[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 157 (2011), Part 14]
[House]
[Pages 19965-19977]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  2100
IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION REFORM AND MODERNIZATION 
                              ACT OF 2011

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass 
the bill (H.R. 2105) to provide for the application of measures to 
foreign persons who transfer to Iran, North Korea, and Syria certain 
goods, services, or technology, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 2105

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Iran, 
     North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and 
     Modernization Act of 2011''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Statement of policy.
Sec. 3. Reports on proliferation relating to Iran, North Korea, and 
              Syria.
Sec. 4. Application of measures to certain foreign persons.
Sec. 5. Determination exempting a foreign person from the application 
              of certain measures.
Sec. 6. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries aiding 
              proliferation by Iran, North Korea, or Syria.
Sec. 7. Identification of countries that enable proliferation to or 
              from Iran, North Korea, or Syria.
Sec. 8. Prohibition on United States assistance to countries assisting 
              proliferation activities by Iran, North Korea, or Syria.
Sec. 9. Restriction on extraordinary payments in connection with the 
              International Space Station.
Sec. 10. Exclusion from the United States of senior officials of 
              foreign persons who have aided proliferation relating to 
              Iran.
Sec. 11. Prohibition on certain vessels landing in the United States; 
              enhanced inspections.
Sec. 12. Sanctions with respect to critical defense resources provided 
              to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria.
Sec. 13. Definitions.
Sec. 14. Repeal of Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.

     SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It shall be the policy of the United States to fully 
     implement and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, 
     and Syria for their proliferation activities and policies.

     SEC. 3. REPORTS ON PROLIFERATION RELATING TO IRAN, NORTH 
                   KOREA, AND SYRIA.

       (a) Reports.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and every 120 days thereafter, the 
     President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report identifying every foreign person with 
     respect to whom there is credible information indicating that 
     such person--
       (1) on or after January 1, 1999, transferred to or acquired 
     from Iran, on or after January

[[Page 19966]]

     1, 2005, transferred to or acquired from Syria, or on or 
     after January 1, 2006, transferred to or acquired from North 
     Korea--
       (A) goods, services, or technology listed on--
       (i) the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export 
     of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information 
     Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) 
     and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 
     Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular 
     INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions);
       (ii) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and 
     Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions;
       (iii) the lists of items and substances relating to 
     biological and chemical weapons the export of which is 
     controlled by the Australia Group;
       (iv) the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of toxic 
     chemicals and precursors the export of which is controlled 
     pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
     Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
     Weapons and on Their Destruction; or
       (v) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and 
     Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and 
     subsequent revisions; or
       (B) goods, services, or technology not listed on any list 
     specified in subparagraph (A) but which nevertheless would 
     be, if such goods, services, or technology were United States 
     goods, services, or technology, prohibited for export to 
     Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, because of 
     the potential of such goods, services or technology to make a 
     material contribution to the development of nuclear, 
     biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise 
     missile systems or destabilizing types and amounts of 
     conventional weapons;
       (2) except as provided in subsection (b), on or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, acquired materials mined 
     or otherwise extracted within the territory or control of 
     Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, for purposes 
     relating to the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or 
     ballistic or cruise missile development programs of Iran, 
     North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be;
       (3) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     transferred to Iran, Syria, or North Korea goods, services, 
     or technology that could assist efforts to extract or mill 
     uranium ore within the territory or control of Iran, North 
     Korea, or Syria, as the case may be;
       (4) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     provided to Iran, Syria, or North Korea destabilizing types 
     and amounts of conventional weapons and technical assistance; 
     or
       (5) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     provided a vessel, insurance or reinsurance, or any other 
     shipping service for the transportation of goods to or from 
     Iran, North Korea, or Syria for purposes relating to the 
     nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or 
     cruise missile development programs of Iran, North Korea, or 
     Syria, as the case may be.
       (b) Exceptions.--Any foreign person who--
       (1) was identified in a report transmitted in accordance 
     with subsection (a) on account of a particular transfer, or
       (2) has engaged in a transfer on behalf of, or in concert 
     with, the Government of the United States,
     shall not be identified on account of that same transfer in 
     any report submitted thereafter under this section, except to 
     the degree that new information has emerged indicating that 
     the particular transfer at issue may have continued, or been 
     larger, more significant, or different in nature than 
     previously reported under this section.
       (c) Transmission in Classified Form.--If the President 
     considers it appropriate, reports transmitted in accordance 
     with subsection (a), or appropriate parts thereof, may be 
     transmitted in classified form.
       (d) Content of Reports.--Each report required under 
     subsection (a) shall contain, with respect to each foreign 
     person identified in each such report, a brief description of 
     the type and quantity of the goods, services, or technology 
     transferred by such person to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, 
     the circumstances surrounding such transfer, the usefulness 
     to the nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic 
     or cruise missile development programs of Iran, North Korea, 
     or Syria of such transfer, and the probable awareness or lack 
     thereof of the transfer on the part of the government with 
     primary jurisdiction over such person.
       (e) Additional Contents of Reports.--Each report under 
     subsection (a) shall contain a description, with respect the 
     transfer or acquisition of the goods, services, or technology 
     described in such subsection, of the actions taken by foreign 
     governments to assist in interdicting such transfer or 
     acquisition.
       (f) Expediting Sanctions for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological 
     and Missile Proliferation Transfers to Iran.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding the requirement to submit 
     the report under subsection (a), the President shall 
     establish a process to assess information in the possession 
     of the President on an ongoing basis regarding possible 
     transfers to Iran of goods, services, or technology relating 
     to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic 
     missiles in accordance with the requirements of subsection 
     (a).
       (2) Application of sanctions.--Upon a determination of the 
     President that credible information exists that a transfer 
     described in paragraph (1) has occurred, the President shall 
     apply the sanctions to the foreign person that made the 
     transfer in accordance with the requirements of section 4 of 
     this Act.
       (g) Requirement for Plan To Expedite Implementation of 
     Reporting and Sanctions.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan, 
     to include any necessary legislation, to expedite the 
     implementation of this Act with regard to the reports 
     required under subsection (a) and the sanctions under section 
     4 of this Act.

     SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF MEASURES TO CERTAIN FOREIGN PERSONS.

       (a) Application of Measures.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to section 5, the President shall 
     apply, for a period of not less than two years, the measures 
     specified in subsection (b) with respect to each foreign 
     person identified in a report transmitted under section 3(a).
       (2) Related persons.--Subject to section 5, the President 
     may apply, for a period of not less than two years, the 
     measures specified in subsection (b) with respect to one or 
     more of the following:
       (A) Each person that is a successor, subunit, or subsidiary 
     of a foreign person referred to in paragraph (1).
       (B) Each person that owns more than 50 percent of, or 
     controls in fact--
       (i) a foreign person referred to in paragraph (1); or
       (ii) a person described in subparagraph (A).
       (b) Description of Measures.--The measures referred to in 
     subsection (a) are the following:
       (1) Executive order 12938 prohibitions.--The measures 
     specified in the first sentence of subsection (b) and 
     subsections (c) and (d) of section 4 of Executive Order 12938 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction) prohibiting any department or agency of the 
     United States Government from procuring, or entering into any 
     contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from 
     any foreign person described in subsection (a) of section 4 
     of Executive Order 12938.
       (2) Arms export prohibition.--Prohibition on United States 
     Government sales to a person described in subsection (a) of 
     any item on the United States Munitions List and termination 
     of sales to such person of any defense articles, defense 
     services, or design and construction services under the Arms 
     Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
       (3) Dual use export prohibition.--Denial of licenses and 
     suspension of existing licenses for the transfer to a person 
     described in subsection (a) of items the export of which is 
     controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
     U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), as in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the Export 
     Administration Regulations.
       (4) Investment prohibition.--Prohibition on any investment 
     by a United States person in property, including entities, 
     owned or controlled by a person described in subsection (a).
       (5) Financing prohibition.--Prohibition on any approval, 
     financing, or guarantee by a United States person, wherever 
     located, of a transaction by a person described in subsection 
     (a).
       (6) Financial assistance prohibition.--Denial by the United 
     States Government of any credit, credit guarantees, grants, 
     or other financial assistance by any agency of the United 
     States Government to a person described in subsection (a).
       (c) Effective Date.--Measures applied pursuant to 
     subsection (a) shall be effective with respect to a foreign 
     person no later than--
       (1) 90 days after the report identifying the foreign person 
     is submitted, if the report is submitted on or before the 
     date required by section 3(a);
       (2) 90 days after the date required by section 3(a) for 
     submitting the report, if the report identifying the foreign 
     person is submitted within 60 days after that date; or
       (3) on the date that the report identifying the foreign 
     person is submitted, if that report is submitted more than 60 
     days after the date required by section 3(a).
       (d) Publication in Federal Register.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     publish in the Federal Register notice of the application 
     against a person of measures pursuant to subsection (a).
       (2) Content.--Each notice published in accordance with 
     paragraph (1) shall include the name and address (where 
     known) of each person to which measures have been applied 
     pursuant to subsection (a).

     SEC. 5. DETERMINATION EXEMPTING A FOREIGN PERSON FROM THE 
                   APPLICATION OF CERTAIN MEASURES.

       (a) In General.--The application of any measure described 
     in section 4(b) to a person

[[Page 19967]]

     described in section 4(a) shall cease to be effective 
     beginning 15 days after the date on which the President 
     determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional 
     committees, on the basis of information provided by such 
     person or otherwise obtained by the President, that--
       (1) in the case of a transfer or acquisition of goods, 
     services, or technology described in section 3(a)(1)--
       (A) such person did not, on or after January 1, 1999, 
     knowingly transfer to or acquire from Iran, North Korea, or 
     Syria, as the case may be, such goods, services, or 
     technology the apparent transfer of which caused such person 
     to be identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 
     3(a);
       (B) the goods, services, or technology the transfer of 
     which caused such person to be identified in a report 
     submitted pursuant to section 3(a) did not contribute to the 
     efforts of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, 
     to develop--
       (i) nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic 
     or cruise missile systems, or weapons listed on the Wassenaar 
     Arrangement Munitions List of July 12, 1996, or any 
     subsequent revision of such List; or
       (ii) destabilizing types or amounts of conventional weapons 
     or acquire technical assistance;
       (C) such person is subject to the primary jurisdiction of a 
     government that is an adherent to one or more relevant 
     nonproliferation regimes, such person was identified in a 
     report submitted pursuant to section 3(a) with respect to a 
     transfer of goods, services, or technology described in 
     section 3(a)(1)(A), and such transfer was made in accordance 
     with the guidelines and parameters of all such relevant 
     regimes of which such government is an adherent; or
       (D) the government with primary jurisdiction over such 
     person has imposed meaningful penalties on such person on 
     account of the transfer of such goods, services, or 
     technology that caused such person to be identified in a 
     report submitted pursuant to section 3(a);
       (2) in the case of an acquisition of materials mined or 
     otherwise extracted within the territory of Iran, North 
     Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, described in section 
     3(a)(2) for purposes relating to the nuclear, biological, or 
     chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile development 
     programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, 
     such person did not acquire such materials; or
       (3) in the case of the provision of a vessel, insurance or 
     reinsurance, or another shipping service for the 
     transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or 
     Syria, as the case may be, described in section 3(a)(3) for 
     purposes relating to the nuclear, biological, or chemical 
     weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile development programs 
     of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, such 
     person did not provide such a vessel or service.
       (b) Opportunity To Provide Information.--Congress urges the 
     President--
       (1) in every appropriate case, to contact in a timely 
     fashion each person described in section 3(a), or the 
     government with primary jurisdiction over such person, in 
     order to afford such person, or such government, the 
     opportunity to provide explanatory, exculpatory, or other 
     additional information with respect to the transfer that 
     caused such person to be identified in a report submitted 
     pursuant to section 3(a); and
       (2) to exercise the authority described in subsection (a) 
     in all cases in which information obtained from each person 
     described in section 3(a), or from the government with 
     primary jurisdiction over such person, establishes that the 
     exercise of such authority is warranted.
       (c) Form of Transmission.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     determination and report of the President under subsection 
     (a) shall be transmitted in unclassified form.
       (2) Exception.--The determination and report of the 
     President under subsection (a) may be transmitted in 
     classified form if the President certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that it is vital to the national 
     security interests of the United States to do so.

     SEC. 6. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH COUNTRIES 
                   AIDING PROLIFERATION BY IRAN, NORTH KOREA, OR 
                   SYRIA.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Restrictions.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (A) no agreement for cooperation between the United States 
     and the government of any country that is assisting the 
     nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or 
     transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to 
     Iran, North Korea, or Syria may be submitted to the President 
     or to Congress pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153),
       (B) no such agreement may enter into force with respect to 
     such country,
       (C) no license may be issued for export directly or 
     indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, 
     facilities, components, or other goods, services, or 
     technology that would be subject to such agreement, and
       (D) no approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer 
     directly or indirectly to such country of any nuclear 
     material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, 
     or technology that would be subject to such agreement,
     until the President makes the determination and report under 
     paragraph (2).
       (2) Determination and report.--The determination and report 
     referred to in paragraph (1) are a determination and report 
     by the President, submitted to the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate, that--
       (A) Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may, has 
     ceased its efforts to design, develop, or acquire a nuclear 
     explosive device or related materials or technology; or
       (B) the government of the country that is assisting the 
     nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case 
     may be, or transferring advanced conventional weapons or 
     missiles to Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be--
       (i) has suspended all nuclear assistance to Iran, North 
     Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, and all transfers of 
     advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran, North 
     Korea, or Syria, as the case may be; and
       (ii) is committed to maintaining that suspension until 
     Iran, North Korea, or Syria, as the case may be, has 
     implemented measures that would permit the President to make 
     the determination described in subparagraph (A).
       (b) Rules of Construction.--The restrictions described in 
     subsection (a)(1)--
       (1) shall apply in addition to all other applicable 
     procedures, requirements, and restrictions described in the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other applicable Acts;
       (2) shall not be construed as affecting the validity of an 
     agreement for cooperation between the United States and the 
     government of a country that is in effect on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act; and
       (3) shall not be construed as applying to assistance for 
     the Bushehr nuclear reactor, unless such assistance is 
     determined by the President to be contributing to the efforts 
     of Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agreement for cooperation.--The term ``agreement for 
     cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 
     b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).
       (2) Assisting the nuclear program of iran, north korea, or 
     syria.--The term ``assisting the nuclear program of Iran, 
     North Korea, or Syria'' means the intentional transfer to 
     Iran, North Korea, or Syria by a government, or by a person 
     subject to the jurisdiction of a government with the 
     knowledge and acquiescence of that government, of goods, 
     services, or technology listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and 
     Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and 
     subsequent revisions), or the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 
     Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular 
     INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions).
       (3) Country that is assisting the nuclear programs of iran, 
     north korea, or syria or transferring advanced conventional 
     weapons or missiles to iran, north korea, or syria.--The term 
     ``country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran, 
     North Korea, or Syria or transferring advanced conventional 
     weapons or missiles to Iran, North Korea, or Syria'' means 
     any country determined by the President to be assisting the 
     nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria or 
     transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to 
     Iran, North Korea, or Syria.
       (4) Transfer.--The term ``transfer'' means the conveyance 
     of technological or intellectual property, or the conversion 
     of intellectual or technological advances into marketable 
     goods, services, or articles of value, developed and 
     generated in one place, to another through illegal or illicit 
     means to a country, the government of which the Secretary of 
     State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1)(A) of 
     the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant 
     to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), and section 620A of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), is a government that 
     has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
     terrorism.
       (5) Transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles 
     to iran, north korea, or syria.--The term ``transferring 
     advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran, North 
     Korea, or Syria'' means the intentional transfer to Iran, 
     North Korea, or Syria by a government, or by a person subject 
     to the jurisdiction of a government with the knowledge and 
     acquiescence of that government, of goods, services, or 
     technology listed on--
       (A) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and 
     Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and 
     subsequent revisions; or
       (B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and 
     Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions.

[[Page 19968]]



     SEC. 7. IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES THAT ENABLE PROLIFERATION 
                   TO OR FROM IRAN, NORTH KOREA, OR SYRIA.

       (a) Annual Report.--The President shall transmit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees and make available to 
     the public on an annual basis a report that identifies each 
     foreign country that allows one or more foreign persons under 
     the jurisdiction of such country to engage in activities 
     described in section 3 that are sanctionable under section 4 
     despite requests by the United States Government to the 
     government of such country to prevent such activities.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex if necessary.

     SEC. 8. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES 
                   ASSISTING PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES BY IRAN, 
                   NORTH KOREA, OR SYRIA.

       (a) In General.--The President shall prohibit assistance 
     (other than humanitarian assistance) under the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 and shall not issue export licenses 
     for defense articles or defense services under the Arms 
     Export Control Act to a foreign country the government of 
     which the President has received credible information is 
     assisting Iran, North Korea, or Syria in the acquisition, 
     development, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
     or ballistic missiles.
       (b) Resumption of Assistance.--The President is authorized 
     to provide assistance described in subsection (a) to a 
     foreign country subject to the prohibition in subsection (a) 
     if the President determines and notifies the appropriate 
     congressional committees that there is credible information 
     that the government of the country is no longer assisting 
     Iran, North Korea, or Syria in the acquisition, development, 
     or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic 
     missiles.
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``assisting'' 
     means providing material or financial support of any kind, 
     including purchasing of material, technology or equipment 
     from Iran, North Korea, or Syria.

     SEC. 9. RESTRICTION ON EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN CONNECTION 
                   WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.

       (a) Restriction.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, no agency of the United States Government may make 
     extraordinary payments in connection with the International 
     Space Station to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, any 
     organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of 
     the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, or any other 
     organization, entity, or element of the Government of the 
     Russian Federation, unless, during the fiscal year in which 
     such extraordinary payments are to be made, the President has 
     made the determination described in subsection (b), and 
     reported such determination to the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 
     of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate.
       (2) Waiver.--If the President is unable to make the 
     determination described in subsection (b) with respect to a 
     fiscal year in which extraordinary payments in connection 
     with the International Space Station are to be made, the 
     President is authorized to waive the application of paragraph 
     (1) on a case-by-case basis with respect to the fiscal year 
     if not less than 15 days prior to the date on which the 
     waiver is to take effect the President submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that contains--
       (A) the reasons why the determination described in 
     subsection (b) cannot be made;
       (B) the amount of the extraordinary payment to be made 
     under the waiver;
       (C) the steps being undertaken by the United States to 
     ensure compliance by the Russian Federation with the 
     conditions described in subsection (b); and
       (D) a determination of the President that the waiver is 
     vital to the national interests of the United States.
       (b) Determination Regarding Russian Cooperation in 
     Preventing Proliferation Relating to Iran, North Korea, and 
     Syria.--The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a 
     determination by the President that--
       (1) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian 
     Federation (including the law enforcement, export promotion, 
     export control, and intelligence agencies of such Government) 
     to oppose the proliferation to or from Iran, North Korea, and 
     Syria of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems 
     capable of delivering such weapons;
       (2) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the 
     law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and 
     intelligence agencies of such Government) has demonstrated 
     and continues to demonstrate a sustained commitment to seek 
     out and prevent the transfer to or from Iran, North Korea, 
     and Syria of goods, services, and technology that could make 
     a material contribution to the nuclear, biological, or 
     chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems 
     development programs of Iran; and
       (3) neither the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, nor any 
     organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of 
     the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, has, during the one-
     year period ending on the date of the determination under 
     this subsection made transfers to or from Iran, North Korea, 
     or Syria reportable under section 3(a) (other than transfers 
     with respect to which a determination pursuant to section 5 
     has been or will be made).
       (c) Prior Notification.--Not less than five days before 
     making a determination under this section, the President 
     shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
     Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
     the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate of the President's intention to make such a 
     determination.
       (d) Written Justification.--A determination of the 
     President under this section shall include a written 
     justification describing in detail the facts and 
     circumstances supporting the President's conclusion.
       (e) Transmission in Classified Form.--If the President 
     considers it appropriate, a determination of the President 
     under this section, a prior notification under subsection 
     (c), and a written justification under subsection (d), or 
     appropriate parts thereof, may be transmitted in classified 
     form.
       (f) Exception for Crew Safety.--
       (1) Exception.--The National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration may make extraordinary payments in connection 
     with the International Space Station to the Russian Aviation 
     and Space Agency or any organization or entity under the 
     jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space 
     Agency, or any subcontractor thereof, that would otherwise be 
     prohibited under this section if the President notifies 
     Congress in writing that such payments are necessary to 
     prevent the imminent loss of life of or grievous injury to 
     individuals aboard the International Space Station.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after notifying 
     Congress that the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration will make extraordinary payments under 
     paragraph (1), the President shall transmit to Congress a 
     report describing--
       (A) the extent to which the provisions of subsection (b) 
     had been met as of the date of notification; and
       (B) the measures that the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration is taking to ensure that--
       (i) the conditions posing a threat of imminent loss of life 
     of or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International 
     Space Station necessitating the extraordinary payments are 
     not repeated; and
       (ii) it is no longer necessary to make extraordinary 
     payments in order to prevent imminent loss of life of or 
     grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space 
     Station.
       (g) Service Module Exception.--
       (1) In general.--The National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration may make extraordinary payments in connection 
     with the International Space Station to the Russian Aviation 
     and Space Agency, any organization or entity under the 
     jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space 
     Agency, or any subcontractor thereof, that would otherwise be 
     prohibited under this section for the construction, testing, 
     preparation, delivery, launch, or maintenance of the Service 
     Module, and for the purchase (at a total cost not to exceed 
     $14,000,000) of the pressure dome for the Interim Control 
     Module and the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter and 
     related hardware for the United States propulsion module, 
     if--
       (A) the President has notified Congress at least five days 
     before making such payments;
       (B) no report has been made under section 3(a) with respect 
     to an activity of the entity to receive such payment, and the 
     President has no credible information of any activity that 
     would require such a report; and
       (C) the United States will receive goods or services of 
     value to the United States commensurate with the value of the 
     extraordinary payments made.
       (2) Definition.--For purposes of this subsection, the term 
     ``maintenance'' means activities that cannot be performed by 
     the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and which 
     must be performed in order for the Service Module to provide 
     environmental control, life support, and orbital maintenance 
     functions which cannot be performed by an alternative means 
     at the time of payment.
       (3) Termination.--This subsection shall cease to be 
     effective on the date that is 60 days after the date on which 
     a United States propulsion module is in place at the 
     International Space Station.
       (h) Exception.--No agency of the United States Government 
     may make extraordinary payments in connection with the 
     International Space Station, or any other payments in 
     connection with the International Space Station, to any 
     foreign person subject to measures applied pursuant to 
     section 4 of Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994), as 
     amended by Executive Order 13094 (July 28, 1998).
       (i) Report on Certain Payments Related to International 
     Space Station.--

[[Page 19969]]

       (1) In general.--The President shall, together with each 
     report submitted under section 3(a), transmit to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
     a report that identifies each Russian entity or person to 
     whom the United States Government has, since November 22, 
     2005, made a payment in cash or in kind for work to be 
     performed or services to be rendered under the Agreement 
     Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space 
     Station, with annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998, 
     and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any protocol, 
     agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related 
     thereto.
       (2) Content.--Each report transmitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include--
       (A) the specific purpose of each payment made to each 
     entity or person identified in such report; and
       (B) with respect to each such payment, the assessment of 
     the President that the payment was not prejudicial to the 
     achievement of the objectives of the United States Government 
     to prevent the proliferation of ballistic or cruise missile 
     systems in Iran and other countries that have repeatedly 
     provided support for acts of international terrorism, as 
     determined by the Secretary of State under section 620A(a) of 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), 
     section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
     U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).

     SEC. 10. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF SENIOR OFFICIALS 
                   OF FOREIGN PERSONS WHO HAVE AIDED PROLIFERATION 
                   RELATING TO IRAN.

       Except as provided in subsection (b), the Secretary of 
     State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien whom 
     the Secretary of State determines is an alien who, on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, is a--
       (1) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a 
     controlling interest of a foreign person identified in a 
     report submitted pursuant to section 3(a);
       (2) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a 
     controlling interest of a successor entity to, or a parent or 
     subsidiary of, a foreign person identified in such a report;
       (3) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a 
     controlling interest of an affiliate of a foreign person 
     identified in such a report, if such affiliate engaged in the 
     activities referred to in such report, and if such affiliate 
     is controlled in fact by the foreign person identified in 
     such report; or
       (4) spouse, minor child, or agent of a person excludable 
     under paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

     SEC. 11. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN VESSELS LANDING IN THE UNITED 
                   STATES; ENHANCED INSPECTIONS.

       The Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq.) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN VESSELS LANDING IN THE 
                   UNITED STATES; ENHANCED INSPECTIONS.

       ``(a) Certification Requirement.--
       ``(1) In general.--Beginning on the date of enactment of 
     the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and 
     Modernization Act of 2011, before a vessel arrives at a port 
     in the United States, the owner, charterer, operator, or 
     master of the vessel shall certify that the vessel did not 
     enter a port in Iran, North Korea, or Syria during the 180-
     day period ending on the date of arrival of the vessel at the 
     port in the United States.
       ``(2) False certifications.--The Secretary shall prohibit 
     from landing at a port in the United States for a period of 
     at least 2 years--
       ``(A) any vessel for which a false certification was made 
     under section (a); and
       ``(B) any other vessel owned or operated by a parent 
     corporation, partnership, association, or individual 
     proprietorship of the vessel for which the false 
     certification was made.
       ``(b) Enhanced Inspections.--The Secretary shall--
       ``(1) identify foreign ports at which vessels have landed 
     during the preceding 12-month period that have also landed at 
     ports in Iran, North Korea, or Syria during that period; and
       ``(2) inspect vessels arriving in the United States from 
     foreign ports identified under paragraph (1) to establish 
     whether the vessel was involved, during the 12-month period 
     ending on the date of arrival of the vessel at the port in 
     the United States, in any activity that would be subject to 
     sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
     Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act of 2011.''.

     SEC. 12. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL DEFENSE RESOURCES 
                   PROVIDED TO OR ACQUIRED FROM IRAN, NORTH KOREA, 
                   OR SYRIA.

       (a) In General.--The President shall apply the sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) to any person the President 
     determines is, on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, providing to, or acquiring from, Iran, North Korea, or 
     Syria any good or technology that the President determines is 
     used, or is likely to be used, for military applications.
       (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are, with respect to a person described in 
     subsection (a), the following:
       (1) Foreign exchange.--Prohibiting any transactions in 
     foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
     United States and in which that person has any interest.
       (2) Banking transactions.--Prohibiting any transfers of 
     credit or payments between financial institutions or by, 
     through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that 
     such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of 
     the United States and involve any interest of that person.
       (3) Property transactions.--Prohibiting any person from--
       (A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, 
     withdrawing, transporting, or exporting any property that is 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with 
     respect to which the person described in subsection (a) has 
     any interest;
       (B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege 
     with respect to such property; or
       (C) conducting any transaction involving such property.
       (4) Loan guarantees.--Prohibiting the head of any Federal 
     agency from providing a loan guarantee to that person.
       (5) Additional sanctions.--Additional sanctions, as 
     appropriate, in accordance with the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       (c) Restrictions on Export Licenses for Nuclear Cooperation 
     and Certain Loan Guarantees.--Before issuing a license for 
     the exportation of any article pursuant to an agreement for 
     cooperation under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or approving a loan guarantee or any 
     other assistance provided by the United States Government 
     with respect to a nuclear energy project, the Secretary of 
     Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory 
     Commission shall certify to Congress that issuing the license 
     or approving the loan guarantee or other assistance (as the 
     case may be) will not permit the transfer of any good or 
     technology described in subsection (a) to Iran, North Korea, 
     or Syria.
       (d) Exception.--The sanctions described in subsection (b) 
     shall not apply to the repayment or other satisfaction of a 
     loan or other obligation incurred under a program of the 
     Export-Import Bank of the United States, as in effect as of 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 13. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Adherent to relevant nonproliferation regime.--A 
     government is an ``adherent'' to a ``relevant 
     nonproliferation regime'' if such government--
       (A) is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect 
     to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in 
     section 3(a)(1)(A)(i);
       (B) is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology 
     described in section 3(a)(1)(A)(ii), or is a party to a 
     binding international agreement with the United States that 
     was in effect on January 1, 1999, to control the transfer of 
     such goods, services, or technology in accordance with the 
     criteria and standards set forth in the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime;
       (C) is a member of the Australia Group with respect to a 
     transfer of goods, services, or technology described in 
     section 3(a)(1)(A)(iii);
       (D) is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
     Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
     Weapons and on Their Destruction with respect to a transfer 
     of goods, services, or technology described in section 
     3(a)(1)(A)(iv); or
       (E) is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement with respect 
     to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in 
     section 3(a)(1)(A)(v).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, 
     Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
       (3) Extraordinary payments in connection with the 
     international space station.--The term ``extraordinary 
     payments in connection with the International Space Station'' 
     means payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the 
     United States Government--
       (A) for work on the International Space Station which the 
     Government of the Russian Federation pledged at any time to 
     provide at its expense, or
       (B) for work on the International Space Station, or for the 
     purchase of goods or services relating to human space flight, 
     that are not required to be made under the terms of a 
     contract or other agreement that was in effect on January 1, 
     1999, as such terms were in effect on such date,
     except that such term does not mean payments in cash or in 
     kind made or to be made by the United States Government 
     before December 31, 2020, for work to be performed or 
     services to be rendered before such date necessary to meet 
     United States obligations

[[Page 19970]]

     under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil 
     International Space Station, with annex, signed at Washington 
     January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 27, 2001, or 
     any protocol, agreement, memorandum of understanding, or 
     contract related thereto.
       (4) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means--
       (A) a natural person who is an alien;
       (B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
     society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, 
     organization, or group, successor, subunit, or subsidiary 
     organized under the laws of a foreign country or that has its 
     principal place of business in a foreign country; and
       (C)(i) any foreign government; or
       (ii) any foreign government agency or entity.
       (5) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to 
     conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has 
     actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the 
     circumstance, or the result of such conduct, circumstance, or 
     result.
       (6) Organization or entity under the jurisdiction or 
     control of the russian aviation and space agency.--
       (A) Definition.--The term ``organization or entity under 
     the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space 
     Agency'' means an organization or entity that--
       (i) was made part of the Russian Space Agency upon its 
     establishment on February 25, 1992;
       (ii) was transferred to the Russian Space Agency by decree 
     of the Government of the Russian Federation on July 25, 1994, 
     or May 12, 1998;
       (iii) was or is transferred to the Russian Aviation and 
     Space Agency or Russian Space Agency by decree of the 
     Government of the Russian Federation at any other time 
     before, on, or after March 14, 2000; or
       (iv) is a joint stock company in which the Russian Aviation 
     and Space Agency or Russian Space Agency has at any time held 
     controlling interest.
       (B) Extension.--Any organization or entity described in 
     subparagraph (A) shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction 
     or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency 
     regardless of whether--
       (i) such organization or entity, after being part of or 
     transferred to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or 
     Russian Space Agency, is removed from or transferred out of 
     the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 
     Agency; or
       (ii) the Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 
     Agency, after holding a controlling interest in such 
     organization or entity, divests its controlling interest.
       (7) Subsidiary.--The term ``subsidiary'' means an entity 
     (including a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, 
     corporation, or other organization) of a parent company that 
     controls, directly or indirectly, the other entity.
       (8) Transfer or transferred.--The term ``transfer'' or 
     ``transferred'', with respect to a good, service, or 
     technology, includes--
       (A) the conveyance of technological or intellectual 
     property; and
       (B) the conversion of technological or intellectual 
     advances into marketable goods, services, or technology of 
     value that is developed and generated in one location and 
     transferred to another location through illegal or illicit 
     means.
       (9) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a natural person who is a citizen or resident of the 
     United States; or
       (B) an entity that is organized under the laws of the 
     United States or any State or territory thereof.
       (10) Vessel.--The term ``vessel'' has the meaning given 
     such term in section 1081 of title 18, United States Code. 
     Such term also includes aircraft, regardless of whether or 
     not the type of aircraft at issue is described in such 
     section.
       (11) Technical assistance.--The term ``technical 
     assistance'' means providing of advice, assistance, and 
     training pertaining to the installation, operation, and 
     maintenance of equipment for destabilizing types and forms of 
     conventional weapons.

     SEC. 14. REPEAL OF IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND SYRIA 
                   NONPROLIFERATION ACT.

       (a) Repeal.--The Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
     Nonproliferation Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is repealed.
       (b) References.--Any reference in a law, regulation, 
     document, or other record of the United States to the Iran, 
     North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act shall be deemed 
     to be a reference to this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Berman) each will control 20 minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California favor the 
motion?
  Mr. BERMAN. I do support the motion, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. On that basis the gentleman from Ohio will 
control the 20 minutes in opposition.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) be allowed to control one-half 
of the time in the affirmative.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida will control 10 
minutes; the gentleman from California will control 10 minutes; and the 
gentleman from Ohio will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 
legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material on this bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I rise in strong support of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act which I introduced, 
together with the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee's 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, my good friend 
from California (Mr. Sherman). I would also like to thank the ranking 
member of the full committee, the gentleman from California, for his 
significant contributions to this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, Iran, North Korea, and Syria are key elements in an 
expanding global proliferation network. North Korea has long been a 
willing merchant of death for anyone with cash and has played a crucial 
role in the development of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile 
program. But Iran is only one of many customers. In 2010, the U.N. 
Security Council released a report saying that North Korea continues to 
market and export its nuclear and ballistic technology. The most 
prominent example of North Korea's proliferation activities is its 
construction of the clandestine Syrian nuclear reactor that, 
thankfully, was destroyed by an Israeli air strike in the year 2007. 
Reports indicate that the reactor was based on a North Korean model 
capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons and that the project 
was financed by Iran.
  But Syria's nuclear ambitions are apparently even greater than 
suspected. Just last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
reportedly identified a previously unknown nuclear facility in 
northeastern Syria, indicating that the regime in Damascus may have 
been pursuing two separate paths to a nuclear weapon, one based on 
uranium enrichment and the other on reprocessing plutonium. One thing 
is clear, as with the first nuclear facility, this second one could 
only have been built with outside help. So it is obvious that once one 
of these regimes gets its hands on weapons of mass destruction, they 
will all have access; and then this deadly capacity is certain to 
spread even further.
  But the proliferation efforts of North Korea, Iran, and Syria are by 
no means limited to nuclear weapons. Theirs is an active trade between 
these countries and advanced conventional weapons as well, including 
ballistic missiles. In the year 2010, an aircraft loaded with North 
Korean conventional weapons was intercepted in Thailand, reportedly on 
its way to Iran in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions 
of the U.N. And there have been several interdictions of Iranian 
weapons reportedly destined for Syria. Clearly these represent just the 
tip of the iceberg.
  These weapons are not intended to be placed in storage. They will be 
used against us and against our allies. North Korea has continued to 
violently assault our ally South Korea, repeatedly attacking its 
military forces out of the blue and murdering civilians almost at will. 
And it is throwing vast resources into developing weapons capable of 
striking U.S. targets, the latest being a

[[Page 19971]]

mobile intercontinental ballistic missile which could eventually be 
added to its list of items for sale.
  We are witnessing the Syrian regime shooting down its own people in 
the streets. Allowing President Assad and his thugs access to nuclear 
technology could exponentially multiply his regime's ability to spread 
destruction far beyond its borders.
  We know that Iran has no problem striking down innocent people in 
that country who dare to stand up to the regime. And Tehran continues 
to be a leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing weapons, money, 
and support to terrorist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and even al 
Qaeda. This means that preventing any and every part of this 
proliferation network from gaining access to the weapons they need to 
threaten anyone is of utmost importance.
  Iran, North Korea, and Syria are not just helping each other. Much of 
the progress they have achieved on the array of weapons programs is 
thanks to the assistance from other foreign sources. The most recent 
report of the IAEA on Iran revealed that Iran has been engaged in 
extensive efforts to develop nuclear weapons and that these efforts 
include acquiring equipment, materials, and information related to 
nuclear weapons development. It has stated that Iran has also actively 
been working on a design for a nuclear weapon, including testing 
components.
  Finally, the IAEA report revealed that Iran has received crucial help 
on its nuclear weapons design from foreign experts. Just 2 weeks ago, 
on December 2, Russian officials were quoted in news reports admitting 
that Russia had supplied Syria's Assad with cruise missiles. According 
to the news reports: ``Israel fears the cruise missiles could fall into 
the hands of Hezbollah militants in neighboring Lebanon.'' Just think 
of all of the countries that have been named in these short remarks.
  China is not far behind, as a recent report of the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission indicates. The China Commission 
report emphasizes the enormous damage to U.S. interests being done by 
China's massive sale of weapons to Iran, including short-range cruise 
missiles.
  H.R. 2105 seeks to cut off the supply networks to Iran, to Syria, and 
to North Korea. It updates and strengthens measures to prevent the 
proliferation of goods, services, or technology relating to nuclear, 
biological, chemical, and other advanced weapons, such as ballistic 
missiles. It expands sanctions on individuals, on businesses, on 
countries engaged in assisting proliferation, embracing financial 
transactions, properties, and visas, among many other penalties.
  It also imposes restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries 
that are assisting the nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea, or Syria 
because no country that is helping an enemy of the United States should 
receive any help from us.
  But it is not enough to put these laws on the books. They must be 
fully implemented and consistently enforced if they are to have the 
intended effect. I call upon the President to use the tools that 
Congress is giving to him to stop these countries from spreading their 
instruments of destruction even further. North Korea has already 
detonated two nuclear devices. Iran is getting closer to a nuclear 
weapon every day. Syria is following in its footsteps. Their stockpiles 
of weapons of mass destruction are growing, as their ballistic missile 
capabilities are growing. And their arsenals of other advanced weapons 
are being made available to enemies of the U.S. and its allies. We must 
act decisively to end this threat before it spreads even further.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the Record my correspondence 
and joint statements with the chairmen of other committees of referral 
on this bill.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                 Washington, DC, November 4, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing concerning H.R. 
     2105, the ``Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation 
     Reform and Modernization Act of 2011,'' which the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs reported favorably. As a result of your 
     having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 2105 that fall 
     within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the 
     Judiciary, we are able to agree to discharging our Committee 
     from further consideration of this bill in order that it may 
     proceed expeditiously to the House floor for consideration.
       The Judiciary Committee takes this action with our mutual 
     understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 2105 at 
     this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject 
     matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our 
     Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the 
     bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may 
     address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our 
     Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an 
     appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and 
     requests your support for any such request.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 2105, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during floor 
     consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Lamar Smith,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                 Washington, DC, November 4, 2011.
     Hon.  Lamar Smith,
     Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Smith: Thank you for your letter concerning 
     H.R. 2105, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation 
     Reform and Modernization Act of 2011, and for your agreement 
     to discharge the Committee on the Judiciary from further 
     consideration of this bill so that it may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House floor.
       I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding that, by 
     forgoing consideration of H.R. 2105 at this time, you are not 
     waiving any jurisdiction over the subject matter in that bill 
     or similar legislation. I look forward to continuing to 
     consult with your Committee as such legislation moves ahead, 
     and would be glad to support a request by your Committee for 
     conferees to a House-Senate conference on this, or any 
     similar, legislation.
       I will seek to place a copy of our exchange of letters on 
     this matter into the Congressional Record during floor 
     consideration of H.R. 2105
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and 
           Infrastructure,
                                 Washington, DC, November 9, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I write concerning H.R. 2105, 
     the ``Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform 
     and Modernization Act of 2011.'' As you know, the Committee 
     on Transportation and Infrastructure also received a referral 
     on H.R. 2105 when the bill was introduced on June 3, 2011. As 
     a result of your consultation with me on provisions in H.R. 
     2105 that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, we will forgo 
     Committee action on the bill.
       The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure takes 
     this action with our mutual understanding that by for going 
     consideration of H.R. 2105 at this time, we do not waive any 
     jurisdiction over subject matter contained in this or similar 
     legislation, and that our Committee will be appropriately 
     consulted and involved as the bill or similar legislation 
     moves forward so that we may address any remaining issues in 
     our jurisdiction. The Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure also reserves the right to seek appointment of 
     an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and 
     requests your support for any such request.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 2105, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during floor 
     consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                     John L. Mica,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                 Washington, DC, November 9, 2011.
     Hon. John L. Mica,
     Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: thank you for your cooperation with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 2105, the Iran, 
     North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and 
     Modernization Act of 2011.
       I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign 
     Affairs Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure 
     Committee regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 
     2105 which the Parliamentarian

[[Page 19972]]

     has indicated involve the jurisdiction of your Committee. In 
     agreeing to waive consideration of that bill, this Committee 
     understands that the Transportation and Infrastructure 
     Committee is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant 
     provisions in that bill or any other related matter. I will 
     seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
       Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Space, 
           and Technology,
                                Washington, DC, November 10, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing to you regarding 
     H.R. 2105, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation 
     Reform and Modernization Act of 2011. This legislation was 
     initially referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and 
     in addition to the Committee on Science, Space, and 
     Technology (among others). The bill contains provisions that 
     fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Science, 
     Space, and Technology.
       H.R. 2105 has been marked up by the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs. Based on discussions that the staff of our two 
     committees have had regarding this legislation and in the 
     interest of permitting your Committee to proceed 
     expeditiously to floor consideration of this important 
     legislation, I am willing to waive further consideration of 
     this bill. I do so with the understanding that by waiving 
     consideration of the bill, the Committee on Science, Space, 
     and Technology does not waive any future jurisdictional claim 
     of the subject matters contained in the bill which fall 
     within its Rule X jurisdiction.
       Additionally, the Committee on Science, Space, and 
     Technology expressly reserves its authority to seek conferees 
     on any provision within its jurisdiction during any House-
     Senate conference that may be convened on this, or any 
     similar legislation. I ask for your commitment to support any 
     request by the Committee for conferees on H.R. 2105, as well 
     as any similar or related legislation.
       Further, I ask that a copy of this letter and your response 
     be included in the report on H.R. 2105 and in the 
     Congressional Record during consideration of this bill.
       I would also like to take this opportunity to thank you for 
     the positive negotiations between our Committees, the result 
     is an improved bill. I look forward to working with you as 
     this important measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Ralph M. Hall,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                 Washington, DC, November 9, 2011.
     Hon. Ralph M. Hall,
     Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Hall: Thank you for your cooperation with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 2105, the Iran, 
     North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and 
     Modernization Act of 2011.
       I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign 
     Affairs Committee and the Science, Space, and Technology 
     Committee regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 
     2105 which the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the 
     jurisdiction of your Committee. In agreeing to waive 
     consideration of that bill, this Committee understands that 
     the Science, Space, and Technology Committee is not waiving 
     jurisdiction over the relevant provisions in that bill or any 
     other related matter. I will seek to place a copy of this 
     letter and your response in the Congressional Record during 
     floor consideration of the bill.
       Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____


 Joint Statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen of the Committee on Foreign 
   Affairs and Chairman Hall of the Committee on Science, Space, and 
      Technology on H.R. 2105, the ``Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
        Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act of 2011''

       The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Science, Space, and Technology affirm the national policy of 
     fully utilizing the International Space Station and recognize 
     the role of international partners in sustaining that 
     enterprise. Consistent with Public Law 111-267, the 
     ``National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization 
     Act of 2010'', the Committees support the national policy of 
     relying on, and fostering development of, United States' 
     owned and operated cargo and crew services to the 
     International Space Station, including those provided by 
     commercial carriers, where such services exist and are 
     certified for flight by the appropriate agencies.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC, November 16, 2011.
     Hon. Darrell E. Issa,
     Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Issa: Thank you for your cooperation with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 2105, the Iran, 
     North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and 
     Modernization Act of 2011.
       I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign 
     Affairs Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform 
     Committee regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 
     2105 which the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the 
     jurisdiction of your Committee. In agreeing to waive 
     consideration of that bill, this Committee understands that 
     the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is not waiving 
     jurisdiction over the relevant provisions in that bill or any 
     other related matter. I will seek to place a copy of this 
     letter and your response in the Congressional Record during 
     floor consideration of the bill. Additionally, I will support 
     your request for an appropriate appointment of outside 
     conferees from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate 
     conference on this or similar legislation should such a 
     conference be convened.
       Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and 
           Government Reform,
                                Washington, DC, November 18, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairwoman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Madam Chairwoman: Thank you for your letter concerning 
     H.R. 2105, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation 
     Reform and Modernization Act of 2011. I concur in your 
     judgment that provisions of the bill are within the 
     jurisdiction of the Oversight and Government Reform 
     Committee.
       I am willing to waive this committee's right to consider 
     the bill. In so doing, I do not waive its jurisdiction over 
     the subject matter of the bill. I appreciate your commitment 
     to insert this exchange of letters into the committee report 
     and the Congressional Record, and your support for outside 
     conferees from the Committee should a conference be convened.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Darrell Issa,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                                Washington, DC, November 23, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing concerning H.R. 
     2105, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation 
     Reform and Modernization Act of 2011. Based on the agreement 
     made by the staff of our two committees regarding H.R. 2105 
     and in the interest of permitting your Committee to proceed 
     expeditiously with the bill, I am willing to forego at this 
     time the consideration of provisions in this bill that fall 
     under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services 
     under Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
       The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with 
     our mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of 
     H.R. 2105 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over 
     the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, 
     and that our Committee will be appropriately consulted and 
     involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward. 
     Our Committee reserves the right to seek appointment of an 
     appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and 
     requests your support for any such requests.
       Further, I ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on 
     this matter be included in the Congressional Record during 
     floor consideration of this bill. I look forward to working 
     with you as this important measure moves through the 
     legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Spencer Bachus,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC, November 23, 2011.
     Hon. Spencer Bachus,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Bachus: Thank you for your cooperation with 
     the Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 2105, the Iran, 
     North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and 
     Modernization Act of 2011.
       I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign 
     Affairs Committee and your Committee regarding the final text 
     of

[[Page 19973]]

     those sections of H.R. 2105 which the Parliamentarian has 
     indicated involve the jurisdiction of your Committee. In 
     agreeing to waive consideration of that bill, this Committee 
     understands that your Committee is not waiving jurisdiction 
     over the relevant provisions in that bill or any other 
     related matter. I will seek to place a copy of this letter 
     and your response in the Congressional Record during floor 
     consideration of the bill. Additionally, I will support your 
     request for an appropriate appointment of outside conferees 
     from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate conference 
     on this or similar legislation should such a conference be 
     convened.
       Thank you again for your consideration and assistance on 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing regarding H.R. 
     2105, the ``Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation 
     Reform and Modernization Act of 2011,'' which was favorably 
     reported out of your Committee on November 2, 2011. I commend 
     you on your efforts to make sure that the United States is 
     better able to address the critical threats that Iran, North 
     Korea, and Syria pose.
       There have been productive conversations between the staffs 
     of our Committees, during which we have proposed changes to 
     provisions within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways 
     and Means in the bill to clarify the intent and scope of the 
     bill with respect to compliance with U.S. international trade 
     obligations, thereby reducing our exposure to trade sanctions 
     and retaliation against our exporters. I believe that 
     compliance with our trade obligations makes for a more 
     credible U.S. response to Iran's behavior and helps us 
     develop a stronger multilateral response to Iran. 
     Accordingly, I appreciate your commitment to address the 
     concerns raised by the Committee on Ways and Means in 
     sections 4 and 10 in H.R. 2105.
       Assuming these issues are resolved satisfactorily, in order 
     to expedite floor consideration of the bill, the Committee on 
     Ways and Means will forgo action on H.R. 2105. Further, the 
     Committee will not oppose the bill's consideration on the 
     suspension calendar, based on our understanding that you will 
     work with the Committee as the legislative process moves 
     forward in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, to 
     ensure that the Committee's concerns continue to be 
     addressed. This is also being done with the understanding 
     that it does not in any way prejudice the Committee with 
     respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional 
     prerogatives on this or similar legislation.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 2105, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during Floor 
     consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Dave Camp,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2011.
     Hon. Dave Camp,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Camp: Thank you for your cooperation with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 2105, the Iran, 
     North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and 
     Modernization Act of 2011.
       I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign 
     Affairs Committee and the Committee on Ways and Means 
     regarding the final text of those sections of 2105 which the 
     Parliamentarian has indicated involve the jurisdiction of 
     your Committee. In agreeing to waive consideration of that 
     bill, this Committee understands that the Committee on Ways 
     and Means is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant 
     provisions in that bill or any other related matter. I will 
     seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     Additionally, I will support your request for an appropriate 
     appointment of outside conferees from your Committee in the 
     event of a House-Senate conference on this or similar 
     legislation should such a conference be convened.
       Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
                                                         Chairman.

  I strongly urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  We're rapidly moving from Iran sanctions to sanctioning the world 
here.
  I stand in support of nonproliferation. I think that this country 
should be leading the world towards nuclear abolition. Let us not 
forget that when the Soviet Union fell, there was one country that got 
rid of its nuclear weapons, Ukraine.

                              {time}  2110

  And Ukraine today, while there are political problems there, they 
still stand strong as a nation among nations for having taken that 
direction.
  We need to be encouraging all of the nations of the world to get rid 
of their nuclear weapons. But if we don't do that and we instead say: 
We will keep our nuclear weapons, and half a dozen other nations and 
more can keep their nuclear weapons, but you, you, you and you, you 
cannot have nuclear weapons, actually what we're doing is we're setting 
the stage for more proliferation. It is the inconsistent U.S. policy on 
nuclear proliferation that has actually brought us to this moment.
  So I have a great deal of sympathy for my colleagues who don't want 
to see more nuclear proliferation among certain nations, but I would 
ask them to join me in taking a stand for nuclear abolition among all 
nations.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  INKSNA, enacted in the year 2000, has forced the United States 
Government to review all intelligence for credible evidence regarding 
sensitive transfers of goods and services related to WMD, missiles, or 
conventional weapons, and made such transfers sanctionable acts.
  While the reports required by INKSNA are 2 years behind schedule--an 
ongoing problem that has plagued successive administrations--we have 
frequently seen new rounds of sanctions against companies and 
individuals who are more interested in making a buck than in protecting 
global security interests.
  The specific details of sanctioned transfers are classified. Press 
reports, however, indicate that INKSNA sanctions have been imposed, for 
example, on Chinese entities for selling carbon fiber and pressure 
transducers which could assist Iran in building more advanced gas 
centrifuges. Multiple Russian, Chinese, and even European weapons 
exporters have been sanctioned, presumably for the transfer of arms to 
Iran and Syria, and Chinese chemical supply companies have been 
repeatedly sanctioned.
  I'd like to thank the chairman for agreeing to include my amendment 
to further strengthen INKSNA. This amendment requires the 
administration to develop a special mechanism to speed up the process 
of imposing sanctions regarding transfers of sensitive technology 
related to weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles to Iran.
  In addition, the amendment requires the President to publicly 
identify those countries that are allowing such transfers of sensitive 
technology to occur, despite repeated requests by the U.S. Government 
to prevent such activities. I would expect China would be listed on the 
first report as a government that directly, indirectly, or through 
inaction, enables its firms to engage in sensitive transfers to Iran, 
Syria, or North Korea.
  Mr. Speaker, I support this bill and urge my colleagues to do the 
same, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I will once again yield time to a 
colleague who I may disagree with, but he is entitled to 3 minutes, and 
I will yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).
  Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for his generosity, 
especially because he will probably disagree with most of what I have 
to say.
  As to the consistency of America's nonproliferation policy, I believe 
we are consistent. We are consistent with the nonproliferation treaty, 
which I believe is the most important peace treaty of our lifetime. It 
identifies five states as nuclear states. Three major nations in this 
world did not sign and do not benefit from the treaty. But Iran, North 
Korea, and Syria all agreed, as non-nuclear states, agreed

[[Page 19974]]

not to develop nuclear weapons, and all of them have violated that 
agreement.
  I want to commend Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for putting forward this 
outstanding bill, one of the toughest nonproliferation bills ever to 
come before Congress. I am the lead Democratic cosponsor of this bill, 
and I want to thank her for the opportunity to work with her on this 
important legislation.
  Iran, Syria, and North Korea are proliferators of nuclear weapons 
technology, and work together to threaten U.S. interests and allies 
around the globe.
  This bill includes an important provision that I put forward in a 
bill that I introduced in May of 2009. That is, it poses sanctions 
against those firms that provide North Korea, Iran, or Syria with 
equipment or technology relevant to mining or milling uranium. Iran in 
particular is facing a uranium shortage, and has been searching for 
foreign sources of uranium as well as trying to improve its own 
domestic capacity to mine uranium. Under this bill, anyone who assists 
that effort would be subject to penalties.
  This bill includes other very important provisions. The U.S.-China 
Economic Security Review Commission identified a loophole in current 
law that arguably exempts from sanctions Chinese companies that are 
providing short-range, anti-naval cruise missiles to Iran. I think it 
is critically important that we protect our naval crews, especially 
when Iran has recently conducted exercises to game the possibility of 
shutting the Strait of Hormuz, which is so critical to world oil 
supplies. We need to do everything we can in this Congress to protect 
our naval crews from Iranian weapons acquired from China.
  Also, following on the shipping sanctions that have been put into 
place against Iranian shipping firms, this bill would go further. It 
effectively bars from any U.S. port any ship that has visited North 
Korea, Iran, or Syria in the last 2 years.
  The bill would also close a loophole in existing sanctions. It would 
require that sanctions be imposed on the parent entity when one of its 
subsidiaries engages in sanctionable activity.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield the gentleman an additional minute.
  Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman.
  Again, this is one of the strongest, perhaps the strongest 
nonproliferation bill to come before Congress, and I urge its adoption.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, 
and I reserve the balance of my time to close.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to my 
friend from New York, the ranking member of the Western Hemisphere 
Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Engel.
  Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for yielding time to me.
  I rise in strong support of H.R. 2105, the Iran, North Korea, and 
Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act of 2011.
  Madam Chair, many years ago we sponsored legislation to slap 
sanctions on Syria. I'm sorry to say we were clairvoyant, but here it 
is nearly 10 years later, and some things never change. So here we are 
back again when Syria is murdering its own people, saying that we were 
right back in 2003 and 2004, and sanctions are what is necessary in 
order to prevent this regime from murdering its own people and 
threatening others with destruction. And so I'm happy to join with you 
and Mr. Berman in doing this.
  When nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons get in the hand of 
regimes which lead these rogue states, it's not only a danger to the 
U.S., it is a danger to all our allies in the Middle East, Asia, and 
around the world.
  What this important bill does is it strengthens existing U.S. 
sanctions against foreign entities that provide nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons components to Iran, North Korea, and Syria. When 
Israel destroyed a Syrian facility, we found that that facility was 
planned and arranged and done by North Korea. So there is this 
collusion of these rogue regimes all throughout the world.
  Importantly, for the first time, this bill imposes sanctions on 
foreign entities that provide to or acquire from these countries any 
goods or technology that could be used for military applications. So I, 
therefore, strongly support this bill in the hope that we can prevent 
Iran, Syria, and North Korea from getting their hands on more 
unconventional weapons.
  And I say again, people say Republicans and Democrats can't agree on 
anything. This is something that we agree on because we understand that 
it is not only a threat to the United States, but it's a threat to the 
entire world when these rogue regimes have these kinds of weapons of 
mass destruction.

                              {time}  2120

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The Congressional Quarterly House Action Report on this legislation 
states the following: that the measure, however, exempts such 
restrictions for assistance for the Bushehr nuclear reactor in Iran 
which is being developed with the aid of Russian entities unless the 
President determines such assistance is contributing to Iran's 
development of nuclear weapons.
  Now, that is very interesting because what that means is that it is 
not axiomatic that the mere presence of nuclear power capability 
necessarily means that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. As a matter 
of fact, you wouldn't have that provision unless the President had the 
authority to be able to make a finding with respect to the development 
of nuclear weapons by Iran.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to a 
former member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and member of the 
Appropriations Committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to thank 
the chair and ranking member for all the leadership on this issue.
  I rise in support of both the Iran Threat Reduction Act as well as 
the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and 
Modernization Act. Both of these bills have at their heart and core the 
same purpose, and that is to prevent some of the most dangerous, 
terrorism-sponsoring and proliferating nations--nations like Iran, 
North Korea, and Syria--from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability or 
proliferating that capability.
  Now, why is that so important? Well, in the case of Iran, Iran's 
acquisition of the bomb would empower that dictatorial regime to carry 
out what it has threatened to do, that is, to potentially wipe Israel 
off the face of the map. It would also, I think, very likely result in 
a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
  And I believe that we will be judged as a country and as a Congress 
on whether we take every possible step, every diplomatic step, every 
step through sanctions to prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb and all 
the potentially disastrous consequences that could have. And this 
legislation, by particularly going after Iran's Central Bank, will be 
the most devastating of all economic sanctions on Iran.
  We saw the concern manifest in Iran when Britain passed similar 
sanctions. Plainly, they are terrified of the impact this would have. 
This is the strongest leverage we could bring against Iran's nuclear 
program, and I strongly urge its passage.
  We also have a deep national security interest in going after any 
potential proliferation of nuclear materials and technology. We have 
already seen in Syria a dictator's willingness to murder thousands of 
his own people. We have also seen a regime in Damascus willing to 
engage in a surreptitious nuclear program in violation of international 
law and agreement.
  I urge passage of both bills.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask how much time remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 14\1/4\ minutes; 
the gentleman from California has 4 minutes remaining; and the 
gentlewoman

[[Page 19975]]

from Florida has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Dr. Robert Pape from Harvard's Journal of International Security has 
been quoted as saying the following: Sanctions have failed to achieve 
their objectives in 95.7 percent of cases since World War I, and 
sanctions are more than three times more likely to end in military 
conflict than success.
  So what we have here is that sanctions inevitably equal a failure of 
diplomacy, and war becomes a failure of sanctions. So we must ask 
ourselves, while we stand here for nonproliferation, something that I 
agree with, how do we stop the nonproliferation of war? Particularly, 
how do we forestall any possibility of a nuclear war?
  Now, Lawrence Korb was the Assistant Secretary of Defense in the 
Reagan administration, and he serves now as a senior fellow at the 
Center for American Progress. Last month, he submitted an article to 
the Plain Dealer in Cleveland, and I want to quote from it because it's 
relevant not only to this debate, but it is relevant to the economic 
stress this country is feeling right now.
  He says that since the second term of the Reagan administration, 
nuclear weapons have been of declining strategic relevance, but our 
budget barely reflects that. Our country is slated to spend $700 
billion over the next 10 years on nuclear weapons programs. This is 
unsustainable, a directionless budget driven in large part by inertia 
and the pressure from Members of Congress to preserve programs in their 
own States at the expense of the country as a whole. Military leaders 
agree that spending on these programs is disconnected from a strategic 
vision and that we are at risk of wasting a vast amount of money.
  General James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, has argued we haven't really exercised the mental gymnastics, 
the intellectual capital on what is required for nuclear deterrence 
yet. I'm pleased that it's starting.
  Other leaders from the Pentagon have also identified nuclear weapons 
programs as an area to make cuts. The commander of the U.S. Strategic 
Command, General Robert Kehler, has pointed to the unsustainability of 
this spending. We're not going to be able to go forward, he said, with 
weapons systems that cost what weapons systems cost today. A case in 
point is a long-range strike bomber; a case in point is the Trident 
submarine replacement. The list goes on.
  The savings to the American taxpayer could be considerable. The long-
range penetrating bomber will cost $50 billion over the next 10 years 
and fills no need that isn't already filled by our existing fleet of B-
52 and B-2 bombers.
  Rightsizing our fleet of nuclear-armed Trident subs to eight or fewer 
from 12 and building no more than eight new nuclear-armed subs would 
save approximately $26 billion over the next decade and help close the 
budget deficit and reduce Russia's incentive to maintain a large 
nuclear arsenal in the bargain, and we will still have a nuclear 
arsenal vastly superior to any other and remain a deterrent capacity 
second to none. Fiscal conservatives have also targeted the nuclear 
weapons budget as a clear area for cuts.
  Senator Tom Coburn voted against the new START arms control treaty 
last December but now advocates spending cuts that would lower the 
number of nuclear weapons below new START numbers.
  The point is that, far from saying we shouldn't have other nations 
proliferating, we should start with ourselves here. Let's start cutting 
back these nuclear programs. Let's take a stand that all nations should 
get rid of their nuclear weapons. Let's move forward to see what a 
world would like look like without nuclear weapons instead of just 
saying, well, there are some nations that shouldn't have nuclear 
weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 9\3/4\ minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself an additional 5 minutes.
  One of the most troubling aspects of this legislation is, and it may 
be the area of the legislation that has not received much attention but 
it needs to have attention right now, and that is that this legislation 
puts this country at odds with Russia in a way that I think is actually 
against the interests of world peace. It goes on to call out the 
Russian Federation specifically with respect to saying that they're 
assisting these nuclear programs. This really, in a sense, is a 
confession of how far away we've gone from the mark of START I and 
START II, about how far we've gone away from that time when President 
Reagan met with Premier Gorbachev to talk about what we can do to start 
to build down these nuclear weapons.
  I remember when Vladimir Putin, who is now being reviled, when 
Vladimir Putin made the offer to President George W. Bush to start to 
get rid of nuclear weapons, and, unfortunately, his efforts were 
rebuffed.

                              {time}  2130

  We should be engaging Russia directly on getting rid of nuclear 
weapons. Instead, what we have here is a restriction on payments in 
connection with the International Space Station. That's in here. You 
know, remember, the International Space Station was the centerpiece of 
U.S.-Russia cooperation. We held that out as proving that we could work 
together on Earth as it is in heaven. We showed that that space station 
was a platform for cooperation and peace between Russia and the United 
States.
  What we're doing here is we're saying in effect that all 
extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space 
Station to Russian Aviation and Space Agency, any organization or 
entity under the jurisdiction or control of Russian Aviation and Space 
Agency, would basically be restricted.
  Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield just on this question?
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate that.
  Two points just on this issue: one is the language the gentleman 
originally read with respect to Russia was amended out of the bill in 
committee.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Well, I thank the gentleman for pointing that out.
  Mr. BERMAN. Secondly, this language with respect to funding on the 
Russian flights to the space station is an extension of the authority, 
not an elimination of the authority, to engage and provide funding for 
that purpose. So I understand why the gentleman said what he did, but 
in reality----
  Mr. KUCINICH. I'm asking you, when you say this was amended out, it 
was amended out with respect to the citation of the Russian 
Federation----
  Mr. BERMAN. Yes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. As well as the section which spoke directly to the 
restrictions on the payments.
  Mr. BERMAN. The restrictions on payments is an extension of time, and 
it also has a waiver. The first reference to Russia was eliminated from 
the bill.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Okay. Well, I appreciate your pointing that out. But I 
would yield to my friend for a question.
  Does this legislation, or does it not, have a reference to the 
International Space Station and Russia? Is there a reference to it?
  Mr. BERMAN. Yes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. And is there any kind of restriction being placed on 
Russia with respect to payments in connection with the International 
Space Station?
  I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. There is language in the bill with respect to 
restrictions. There is a waiver in the bill for those restrictions, and 
there is an extension of non-applicability of those provisions until 
2020.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would reclaim my time and respectfully suggest to my 
friend from California that even if you're extending the non-
applicability, our friends in Russia will read this as being an attempt 
to try to put Russia in a position where we are forcing them to put at 
risk the International Space Station if in fact they wish to have a 
different kind of diplomacy than we have.

[[Page 19976]]

  I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. BERMAN. May I inquire of the Chair how much time I have.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 4 minutes.
  Mr. BERMAN. I am only going to use a moment of the time simply to 
address the issue that my friend from Ohio talked about with respect to 
sanctions.
  The focus on unilateral sanctions without international support 
versus effective multilateral sanctions, that distinction was not made 
by my friend from Ohio. The fact is that this administration and this 
Congress, through legislation, working in coordination with the members 
of the Security Council, our friends in the European Union, our allies 
in Asia, have put together a multilateral level of sanctions that has 
never been seen before.
  And old studies regarding the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions 
in terms of altering a country's behavior are not applicable in this 
situation because we are deeply committed to the understanding that we 
will estop this kind of proliferation in which we have the support of 
all of the countries of the world who are committed to and adhere to 
the nonproliferation treaty.
  And I suggest with that that I should yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. May I ask how much time I have left.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 4\3/4\ minutes, 
and the gentlewoman from Florida has 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Does the gentlelady wish to close?
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. As I have stated before and will continue to 
state, I will reserve my time to close.
  Mr. KUCINICH. It's time for the United States as a Nation to change 
its direction, to begin to see ourselves as a Nation among nations, not 
a Nation above nations, to begin to set aside war as an instrument of 
policy, to be sensitive to the power that we have so that we're not 
attempting to use our force in a way that would punish someone 
militarily who doesn't agree with us.
  The underlying premise that my friends here have of nonproliferation 
is something I agree with, but where we depart from agreement is where 
we're focusing on nonproliferation among only a few countries.
  I will say it again: we need a new direction in America. It's a 
direction where we stand for peace, not the kind of peace which is some 
airy-fairy notion, and not just looking at peace as the absence of war, 
but peace as an active presence and the capacity we have to pursue the 
science of human relations, and to be able to use diplomacy to get to a 
place where we all feel secure.
  But we don't have that today. So what we do is we try to find our 
security through straitjacketing other nations with sanctions that 
inevitably are bound to fail and which inevitably turn the people of 
the countries who we're sanctioning against us and help to strengthen 
the hands of the regime that's being sanctioned.
  We need to, as a Nation, take a stand for nuclear abolition once and 
for all. We need to, as a Nation, get rid of this idea that war is 
acceptable. We need to determine that we can get strength and be a 
strong Nation through peace. Strength through peace is the approach 
that we ought to be taking, have a national security strategy that 
involves strength through peace and let our diplomacy, let our pursuit 
of diplomacy guide us in taking our relations with other nations to a 
new level.
  This isn't naive. I stood here challenging the war in Iraq, and I was 
right about that. And I can tell you that this Congress took a 
direction that wasted $5 trillion, the lives of almost 5,000 of our 
troops, tens of thousands of troops injured, millions of Iraqis dead. 
Why don't we try diplomacy rather than sanctions? It's something that 
we really haven't tried, and it's time that we did.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, to close on this bill, I am pleased to 
give our remaining time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), 
who is the chairman of our Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade and has been a leader in this 
sanctions legislation for a mighty long time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, last week we had a headline in the newspaper 
that I think underscores the importance of this legislation, and what 
that headline said was that North Korea is making a missile able to hit 
the United States.

                              {time}  2140

  Now, the reason we're concerned about Iran's activities here in 
proliferation is because Iran announces they want to kill us. That 
tends to get our attention. And as a consequence, we begin to think, 
what could we do to sanction their central bank in order to make it 
very, very difficult for them to proceed down this road?
  Well, let's go back for a minute to this North Korea story, 
remembering already that we've seen North Korea, proliferate and 
attempt to give nuclear capability to Syria. We've seen North Korea 
proliferate to Iran and Pakistan with their missile capabilities. And 
the story reported that North Korea is moving ahead to build its first 
road mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. And of course, mobile 
missiles are very difficult to find. You can't locate them. They're 
made to be hidden.
  And with these developments, the Secretary of Defense said North 
Korea is in the process of becoming a direct threat to the United 
States. That's former Secretary of Defense Gates.
  No one who has closely watched North Korea is surprised by these 
developments. And because we haven't seriously sanctioned North Korea 
in the way of--I mean, we tried sanctioning the Bank of Delta Asia for 
a short period of time and, frankly, it worked, and then we lifted 
those sanctions.
  I want you to think about this. Pyongyang builds a nuclear reactor in 
Syria, no real consequences. North Korea unveils an advanced uranium 
enrichment plant, no real consequences. Kim Jong-Il torpedoes a South 
Korean ship, no real consequences.
  Fully implementing this legislation could impose costs on North Korea 
or on Iran. But just as with the previous legislation, the 
administration isn't aggressively confronting this North Korean threat.
  Now, I'm going to share with you my concern over all of this. If 
history is a guide, we'll pass these bills, we'll take them up 
tomorrow. They'll pass out of the House by tremendous margins. Then 
we'll wait. We'll wait for the other body to act. Then the Obama 
administration will press for these sanctions to be scaled back, as it 
continues to do. And this is what happened last Congress, and my 
concern is that that is what happens here now. We've got to push this 
now.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, North Korea has nuclear weapons. Iran is 
developing nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda wants to acquire nuclear weapons. 
The threat we face is very, very real.
  Sanctions are important to help prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons, but they are not enough. America must lead by example.
  The U.S. recently signed the New START treaty, requiring reductions 
to our nuclear arsenal. Yet, we still plan to spend hundreds of 
billions of dollars on new nuclear weapons and related programs over 
the next decade.
  Why do we allow this wasteful spending to continue? Because some 
Republicans in this Chamber treat the nuclear weapons budget as a 
sacred cow, never to be questioned or scrutinized. This is ridiculous.
  Wasteful nuclear weapons spending actually harms national security. 
It sends the message to Iran, North Korea, and Syria that while we 
don't want you to have these weapons, we are not willing to make cuts 
ourselves. This is the wrong message to send.
  You cannot argue temperance from a barstool.
  The central deal in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was that the 
non-weapons states agreed to forgo the right to get the bomb. The 
weapons states in return, agreed to negotiate measures leading to 
disarmament.
  That should be our goal, and we can take an important step in this 
direction by reducing unnecessary nuclear weapons spending.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by

[[Page 19977]]

the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend 
the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 2105, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

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