[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 157 (2011), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 8776-8778]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          TAIWAN AIR DEFENSES

  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, on February 23, 2011, the RAND Corporation 
released a report funded by and prepared for the U.S. Air Force 
entitled, ``Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth.'' This report 
provides a comprehensive review of the capabilities of the Chinese Air 
Force, and it is alarming. In less than a decade, China has transformed 
its air force from an antiquated service based on 1950s-era Soviet 
technology into a modern, highly capable 21st century air force. RAND 
predicts that, by approximately 2015, the weapon systems and platforms 
China is acquiring ``would make a Chinese air defense campaign, if 
conducted according to the principles described in Chinese military 
publications, highly challenging for U.S. air forces.''
  Without question, China's military expansion poses a clear and 
present danger to our longstanding ally, Taiwan--a threat that also has 
very serious implications for the United States. In its report, RAND 
predicts that, should the United States have to intervene in a conflict 
between Taiwan and China, the United States ``should expect attacks on 
its forces and facilities in the western Pacific, including those in 
Japan. . . . Chinese military writings, moreover, emphasize the 
advantages of preemptive and surprise attacks, so it is possible that 
Chinese attacks on U.S. forces in the western Pacific would precede a 
use of force against Taiwan.'' RAND further states that, in the event 
of a military conflict off of Taiwan, ``even if the United States 
intervened on a large scale,'' the ``capabilities of Taiwan's armed 
forces would also be critical to the outcome. . . . Defending Taiwan 
against air attack is feasible if Taiwan makes systematic, sustained, 
and carefully chosen investments.''
  These military investments by Taiwan are critical, due to the 
continuing deterioration of its air force. A January 21, 2010, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, DIA, report on the current condition of Taiwan's 
Air Force quantified its eroding air capability in stark terms: 
``Although Taiwan has nearly 400 combat aircraft in service, far fewer 
of these are operationally capable. Taiwan's F-5 fighters have reached 
the end of their operational service life, and while the indigenously 
produced F-CK-1 A/B Indigenous Defense Fighter, IDF, is a large 
component of Taiwan's active fighter force, it lacks the capability for 
sustained sorties. Taiwan's Mirage 2000-5 aircraft are technologically 
advanced, but they require frequent, expensive maintenance that 
adversely affects their operational readiness rate.''
  Last August, the Department of Defense, DOD, released its 2010 Annual 
Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving 
the People's Republic of China. It states: ``Cross-Strait economic and 
political ties continued to make important progress in 2009. Despite 
these positive trends, China's military buildup opposite the island 
[Taiwan] continues

[[Page 8777]]

unabated. The PLA is developing the capability to deter Taiwan 
independence or influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing's 
terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any 
possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict. The balance 
of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in China's favor.'' 
This report recounts that China has a total of approximately 2,300 
operational combat aircraft, including 330 fighters and 160 bombers 
stationed within range of Taiwan.
  These disturbing reports are just the latest warnings that highlight 
both China's military expansion and Taiwan's increasing need for new 
defensive weapons. Some have openly questioned whether selling arms to 
Taiwan is worth the political cost to the U.S.-China bilateral 
relationship. Surely, we would all prefer to have Taiwanese pilots 
flying Taiwanese fighter jets as the island's first line of defense, 
instead of American military pilots. Taiwan understands this, and it 
wants to remain the primary guarantor of its own freedom and democracy. 
A strong and robust defensive capability built on an air force capable 
of holding its own with China will promote a Beijing-Taipei detente 
that can build on the work President Ma has done to ease tensions and 
promote better economic ties with China. It remains to be seen how far 
the Obama administration's support extends to Taiwan and whether this 
administration will try to strategically counter the military rise of 
China.
  China should never be allowed to dictate U.S. policy, either directly 
or indirectly. That includes our decision to sell defensive weapons to 
an important democratic ally. Yet there is evidence that this 
administration is already bowing to Chinese pressure. According to a 
February 7, 2010, report by Defense News, China's extensive holdings of 
U.S. Government securities are already directly influencing U.S. 
national security policy. This article reports that, according to an 
unnamed Pentagon official, Obama administration officials softened a 
draft of a key national security document in order to avoid ``harsh 
words'' that ``might upset Chinese officials at a time when the United 
States and China are economically intertwined.'' The article indicates 
that Pentagon officials ``deleted several passages and softened others 
about China's military buildup.'' This critical document, the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review, QDR, is intended to provide an assessment 
of long-term threats and challenges for the Nation and to guide 
military programs, plans, and budgets in the coming decades.
  Although the QDR was watered down by administration officials, other 
reports effectively highlight the disparity between China's diplomatic 
rhetoric and its true intentions, as demonstrated by its rapid and 
robust military modernization effort. According to the DOD's 2010 
report on China, ``The pace and scope of China's military modernization 
have increased over the past decade,'' increasing ``China's options for 
using military force to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes 
in its favor.'' The DOD's report highlights to China's military 
modernization has been focused on ``improving its capacity for force 
projection and anti-access/area-denial.'' These modernization efforts 
are heavily focused on offensive capabilities, including the 
development of an antiship ballistic missile with a range in excess of 
1,500 km that is ``intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack 
ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean,'' as 
well as an active aircraft carrier research and development program. 
Moreover, PLA Air Force, PLAAF, Commander General Xu Giliang has 
emphasized the transformation of the PLAAF ``from a homeland defense 
focus to one that `integrates air and space,' and that possesses both 
`offensive and defensive' capabilities.''
  It is because of China's military rise and the troubling shift in the 
cross-Strait balance in China's favor that Taiwan recognizes its need 
to modernize its air force. As a result, Taiwan has made repeated 
requests to purchase new F-16 C/D aircraft from the United States since 
2006. Taiwan desperately needs these F-16s--a ``carefully chosen 
investment''--which are comparable to China's own domestically-
developed J-10 fighter aircraft.
  Yet despite a compelling argument, Taiwanese President Ma's requests 
to the United States to purchase these aircraft continue to be snubbed. 
In an interview with the Washington Post, President Ma said, ``Our 
objective in improving cross-strait relations is to seek peace and 
prosperity. However, the Republic of China (Taiwan) is a sovereign 
state; we must have our national defense. While we negotiate with the 
mainland, we hope to carry out such talks with sufficient self defense 
capabilities and not negotiate out of fear. This is an extremely 
important principle. Therefore, we must purchase the necessary 
defensive weapons from overseas that cannot be manufactured here in 
Taiwan to replace outdated ones. This is essential for our national 
survival and development.''
  Moreover, the United States has a statutory obligation under the 
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to provide Taiwan the defense articles and 
services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense 
capabilities, in furtherance of maintaining peace and stability in the 
western Pacific region. Our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act 
recognize that the key to maintaining peace and stability in Asia in 
the face of China's dramatic military expansion is ensuring a 
militarily strong and confident Taiwan.
  To that end, in early 2010, President Obama notified Congress of a 
$6.4 billion military sale to Taiwan. This was a welcome step, but it 
remains the only visible step the Obama administration has taken to 
provide Taiwan the defensive arms it needs, in accordance with our 
statutory obligations. While the administration dithers on Taiwan's 
request for F-16s, evidence continues to mount that what Taiwan 
desperately needs to restore the cross-Strait balance and regain the 
ability to defend its own airspace is new fighter aircraft to bolster 
an air force that is borderline obsolete.
  It is my understanding that the administration may favor selling 
Taiwan upgrade kits for its existing fleet of F-16 A/Bs, instead of 
selling Taiwan brand new fighters. Such a tradeoff will not enhance the 
security of Taiwan. What Taiwan's air force needs is new F-16s and the 
ability to deploy them in sufficient numbers to strengthen its 
defensive posture. Simply upgrading airframes that are more than 20 
years old is not a solution--it is nothing more than a public relations 
Band-Aid. Efforts to upgrade Taiwan's air fleet have to be coupled with 
the sale of new aircraft that can serve for two decades or more into 
the future.
  Another important consideration is the shrinking time window for this 
purchase. The continuing production of new F-16s is dependent on 
foreign sales. It is my understanding that, if no new overseas orders 
are secured this year, the thousands of U.S. suppliers who help build 
the F-16 will begin shuttering that capability. Once this happens, it 
will be very difficult and expensive to restart the supply chain. 
Washington has a longstanding habit of putting off difficult decisions, 
but the decision on whether to sell new F-16s to Taiwan is literally 
now or never.
  As the DIA report made clear, the majority of Taiwan's 400 fighter 
aircraft need to be retired or upgraded. Within the next 5 years, 
Taiwan will have to mothball or scrap more than 100 combat aircraft--
one-quarter of its current force. Without the ability to augment its 
air force with new F-16 aircraft, as well as updates to its existing 
fleet, Taiwan will lose all ability to project a defensive umbrella 
over the island. The repercussions of a rising and potentially 
aggressive China, able to dominate the airspace over Taiwan, demands 
the attention of our military planners, government officials, and 
Members of Congress because it opens the door for China to use force 
against Taiwan. To that end, I was proud to recently join with 43 of my 
Senate colleagues in sending a letter to President Obama urging him to 
act swiftly to provide Taiwan with the F-16s that are critical to 
preserving Taiwan's self-defense capabilities.

[[Page 8778]]

  It is time to recommit ourselves to strengthening the ties that bind 
the U.S. and Taiwan together--from arms sales to free-trade agreements. 
Doing so will promote peace and stability in the region, while also 
protecting U.S. and Taiwanese security interests. I urge President 
Obama and his administration to move quickly and work with Taiwan to 
notify the sale of these fighter jets to Congress.

                          ____________________