[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 157 (2011), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 6994-6995]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      NEW START IMPLEMENTATION ACT

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senators McCain, 
Sessions, Cornyn, Vitter, Wicker, and Inhofe--and probably others 
before the end of the day--I am going to introduce legislation called 
the New START Implementation Act, which I would like to describe 
briefly. This legislation is nearly identical to a companion bill 
introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. Turner, the chairman 
of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. 
He has been a leader in the House on nuclear and missile defense 
issues. I understand many of the provisions have been included in the 
chairman's mark of the National Defense Authorization Act in the House 
and that the remainder will be introduced as amendments later today at 
a full committee level. I specifically wish to thank Chairman Turner 
for his leadership.
  Nuclear deterrence issues are among the most complicated and 
technical issues that we in the Congress are confronted with, and he 
deserves full credit for tackling them with vigor and for mastering 
them so quickly.
  Similar to the House legislation, it is my hope that the Senate bill 
will be incorporated into the Senate version of the National Defense 
Act for fiscal year 2012. Let me now explain a little bit why I think 
this legislation is necessary at this time.
  I voted against the New START treaty for reasons I have made clear 
previously on the floor. But I recognize the President's stated 
commitment to the modernization of our nuclear deterrent is necessary 
and is important and that Congress needs to codify the commitments made 
during the debate on the New START ratification process as well as the 
agreements the President has indicated through his comments and letters 
to us. This is important for the future, for future Congresses and 
future Presidents, because this process is going to take place over a 
period of at least 10 to 12 years. Modernization of our nuclear weapons 
facilities and the strategic delivery systems all will require 
commitments over the space of another decade or more. Memories fade, 
people's interpretations may change over time, circumstances change, 
and what we want to make sure of is that over the time period involved 
during which this modernization process must occur, the understandings 
that were agreed to at the time of the START treaty ratification will 
be memorialized in statute and complied with by the Congress and by the 
administration as time goes on.
  The five key features of the legislation are these. First, it would 
link the funding of the administration's 10-year nuclear modernization 
program with any U.S. nuclear force reductions during the 
implementation phase of the treaty. What that means is, as in the later 
years of the treaty, funding is necessary for the demobilization, the 
dismantling of some of the weapons that are called for to be dismantled 
under the treaty but that funding is coordinated with the funding for 
the modernization program which is going on at the same time. It urges 
the President to stand by the timelines he pledged on warhead 
modernization in the revised plan he submitted in November of 2010. 
This is key to ensuring that Congress will support these modernization 
efforts that were deemed necessary in conjunction with the New START 
treaty.
  The second thing the bill does is to ensure that nuclear doctrine and 
targeting guidelines and the New START force levels that the former 
STRATCOM commander, GEN Kevin Chilton, said were ``exactly what is 
needed'' are not arbitrarily cut by the administration that seems eager 
now to go to even lower levels, perhaps even unilaterally, than were 
negotiated in the START treaty. The President has indicated his desire 
for a world without nuclear weapons and said he would like to do new 
things in the future to reduce the numbers of these weapons. We simply 
want to make certain the guidelines that are militarily necessary 
reference points for the number of weapons we have, the types we have, 
how they are deployed and so on, are not modified in order to be a 
reason for or an excuse for reducing strategic weapons thereafter.
  I think this is necessary because the President's National Security 
Adviser said on March 29 that, even as ``we implement New START, we're 
making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions.'' In 
developing options for further reductions, he said:

[[Page 6995]]

``We need to consider several factors, such as potential changes in 
targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for 
effective deterrence.''
  We were told the New START force levels were exactly what is needed 
for deterrence. Yet now the administration may seek to alter deterrence 
requirements in order to justify further reductions. My view is, the 
administration cannot use one set of facts to ratify the treaty and 
then immediately change those facts in order to suit its Global Zero 
agenda. Forty-one Senators made clear in a letter to the President on 
March 22 that we expect the administration to consult with Congress 
before directing any changes to U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine or 
proposing further strategic nuclear reductions with Russia. No 
consultations have occurred to date, and we expect that those 
consultations would occur before any discussions with Russians take 
place.
  Third, the legislation would ensure that the triad of strategic 
nuclear delivery systems--that is to say, the bombers, cruise missiles, 
ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines--are modernized and that their 
reliability is assessed each year. Even today, we are still uncertain 
about the administration's plans to modernize the ICBM leg, nor do we 
know if the new bomber will be nuclear certified upon its deployment. 
For example, according to an April 22, 2011, press account in the 
Global Security Newswire, ``The US Airforce cannot say exactly how much 
it will spend to explore options for modernizing its ICBM fleet, nor 
where the money will come from.''
  Obviously, if we are currently planning the modernization of these 
fleets, but we do not even know where the money is going to come from 
for the planning, we have a problem that needs to be resolved now 
rather than later. That is what the third requirement of the 
legislation would require.
  Fourth, the bill would affirm that the New START treaty contains no 
limitation on U.S. missile defense beyond the language in article V, 
section 3 and that any future agreement with Russia that would attempt 
to limit U.S. missile defenses could only be done by a treaty that 
would require the Senate's advice and consent. This is no different 
than what we all talked about on a bipartisan basis when the New START 
treaty was ratified, but we think these commitments should actually be 
codified to ensure they are kept.
  Finally, the bill would counsel against unilateral reductions or 
withdrawal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe without the 
unanimous approval of NATO's members. Obviously, in NATO, one State 
should not be permitted to end NATO's successful article V policy, the 
policy that an attack on one is an attack on the others and will be met 
with resistance from the other NATO allies.
  In conclusion, I think this bill should enjoy broad congressional 
support, given the fact that it merely builds on what the Senate and 
the administration agreed to in the New START resolution of 
ratification with respect to nuclear modernization and our freedom of 
action to develop and deploy missile defenses. It ensures that a future 
Congress and a future President understand and support the current 
commitment to nuclear modernization and ensures that there will be no 
further limitations on our missile defense efforts.
  Finally, it builds in vital checks to permit congressional oversight 
of impending activities by the administration that portend significant 
changes to U.S. nuclear doctrine, further strategic nuclear reductions 
and potential activities with, and possibly concessions to, Russia with 
regard to missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe--all 
of which might be counter to U.S. security.
  I will be pleased to add other colleagues as cosponsors to the 
legislation. As I said, I intend to actually introduce this toward the 
end of the day, and I am sure we will have additional cosponsors by 
that time.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Udall of New Mexico). Without objection, 
it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
  Ms. AYOTTE. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Ms. Ayotte pertaining to the introduction of S. 944 
are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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