[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 157 (2011), Part 5]
[House]
[Pages 7212-7229]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 264 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 754.

                              {time}  1442


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 754) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2011 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Yoder in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume. All time yielded is for the purposes of debate only.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish to announce that subsequent to reporting the 
bill, the committee has modified the classified annex to the bill with 
respect to the authorized level of funding for certain programs, with 
bipartisan agreement between myself and the ranking member, Mr. 
Ruppersberger. The classified annex containing the modified schedule of 
authorizations is available for review by all Members of the House, 
subject to the rules of the House and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, under which procedures were described in my announcement 
to the House on May 3, 2011. The modified schedule of authorizations is 
and has been available for review by Members and the period of time 
required by the rules of the House.
  Mr. Chairman, the annual intelligence authorization bill, I do 
believe, is one of the most important bills that will pass in the House 
each year. I want to thank my ranking member, Mr. Ruppersberger. We sat 
down at the beginning of January and decided that matters of national 
security were too important for infectious partisan debate and rhetoric 
and we decided that we would work out through every cause, as 
congenially as possible, and agree where we could, on every matter that 
we had a difference on, moving forward on, again, matters of 
intelligence and matters of national security.
  I think the product we see on the floor today reflects that 
commitment and that working relationship, and I want to commend Mr. 
Ruppersberger and the entire House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence for their work, their cooperation, and their commitment to 
our national security to the United States.
  We recently saw the successful mission against Osama bin Laden. Our 
intelligence professionals remain on the front lines in America's 
defense against our enemies. For the last 6 years, Congress has failed 
to pass a bona fide intelligence authorization bill with funding 
authority. Instead, yearly appropriation bills have simply deemed 
intelligence funding to be authorized.
  We must, and I think we agree in a bipartisan way, stop that trend 
and stop it this year. The continued success of our intelligence 
community requires effective and aggressive congressional oversight. 
Such oversight can only be achieved if we get back in the habit of 
meeting our responsibility of passing an intelligence authorization 
bill every year.
  Mr. Chairman, we have men and women scattered all across this globe 
who are engaged daily in sometimes often very dangerous work of 
collecting information to provide our policymakers and our warfighters 
the information they need to defeat our enemy. From trying to catch 
spies here in the United States by our FBI to recruiting people who 
want to cooperate and help the United States on tough issues like 
nuclear proliferation or terrorism efforts targeted against us or our 
allies, these folks log countless hours, risk their lives, spend time 
away from their families, and deserve our praise and our commitment 
that we will work with them to give them the tools that they need to be 
successful.
  I can't think of a more important time in our history where I have 
seen intelligence play such an important role in our world affairs. The 
world is changing before our eyes, and our intelligence community is 
providing us the information we need, not just to be safe, but to make 
good decisions on what that world looks like and what our national 
interests are country by country, region by region.
  I am particularly pleased that this bill has such strong bipartisan 
support. The legislative provisions are intentionally limited to focus 
our attention on providing necessary resources to the men and women of 
the intelligence community as provided in the classified annex. The 
secrecy that is a necessary part of our country's intelligence work 
requires that the congressional Intelligence Committees conduct strong 
and effective oversight on behalf of the American people, and that 
strong and effective oversight is possible. But without that annual 
intelligence authorization bill, the bill that we will pass today--we 
must get back in the habit of passing that bill every year.
  We make important commitments in this bill, Mr. Chairman, for the 
priorities of the intelligence community. Technology has fused in the 
intelligence collection like I have never seen it, and its increase is 
exponential over the past 10 years.
  We make important investment in the new technologies that allow our 
intelligence officials and professionals to do the work they need to 
do. It makes them more effective, and it also makes the investment in 
the people who oversee that technology even more important. We make 
that important investment in this FY 2011 intelligence authorization 
bill as well.
  Nothing brings that home like the broad scope of what we saw 
participate in the Osama bin Laden event of last Sunday. Every single 
intelligence agency, and I do mean every single one, played a part in 
that operation, from collecting small bits of information, from putting 
that piece together, signals intelligence, satellite intelligence, 
MASINT intelligence, all of those things came together over the course 
of 10 years.
  I credit George Bush and his administration for assembling this new 
intelligence community that really started after 9/11 and President 
Obama for making the authorization and the continued policies that 
allowed us to have that information to go after Osama bin Laden. It was 
really quite an impressive thing. Both administrations deserve credit 
for that, and I would hope that today the people of the House of 
Representatives would celebrate that victory and all the work of the 
unsung heroes who work in the shadows by passing this FY 2011 so they 
can get about the business of protecting the United States.
  I appreciate, again, this bipartisan consensus.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1450

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  First, I rise in support of H.R. 754, the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for FY 2011.
  The men and women in the military and intelligence community who 
helped locate al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden exemplify the 
extraordinary courage and skill of those who work tirelessly to keep 
our community safe.

[[Page 7213]]

They should be commended for a job well done. But our fight against 
terrorism is not over. We have severely weakened al Qaeda, but we must 
remain vigilant as we work to eliminate this threat. I believe that 
it's our responsibility to give our intelligence professionals the 
resources, capabilities, and authorities they need to do their jobs 
successfully.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2011 has thousands of 
civilian positions above the level enacted in FY 2010 and above the 
level of people currently on board. This includes counterterrorism 
positions at the CIA and a large increase in personnel at the National 
Counterterrorism Center, the NCTC. The bill also adds hundreds of 
millions of dollars for intelligence above current levels. In response 
to the Web site WikiLeaks, the bill includes an insider threat 
detection program that automatically monitors unauthorized access to 
classified information.
  The way Congress conducts effective oversight of the intelligence 
community is by passing an Intelligence authorization bill to give the 
intelligence community budgetary direction.
  When I first got to the Intelligence Committee 8 years ago, right 
after 9/11, I was concerned with the lack of coordination and 
communication within the intelligence community. In the different areas 
in intelligence--the CIA, NSA, FBI--there was not the communication or 
coordination that was necessary. But this has definitely changed today. 
The Osama bin Laden mission proved that. Professionals from all across 
the intelligence community, including the CIA, NGA, NSA, and Special 
Ops, all came together as a team to get the job done. We are now on our 
game. We're working together. We're better than we've ever been. And we 
clearly have sent a message to the world: If you're going to attack 
Americans, if you're going to kill Americans, we're going to find you 
and we're going to bring you to justice.
  On the House Select Intelligence Committee we work together. Chairman 
Rogers, as he stated before, and I have agreed to work together in a 
bipartisan manner. The stakes are too high not to do so. I join 
Chairman Rogers in saying politics has no place in the Intelligence 
Committee. The threats are real and the stakes are too high. Sure, we 
will have disagreements. We will disagree from time to time on policy. 
But we will work together to work through these issues to do what is 
right for the intelligence community to protect our country and our 
national security. This is what we did in this budget.
  After months of negotiations with the majority and a number of 
changes to address many of the concerns of the administration, I 
believe this bill moves in a positive direction. It goes a long way to 
help our intelligence professionals get the job done.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield 1 minute to the distinguished member 
of the Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
LoBiondo).
  Mr. LoBIONDO. I would like to start out by thanking you, Chairman 
Rogers and Mr. Ruppersberger, for refocusing the efforts of the Intel 
Committee on that which is critically important with the authorization 
and oversight for our intelligence community.
  We have incredibly dedicated men and women who are putting their 
lives on the line every day in a way that almost all of America will 
never know. These individuals deserve nothing less than the full 
attention and help from Congress in the authorization and helping them 
with the programs that are necessary to continue the dramatic successes 
such that we've seen with Osama bin Laden.
  They have successes every day, ladies and gentlemen. They're not as 
high profile as the one we had last week, but many of them are just as 
important. Without the Intelligence authorization bill, we're having 
them go out with one arm tied behind their backs. It's unfair to them; 
it's unfair to the country. In these times of turbulence, with an enemy 
that is bound and determined to hurt our country, we rely on our 
intelligence community and the great work that they do. This bill will 
help them do that.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 3 minutes to a senior member of the 
Intelligence Committee, the ranking member of the Terrorism 
Subcommittee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson).
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank Mr. Ruppersberger for yielding, 
and I thank Mr. Ruppersberger and Mr. Rogers for their good work in the 
committee.
  As ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human 
Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, I'm pleased that we 
were able to work through our differences to bring a stronger and now 
bipartisan Intelligence authorization bill to the floor today.
  H.R. 754 will support critical U.S. intelligence capabilities by 
increasing resources for our country's counterterrorism efforts while 
also providing needed flexibility to the Central Intelligence Agency to 
hire the analysts that it needs.
  Last year, under the leadership of then-Speaker Pelosi and Chairman 
Reyes, President Obama signed the first Intelligence Authorization Act 
in 6 years. That bill included a number of long overdue provisions that 
supported critical U.S. intelligence capabilities, significantly 
enhanced congressional oversight, and improved accountability across 
the entire intelligence community. Today's bill builds on that effort 
and represents an important step forward towards enacting an 
Intelligence authorization bill for the second year in a row.
  Unfortunately, the process used to produce this bill was badly flawed 
and there weren't proper hearings to get to where we are now. And 
that's evidenced by the amendments that we are able to get into this 
bill to bring it up to the position that it's in. However, with the 
changes made to the classified annex, I believe this authorization will 
strengthen our national security and is in the best interest of our 
intelligence community.
  Specifically, the additional funds authorized by this bill to hire 
more counterterrorism analysts will make our country safer and more 
secure. It was, after all, counterterrorism analysts that located Osama 
bin Laden after he had disappeared for nearly 10 years and that are now 
tracking senior al Qaeda leadership around the globe. By providing more 
resources to this critical effort, our intelligence community will be 
able to confront head-on the threat posed by al Qaeda and other 
terrorist organizations throughout the world. In fact, given the recent 
success of our counterterrorism effort, this is the strategy we should 
pursue over our counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, which has 
not shown the results Congress expected or that the American people 
demand. This tactical change would significantly reduce our military 
footprint in countries around the world while allowing our military and 
intelligence assets to confront terrorism threats wherever they're 
developed.
  Mr. Chair, our intelligence community must be prepared for any and 
all threats, making it all the more critical for Congress to pass an 
Intelligence authorization that furthers our national security.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman 30 additional seconds.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. This legislation is necessary, will 
enhance the capabilities of the intelligence community, specifically 
our counterterrorism efforts, and will make our Nation safer.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill and thank the members of 
our intelligence community and their families for their great work and 
their sacrifice.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to 
gentlewoman from the great State of North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick), a 
distinguished member of the Intelligence Committee.
  Mrs. MYRICK. I'm delighted to be here today because this is a good 
moment for our intelligence community that we are going to pass an 
Intelligence bill.

[[Page 7214]]

  You've heard it said it has been 6 years since there has been an 
authorization for these people. They are out there every single day in 
every single agency doing what they do so we can be here to be able to 
discuss this on the floor and to live freely in this country and around 
the world. It's extremely important that they have the knowledge and 
security of knowing that what they do is approved of and authorized by 
this committee in the House.
  It has been good to have a bipartisan agreement in the sense that we 
worked very well together. Mr. Rogers and Mr. Ruppersberger worked 
extremely well. Myself and Mr. Thompson, who chair one of the 
committees, work very well together. The committee members do. And so 
it's encouraging that we're able to move forward in a way that's very 
positive for the people of this country relative to their national 
security.
  So I urge all of my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman 
from Kentucky (Mr. Chandler), a hardworking member of the Technical and 
Tactical Subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee.

                              {time}  1500

  Mr. CHANDLER. I thank the gentleman from Maryland for yielding.
  Osama bin Laden, one of the worst men to walk the Earth since Adolf 
Hitler, is dead. While on the run for many years, bin Laden continued 
to plan and coordinate attacks against Americans. He was only found and 
killed because of the brave men and women in our military and in our 
intelligence community. We have some of the best intelligence 
operations in the world, and if we want to continue the fight against 
terrorism, we need to keep it that way. This bill does just that.
  The bill authorizes funding for the dedicated men and women of the 
intelligence community to help them do their jobs and protect American 
citizens. In my tenure on the Intelligence Committee, I have had the 
privilege of visiting with many of the courageous and extremely bright 
people who work in intelligence. After meeting them, there is no doubt 
in my mind that we are in good hands, and I have a greater appreciation 
for the work they do to keep America safe every day. It is incredibly 
important that we support those efforts, especially in light of the 
extraordinary job the intelligence community did in finding and killing 
bin Laden.
  These are tough times with our budget, but the security of our people 
has got to be our priority.
  Last year, under the leadership of Chairman Reyes, Congress passed 
its first Intelligence authorization act since the 2005 bill. I applaud 
both Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger in their efforts 
to work out a bipartisan compromise that would help maintain and 
strengthen our impressive intelligence community. They've done a 
tremendous job, and it's a breath of fresh air to see everybody working 
so well together.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Texas and a member of the Intelligence 
Committee, Mr. Conaway.
  Mr. CONAWAY. I thank the gentleman for yielding, I appreciate the 
chairman's words, and I hope those aren't mutually exclusive, being 
distinguished and being from Texas.
  I rise in strong, strong support of this year's Intelligence 
authorization bill and encourage my colleagues, all of them, to support 
this. But with that strong support comes a modest amount of 
disappointment in that, through no fault of anyone in particular, we 
had to make a tough decision to strike section 412 from the bill, which 
would have allowed certain elements within the intel community to set 
up their own direct accounts with Treasury. It's a bit of an arcane 
statement, but it allows greater steps toward achieving auditability 
across the intelligence community. This provision was intended to 
promote this goal of better financial accountability and insight into 
our classified spending.
  The intelligence community, Mr. Chairman, must meet the same 
financial accounting standards as the rest of the government. Those 
accounting standards will help uncover savings in current programs that 
can be reinvested into vital intelligence priorities or returned to the 
taxpayers.
  While I am disappointed that the provision was not in the 2011 bill, 
I have already had good conversations with the chairman in reference to 
the 2012 bill, which will be in committee in the next couple of weeks, 
so that we can continue to move the intelligence community, their 
various slots, toward accountability, which is important for the 
taxpayer, and it helps give management a reliable tool. If they've got 
those systems, got the internal controls in place, it will give them 
tools in order to manage the money, the precious resources that we take 
from the taxpayers and entrust to the intelligence community to do the 
great work that they have done over these past years.
  There is no greater example of that, of course, than the find-and-fix 
portion of the bin Laden experience that we saw play out on May 1 and 
2, a terrific achievement by folks whose faces will never be seen, 
whose names will never be known except to them and their colleagues. 
They'll know who they are. They'll have that great pride of knowing 
they've done great work for this country using the tools that we 
provide them.
  I urge my colleagues to support the reauthorization bill.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining?
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Maryland has 21\1/2\ minutes remaining, 
and the gentleman from Michigan has 20 minutes remaining.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield 2 minutes to the appropriator member 
of the House Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Frelinghuysen).
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I rise in 
support of this reauthorization.
  Mr. Chairman, I also rise to pay tribute to the dedicated men and 
women of our intelligence community. Their work is not an easy job in 
the best of times, but over the last 10 years, they've carried an 
especially heavy day-to-day burden. They work long hours under 
tremendous pressure, mostly in obscurity, to ensure that Americans are 
protected everywhere. They are the unsung heroes of national security, 
and we owe them more than we can possibly repay.
  My colleagues, as a Member of the House from a ``9/11 State,'' I take 
very seriously the findings of the 9/11 Commission. One of the key 
recommendations of the commission was the need to improve coordination 
of the numerous congressional committees charged with overseeing and 
funding the intelligence community and its many activities.
  To this end, I commend Chairman Mike Rogers for including me as part 
of the intelligence team in his committee. I would also like to thank 
Chairman Hal Rogers of the Appropriations Committee for seeing fit to 
appoint me as one of three liaisons to the Intelligence Committee. We 
are working closely with the Intelligence Committee to eliminate the 
daylight that has existed in the past between these two important 
committees and the legislation that's produced.
  The bill Chairman Rogers and Mr. Ruppersberger have constructed does 
ensure that our intelligence community has the tools and resources to 
analyze, predict, respond, and counter all the threats to America and 
Americans. I commend them for their effort. I am proud to be part of 
their team.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Georgia, also a member of the committee, Mr. 
Westmoreland.
  Mr. WESTMORELAND. I thank the chairman for yielding me this time.
  I cannot stress enough the importance of passing this FY 2011 
Intelligence authorization bill. This legislation will not only ensure 
that our intelligence agencies are sufficiently

[[Page 7215]]

funded to carry out their functions, but it will hold them fiscally 
accountable.
  It has been 6 years since Congress has passed a complete Intelligence 
authorization bill. In years past, we have simply continued to ``deem'' 
funding for our intelligence programs to be authorized through other 
appropriations bills. Well, our law expressly requires that we 
explicitly authorize intelligence funding, and that is what we need to 
do here. We need to start passing an authorization bill each year in 
order to maintain the success of our intelligence communities and spell 
out exactly what will be provided. I want to commend Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger and Chairman Rogers for their work in working together to 
make sure that this is made possible.
  The significance of our country's intelligence cannot be overstated. 
The killing of Osama bin Laden is a direct example of the meaningful 
work that these agencies perform in order to protect us. We must 
continue to provide these men and women with the resources and 
capabilities that they need and not just place obstacles in their way 
but give them the resources that will make their job easier and more 
efficient. This authorization bill provides a detailed blueprint of 
necessary budget needs for the 17 separate agencies that it covers. It 
funds both military and civilian members of our intelligence community 
and directly supports those involved in dangerous operations at home 
and abroad. They are the very operations that are countering global 
terrorism and monitoring foreign militaries. These are the operations 
that make sure America stays on the cutting edge of intelligence 
technology to be able to detect and thwart threats before they become 
imminent. These are the people we must ensure are adequately funded.
  I ask all my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
  Mr. FLAKE. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I would just like 
to engage in a colloquy briefly if we can.
  As the gentleman knows, I have worked and he has worked to decrease 
funding for the NDIC, the National Drug Intelligence Center. This is a 
center that has received hundreds of millions of dollars over the 
years, yet in 2005 a White House OMB report said that the NDIC ``has 
proven ineffective in achieving its assigned mission.'' Reports 
subsequent to that have pointed to similar failures and problems. Yet 
it still received last year, I think, $44 million.

                              {time}  1510

  I had intended to bring an amendment to this authorization bill, but 
I don't want to hold up this important authorization for FY 11. If I 
could just ask the chairman if he plans to bring an authorization bill 
for 2012.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FLAKE. I yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. We plan to bring a bill for 2012, and I will 
work with you on the NDIC. I couldn't agree more: it's important that 
we continue to have the government effort focus on illicit drugs; 
however, the National Drug Intelligence Center has done very little to 
address this national priority, and I look forward to working with the 
Member.
  Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to a 
distinguished member of the Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from 
Nevada (Mr. Heck).
  Mr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  I would like to begin by recognizing our military's extraordinary 
efforts to successfully close a painful chapter in American history. Of 
course, the military could not have performed their mission so 
successfully without our intelligence community's unflagging efforts. 
The men and women of the intelligence community are the unsung heroes 
of not only the mission to bring Osama bin Laden to justice but many 
other successful counterterrorism operations, and they deserve 
tremendous credit.
  The successful bin Laden mission highlights the critical role our 
intelligence community plays in protecting our national security. Two 
of the intelligence community's chief weapons against terrorism are 
information and the ability to communicate that information swiftly. 
I'm proud to say that the airmen at Creech Air Force Base in my home 
State of Nevada are critical to both capturing and communicating 
information that is necessary for intelligence operations.
  One reason Nevadans elected me last fall was to restore government 
accountability and oversight. Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen both identified America's 
growing debt as our number one national security concern.
  As we're fighting the war on terror, we must not allocate resources 
without due process.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 
seconds.
  Mr. HECK. And we must ensure the intelligence community is 
accountable for their operations because most of their operations occur 
outside of the public's view.
  Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger are doing incredible 
work to make these ideas that we share a reality. I applaud their 
dedication to restoring proper accountability and oversight to the 
intelligence community. I am confident the Intelligence Authorization 
Act provides the resources and latitude our intelligence community 
needs while ensuring fiscal and operational responsibility.
  That is why I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 754.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to another 
distinguished gentleman from the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Rooney).
  Mr. ROONEY. I thank the chairman and ranking member for their 
leadership.
  I rise today, Mr. Chairman, in support of the fiscal year 2011 
Intelligence authorization legislation. On September 11, 2001, our 
Nation faced the deadliest act of terror in U.S. history. On the 
evening of May 1, 2011, the mastermind of those attacks, Osama bin 
Laden, was brought to justice and killed while hiding in a compound in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan.
  Along with the sacrifices our Nation's troops have made over the past 
10 years, our intelligence community has played an integral role in 
fighting the war on terror and keeping America safe. The behind-the-
scenes work of the intelligence community leading up to the attack and 
the raid in Abbottabad was critical to the success of the mission and 
will continue to be a crucial asset to winning the war on terror.
  Completing the Intelligence authorization bill is critical to 
ensuring that our Nation's intelligence agencies have the tools they 
need to remain at the forefront of global and national security. This 
bill provides vital congressional oversight and policy guidance to the 
intelligence community on behalf of the American people. Congress must 
ensure these agencies are acting in our best interest and spending 
taxpayer dollars wisely.
  As a member of the House Intelligence Committee and the House Armed 
Services Committee, I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  There are two issues that I would like to discuss that we don't talk 
about a lot, but I think it is important that we do raise the issue. I 
know Chairman Rogers and I and the rest of the committee do work on 
this issue, and that's our space program and that's also cybersecurity.
  We, years ago, responded to Russia's putting up Sputnik by, in 10 
years, putting a man on the Moon. What we did basically is we helped 
create the science of rocket science. We did research and development, 
and we were

[[Page 7216]]

able to put a man on the Moon. That was a great day for the United 
States of America when we did put a man on the Moon.
  Now we're in a situation where our space program needs to move 
forward. We have a lot of issues that we have to deal with in our space 
program; and the main reason for that is that, if you control the 
skies, you basically control the world. Space and satellites are so 
important to what we do, not just from an intelligence point of view, 
getting the information, taking the pictures, dealing with all sorts of 
communications. These are things that we do in space, and we have to 
keep moving ahead. We have to get our younger generation graduating 
from our colleges to continue to go into space.
  And the big threat there is China and Russia. China is putting 
billions of dollars into space. Their goal is to go to the Moon, and it 
is our concern that if they do that we have to be with them there. We 
have to continue our research and development, and we have to be 
vigilant in our space program. Russia, also, is very active in the 
space area.
  So it's something that isn't talked about a lot, but there's a lot of 
money that goes into space; and I think we have to do a better job in 
our military, in our space and intelligence, and let the public know 
how important space is.
  There's also another issue which is of great concern, I think, to the 
United States of America's national security, and that is the issue of 
cybersecurity. As we speak, we're being attacked by different 
governments and who knows what else we're being attacked by, getting 
information, relevant information, every day we speak. It's a very 
serious issue; and, unfortunately, the public does not really 
understand what cyber is about.
  Our NSA is as good as any operation in the world in their technology 
and developing the technology in order to protect our country. We don't 
control the Internet other than a small part, our dot-mils, the 
military part. So we have to make sure that our public understands how 
important cybersecurity is, how we could be attacked.
  We just recently had an attack about a month ago on NASDAQ. Just 
think if we had a cyberattack on our banks and what the lack of 
confidence would be for our public, and the government can't afford to 
pay for it all. So there has to be an effort between our government, 
our military, our NSA, between our private sector and between 
individuals who have their personal computers. This is an area of the 
future we need to focus on.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend Mr. 
Ruppersberger for the last remarks. Cybersecurity is a real and growing 
threat for the United States. We make serious commitments in this FY 11 
bill, and we have pledged to work together on separate pieces of 
legislation to put the United States in a better position to defend 
itself against cybersecurity. Something that started out so long ago as 
somebody in their mother's basement hacking into the local school to 
change their grades has become whole nation-states using the Internet 
and all of cyberspace to not only steal intellectual property from 
private enterprise, attempt to hack and steal information from the 
United States, but also use it for offensive purposes where we have 
seen the Russians who when they went into Georgia use aggressively 
cyber to prep the battlefield for their invasion, something that we all 
need to worry about.
  I want to, again, pledge to work with the ranking member on this 
very, very important issue so that we can get on better footing as we 
move forward.
  Also, on the space, it is one of the things that has given the United 
States a technological advantage in the world, something that we need 
to continue to make those investments into the overhead architecture of 
the United States from communication satellites to all of the things 
that we do from space. And it is a serious investment on this country, 
but when you look at the success of something like the Osama bin Laden 
raid, you realize all of it, from space, to cyber, to signals 
intelligence, to human intelligence, is something that was invested in 
in this money; and I'm glad that the ranking member used this 
opportunity to talk about those very important issues and the 
commitment in this bill to start to put us on better footing for that.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1520

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I believe many valid points have 
been made in support of H.R. 754, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011.
  First, I want to thank Mr. Rogers for his leadership and for working 
together in a bipartisan way to do what's right for our country's 
national security and to make sure that we do our job in the oversight 
of all of the intelligence areas. Hopefully, we will continue this 
relationship as we go forward.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes), a distinguished member of the 
House Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. NUNES. I would like to say thank you to Chairman Rogers and to 
Ranking Member Ruppersberger for really taking the Intelligence 
Committee and establishing its relevance back in the House. I know 
we've had some disagreements in the past, but Chairman Rogers, along 
with a lot of new members on the committee, have been working closely 
with the Democrats in a bipartisan way to, I believe, make a real 
difference in Congress' role in the intelligence community. I want to 
commend both of them for their honest and hard work. It's never easy 
because, as I'm learning now since being on the committee, it takes a 
lot of hours, and it's a lot of hours on behalf of the members that 
they have to commit to this committee; so having a chairman and a 
ranking member to really lead us in that effort makes a big difference.
  Mr. Chairman, let me speak to the issue at hand, which is that it is 
very concerning that Congress has not completed an authorization bill 
in 6 years even though the terrorist threat has not lessened since 
September 11, 2001. This has limited an important oversight 
responsibility of the Congress. The world is too dangerous for Congress 
not to be more engaged in overseeing 16 intelligence agencies. We 
simply cannot maintain the status quo of the 111th Congress and ignore 
laws that require congressional oversight and the authorization of 
intelligence operations by the House Intelligence Committee.
  Congress must meet its responsibilities and again begin to pass 
annual intelligence authorization bills, which are vital to ensuring, 
among other things, that the men and women who really risk their lives 
to be part of this intelligence community are properly funded to carry 
out their critical mission of defending our country, such as the 
mission we just saw a couple of weeks ago, that of the killing of Osama 
bin Laden.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.
  Mr. NUNES. Congress can no longer avoid its responsibilities when our 
counterintelligence operations provide critical support to our combat 
units in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and in other important places across 
the world or when our intelligence agencies require new, cutting-edge 
technology or during a time of unprecedented unrest in the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia or in other parts of Central and South America.
  This does not mention the ever-growing threat that we face in the 
cyber community, with cyberspace, which is an area that this committee, 
I believe, will have to spend some significant time on.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has again expired.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 
seconds.
  Mr. NUNES. It also doesn't mention the time that we will have to 
spend on some foreign countries that are quickly gaining access to 
minerals that are

[[Page 7217]]

very hard to come by. So many foreign nations are investing a lot of 
time, energy and effort into locating not only these minerals, oil, and 
natural gas all over the world, but they're coming together and working 
outside the interests of the United States. We have to have 
intelligence in these areas.
  This isn't your typical authorization bill, but it funds 17 
intelligence agencies which are critical to the defense of our country. 
Each agency has a unique perspective on the world, and Congress should 
be bipartisan in its partnering in these missions throughout the 
authorization and oversight processes. I look forward to voting ``yes'' 
on the 11th bill and to working in a bipartisan way on the 12th bill.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to an outstanding 
member of the Terrorism Subcommittee, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. 
Boren).
  Mr. BOREN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.
  I want to thank Chairman Rogers, and I also want to thank Ranking 
Member Ruppersberger for working together in a bipartisan way to 
produce this bill. Their leadership was invaluable in moving this bill 
forward, and it has been critical to all of the committee's efforts 
during the 112th Congress.
  Last year, the President signed into law an Intelligence 
Authorization Act for the first time since 2005. That bill included a 
number of important provisions to address the foreign language needs of 
the intelligence community, including a provision I sponsored, which 
created a pilot program in African languages under the National 
Security Education Program.
  I am glad we can build upon the FY10 bill and can get another 
authorization bill signed into law for the second straight year. This 
bill authorizes the annual funding for the 16 member agencies of the 
intelligence community; aligns the national counterterrorism strategy 
with the policies and strategies of the DNI; and requires the DNI to 
establish an insider threat detection program to prevent unauthorized 
leaks of classified information.
  While this bill is important to our intelligence community's ability 
to be the first line of defense for America, as we recently saw with 
the killing of bin Laden in Pakistan, the intelligence community often 
forms the first line of offense against our enemies as well.
  Last month, I traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and witnessed 
firsthand the tremendous challenge of locating bin Laden and other 
members of al Qaeda. Finding him would not have been possible without 
the robust capabilities that are available to the dedicated 
intelligence professionals at the CIA and other agencies. That is why 
Congress must continue to provide the intelligence community with every 
resource it needs to complete its missions.
  Again, I extend my gratitude to Chairman Rogers and to Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger for their exceptional work on this legislation, and I 
also thank the Intelligence Committee staff for its tireless efforts in 
preparing this year's bill.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 2 minutes to a 
former Army captain, the great new Member from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo).
  Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  I wanted to come to the floor today and thank Chairman Rogers and the 
ranking member for the great work they've done.
  I do not sit on this committee, but I did have the opportunity to 
serve in uniform our country. We witnessed what happened in the capture 
of the world's greatest terrorist, and we saw the great military feats 
which took place, but we also know all of the enormous work that our 
intelligence community did to make that happen.
  I served in a unit that patrolled the East German and Czechoslovakian 
border. Every day, we relied on the fact that our intelligence 
community was providing our military with the finest information and 
the finest data in as near realtime as it possibly could to make sure 
that we knew how to deploy our forces and knew the things that needed 
to be done to keep America safe.
  So I want to applaud the efforts of the Intelligence Committee. I 
want to urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation and the 
intelligence community, which keeps everyone in America safe.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, in closing, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 provides policy guidelines and 
sets classified funding levels for the 16 agencies in the intelligence 
community. Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is gone forever, but our 
fight against terrorism is far from over.
  I believe this bill moves us in the right direction to ensure our 
topnotch intelligence professionals have the resources, capabilities 
and authorities they need to keep our country safe.
  I also want to acknowledge our staffs on both the Democratic and 
Republican sides, who worked together very closely with us to help put 
together this bill. I've always said that you're only as good as your 
team. We talk about teamwork. You need a good team and a good staff.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1530

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I will just take this 
opportunity to thank both the Democrat and Republican staff members who 
helped us prepare this bill. For the first time since I have served on 
the committee, we had both Democrat and Republican staff briefed in a 
bipartisan way at the same table, all Members in the room. And we think 
that that improved the value of this product tremendously, something we 
are hoping to continue.
  So my hat is off to all of the staff. We hire professionals from the 
community, from all walks of life as well to provide us the expertise 
that we need to provide the proper oversight for the intelligence 
community. And I do believe, in this great spirit of bipartisanship 
with Mr. Ruppersberger, that this will give the tools to those 17 
agencies who work in secrecy on behalf of the United States the things 
that they need to accomplish their mission and to keep this great 
country safe.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HURT. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of H.R. 754, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.
  Our intelligence community plays a critical role in keeping us safe 
from those who seek to do us harm, and I believe we need to ensure that 
they have the necessary tools to do their job to the fullest.
  It was the hard work and dedication of the members of the 
intelligence community that helped lead us to securing a great victory 
in the war on terror--the death of Osama bin Laden. We will be forever 
grateful to them--and all of those in the intelligence field--for their 
service to this country, including those in Virginia's 5th District.
  I would like to take this opportunity to recognize and thank the work 
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial 
Intelligence Agency, and the National Ground Intelligence Center 
located in Charlottesville, Virginia, and those members of the 
intelligence community across the 5th District who are working every 
day to help ensure the safety of all Americans.
  A top priority of government is to protect its citizens from threats 
at home and abroad. While I believe that we need to prioritize all 
spending in the context of a balanced budget, we need to make sure that 
those in the intelligence field are equipped to carry out their duties 
to help protect and defend our nation, especially when we are engaged 
in a global war on terror and thousands of American troops continue to 
serve bravely in harm's way around the world.
  I urge support of H.R. 754.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of H.R. 754, the FY 2011 
Intelligence Authorization Act. I thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking 
Member Ruppersberger for bringing this bipartisan bill to the floor 
today.
  This bill sets the funding levels for the 16 agencies that comprise 
the nation's intelligence community including the Central Intelligence 
Agency and parts of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigations. It also supports the 
dedicated and skilled men and women who work in secret at these and 
other elements of the nation's clandestine services that helped bring 
Osama bin Laden to justice.

[[Page 7218]]

  H.R. 754 authorizes funding for the counterterrorism analysis and 
worldwide clandestine operations of the CIA; the tactical intelligence 
support of the National Security Agency; the electronics surveillance 
and real-time analysis of the National Geospacial Agency; and the 
coordination of the National Intelligence Director. The coordinated 
efforts of all these agencies enable the U.S. to anticipate and respond 
to emerging threats and to maintain its technological advantage over 
our adversaries around the world.
  Bringing Osama bin Laden to justice was the result of the hard work 
and sacrifice by this nation's intelligence and Special Forces 
community. These brave men and women are silent warriors who deserve 
our gratitude and unwavering support. I commend them for their ongoing 
efforts to disrupt, dismantle and defeat terrorism around the world.
  I encourage my colleagues to join me in thanking our intelligence 
professionals for all that they do to keep our country safe and I urge 
passage of this bill.
  Mr. WELCH. Mr. Chair, today I want to highlight a critical issue 
facing the Intelligence Community: increasing reliance on contractors.
  A 2010 Washington Post story reported that 30 percent of the 
workforce in our intelligence agencies is contractors. Furthermore, the 
Post estimated that out of 854,000 people with top-secret clearances, 
265,000 are contractors. I encourage my colleagues to read this eye 
opening article.
  These startling facts cause me great concern--we've learned the hard 
way time and time again what happens when we fail to monitor the work 
of federal contractors. The federal government has the responsibility 
to maintain its commitment to monitoring their use--with special 
attention made to the evolving nature of their work and the associated 
national security risks inherent to outsourcing these tasks. I look 
forward to working with the Select Committee on Intelligence to achieve 
this goal.

               [From the Washington Post, July 20, 2010]

                        National Security, Inc.

                 (By Dana Priest and William M. Arkin)

       In June, a stone carver from Manassas chiseled another 
     perfect star into a marble wall at CIA headquarters, one of 
     22 for agency workers killed in the global war initiated by 
     the 2001 terrorist attacks.
       The intent of the memorial is to publicly honor the courage 
     of those who died in the line of duty, but it also conceals a 
     deeper story about government in the post-9/11 era: Eight of 
     the 22 were not CIA officers at all. They were private 
     contractors.
       To ensure that the country's most sensitive duties are 
     carried out only by people loyal above all to the nation's 
     interest, federal rules say contractors may not perform what 
     are called ``inherently government functions.'' But they do, 
     all the time and in every intelligence and counterterrorism 
     agency, according to a two-year investigation by The 
     Washington Post.
       What started as a temporary fix in response to the 
     terrorist attacks has turned into a dependency that calls 
     into question whether the federal workforce includes too many 
     people obligated to shareholders rather than the public 
     interest--and whether the government is still in control of 
     its most sensitive activities. In interviews last week, both 
     Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and CIA Director Leon 
     Panetta said they agreed with such concerns.
       The Post investigation uncovered what amounts to an 
     alternative geography of the United States, a Top Secret 
     America created since 9/11 that is hidden from public view, 
     lacking in thorough oversight and so unwieldy that its 
     effectiveness is impossible to determine.
       It is also a system in which contractors are playing an 
     ever more important role. The Post estimates that out of 
     854,000 people with top-secret clearances, 265,000 are 
     contractors. There is no better example of the government's 
     dependency on them than at the CIA, the one place in 
     government that exists to do things overseas that no other 
     U.S. agency is allowed to do.
       Private contractors working for the CIA have recruited 
     spies in Iraq, paid bribes for information in Afghanistan and 
     protected CIA directors visiting world capitals. Contractors 
     have helped snatch a suspected extremist off the streets of 
     Italy, interrogated detainees once held at secret prisons 
     abroad and watched over defectors holed up in the Washington 
     suburbs. At Langley headquarters, they analyze terrorist 
     networks. At the agency's training facility in Virginia, they 
     are helping mold a new generation of American spies.
       Through the federal budget process, the George W. Bush 
     administration and Congress made it much easier for the CIA 
     and other agencies involved in counterterrorism to hire more 
     contractors than civil servants. They did this to limit the 
     size of the permanent workforce, to hire employees more 
     quickly than the sluggish federal process allows and because 
     they thought--wrongly, it turned out--that contractors would 
     be less expensive.
       Nine years later, well into the Obama administration, the 
     idea that contractors cost less has been repudiated, and the 
     administration has made some progress toward its goal of 
     reducing the number of hired hands by 7 percent over two 
     years. Still, close to 30 percent of the workforce in the 
     intelligence agencies is contractors.
       ``For too long, we've depended on contractors to do the 
     operational work that ought to be done'' by CIA employees, 
     Panetta said. But replacing them ``doesn't happen overnight. 
     When you've been dependent on contractors for so long, you 
     have to build that expertise over time.'' A second concern of 
     Panetta's: contracting with corporations, whose 
     responsibility ``is to their shareholders, and that does 
     present an inherent conflict.''
       Or as Gates, who has been in and out of government his 
     entire life, puts it: ``You want somebody who's really in it 
     for a career because they're passionate about it and because 
     they care about the country and not just because of the 
     money.''
       Contractors can offer more money--often twice as much--to 
     experienced federal employees than the government is allowed 
     to pay them. And because competition among firms for people 
     with security clearances is so great, corporations offer such 
     perks as BMWs and $15,000 signing bonuses, as Raytheon did in 
     June for software developers with top-level clearances.
       The idea that the government would save money on a contract 
     workforce ``is a false economy,'' said Mark M. Lowenthal, a 
     former senior CIA official and now president of his own 
     intelligence training academy.
       As companies raid federal agencies of talent, the 
     government has been left with the youngest intelligence 
     staffs ever while more experienced employees move into the 
     private sector. This is true at the CIA, where employees from 
     114 firms account for roughly a third of the workforce, or 
     about 10,000 positions. Many of them are temporary hires, 
     often former military or intelligence agency employees who 
     left government service to work less and earn more while 
     drawing a federal pension.
       Across the government, such workers are used in every 
     conceivable way. Contractors kill enemy fighters. They spy on 
     foreign governments and eavesdrop on terrorist networks. They 
     help craft war plans. They gather information on local 
     factions in war zones. They are the historians, the 
     architects, the recruiters in the nation's most secretive 
     agencies. They staff watch centers across the Washington 
     area. They are among the most trusted advisers to the four-
     star generals leading the nation's wars.
       So great is the government's appetite for private 
     contractors with top-secret clearances that there are now 
     more than 300 companies, often nicknamed ``body shops,'' that 
     specialize in finding candidates, often for a fee that 
     approaches $50,000 a person, according to those in the 
     business.
       Making it more difficult to replace contractors with 
     federal employees: The government doesn't know how many are 
     on the federal payroll. Gates said he wants to reduce the 
     number of defense contractors by about 13 percent, to pre-9/
     11 levels, but he's having a hard time even getting a basic 
     head count.
       ``This is a terrible confession,'' he said. ``I can't get a 
     number on how many contractors work for the Office of the 
     Secretary of Defense,'' referring to the department's 
     civilian leadership.
       The Post's estimate of 265,000 contractors doing top-secret 
     work was vetted by several high-ranking intelligence 
     officials who approved of The Post's methodology. The 
     newspaper's Top Secret America database includes 1.931 
     companies that perform work at the top-secret level. More 
     than a quarter of them--533--came into being after 2001, and 
     others that already existed have expanded greatly. Most are 
     thriving even as the rest of the United States struggles with 
     bankruptcies, unemployment and foreclosures.
       The privatization of national security work has been made 
     possible by a nine-year ``gusher'' of money, as Gates 
     recently described national security spending since the 9/11 
     attacks.
       With so much money to spend, managers do not always worry 
     about whether they are spending it effectively.
       ``Someone says, `Let's do another study,' and because no 
     one shares information, everyone does their own study,'' said 
     Elena Mastors, who headed a team studying the al-Qaeda 
     leadership for the Defense Department. ``It's about how many 
     studies you can orchestrate, how many people you can fly all 
     over the place. Everybody's just on a spending spree. We 
     don't need all these people doing all this stuff.''
       Most of these contractors do work that is fundamental to an 
     agency's core mission. As a result, the government has become 
     dependent on them in a way few could have foreseen: wartime 
     temps who have become a permanent cadre.
       Just last week, typing ``top secret'' into the search 
     engine of a major jobs Web site showed 1,951 unfilled 
     positions in the Washington area, and 19,759 nationwide: 
     ``Target analyst,'' Reston. ``Critical infrastructure 
     specialist,'' Washington, D.C. ``Joint expeditionary team 
     member,'' Arlington.

[[Page 7219]]

       ``We could not perform our mission without them. They serve 
     as our `reserves,' providing flexibility and expertise we 
     can't acquire,'' said Ronald Sanders, who was chief of human 
     capital for the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence before retiring in February. ``Once they are on 
     board, we treat them as if they're a part of the total 
     force.''
       The Post's investigation is based on government documents 
     and contracts, job descriptions, property records, corporate 
     and social networking Web sites, additional records, and 
     hundreds of interviews with intelligence, military and 
     corporate officials and former officials. Most requested 
     anonymity either because they are prohibited from speaking 
     publicly or because, they said, they feared retaliation at 
     work for describing their concerns.
       The investigation focused on top-secret work because the 
     amount classified at the secret level is too large to 
     accurately track. A searchable database of government 
     organizations and private companies was built entirely on 
     public records. [For an explanation of the newspaper's 
     decision making behind this project, please see the Editor's 
     Note.]
       The national security industry sells the military and 
     intelligence agencies more than just airplanes, ships and 
     tanks. It sells contractors' brain power. They advise, brief 
     and work everywhere, including 25 feet under the Pentagon in 
     a bunker where they can be found alongside military personnel 
     in battle fatigues monitoring potential crises worldwide.
       Late at night, when the wide corridors of the Pentagon are 
     all but empty, the National Military Command Center hums with 
     purpose. There's real-time access to the location of U.S. 
     forces anywhere in the world, to granular satellite images or 
     to the White House Situation Room.
       The purpose of all this is to be able to answer any 
     question the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might 
     have. To be ready 24 hours a day, every day, takes five 
     brigadier generals, a staff of colonels and senior 
     noncommissioned officers--and a man wearing a pink contractor 
     badge and a bright purple shirt and tie.
       Erik Saar's job title is ``knowledge engineer.'' In one of 
     the most sensitive places in America, he is the only person 
     in the room who knows how to bring data from far afield, 
     fast. Saar and four teammates from a private company, SRA 
     International, teach these top-ranked staff officers to think 
     in Web 2.0. They are trying to push a tradition-bound culture 
     to act differently, digitally.
       That sometimes means asking for help in a public online 
     chat room or exchanging ideas on shared Web pages outside the 
     military computer networks dubbed .mil--things much resisted 
     within the Pentagon's self-sufficient culture. ``Our job is 
     to change the perception of leaders who might drive change,'' 
     Saar said.
       Since 9/11, contractors have made extraordinary 
     contributions--and extraordinary blunders--that have changed 
     history and clouded the public's view of the distinction 
     between the actions of officers sworn on behalf of the United 
     States and corporate employees with little more than a 
     security badge and a gun.
       Contractor misdeeds in Iraq and Afghanistan have hurt U.S. 
     credibility in those countries as well as in the Middle East. 
     Abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, some of it done by 
     contractors, helped ignite a call for vengeance against the 
     United States that continues today. Security guards working 
     for Blackwater added fuel to the five-year violent chaos in 
     Iraq and became the symbol of an America run amok.
       Contractors in war zones, especially those who can fire 
     weapons, blur ``the line between the legitimate and 
     illegitimate use of force, which is just what our enemies 
     want,'' Allison Stanger, a professor of international 
     politics and economics at Middlebury College and the author 
     of ``One Nation Under Contract,'' told the independent 
     Commission on Wartime Contracting at a hearing in June.
       Misconduct happens, too. A defense contractor formerly 
     called MZM paid bribes for CIA contracts, sending Randy 
     ``Duke'' Cunningham, who was a California congressman on the 
     intelligence committee, to prison. Guards employed in 
     Afghanistan by ArmorGroup North America, a private security 
     company, were caught on camera in a lewd-partying scandal.
       But contractors have also advanced the way the military 
     fights. During the bloodiest months in Iraq, the founder of 
     Berico Technologies, a former Army officer named Guy 
     Filippelli, working with the National Security Agency. 
     invented a technology that made finding the makers of 
     roadside bombs easier and helped stanch the number of 
     casualties from improvised explosives, according to NSA 
     officials.
       Contractors have produced blueprints and equipment for the 
     unmanned aerial war fought by drones, which have killed the 
     largest number of senior al-Qaeda leaders and produced a 
     flood of surveillance videos. A dozen firms created the 
     transnational digital highway that carries the drones' real-
     time data on terrorist hide-outs from overseas to command 
     posts throughout the United States.
       Private firms have become so thoroughly entwined with the 
     government's most sensitive activities that without them 
     important military and intelligence missions would have to 
     cease or would be jeopardized. Some examples:
       *At the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the number 
     of contractors equals the number of federal employees. The 
     department depends on 318 companies for essential services 
     and personnel, including 19 staffing firms that help DHS find 
     and hire even more contractors. At the office that handles 
     intelligence, six out of 10 employees are from private 
     industry.
       *The National Security Agency, which conducts worldwide 
     electronic surveillance, hires private firms to come up with 
     most of its technological innovations. The NSA used to work 
     with a small stable of firms; now it works with at least 484 
     and is actively recruiting more.
       *The National Reconnaissance Office cannot produce, launch 
     or maintain its large satellite surveillance systems, which 
     photograph countries such as China, North Korea and Iran, 
     without the four major contractors it works with.
       *Every intelligence and military organization depends on 
     contract linguists to communicate overseas, translate 
     documents and make sense of electronic voice intercepts. The 
     demand for native speakers is so great, and the amount of 
     money the government is willing to pay for them is so huge, 
     that 56 firms compete for this business.
       *Each of the 16 intelligence agencies depends on 
     corporations to set up its computer networks, communicate 
     with other agencies' networks, and fuse and mine disparate 
     bits of information that might indicate a terrorist plot. 
     More than 400 companies work exclusively in this area, 
     building classified hardware and software systems.
       Hiring contractors was supposed to save the government 
     money. But that has not turned out to be the case. A 2008 
     study published by the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence found that contractors made up 29 percent of the 
     workforce in the intelligence agencies but cost the 
     equivalent of 49 percent of their personnel budgets. Gates 
     said that federal workers cost the government 25 percent less 
     than contractors.
       The process of reducing the number of contractors has been 
     slow, if the giant Office of Naval Intelligence in Suitland 
     is any example. There, 2,770 people work on the round-the-
     clock maritime watch floor tracking commercial vessels, or in 
     science and engineering laboratories, or in one of four 
     separate intelligence centers. But it is the employees of 70 
     information technology companies who keep the place 
     operating.
       They store, process and analyze communications and 
     intelligence transmitted to and from the entire U.S. naval 
     fleet and commercial vessels worldwide. ``Could we keep this 
     building running without contractors?'' said the captain in 
     charge of information technology. ``No, I don't think we 
     could keep up with it.''
       Vice Adm. David J. ``Jack'' Dorsett, director of naval 
     intelligence, said he could save millions each year by 
     converting 20 percent of the contractor jobs at the Suitland 
     complex to civil servant positions. He has gotten the go-
     ahead, but it's been a slow start. This year, his staff has 
     converted one contractor job and eliminated another--out of 
     589. ``It's costing me an arm and a leg,'' Dorsett said.
       Washington's corridors of power stretch in a nearly 
     straight geographical line from the Supreme Court to the 
     Capitol to the White House. Keep going west, across the 
     Potomac River, and the unofficial seats of power--the 
     private, corporate ones--become visible, especially at night. 
     There in the Virginia suburbs are the brightly illuminated 
     company logos of Top Secret America: Northrop Grumman, SAIC, 
     General Dynamics.
       Of the 1,931 companies identified by The Post that work on 
     top-secret contracts, about 110 of them do roughly 90 percent 
     of the work on the corporate side of the defense-
     intelligence-corporate world.
       To understand how these firms have come to dominate the 
     post-9/11 era, there's no better place to start than the 
     Herndon office of General Dynamics. One recent afternoon 
     there, Ken Pohill was watching a series of unclassified 
     images, the first of which showed a white truck moving across 
     his computer monitor.
       The truck was in Afghanistan, and a video camera bolted to 
     the belly of a U.S. surveillance plane was following it. 
     Pohill could access a dozen images that might help an 
     intelligence analyst figure out whether the truck driver was 
     just a truck driver or part of a network making roadside 
     bombs to kill American soldiers.
       To do this, he clicked his computer mouse. Up popped a 
     picture of the truck driver's house, with notes about 
     visitors. Another click. Up popped infrared video of the 
     vehicle. Click: Analysis of an object thrown from the 
     driver's side. Click: U-2 imagery. Click: A history of the 
     truck's movement. Click: A Google Earth map of friendly 
     forces. Click: A chat box with everyone else following the 
     truck, too.
       Ten years ago, if Pohill had worked for General Dynamics, 
     he probably would have had a job bending steel. Then, the 
     company's center of gravity was the industrial port city of 
     Groton, Conn., where men and women in wet galoshes churned 
     out submarines, the

[[Page 7220]]

     thoroughbreds of naval warfare. Today, the firm's commercial 
     core is made up of data tools such as the digital imagery 
     library in Herndon and the secure BlackBerry-like device used 
     by President Obama, both developed at a carpeted suburban 
     office by employees in loafers and heels.
       The evolution of General Dynamics was based on one simple 
     strategy: Follow the money.
       The company embraced the emerging intelligence-driven style 
     of warfare. It developed small-target identification systems 
     and equipment that could intercept an insurgent's cellphone 
     and laptop communications. It found ways to sort the billions 
     of data points collected by intelligence agencies into piles 
     of information that a single person could analyze.
       It also began gobbling up smaller companies that could help 
     it dominate the new intelligence landscape, just as its 
     competitors were doing. Between 2001 and 2010, the company 
     acquired 11 firms specializing in satellites, signals and 
     geospatial intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, 
     technology integration and imagery.
       On Sept. 11, 2001, General Dynamics was working with nine 
     intelligence organizations. Now it has contracts with all 16. 
     Its employees fill the halls of the NSA and DHS. The 
     corporation was paid hundreds of millions of dollars to set 
     up and manage DHS's new offices in 2003, including its 
     National Operations Center, Office of Intelligence and 
     Analysis and Office of Security. Its employees do everything 
     from deciding which threats to investigate to answering 
     phones.
       General Dynamics' bottom line reflects its successful 
     transformation. It also reflects how much the U.S. 
     government--the firm's largest customer by far--has paid the 
     company beyond what it costs to do the work, which is, after 
     all, the goal of every profit-making corporation.
       The company reported $31.9 billion in revenue in 2009, up 
     from $10.4 billion in 2000. Its workforce has more than 
     doubled in that time, from 43,300 to 91,700 employees, 
     according to the company.
       Revenue from General Dynamics' intelligence- and 
     information-related divisions, where the majority of its top-
     secret work is done, climbed to $10 billion in the second 
     quarter of 2009, up from $2.4 billion in 2000, accounting for 
     34 percent of its overall revenue last year.
       The company's profitability is on display in its Falls 
     Church headquarters. There's a soaring, art-filled lobby, 
     bistro meals served on china enameled with the General 
     Dynamics logo and an auditorium with seven rows of white 
     leather-upholstered seats, each with its own microphone and 
     laptop docking station.
       General Dynamics now has operations in every corner of the 
     intelligence world. It helps counterintelligence operators 
     and trains new analysts. It has a $600 million Air Force 
     contract to intercept communications. It makes $1 billion a 
     year keeping hackers out of U.S. computer networks and 
     encrypting military communications. It even conducts 
     information operations, the murky military art of trying to 
     persuade foreigners to align their views with U.S. interests.
       ``The American intelligence community is an important 
     market for our company,'' said General Dynamics spokesman 
     Kendell Pease. ``Over time, we have tailored our organization 
     to deliver affordable, best-of-breed products and services to 
     meet those agencies' unique requirements.''
       In September 2009, General Dynamics won a $10 million 
     contract from the U.S. Special Operations Command's 
     psychological operations unit to create Web sites to 
     influence foreigners' views of U.S. policy. To do that, the 
     company hired writers, editors and designers to produce a set 
     of daily news sites tailored to five regions of the world. 
     They appear as regular news Web sites, with names such as 
     ``SETimes.com: The News and Views of Southeast Europe.'' The 
     first indication that they are run on behalf of the military 
     comes at the bottom of the home page with the word 
     ``Disclaimer.'' Only by clicking on that do you learn that 
     ``the Southeast European Times (SET) is a Web site sponsored 
     by the United States European Command.''
       What all of these contracts add up to: This year, General 
     Dynamics' overall revenue was $7.8 billion in the first 
     quarter, Jay L. Johnson, the company's chief executive and 
     president, said at an earnings conference call in April. 
     ``We've hit the deck running in the first quarter,'' he said, 
     ``and we're on our way to another successful year.''
       In the shadow of giants such as General Dynamics are 1,814 
     small to midsize companies that do top-secret work. About a 
     third of them were established after Sept. 11, 2001, to take 
     advantage of the huge flow of taxpayer money into the private 
     sector. Many are led by former intelligence agency officials 
     who know exactly whom to approach for work.
       Abraxas of Herndon, headed by a former CIA spy, quickly 
     became a major CIA contractor after 9/11. Its staff even 
     recruited midlevel managers during work hours from the CIA's 
     cafeteria, former agency officers recall.
       Other small and medium-size firms sell niche technical 
     expertise such as engineering for low-orbit satellites or 
     long-dwell sensors. But the vast majority have not invented 
     anything at all. Instead, they replicate what the 
     government's workforce already does.
       A company called SGIS, founded soon after the 2001 attacks, 
     was one of these.
       In June 2002, from the spare bedroom of his San Diego home, 
     30-year-old Hany Girgis put together an information 
     technology team that won its first Defense Department 
     contract four months later. By the end of the year, SGIS had 
     opened a Tampa office close to the U.S. Central Command and 
     Special Operations Command, had turned a profit and had 30 
     employees.
       SGIS sold the government the services of people with 
     specialized skills; expanding the types of teams it could put 
     together was one key to its growth. Eventually it offered 
     engineers, analysts and cyber-security specialists for 
     military, space and intelligence agencies. By 2003, the 
     company's revenue was $3.7 million. By then, SGIS had become 
     a subcontractor for General Dynamics, working at the secret 
     level. Satisfied with the partnership, General Dynamics 
     helped SGIS receive a top-secret facility clearance, which 
     opened the doors to more work.
       By 2006, its revenue had multiplied tenfold, to $30.6 
     million, and the company had hired employees who specialized 
     in government contracting just to help it win more contracts.
       ``We knew that's where we wanted to play,'' Girgis said in 
     a phone interview. ``There's always going to be a need to 
     protect the homeland.''
       Eight years after it began, SGIS was up to revenue of $101 
     million, 14 offices and 675 employees. Those with top-secret 
     clearances worked for 11 government agencies, according to 
     The Post's database.
       The company's marketing efforts had grown, too, both in 
     size and sophistication. Its Web site, for example, showed an 
     image of Navy sailors lined up on a battleship over the words 
     ``Proud to serve'' and another image of a Navy helicopter 
     flying near the Statue of Liberty over the words ``Preserving 
     freedom.'' And if it seemed hard to distinguish SGIS's work 
     from the government's, it's because they were doing so many 
     of the same things. SGIS employees replaced military 
     personnel at the Pentagon's 24/7 telecommunications center. 
     SGIS employees conducted terrorist threat analysis. SGIS 
     employees provided help-desk support for federal computer 
     systems.
       Still, as alike as they seemed, there were crucial 
     differences.
       For one, unlike in government, if an SGIS employee did a 
     good job, he might walk into the parking lot one day and be 
     surprised by co-workers clapping at his latest bonus: a 
     leased, dark-blue Mercedes convertible. And he might say, as 
     a video camera recorded him sliding into the soft leather 
     driver's seat, ``Ahhhh . . . this is spectacular.''
       And then there was what happened to SGIS last month, when 
     it did the one thing the federal government can never do.
       It sold itself.
       The new owner is a Fairfax-based company called Salient 
     Federal Solutions, created just last year. It is a management 
     company and a private-equity firm with lots of Washington 
     connections that, with the purchase of SGIS, it intends to 
     parlay into contracts.
       ``We have an objective,'' says chief executive and 
     President Brad Antle, ``to make $500 million in five years.''
       Of all the different companies in Top Secret America, the 
     most numerous by far are the information technology, or IT, 
     firms. About 800 firms do nothing but IT.
       Some IT companies integrate the mishmash of computer 
     systems within one agency; others build digital links between 
     agencies; still others have created software and hardware 
     that can mine and analyze vast quantities of data.
       The government is nearly totally dependent on these firms. 
     Their close relationship was on display recently at the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency's annual information technology 
     conference in Phoenix. The agency expected the same IT firms 
     angling for its business to pay for the entire five-day get-
     together, a DIA spokesman confirmed.
       And they did.
       General Dynamics spent $30,000 on the event. On a perfect 
     spring night, it hosted a party at Chase Field, a 48,569-seat 
     baseball stadium, reserved exclusively for the conference 
     attendees. Government buyers and corporate sellers drank beer 
     and ate hot dogs while the DIA director's morning keynote 
     speech replayed on the gigantic scoreboard, digital baseballs 
     bouncing along the bottom of the screen.
       Carahsoft Technology, a DIA contractor, invited guests to a 
     casino night where intelligence officials and vendors ate, 
     drank and bet phony money at craps tables run by professional 
     dealers.
       The McAfee network security company, a Defense Department 
     contractor, welcomed guests to a Margaritaville-themed social 
     on the garden terrace of the hotel across the street from the 
     convention site, where 250 firms paid thousands of dollars 
     each to advertise their services and make their pitches to 
     intelligence officials walking the exhibition hall.
       Government officials and company executives say these 
     networking events are critical to building a strong 
     relationship between the public and private sectors.

[[Page 7221]]

       ``If I make one contact each day, it's worth it,'' said Tom 
     Conway, director of federal business development for McAfee.
       As for what a government agency gets out of it: ``Our goal 
     is to be open and learn stuff,'' said Grant M. Schneider, the 
     DIA's chief information officer and one of the conference's 
     main draws. By going outside Washington, where many of the 
     firms are headquartered, ``we get more synergy. . . . It's an 
     interchange with industry.''
       These types of gatherings happen every week. Many of them 
     are closed to anyone without a top-secret clearance.
       At a U.S. Special Operations Command conference in 
     Fayetteville, N.C., in April, vendors paid for access to some 
     of the people who decide what services and gadgets to buy for 
     troops. In mid-May, the national security industry held a 
     black-tie evening funded by the same corporations seeking 
     business from the defense, intelligence and congressional 
     leaders seated at their tables.
       Such coziness worries other officials who believe the post-
     9/11 defense-intelligence-corporate relationship has become, 
     as one senior military intelligence officer described it, a 
     ``self-licking ice cream cone.''
       Another official, a longtime conservative staffer on the 
     Senate Armed Services Committee, described it as ``a living, 
     breathing organism'' impossible to control or curtail. ``How 
     much money has been involved is just mind-boggling,'' he 
     said. ``We've built such a vast instrument. What are you 
     going to do with this thing? . . . It's turned into a jobs 
     program.''
       Even some of those gathered in Phoenix criticized the size 
     and disjointedness of the intelligence community and its 
     contracting base. ``Redundancy is the unacceptable norm,'' 
     Lt. Gen. Richard P. Zahner, Army deputy chief of staff for 
     intelligence, told the 2,000 attendees. ``Are we spending our 
     resources effectively? . . . If we have not gotten our houses 
     in order, someone will do it for us.''
       On a day that also featured free back rubs, shoeshines, ice 
     cream and fruit smoothies, another speaker, Kevin P. Meiners, 
     a deputy undersecretary for intelligence, gave the audience 
     what he called ``the secret sauce,'' the key to thriving even 
     when the Defense Department budget eventually stabilizes and 
     stops rising so rapidly.
       ``Overhead,'' Meiners told them--that's what's going to get 
     cut first. Overhead used to mean paper clips and toner. Now 
     it's information technology, IT, the very products and 
     services sold by the businesspeople in the audience.
       ``You should describe what you do as a weapons system, not 
     overhead,'' Meiners instructed. ``Overhead to them--I'm 
     giving you the secret sauce here--is IT and people. . . . You 
     have to foot-stomp hard that this is a war-fighting system 
     that's helping save people's lives every day.''
       After he finished, many of the government officials 
     listening headed to the exhibit hall, where company 
     salespeople waited in display booths. Peter Coddington, chief 
     executive of InTTENSITY, a small firm whose software teaches 
     computers to ``read'' documents, was ready for them.
       ``You have to differentiate yourself,'' he said as they 
     fanned out into the aisles. Coddington had glass beer mugs 
     and pens twirling atop paperweight pyramids to help persuade 
     officials of the nation's largest military intelligence 
     agency that he had something they needed.
       But first he needed them to stop walking so fast, to slow 
     down long enough for him to start his pitch. His twirling 
     pens seemed to do the job. ``It's like moths to fire,'' 
     Coddington whispered.
       A DIA official with a tote bag approached. She spotted the 
     pens, and her pace slowed. ``Want a pen?'' Coddington called.
       She hesitated. ``Ah . . . I have three children,'' she 
     said.
       ``Want three pens?''
       She stopped. In Top Secret America, every moment is an 
     opportunity.
       ``We're a text extraction company . . . ,'' Coddington 
     began, handing her the pens.
                                 ______
                                 
       Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

  The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the 
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered 
read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                                H.R. 754

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 303. Non-reimbursable detail of other personnel.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Schedule and requirements for the National 
              Counterintelligence Strategy.
Sec. 402. Insider threat detection program.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements

Sec. 411. Defense Intelligence Agency counterintelligence and 
              expenditures.
Sec. 412. Accounts and transfer authority for appropriations and other 
              amounts for the intelligence elements of the Department 
              of Defense.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2011 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and 
     the authorized personnel levels (expressed as full-time 
     equivalent positions) as of September 30, 2011, for the 
     conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed 
     in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 754 of the One Hundred 
     Twelfth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the 
     President. The President shall provide for suitable 
     distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of 
     the Schedule, within the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2011 the sum of $660,732,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2012.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 787 full-time equivalent 
     personnel as of September 30, 2011. Personnel serving in such 
     elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from 
     other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2011 such

[[Page 7222]]

     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). 
     Such additional amounts made available for advanced research 
     and development shall remain available until September 30, 
     2012.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2011, there are authorized such full-time equivalent 
     personnel for the Community Management Account as of that 
     date as are specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2011 the sum of $292,000,000.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 303. NON-REIMBURSABLE DETAIL OF OTHER PERSONNEL.

       (a) In General.--Section 113A of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h-1) is amended to read as follows:


              ``non-reimbursable detail of other personnel

       ``Sec. 113A. An officer or employee of the United States or 
     member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an 
     element of the intelligence community funded through the 
     National Intelligence Program from another element of the 
     intelligence community or from another element of the United 
     States Government on a non-reimbursable basis, as jointly 
     agreed to by the heads of the receiving and detailing 
     elements, for a period not to exceed two years. This section 
     does not limit any other source of authority for reimbursable 
     or non-reimbursable details.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of such Act is amended by striking the item 
     relating to section 113A and inserting the following:

``Sec. 113A. Non-reimbursable detail of other personnel.''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. SCHEDULE AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NATIONAL 
                   COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.

       Section 904(d)(2) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement 
     Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 402c(d)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Subject'' and inserting the following:
       ``(A) Requirement to produce.--Subject'';
       (2) by striking ``on an annual basis''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Revision and requirement.--The National 
     Counterintelligence Strategy shall be revised or updated at 
     least once every three years and shall be aligned with the 
     strategy and policies of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 402. INSIDER THREAT DETECTION PROGRAM.

       (a) Initial Operating Capability.--Not later than October 
     1, 2012, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     establish an initial operating capability for an effective 
     automated insider threat detection program for the 
     information resources in each element of the intelligence 
     community in order to detect unauthorized access to, or use 
     or transmission of, classified intelligence.
       (b) Full Operating Capability.--Not later than October 1, 
     2013, the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the 
     program described in subsection (a) has reached full 
     operating capability.
       (c) Report.--Not later than December 1, 2011, the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the resources required to 
     implement the insider threat detection program referred to in 
     subsection (a) and any other issues related to such 
     implementation the Director considers appropriate to include 
     in the report.
       (d) Information Resources Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``information resources'' means networks, systems, 
     workstations, servers, routers, applications, databases, 
     websites, online collaboration environments, and any other 
     information resources in an element of the intelligence 
     community designated by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements

     SEC. 411. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 
                   EXPENDITURES.

       Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-5) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(5), by inserting ``and 
     counterintelligence'' after ``human intelligence'';
       (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
       ``(c) Expenditure of Funds by the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director 
     of the Defense Intelligence Agency may expend amounts made 
     available to the Director for human intelligence and 
     counterintelligence activities for objects of a confidential, 
     extraordinary, or emergency nature, without regard to the 
     provisions of law or regulation relating to the expenditure 
     of Government funds.
       ``(2) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may 
     not expend more than five percent of the amounts made 
     available to the Director for human intelligence and 
     counterintelligence activities for a fiscal year for objects 
     of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature in 
     accordance with paragraph (1) during such fiscal year 
     unless--
       ``(A) the Director notifies the congressional intelligence 
     committees of the intent to expend the amounts; and
       ``(B) 30 days have elapsed from the date on which the 
     Director notifies the congressional intelligence committees 
     in accordance with subparagraph (A).
       ``(3) For each expenditure referred to in paragraph (1), 
     the Director shall certify that such expenditure was made for 
     an object of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency 
     nature.
       ``(4) Not later than December 31 of each year, the Director 
     of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on any 
     expenditures made during the preceding fiscal year in 
     accordance with paragraph (1).''.

     SEC. 412. ACCOUNTS AND TRANSFER AUTHORITY FOR APPROPRIATIONS 
                   AND OTHER AMOUNTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS 
                   OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 21 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 428 the following 
     new section:

     ``Sec. 429. Appropriations for defense intelligence elements: 
       accounts for transfer; transfer

       ``(a) Accounts for Appropriations for Defense Intelligence 
     Elements.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish one 
     or more accounts for the receipt of appropriations and other 
     amounts transferred pursuant to subsection (b).
       ``(b) Transfers Authorized.--(1) There may be transferred 
     to an account established pursuant to subsection (a) the 
     following:
       ``(A) Appropriations transferred by the Secretary of 
     Defense from appropriations of the Department of Defense 
     available for intelligence, intelligence-related activities, 
     and intelligence-related communications.
       ``(B) Appropriations and other amounts transferred by the 
     Director of National Intelligence from appropriations and 
     other amounts available for the defense intelligence 
     elements.
       ``(C) Amounts and reimbursements in connection with 
     transactions authorized by law between the defense 
     intelligence elements and other entities.
       ``(2) The transfer authority of the Secretary of Defense 
     under paragraph (1)(A) is in addition to any other transfer 
     authority available to the Secretary by law.
       ``(c) Availability of Appropriations and Amounts 
     Transferred.--(1) Appropriations transferred pursuant to 
     subsection (b) shall remain available for the same time 
     period, and shall be available for the same purposes, as the 
     appropriations from which transferred.
       ``(2) Appropriation balances in an account established 
     pursuant to subsection (a) may be transferred back to the 
     account or accounts from which such balances originated as an 
     appropriation refund.
       ``(d) Defense Intelligence Elements Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `defense intelligence elements' means the 
     agencies, offices, and elements of the Department of Defense 
     that are included within the elements of the intelligence 
     community specified in or designated under section 3(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of subchapter I of chapter 21 of such title is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 428 
     the following new item:

``429. Appropriations for defense intelligence elements: accounts for 
              transfer; transfer.''.

  The CHAIR. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order except 
those printed in House Report 112-75. Each such amendment may be 
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated 
in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the 
time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the 
proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall 
not be subject to a demand for division of the question.


           Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in 
House Report 112-75.

[[Page 7223]]


  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 12, line 10, insert ``under the National Intelligence 
     Program'' after ``the Director''.
       Page 12, line 17, insert ``under the National Intelligence 
     Program'' after ``the Director''.
       Strike section 412.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 264, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, this is a manager's amendment 
to the bill that contains two provisions.
  The first provision would simply clarify that section 411 of the 
bill, which relates to certain Defense Intelligence Agency 
expenditures, applies only to the National Intelligence Program funds. 
This clarification was requested by the Committee on Armed Services and 
is largely technical in nature.
  The second provision would strike section 412 of the reported bill, 
which provides for the creation of certain accounts for intelligence 
funds. While this provision is an important one, intended to promote 
auditability of intelligence funds, some technical issues have arisen; 
and I believe it was prudent to hold this over until the FY12 bill. It 
is something that I support and hope to return to the bill in FY12. I 
do not believe that either of these changes are controversial and urge 
Members to support the amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in 
opposition, though I am not opposed to the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. In this era of tight budgets, I believe it is our 
responsibility to manage every taxpayer dollar efficiently and 
effectively. Section 412 of the bill provides the Secretary of Defense 
authority to transfer certain funds into specific accounts to provide 
more accurate accounting of money spent. The manager's amendment 
strikes section 412 from the bill.
  Section 412 will allow for an accurate audit of taxpayer dollars. 
This important tool will save us money in the long run. We must 
identify programs that are not working and trim those costs. A thorough 
audit will help us do that. We must ensure any cuts do not negatively 
impact on the performance of the mission. The administration supports 
section 412, and so do I.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I thank the ranking member. I look forward to 
working with him on this particular issue.
  As I think the ranking member understands, Mr. Chairman, we've 
brought in auditors on the committee. This is something we're very 
committed to in a bipartisan way, to actually have funds that can be 
audited. It's a bit shocking, I think, to both of us that they have had 
these funds for such a long time that have not been able to be audited, 
and we hope to do that on behalf of the taxpayers of the United States.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I agree with the chairman. Staff is working 
together to try to resolve the issues involving section 412. We look 
forward to a positive resolution.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan will be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Barrow

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in 
House Report 112-75.
  Mr. BARROW. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       After section 303, insert the following:

     SEC. 304. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.

       Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 441p) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``subsection (b)'' 
     and inserting ``subsections (b) and (c)'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (c) through (f) as 
     subsections (d) through (g), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after subsection (b), the following:
       ``(c) Grant Program for Historically Black Colleges and 
     Universities.--(1) The Director may provide grants to 
     historically black colleges and universities to provide 
     programs of study in educational disciplines identified under 
     subsection (a)(2) or described in paragraph (2).
       ``(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may be used to 
     provide programs of study in the following educational 
     disciplines:
       ``(A) Intermediate and advanced foreign languages deemed in 
     the immediate interest of the intelligence community, 
     including Farsi, Pashto, Middle Eastern, African, and South 
     Asian dialects.
       ``(B) Study abroad programs and cultural immersion 
     programs.''; and
       (4) in paragraph (g) (as so redesignated)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (1), the following:
       ``(2) Historically black college and university.--The term 
     `historically black college and university' has the meaning 
     given the term `part B institution' in section 322 of the 
     Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061).''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) Study abroad program.--The term `study abroad 
     program' means a program of study that--
       ``(A) takes places outside the geographical boundaries of 
     the United States;
       ``(B) focuses on areas of the world that are critical to 
     the national security interests of the United States and are 
     generally underrepresented in study abroad programs at 
     institutions of higher education, including Africa, Asia, 
     Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Latin America, and the 
     Middle East; and
       ``(C) is a credit or noncredit program.''.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 264, the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Barrow) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. BARROW. Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by thanking Chairman Rogers 
and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their hard work on this important 
legislation.
  We face a diverse and growing array of threats around the globe, and 
we need an intelligence community as diverse as the threats we face. My 
amendment directs the national intelligence director to create a pilot 
program for Historically Black Colleges and Universities to help 
develop critical language curricula and study abroad programs. Our 
defenses have to be as advanced as the means used by our enemies. That 
means that our human assets have to be as diverse as our enemies. 
Cultural, language, and educational barriers affect the quality of 
intelligence we can gather; and it's critical that we have the human 
assets to overcome these barriers.
  The area of Georgia I represent is home to several HBCUs with 
specific expertise in critical languages. Engaging centers of academic 
excellence such as these will help the intelligence community meet our 
strategic security goals and will produce more sophisticated 
intelligence officers. This, in turn, will make our country more 
secure. I, therefore, urge my colleagues to support this amendment and 
support passage of the bill.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the 
amendment, I would ask unanimous consent to claim the time in 
opposition.
  The CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.

[[Page 7224]]

  While I support the intent behind the amendment, I believe it is also 
important to note for the record--and I appreciate the gentleman's work 
on this--that the Intelligence Committee has already a number of 
existing programs and initiatives in this area. I think this will, in 
fact, enhance that effort.
  The proposed amendment has the goal of assisting Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities in creating and maintaining academic 
curricula that help the intelligence community meet its workforce 
diversity and critical language goals. I am happy to say that the 
community already understands well that a diverse workforce enhances 
its mission performance. For example, Director Panetta has launched his 
own initiative at CIA to enhance the diversity of that agency's 
workforce.
  Additionally, there are other initiatives under way to increase the 
employment and retention of the diverse candidates throughout the 
intelligence community. And I won't go on, other than to compliment the 
gentleman for his interest in exposing the number of people who would 
have the skills to apply and diversify our workforce at the CIA.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Barrow).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Dent

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in 
House Report 112-75.
  Mr. DENT. I offer an amendment, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 304. INFORMATION ON PURSUIT OF ANWAR AL-AWLAKI.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall jointly 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees--
       (1) all information in the possession of the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence and the Central 
     Intelligence Agency relating to the pursuit and targeting of 
     Anwar al-Awlaki by the Federal Government; and
       (2) an analysis of the legal impediments to pursuing the 
     capture of Anwar al-Awlaki.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 264, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Dent) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I first want to commend the chairman and the 
ranking member for the very good work they have done on this bill. They 
really have worked in a bipartisan manner, and they are really trying 
to advance the best interests of the intelligence community and this 
Nation's national security. So I applaud them for the spirit in which 
they have taken on this legislation.
  I will withdraw this amendment after having conversations with the 
chairman. But the point I want to make about the amendment is that the 
amendment simply directs the Director of National Intelligence and the 
CIA that within 90 days of this act to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees all information possessed by the DNI and the 
CIA relating to the pursuit and targeting of one Anwar al-Awlaki by the 
Federal Government as well as an analysis of the legal impediments to 
pursuing the capture of Anwar al-Awlaki.
  Americans are all very much familiar with who Osama bin Laden is. 
Everybody knows who he is, and we're all extremely gratified about his 
demise. At the same time, we should all be aware too that Anwar al-
Awlaki seems to be the leader of many of the operational aspects of al 
Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. He is a real threat. He is an American 
citizen. He is also a Yemeni citizen. He has targeted Americans. We 
always thought he was a spiritual adviser and certainly a recruiter for 
al Qaeda. But now it's quite clear that he has also gone operational.

                              {time}  1540

  We're aware of that as it relates to the underwear bomber, 
Abdulmutallab and his attempt to the blow up the airliner near Detroit.
  So the point of this amendment is to raise awareness on Anwar al-
Awlaki, also to point out the fact that he is a citizen, to point out 
the fact that I think it's important that we consider essentially that 
he has committed expatriating acts. I mean, the fact that he has 
targeted American citizens, that he has called for the death of many 
Americans, I have legislation that is also prepared to deal with his 
citizenship issue, that it should be revoked, or at least we should 
seriously do that, just as we would for any other individual who takes 
up arms against this country. We have laws on the books from 1944 when 
there were individuals who were signed up with the Nazi army or the 
Imperial Army of Japan who took up arms against this country as 
citizens. Those are expatriating acts.
  I simply believe that if an individual takes up arms with al Qaeda or 
the Taliban or any other terrorist organization, foreign terrorist 
organization that is intent on killing Americans, that we should treat 
them just as we would an individual who is an agent of a foreign 
government or part of a foreign army. That's the whole point.
  But recognizing this is probably not the best place to offer this 
amendment at this time, I have agreed to withdraw it. I appreciate the 
chairman's consideration, and I will be working to make sure that this 
Congress has the opportunity to address the citizenship issue of Anwar 
al-Awlaki. It has reported in the press that our government has a kill 
or capture order on Mr. Al-Awlaki. I don't know if that is true or not. 
I read it in the press.
  Just last week we saw reports that Anwar al-Awlaki was supposedly the 
intended target of an attack, unsuccessful, in Yemen, and so he is 
still alive. And the point I want to make is that I think that if we're 
targeting an American citizen for assassination, then I think we should 
at least take up the issue of his citizenship and revoke it if at all 
possible. So at that point I will address it in another forum.
  At this time I would again urge everybody here to support the 
underlying legislation. I will withdraw this amendment, and I 
appreciate the chairman and ranking member's consideration.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in 
House Report 112-75.


                 Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Gibson

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in 
House Report 112-75.
  Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 11, after line 
     20), add the following new section:

     SEC. 403. REPORT ON POTENTIAL CONSOLIDATION OF ELEMENTS OF 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Not later than December 31, 2011, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to congress a report containing any 
     recommendations the Director considers appropriate for 
     consolidating elements of the intelligence community.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 264, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gibson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Chairman, I actually want to begin this afternoon by 
praising the chairman and the ranking member, all of the members of the 
intel committee and their staff for truly magnificent work here on 
behalf of the American people. I've spent some time down in the SCIF 
and have been through the bill, and I think it's something that 
everyone can be proud of. And clearly, the operation that occurred 
about 2 weeks ago that ended in the death of Osama Bin Laden is an 
example of how intel and operations can be fused for successful 
operations.

[[Page 7225]]

  And I'm rising today to offer an amendment to the intel authorization 
bill that I hope the committee will be willing to accept. It's based on 
my experiences from the 29 years I served in the United States 
military, nearly 5 in the New York Army National Guard, and then 24 
years in the United States Army.
  And I will tell you that, particularly, my experiences in Iraq 
commanding an airborne infantry battalion task force, and then later as 
a Division G-3, that's an operations officer for Multinational Division 
North, I saw firsthand the virtues of intel and operations being fused 
for successful operations.
  And so what concerns me today is the fact that since the 11th of 
September, we've had significant growth in the intel community to 
address various concerns. And what I think we need to do now is pause, 
reflect, and look for ways to consolidate all that growth so that we 
can continue to have effective intel operations in a manner that's 
consistent for Republicans, and one that we can afford.
  So what I offered is actually a very simple amendment. It asks the 
Director of National Intelligence to provide his recommendations on 
consolidation with an eye towards effectiveness and efficiency.
  When we initially created this position this, of course, was a result 
of the Kean Commission after the horrific attacks of the 11th of 
September, 2001. We created the DNI to help us to really provide 
leadership in the intel community. In my estimation, we did not provide 
the adequate budget and legal authorities for him to really accomplish 
all those duties that we expected of him. So I would think that he 
would welcome this task to provide his recommendation to us on how we 
might better organize, consolidate the intel community to perform its 
very critical function for the American people.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. And again I want to 
thank the intel committee, the leadership and all those who provided 
the work for this bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I appreciate Congressman Gibson's intent. And I 
also want to thank him for his service in the military. But I believe 
we should always be looking for efficiencies to help reduce costs 
throughout the government.
  The Director of National Intelligence is conducting a similar review 
that will identify redundancies without sacrificing core missions. I 
want to see the product of those efforts before asking the DNI, 
Director of National Intelligence, to submit an additional report. For 
this reason I oppose the amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GIBSON. I certainly respect my colleague for all his experiences 
that he brings before he comes to the Congress, and for the tremendous 
work he's done in the time that he's been here serving the American 
people in the United States Congress.
  I respectfully disagree with the position, and would like to hear 
directly from the Director of National Intelligence. I know if I were 
in his shoes I would welcome this task. I would want to provide the 
United States Congress, the American people, by way of the United 
States Congress, to provide the recommendations on the way that he, in 
this case, the way he sees fit on better organizing the intel 
community.
  So, with a very heavy respect for the ranking member, I still urge my 
colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GIBSON. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Gibson).
  The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York will be postponed.

                              {time}  1550


              Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Ruppersberger

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in 
House Report 112-75.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I rise to offer the amendment for Congresswoman 
Waters as her designee.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle A of title IV, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 403. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION 
                   OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to Congress a report on 
     the degree to which racial and ethnic minorities in the 
     United States are employed in professional positions in the 
     intelligence community and barriers to the recruitment and 
     retention of additional racial and ethnic minorities in such 
     positions.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 264, the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentlewoman from California, 
Congresswoman Waters.
  Ms. WATERS. I thank the gentleman.
  My amendment requires the inspector general of the intelligence 
community to report to Congress on racial and ethnic diversity in the 
intelligence community.
  A diverse workforce is essential to intelligence work. People from a 
variety of backgrounds bring a variety of perspectives to the table to 
understand the world in which we live. A diverse workforce provides 
intelligence agencies critical insights into different cultures around 
the world, where information about potential threats to our national 
security is being collected and analyzed.
  Many leading intelligence officials understand the importance of a 
diverse workforce. The Web site of the Central Intelligence Agency 
includes the following statement:
  ``In order for the CIA to meet our mission of protecting our national 
security interests, we need to employ a workforce as diverse as America 
itself, the most diverse Nation on Earth. Diversity reflects the unique 
ways we vary as intelligence officers. Our nationality, race, 
ethnicity, gender, age, language, culture, sexual orientation, 
education, values, beliefs, abilities, and disabilities. These assorted 
attributes create different demographic, functional, and intellectual 
views which are so vital to our innovation, agility, collection, and 
analysis.''
  And I really do think that says it all.
  Unfortunately, there is virtually no data available to Congress and 
the public regarding the degree of racial and ethnic diversity in the 
intelligence community. The most recent publicly available report that 
discusses this subject is a 1996 report by the Government 
Accountability Office on personnel practices at intelligence agencies, 
which focused on equal employment opportunity practices.
  The report concluded that intelligence agencies have workforce 
diversity programs, but results lag far behind other Federal agencies. 
This report was written more than 5 years before the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 and 15 years before the death of Osama bin Laden. Needless to 
say, both the intelligence community and the world in which it operates 
have changed tremendously since then.
  My amendment states that, within 180 days after the enactment of the 
bill, the inspector general shall submit to Congress a report on the 
degree to which racial and ethnic minorities in the United States are 
employed in professional positions in the intelligence community and 
barriers to the recruitment and retention of additional racial

[[Page 7226]]

and ethnic minorities in these position. The amendment requires that 
the report be submitted in unclassified form, but allows the inspector 
general to include a classified annex.
  It is long past time for Congress to reevaluate the diversity of the 
intelligence community workforce, and I urge my colleagues to support 
my amendment.
  Again, I thank the gentleman, Mr. Ruppersberger, for yielding.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose this 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to claim time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I support efforts to create a 
diverse workforce within the intelligence community. A diverse 
workforce is instrumental to effectively respond to the complex global 
threats faced by the United States.
  I do have so many concerns that this amendment is duplicative with 
many efforts which are already under way within the intelligence 
community to address this issue.
  For example, section 338 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 
2010, passed after the fiscal year last year, requires the DNI to 
coordinate with each element of the IC to provide a report of plans to 
increase the employment and retention of diverse candidates. Moreover, 
the DNI has already created a strategic plan on equal employment 
opportunity and issued Community Directive 110, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity and Diversity Program.
  It is my hope that the inspector general will consider all of these 
existing initiatives in the report and use the substantial body of work 
that has already been done on these issues in completing it.
  Nonetheless, I will support the amendment and its laudable goals.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Hinchey

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in 
House Report 112-75.
  Mr. HINCHEY. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   IN ARGENTINA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report containing the following:
       (1) A description of any information in the possession of 
     the intelligence community with respect to the following 
     events in the Republic of Argentina:
       (A) The accession to power by the military of the Republic 
     of Argentina in 1976.
       (B) Violations of human rights committed by officers or 
     agents of the Argentine military and security forces during 
     counterinsurgency or counterterror operations, including by 
     the State Intelligence Secretariat (Secretaria de 
     Inteligencia del Estado), Military Intelligence Detachment 
     141 (Destacamento de Inteligencia Militar 141 in Cordoba), 
     Military Intelligence Detachment 121 (Destacamento Militar 
     121 in Rosario), Army Intelligence Battalion 601, the Army 
     Reunion Center (Reunion Central del Ejercito), and the Army 
     First Corps in Buenos Aires.
       (C) Operation Condor and Argentina's role in cross-border 
     counterinsurgency or counterterror operations with Brazil, 
     Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, or Uruguay.
       (2) Information on abductions, torture, disappearances, and 
     executions by security forces and other forms of repression, 
     including the fate of Argentine children born in captivity, 
     that took place at detention centers, including the 
     following:
       (A) The Argentine Navy Mechanical School (Escuela Mecanica 
     de la Armada).
       (B) Automotores Orletti.
       (C) Operaciones Tacticas 18.
       (D) La Perla.
       (E) Campo de Mayo.
       (F) Institutos Militares.
       (3) An appendix of declassified records reviewed and used 
     for the report submitted under this subsection.
       (4) A descriptive index of information referred to in 
     paragraph (1) or (2) that is classified, including the 
     identity of each document that is classified, the reason for 
     continuing the classification of such document, and an 
     explanation of how the release of the document would damage 
     the national security interests of the United States.
       (b) Review of Classified Documents.--Not later than two 
     years after the date on which the report required under 
     subsection (a) is submitted, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall review information referred to in 
     paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) that is classified to 
     determine if any of such information should be declassified.
       (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 264, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Hinchey) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, in 1976, amid social unrest and a deep 
political crisis in Argentina, a military coup installed one of the 
cruelest dictatorships South America has ever seen. Illegal detentions, 
torture, and summary executions of dissidents became routine. Cross-
country operations to capture and assassinate dissidents were organized 
by Argentina in cooperation with Southern Cone military regimes in what 
is known as Operation Condor.
  Over the years, as the victims of the repression increasingly went 
missing, a new tactic of the Argentine security forces was revealed. It 
is estimated that 30,000 people disappeared in Argentina between 1976 
and 1985. Many of these victims, known as ``the disappeared,'' were 
abducted. They were tortured and then dropped far out into the ocean.
  During the dictatorship, hundreds of children were born into 
captivity and distributed to members of the Argentine security forces, 
while their mothers are believed to have been killed.

                              {time}  1600

  The identity of some of these children has been discovered, but the 
majority of their identities and whereabouts remain unknown. My 
amendment seeks to shed light on the unknown fate of these children, 
who would be now in their twenties and early thirties.
  Given the close relationship with their Argentine counterparts in the 
intelligence, security and military community, the documentation of the 
American intelligence community is likely to contain invaluable 
information to support renewed justice investigations and the search 
for the children of ``the disappeared.''
  This amendment that I am offering would direct the Director of 
National Intelligence to report to the House and Senate Intelligence 
panels on information it has regarding the human rights violations of 
the military government in Argentina and also seeks to help shed light 
on the unknown fate of the Argentine children who were born in 
captivity. The amendment instructs the DNI to include an appendix of 
declassified documents used for the report and gives the authority for 
the inclusion of a classified annex.
  Thousands of families have waited more than 30 years to learn the 
fate of their loved ones, and today we have an opportunity to make a 
significant contribution to truth and justice and help bring to a close 
this troubling chapter in Argentina's history.
  In 2008, this amendment was made in order by the Rules Committee and 
agreed to on the House floor without objection from either party by 
voice vote. At that time, my dear friend and colleague Peter Hoekstra 
said, ``I will not oppose this amendment, Mr. Chairman. I will support 
the amendment.''
  So I urge all of us to join in supporting this contribution to truth 
and justice in the country of Argentina.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment.

[[Page 7227]]

  The CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I must unfortunately oppose this amendment.
  I certainly can sympathize with the gentleman's intention to try to 
bring some closure for families in this particularly difficult issue in 
Argentina, and it may certainly result in some information to those who 
are conducting maybe historical research and analysis and certainly to 
mend the wounds that have been created in this particular situation.
  It would also do something, I think, equally damaging to today's 
effort in the war on terror. It would divert the intelligence community 
from its mission of protecting the United States and our interests from 
current threats. When you think about how difficult it was to take a 
small piece of information and stretch a nickname, an Arabic nickname 
applied to someone who is using an alias, who is likely associating 
with individuals who had Arabic nicknames associated to aliases, and 
from that little scrap of information, the entire intelligence 
apparatus spent years trying to develop the right lead to lead us to 
last Sunday's event to bring Osama bin Laden to justice.
  This year, the intelligence community came forward and said, We need 
more analysts. We need more human resources in order to accomplish this 
mission. There are too many threats in too many places for our people 
to handle it. And what this amendment does, although it is very well 
intended, it takes resources away to apply it to a problem that is 20 
to 30 years old. I am sorry, we just don't have that luxury today.
  We are concerned, the intelligence community is concerned that the 
next few months, the next 6 months are crucial when al Qaeda is trying 
to get its act back together after losing its operational and 
inspirational leader and how they reach out or lash out in some kind of 
an attack. It is imperative that every minute of every day be spent 
targeting those who are seeking to kill Americans or our allies 
overseas now.
  I hope that we find some other alternative to what the gentleman 
proposes in maybe another way. But redirecting the valuable assets in 
the fight on terror today I just think is a misuse of our resources and 
may, in fact, be a dangerous one at that. This is not the time to be 
disrupting our counterterrorism analysts, our case officers, or anybody 
in the CIA or other intelligence agencies away from disrupting, 
dismantling and defeating al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations 
for the activities of the Government of Argentina nearly 25 years ago.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, how much time do we have remaining?
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from New York has 2 minutes remaining, and 
the gentleman from Michigan has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate what has just been 
said. But the fact of the matter is that there are no significant costs 
involved in this. This operation has been looked at in the past. The 
information that we are asking for in the context of this amendment is 
readily available. It is not going to take any significant costs 
whatsoever and it can be done very, very quickly.
  This is a situation that really needs to be corrected. It is a 
violent, deeply disturbing activity that took place in the context of 
many, many families, many of whom are completely innocent, and the 
effects of that were in many cases deeply disastrous.
  This is something that can be done easily and can be done quickly, 
and it was supported by the opposition almost unanimously--in fact, 
unanimously--the last time that this bill came up and this amendment 
was brought forward.
  So I ask the opposition here to reconsider this. Think closely about 
this, how important this is, how significantly important it is for 
Argentina and for the United States, and how it can be done readily and 
easily, and how the results of it being done would be happily taken 
care of by these two countries. There isn't anyone who is going to 
deeply object to this, anyone who is significant at least in the 
context of this operation who is going to deeply object to this.
  We need to do this. It is an honest thing and it is something that is 
going to be positive. It will be deeply positive and effective for us 
in the context of bringing this about. So I hope that everyone in this 
body will recognize the significance of this and vote in favor of it.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, again, with deep respect to the 
Member from New York, and I appreciate your passion on this, I can tell 
you as a former FBI agent, when you take 1 minute away from your case 
to cull information, it does take somebody who is operational in some 
sense, either an analyst or an operator or even on the IT front, to 
gather, collect, sort that information, to go through it, to put it in 
the proper form and to get it in the right place.
  Really, every minute of every day is so precious to these individuals 
who are trying to focus on al Qaeda and the current threat. My argument 
is that this is something that can wait. It has waited 25 years. 
Probably the next few years won't make a difference, but the next few 
years in the fight against al Qaeda can mean the life and death of U.S. 
citizens.
  So, again, I hope the gentleman doesn't think it is any condemnation 
of his effort. I think the time and the place and the resources that 
would be lost are just not meeting the national security priorities as 
we look out across what the threat stream is today.
  So, unfortunately, I will continue to oppose it. I would like to work 
with the gentleman on something in the future.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Hinchey).
  The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York will be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Carney

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in 
House Report 112-75.
  Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the bill, add the following new title:

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 501. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRIORITY OF RAILWAY 
                   TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) railway transportation (including subway transit) 
     should be prioritized in the development of transportation 
     security plans by the intelligence community; and
       (2) railway transportation security (including subway 
     transit security) should be included in transportation 
     security budgets of the intelligence community.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 264, the gentleman from 
Delaware (Mr. Carney) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Delaware.

                              {time}  1610

  Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Chairman, over the past week, officials have 
announced that preliminary intelligence gathered from Osama bin Laden's 
Pakistan hideout shows that al Qaeda had been plotting a terrorist 
attack on our Nation's rail system. While roughly 1.7 million 
passengers ride on domestic and international flights daily, every 
weekday 34 million Americans ride on trains and transit systems. The 
issue of rail security is more relevant now than ever. And I'm here 
today to argue for making rail security a national intelligence 
priority.
  On March 11, 2004, nearly 200 people were killed in Madrid as a 
result of a terrorist bombing while riding the commuter rail to work. 
In 2005, over 50 people were killed and 700 injured on the London 
transit system in a series of explosions during the morning rush hour. 
An attack on our rail system

[[Page 7228]]

here in the United States would be devastating. It would almost 
certainly result in the loss of life.
  Clearly, terrorist organizations around the world have made rail 
systems a target. I strongly believe that we need to address the 
vulnerabilities in our rail system by ensuring that rail security is 
one of our Nation's top intelligence priorities. That's why I offered 
this amendment directing the intelligence community to include rail and 
subway transit security in its transportation security plans and 
budgets.
  The 9/11 Commission report found that over 90 percent of the Nation's 
annual investment in transportation security is spent on aviation 
security. While addressing security vulnerabilities within aviation is 
critical, this allocation leaves too little for surface transportation 
security, particularly on our rail systems.
  ``For now, riding trains is safe.'' That's how Transportation 
Secretary LaHood described the state of our rail system in light of the 
intelligence found in Osama bin Laden's compound. But we need to do 
better than that. As a near daily rider of Amtrak myself, I want to 
know that the United States Government is doing all it can to keep my 
fellow passengers safe. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment 
so that our intelligence community is able to identify and prevent a 
terrorist attack on our rail system.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. While I agree with the need for strong 
security in the railway sector, I just don't believe this amendment is 
best suited for the Intelligence authorization bill, as it seems to 
address the policy issues that are not authorized or otherwise 
addressed in the FY11 Intelligence authorization bill. The intelligence 
community does not have transportation security plans or transportation 
security budgets, nor do individual intelligence community agencies. In 
order to meet the requirement of this, they would have to restructure 
themselves to bring in the right people to do the plans for security 
for the railway. I don't think that's what the gentleman intends, but 
that's clearly what the gentleman's amendment would do.
  I would argue that this amendment would be better focused on the 
Transportation Security Administration, or TSA. That agency, however, 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Homeland Security Committee and not 
the Intelligence Committee. The intelligence community does not develop 
transportation security plans. Rather, the intelligence community, 
through DHS, provides threat information to the transportation sector 
to better enable it to develop security plans.
  Additionally, I note that this amendment simply expresses the sense 
of the Congress on the issue. It does not actually compel any action. I 
would question the real improvement to security on the railway sector 
from its adoption because, again, it appears that the amendment would 
not have a real impact. This is really out of the scope of the 
intelligence community.
  I would urge the gentleman to reconsider and contemplate maybe 
addressing it in the TSA. If the gentleman would like any help and 
assistance in doing that, I would be eager to try to help the gentleman 
do that.
  Again, given the time pressures on our intelligence community to stop 
real-time threats and pass that information on to people in the TSA and 
others, I would argue that this is an amendment that we should all 
oppose and look for a better opportunity.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CARNEY. I would just like to add that I listened to the gentleman 
and I appreciate his comments. I listened to his remarks earlier on the 
previous amendment, and he said that the intelligence agencies spend 
all their time, every waking hour, targeting people trying to kill 
Americans every day. The facts are that these terrorists are trying to 
kill Americans on American rail transit systems. And that's the purpose 
of this amendment--to make sure that this is given a priority in our 
intelligence plans.
  With that, I yield such time as he may consume to the ranking member, 
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I thank the gentleman for his amendment.
  I disagree with the chairman. I believe it's vitally important that 
we protect our railway infrastructure from terrorist attacks. Just last 
week, the Department of Homeland Security issued an intelligence 
message about potential al Qaeda contemplation in February 2010 of 
plots against the U.S. rail sector.
  While there was no imminent threat at that time, we must remain 
vigilant. It's important that we devote resources to this issue. I hope 
that we could work together with the chairman if the amendment does not 
pass so that we can focus on this serious area of threat to our 
national security.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on this amendment.
  Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Chair, how much time do I have remaining?
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Delaware has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Chair, I would just like to add a few more things 
before finishing up here. Between 2004 and 2008, there were 500 
terrorist attacks waged worldwide against mass transit and passenger 
rail targets, resulting in over 2,000 deaths and over 9,000 injuries. 
Five billion passenger miles, intercity and commuter rail, are logged 
every day in the northeast corridor alone here in the U.S. That 
represents more than one-third of the daily vehicle miles logged on I-
95 between Washington, D.C. and New York City.
  My amendment will ensure that the U.S. Government places a priority 
on ensuring the safety of rail passengers around the country by working 
to prevent a terrorist attack on our rail system. And I would ask 
support for this amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Again, I appreciate both of the gentlemen's 
perspectives on this, but this is about the right tool for the right 
job. The intelligence community is the one that's supposed to develop 
the intelligence, the threat stream, the lead, and pass it to somebody 
who is in charge--the TSA in this case--of protecting the 
transportation sector.
  Again, I make the argument it is important, but I just think this is 
misplaced. The intelligence community would have to try to create this 
expertise, which they do not have today in the entirety of the 
intelligence community, to make security plans. This is not what they 
do. It's not what they're equipped to do. They are not, in most cases, 
with the exception of the FBI and DEA, they're not domestic agencies. 
They're agencies that are designed to collect overseas. So it is just 
not a good fit.
  Again, I appreciate the gentleman's position. I just think the 
community would have to spend a lot of time and resources diverting 
from its real intention and mission to keep us safe.
  Just quickly and just for the record--I think it's important--the 
information that the gentleman referenced was aspirational. We saw a 
lot of press reports that I think misrepresented the information that 
was provided. It was something that Osama bin Laden thought about. It 
is not something that the intelligence community believes was 
operational, which means you have to be vigilant all the time on all 
these issues.
  So I commend the gentleman in his effort on trying to bring better 
security to our railways. Again, just the right tool for the right job. 
This is not the right place. Unfortunately, I will oppose it but would 
like to work with the gentleman on the right place to get the job done.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Delaware has 30 seconds remaining.
  Mr. CARNEY. I certainly thank the gentleman and appreciate his 
comments and certainly respect his expertise. But I can't imagine that 
the intelligence agencies aren't, as they're doing their activities--
intelligence activities overseas--aren't finding out

[[Page 7229]]

that there are threats to the U.S. rail system. My amendment would just 
make that a priority within all the things that they do.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Delaware (Mr. Carney).
  The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from Delaware will be postponed.

                              {time}  1620

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do 
now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Benishek) having assumed the chair, Mr. Yoder, Chair of the Committee 
of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that 
Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 754) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2011 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________