[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 157 (2011), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 10560-10562]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN:
  S. 1336. A bill to prevent immigration fraud and for other purposes; 
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Immigration 
Fraud Prevention Act of 2011. This legislation would provide a much-
needed tool for prosecutors to use to combat the exploitative actions 
of fraudulent lawyers and consultants who take advantage of individuals 
seeking immigration assistance.
  The Immigration Fraud Prevention Act would punish fraud and 
misrepresentation in the context of immigration proceedings. The act 
would create a new Federal crime to penalize those who engage in 
schemes to defraud immigrants.
  Specifically, the act would make it a Federal crime to knowingly and 
falsely represent that an individual is an attorney or accredited 
representative authorized to represent aliens in immigration 
proceedings; and to knowingly defraud or receive money or anything of 
value from any person by false or fraudulent pretences, 
representations, or promises.
  Violations of these crimes would result in a fine, imprisonment of 
not more than 5 years, or both.
  The bill would also work to combat immigration fraud by increasing 
the awareness of notario fraud to immigrants.
  The bill would require immigration courts to provide immigrants in 
removal proceedings with information about notario fraud.
  The bill would require the Justice Department to compile and make 
available to the public a list of individuals and organizations that 
have been convicted of immigration fraud; and permit only people who 
have, within a 12-month period, represented immigrants pro bono appear 
on the Justice Department's list of pro bono legal services.
  By enacting this bill, Congress would help prevent more victims like 
Mr. Ibarra, a Mexican national and father of four, who has resided in 
Los Angeles since 1988. Mr. Ibarra hired a so-called ``immigration 
specialist'' and paid him over $7,500. In his apartment, Mr. Ibarra 
keeps reams of documents that the immigration consultant claimed to 
have filed on his behalf but never did--as Mr. Ibarra subsequently 
learned from immigration authorities when he was placed into removal 
proceedings. I wish I could tell you that this kind of egregious 
behavior is uncommon, but sadly, that is not the case.
  Last November, the San Francisco City Attorney filed a lawsuit 
against a former lawyer who ran an illicit immigration law practice. In 
the three decades in which the lawyer was licensed to practice law, he 
was reported on numerous occasions to the California bar for his 
unethical behavior that included collecting exorbitant fees; 
representing clients in a negligent manner; and misleading immigrants 
with assurances of favorable outcomes.
  Eventually, the lawyer resigned from the legal profession and was 
prohibited from representing clients before the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. The terms of his resignation prevented him from practicing law 
or portraying himself as eligible to practice law. Instead of abiding 
by these terms, the lawyer proceeded to set up another law practice 
through which he defrauded over two hundred immigrants, depleting many 
of these victims of their entire life savings.
  I am pleased that last month the Federal Government partnered with 
State prosecutors and immigration advocacy organizations to launch a 
nationwide campaign to combat these harmful schemes. The enactment of 
this bill would enhance the government's ability to achieve the goals 
of this national campaign by providing prosecutors with a tough new 
Federal criminal law that could be used to convict fraudulent-lawyers 
and consultants who prey on immigrants.
  Mr. President, I urge support for the Immigration Fraud Prevention 
Act of 2011.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1336

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Immigration Fraud Prevention 
     Act of 2011''.

     SEC. 2. MISREPRESENTATION.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 1041. Misrepresentation

       ``Any person who knowingly and falsely represents that such 
     person is, or holds himself or herself out as, an attorney, 
     an accredited representative, or any person authorized to 
     represent any other person before any court or agency of the 
     United States in any removal proceeding or any other case or 
     matter arising under the immigration laws (as defined in 
     section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) shall be fined under this title, 
     imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.''.
       (b) Table of Sections Amendment.--The table of sections for 
     chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding after the item relating to section 1040 the following:

``Sec. 1041. Misrepresentation.''.

     SEC. 3. IMMIGRATION SCHEMES TO DEFRAUD ALIENS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 63 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 1352. Immigration schemes to defraud aliens

       ``Any person who, in connection with any matter arising 
     under the immigration laws (as defined in section 101(a)(17) 
     of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) 
     or any matter the offender claims or represents to arise 
     under such immigration laws, knowingly executes a scheme or 
     artifice to--
       ``(1) defraud any person; or
       ``(2) obtain or receive money or anything else of value 
     from any person by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
     representations, or promises,

     shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 
     years, or both.''.
       (b) Table of Sections Amendment.--The table of sections for 
     chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 1352. Immigration schemes to defraud aliens.''.

     SEC. 4. LISTS OF COUNSEL FOR ALIENS.

       Section 239(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1229(b)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(2) Current lists of counsel.--The Attorney General shall 
     compile and update, not less frequently than quarterly, lists 
     of persons who, during the most recent 12 months, have 
     provided pro bono representation of aliens in proceedings 
     under section 240 that--
       ``(A) include a description of who may represent the alien 
     in the proceedings, including a notice that immigration 
     consultants, visa consultants, and other unauthorized 
     individuals may not provide such representation; and
       ``(B) shall be provided in accordance with subsection 
     (a)(1)(E) and otherwise made generally available.''.

     SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON REPRESENTATION.

       Section 239(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1229(b)) is amended--

[[Page 10561]]

       (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) List of prohibitions.--The Attorney General shall--
       ``(A) compile a list of specific individuals, 
     organizations, and practices that the Attorney General has 
     determined are prohibited in the provision of representation 
     in immigration proceedings, including individuals who have 
     been convicted for a violation of section 1041 or 1352 of 
     title 18, United States Code;
       ``(B) update the list compiled pursuant to subparagraph (A) 
     not less frequently than quarterly; and
       ``(C) make such list available to the general public.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. WHITEHOUSE:
  S. 1338. A bill to amend chapter 5 of title 31, United States Code, 
to establish the Office of Regulatory Integrity within the Office of 
Management and Budget; to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs.
  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I rise to speak about two bills that I 
am introducing today to address a serious and persistent threat to the 
integrity of our government: regulatory capture.
  Over the last 50 years, Congress has tasked an alphabet soup of 
regulatory agencies to administer our laws through rule-making, 
adjudication, and enforcement. Protecting the proper functioning of 
these regulatory agencies has led me to the topic of regulatory 
capture. I held a hearing on the subject last year in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and now am filing two bills that will make our 
government more resistant to the ever-growing power of special 
interests. I urge my colleagues to join me in passing these important 
good-government measures.
  At bottom, regulatory capture is a threat to democratic government. 
``We the People'' pass laws through a democratic and open process. 
Powerful interests then seek to ``capture'' the regulatory agencies 
that enforce those laws so that they can avoid their intended effect, 
turning laws passed to protect the public interest into regulations and 
enforcement practices that benefit limited private interests.
  This concept of ``regulatory capture'' is well-established in 
regulatory and economic theory.
  In 1913, Woodrow Wilson wrote this: ``If the government is to tell 
big business men how to run their business, then don't you see that big 
business men .  .  . must capture the government, in order not to be 
restrained too much by it?''
  The first dean of the Woodrow Wilson School, Marver Bernstein, wrote 
that a regulatory commission will tend over time to ``become more 
concerned with the general health of the industry,'' and try ``to 
prevent changes which will adversely affect'' the industry. This, he 
said, ``is a problem of ethics and morality as well as administrative 
method''; ``a blow to democratic government and responsible political 
institutions.'' Ultimately he said it leads to ``surrender'': ``The 
commission finally becomes a captive of the regulated groups.''
  Regulatory capture has been the subject of work by Nobel laureate 
George Stigler in his article ``The Theory of Economic Regulation.'' 
Students of administrative law know how well established the doctrine 
of ``regulatory capture'' or ``agency capture'' is in that field.
  Last year, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute wrote in the Wall 
Street Journal about ``a striking example of regulatory capture.'' He 
described the phenomenon this way: ``Agencies tasked with protecting 
the public interest come to identify with the regulated industry and 
protect its interests against that of the public. The result: 
Government fails to protect the public.'' His example was the Minerals 
Management Service, in relation to the BP oil spill.
  The failures of MMS in the lead up to the oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, the cozy relationship between MMS officials and industry 
executives, and the shameful behavior of some MMS employees are 
archetypal symptoms of regulatory capture. But the report of the 
commission on the Gulf oil spill never mentioned ``regulatory 
capture.''
  That is a pretty strong signal that regulatory capture isn't getting 
the attention it deserves.
  When you think about the century-long academic and policy debate 
about regulatory capture, and when you look at the cost of recent 
disasters in areas regulated by the Minerals Management Service, the 
Mine Safety and Health Administration, and the Securities Exchange 
Commission, it seems pretty evident that Congress should be concerned 
not only about those prior incidents, but about addressing the threat 
of future regulatory capture. The experts I have spoken with in my home 
state of Rhode Island certainly understand that regulatory capture 
matters. They don't want a captured agency to allow the next oil spill 
or other man-made disaster to happen in our state, or for a financial 
agency to allow speculators to wipe out the savings of our citizens. 
Surely constituents of each of the members of this body would agree 
whole-heartedly.
  That is why I am introducing two pieces of legislation today.
  The first bill is called the Regulatory Capture Prevention Act. It 
would create an office within the Office of Management and Budget with 
the authority to investigate and report regulatory capture. The office 
would ensure that abuses were not overlooked, and sound the alarm if a 
regulatory agency were overwhelmed by a more sophisticated and better-
resourced regulated industry. Scrutiny and publicity are powerful tools 
for protecting the integrity of our regulatory agencies. This bill 
would employ them to prevent powerful interests from coopting our laws.
  The second bill is called the Regulatory Information Reporting Act. 
It would shed extra sunlight into regulatory agencies by requiring them 
to report to a public Web site the following: first, the name and 
affiliation of each party that comments on an agency regulation; 
second, whether that party affected the regulatory process; and 
finally, whether that party is an economic, noneconomic, or citizen 
interest. By centralizing this information for public and congressional 
scrutiny, the bill would create a simple dashboard for hints of 
regulatory capture in agency rulemaking.
  As the Senate considers these bills, we should remember how much 
agreement exists about regulatory capture. During the hearing I chaired 
on regulatory capture last year, all of the witnesses, from across the 
ideological spectrum, agreed on each of the following 7 propositions. 
First, regulatory capture is a real phenomenon and a threat to the 
integrity of government. Second, regulated entities have a concentrated 
incentive to gain as much influence as possible over regulators, 
opposed by a diffuse public interest. Third, regulated industries 
ordinarily have substantial organizational and resource advantages in 
the regulatory process when compared to public interest groups. Fourth, 
some regulatory processes lend themselves to gaming by regulated 
entities seeking undue control over regulation. Fifth, regulatory 
capture by its nature happens in the dark--done as quietly as possible; 
no industry puts up a flag announcing its capture of a regulatory 
agency. Sixth, the potential damage from regulatory capture is 
enormous. Finally, effective congressional oversight is key to keeping 
regulators focused on the public interest.
  With that as a starting point, I am hopeful that the Senate can agree 
on legislation to address this very real problem. Administrative law 
may not be the most glamorous subject, but I hope to work with 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle to eliminate regulatory capture.
  This is so important because for as long as there are regulatory 
agencies, regulated industries, and money, there will be efforts at 
regulatory capture. We owe it to our country to do everything possible 
to defeat such efforts to capture our government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people.

[[Page 10562]]



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