[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 158 (2012), Part 1]
[House]
[Pages 1134-1137]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  AFGHANISTAN: AMERICA NEEDS THE TRUTH

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern) for 5 minutes.
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, Congress and the American people need to 
hear the truth about Afghanistan. It is impossible for us to make 
thoughtful, rational decisions on policy if we do not receive straight, 
accurate information about the situation on the ground. And we have no 
right to keep our brave service men and women in harm's way day after 
day, week after week, based on a steady diet of rosy statements that 
tell us everything is going well, progress is being made, conditions 
are improving, and victory is at hand.
  On January 18, I had the privilege of sitting down with U.S. Army 
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis for a special briefing on his 
assessment of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. He had 
recently submitted reports in both classified and unclassified versions 
to his superiors at the Pentagon. I was joined at that briefing by my 
colleagues Congressman Walter Jones and John Garamendi, and we were not 
only impressed with Lieutenant Colonel Davis' character, but the 
information and analysis he shared with us. Simply put, the situation 
in Afghanistan does not reflect the optimistic statements we repeatedly 
hear from high military officials and commanders on a regular basis.
  This week, a great deal of what Lieutenant Colonel Davis told us has 
appeared in the media in an article he wrote for the Armed Forces 
Journal, the Nation's oldest independent military magazine, and in The 
New York Times.
  Lieutenant Colonel Davis talks about the difficulties of training the 
Afghan police and military, the challenges facing our own troops to 
establish sustainable security zones, the rampant corruption, and the 
great discrepancy between the military's positive public statements and 
the classified material that contradicts such claims.
  The briefing with Danny Davis comes close on the heels of a number of 
articles that appeared toward the end of last year about the more 
pessimistic conclusions found in the most recent National Intelligence 
Estimate on Afghanistan.
  According to the press, the current NIE on Afghanistan recognizes 
that U.S. policy has not achieved the objectives outlined by the 
President; that instead it casts doubt on official assertions of 
progress made by the U.S. Government and military leaders. No one likes 
to hear bad news, Mr. Speaker, but we do need to hear the unvarnished 
truth. We need accurate information in order to get a genuine 
understanding of what the situation is like on the ground in 
Afghanistan. We need to know the very real challenges faced by our 
troops and our diplomatic, development, and humanitarian workers every 
day.
  As Lieutenant Colonel Davis asserts, the amount of unclassified 
information available to the American people, the media, and public 
officials continues to shrink. Ironically, one week before being 
briefed by Davis, Congressman Walter Jones and I sent a letter on 
January 12 to the President asking him to declassify and release the 
2011 NIE in Afghanistan. We are still waiting for a response to that 
request.
  Mr. Speaker, the U.S. has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on 
military operations in Afghanistan. Over 5,500 Americans were wounded 
or killed in Afghanistan last year alone. Over the course of a decade, 
tens of thousands have come home. Many will carry for a lifetime the 
unseen scars of post-traumatic stress or traumatic brain injury. Like 
soldiers everywhere, they face a callous and unsympathetic battlefield. 
They do what is expected of them, and they do it with courage and 
determination.
  As my colleagues know, the majority of Americans want a safe and 
orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan as quickly as possible. I want 
every single one of our troops home and reunited with their families 
and loved ones as soon as humanly possible. I want them to be able to 
leave safely and in a manner that generates confidence in what the next 
day will bring for Afghanistan and the region.
  On February 1, the administration announced that it will end U.S. 
combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of next year. This is 
welcome news. To ensure that timeline is met and to ensure that our 
policies and priorities pave the way for a successful transition, we 
need to know now what the real conditions are on the ground. We can 
only do that with a clear-eyed, hard-eyed assessment of what is going 
on in Afghanistan.
  An unclassified version of Lieutenant Colonel Davis' report can be 
found at www.Afghanreport.com. I encourage all my House colleagues to 
read it. I encourage them to meet with Lieutenant Colonel Davis for a 
briefing. I urge my House colleagues to ask the President to declassify 
the 2011 NIE on Afghanistan. And I ask the Pentagon public affairs 
office to stop stalling and formally approve the release of Lieutenant 
Colonel Danny Davis' unclassified report.
  Mr. Speaker, the Congress and the people of this country deserve more 
than a whitewash. Too often over the last decade we have been misled 
about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Too often Congress has made 
decisions based on false information, and too many of our brave service 
men and women have lost their lives. This must change. America needs 
and deserves the truth.

                                Congress of the United States,

                                 Washington, DC, January 12, 2012.
     Hon. Barack Obama,
     President of the United States,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: Recent media reports have detailed that 
     the current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on 
     Afghanistan recognizes that U.S. policy has not achieved the 
     objectives you have stated for our nation in Afghanistan. 
     Similar reports were published concerning the 2010 NIE. These 
     reports reinforce outside, independent assessments of the 
     Afghan war and

[[Page 1135]]

     cast doubt on official assertions of progress by the U.S. 
     government and military.
       Outside of official public statements by U.S. officials, 
     there seems to be near universal recognition that the 
     situation in Afghanistan over the last several years has 
     deteriorated significantly. We are conscious of and 
     sympathetic to the timing of a debate on the Afghan War 
     during an election year. However, as you are aware, the 
     majority of Americans continue to favor an accelerated 
     withdrawal of American troops from the midst of what they 
     rightly recognize as a civil war internal to Afghanistan, one 
     devoid of significant or meaningful al-Qaeda participation.
       In order to facilitate an honest understanding of America's 
     involvement in Afghanistan we request that you authorize the 
     declassification and release of the 2011 National 
     Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan. There are historical 
     precedents for the declassification and release of NIEs. 
     Tragically, there are also historical precedents for 
     inaccurate and misleading public assertions of progress in 
     war by those opposed to bringing military actions to a close. 
     It is haunting in the face of the enormous expenditure of 
     American lives, limbs and resources that progress in 
     Afghanistan may, in fact, be something other than is being 
     represented by those who advocate continued involvement.
       The American public and its elected representatives deserve 
     to have a full understanding of the situation in and outlook 
     for Afghanistan as understood by our government. Too many 
     families of our service members are sacrificing too greatly 
     to allow for anything else.
           Respectfully,
     James P. McGovern,
       Member of Congress.
     Walter B. Jones,
       Member of Congress.
                                  ____


             [From the Armed Forces Journal, Feb. 6, 2012]

                      Truth, Lies and Afghanistan


                 how military leaders have let us down

                     (By Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis)

       I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with 
     U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the 
     Army's Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant 
     area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 
     12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, 
     traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, 
     Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other 
     provinces.
       What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements 
     by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.
       Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn 
     that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan 
     were improving, that the local government and military were 
     progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to 
     witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely 
     hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or 
     battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.
       Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually 
     every level.
       My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my 
     fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A 
     Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in 
     Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq 
     in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years 
     in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs--
     among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign 
     affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas.
       As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set 
     out to talk to our troops about their needs and their 
     circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and 
     dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional 
     and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations 
     with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-
     ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff 
     members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan 
     security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village 
     elders.
       I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would 
     have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; 
     I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually 
     every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International 
     Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.
       I saw little to no evidence the local governments were able 
     to provide for the basic needs of the people. Some of the 
     Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn't want to 
     be connected to a predatory or incapable local government.
       From time to time, I observed Afghan Security forces 
     collude with the insurgency.


                          FROM BAD TO ABYSMAL

       Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or 
     wrote in official reports, I can't talk about; the 
     information remains classified. But I can say that such 
     reports--mine and others'--serve to illuminate the gulf 
     between conditions on the ground and official statements of 
     progress.
       And I can relate a few representative experiences, of the 
     kind that I observed all over the country.
       In January 2011, I made my first trip into the mountains of 
     Kunar province near the Pakistan border to visit the troops 
     of 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry. On a patrol to the 
     northernmost U.S. position in eastern Afghanistan, we arrived 
     at an Afghan National Police (ANP) station that had reported 
     being attacked by the Taliban 2\1/2\ hours earlier.
       Through the interpreter, I asked the police captain where 
     the attack had originated, and he pointed to the side of a 
     nearby mountain.
       ``What are your normal procedures in situations like 
     these?'' I asked. ``Do you form up a squad and go after them? 
     Do you periodically send out harassing patrols? What do you 
     do?''
       As the interpreter conveyed my questions, the captain's 
     head wheeled around, looking first at the interpreter and 
     turning to me with an incredulous expression. Then he 
     laughed.
       ``No! We don't go after them,'' he said. ``That would be 
     dangerous!''
       According to the cavalry troopers, the Afghan policemen 
     rarely leave the cover of the checkpoints. In that part of 
     the province, the Taliban literally run free.
       In June, I was in the Zharay district of Kandahar province, 
     returning to a base from a dismounted patrol. Gunshots were 
     audible as the Taliban attacked a U.S. checkpoint about one 
     mile away.
       As I entered the unit's command post, the commander and his 
     staff were watching a live video feed of the battle. Two ANP 
     vehicles were blocking the main road leading to the site of 
     the attack. The fire was coming from behind a haystack. We 
     watched as two Afghan men emerged, mounted a motorcycle and 
     began moving toward the Afghan policemen in their vehicles.
       The U.S. commander turned around and told the Afghan radio 
     operator to make sure the policemen halted the men. The radio 
     operator shouted into the radio repeatedly, but got no 
     answer.
       On the screen, we watched as the two men slowly motored 
     past the ANP vehicles. The policemen neither got out to stop 
     the two men nor answered the radio--until the motorcycle was 
     out of sight.
       To a man, the U.S. officers in that unit told me they had 
     nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area--and 
     that was before the above incident occurred.
       In August, I went on a dismounted patrol with troops in the 
     Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Several troops from 
     the unit had recently been killed in action, one of whom was 
     a very popular and experienced soldier. One of the unit's 
     senior officers rhetorically asked me, ``How do I look these 
     men in the eye and ask them to go out day after day on these 
     missions? What's harder: How do I look [my soldier's] wife in 
     the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died 
     for something meaningful? How do I do that?''
       One of the senior enlisted leaders added, ``Guys are 
     saying, `I hope I live so I can at least get home to R&R 
     leave before I get it,' or `I hope I only lose a foot.' 
     Sometimes they even say which limb it might be: `Maybe it'll 
     only be my left foot.' They don't have a lot of confidence 
     that the leadership two levels up really understands what 
     they're living here, what the situation really is.''
       On Sept. 11, the 10th anniversary of the infamous attack on 
     the U.S., I visited another unit in Kunar province, this one 
     near the town of Asmar. I talked with the local official who 
     served as the cultural adviser to the U.S. commander. Here's 
     how the conversation went:
       Davis: ``Here you have many units of the Afghan National 
     Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against 
     the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?''
       Adviser: ``No. They are definitely not capable. Already all 
     across this region [many elements of] the security forces 
     have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won't shoot at 
     the Taliban, and the Taliban won't shoot them.
       ``Also, when a Taliban member is arrested, he is soon 
     released with no action taken against him. So when the 
     Taliban returns [when the Americans leave after 2014], so too 
     go the jobs, especially for everyone like me who has worked 
     with the coalition.
       ``Recently, I got a cellphone call from a Talib who had 
     captured a friend of mine. While I could hear, he began to 
     beat him, telling me I'd better quit working for the 
     Americans. I could hear my friend crying out in pain. [The 
     Talib] said the next time they would kidnap my sons and do 
     the same to them. Because of the direct threats, I've had to 
     take my children out of school just to keep them safe.
       ``And last night, right on that mountain there [he pointed 
     to a ridge overlooking the U.S. base, about 700 meters 
     distant], a member of the ANP was murdered. The Taliban came 
     and called him out, kidnapped him in front of his parents, 
     and took him away and murdered him. He was a member of the 
     ANP from another province and had come back to visit his 
     parents. He was only 27 years old. The people are not safe 
     anywhere.''
       That murder took place within view of the U.S. base, a post 
     nominally responsible for the security of an area of hundreds 
     of square kilometers. Imagine how insecure the population is 
     beyond visual range. And yet that

[[Page 1136]]

     conversation was representative of what I saw in many regions 
     of Afghanistan.
       In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was 
     bad to abysmal. If the events I have described--and many, 
     many more I could mention--had been in the first year of war, 
     or even the third or fourth, one might be willing to believe 
     that Afghanistan was just a hard fight, and we should stick 
     it out. Yet these incidents all happened in the 10th year of 
     war.
       As the numbers depicting casualties and enemy violence 
     indicate the absence of progress, so too did my observations 
     of the tactical situation all over Afghanistan.


                            CREDIBILITY GAP

       I'm hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy 
     between official statements and the truth on the ground.
       A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office 
     noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at 
     the end of 2010 were ``sharply divergent from IMF, 
     [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] 
     `strategic communication' messages suggesting improvements. 
     We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to 
     recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any 
     such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to 
     influence American and European public opinion ahead of the 
     withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate 
     portrayal of the situation for those who live and work 
     here.''
       The following month, Anthony Cordesman, on behalf of the 
     Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote that 
     ISAF and the U.S. leadership failed to report accurately on 
     the reality of the situation in Afghanistan.
       ``Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does 
     provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively 
     `spinning' the road to victory by eliminating content that 
     illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,'' 
     Cordesman wrote. ``They also, however, were driven by 
     political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and 
     insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems 
     caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate 
     the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to 'spin' the 
     value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady 
     growth of Taliban influence and control.''
       How many more men must die in support of a mission that is 
     not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years 
     of optimistic statements by U.S. senior leaders in 
     Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a 
     successful plan. But we do expect--and the men who do the 
     living, fighting and dying deserve--to have our leaders tell 
     us the truth about what's going on.
       I first encountered senior-level equivocation during a 1997 
     division-level ``experiment'' that turned out to be far more 
     setpiece than experiment. Over dinner at Fort Hood, Texas, 
     Training and Doctrine Command leaders told me that the 
     Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) had shown that a 
     ``digital division'' with fewer troops and more gear could be 
     far more effective than current divisions. The next day, our 
     congressional staff delegation observed the demonstration 
     firsthand, and it didn't take long to realize there was 
     little substance to the claims. Virtually no legitimate 
     experimentation was actually conducted. All parameters were 
     carefully scripted. All events had a preordained sequence and 
     outcome. The AWE was simply an expensive show, couched in the 
     language of scientific experimentation and presented in 
     glowing press releases and public statements, intended to 
     persuade Congress to fund the Army's preference. Citing the 
     AWE's ``results,'' Army leaders proceeded to eliminate one 
     maneuver company per combat battalion. But the loss of 
     fighting systems was never offset by a commensurate rise in 
     killing capability.
       A decade later, in the summer of 2007, I was assigned to 
     the Future Combat Systems (FCS) organization at Fort Bliss, 
     Texas. It didn't take long to discover that the same thing 
     the Army had done with a single division at Fort Hood in 1997 
     was now being done on a significantly larger scale with FCS. 
     Year after year, the congressionally mandated reports from 
     the Government Accountability Office revealed significant 
     problems and warned that the system was in danger of failing. 
     Each year, the Army's senior leaders told members of Congress 
     at hearings that GAO didn't really understand the full 
     picture and that to the contrary, the program was on 
     schedule, on budget, and headed for success. Ultimately, of 
     course, the program was canceled, with little but spinoffs to 
     show for $18 billion spent.
       If Americans were able to compare the public statements 
     many of our leaders have made with classified data, this 
     credibility gulf would be immediately observable. Naturally, 
     I am not authorized to divulge classified material to the 
     public. But I am legally able to share it with members of 
     Congress. I have accordingly provided a much fuller 
     accounting in a classified report to several members of 
     Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, senators and House 
     members.
       A nonclassified version is available at 
     www.afghanreport.com. [Editor's note: At press time, Army 
     public affairs had not yet ruled on whether Davis could post 
     this longer version.]


                             TELL THE TRUTH

       When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging 
     our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe 
     it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid--
     graphically, if necessary--in telling them what's at stake 
     and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. 
     citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the 
     risk to blood and treasure is worth it.
       Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, 
     alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won 
     at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation 
     to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth 
     and let the people decide what course of action to choose. 
     That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. 
     The American people deserve better than what they've gotten 
     from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of 
     years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start.
                                  ____


                [From the Huffington Post, Feb. 6, 2012]

      Lieutenant Colonel Davis, Death and Deception in Afghanistan

                            (By Matthew Hoh)

       ``God help this country when someone sits in this chair who 
     doesn't know the military as well as I do.''--President 
     Dwight D. Eisenhower
       In late December, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta assured 
     Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) that the United States was 
     ``making undeniable progress'' in its war in Afghanistan and 
     that a congressionally mandated, independent assessment of 
     the war was ``not necessary.'' However, recent media reports 
     of internal Department of Defense and Intelligence Community 
     assessments of the war contradict, again, claims of progress 
     and illustrate instead that the war is stalemated with US 
     policies over the last several years weakening the Karzai 
     government and alienating the Afghan population, while 
     strengthening the Afghan insurgency and ruining the US 
     relationship with nuclear armed Pakistan. Independent studies 
     of the conflict by non-government and international 
     organizations corroborate these reports and assessments.
       Today, the New York Times reports that an active duty Army 
     officer, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis, has submitted a 
     classified report to members of Congress that documents the 
     failings of US policy in Afghanistan. More importantly, LTC 
     Davis attests that senior leaders of the Department of 
     Defense, both uniformed and civilian, have intentionally and 
     consistently misled the American people and Congress on the 
     conduct and progress of the Afghan War. The 58-page 
     classified report he prepared, briefed and submitted to 
     senators, representatives and cleared staff members over the 
     last few weeks utilizes nearly 50 historical and current 
     classified sources and draws from 250 interviews he conducted 
     with soldiers throughout Afghanistan during his most recent 
     year-long combat deployment.
       In addition to the classified report, LTC Davis has written 
     an 86-page unclassified version, as well as an article, 
     published today by the Armed Forces Journal. These reports 
     depict a near institutionalizing of dishonesty and deception 
     by senior DOD leadership towards the American public and 
     Congress. LTC Davis documents, as well, examples from the 
     Iraq war and major weapons procurement programs to illustrate 
     the persistent duplicity of the Pentagon's senior ranks. 
     Victory narratives, career ambitions and institutional 
     protection fuel these deceits. Deceits that have only 
     delivered the loss of thousands of lives, the waste of 
     hundreds of billions of dollars and the failure to achieve 
     American policy objectives.
       LTC Davis has submitted his reports to the Department of 
     the Army, his chain of command and the Department of Defense 
     Inspector General. Hard copies of the classified reports are 
     available for viewing by appropriately cleared members and 
     staff of Congress. However, DOD has not publicly released the 
     unclassified version, even with it being verified as not 
     containing classified information. This is in spite of LTC 
     Davis having provided the report for review to the Defense 
     Department over two weeks ago (Defense Department regulations 
     require only a 10 business day review). I am not surprised 
     DOD is slow with its approval; his allegations are harsh and 
     damning, although accurate and honest.
       Danny Davis is a friend of mine; we have known each other 
     since the fall of 2009. Bonding over coffees and lunches as 
     rightful skeptics of the escalation of the Afghan war, we are 
     now observing our worst concerns being realized. At a cost of 
     over 11,000 killed and wounded Americans, the surge in 
     Afghanistan is now being wound down without the achievement 
     of its core objectives.* However, accompanying such a 
     failure, are triumphant claims of success and accomplishment 
     from American generals and their civilian counterparts. For 
     those that comprehend the true consequences of this war: the 
     cold, waxen dead; the mutilated flesh and shattered bone; the 
     fatherless children so very young and the new widows so alone 
     and so heartbroken; such specious and unfounded claims of 
     progress without fact in this war are reckless, dishonorable 
     and injurious.

[[Page 1137]]

       Over the last several months, at great risk to his career 
     and personal life, LTC Davis has documented the deliberate 
     misleading of the American people and Congress by the leaders 
     of the Department of Defense.** He has done his nation and 
     the United States Army a tremendous service. Thus far the 
     Army has taken no punitive action against LTC Davis, however, 
     I have no doubt his character and motivations will ultimately 
     be attacked and disparaged. I suspect elements of DOD 
     leadership and their supporters will seek to discredit him 
     and persecute him. I am afraid he will face significant, but 
     spurious, investigations and prosecutions for his truth 
     telling actions, such as Justice Department lawyer Thomas 
     Tamm or National Security Agency employee Thomas Drake had to 
     suffer, or that State Department officer Peter Van Buren is 
     currently enduring.
       Over 5,500 Americans were killed or wounded in Afghanistan 
     in 2011. Tens of thousands who have come home will soldier a 
     lifetime with the unseen scars of post-traumatic stress or 
     traumatic brain injury. Our service members find themselves 
     held to account on a callous and unsympathetic battlefield in 
     a schizophrenic and absurd war. They do what is expected of 
     them and hold themselves responsible to those who depend on 
     them.
       In contrast, for those in Washington charged with the 
     decisions of war and peace, many of the participants seem to 
     alternate between Pollyannas, chickenhawks and those who have 
     lost sight of the difference between respect for and 
     deference to the military. Any accounting for last year's 
     5,500 killed and wounded, if the discussants are even aware 
     of the toll, is only a mathematical exercise, and an abstract 
     one at that.
       We expect our service members in Afghanistan to do the 
     hard, brutal and savage fighting our policies ask of them 
     without question. They do. Their expectation of those of us 
     in Washington, those of us in our heated offices, wearing 
     ties and high heels, who wake each day safe with our 
     families, is that we ask hard questions, examine the reality 
     of the conflict and not accept assertions of success without 
     evidence.
       The assumptions underlying the escalation of the Afghan war 
     were incorrect. The Afghan surge, viewed by policy makers and 
     some in the military as some form of social experiment to 
     validate personal and institutional legacies and theories, 
     rather than achieve US objectives worthy of bodily sacrifice, 
     is failing. LTC Davis has demonstrated the courage to expose 
     the deceptions that perpetuate this war, its failings and its 
     deaths. It is now up to the American people and its Congress 
     to hold those who were not just wrong, but mendacious, to 
     account.
       *To be clear, however, continuation of the current war 
     policy would simply be madness. Secretary Panetta's recent 
     announcement to end US combat operations in 2013 is a wise 
     decision (wiser if it had been made in 2009); particularly if 
     this policy shift is coupled with a transition of the role of 
     the US from belligerent in the conflict to mediator of an 
     inclusive political process to settle the three decade plus 
     Afghan war.
       **Myself and investigative journalist and historian Gareth 
     Porter, and former intelligence officer and author Tony 
     Shaffer, have provided moral support throughout this process.

                          ____________________