[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 158 (2012), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16300-16301]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  MALI

  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I rise today to address a challenging 
situation in Mali. Mali is a west African country, a country of nearly 
\1/2\ million square miles, a vast country that stretches from the 
Sahara Desert to the Niger River area and is home to roughly 15 million 
people. Yet it is not at the top of the list of concerns for many 
Americans.
  This spring, back in March, a rogue element in Mali's security forces 
launched a coup and forcefully overthrew a longstanding, democratically 
elected government in the nation of Mali, our ally. This may seem 
inconsequential to the average American, but it could have big 
implications for our security, as well that of our regional and global 
allies, because in the power vacuum created in that spring coup, al-
Qaida saw an opportunity, and they stepped in. Three different 
extremist groups, all linked to or controlled by al-Qaida in the 
Islamic Mahgreb, or AQIM, now control an area the size of Texas in the 
northern part of Mali. They succeeded in fracturing a formerly stable 
democracy and contributing to broad security, political, and 
humanitarian crises that I believe have grave implications for the 
Sahel region and for America's interests. To put it simply, this 
matters.
  Mali, a relatively strong democracy for more than two decades and an 
ally to the United States, is now embroiled in turmoil. The United 
States, in partnership with the international community, must show 
leadership in helping it rebuild its democracy and restore its 
territorial integrity by reclaiming northern Mali from terrorists and 
extremists. So this morning, as the chair of the African Affairs 
Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, I chaired a hearing to 
assess the developments and the path forward for U.S. policy in Mali.
  What I heard from our experts, from the Department of Defense, from 
the State Department, from the USAID, as well as a range of outside 
experts and one witness who testified from Bamako, the capital of Mali, 
was of real concern to me.
  Northern Mali today is the largest terrorist-controlled area in the 
world. In the north, extremists have imposed a harsh and strict version 
of Sharia or Islamic law and committed gross violations of human 
rights. Many folks have heard of Timbuktu but don't know that it is an 
ancient city in northern Mali, a site where these Islamic extremists 
have behaved much as the Taliban did in Afghanistan before 9/11. They 
destroyed sacred religious and historic artifacts in Timbuktu, imposing 
a harsh version of Sharia that has meant amputations, stonings, 
violations of women's rights of free speech, religious exercise of 
rights, fundamentally changing the tolerance and exclusive history of 
Mali.
  This created a humanitarian crisis as more than 400,000 Malians have 
fled, either internally displaced within Mali or going into neighboring 
countries as refugees.
  With growing ties between these terrorists and Nigeria, Libya, and 
throughout the region, AQIM, we believe, may now use its safe haven in 
northern Mali to plan for regional or transnational terrorist attacks. 
Just as we should not have ignored developments in Afghanistan, which 
seemed a remote and troubled country when the Taliban took it over more 
than a dozen years ago, so too we would ignore the chaos in northern 
Mali at our peril.
  In fact, Secretary Clinton has said that Mali has now become a powder 
keg of potential instability in the region and beyond. The top American 
military commander in Africa, GEN Carter Ham, said publicly just this 
week that al-Qaida is operating terrorist camps in northern Mali and is 
providing arms, explosives, and financing to other terrorist groups in 
the region. So I believe it is critical that the United States has a 
strong and comprehensive policy to deal with this threat.

[[Page 16301]]

  I am concerned that the current U.S. approach may not be forward 
leaning enough to address all three crises--security, political, and 
humanitarian--in a coordinated, comprehensive, and effective way at the 
same time. Given the compelling U.S. interest in stability, security, 
and good governance in Mali, we must ensure that we don't miss the 
bigger picture of what this situation means for the future of Mali, to 
our allies, and to our security.
  The U.N. Security Council is now considering what they call a concept 
of operations for an African-led military operation. The United States 
can and should play a more active role in supporting this and 
preventing the country from becoming a permanent home for extremists 
and a safe haven for terrorists.
  An active role does not mean putting American boots on the ground. 
Instead, we can provide operational support for a regionally led, 
multilateral, African-led force being organized by ECOWAS, the Economic 
Community of West African States, and the African Union. In the weeks 
ahead the U.N. Security Council will likely vote on a resolution 
authorizing this coalition to lead a military intervention to dislodge 
the terrorists in the north. We have seen models like this work in Cote 
d'Ivoire and Somalia, so there is reason to believe in the potential of 
a regional military solution to the security crisis in the north.
  However, even if this intervention works, it will take time to train, 
equip, and assemble the regional force and to develop the appropriate 
plans for what happens during and after a military intervention. 
Frankly, Mr. President, security and stability can't be restored to 
Mali with military action alone. The current crisis is as much about 
governance as it is about security. A stronger Malian democracy is the 
best way to ensure security and societal gains in the short term and 
the long term, but democracy doesn't just begin or end with an 
election.
  One of the reasons Mali's democracy crumbled so quickly was that 
Malians didn't feel connected to, represented, or well served by their 
government. Voter turnout in the last few elections was lower and 
lower, with the government viewed as corrupt, social services not 
benefiting the relatively sparsely populated north, and institutions 
nationwide that were weak.
  The political and security challenges in Mali are two sides of the 
same coin; they are not separate issues. I will urge that we break down 
silos between departments and agencies in our government and take a 
comprehensive view.
  If we focus on the political only and insist on Mali moving forward 
briskly with an election even when the security situation will prevent 
most northern Malians from meaningfully participating, I think we risk 
unintentionally strengthening the hands of those who want to ensure 
that Mali's regional divide is permanent and hand a symbolic victory to 
al-Qaida.
  On the other hand, if we rush forward with a security solution, with 
a regional military intervention before it is adequately planned, 
before they are responsibly trained and equipped, we risk defeat on 
that front as well.
  I think we can and should do better. We can work closely with our 
allies, with regional partners in the international community to 
address all the security, political, and humanitarian crises unfolding 
in Mali. Effective, inclusive elections early next year should be one 
goal but not the only one. We also have to address the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis of the 400,0000 displaced persons and refugees, the 
more than 4.5 million people in need of emergency food aid in the 
region, and the security crisis of terrorists controlling an area this 
large.
  To bring long-term peace and stability to Mali and to ensure northern 
Mali doesn't slide into being the base of operations for the next al-
Qaida attack on our allies, our interests abroad, or even the United 
States, we can't afford to ignore any of the pieces of this complex 
puzzle. The United States simply cannot afford, despite the many 
distractions and other priorities facing us, to ignore Mali.
  I pledge to work in close partnership with my colleagues in the 
Senate and with my friends on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to 
ensure an effective engagement by the United States in this important 
area.
  I yield the floor.

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