[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 157 (2011), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 8715-8718]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            NEW START TREATY

  Mr. KYL. The other subject I would like to address today is news on a 
totally different front, but it is a subject that will be familiar to 
us from last December when the Senate argued the New START treaty and 
ultimately passed it. I am going to speak primarily about questions of 
missile defense cooperation with Russia, which was a big part of that 
discussion.
  I wanted to first call attention to the fact that the Department of 
State released a fact sheet last Wednesday. It was entitled ``New START 
Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offense Arms''--a long title. But 
the statement from the State Department confirmed what we had argued 
during the time of this START debate and what I thought was pretty 
widely understood at the time, despite administration protestations to 
the contrary; namely that the New START treaty is perhaps the first 
bilateral treaty that resulted in U.S. unilateral reductions in nuclear 
forces.
  As this fact sheet makes clear, Russia was already below the deployed 
strategic forces and deployed delivery vehicle limits of the treaty 
when we ratified the treaty. This is something we tried to point out. 
We said this is not a two-way street. Russia has already reduced its 
weapons below the levels called for in the treaty. The only country 
that will have to reduce levels from what currently exists is the 
United States. Now this information is confirmed by the State 
Department. Even the Arms Control Association recognized this when it 
posted on its blog recently, on June 1:

       Why has Russia already met its obligations? Because Moscow 
     was in the process of retiring older strategic missiles while 
     the treaty was under negotiation.

  Exactly correct. This fact should not be overlooked, especially not 
as the administration undertakes a review of the nuclear deployment 
guidance and targeting and deterrence doctrines, which are designed, or 
so the administration claims, to be ``preparations for the next round 
of nuclear reductions.'' That is according to the President's National 
Security Adviser.
  I worry that the next round may also be a unilateral round where the 
United States makes all of the concessions, as occurred under the New 
START treaty.
  According to Gary Samore of the national security staff, at an Arms 
Control Association Conference, he said these may be ``unilateral steps 
that the U.S. could take.''
  Obviously, that is something we would be concerned about if we are 
making unilateral concessions while the Russians make none. He made one 
other point at the Arms Control Association. He said:

       We've reached the level in our forces where further 
     reductions will raise questions about whether we retain the 
     triad or whether we go to a system that is only a dyad. Those 
     are important considerations. Reductions below the level that 
     we have now are going to require some more fundamental 
     questions about force structure.

  When we speak of the triad or the dyad, remember the triad is the 
system we have had all throughout the Cold War that relies on a 
combination of ICBMs on land, submarine-based missiles at sea, and a 
bomber force that can deliver weapons from the air.
  As Mr. Samore points out, if we reduce our weapons levels even 
further, we will probably reach a point where instead of all three 
systems, we will only have two. So I think it is clear we have reached 
a breaking point where further reductions will require significant 
changes to the U.S. nuclear deterrent and could presumably alter the 
commitments that the administration made to the Senate as to the 
modernization of deterrent.

[[Page 8716]]

  During our debate on the START treaty, there were a lot of promises 
made about how we were going to retain the triad, and we were not going 
to eliminate further strategic weapons. Now those matters seem to be in 
doubt, and this is why, one of the reasons why, 41 Senators wrote to 
the President on March 22 and asked that the Senate be consulted about 
any further changes that the administration may choose to embark upon. 
And I want to be clear, it is a choice. There is no compelling 
justification to change the current U.S. nuclear posture. So this would 
be something the administration would be doing on its own.
  But I am concerned that in the National Security Adviser's letter--
responding to ours--on May 31 there was no reference to how the 
administration intended to keep the Senate involved as this process 
goes forward. I think it makes all the more clear the need to pass S. 
1097, the New START Implementation Act, which provides, as one of its 
provisions, for the Congress to be consulted before any changes are 
made to the nuclear guidance.
  I also look forward to an opportunity to discuss these matters with 
the President's nominee for Secretary of Defense, Mr. Leon Panetta. I 
will be curious to learn if he agrees with the 10-year commitments made 
to the Senate last year regarding the modernization of the nuclear 
deterrent, if he agrees with General Chilton who told the Senate that 
current levels of nuclear forces are exactly what is needed for 
deterrence, and also whether he agrees with Secretary Gates' recent 
comments at the American Enterprise Institute that nuclear 
modernization programs are absolutely critical.
  So it was on the basis of the administration's commitments to our 
nuclear modernization program that some Senators agreed to support or 
to ratify the New START treaty.
  Let me turn now to the question of missile defense. During the 
consideration of the New START treaty, many of us made the fundamental 
point that with respect to missile defense, there was no meeting of the 
minds between Russia and the United States.
  While the administration insisted that there were no restrictions on 
missile defense, either legal or otherwise, the Russian side believed 
that ``the linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled out in the 
accord and is legally binding.'' That was noted by Russian Foreign 
Minister Lavrov on April 6 of last year.
  Of course, the administration was never willing to share with the 
Senate the negotiating record that the Russian negotiators obviously 
were aware of. Sharing the record with us might have cleared up just 
what understandings the Russians think they received during the 
negotiation of the treaty.
  In order to secure Russian support for the New START treaty and 
assuage their misplaced concern about U.S. missile defense activities, 
the administration initiated talks with Russia to find common ground on 
missile defense cooperation, and it cancelled a third site deployment 
in Poland and the Czech Republic.
  Or, as Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher characterized the 
purpose of missile defense cooperation in a speech of May 19, 2010: 
``to turn what has been an irritant to U.S.-Russian relations into a 
shared interest.''
  Although administration officials might deny this, I believe Russian 
officials were under the impression that in return for Russian support 
for New START, the United States would provide Russia not only the 
opportunity for missile defense technical cooperation, but that Russia 
would also play a role in defining future U.S. and NATO missile defense 
plans. Thus, President Medvedev told the Russian General Assembly in 
December 2010:

       I'd like to speak plainly about the choice we face in the 
     next ten years: either we reach an agreement on missile 
     defense and create a meaningful joint mechanism for 
     cooperation, or if we fail to do so, a new round of the arms 
     race will begin and we will have to make decisions on the 
     deployment of new strike weapons.

  As it turns out, we didn't have long to wait until the Russians 
threatened this ``choice.'' In response to the recently concluded U.S. 
and Romanian agreement to base SM-3 block TB missiles in Romania in 
2015, President Medvedev has again threatened the U.S. and NATO with an 
arms race if these planned deployments go forward.
  On May 18, 2011, President Medvedev told a gathering of journalists 
in Moscow that ``if we don't [forge a missile defense cooperation 
model], we will have to take retaliatory measures, which we do not want 
to have to do. This will mean forcing the development of our strike 
nuclear potential.
  Medvedev went on to reiterate a warning issued by the Foreign 
Ministry that Moscow may pull out of the new START disarmament 
agreement in response to the United States' position on missile 
defense.
  This is precisely what many of us predicted would happen if we 
ratified the New START treaty in December. I didn't think it would 
happen quite so quickly.
  This point was reiterated by President Medvedev following the recent 
G-8 summit in Deauville, France when he said, ``We're wasting time . . 
. if we do not reach agreement by 2020, a new arms race will begin . . 
. I would like my partners to bear this in mind constantly.''
  The Russians are of one point of mind at the top of their leadership. 
They are threatening a new arms race. What they mean by that is, the 
United States reduces our capability to defend against missiles that 
could theoretically come from Russia.
  Is this the reset in relationships the administration promised? Did 
they manage to reset our relationship right back to the dark days of 
the Cold War?
  It appears from the comments of the President of the Russian 
Federation that this is precisely what happened.
  The Russian Foreign Minister has further said Russia needed ``legal 
assurances,'' that the proposed U.S. missile defense deployments were 
not aimed at Russian territory.
  Presumably, even the administration would agree no such ``legal 
assurance'' can be made.
  But, then again, could the administration include such an assurance 
in the Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement, MDCA, or the Defense 
Technology Cooperation Agreement, DTCA, the administration is 
discussing with the Russian Federation?
  Again, no Senator nor Senate staffer has been able to see the 
document that the administration has shared with Russian counterparts. 
So, we are left to wonder.
  Here we are, and the Senate, being part of the American Government, 
isn't even privy to what our administration is talking to the Russians 
about--matters on which eventually the administration is likely to seek 
our consent to. Remember, the Constitution provides for Senate advice 
and consent. What I have said before is if the Senate is to give its 
consent, we need an opportunity to provide some advice before the 
administration negotiates its agreements with Russia.
  Why not share these documents with the Senate--and the House--and 
remove any cause for concern, if, in fact, there is none?
  I also note Russian President Medvedev has sent a letter to the NATO-
Russia Counsel outlining Moscow's position on a common missile defense 
system--which differs significantly from NATO's conception of two 
independently operated missile defense systems sharing some form of 
early warning data. These are two very different things.
  And, it is not as if Members of Congress have been ambiguous about 
our concerns.
  Following a 14 April letter to the President signed by 39 Senators, 4 
Senators met with Senior Defense and State Department officials on May 
15 to again express our concerns about sharing sensitive missile 
defense technical and sensor data with the Russians, and to better 
understand the content and legal authority of the draft Defense 
Technology Cooperation Agreement and Missile Defense Cooperation 
Agreement being discussed with the Russians.
  Moreover, the House Armed Services Committee just incorporated the 
New START Implementation Act into its

[[Page 8717]]

version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 
as well as the amendment offered by Representative Brooks that will 
prohibit the sharing of sensitive missile defense technology and data.
  How will the United States and NATO respond to this latest Russian 
intimidation?
  Will NATO alter its plans to accommodate the Russian objective of a 
``sectoral'' defense system?
  Will the United States and NATO curtail deployment of phases III and 
IV of the European Phased Adaptive Approach? Phase IV is, of course, 
still just a paper missile, not something we developed, but it is part 
of our ultimate plan.
  Will the United States agree to share sensitive information or 
technology with Russia for the sake of a missile defense agreement?
  The administration informs us that these Russian threats are mere 
rhetoric, associated more with the upcoming presidential elections in 
Russia than with any true threats. And that Russia will not pull out of 
New START or begin a new arms race in response to U.S. missile defense 
plans. The administration assures us the United States will not alter 
its missile defense plans to accommodate Russian concerns.
  Nevertheless, the Congress needs better insight into administration 
plans for missile defense cooperation and missile defense talks with 
Russia than has thus far been the case.
  At the very outset, the administration created a separate venue from 
New START to discuss missile defense cooperation with Russia--this was 
the so-called Tauscher-Ryabkov track; despite repeated inquiries from 
Congress, the administration still refuses to provide meaningful 
details about the nature of these discussions.
  Likewise, we are interested to know where the administration will 
recommend basing a new missile defense early-warning radar, called a 
TPY-2 radar. Will it put the radar in the Caucasus, as the Bush 
administration planned to do, or will it seek instead to base the radar 
in a location less advantageous to the missile defense of the United 
States homeland, but more acceptable to the Russians--even if that 
means that an ally like Israel will be denied access to the data 
generated, by the radar, as Turkey has said it requires?
  To this end, and as I referenced earlier, 39 Senators sent a letter 
to the President on April 14 to inquire whether, contrary to the 
President's December 18, 2010 letter, we will make our missile defense 
decisions ``regardless of Russia's actions.''
  The letter expresses serious concerns about reports the 
administration may provide Russia with access to sensitive satellite 
data and U.S. hit-to-kill missile defense technology, and urges the 
administration to share with Congress the materials on U.S. missile 
defense cooperation that have been provided, or will shortly be 
provided, to the Russian government. We still await these materials.
  Lastly, the administration owes Senators information about what 
national security staff member Michael McFaul, whom I understand has 
been recently nominated by the President to be the U.S. Ambassador to 
Russia, meant when he briefed the press on May 26 that ``we got a new 
signal on missile defense cooperation that as soon as I'm done here 
I'll be engaging on that with the rest of the U.S. government.''
  I am concerned that my staff asked the National Security staff about 
this almost a week ago and have heard nothing back.
  I hope to hear back from the administration soon, especially if the 
administration expects the Senate to act promptly on Mr. McFaul's 
nomination.
  Mr. President I am deeply skeptical about the course the United 
States and Russia are on concerning missile defense.
  I think it should be abundantly clear that Senators and House Members 
will be paying very close attention to the development and deployment 
of the European phased adaptive approach to make sure it is done in a 
manner consistent with the security of the United States, without 
consideration to Russian ``understanding'' of what they think has been 
agreed to between the United States and Russia.
  I will be working with my House colleagues to ensure that it is very 
clear that the United States will accept no limitations on its missile 
defenses. But I note, as I said at the outset, it is interesting that 
things that were told to us at the time the Senate was debating the New 
START agreement have turned out not to be true, just as many of us 
predicted, starting with the proposition that the United States would 
be drawing our weapons down while Russia would not. It turns out that 
is what happened because the Russians were already at the level they 
negotiated us down to.
  So the question is, What did we get for our unilateral concessions? 
It appears to me that the only thing we got is an understanding by 
Russia that they are also going to be able to talk us down from our 
missile defense plans that could protect both the United States and 
allies in Europe or that as an alternative Russians would be part of a 
cooperative missile defense program which would, of necessity, require 
the sharing of economic data that would be inimical to the U.S. 
national interests.
  I express these concerns in the hope that we can receive information 
from the administration that might allay our concerns, persuade us that 
it is not involved right now in negotiations, in effect, behind the 
Senate's back, and the best way to assure us is to share the 
information with us that we requested in letters we sent previously. I 
hope the administration will, next time it asks for our consent, be 
able to say it had already asked for our advice because I am afraid, if 
it does not, the Senate is much less likely to provide its consent to 
any agreements that might be submitted.

                               Exhibit 1

               [From RealClearPolitics.com, June 6, 2011]

          Obama Tunes Out, and Business Goes on Hiring Strike

                          (By Michael Barone)

       Last week, I noted that various forms of the word 
     ``unexpected'' almost inevitably appeared in news stories 
     about unfavorable economic developments.
       You can find them again in stories about Friday's shocking 
     news, that only 54,000 net new jobs were created in the month 
     of May and that unemployment rose to 9.1 percent.
       But with news that bad, maybe bad economic numbers will no 
     longer be ``unexpected.'' You can only expect a robust 
     economic recovery for so long before you figure out, as 
     Herbert Hoover eventually did, that it is not around the 
     corner.
       Exogenous factors explain some part of the current economic 
     stagnation. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan caused a 
     slowdown in manufacturing. Horrendous tornados did not help. 
     Nor did bad weather, though only a few still bitterly cling 
     to the theory that it's caused by manmade global warming.
       But poor public policy is surely one reason why the 
     American economy has not rebounded from recession as it has 
     in the past. And political posturing has also played a major 
     role.
       Barack Obama and the Democratic congressional 
     supermajorities of 2009-10 raised federal spending from 21 
     percent to 25 percent of gross domestic product. Their 
     stimulus package stopped layoffs of public employees for a 
     while, even as private sector payrolls plummeted.
       And the Obama Democrats piled further burdens on would-be 
     employers in the private sector. Obamacare and the Dodd-Frank 
     financial regulation bill are scheduled to be followed by 
     thousands of regulations that will impose impossible-to-
     estimate costs on the economy.
       That seems to have led to a hiring freeze. The Obama 
     Democrats can reasonably claim not to be responsible for the 
     huge number of layoffs that occurred in the months following 
     the financial crisis of fall 2008. And Treasury Secretary 
     Timothy Geithner and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
     did manage to help stabilize financial markets.
       But while the number of layoffs is now vastly less than in 
     the first half of 2009, the number of new hires has not 
     increased appreciably. Many more people have been unemployed 
     for longer periods than in previous recessions, and many more 
     have stopped looking for work altogether.
       It's hard to avoid the conclusion that the threat of tax 
     increases and increased regulatory burdens have produced 
     something in the nature of a hiring strike.
       And then there is the political posturing. On April 13, 
     Barack Obama delivered a ballyhooed speech at George 
     Washington University. The man who conservatives as well as 
     liberal pundits told us was a combination of Edmund Burke and 
     Reinhold

[[Page 8718]]

     Niebuhr was widely expected to present a serious plan to 
     address the budget deficits and entitlement spending.
       Instead, the man who can call on talented career 
     professionals at the Office of Management and Budget to 
     produce detailed blueprints gave us something in the nature 
     of a few numbers scrawled on a paper napkin.
       The man depicted as pragmatic and free of ideological cant 
     indulged in cheap political rhetoric, accusing Republicans, 
     including House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, who was 
     in the audience, of pushing old ladies in wheelchairs down 
     the hill and starving autistic children.
       The signal was clear. Obama had already ignored his own 
     deficit reduction commission in preparing his annual budget, 
     which was later rejected 97-0 in the Senate. Now he was 
     signaling that the time for governing was over and that he 
     was entering campaign mode 19 months before the November 2012 
     election.
       People took notice, especially those people who decide 
     whether to hire or not. Goldman Sachs' Current Activity 
     Indicator stood at 4.2 percent in March. In April--in the 
     middle of which came Obama's GW speech--it was 1.6 percent. 
     For May, it is 1.0 percent.
       ``That is a major drop in no time at all,'' wrote Business 
     Insider's Joe Weisenthal.
       After April 13, Obama Democrats went into campaign mode. 
     They staged a poll-driven Senate vote to increase taxes on 
     oil companies.
       They launched a Mediscare campaign against Ryan's budget 
     resolution that all but four House Republicans had voted for. 
     That seemed to pay off with a special election victory in the 
     New York 26th congressional district.
       The message to job creators was clear. Hire at your own 
     risk. Higher taxes, more burdensome regulation and crony 
     capitalism may be here for some time to come.
       One possible upside is that economic bad news may no longer 
     be ``unexpected.'' Another is that voters may figure out what 
     is going on.

  Mr. KYL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Blumenthal). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________