[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 158 (2012), Part 10]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 13442-13443]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




            THE FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY ACT (H.R. 459)

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN

                              of maryland

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, August 2, 2012

  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, the Federal Reserve is by charter and 
design an independent central bank. At the same time, because ours is a 
system of checks and balances, the Federal Reserve's operations are 
governed by congressional mandate and subject to strict accountability 
and oversight.
  Specifically, the Federal Reserve has for many years been audited by 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as independent, 
third-party firms. Additionally, pursuant to the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve testifies before both chambers of 
Congress twice a year. Minutes of the Federal Reserve's Open Market 
Committee are made public 6 weeks after its meetings occur, and the Fed 
publishes updated balance sheets on its website weekly. Moreover, the 
recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform law further enhanced the 
Federal Reserve's transparency by expanding the types of audits GAO 
must conduct and by mandating disclosure of transactions at the Federal 
Reserve's discount window.
  In light of these facts, the issue in H.R. 459 is not whether the Fed 
should be audited. It already is. Instead, what is at issue in this 
legislation is whether the Fed's internal deliberations concerning the 
formation of monetary policy should be made public. This is the 
equivalent of asking whether Supreme Court justices' pre-decisional 
debate should be made public--and it is a bad idea for the same reason. 
It would have a predictably counterproductive and chilling effect on 
that debate and ultimately undermine the Fed's independence. Time and 
time again, history has shown that central banks whose decision-making 
falls under the influence of short-term

[[Page 13443]]

political considerations quickly lose all credibility with the public 
and with the credit markets. This cannot be allowed to happen.
  It's ironic that most, if not all, of the information proponents of 
this legislation cite to justify its enactment is in the public domain 
because of the transparency measures that are already in place. Indeed, 
many advocates of H.R. 459 are avowedly less interested in striking the 
right balance between independence and accountability at the Federal 
Reserve than they are in abolishing the Federal Reserve altogether--or 
in ending the Federal Reserve's dual mandate to achieve both stable 
prices and maximum employment.
  I am in neither camp. I support an independent Federal Reserve 
pursuing its congressionally directed dual mandate, subject to strict 
oversight and accountability--and that is why I oppose this bill.

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