[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 157 (2011), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 13259-13278]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 1892.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Brady of Texas). Is there objection to 
the request of the gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 392 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1892.

                              {time}  0915


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 1892) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mrs. Miller of Michigan in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

[[Page 13260]]


  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I first wish to announce that, subsequent to ordering 
the bill reported, the committee has modified the classified schedule 
of authorizations to the bill with respect to the level of funding of 
certain programs, with bipartisan agreement between myself and my 
ranking member, Mr. Ruppersberger.
  The classified annex containing the schedule of authorizations is 
available for review by all Members of the House, subject to the rules 
of the House and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, under 
the procedures described in my announcement to the House on Wednesday. 
The modified schedule of authorizations is and has been available for 
review to Members for the period of time required by the rules of the 
House.
  Madam Chair, I think this is an important day for the community, 
certainly rolling into the weekend of the 10th anniversary of that 
tragic event on 9/11. It is important, it is crucial, that we continue 
to monitor, to improve, to provide support for our intelligence 
services who so bravely around the world and here at home serve to 
protect the United States of America.
  The bill before us today is a vital tool for our oversight of the 
intelligence community's classified activities and is critical to 
ensuring our intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities 
they need to do their important work. Passing an annual intelligence 
bill is vital to keeping the laws governing our intelligence operations 
up to date. The FY12 bill sustains today's intelligence operations and 
provides for future capabilities while achieving significant savings.
  The U.S. intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on 
terrorism and securing the country from many other threats that we 
face. This bill funds all U.S. intelligence agencies, spanning 17 
separate agencies, totaling roughly $80 billion. The bill's 
comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance on 
intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly programs. It 
provides oversight and authorization for critical intelligence 
activities, including but not limited to the global counterterrorism 
operations such as the one that took out Osama bin Laden; tactical 
intelligence support to combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq and other 
places; cyber defense by the National Security Agency; detecting and 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the R&D, 
research and development, of new technology to maintain our 
intelligence agencies' technological edge, including work on code 
breaking and spy satellites.
  The bill also reflects our tough economic times as well, Madam Chair. 
After passage of the Budget Control Act, the committee revamped the 
bill it reported out of committee in May to double its budget savings. 
The bill is significantly below the President's FY12 budget request and 
further still below the FY11 authorized and appropriated levels. We 
accomplished this without impacting the mission. The savings were 
achieved through a whole series of joint work and effort by many to 
merge services and find savings that would bring efficiencies, as I 
said, again, Madam Chair, without impacting the mission of the 
intelligence services.
  The bill curbs unnecessary personnel growth. The cost of additional 
personnel would squeeze funding for high-tech investments, which is our 
competitive advantage in intelligence. While the bill denies most of 
the administration's requested personnel increases, it adds some key 
positions in high priority areas such as cyber defense. The bill also 
promotes major operating efficiencies in a number of areas, including 
data processing, IT, and office leases, finding over $100 million in 
savings.

                              {time}  0920

  This bill also makes only ``best value'' investments and shaves $1 
billion from a handful of very large-ticket hardware items and programs 
that the intelligence community is involved in. The bill protects 
investments in cutting-edge R&D and redirects $500 million of savings 
to invest in some game-changing technologies.
  The bottom line is this bipartisan bill preserves and advances 
national security, and it is also fiscally responsible. Secrecy is a 
necessary part of our country's intelligence work, so the intelligence 
committees must conduct strong and effective oversight on behalf of the 
American people. That oversight is impossible, however, without an 
annual Intelligence authorization bill. Madam Chair, that's why we 
stand before you today with a bill that I think this body can be proud 
of, America can be proud of, and our intelligence community can take to 
the bank that we're investing in their mission success.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC, September 2, 2011.
     Hon. Mike Rogers,
     Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         House of Representatives, The Capitol, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Rogers: I write to confirm our mutual 
     understanding regarding provisions in the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 within the 
     jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically 
     the preparation of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 
     Statements and a requirement that the Department of State 
     provide information concerning individuals detained at Naval 
     Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We appreciate your agreeing to 
     include the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee in the list of committees to 
     which this information will be submitted.
       In order to expedite Floor consideration of this 
     legislation, the Committee will not object to the inclusion 
     of these two provisions and will not mark up the bill. The 
     Committee takes this action with the mutual understanding 
     that the Committee's jurisdiction over this, and similar 
     legislation, is in no way diminished or altered.
       The Committee reserves the right to seek appointment to any 
     House-Senate conference on this legislation, and requests 
     your support if such a request is made. I would appreciate 
     your including this letter in the Congressional Record during 
     consideration of the legislation on the House Floor.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                Washington, DC, September 6, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: Thank you for your letter 
     regarding H.R. 1892, the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2012. As you noted, elements of the bill fall 
     within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
     I will continue to work with you on these sections and will 
     support the request of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for 
     conferees in any conference that may occur on the bill.
       I appreciate your willingness to forego consideration of 
     the bill in the interest of expediting this legislation for 
     floor consideration. I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive 
     consideration of the bill, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
     does not waive any jurisdiction it may have over provisions 
     of the bill or any matters under your jurisdiction. I will 
     include a copy of your letter and this response in the 
     Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation 
     on the House floor.
       Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Mike Rogers,
                                                         Chairman.

  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I rise today in favor of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012, and I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  When Chairman Rogers and I took over leadership of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we made a commitment to 
getting back into the practice of passing intelligence budgets. We made 
a commitment to the men and women of the intelligence community to do 
what is right--to give our intelligence professionals the resources, 
capabilities, and authorities they need to keep us safe.
  We on the Intelligence Committee have a responsibility to provide 
effective oversight; to help build up the community, not to tear it 
down; to hold the community accountable for performance while upholding 
the Constitution and protecting civil liberties. This is even more 
important today as we approach the 10th anniversary of 


[[Page 13261]]

9/11, where close to 3,000 innocent Americans lost their lives.
  The bill makes smart choices by trimming where possible, eliminating 
duplicative efforts, and ensuring we do not affect the current critical 
capabilities that protect our Nation now and in the future.
  The bill aligns our resources with our current threats in a fiscally 
responsible manner. After the debt debate this last summer, our 
committee trimmed our budget even further to keep its costs in check. 
The bill curbs personal growth when appropriate, never affecting the 
core mission. It invests in new positions for select high-priority 
needs, such as FBI surveillance officers to keep watch on terrorists, 
NSA cyber professionals to protect computers from malicious intrusions, 
and Treasury financial analysts to unravel terrorist plots.
  We found major savings in operating costs, pushed down the price of 
programs through intense oversight, required acquisitions to come in on 
budget and on schedule, and invested in research and technology to keep 
our competitive edge. We fully funded the President's major satellite 
program as well as commercial imagery to ensure our intelligence 
professionals, the warfighters and our allies have the information they 
need on the front lines around the world.
  Right now, this bill includes two controversial provisions relating 
to Guantanamo Bay detainees and another making the Director of the 
National Security Agency a Senate-confirmed position. These provisions 
garnered a veto threat from the White House. Chairman Rogers and I 
worked together to come up with a solution. Today's manager's amendment 
withdraws the Gitmo and the NSA Director provisions. I encourage all 
Members to vote in favor of the manager's amendment. If these 
provisions can be successfully eliminated, I will support this bill and 
look forward to seeing it become law. This bill will make great 
investments in space, cyber, and the warfighter.
  Republicans and Democrats have worked together with our Senate 
counterparts to make this a good bipartisan bill. Intelligence is 
clearly the best defense against terrorism. This is even more important 
as we approach the 10-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks.
  If this bill is signed into law, it will be the third time in 3 years 
that the Intelligence Committee passed an Intel authorization act. For 
the 5 years before that, we did not have an Intelligence bill.
  With this bill, we are giving the intelligence community guidance and 
critical direction. We are doing our job. With the passage of the 
manager's amendment, I believe this is a good bipartisan bill that 
makes important decisions to protect our families and communities. I 
urge my colleagues to support it.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Thompson), the vice chair on the Democratic side of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chair, I rise in support of H.R. 
1892, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as 
amended by the manager's amendment.
  As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human 
Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, I am pleased that we 
were able to work together to bring a bipartisan Intelligence 
authorization bill to the floor today.
  H.R. 1892 will support critical U.S. intelligence capabilities by 
strengthening funding for our intelligence collection programs, 
enhancing counterintelligence efforts, and improving upon critical 
training operations vital to the future of the intelligence community.
  This legislation also includes two provisions that I authored. The 
first provision requires the Director of National Intelligence to 
compile a threat assessment of foreign drug traffickers that are 
increasingly turning to public lands in the United States to further 
their operations.
  Last year alone, over 3 million marijuana plants were eradicated on 
62 of our national forests. The effect of these illegal drugs' growth 
has been profound, leading to unacceptable levels of violence and the 
devastation of our environment and our natural resources. Our public 
lands have been taken away from us. This is wrong, and it must be 
stopped.
  This threat assessment will examine the ability of law enforcement 
and the intelligence community to gather, process, and share critical 
intelligence information regarding the presence of foreign drug 
traffickers on our Federal public lands. This coordination between the 
intelligence community and local law enforcement is extremely 
important.
  The second provision that I authored requires the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency to provide Congress with a full report on 
the events surrounding the May 2011 Osama bin Laden raid. This record, 
once complete, will provide an official account of a critical point in 
our country's history.
  We are all proud of the intelligence community's extraordinary effort 
in carrying out the bin Laden operation. I believe it is necessary that 
we never forget what actually happened in the raid and to be able to 
recognize the amazing contribution of the intelligence community and 
this important success.
  The historical significance of this mission cannot be understated. 
That's why we must make a determined effort to document and preserve 
all that went into this operation so that in the future the history 
books will be accurate and complete. I would like to just take a moment 
to thank my friend, a former committee colleague of ours, 
Representative Eshoo, for her work on this important part of the bill.
  Madam Chair, our intelligence community must be prepared for any and 
all threats. While Osama bin Laden may no longer pose a direct threat 
to our country's safety and security, the remaining elements of al 
Qaeda and other emerging terrorist organizations are more determined 
than ever. It is critical for Congress to pass an Intelligence 
authorization that furthers our national security, which I believe this 
bill, with a manager's amendment, will do.
  This legislation is necessary, will enhance the capabilities of the 
intelligence community, specifically our counterterrorism efforts, and 
will make our Nation stronger.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amended bill.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. I thank my friend from Maryland.
  Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the dedicated public 
servants of our intelligence community. Their work to ensure national 
security is to be commended. However, I must oppose the Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 2012.
  Ten years after 9/11, the United States continues to use its 
intelligence and defense apparatus in ways that undermine the rule of 
law at home and abroad.

                              {time}  0930

  There are plenty of examples, in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Libya. In a recent PBS Frontline feature, a top CIA official who was at 
the agency for over 34 years was quoted as saying, ``The Obama 
administration changed virtually nothing with respect to existing CIA 
programs and operations.''
  Last month the Associated Press reported that the New York Police 
Department was using domestic surveillance methods, in conjunction with 
the Central Intelligence Agency, to spy on local communities in a way 
that significantly undermined civil liberties. The United States 
continues to use drones for targeted assassination under the color of 
international law.
  Earlier this year we rubberstamped three provisions of the Patriot 
Act that allowed the government to conduct surveillance and demand 
records from innocent Americans with impunity, even for activities 
associated

[[Page 13262]]

with First and Fourth Amendment rights.
  Yesterday, it was reported in The New York Times and other 
publications that Russian heat-seeking missiles ``that could be used to 
shoot down civilian airliners have gone missing from warehouses in 
Libya.'' Now, think about this. Who has control over Libya right now? 
The CIA, everyone knows this, the CIA was involved in the overthrow of 
the government of Qadhafi.
  Now, whether you agree with the overthrow or not is not the point 
here. Didn't we know about these weapons warehouses ahead of time?
  There was one news report that said there might be as many as 20,000 
surface-to-air missiles that could be in jeopardy of being lost, 
missing, gone to the black market in who knows whose hands, and it's 
the rebels that are running there now.
  And I'm also concerned about that because of the stories about al 
Qaeda's connection to the rebels from the beginning of the 
insurrection. Despite the drones, intelligence personnel we have on the 
ground, and nearly a billion dollars we've already spent in the war on 
Libya, no one seems to know who took the missiles or who has them. How 
is this allowed to happen? And who needs to be held accountable?
  This is a debate we should be having exactly today over this 
legislation. What happened to the missiles?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I have a lot of respect for the gentleman from Ohio. I 
think on this, unfortunately, his facts were just not correct. It's 
interesting in the business of intelligence because so much of it is 
classified that the rhetoric is easy to throw around and the 
condemnation is easy to heap on the very brave men and women who are 
following the law that we give them overseas. And I think that's one of 
the reasons that this administration came to power and said, all of the 
kinds of things and all the rhetoric around the political campaign just 
wasn't true. They found that they were following the law. They were 
comporting with the missions and guidelines and objectives in 
accordance with the law of the United States. So they are, in fact 
following the law.
  There was no, absolutely no role for the CIA to overthrow the Qadhafi 
regime. That is just false. So I think we need to be careful about 
making these assertions that are pretty damning, if you will, that are 
completely inaccurate. We may believe that happened. I can tell you, on 
the Intelligence Committee, and my friend, Dutch Ruppersberger, we 
watch this closely.
  One of the reasons I hope he will change his mind on the bill, Madam 
Chair, is that we need the ability to have oversight of these 17 
agencies. This bill allows us to do it. By having no bill for 6 years, 
no authorization bill of any meaning was passed in this House. That's 
when problems start.
  This gets us back to regular order. It gets us back into the business 
of conducting proper oversight and setting the guidelines in the 
classified annex, which I would urge the gentleman to come down and 
review in the House Intelligence Committee, which every Member has the 
privilege and, I argue, responsibility to do that if that's what they 
desire to do. It lays out very clear guidelines on spending and 
objectives and policies.
  So I would argue that the gentleman's position is misstated. I 
understand his frustration. But, again, this gets us back to regular 
order, and I praise the administration for continuing the programs that 
we know were put in place under the last administration that are 
keeping Americans safer today.
  With that, Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. I honor the chairman's service, and I know of his 
dedication to our country.
  What I'm pointing out is that I think it's time we have the 
discussion about the role that the CIA had in Libya, which was really 
no secret, and the fact that these missiles that really we should have 
known ahead of time where they were, that that should have been the 
first place we want to guard. All of a sudden we have surface-to-air 
missiles that can't be accounted for. I think the CIA has to take 
responsibility for that.
  I want to thank the gentleman, though, for the way in which he's 
conducted the points that he's made.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Again, I thank the gentleman for his comments. I too have concerns 
about weapons systems in Libya. But one of the problems was you can't 
be against the intelligence services being places to collect 
information, and then wonder why they're not in a place to get the 
information that we might need. And that's part of the problem here.
  There was no CIA involvement in the regime change, none. That did not 
happen. I don't know where that got started. That is inaccurate 
information, and I would be careful about throwing out that the agency 
was involved in some regime changes. They were not.
  We have pressed the agency and the administration to be more 
aggressive on accounting for and rendering safe weapons systems that 
are scattered all around Libya. We saw this in Iraq. When the regime 
uses these weapons caches, not to protect the citizens of its own state 
but to protect its regime, it becomes much more difficult to get a 
handle on it. We ought to be celebrating the agency's work in trying to 
determine where these systems are and how we render them safe and 
account for them, and one way we can do that is passing this bill that 
gives them the resources to do exactly that.
  I would hope the gentleman would have a change of heart.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I just want to confirm, Mr. Kucinich, I do respect 
your comments and your point of view, but our role on the Intelligence 
Committee is oversight. When we can pass bills, we work and oversee all 
these agencies. And if we find out where there are allegations of a 
concern, let me know, and we will try to do what we can do to get 
information. But I know of no situation that we have not been told in 
the last couple of years, when Mr. Rogers and I have been working 
together.
  I think it's important for the United States of America to remember 
this. In my opinion, the best defense against terrorism is 
intelligence, but it's got to be done the right way and protect civil 
liberties.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I respect the gentleman from Ohio's position 
as well and hope that we can work out those differences as we move 
forward.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York 
(Mrs. Maloney).
  Mrs. MALONEY. I thank the ranking member for his leadership in so 
many ways before this Congress, and Chairman Rogers for his lifetime 
commitment to protecting Americans even as a former FBI agent.
  I want to underscore what the ranking member said. The best defense 
against terrorism is intelligence, and we need to support this bill in 
every single way. We were reminded of the need for intelligence 
yesterday when Mayor Bloomberg announced there was a credible threat 
against New York and Washington. And where did this information come 
from? It came from the intelligence community.
  After 9/11, the 9/11 Commission report said the biggest failure in 
preventing 
9/11 was a failure in our intelligence system. This Congress came 
together, and I was proud to have worked with and helped author a bill 
that was the first major reorganization and the most fundamental since 
1948, where it brought all 17 agencies together under Homeland Security 
and one director to gather information to make us safer.
  This bill very critically supports the task forces, the joint 
terrorism task forces that are sharing information and protecting our 
citizens, and this bill

[[Page 13263]]

approaches and focuses on cyber attacks, which are one of the most 
serious attacks that we have in our country now on the Pentagon and on 
financial institutions. Foreign countries are hacking into our 
information systems. This bill addresses that and focuses resources and 
oversight in that area.
  I congratulate this bipartisan effort. I consider it one of the most 
important bills that we have an opportunity to vote on, and I support 
it completely.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to my good friend 
from Rhode Island, Jim Langevin.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me just say how proud I am to support the FY 2012 
Intelligence Authorization Act. I appreciate the leadership of both 
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger in crafting this bill. 
This has truly been a bipartisan effort of which I have been proud to 
be a part.
  I am pleased that this bill includes funding to accelerate 
implementation of an insider threat detection program, and that's both 
on the cyber front but also in cases like the Hasan case that was 
tragically in the news and that occurred not long ago and cost many 
lives.
  This bill basically requires best practices implemented within the 
Army to be reviewed for inclusion across the intelligence community. 
That's referring to their insider threat detection program.
  In addition, the bill supports critical resources needed for 
cybersecurity, the broader cybersecurity threat, a threat which demands 
the attention of our national security specialists and the entire 
country.
  As the successful operation against Osama bin Laden showed us earlier 
this year, the intelligence community has made significant strides 
toward working together to counter the most complex threats facing our 
Nation. This productive cooperation and integration embodies the intent 
of Congressional intelligence reforms made after the tragic events of 
9/11, and I'm encouraged to see this progress in the area of 
information-sharing.

                              {time}  0940

  Yet while the sharing of classified information is imperative to keep 
our country safe, unrestrained and unregulated access can put our 
country at great risk. As we have seen from both the damage of 
WikiLeaks and historical espionage cases, the threat from a malicious 
insider with the keys to the kingdom is very real. We are far beyond 
the risk of paper documents being copied and carried out. Today the 
question is how much information can a potential leaker or spy fit on 
to a USB drive or a CD.
  Although technological advances have strengthened the efforts of our 
intelligence community, they have also increased the risk.
  Now, with this serious concern in mind, I'm proud that this bill 
requires the DNI to review improvements made by the Army's insider 
threat regulations and consider implementation of these practices 
across the entire intelligence community.
  In addition, the bill accelerates other technical initiatives within 
the insider threat program. I believe it's imperative that we ensure 
that our security officers and network administrators have the 
capabilities in place to protect our most sensitive information.
  Now, in view of the enormous resources spent on security clearances, 
protecting classified information, and securing networks across the 
globe, it also makes fiscal sense to protect our investment by taking 
advantage of the auditing software already available today. The access 
to classified information bears with it significant responsibilities, 
one that I know that I and my colleagues on the committee take very 
seriously.
  The other serious threats which this bill addresses are the risks 
posed to our broader cyber networks. Now, I'm proud that it strengthens 
resources and it furthers the administration's efforts to address the 
threats of our critical infrastructure. I know that that is something 
that is also shared by my colleague, Congressman Ruppersberger.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. While I applaud the administration's work, I think that 
we need to go further to raise awareness and work with both public and 
private sector partners to meet this threat. We cannot afford to 
continue operating with the massive digital vulnerabilities to not just 
our sensitive information but also our important intellectual property 
that makes up the foundation of our innovative economy. Addressing 
these threats must become a national priority, and we must work quickly 
to grow our current and future cyber workforce to fill the rising 
demand for cybersecurity information assurance.
  This bill helps secure our sensitive information and vital networks 
to threats from malicious actors beyond our borders and on the inside 
because of these important provisions, along with the other merits 
cited by my colleagues today.
  I thank again Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for 
the outstanding bipartisan cooperation we've seen in their leadership 
and also the other members of the committee. It's a committee that I'm 
proud to serve on. I thank them and the committee for their work.
  I urge Members to support this bill.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time 
to close.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself the balance of my time.
  It took a long time for us to get here today: days of important 
hearings, analyzing the intelligence community, hours of critical 
meetings, making important decisions of what to include and not to 
include in the bill and lots of time pulling it together.
  Republicans and Democrats came together to make important choices to 
do what's right for the intelligence community and for our country. I 
commend everyone who participated in this effort, especially the 
bipartisan leadership of Chairman Rogers and other members of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  I would like to thank both Democrat and Republican staff for the 
countless hours they spent helping us make this happen. With the 
passage of the manager's amendment, I fully support this bill and urge 
my colleagues to do the same. The stakes are too high not to.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  I want to thank the gentleman from Maryland, who is not only a 
colleague but a friend, in working so diligently over the course of the 
summer and really at the beginning of this year to reestablish the 
Intelligence Committee as a force for oversight over the 17 agencies. 
It is a tremendous amount of money, and it is a tremendous amount of 
responsibility because most of what we do happens behind closed doors 
and is classified.
  I think working together we have come to one of the best products 
certainly I have seen since on the committee of the most thorough 
review from line by line by line of both the National Intelligence 
Program spending as well as the Military Intelligence Program spending, 
and we've had very good cooperation because we've cooperated together 
from the agencies themselves.
  There really was a unity of effort here that I think Americans can 
and should be proud of in an effort to make sure that our men and women 
who are risking their lives today to protect the United States of 
America have the resources they need and the commitment on behalf of 
this Congress and the American people to be successful in their 
particular mission.
  I want to thank the staffs on both committees. For the first time we 
had joint briefings with both Republican and Democrat staff on the very 
difficult budget issues that worked sometimes through the process of 
the Intelligence authorization bill. They briefed at the same table at 
the same time, which sounds a little--something that should happen more 
often but it did not and we have reestablished that. We have 
reestablished the quarterly reviews on all of the programs so that we

[[Page 13264]]

have regular and consistent oversight on what happens in the 
intelligence community. That all wouldn't really have happened without 
the leadership of Mr. Ruppersberger and his team and my team as well.
  There are too many to name who spent countless hours on this 
particular bill, the leadership team here and all the folks on the 
Intelligence staff. Honorable mention to Brian Smith, our budget 
director, who gave a lot of his heart and soul to go through every line 
and find every penny for us. I know on Mr. Ruppersberger's staff they 
have sat beside him the entire time to make that happen.
  Without further ado, Madam Chair, we'll get to the amendments; but, 
again, I do think this is a product that reflects the best of what 
Congress can do when we work together, and the best of the most amazing 
people in our intelligence community and what they have to offer in the 
protection of the United States of America.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Madam Chair, I rise in support of H.R. 1892, The 2012 
Intelligence Authorization Act and to congratulate Chairman Rogers and 
Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their close collaboration on the bill 
and for their willingness to work together to shape a bi-partisan 
measure. This legislation demonstrates the Intelligence Committee's 
continued commitment to honoring the sacrifices and dedication of the 
public servants who comprise the Nation's intelligence community.
  Sunday marks the 10th anniversary of the attacks of September 11th, 
2001. Today this body will consider two pieces of legislation directly 
relevant to that event. H. Res. 391, which expresses the sense of the 
House regarding the anniversary of the attacks and H.R. 1892.
  H.R. 1892, the FY12 Intelligence Authorization Act, authorizes about 
$80 billion in funding for the 17 agencies that oversee and conduct the 
nation's intelligence and intelligence-related activities including the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA, and the 
National Security Agency, as well as intelligence activities of the 
Defense Department, FBI, State Department, Homeland Security 
Department, and other agencies. The Intelligence Committee has written 
the bill with enhanced oversight and accountability features to better 
protect the American taxpayer's investment in national security and to 
prevent the wasting of resources. In that regard, the bill cuts one 
billion dollars from the intelligence budget without sacrificing the 
Nation's security by merging services and finding other savings. The 
bill is fiscally responsible and preserves national security. I support 
both H. Res. 391 and H.R. 1892 and encourage my colleagues to do the 
same.
  The intelligence apparatus of the country has evolved and improved 
since the tragic events of September 11th and now collaborates on data 
collection and analysis in a way that it did not ten years ago. The 
culture of our intelligence community now has a more open and inclusive 
attitude across all platforms from the highest levels of government 
down to the agent in the field.
  The fruits of that successful collaboration were on bold display on 
May 1, 2011 when a commando team of Navy Seals brought Osama bin Laden 
to justice during their secret raid on his compound in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan. Due to the concerted efforts, dedication and hard work of our 
Nation's clandestine services and the people who support them, the U.S. 
is safer now than it was in the days leading up the attacks of 
September 11th.
  We meet today in advance of Sunday's anniversary to honor and 
remember the heroes and victims of 9/11. We also gather to express once 
again our gratitude to the focused, determined and persistent efforts 
of the men and women who comprise this Nation's intelligence community 
for all that they do.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Chair, today I voted against H.R. 1892. Despite 
of the progress we've made in reforming our intelligence community in 
size, scope and accountability, today's authorization does not go 
nearly far enough.
  On the eve of the 10th anniversary of 9/11, there is still nothing 
more important than the security of our people. Unfortunate, there is a 
clear lack of progress in getting a handle on the sprawling 
intelligence bureaucracy.
  There are 856,000 people with top-secret security clearances in the 
United States. That's nearly the population of the entire state of 
Delaware and more than the entire population of San Francisco. In over 
10,000 locations scattered across the U.S., there are around 1,200 
government organizations and 1,900 private companies that focus on 
intelligence gathering and on homeland security.
  In the wake of 9/11, we opened the funding floodgates to our 
intelligence community. It has now grown so large and so secretive that 
we have no idea how much it costs or how many people it employs, let 
alone understand how much of this work is duplicative. While 
improvements have been made, Congress needs to not just take a closer 
look, but reverse this dangerous trend.
  With the inability for anyone to really know exactly what's going on, 
the surge of information isn't always a source of protection, but a 
potential vulnerability. We can have too much information to use 
effectively. After all, parts of the bureaucracy were well aware of the 
threat from Osama bin Laden immediately prior to 
9/11.
  The problem is not intelligence gathering, which is essential to the 
security of America. The killing of Osama bin Laden would not have been 
possible without such efforts. It's simply that since 9/11, the 
intelligence community has grown so fast, and so secretively, that 
oversight hasn't kept up.
  At a time when we are cutting to the bone essential government 
services, this is a huge area that is ripe for budget scrutiny and, 
very likely, budget reduction. This bill has good features, but avoids 
getting this vast intelligence network under control. That is why I 
voted against H.R. 1892.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I rise in reluctant support of this bill.
  This bill is, by the conventional standards of the House, an 
appropriate vehicle for meeting many of the routine needs of the 
Intelligence Community. However, it completely fails to undertake the 
kind of probing, large-scale reassessment of the structure, mission, 
and purpose of our intelligence enterprise in a post-bin Laden era. I 
regret that Congress has not shown the stomach for the kind of 
thorough, comprehensive, and brave review of intelligence activities 
that was undertaken by the Church Committee in the 1970's. Given the 
events of the last decade, such a review is both long overdue and very 
badly needed. Despite my strong reservations about what this bill does 
not but should do, I will support this bill.

                              {time}  0950

  The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the 5-minute rule.
  In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it 
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of 
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute consisting of the text of the Rules Committee print, dated 
August 31, 2011. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 
considered read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H.R. 1892

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; Table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Annual report on hiring of National Security Education 
              Program participants.
Sec. 304. Enhancement of authority for flexible personnel management 
              among the elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Preparation of nuclear proliferation assessment statements.
Sec. 306. Cost estimates.
Sec. 307. Detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
              Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 308. Updates of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of 
              detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
              Bay, Cuba.

[[Page 13265]]

Sec. 309. Submission of information on Guantanamo Bay detainee 
              transfers.
Sec. 310. Enhanced procurement authority to manage supply chain risk.
Sec. 311. Modification of certain reporting requirements.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Report and strategic plan on drug trafficking organizations 
              and impact on public lands.
Sec. 402. Application of certain financial reporting requirements to 
              the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector 
              General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 404. Clarification of status of Chief Information Officer in the 
              Executive Schedule.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 411. Burial allowance.
Sec. 412. Acceptance of gifts.
Sec. 413. Foreign language proficiency requirements for Central 
              Intelligence Agency officers.
Sec. 414. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector 
              General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 415. Creating an official record of the Osama bin Laden operation.
Sec. 416. Recruitment of personnel in the Office of the Inspector 
              General.

                  Subtitle C--National Security Agency

Sec. 421. Confirmation of appointment of the Director of the National 
              Security Agency.
Sec. 422. Additional authorities for National Security Agency security 
              personnel.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 431. Codification of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
              Department of Homeland Security as element of the 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 432. Federal Bureau of Investigation participation in the 
              Department of Justice leave bank.
Sec. 433. Accounts and transfer authority for appropriations and other 
              amounts for intelligence elements of the Department of 
              Defense.
Sec. 434. Report on training standards of defense intelligence 
              workforce.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 501. Report on airspace restrictions for use of unmanned aerial 
              vehicles along the border of the United States and 
              Mexico.
Sec. 502. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 503. Technical amendments to title 18, United States Code.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2012 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, 
     subject to section 104, the authorized personnel ceilings as 
     of September 30, 2012, for the conduct of the intelligence 
     activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through 
     (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill 
     H.R. 1892 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability to committees of congress.--The classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) 
     shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate 
     portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--In carrying out paragraph (2), 
     the President may disclose only that budget-related 
     information necessary to execute the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations and shall not disclose the Schedule or any 
     portion of the Schedule publicly.
       (c) Use of Funds for Certain Activities in the Classified 
     Annex.--In addition to any other purpose authorized by law, 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation may expend funds 
     authorized in this Act as specified in the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation Policy Implementation section of the classified 
     annex accompanying this Act.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number of full-time equivalent 
     positions for fiscal year 2012 authorized by the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if 
     the Director of National Intelligence determines that such 
     action is necessary for the performance of important 
     intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel 
     employed in excess of the number authorized under such 
     section may not, for any element of the intelligence 
     community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian 
     personnel authorized under such section for such element.
       (b) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by 
     Contract Personnel.--
       (1) In general.--In addition to the authority in subsection 
     (a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element 
     of the intelligence community makes a determination that 
     activities currently being performed by contract personnel 
     should be performed by employees of such element, the 
     Director of National Intelligence, in order to reduce a 
     comparable number of contract personnel, may authorize for 
     that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent 
     personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time 
     equivalent contract personnel performing such activities.
       (2) Concurrence and approval.--The authority described in 
     paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of 
     National Intelligence concurs with the determination 
     described in such paragraph.
       (c) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment--
       (1) in a student program, trainee program, or similar 
     program;
       (2) in a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) in details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time 
     training.
       (d) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described 
     in subsection (a) or (b).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2012 the sum of $576,393,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2013.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 777 full-time or full-
     time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2012. Personnel 
     serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the 
     Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel 
     detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2012 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for 
     advanced research and development shall remain available 
     until September 30, 2013.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2012, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2012 the sum of $514,000,000.

[[Page 13266]]



                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. ANNUAL REPORT ON HIRING OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   EDUCATION PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS.

       Not later than 90 days after the end of each of fiscal 
     years 2012, 2013, and 2014, the head of each element of the 
     intelligence community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report, which may be in classified 
     form, containing the number of personnel hired by such 
     element during such fiscal year that were at any time a 
     recipient of a grant or scholarship under the David L. Boren 
     National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et 
     seq.).

     SEC. 304. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR FLEXIBLE PERSONNEL 
                   MANAGEMENT AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted 
     Service.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the 
     concurrence of the head of the covered department concerned 
     and in consultation with the Director of the Office of 
     Personnel Management, may--
       ``(A) convert competitive service positions, and the 
     incumbents of such positions, within an element of the 
     intelligence community in such department, to excepted 
     service positions as the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines necessary to carry out the intelligence functions 
     of such element; and
       ``(B) establish new positions in the excepted service 
     within an element of the intelligence community in such 
     department, if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines such positions are necessary to carry out the 
     intelligence functions of such element.
       ``(2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the 
     enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service 
     under this section shall have the right to refuse such 
     conversion. Once such individual no longer occupies the 
     position, the position may be converted to the excepted 
     service.
       ``(3) In this subsection, the term `covered department' 
     means the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland 
     Security, the Department of State, or the Department of the 
     Treasury.''.

     SEC. 305. PREPARATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENT 
                   STATEMENTS.

       Section 102A of the National Seucrity Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 304 of this Act, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements 
     Intelligence Community Addendum.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the 
     appropriate elements of the intelligence community and the 
     Secretary of State, shall provide to the President, the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an addendum to 
     each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement accompanying 
     a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, containing a 
     comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system 
     with respect to nuclear-related matters, including 
     interactions with other countries of proliferation concern 
     and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or missile-
     related transfers to such countries.''.

     SEC. 306. COST ESTIMATES.

       (a) In General.--Section 506A of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-1) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(2)--
       (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) For major system acquisitions requiring a service or 
     capability from another acquisition or program to deliver the 
     end-to-end functionality for the intelligence community end 
     users, independent cost estimates shall include, to the 
     maximum extent practicable, all estimated costs across all 
     pertinent elements of the intelligence community. For 
     collection programs, such cost estimates shall include the 
     cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for 
     data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional 
     costs for data processing, storing, and power, space, and 
     cooling across the life cycle of the program. If such costs 
     for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage are 
     scheduled to be executed in other elements of the 
     intelligence community, the independent cost estimate shall 
     identify and annotate such costs for such other elements 
     accordingly.''; and
       (2) in subsection (e)(2)--
       (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)'';
       (B) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking 
     ``associated with the acquisition of a major system,'' and 
     inserting ``associated with the development, acquisition, 
     procurement, operation, and sustainment of a major system 
     across its proposed life cycle,''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) In accordance with subsection (a)(2)(B), each 
     independent cost estimate shall include all costs required 
     across elements of the intelligence community to develop, 
     acquire, procure, operate, and sustain the system to provide 
     the end-to-end intelligence functionality of the system, 
     including--
       ``(i) for collection programs, the cost of new analyst 
     training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and 
     analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data 
     processing, storing, and power, space, and cooling across the 
     life cycle of the program; and
       ``(ii) costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, 
     and storage costs are scheduled to be executed in other 
     elements of the intelligence community, such element shall 
     identify and annotate such costs accordingly.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 307. DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, 
                   GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       (a) Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 
     2010.--Subsection (e) of section 552 of the Department of 
     Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-
     83; 123 Stat. 2178) is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``15 
     days'' and inserting ``30 days'';
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``such agreement.'' and 
     inserting ``such agreement and any monitoring assurances 
     provided by such government.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) The agency or department of the United States 
     responsible for ensuring that the agreement described in 
     paragraph (3) is carried out.''.
       (b) Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related 
     Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010.--Subsection (e) of section 
     428 of the Department of the Interior, Environment, and 
     Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (division A of 
     Public Law 111-88; 123 Stat. 2963) is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``15 
     days'' and inserting ``30 days'';
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``such agreement.'' and 
     inserting ``such agreement and any monitoring assurances 
     provided by such government.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) The agency or department of the United States 
     responsible for ensuring that the agreement described in 
     paragraph (3) is carried out.''.
       (c) Savings Clause.--None of the amendments made by this 
     section shall supersede or otherwise affect the 
     implementation of the following provisions of law:
       (1) Section 1033 of the Ike Skelton National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111q-383; 
     124 Stat. 4351).
       (2) Section 1113 of the Department of Defense and Full-Year 
     Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Public Law 112-10; 125 
     Stat. 104).

     SEC. 308. UPDATES OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST 
                   RECIDIVISM OF DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES 
                   NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       (a) Updates and Consolidation of Language.--
       (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 506H the following new section:


``summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees 
       held at united states naval station, guantanamo bay, cuba

       ``Sec. 506I.  (a) In General.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an 
     unclassified summary of--
       ``(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees 
     currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
       ``(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees 
     will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in 
     terrorist organizations.
       ``(b) Updates.--Not less frequently than once every 6 
     months, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make 
     publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the 
     information required by subsection (a) and the number of 
     individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo 
     Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to 
     terrorist activities after release or transfer from such 
     Naval Station.''.
       (2) Initial update.--The initial update required by section 
     506I(b) of such Act, as added by paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection, shall be made publicly available not later than 
     10 days after the date the first report following the date of 
     the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2012 is submitted to members and committees of 
     Congress pursuant to section 319 of the Supplemental 
     Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 10 U.S.C. 801 
     note).

[[Page 13267]]

       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506H 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 506I. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism 
              of detainees held at United States Naval Station, 
              Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.''.

     SEC. 309. SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION ON GUANTANAMO BAY 
                   DETAINEE TRANSFERS.

       (a) Requirement for Submission.--Not later than 45 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House 
     of Representatives and the Senate information concerning the 
     transfer or potential transfer of individuals who are or have 
     been detained by the United States at Naval Station, 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
       (b) Information Required.--The information required by 
     subsection (a) shall include the following:
       (1) An assessment of the sufficiency of the monitoring 
     undertaken by each foreign country to which an individual 
     referred to in subsection (a) has been transferred.
       (2) Any written or verbal agreement between the Secretary 
     of State and the government of a foreign country that 
     describes monitoring and security assurances related to such 
     an individual.
       (3) Each Department of State cable, memorandum, or report 
     relating to or describing the threat such an individual may 
     or may not pose.

     SEC. 310. ENHANCED PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY TO MANAGE SUPPLY 
                   CHAIN RISK.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered agency.--The term ``covered agency'' means any 
     element of the intelligence community other than an element 
     within the Department of Defense.
       (2) Covered item of supply.--The term ``covered item of 
     supply'' means an item of information technology (as that 
     term is defined in section 11101 of title 40, United States 
     Code) that is purchased for inclusion in a covered system, 
     and the loss of integrity of which could result in a supply 
     chain risk for a covered system.
       (3) Covered procurement.--The term ``covered procurement'' 
     means--
       (A) a source selection for a covered system or a covered 
     item of supply; or
       (B) any contract action involving a contract for a covered 
     system or a covered item of supply where such contract 
     includes a clause establishing requirements relating to 
     supply chain risk.
       (4) Covered procurement action.--The term ``covered 
     procurement action'' means any of the following actions, if 
     the action takes place in the course of conducting a covered 
     procurement:
       (A) The exclusion of a source for the purpose of reducing 
     supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered systems.
       (B) The exclusion of a source that fails to achieve an 
     acceptable rating with regard to an evaluation factor 
     providing for the consideration of supply chain risk in the 
     evaluation of proposals for the award of a contract or the 
     issuance of a task or delivery order.
       (C) The decision to withhold consent for a contractor to 
     subcontract with a particular source or to direct a 
     contractor for a covered system to exclude a particular 
     source from consideration for a subcontract under the 
     contract.
       (5) Covered system.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``covered system'' means any 
     information system (including any telecommunications system) 
     used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an 
     agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency--
       (i) the function, operation, or use of which--

       (I) involves intelligence activities;
       (II) involves cryptologic activities related to national 
     security;
       (III) involves command and control of military forces;
       (IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a 
     weapon or weapons system; or
       (V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct 
     fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or

       (ii) is protected at all times by procedures established 
     for information that have been specifically authorized under 
     criteria established by an Executive order or an Act of 
     Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national 
     defense or foreign policy.
       (B) Exception of administrative and business 
     applications.--Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a 
     system that is to be used for routine administrative and 
     business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, 
     and personnel management applications).
       (6) Supply chain risk.--The term ``supply chain risk'' 
     means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously 
     introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, 
     integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, 
     installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system 
     so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the 
     function, use, or operation of such system.
       (b) Authority.--Subject to subsection (c), the head of a 
     covered agency may, in conducting intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities--
       (1) carry out a covered procurement action; and
       (2) limit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, in 
     whole or in part, the disclosure of information relating to 
     the basis for carrying out a covered procurement action.
       (c) Determination and Notification.--The head of a covered 
     agency may exercise the authority provided in subsection (b) 
     only after--
       (1) any appropriate consultation with procurement or other 
     relevant officials of the covered agency;
       (2) making a determination in writing, which may be in 
     classified form, that--
       (A) use of the authority in subsection (b)(1) is necessary 
     to protect national security by reducing supply chain risk;
       (B) less intrusive measures are not reasonably available to 
     reduce such supply chain risk; and
       (C) in a case where the head of the covered agency plans to 
     limit disclosure of information under subsection (b)(2), the 
     risk to national security due to the disclosure of such 
     information outweighs the risk due to not disclosing such 
     information;
       (3) notifying the Director of National Intelligence that 
     there is a significant supply chain risk to the covered 
     system concerned, unless the head of the covered agency 
     making the determination is the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       (4) providing a notice, which may be in classified form, of 
     the determination made under paragraph (2) to the 
     congressional intelligence committees that includes a summary 
     of the basis for the determination, including a discussion of 
     less intrusive measures that were considered and why they 
     were not reasonably available to reduce supply chain risk.
       (d) Savings.--The authority under this section is in 
     addition to any other authority under any other provision of 
     law. The authority under this section shall not be construed 
     to alter or effect the exercise of any other provision of 
     law.
       (e) Effective Date.--The requirements of this section shall 
     take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act and shall apply to contracts that 
     are awarded on or after such date.
       (f) Sunset.--The authority provided in this section shall 
     expire on the date that section 806 of the Ike Skelton 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 
     (Public Law 111-383; 10 U.S.C. 2304 note) expires.

     SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004.--Section 1041(b) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 403-1b(b)) is 
     amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
       (b) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.--
     Section 904(d)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 402c(d)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``on an annual basis''.
       (c) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.--
     Section 809 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170b) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (b); and
       (2) in subsection (c), by striking ``reports referred to in 
     subsections (a) and (b)'' and inserting ``report referred to 
     in subsection (a)''.
       (d) Report on Temporary Personnel Authorizations for 
     Critical Language Training.--Paragraph (3)(D) of section 
     102A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
     1(e)), as amended by section 306 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259; 
     124 Stat. 2661), is amended by striking ``The'' and inserting 
     ``For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. REPORT AND STRATEGIC PLAN ON DRUG TRAFFICKING 
                   ORGANIZATIONS AND IMPACT ON PUBLIC LANDS.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on--
       (1) the intelligence collection efforts of the United 
     States that assess the threat from covered entities that are 
     currently or have previously used public lands in the United 
     States to further their operations; and
       (2) efforts to protect public lands of the United States 
     from illegal drug grows.
       (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) An assessment of the intelligence collection efforts of 
     the United States dedicated to covered entities.
       (2) An assessment of any problems that may reduce the 
     overall effectiveness of United States intelligence 
     collection and analysis to identify and protect public lands 
     from illegal drug grows and other activities and threats of 
     covered entities, including--
       (A) intelligence collection gaps or inefficiencies;
       (B) information sharing practices in the intelligence 
     community and other agencies, including Federal land 
     management agencies; and
       (C) cooperation among Federal departments or agencies.
       (3) A strategic plan prepared by the Director of National 
     Intelligence that describes actions the appropriate elements 
     of the intelligence community can take to close intelligence 
     gaps related to covered entities, and provide intelligence in 
     support of efforts by Federal land management agencies to 
     counter the use by covered entities of public lands for 
     illegal purposes.
       (4) A description of appropriate goals, schedules, 
     milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term effectiveness 
     of actions implemented to carry out the plan described in 
     paragraph (4).

[[Page 13268]]

       (c) Implementation of Strategic Plan.--Not later than 30 
     days after the date on which the Director of National 
     Intelligence submits the report required by subsection (a), 
     the Director shall begin implementation of the strategic plan 
     described in subsection (b)(4).
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an 
     international drug trafficking organization or other actor 
     involved in drug trafficking generally.
       (2) Federal land management agency.--The term ``Federal 
     land management agency'' includes--
       (A) the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture;
       (B) the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the 
     Interior;
       (C) the National Park Service of the Department of the 
     Interior;
       (D) the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the 
     Interior; and
       (E) the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the 
     Interior.
       (3) Public lands.--The term ``public lands'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 103 of the Federal Land 
     Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1702).

     SEC. 402. APPLICATION OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL REPORTING 
                   REQUIREMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the 
     requirements of section 3515 of title 31, United States Code, 
     to submit an audited financial statement shall not apply to 
     the Office of the Director of National Intelligence if the 
     Director of National Intelligence determines and notifies 
     Congress that audited financial statements for such years for 
     such Office cannot be produced on a cost-effective basis.

     SEC. 403. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE 
                   INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3h) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of 
     the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director 
     of National Intelligence information relating to the Office 
     of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
     including methods to contact the Inspector General.
       ``(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be 
     obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information 
     related to the Office of the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community.''.

     SEC. 404. CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF CHIEF INFORMATION 
                   OFFICER IN THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to the Chief Information 
     Officer, Small Business Administration the following new 
     item:
       ``Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
     Community.''.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     SEC. 411. BURIAL ALLOWANCE.

       (a) In General.--Section 11 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403k) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by inserting ``and burial allowance'' 
     after ``gratuities''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c)(1) At the request of a representative of the estate 
     of any officer or employee of the Agency (as determined in 
     accordance with the laws of a State) who dies in a manner 
     described in subsection (a)(1), the Director may pay to such 
     estate a burial allowance.
       ``(2) A burial allowance paid under paragraph (1) may be 
     used to cover burial expenses, including recovery, mortuary, 
     funeral or memorial service, cremation, burial costs, and 
     costs of transportation by common carrier to the place 
     selected for final disposition of the deceased.
       ``(3) Each payment made under this subsection shall be--
       ``(A) in an amount not greater than $15,000 plus the actual 
     costs of transportation referred to in paragraph (2); and
       ``(B) in addition to any other benefit that may be due 
     under any other provision of law.
       ``(4) The Director may annually increase the amount in 
     paragraph (3)(A) to reflect any increase in the Consumer 
     Price Index occurring during the preceding year.
       ``(5) The Director may pay the burial benefit authorized 
     under this subsection more than once for funeral, memorial, 
     or burial expenses stemming from a single death of an officer 
     or employee of the Agency if the remains of such officer or 
     employee were not recovered, were recovered after 
     considerable delay, or were not recovered intact.''.
       (b) Effective Date of Authority to Increase Allowance.--
     Section 11(c)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect on the 
     date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 412. ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS.

       Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 403l(a)) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and
       (B) by striking the second and third sentences and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(2) Any gift accepted under this section (and any income 
     produced by any such gift)--
       ``(A) may be used only for--''
       ``(i) artistic display;
       ``(ii) purposes relating to the general welfare, education, 
     or recreation of employees or dependents of employees of the 
     Agency or for similar purposes; or
       ``(iii) purposes relating to the welfare, education, or 
     recreation of an individual described in paragraph (3); and
       ``(B) under no circumstances may such a gift (or any income 
     produced by any such gift) be used for operational purposes.
       ``(3) An individual described in this paragraph is an 
     individual who--
       ``(A) is an employee or a former employee of the Agency who 
     suffered injury or illness while employed by the Agency 
     that--
       ``(i) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities;
       ``(ii) occurred in connection with an intelligence activity 
     having a significant element of risk; or
       ``(iii) occurred under other circumstances determined by 
     the Director to be analogous to the circumstances described 
     in clause (i) or (ii);
       ``(B) is a family member of such an employee or former 
     employee; or
       ``(C) is a surviving family member of an employee of the 
     Agency who died in circumstances described in clause (i), 
     (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A).
       ``(4) The Director may not accept any gift under this 
     section that is expressly conditioned upon any expenditure 
     not to be met from the gift itself or from income produced by 
     the gift unless such expenditure has been authorized by law.
       ``(5) The Director may, in the Director's discretion, 
     determine that an individual described in subparagraph (A) or 
     (B) of paragraph (3) may accept a gift for the purposes 
     described in paragraph (2)(A)(iii).''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) The Director, in consultation with the Director of 
     the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to 
     carry out the authority provided in this section. Such 
     regulations shall ensure that such authority is exercised 
     consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and 
     principles, including--
       ``(1) the avoidance of any prohibited conflict of interest 
     or appearance of impropriety; and
       ``(2) a prohibition against the acceptance of a gift from a 
     foreign government or an agent of a foreign government.''.

     SEC. 413. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICERS.

       (a) In General.--Section 104A(g) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)--
       (i) by inserting ``in the Directorate of Intelligence 
     career service or the National Clandestine Service career 
     service'' after ``an individual'';
       (ii) by inserting ``or promoted'' after ``appointed''; and
       (iii) by striking ``individual--'' and inserting 
     ``individual has been certified as having a professional 
     speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such 
     proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency 
     Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate 
     proficiency level using such other indicator of proficiency 
     as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers 
     appropriate.'';
       (B) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B); and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of 
     positions'' both places that term appears and inserting 
     ``position, category of positions, or occupation''.
       (b) Effective Date.--Section 611(b) of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 
     50 U.S.C. 403-4a note) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``or promotions'' after ``appointments''; 
     and
       (2) by striking ``that is one year after the date''.
       (c) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 
     118 Stat. 3955) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence--
       (A) by striking ``positions'' and inserting ``individual 
     waivers''; and
       (B) by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting 
     ``National Clandestine Service''; and
       (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``position or 
     category of positions'' and inserting ``position, category of 
     positions, or occupation''.
       (d) Report on Transfers.--Not later than 45 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and on an annual basis for 
     each of the following 3 years, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior 
     Intelligence Service employees of the Agency who--
       (1) were transferred during the reporting period to a 
     Senior Intelligence Service position in the Directorate of 
     Intelligence career service or the National Clandestine 
     Service career service; and
       (2) did not meet the foreign language requirements 
     specified in section 104A(g)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)(1)) at the time of such 
     transfer.

     SEC. 414. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE 
                   INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY.

       Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:

[[Page 13269]]

       ``(h) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on 
     the homepage of the Agency's publicly accessible website 
     information relating to the Office of the Inspector General 
     including methods to contact the Inspector General.
       ``(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be 
     obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information 
     related to the Office of the Inspector General.''.

     SEC. 415. CREATING AN OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE OSAMA BIN LADEN 
                   OPERATION.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) On May 1, 2011, United States personnel killed 
     terrorist leader Osama bin Laden during the course of a 
     targeted strike against his secret compound in Abbottabad, 
     Pakistan.
       (2) Osama bin Laden was the leader of the al Qaeda 
     terrorist organization, the most significant terrorism threat 
     to the United States and the international community.
       (3) Osama bin Laden was the architect of terrorist attacks 
     which killed nearly 3,000 civilians on September 11, 2001, 
     the most deadly terrorist attack against our Nation, in which 
     al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them 
     into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in 
     Washington, D.C., and, due to heroic efforts by civilian 
     passengers to disrupt the terrorists, near Shanksville, 
     Pennsylvania.
       (4) Osama bin Laden planned or supported numerous other 
     deadly terrorist attacks against the United States and its 
     allies, including the 1998 bombings of United States 
     embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the 
     U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and against innocent civilians in 
     countries around the world, including the 2004 attack on 
     commuter trains in Madrid, Spain and the 2005 bombings of the 
     mass transit system in London, England.
       (5) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 
     the United States, under President George W. Bush, led an 
     international coalition into Afghanistan to dismantle al 
     Qaeda, deny them a safe haven in Afghanistan and ungoverned 
     areas along the Pakistani border, and bring Osama bin Laden 
     to justice.
       (6) President Barack Obama in 2009 committed additional 
     forces and resources to efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
     as ``the central front in our enduring struggle against 
     terrorism and extremism''.
       (7) The valiant members of the United States Armed Forces 
     have courageously and vigorously pursued al Qaeda and its 
     affiliates in Afghanistan and around the world.
       (8) The anonymous, unsung heroes of the intelligence 
     community have pursued al Qaeda and affiliates in 
     Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world with tremendous 
     dedication, sacrifice, and professionalism.
       (9) The close collaboration between the Armed Forces and 
     the intelligence community prompted the Director of National 
     Intelligence, General James Clapper, to state, ``Never have I 
     seen a more remarkable example of focused integration, 
     seamless collaboration, and sheer professional magnificence 
     as was demonstrated by the Intelligence Community in the 
     ultimate demise of Osama bin Laden.''.
       (10) While the death of Osama bin Laden represents a 
     significant blow to the al Qaeda organization and its 
     affiliates and to terrorist organizations around the world, 
     terrorism remains a critical threat to United States national 
     security.
       (11) President Obama said, ``For over two decades, bin 
     Laden has been al Qaeda's leader and symbol, and has 
     continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends 
     and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant 
     achievement to date in our Nation's effort to defeat al 
     Qaeda.''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the raid that killed Osama bin Laden demonstrated the 
     best of the intelligence communities capabilities and 
     teamwork;
       (2) for years to come, Americans will look back at this 
     event as a defining point in the history of the United 
     States;
       (3) it is vitally important that the United States 
     memorialize all the events that led to the raid so that 
     future generations will have an official record of the events 
     that transpired before, during, and as a result of the 
     operation; and
       (4) preserving this history now will allow the United 
     States to have an accurate account of the events while those 
     that participated in the events are still serving in the 
     Government.
       (c) Report on the Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden.--
     Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in 
     consultation with other agencies and entities involved in the 
     operation that killed Osama bin Laden, shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a classified report 
     that memorializes such operation including a description of 
     the events leading up to the discovery of the location of 
     Osama bin Laden, the planning and execution of the raid, and 
     the results of the intelligence gained from the raid.
       (d) Preservation of Records.--The Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall preserve any records, including 
     intelligence information and assessments, used to generate 
     the report described in subsection (c).

     SEC. 416. RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL IN THE OFFICE OF THE 
                   INSPECTOR GENERAL.

       (a) Study.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, in consultation with the Inspector General of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency, shall carry out a study of the 
     personnel issues of the Office of the Inspector General. Such 
     study shall include--
       (1) identification of any barriers or disincentives to the 
     recruitment or retention of experienced investigators within 
     the Office of the Inspector General; and
       (2) a comparison of the personnel authorities of the 
     Inspector General with personnel authorities of Inspectors 
     General of other agencies and departments of the United 
     States, including a comparison of the benefits available to 
     experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector 
     General of the Central Intelligence Agency with similar 
     benefits available within the offices of Inspectors General 
     of such other agencies or departments.
       (b) Recommendations.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees--
       (1) any recommendations of the Director for legislative 
     action based on the results of the study conducted under 
     subsection (a); and
       (2) a description of any administrative actions taken by 
     the Director based on such results.

                  Subtitle C--National Security Agency

     SEC. 421. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       (a) Director of National Security Agency.--Section 2 of the 
     National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(b)'' before ``There''; and
       (2) by inserting before subsection (b), as so designated by 
     paragraph (1), the following new subsection
       ``(a)(1) There is a Director of the National Security 
     Agency.
       ``(2) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be 
     appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate.
       ``(3) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be 
     the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge 
     such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or 
     otherwise by law.''.
       (b) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.--The 
     President may designate the Director of the National Security 
     Agency as a position of importance and responsibility under 
     section 601 of title 10, United States Code.
       (c) Effective Date and Applicability.--
       (1) In general.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act 
     and shall apply upon the earlier of--
       (A) the date of the nomination by the President of an 
     individual to serve as the Director of the National Security 
     Agency, except that the individual serving as such Director 
     as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to 
     perform such duties after such date of nomination and until 
     the individual appointed as such Director, by and with the 
     advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such 
     Director; or
       (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the 
     duties of such Director by the individual performing such 
     duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) Positions of importance and responsibility.--Subsection 
     (b) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 422. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
                   SECURITY PERSONNEL.

       (a) Authority To Transport Apprehended Persons.--Paragraph 
     (5) of section 11(a) of the National Security Agency Act of 
     1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(5) Agency personnel authorized by the Director under 
     paragraph (1) may transport an individual apprehended under 
     the authority of this section from the premises at which the 
     individual was apprehended, as described in subparagraph (A) 
     or (B) of paragraph (1), for the purpose of transferring such 
     individual to the custody of law enforcement officials. Such 
     transportation may be provided only to make a transfer of 
     custody at a location within 30 miles of the premises 
     described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment Relating to Tort Liability.--
     Paragraph (1) of section 11(d) of the National Security 
     Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) transport an individual pursuant to subsection 
     (a)(2).''.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

     SEC. 431. CODIFICATION OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS 
                   OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AS 
                   ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 3(4)(K) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)(K)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
     Department of Homeland Security.''.

     SEC. 432. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PARTICIPATION IN 
                   THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LEAVE BANK.

       Subsection (b) of section 6372 of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and 
     notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, 
     neither an excepted agency nor any individual employed in or 
     under an excepted agency may be included in a leave bank 
     program established under any of the preceding provisions of 
     this subchapter.

[[Page 13270]]

       ``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may authorize 
     an individual employed by the Bureau to participate in a 
     leave bank program administered by the Department of Justice 
     under this subchapter if in the Director's judgment such 
     participation will not adversely affect the protection of 
     intelligence sources and methods.''.

     SEC. 433. ACCOUNTS AND TRANSFER AUTHORITY FOR APPROPRIATIONS 
                   AND OTHER AMOUNTS FOR INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF 
                   THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 21 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 428 the following 
     new section:

     ``Sec. 429. Appropriations for Defense intelligence elements: 
       accounts for transfers; transfer authority

       ``(a) Accounts for Appropriations for Defense Intelligence 
     Elements.--The Secretary of Defense may transfer 
     appropriations of the Department of Defense which are 
     available for the activities of Defense intelligence elements 
     to an account or accounts established for receipt of such 
     transfers. Each such account may also receive transfers from 
     the Director of National Intelligence if made pursuant to 
     Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-1), and transfers and reimbursements arising from 
     transactions, as authorized by law, between a Defense 
     intelligence element and another entity. Appropriation 
     balances in each such account may be transferred back to the 
     account or accounts from which such appropriations originated 
     as appropriation refunds.
       ``(b) Recordation of Transfers.--Transfers made pursuant to 
     subsection (a) shall be recorded as expenditure transfers.
       ``(c) Availability of Funds.--Funds transferred pursuant to 
     subsection (a) shall remain available for the same time 
     period and for the same purpose as the appropriation from 
     which transferred, and shall remain subject to the same 
     limitations provided in the act making the appropriation.
       ``(d) Obligation and Expenditure of Funds.--Unless 
     otherwise specifically authorized by law, funds transferred 
     pursuant to subsection (a) shall only be obligated and 
     expended in accordance with chapter 15 of title 31 and all 
     other applicable provisions of law.
       ``(e) Defense Intelligence Element Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `Defense intelligence element' means any of 
     the Department of Defense agencies, offices, and elements 
     included within the definition of `intelligence community' 
     under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)).".''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of subchapter I of such chapter is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new item:

``429. Appropriations for Defense intelligence elements: accounts for 
              transfers; transfer authority.''.

     SEC. 434. REPORT ON TRAINING STANDARDS OF DEFENSE 
                   INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall 
     submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the 
     training standards of the defense intelligence workforce. 
     Such report shall include--
       (1) a description of existing training, education, and 
     professional development standards applied to personnel of 
     defense intelligence components; and
       (2) an assessment of the ability to implement a 
     certification program for personnel of the defense 
     intelligence components based on achievement of required 
     training, education, and professional development standards.
       (b) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Defense intelligence components.--The term ``defense 
     intelligence components'' means--
       (A) the National Security Agency;
       (B) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
       (C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
       (D) the National Reconnaissance Office;
       (E) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the 
     Air Force, and the Marine Corps; and
       (F) other offices within the Department of Defense for the 
     collection of specialized national intelligence through 
     reconnaissance programs.
       (2) Defense intelligence workforce.--The term ``defense 
     intelligence workforce'' means the personnel of the defense 
     intelligence components.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 501. REPORT ON AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS FOR USE OF UNMANNED 
                   AERIAL VEHICLES ALONG THE BORDER OF THE UNITED 
                   STATES AND MEXICO.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate a report on whether restrictions on the use of 
     airspace are hampering the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by 
     the Department of Homeland Security along the international 
     border between the United States and Mexico.

     SEC. 502. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 
                   OF 1947.

       The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) 
     is amended--
       (1) in section 3(6) (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)), by striking 
     ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director 
     of National Intelligence'';
       (2) in section 506(b) (50 U.S.C. 415a(b)), by striking 
     ``Director of Central Intelligence.'' and inserting 
     ``Director of National Intelligence.''; and
       (3) in section 506A(c)(2)(C) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(c)(2)(C)), 
     by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' both 
     places that term appears and inserting ``National 
     Intelligence Program''.

     SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES 
                   CODE.

       Section 351(a) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``the Director (or a person nominated to 
     be Director during the pendency of such nomination) or 
     Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,'' after 
     ``in such department,''; and
       (2) by striking ``Central Intelligence,'' and inserting 
     ``the Central Intelligence Agency,''.

  The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute made in order as original text shall be in order except 
those printed in part B of House Report 112-200 and amendments en bloc 
described in section 2(f) of House Resolution 392. Each amendment 
printed in part B of the report may be offered only by a Member 
designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be 
debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and 
controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to 
amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the 
question.
  It shall be in order at any time for the chair of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence or his designee to offer amendments en 
bloc consisting of amendments printed in part B not earlier disposed 
of. Amendments en bloc shall be considered as read, shall be debatable 
for 10 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking 
minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence or 
their designees, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be 
subject to a demand for division of the question. The original 
proponent of an amendment included in such amendments en bloc may 
insert a statement in the Congressional Record immediately before 
disposition of the amendments en bloc.


           Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in 
part B of House Report 112-200.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 5, strike lines 9 through 14 and insert the following:
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     415c)
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.
       Page 5, line 17, insert ``the Director of'' before ``the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation''.
       Strike section 307 (page 15, line 1 through page 16, line 
     18).
       Strike section 309 (page 18, line 17 through page 19, line 
     16).
       Page 24, after line 15 insert the following:
       (d) Delegation.--The head of a covered agency may not 
     delegate the authority provided in subsection (b) or the 
     responsibility to make a determination under subsection (c) 
     to an official below the level of the service acquisition 
     executive for the agency concerned.
       At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 30, after line 
     18), add the following new section:

     SEC. 405. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO FILL VACANCIES WITHIN 
                   OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Temporary Filling of Vacancies.--With respect to 
     filling temporarily a vacancy in an office within the Office 
     of the Director of National Intelligence (other than that of 
     the Director of National Intelligence), section 3345(a)(3) of 
     title 5, United States Code, may be applied--
       ``(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by 
     substituting `an element of the intelligence community, as 
     that term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act

[[Page 13271]]

     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)),' for `such Executive agency'; 
     and
       ``(2) in subparagraph (A), by substituting `the 
     intelligence community' for `such agency'.''.
       Strike section 421 (page 43, line 14 through page 45, line 
     9).

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent to 
modify the manager's amendment to include a clarification at the 
request of the ranking member. The modification is at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment No. 1:
       After the amendment to line 15 of page 24 of the bill, 
     insert the following:
       Strike section 401 (page 26, line 12 through page 29, line 
     6) and insert the following new section:

     SEC. 401. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER DRUG 
                   TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS USING PUBLIC LANDS.

       (a) Consultation.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall consult with the heads of the Federal land management 
     agencies on the appropriate actions the intelligence 
     community can take to assist such agencies in responding to 
     the threat from covered entities that are currently or have 
     previously used public lands in the United States to further 
     the operations of such entities.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the results of the consultation under subsection 
     (a). Such report shall include--
       (1) an assessment of the intelligence community collection 
     efforts dedicated to covered entities, including any 
     collection gaps or inefficiencies; and
       (2) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence 
     community to assist Federal land management agencies in 
     identifying and protecting public lands from illegal drug 
     grows and other activities and threats of covered entities, 
     including through the sharing of intelligence information.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an 
     international drug trafficking organization or other actor 
     involved in drug trafficking generally.
       (2) Federal land management agency.--The term ``Federal 
     land management agency'' includes--
       (A) the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture;
       (B) the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the 
     Interior;
       (C) the National Park Service of the Department of the 
     Interior;
       (D) the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the 
     Interior; and
       (E) the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the 
     Interior.
       (3) Public lands.--The term ``public lands'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 103 of the Federal Land 
     Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1702).

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan (during the reading). I ask unanimous consent 
that the modification be considered as read.
  The CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, this is the manager's amendment 
to the bill. These are the last few details that we were able to work 
out in a bipartisan way to bring the bill to the floor.
  The manager's amendment is primarily intended to remove three 
provisions that have been the subject of a veto threat by the 
administration. In addition, it makes a number of largely technical 
clarifications and adds a provision on authority to fill vacancies, a 
provision that was inadvertently omitted from the Rules Committee's 
print of the bill.
  Madam Chair, as I explained during the general debate, moving this 
bill forward is critical to ensure comprehensive legislative oversight 
of our intelligence activities and, just as importantly, intelligence 
budgeting and spending. While I regret that our efforts to reach 
accommodation on these provisions, which were originally included in 
the Senate Intelligence Committee's bill, it is important that we 
remove these contentious provisions now so that the detailed spending 
and oversight recommendations in the classified annex can go forward.
  The first contentious provision would have required Senate 
confirmation of the National Security Administration's Director. The 
other two contentious provisions subject to veto would have required 
the production of certain State Department cables related to detainee 
negotiations. While I support the production of these materials, the 
committees seeking them have other tools at their disposal to obtain 
them, and the bill should not be held up over that document dispute.
  In addition, the manager's amendment includes a clarification to 
clarify section 310 on mitigating risks in the supply chain to ensure 
that those authorities cannot be delegated below the level of a service 
acquisition executive. The change is important to ensure the 
appropriate level of management is involved in such important 
decisions. This change reflects the committee's understanding that 
these acquisition authorities will not be used lightly and that all 
decisions under this provision will be carried out by responsible 
senior officials within the intelligence community and coordinated and 
overseen by the Director of National Intelligence.
  Finally, the manager's amendment contains a modification requested by 
the ranking member to a provision concerning narcotics trafficking on 
public lands. The modification is needed to clarify the intended scope 
of the provision to ensure it is not read too broadly.
  With that, Madam Chair, I ask Members to support the manager's 
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I claim time in opposition to the amendment, 
although I am not opposed.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I strongly support the manager's 
amendment.
  The manager's amendment deals with the issues that the chairman 
talked about. Also, it was our negotiation to resolve certain issues, 
and that has been done. So I fully support it.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by 
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Wolf

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in 
part B of House Report 112-200.
  Mr. WOLF. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 312. ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTERTERRORISM COMPETITIVE 
                   ANALYSIS COUNCIL.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) terrorism and domestic radicalization represent 
     evolving, dynamic, multidimensional threats that necessitate 
     a structured, iterative process to continuously revise plans, 
     operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities; and
       (2) past federal experience in competitive analysis 
     executed by experts drawn from outside the government has 
     helped the intelligence community and policymakers better 
     understand the nature of complex threats to the United 
     States.
       (b) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:


            ``counterterrorism competitive analysis council

       ``Sec. 120.  (a) Establishment.--There is established a 
     council to be known as the `Counterterrorism Competitive 
     Analysis Council' (in this section referred to as the 
     `Council').
       ``(b) Duties.--The Council shall--
       ``(1) advise the Director of National Intelligence on 
     matters of policy relating to the threats of international 
     terrorism and domestic radicalization based on all-source 
     information;

[[Page 13272]]

       ``(2) prepare a competitive analysis of each national 
     intelligence estimate concerning al-Qaeda and other foreign 
     terrorist organizations and submit such analysis to the 
     Director of National Intelligence and the National 
     Intelligence Council; and
       ``(3) annually submit to Congress a report in unclassified 
     form, which may include a classified annex, on trends in 
     counterterrorism and domestic radicalization, including a 
     summary of any competitive analysis prepared pursuant to 
     paragraph (2).
       ``(c) Members.--(1) The Council shall be composed of eight 
     members appointed by the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. Members shall be 
     selected on the basis of previous experience with matters of 
     policy relating to international terrorism and domestic 
     radicalization.
       ``(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence may not 
     appoint an individual to the Council if such individual has 
     served as an officer or employee of the Federal Government 
     within a five-year period of the date of appointment.
       ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not appoint 
     an individual to the Council if--
       ``(i) such individual has served as an officer or employee 
     of the Federal Government within a 15-year period of the date 
     of appointment; and
       ``(ii) on the date of appointment, three of the members of 
     the Council have served as officers or employees of the 
     Federal Government within a 15-year period of the date of 
     appointment.
       ``(3) The term of a member is five years, and a member may 
     not serve more than two terms, except that a member appointed 
     to fill a vacancy may serve two additional terms after the 
     expiration of the term in which that vacancy occured.
       ``(4) Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring 
     before the expiration of a term shall be appointed for the 
     remainder of that term.
       ``(5) Every two years, the Council shall select a chair and 
     vice chair from among its members.
       ``(6) To the extent provided in advance in appropriation 
     Acts, each member shall be paid at a rate not to exceed the 
     annual rate of basic pay for level V of the Executive 
     Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(7) Any member of the Council may, if authorized by the 
     Council, take any action which the Council is authorized to 
     take by this section.
       ``(d) Staff of Council.--(1) To the extent provided in 
     advance in appropriation Acts, the Council shall appoint and 
     fix the compensation of a Director and such additional staff 
     as may be necessary to enable the Council to carry out its 
     duties.
       ``(2) The Director and staff of the Council may be 
     appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5, United 
     States Code, governing appointments in the competitive 
     service, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of 
     chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title 
     relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, 
     except that the rate of pay fixed for the Director and staff 
     may not exceed the annual rate of basic pay for level V of 
     the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       ``(3) In accordance with rules adopted by the Council, and 
     to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts, the 
     Council may procure the services of experts and consultants 
     under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, but at 
     rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of 
     the annual rate of basic pay for level V of the Executive 
     Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(e) Access to Intelligence Information.--(1) The Director 
     of National Intelligence shall transmit to the Council each 
     national intelligence estimate concerning al-Qaeda and other 
     foreign terrorist organizations.
       ``(2) Upon request of the Council, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall make available to the Council any 
     intelligence information in the possession of the 
     intelligence community.
       ``(3) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure 
     that the appropriate executive departments and agencies 
     cooperate with the Council in expeditiously providing to the 
     members and staff appropriate security clearances in a manner 
     consistent with existing procedures and requirements.
       ``(f) Applicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.--
     Section 14(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 
     U.S.C. App.), relating to the termination of advisory 
     committees, shall not apply to the Council.
       ``(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for 
     each of fiscal years 2012 through 2017. No amount is 
     authorized to carry out this section for a fiscal year unless 
     the appropriation for the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence for such fiscal year is reduced by an amount 
     equal to the amount appropriated to carry out this section 
     for such fiscal year.''.
       (c) Initial Report.--The initial report required to be 
     submitted under section 120(b)(2) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be filed not 
     later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 119B 
     the following:
``Sec. 120. Counterterrorism Competitive Analysis Council.''.

  Mr. WOLF. I have a modification at the desk, and I ask unanimous 
consent for its consideration.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment No. 2:
       Strike the entire text of the amendment and insert the 
     following:
       At the end of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 312. COUNTERTERRORISM COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS COMMISSION.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) terrorism and domestic radicalization represent 
     evolving and dynamic threats to the United States;
       (2) biases and group think can prevent intelligence 
     analysts from detecting important changes in such threats 
     that can prevent the detection and prevention of terrorist 
     attacks; and
       (3) competitive and alternative intelligence analysis are 
     important tools to prevent biases and group think from 
     resulting in analytical failures and can help the 
     intelligence community and policy makers better understand 
     the nature of complex threats to the United States.
       (b) Establishment.--There is established a Commission to be 
     known as the ``Counterterrorism Competitive Analysis 
     Commission'' (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Commission'').
       (c) Duties.--
       (1) Study.--The Commission shall conduct a study on--
       (A) how the elements of the intelligence community use red 
     teams, alternative analysis, and competitive analysis of 
     foreign intelligence to address domestic radicalization;
       (B) whether such analysis is timely, objective, based upon 
     all sources of available foreign intelligence, and employs 
     the standards of proper analytic tradecraft; and
       (C) the feasibility and advisability of establishing a 
     permanent entity to--
       (i) advise the Director on matters of policy relating to 
     the threats of international terrorism and domestic 
     radicalization;
       (ii) prepare competitive analyses of national intelligence 
     estimates prepared by the intelligence community and submit 
     such analyses to the Director and the National Intelligence 
     Commission; and
       (iii) annually submit to Congress a report in unclassified 
     form, which may include a classified annex, on trends in 
     counterterrorism and domestic radicalization, including a 
     summary of any competitive analyses referred to in clause 
     (ii).
       (2) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report containing the 
     results of the study under paragraph (1).
       (d) Members.--
       (1) Appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of six 
     members selected on the basis of previous experience with 
     matters of policy relating to international terrorism, 
     intelligence analysis, and domestic radicalization, of whom--
       (A) 2 members shall be appointed by the President;
       (B) 1 member shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House 
     of Representatives;
       (C) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of 
     the House of Representatives;
       (D) 1 member shall be appointed by the majority leader of 
     the Senate; and
       (E) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of 
     the Senate.
       (2) Qualifications.--An individual may not be appointed to 
     the Commission under paragraph (1) if such individual has 
     served as an officer or employee of the Federal Government 
     within a three-year period of the date of appointment.
       (3) Compensation.--To the extent provided in advance in 
     appropriation Acts, each member of the Commission shall be 
     paid consistent with the skill and experience of such member 
     at a rate not to exceed the annual rate of basic pay for 
     level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 
     5, United States Code.
       (4) Actions of commission.-- Any member of the Commission 
     may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action which 
     the Commission is authorized to take by this section.
       (e) Staff of Commission.--
       (1) Compensation.--To the extent provided in advance in 
     appropriation Acts, the Commission shall appoint and fix the 
     compensation of a Director and such additional staff as may 
     be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its 
     duties.
       (2) Rate of pay.-- The Director and staff of the Commission 
     may be appointed without

[[Page 13273]]

     regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, 
     governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be 
     paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and 
     subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to 
     classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that 
     the rate of pay fixed for the Director and staff may not 
     exceed the annual rate of basic pay for level V of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (3) Experts and consultants.-- In accordance with rules 
     adopted by the Commission, and to the extent provided in 
     advance in appropriation Acts, the Commission may procure the 
     services of experts and consultants under section 3109(b) of 
     title 5, United States Code, but at rates for individuals not 
     to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic 
     pay for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (f) Security Clearances.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall ensure that the appropriate executive 
     departments and agencies cooperate with the Commission in 
     expeditiously providing to the members and staff appropriate 
     security clearances in a manner consistent with existing 
     procedures and requirements.
       (g) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on the 
     date that is 30 days after the date on which the Commission 
     submits the report required under subsection (c)(2), or on 
     the date that is 395 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, whichever is earlier.

  Mr. WOLF (during the reading). I ask unanimous consent to dispense 
with the reading.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the reading of the amendment, as 
modified, is dispensed with.
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Wolf) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. WOLF. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to personally thank Mr. Rogers and his staff for helping with 
regard to this amendment with regard to radicalization, and I also want 
to thank Mr. Ruppersberger. Also, as somebody who has served here for a 
number of years, I want to say that I don't think there have been two 
finer chairmen and ranking members of the Intelligence Committee since 
I've been here. I think it's very impressive to see that, and I just 
want everyone up here, particularly in the country, to know that.
  Very briefly, Madam Chair, this amendment deals with radicalization. 
I won't go into the whole statement, but I will just read several 
examples of radicalization that have taken place in northern Virginia.
  In October 2010, Farooque Ahmed from Ashburn, in my congressional 
district of Vienna, was arrested for allegedly plotting attacks on the 
Washington Metro system, targeting Metro stations to find optimal times 
to kill as many innocent people as possible.
  In July 2010, Zachary Chesser, a graduate of nearby Oakton High 
School, which is very close to where I live, was arrested in New York 
en route to join al Shabaab in Somalia. Late last year, Chesser pled 
guilty to charges of providing material support to terrorists, 
communicating threats and soliciting crimes of violence, and was 
sentenced to 30 years in prison.
  In November 2009, five American teenagers from Fairfax County, 
Virginia, were arrested in Pakistan, attempting to join militant 
Islamist organizations. They have been sentenced to 10 years in a 
Pakistan prison.
  In November 2009, Virginia native Army Major Nidal Hassan attacked 
Fort Hood in Texas and was charged with the shooting deaths of 13 
service men and women and civilians. Hassan was a graduate of Virginia 
Tech and grew up in Arlington County and Roanoke, Virginia.
  In 2004, Abdul Rahman al-Amoudi from Falls Church, Virginia, was 
convicted on three charges of terrorist financing and conspiring to 
assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and was sentenced to 23 years 
in jail.
  In 2003, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a northern Virginia resident and the 
Islamic Saudi Academy's 1999 valedictorian, was arrested in Saudi 
Arabia and was later convicted in Federal District Court in Alexandria 
of conspiracy to commit terrorism, including a plot to assassinate 
President Bush. He was sentenced to life in prison.
  Probably the number one terrorist threat today is Aulaqi, who is an 
American citizen and who went to college on American taxpayers' money. 
He was with a mosque in northern Virginia, in Falls Church, which used 
to be in my old congressional district. So this issue of radicalization 
is very important.
  Again, I want to thank the chairman and his staff and Mr. 
Ruppersberger and his staff.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1000

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I claim time in opposition to the amendment, 
although I do not intend to oppose it.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I just want to thank my friend, the gentleman from 
Virginia, for his involvement in all national security issues. We serve 
together on the Commerce-Justice Subcommittee in Appropriations and we 
work together on gangs. So I appreciate your focus on this area to 
protect the citizens of our country and our district.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by 
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf).
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in 
part B of House Report 112-200.
  The Chair understands that amendment No. 4 will not be offered.


                  Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Holt

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in 
part B of House Report 112-200.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle A of title IV, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 405. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THE IMPACT OF 
                   REVOLUTIONS IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE 
                   EAST.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to Congress a national intelligence estimate on the impact of 
     the recent revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East on 
     the security of the State of Israel.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, many have expressed deep concern about the 
security situation in the Middle East. There are many hopeful signs 
from the so-called Arab Spring, but there are also concerns about the 
security of Israel and neighboring States.
  Several among us and among my constituents expressed concern some 
months ago about what would happen with a weakened border between Egypt 
and Israel. And, as we all know, on August 18 several groups of 
terrorists killed eight Israelis, wounded several more in attacks along 
the road leading to Eilat.
  This is just one example of what we need to pay attention to in the 
area. Will Egypt become a staging ground for more terrorist attacks 
against Israel? Can al Qaeda gain new safe haven in any of the 
countries undergoing massive political change? We hope not, I would 
like to think not, but it is important that we have good, solid 
intelligence assessments of the situation.
  My amendment would direct the Director of National Intelligence to 
submit to Congress within half a year of passage of this law an 
estimate on the implications of these revolutions for the security of 
the State of Israel and to report to Congress in a way that is 
accessible to all Members of Congress on the implications of the so-
called Arab Spring and the changes in the countries around the area.

[[Page 13274]]

  This amendment is for obvious reasons. Israel is an important ally 
and really is founded on principles of law and fairness and justice, 
and we want to see those values upheld and extended.
  I recognized, in conversations with Chairman Rogers and the ranking 
member, that an amendment to this legislation is, perhaps, not the best 
way to accomplish this. So in a moment I will ask unanimous consent to 
withdraw the amendment, giving notice to the Chair, but with the 
understanding that we will make this same request of the Director of 
National Intelligence by way of a letter and that we will have 
available to Members of Congress this estimate of this security 
situation.
  I thank the chairman and the ranking member very much for their 
cooperation on this. They are fully aware of this, which is partly why 
it is not necessary to offer an amendment to that effect.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I appreciate the gentleman for working with 
us. It is an important issue, and you have our commitment from myself 
and, I believe, the ranking member to coordinate this particular 
report.
  I appreciate the gentleman's consideration, because it will allow the 
community to prioritize it. It may take 3 weeks or longer, or 3 weeks 
shorter than an amendment might call for, but it allows them to adjust 
according to the demands at the particular time on the intelligence 
community. For that, I want to thank the gentleman, and I look forward 
to working with him on the issue.
  Mr. HOLT. Reclaiming my time, having served on the Intelligence 
Committee until this year for a number of years, I am very much aware 
of the constraints that are sometimes placed on the agencies by lots of 
reports due on lots of dates.
  I look forward to working with the chairman and the ranking member to 
see that we get this estimate done in the most constructive way.
  With that, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the pending amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  There was no objection.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Hunter

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in 
part B of House Report 112-200.
  Mr. HUNTER. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       After section 501 (page 51, after line 18), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 502. STRATEGY TO COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

       (a) Strategy.--
       (1) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Secretary of Defense shall establish a coordinated 
     strategy utilizing all available personnel and assets for 
     intelligence collection and analysis to identify and counter 
     network activity and operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
     relating to the development and use of improvised explosive 
     devices.
       (2) Contents.--The strategy established under paragraph (1) 
     shall identify--
       (A) the networks that design improvised explosive devices, 
     provide training on improvised explosive device assembly and 
     employment, and smuggle improvised explosive device 
     components into Afghanistan;
       (B) the persons and organizations not directly affiliated 
     with insurgents in Afghanistan who knowingly enable the 
     movement of commercial products and material used in 
     improvised explosive device construction from factories and 
     vendors in Pakistan into Afghanistan;
       (C) the financiers, financial networks, institutions, and 
     funding streams that provide resources to the insurgency in 
     Afghanistan; and
       (D) the links to military, intelligence services, and 
     government officials who are complicit in allowing the 
     insurgent networks in Afghanistan to operate.
       (b) Report and Implementation.--Not later than 120 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall--
       (1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees and 
     the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate a report containing the 
     strategy established under subsection (a); and
       (2) implement such strategy.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Hunter) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. HUNTER. Madam Chair, my amendment is pretty simple. It requests 
that the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
Defense, 120 days after the passage of this bill, submit a plan and 
execute the plan to develop a coordinated strategy between our 
intelligence communities and our Department of Defense to go after IED 
manufacturers and IED transporters between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
  The majority of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan come from 
Pakistan. We know where a lot of those IED manufacturers are, but our 
DOD is not able to execute the strategy of going after those IED 
manufacturers and the people that transport them across the border on 
their own. They need the intelligence community and the 16 agencies 
which make up that community to be on their side.
  More than 80 percent of the explosive devices used against our U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan have homemade explosives as the main charge and 
are almost exclusively derived from calcium ammonium nitrate fertilizer 
produced in Pakistan. Homemade explosives are also called HMEs.
  The vast majority of IED components, including commercial explosives, 
radio-control triggers, and HME precursors are sourced from and/or 
transmitted through Pakistan. The continued uncontrolled availability 
of ammonium nitrate and other HME precursor materials smuggled into 
Afghanistan from Pakistan is the most significant factor contributing 
to the Afghan IED problem. Over 70 percent of our casualties in 
Afghanistan come from these homemade IEDs.
  IEDs are also a problem in Pakistan and to the Pakistani people. 
Since January of 2011, more than 500 people have been killed and over 
14,000 people have been injured by IEDs in Pakistan.
  The Afghanistan IED threat cannot be defeated without addressing the 
networks and precursors in Pakistan. To defeat the Pakistan-produced 
HME-fueled IEDs in Afghanistan, the solution requires integrated 
efforts and leveraging of the combined authorities, policies, and 
capabilities of many agencies of our government, coalition partners, 
and especially the intelligence community.
  We need to identify the key facilitators of raw materials supplying 
the HME pipeline into Afghanistan. We also need to identify specific 
financial networks and funding streams for these HME networks, as well 
as identify these key financiers.
  That's what my amendment does. It makes the intelligence community 
and the defense community get together, submit a plan, and execute that 
plan to work on the same page, because right now there is a severe gap 
between what the DOD considers its number 1 priority, our defense guys 
over there, our soldiers and marines on the ground; their number 1 
priority is different from the intelligence community's number one 
priority.

                              {time}  1010

  The intelligence community right now goes after high-value targets. 
They go after the bad guys wherever they may be found, but they need to 
work together on these IEDs coming over from Pakistan. It's the only 
way we can defeat them.
  With that, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to accept 
my amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I claim time in opposition, although 
I am not opposed to the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First, I just want to acknowledge the gentleman's 
service. You have been on the field. I think IEDs are one of the 
biggest

[[Page 13275]]

threats that we have to our men and women in theater, and I strongly 
support that we move forward with your amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HUNTER. Madam Chair, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Michigan, Chairman Rogers.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I thank the gentleman from California.
  This is an important amendment. These are issues we have been working 
on in committee; and I can tell you, we have been a tad bit frustrated 
at that lack of coordination. I think it is unfortunate it took this 
amendment as a part of the Intelligence bill to continue to put 
pressure on the administration to get their act together on this 
particular issue. It is an issue we absolutely must solve, not only for 
the safety and security of the men and women who serve in our Armed 
Forces in Afghanistan, but also for the greater impact on the war on 
terror. I strongly urge support of the Hunter amendment.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Hunter).
  The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be 
postponed.


                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Carney

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in 
part B of House Report 112-200.
  Mr. CARNEY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Insert after section 501 the following new section:

     SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRIORITY OF RAILWAY 
                   TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the nation's railway transportation (including subway 
     transit) network is broad and technically complex, requiring 
     robust communication between private sector stakeholders and 
     the intelligence community to identify, monitor, and respond 
     to threats;
       (2) the Department of Homeland Security Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis maintains a constructive 
     relationship with other Federal agencies, state and local 
     governments, and private entities to safeguard our railways; 
     and
       (3) railway transportation security (including subway 
     transit security) should continue to be prioritized in the 
     critical infrastructure threat assessment developed by the 
     Office of Intelligence and Analysis and included in threat 
     assessment budgets of the intelligence community.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from 
Delaware (Mr. Carney) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Delaware.
  Mr. CARNEY. Madam Chair, I rise to recognize the importance of rail 
security in the effort to access, prepare for, and neutralize terrorist 
threats to our critical infrastructure. While roughly 1.7 million 
passengers ride in domestic and international air flights daily, every 
weekday 34 million Americans ride on trains and transit systems.
  We have seen the tragic consequences of attacks to rail and subway 
systems in Britain, Spain, and India. We know al Qaeda was looking to 
target American rail systems this year. An attack on our rail system 
here in the United States would simply be devastating.
  Earlier this year, the House adopted an amendment I offered to the 
fiscal year 2011 Intelligence Authorization Act. There was broad 
bipartisan support for making rail security an intelligence priority. I 
continue to believe we must address the security vulnerabilities in our 
rail and transit systems. Our intelligence community does great work to 
coordinate with those who own and operate trains and rail lines. In 
particular, the Office of Intelligence Analysis within the Department 
of Homeland Security develops a threat assessment for critical 
infrastructure.
  My amendment is a simple amendment. It affirms the importance of 
assessments and information sharing conducted by intelligence analysts. 
It expresses the sense of Congress that the intelligence community must 
continue to prioritize rail security in identifying and preventing 
terrorist threats.
  As a near daily rider of Amtrak myself, I want to know that the 
United States Government is doing all it can to keep my fellow 
passengers and rail passengers across the country safe. I urge my 
colleagues to support this amendment. I thank you for your 
consideration.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I claim time in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Again, I appreciate the gentleman's concern 
for rail security. It is an incredibly important issue. I continue to 
believe, as I did the last go-round, this is not the right place for 
this. I have agreed not to officially oppose his amendment.
  I just want to again remind individuals that this is 17 agencies 
across the whole spectrum of intelligence work. And for Congress to 
step in and say rail priority, even if their agency might be satellite 
oriented, just does not make a lot of sense to me; and I know it won't 
make a lot of sense to them as well.
  Again, I agree that rail security is incredibly important. We have 
segments of the intelligence community, and I want to re-emphasize 
segments, and here in our homeland security, that worry about rail 
security, and I argue that would be a better place for this amendment. 
As I said, I will not officially oppose it. I have made no official 
recommendation. Again, I appreciate the gentleman's position. I will be 
voting ``no,'' but I would tell the rest of the Members to do what they 
see fit.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CARNEY. In closing, I would like to thank the chair. I appreciate 
his position on this. I thank him for not officially opposing it and 
ask for support from everyone in the Chamber.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Delaware (Mr. Carney).
  The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CARNEY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from Delaware will be postponed.
  The Chair understands that amendment No. 8 will not be offered.


                 Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Keating

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in 
part B of House Report 112-200.
  Mr. KEATING. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       After section 501 (page 51, after line 18), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTEGRATION OF FUSION 
                   CENTERS.

       It is the sense of Congress that ten years after the 
     terrorist attacks upon the United States on September 11, 
     2001, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 
     with the Director of National Intelligence, should continue 
     to integrate and leverage fusion centers to enlist all of the 
     intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security 
     capabilities of the United States in a manner that is 
     consistent with the Constitution to prevent acts of terrorism 
     against the United States.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Madam Chair; and thank you, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, for allowing me to present this timely amendment to the 
FY12 Intelligence authorization.
  Madam Chair, there are 72 fusion centers throughout the United 
States, including one in Massachusetts, which is also the home of the 
sole joint terrorism task force that is housed in an airport. However, 
as noted yesterday by Mr. Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the 9/11 
Commission, during the Committee

[[Page 13276]]

on Homeland Security hearing, which dealt with looking back 10 years 
after 9/11, all 72 fusion centers have varying degrees of quality, and 
this results in gaps in communication. Gaps in sharing, such as 
agencies' failure to link information about the individual who 
attempted the December 25, 2009, airline bombing, prevented him from 
being included in the Federal Government's terrorist watch list, a tool 
used by DHS to screen for persons who pose a significant security 
threat.
  This week, the GAO released a report to the Department of Homeland 
Security recommending that DHS improve its assistance and services to 
State and local homeland security partners and streamline some of the 
information-sharing mechanisms.
  Furthermore, in July 2011, DHS reported that it established 
performance measures for assessing its information-sharing efforts. 
These measures include, for example, the percent of intelligence 
reports customers rated as satisfactory, enabling customers to 
anticipate emergency threats.
  DHS plans to report on these metrics beginning in fiscal year 2012. 
While these are positive steps, GAO's work has shown that developing 
outcome-based performance measures that gauge information-sharing 
efforts are really necessary to strengthen the accountability of these 
efforts, and we are still waiting for DHS to implement these steps.
  Now, as a former district attorney of over a decade, I understand how 
critical it is to share information and how not sharing that 
information enhances and enables critical activity. That, indeed, 
carries over to terrorists themselves.

                              {time}  1020

  This amendment encourages this type of streamlining process by 
further integrating and leveraging fusion centers to enlist all the 
intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security capabilities in the 
United States in a manner that's consistent with the Constitution to 
prevent acts of terrorism against the United States of America. It was 
just a few months ago that Secretary Napolitano in testimony before the 
Homeland Security Committee said that the threat of terrorism is at its 
most heightened state since 9/11. That's what she's saying now.
  So I encourage all Members to vote for this amendment, as well as the 
manager's amendment, to strengthen this bill and incorporate all the 
elements of the intelligence community, particularly trying to merge 
information, enhance sharing of information with State and local 
officials who have their ear to the ground.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I claim time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Again, I appreciate the gentleman's interest 
here. I don't know any organization that we established not to operate 
under the rules and construct of the Constitution of the United States. 
It is a little bit redundant, in my perspective; and also we deal with 
these issues through IGs, we do this through congressional oversight, 
and we deal with this in the classified annex. I would encourage the 
gentleman to take a look at the classified annex. A lot of the work 
that we do is to make sure that these organizations are functioning 
according to rules, regulation, and constitutional law.
  I am not going to oppose his amendment. I have no recommendation. I 
do think, however, it's probably not well placed in this particular 
piece of legislation.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. KEATING. I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First, I support this amendment. The amendment 
would include a sense of Congress language to encourage the Director of 
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
integrate the intelligence-sharing capability of fusion centers and 
leverage participation from all intelligence, law enforcement, and 
homeland security agencies to prevent acts of terrorism against the 
United States.
  I thank the gentleman for this amendment, which is very timely as we 
approach the 10th anniversary of September 11. The Intelligence 
Committee is holding a series of open hearings in order to acknowledge 
the progress made in the intelligence and national security community 
since 9/11 and to identify areas that will need improvement.
  One area we will explore is Federal collaboration with first 
responders at State and local levels. The Bipartisan Policy Center and 
the former cochairman of the 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, recently 
issued a report about our national response to 9/11 over the last 10 
years. They found that Federal and local information sharing is still 
not as good as it could be.
  The proposed sense of Congress is consistent with the findings of 
numerous organizations, but our Nation still requires better 
integration of intelligence. I therefore urge a ``yes'' vote on the 
amendment.
  Also, I acknowledge the fact you are a former prosecutor. I am a 
former prosecutor. Our chairman is a former FBI agent.
  Mr. KEATING. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                       Announcement by the Chair

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will now 
resume on those amendments printed in part B of House Report 112-200 on 
which further proceedings were postponed, in the following order:
  Amendment No. 6 by Mr. Hunter of California.
  Amendment No. 7 by Mr. Carney of Delaware.
  The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Hunter

  The CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) 
on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 397, 
noes 0, not voting 34, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 695]

                               AYES--397

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amash
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Benishek
     Berg
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canseco
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva

[[Page 13277]]


     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Heinrich
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hochul
     Holt
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Inslee
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Kucinich
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lummis
     Lynch
     Mack
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHenry
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Olver
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quayle
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Speier
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--34

     Akin
     Bachmann
     Barletta
     Barton (TX)
     Becerra
     Bishop (UT)
     Brown (FL)
     Cardoza
     Diaz-Balart
     Engel
     Filner
     Giffords
     Granger
     Higgins
     Holden
     Honda
     Johnson (GA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Marino
     McCotter
     Miller, Gary
     Neal
     Paul
     Pitts
     Reyes
     Sullivan
     Thompson (PA)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  1053

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Madam Chair, on rollcall 695, I was unable to vote. Had I 
been present, I would have voted ``aye.''


                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Carney

  The CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Carney) on 
which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 303, 
noes 92, not voting 36, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 696]

                               AYES--303

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cohen
     Cole
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     Deutch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleming
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayworth
     Heinrich
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hochul
     Holt
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Kucinich
     Lance
     Landry
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lynch
     Mack
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree (ME)
     Platts
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Renacci
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Rogers (AL)
     Rokita
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walz (MN)
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (IN)

                                NOES--92

     Amash
     Benishek
     Berg
     Black
     Blackburn
     Boustany
     Broun (GA)
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Canseco
     Carter
     Chaffetz
     Coffman (CO)
     Conaway
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     DesJarlais
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Farenthold
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Foxx
     Garrett
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gowdy
     Graves (GA)
     Hall
     Hartzler
     Hastings (WA)
     Heck
     Hensarling
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Long
     Lummis
     Marchant
     McClintock
     McHenry
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Murphy (PA)
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Quayle
     Reichert
     Ribble
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rooney
     Ross (FL)
     Royce
     Schilling
     Schock
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Smith (NE)
     Southerland
     Stutzman
     Thornberry
     Walsh (IL)
     West
     Westmoreland
     Womack
     Woodall

                             NOT VOTING--36

     Akin
     Bachmann
     Barletta
     Barton (TX)
     Bishop (UT)
     Brown (FL)
     Cardoza
     Diaz-Balart
     Engel
     Filner
     Giffords
     Granger
     Higgins
     Holden
     Honda
     Johnson (GA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Marino
     McCotter

[[Page 13278]]


     Miller, Gary
     Neal
     Paul
     Petri
     Pitts
     Reyes
     Smith (TX)
     Sullivan
     Thompson (PA)
     Van Hollen
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  1100

  Mrs. BLACK changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. PENCE and Ms. HAYWORTH changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Madam Chair, on rollcall No. 696, I was unable to vote. 
Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
  Mr. PETRI. Madam Chair, I inadvertently did not vote on the Carney 
amendment to H.R. 1892. I would have voted for adoption of the 
amendment.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. AKIN. Madam Chair, on rollcall Nos. 695 and 696, I was delayed 
and unable to vote. Had I been present I would have voted ``aye'' on 
both.


                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION

  Mr. WITTMAN. Madam Chair, on rollcall Nos. 695 and 696, I was 
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on 
695 and ``aye'' on 696.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Grimm) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Miller of Michigan, Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1892) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and, pursuant 
to House Resolution 392, reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Pursuant to clause 1(c) of rule XIX, further consideration of H.R. 
1892 is postponed.

                          ____________________