking about any activity--that our 
intelligence community may or may not engage in. I think that you would 
be shocked and stunned how wrong those public reports are about 
civilian casualties, and I say that with all seriousness and with the 
very thought that every one of these events is reviewed.
  If there is an air strike used as a technique anywhere in the world 
to keep America safe, it is reviewed if it comes within the purview of 
the intelligence community, both military and civilian, on this 
committee. Those reports are wrong. They are not just wrong; they are 
wildly wrong. And I do believe people use those reports for their own 
political purposes outside of the country to try to put pressure on the 
United States.

                              {time}  1050

  Mr. KUCINICH. If I may, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. What I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to present to 
you and the ranking member reports that have been forwarded to me 
regarding these casualties. Maybe these are reports that you've seen, 
and maybe they aren't; but I certainly think that in the interest of 
acquitting our country's efforts that we make sure that every effort is 
made to avoid civilian casualties. So I will present those to you and 
the ranking member in the next few days, and I want to thank you for 
giving me this opportunity.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. In reclaiming my time, I just want to assure 
the gentleman that every one of these is reviewed, and rest assured 
that the public reports about civilian casualties are not just a little 
bit wrong; they are wildly wrong.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First, I do want to acknowledge the work that has been done by Dennis 
Kucinich as a Member of Congress. Dennis and I don't always 
philosophically agree, but I respect that he has a good point of view. 
That's the whole process here in Congress--that we have different 
points of view, that we come together, that we debate, and that we can 
make decisions.
  So, Dennis, we are going to miss you. Good luck to you and your 
family in the future, and I'm glad that one of the last things you're 
going to do is come here and talk about our bill today.
  In just acknowledging what the chairman said, there is an aggressive 
legal process that is undertaken as far as drones are concerned that 
goes to the highest levels of our government before strikes are taken. 
In everything that I have reviewed, if there are children or innocent 
victims there, the strike does not take place. So there is

[[Page 18438]]

a process. Unfortunately, there are some casualties--very minor. I 
would also agree with the chairman as far as this is concerned: in that 
what you read in the media is usually not what the facts are.
  It is part of what we do. Why do we have the Intelligence Committee? 
We have it because there is classified information that if it got out 
would hurt the national security of our country. It's part of our role 
and our committee's role to take this classified information and work 
with the agencies to which we provide oversight so we will continue to 
work through that process.
  Mr. Kucinich, I'm glad that you did raise that as an issue, as we all 
should.
  Madam Speaker, for the third time in 3 years, Chairman Rogers and I 
have stood on the floor of the House encouraging our colleagues to 
support our intelligence budget bill. Today, we both rise in support of 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. The bill gives 
our intelligence professionals the resources, capabilities, and 
authorities they need to protect America and American interests.
  We crafted a bill that addresses our core needs, including space, 
cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. We are also 
keeping an eye on the bottom line. The bill is slightly below last 
year's budget and holds personnel at last year's levels. In a very 
strong bipartisan way, the Intelligence Committee came together as 
Democrats and Republicans to do what is right for our country and for 
the intelligence community.
  I thank the staff again for what it has done, and I thank the 
chairman for his leadership in helping to provide this bill in a very 
fair, bipartisan way.
  I would also like to acknowledge two Democratic Members who will be 
leaving us at the end of this session--Congressman Dan Boren of 
Oklahoma and Congressman Ben Chandler of Kentucky. Both Members will be 
greatly missed, and I appreciate their service on the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for FY 2013, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, may I inquire as to how much 
time is remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 5\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Again, I want to thank my ranking member and both staffs on the 
Intelligence Committee for the long hours, hard work and thorough, 
detailed work on the budgets and on the classified annex of this 
report.
  I think it should alleviate many of the good concerns of Mr. Kucinich 
and others who are concerned about these activities. I think it's 
important to reiterate that we have the same concerns, which is why we 
are so thorough and why we have joined together in a bipartisan way to 
increase the level of congressional oversight and to increase our 
impact and influence on the policies of the intelligence community in 
order to make sure it conforms with what this body and what I think the 
United States of America wants and needs in its intelligence services.
  We have now done, as I said before, regularly scheduled covert 
action, which, I think, should rest assured Americans that it is 
serious, thoughtful and thorough oversight. For counterintelligence 
activities, we now have regularly scheduled oversight. Every department 
is required to proffer its budget request, and we go over it line by 
line, dollar by dollar, policy by policy to make sure it conforms with 
the concerns of everyone in this body.
  As I said before, these are very brave Americans who are serving in 
really tough neighborhoods all over the world--trying to collect 
information, trying to take actionable intelligence to a point that it 
protects us from harm here at home. They deserve our respect, our 
encouragement, our high-five and pat on the back when they come home. 
They want thorough oversight. You wouldn't believe it, but they do. 
They want to know that the work that they're doing would make America 
proud for them risking their lives and being away from their families 
and putting it all on the line to keep America safe.
  That's why we agreed to do this in a bipartisan way and to be so 
thorough in its congressional oversight, because without that--without 
that confidence, without that faith of the American people that they're 
doing something on behalf of this great Nation--they will lose their 
ability to do what they do, and they will lose the courage and 
confidence that they need to do it in the right way. So that's what 
this bill reflects.
  I understand your concerns. I look forward to our further 
conversations on this; and in further conversations, I'd like to have 
the opportunity, if we can arrange this, to give you some examples--a 
peek behind the curtain as to exactly what goes on in the processes of 
making sure that we keep the good people safe and that the bad guys are 
brought to justice. I think you'd be proud of that work. This bill 
reflects that.
  Again, thanks to the ranking member and to the staffs and to the 
members on both sides of this committee. Thanks to Senator Feinstein 
and to Senator Saxby Chambliss for their help in putting this bill 
together.
  I hope we'll get a large show of support with a strong vote of 
bipartisanship for the men and women who are serving at our 
intelligence posts all around the world today. Let's send this to the 
President so we can go about the business of keeping America safe and 
maybe even look at some other details that the Speaker may have 
interest in dealing with today.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, today, I voted against the Fiscal Year 
2013 Intelligence Authorization Act. Despite keeping funding levels 
flat and capping personnel levels to that of Fiscal Year 2012, this 
authorization is not significantly different than the earlier version I 
voted against in May.
  It is another missed opportunity to make significant, smart 
reductions in our intelligence infrastructure, at a time when we're 
asking so many others to make significant budgetary sacrifices in the 
midst of austerity. This legislation continues to spend way too much 
money--$72 to $78 billion a year--with little transparency or efforts 
to reduce the sprawling intelligence community and protect privacy 
rights.
  It's of paramount importance to keep our country safe, and that's 
exactly what our intelligence community has done, but we cannot afford 
to spend as much on intelligence as Russia does on its entire military 
budget or employ hundreds of thousands of people with secret clearance.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Speaker, I regret that this bill, like so many of its 
predecessors over the past several years, does nothing to address some 
the urgent need for real reform in our intelligence community.
  I am particularly troubled by the failure of this bill to address the 
deepening militarization of the Central Intelligence Agency, a process 
that began long ago but that has accelerated dramatically in the post-
9/11 era.
  Throughout most of its history, the CIA has--at the direction of 
successive presidents--veered between two organizational paths. The 
first, and the proper one, is for the CIA to do what President Truman 
intended when he created it: to collect information about the world 
around us, synthesize and analyze that data, and provide it to the 
executive and the legislature for their information and action, as 
appropriate. The other path--the one that has caused the CIA and our 
Nation so much grief--is the path of militarized covert, and not-so-
covert, action.
  Today, it is manifested in a quasi-publicly acknowledged CIA 
assassination-by-drone campaign on which the Administration has refused 
to provide information, despite my own request and the request of many 
other House and Senate members for the information. In the previous 
decade, we saw what happened when lines of responsibility and 
accountability for secret programs were fuzzy or not observed. The 
result was a detainee and interrogation program that was a national 
embarrassment morally, and an albatross politically with our allies 
around the world. The not-so-covert ``drone wars'' are on a similar 
glide path, and this bill does nothing to provide a much-needed course 
correction for the policy.
  This state of affairs is all the more regrettable because there are 
many dedicated professionals working in the CIA and elsewhere in our 
intelligence community who are forced to implement these questionable 
programs

[[Page 18439]]

and policies. Some would agree with me that the entire enterprise is 
out of control and would benefit from much more focused and effective 
Congressional oversight. If this bill contained whistleblower 
protections for intelligence community employees, some of those 
individuals might well step forward to report what they know, and what 
they believe needs to be changed. But this bill contains no such 
protections, ensuring that the chilling threat of job retaliation 
remains in place. We will not restore true accountability and oversight 
over the intelligence community until such reforms are enacted, and 
which are absent from this bill. Accordingly, I cannot support it.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, S. 3454.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I object to the vote on the 
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
quorum is not present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

                          ____________________