[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 157 (2011), Part 14]
[House]
[Pages 19937-19965]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   IRAN THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 2011

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass 
the bill (H.R. 1905) to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose 
of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other 
threatening activities, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 1905

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Iran 
     Threat Reduction Act of 2011''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy.

                     TITLE I--IRAN ENERGY SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 104. Multilateral regime.
Sec. 105. Imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 106. Description of sanctions.
Sec. 107. Advisory opinions.
Sec. 108. Termination of sanctions.
Sec. 109. Duration of sanctions.
Sec. 110. Reports required.
Sec. 111. Determinations not reviewable.
Sec. 112. Definitions.
Sec. 113. Effective date.
Sec. 114. Repeal.

                     TITLE II--IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT

Sec. 201. Codification of sanctions.
Sec. 202. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by 
              foreign subsidiaries.
Sec. 203. Declaration of Congress regarding United States policy toward 
              Iran.
Sec. 204. Assistance to support democracy in Iran.
Sec. 205. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons who are 
              responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses 
              committed against citizens of Iran or their family 
              members after the June 12, 2009, elections in Iran.
Sec. 206. Clarification of sensitive technologies for purposes of 
              procurement ban.
Sec. 207. Comprehensive strategy to promote internet freedom and access 
              to information in Iran.

  TITLE III--IRAN REGIME AND IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 
                             ACCOUNTABILITY

Sec. 301. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 302. Additional export sanctions against Iran.
Sec. 303. Sanctions against affiliates of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary 
              Guard Corps.
Sec. 304. Measures against foreign persons or entities supporting 
              Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 305. Special measures against foreign countries supporting Iran's 
              Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 306. Authority of State and local governments to restrict 
              contracts or licenses for certain sanctionable persons.
Sec. 307. Iranian activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Sec. 308. United States policy toward Iran.
Sec. 309. Definitions.
Sec. 310. Rule of construction.

 TITLE IV--IRAN FINANCIAL SANCTIONS; DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES 
  THAT INVEST IN IRAN; AND PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, 
                   SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN

Sec. 401. Iran financial sanctions.
Sec. 402. Divestment from certain companies that invest in Iran.
Sec. 403. Prevention of diversion of certain goods, services, and 
              technologies to Iran.

              TITLE V--SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Sec. 501. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
              relating to sanctionable activities.

                      TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 601. Denial of visas for certain persons of the Government of 
              Iran.
Sec. 602. Inadmissibility of certain aliens who engage in certain 
              activities with respect to Iran.
Sec. 603. Amendments to civil and criminal penalties provisions under 
              the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Sec. 604. Exclusion of certain activities.
Sec. 605. Regulatory authority.
Sec. 606. Sunset.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Successive administrations have clearly identified the 
     unacceptability of the Iranian regime's pursuit of nuclear 
     weapons capabilities and the danger that pursuit presents to 
     the United States, to our friends and allies, and to global 
     security.
       (2) In May 1995, President Clinton stated that ``The 
     specter of an Iran armed with weapons of mass destruction and 
     the missiles to deliver them haunts not only Israel but the 
     entire Middle East and ultimately all the rest of us as well. 
     The United States and, I believe, all the Western nations 
     have an overriding interest in containing the threat posed by 
     Iran.''.
       (3) In the 2006 State of the Union Address, President Bush 
     stated that ``The Iranian government is defying the world 
     with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the world must 
     not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons. 
     America will continue to rally the world to confront these 
     threats.''.
       (4) In February 2009, President Obama committed the 
     Administration to ``developing a strategy to use all elements 
     of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear 
     weapon''.
       (5) Iran is a major threat to United States national 
     security interests, not only exemplified by Tehran's nuclear 
     program but also by its material assistance to armed groups 
     in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, to 
     Lebanese Hezbollah, the Government of Syria, and to other 
     extremists that seek to undermine regional stability. These 
     capabilities provide the regime with potential asymmetric 
     delivery vehicles and mechanisms for nuclear or other 
     unconventional weapons.
       (6) Iran's growing inventory of ballistic missile and other 
     destabilizing types of conventional weapons provides the 
     regime the capabilities to enhance its power projection 
     throughout the region and undermine the national security 
     interests of the United States and its friends and allies.
       (7) Were Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, it 
     would, inter alia--
       (A) likely lead to the proliferation of such weapons 
     throughout the region, where several states have already 
     indicated interest in nuclear programs, and would 
     dramatically undercut 60 years of United States efforts to 
     stop the spread of nuclear weapons;
       (B) greatly increase the threat of nuclear terrorism;
       (C) significantly expand Iran's already-growing influence 
     in the region;
       (D) insulate the regime from international pressure, giving 
     it wider scope further to oppress its citizens and pursue 
     aggression regionally and globally;
       (E) embolden all Iranian-supported terrorist groups, 
     including Hamas and Hezbollah; and
       (F) directly threaten several United States friends and 
     allies, especially Israel, whose very right to exist has been 
     denied successively by every leader of the Islamic Republic 
     of Iran and which Iranian President Ahmadinejad says should 
     be ``wiped off the map''.
       (8) Successive Congresses have clearly recognized the 
     threat that the Iranian regime and its policies present to 
     the United States,

[[Page 19938]]

     to our friends and allies, and to global security, and 
     responded with successive bipartisan legislative initiatives.
       (9) The extent of the Iranian threat is greater today than 
     when the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 was signed into 
     law, now known as the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. That 
     landmark legislation imposed sanctions on foreign companies 
     investing in Iran's energy infrastructure in an effort to 
     undermine the strategic threat from Iran, by cutting off 
     investment in its petroleum sector and thereby denying the 
     regime its economic lifeline and its ability to pursue a 
     nuclear program.
       (10) Laws such as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 
     which was retitled the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, paved the 
     way for the enactment of similar laws, such as the Iran, 
     North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act, the Iran-Iraq 
     Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, the Iran Freedom Support 
     Act, and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
     and Divestment Act of 2010.
       (11) United States sanctions on Iran have hindered Iran's 
     ability to attract capital, material, and technical support 
     for its petroleum sector, creating financial difficulties for 
     the regime.
       (12) In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of 
     Conference to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-
     195; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) issued on June 23, 2010, the 
     Members of the Committee of Conference noted that ``Although 
     [the Iran Sanctions Act] was enacted more than a decade ago, 
     no Administration has sanctioned a foreign entity for 
     investing $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector, 
     despite a number of such investments. Indeed, on only one 
     occasion, in 1998, did the Administration make a 
     determination regarding a sanctions-triggering investment, 
     but the Administration waived sanctions against the offending 
     persons. Conferees believe that the lack of enforcement of 
     relevant enacted sanctions may have served to encourage 
     rather than deter Iran's efforts to pursue nuclear 
     weapons.''.
       (13) The Joint Explanatory Statement also noted that ``The 
     effectiveness of this Act will depend on its forceful 
     implementation. The Conferees urge the President to 
     vigorously impose the sanctions provided for in this Act.''.
       (14) The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 mandates among other provisions that 
     the President initiate investigations of potentially 
     sanctionable activity under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. 
     Although more than 16 months have passed since enactment of 
     this legislation, Congress has not received notice of the 
     imposition of sanctions on any entities that do significant 
     business in the United States, despite multiple reports of 
     potentially sanctionable activity by such entities. Although, 
     in accordance with the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, some potentially 
     sanctionable entities have been persuaded to wind down and 
     end their involvement in Iran, others have not.
       (15) It is unlikely that Iran can be compelled to abandon 
     its pursuit of nuclear weapons unless sanctions are fully and 
     effectively implemented.

     SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It shall be the policy of the United States to--
       (1) prevent Iran from--
       (A) acquiring or developing nuclear weapons and associated 
     delivery capabilities;
       (B) developing its unconventional weapons and ballistic 
     missile capabilities; and
       (C) continuing its support for foreign terrorist 
     organizations and other activities aimed at undermining and 
     destabilizing its neighbors and other nations; and
       (2) fully implement all multilateral and bilateral 
     sanctions against Iran in order to deprive the Government of 
     Iran of necessary resources and to compel the Government of 
     Iran to--
       (A) abandon and verifiably dismantle its nuclear 
     capabilities;
       (B) abandon and verifiably dismantle its ballistic missile 
     and unconventional weapons programs; and
       (C) cease all support for foreign terrorist organizations 
     and other activities aimed at undermining and destabilizing 
     its neighbors and other nations.

                     TITLE I--IRAN ENERGY SANCTIONS

     SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to achieve 
     nuclear weapons capability and to acquire other 
     unconventional weapons and the means to deliver them, both 
     through ballistic missile and asymmetric means, and its 
     support for foreign terrorist organizations and other 
     extremists endanger the national security and foreign policy 
     interests of the United States and those countries with which 
     the United States shares common strategic and foreign policy 
     objectives.
       (2) The objectives of preventing the proliferation of 
     nuclear and other unconventional weapons and countering the 
     activities of foreign terrorist organizations and other 
     extremists through existing multilateral and bilateral 
     initiatives require further efforts to deny Iran the 
     financial means to sustain its nuclear, chemical, biological, 
     and missile weapons programs and its active support for 
     terrorism.
       (3) The Government of Iran uses its diplomatic facilities 
     and quasi-governmental institutions outside of Iran to 
     support foreign terrorist organizations and other extremists, 
     and assist its unconventional weapons and missile programs, 
     including its nuclear program.

     SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the goal of compelling 
     Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other 
     threatening activities can be achieved most effectively 
     through full implementation of all sanctions enacted into 
     law, including those sanctions set out in this title.

     SEC. 103. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

       Congress declares that it is the policy of the United 
     States to deny Iran the ability to support acts of foreign 
     terrorist organizations and extremists and develop 
     unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles. A critical 
     means of achieving that goal is sanctions that limit Iran's 
     ability to develop its energy resources, including its 
     ability to explore for, extract, refine, and transport by 
     pipeline its hydrocarbon resources, in order to limit the 
     funds Iran has available for pursuing its objectionable 
     activities.

     SEC. 104. MULTILATERAL REGIME.

       (a) Multilateral Negotiations.--In order to further the 
     objectives of section 103 of this Act, Congress urges the 
     President immediately to initiate diplomatic efforts, both in 
     appropriate international fora such as the United Nations, 
     and bilaterally with allies of the United States, to expand 
     the multilateral sanctions regime regarding Iran, including--
       (1) qualitatively expanding the United Nations Security 
     Council sanctions regime against Iran;
       (2) qualitatively expanding the range of sanctions by the 
     European Union, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other key 
     United States allies;
       (3) further efforts to limit Iran's development of 
     petroleum resources and import of refined petroleum; and
       (4) initiatives aimed at increasing non-Iranian crude oil 
     product output for current purchasers of Iranian petroleum 
     and petroleum byproducts.
       (b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 
     the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on the extent to which diplomatic efforts 
     described in subsection (a) have been successful. Each report 
     shall include--
       (1) the countries that have agreed to undertake measures to 
     further the objectives of section 103 of this Act with 
     respect to Iran, and a description of those measures; and
       (2) the countries that have not agreed to measures 
     described in paragraph (1), and, with respect to those 
     countries, other measures the President recommends that the 
     United States take to further the objectives of section 103 
     of this Act with respect to Iran.
       (c) Interim Report on Multilateral Sanctions; Monitoring.--
     Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on--
       (1) the countries that have established legislative or 
     administrative standards providing for the imposition of 
     trade sanctions on persons or their affiliates that conduct 
     business or have investments in Iran;
       (2) the extent and duration of each instance of the 
     application of such sanctions; and
       (3) the disposition of any decision with respect to such 
     sanctions by the World Trade Organization or its predecessor 
     organization.
       (d) Investigations.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall initiate an 
     investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions under 
     section 105 of this Act against a person upon receipt by the 
     United States of credible information indicating that such 
     person is engaged in an activity described in such section.
       (2) Determination and notification.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date on which an investigation is initiated 
     under paragraph (1), the President shall (unless paragraph 
     (6) applies) determine, pursuant to section 105 of this Act, 
     if a person has engaged in an activity described in such 
     section and shall notify the appropriate congressional 
     committees of the basis for any such determination.
       (3) Briefing.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and at the end of every 3-month 
     period thereafter, the President, acting through the 
     Secretary of State, shall brief the appropriate congressional 
     committees regarding investigations initiated under this 
     subsection.
       (B) Form.--The briefings required under subparagraph (A) 
     shall be provided in unclassified form, but may be provided 
     in classified form.
       (4) Submission of information.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall, in 
     accordance with section 15(b) of the State Department Basic 
     Authorities Act of

[[Page 19939]]

     1956 (22 U.S.C. 2680(b)), provide to the appropriate 
     congressional committees all requested information relating 
     to investigations or reviews initiated under this title, 
     including the number, scope, and dates of such investigations 
     or reviews.
       (B) Form.--The information required under subparagraph (A) 
     shall be provided in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (5) Termination.--Subject to paragraph (6), the President 
     may, on a case-by-case basis, terminate an investigation of a 
     person initiated under this subsection.
       (6) Special rule.--
       (A) In general.--The President need not initiate an 
     investigation, and may terminate an investigation, on a case-
     by-case basis under this subsection if the President 
     certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional 
     committees 15 days prior to the determination that--
       (i) the person whose activity was the basis for the 
     investigation is no longer engaging in the activity or is 
     divesting all holdings and terminating the activity within 
     one year from the date of the certification; and
       (ii) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in an activity described 
     in section 105(a) of this Act in the future.
       (B) Application of sanctions.--The President shall apply 
     the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act in 
     accordance with section 105(a) of this Act to a person 
     described in subparagraph (A) if--
       (i) the person fails to verifiably divest all holdings and 
     terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A) of this 
     paragraph within one year from the date of certification of 
     the President under subparagraph (A); or
       (ii) the person has been previously designated pursuant to 
     section 4(e)(3) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in 
     effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, and fails to verifiably divest all holdings and 
     terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A) within 
     180 days from the date of enactment of this Act.
       (C) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on the actions 
     taken by persons previously designated pursuant to section 
     4(e)(3) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in effect on 
     the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, to 
     verifiably divest all holdings and terminate the activity 
     described in subparagraph (A).

     SEC. 105. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

       (a) Sanctions With Respect to the Development of Petroleum 
     Resources of Iran, Production of Refined Petroleum Products 
     in Iran, and Exportation of Refined Petroleum Products to 
     Iran.--
       (1) Development of petroleum resources of iran.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), the 
     President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described 
     in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person knowingly, on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (i) makes an investment described in subparagraph (B) of 
     $20,000,000 or more; or
       (ii) makes a combination of investments described in 
     subparagraph (B) in a 12-month period if each such investment 
     is of at least $5,000,000 and such investments equal or 
     exceed $20,000,000 in the aggregate.
       (B) Investment described.--An investment described in this 
     subparagraph is an investment that directly and significantly 
     contributes to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop 
     petroleum resources.
       (2) Production of refined petroleum products.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), the 
     President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described 
     in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person knowingly, on or after 
     the date of the enactment this Act, sells, leases, or 
     provides to Iran goods, services, technology, information, or 
     support described in subparagraph (B)--
       (i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or 
     more; or
       (ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair 
     market value of $5,000,000 or more.
       (B) Goods, services, technology, information, or support 
     described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or 
     support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, 
     technology, information, or support that could directly and 
     significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of 
     Iran's domestic production of refined petroleum products, 
     including any direct and significant assistance with respect 
     to the construction, modernization, or repair of petroleum 
     refineries or associated infrastructure, including 
     construction of port facilities, railways, and roads, the 
     primary use of which is to support the delivery of refined 
     petroleum products.
       (3) Exportation of refined petroleum products to iran.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), the 
     President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described 
     in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the 
     President determines that the person knowingly, on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (i) sells or provides to Iran refined petroleum products--

       (I) that have a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or
       (II) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair 
     market value of $5,000,000 or more; or

       (ii) sells, leases, or provides to Iran goods, services, 
     technology, information, or support described in subparagraph 
     (B)--

       (I) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or 
     more; or
       (II) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair 
     market value of $5,000,000 or more.

       (B) Goods, services, technology, information, or support 
     described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or 
     support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, 
     technology, information, or support that could directly and 
     significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran's ability 
     to import refined petroleum products, including--
       (i) except as provided in subparagraph (C), underwriting or 
     entering into a contract to provide insurance or reinsurance 
     for the sale, lease, or provision of such goods, services, 
     service contracts, technology, information, or support;
       (ii) financing or brokering such sale, lease, or provision;
       (iii) bartering or contracting by which the parties 
     exchange goods for goods, including the insurance or 
     reinsurance of such exchanges;
       (iv) purchasing, subscribing to, or facilitating the 
     issuance of sovereign debt of the Government of Iran, 
     including governmental bonds; or
       (v) providing ships or shipping services to deliver refined 
     petroleum products to Iran.
       (C) Exception for underwriters and insurance providers 
     exercising due diligence.--The President may not impose 
     sanctions under this paragraph with respect to a person that 
     provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance if 
     the President determines that the person has exercised due 
     diligence in establishing and enforcing official policies, 
     procedures, and controls to ensure that the person does not 
     underwrite or enter into a contract to provide insurance or 
     reinsurance for the sale, lease, or provision of goods, 
     services, technology, information, or support described in 
     subparagraph (B).
       (4) Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the 
     issuance of iranian sovereign debt.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (f), the President shall impose a majority of the 
     sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act with 
     respect to a person if the President determines that the 
     person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, purchases, subscribes to, or facilitates the 
     issuance of--
       (A) sovereign debt of the Government of Iran, including 
     governmental bonds; or
       (B) debt of any entity owned or controlled by the 
     Government of Iran, including bonds.
       (b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Development of 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall impose a majority of 
     the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act if the 
     President determines that a person, on or after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, has knowingly exported, 
     transferred, permitted, hosted, or otherwise facilitated 
     transshipment that may have enabled a person to export, 
     transfer, or transship to Iran or otherwise provided to Iran 
     any goods, services, technology, or other items that would 
     contribute materially to the ability of Iran to--
       (A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear 
     weapons or related technologies; or
       (B) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of 
     advanced conventional weapons.
       (2) Additional mandatory sanctions relating to transfer of 
     nuclear technology.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) 
     and (C), in any case in which a person is subject to 
     sanctions under paragraph (1) because of an activity 
     described in that paragraph that relates to the acquisition 
     or development of nuclear weapons or related technology or of 
     missiles or advanced conventional weapons that are designed 
     or modified to deliver a nuclear weapon, no license may be 
     issued for the export, and no approval may be given for the 
     transfer or retransfer to the country the government of which 
     has primary jurisdiction over the person, of any nuclear 
     material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, 
     or technology that are or would be subject to an agreement 
     for cooperation between the United States and that 
     government.
       (B) Exception.--The sanctions described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall not apply with respect to a country the government of 
     which has primary jurisdiction over a person that engages in 
     an activity described in that subparagraph if the President 
     determines and notifies the appropriate congressional 
     committees that the government of the country--
       (i) does not know or have reason to know about the 
     activity; or

[[Page 19940]]

       (ii) has taken, or is taking, all reasonable steps 
     necessary to prevent a recurrence of the activity and to 
     penalize the person for the activity.
       (C) Individual approval.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), 
     the President may, on a case-by-case basis, approve the 
     issuance of a license for the export, or approve the transfer 
     or retransfer, of any nuclear material, facilities, 
     components, or other goods, services, or technology that are 
     or would be subject to an agreement for cooperation, to a 
     person in a country to which subparagraph (A) applies (other 
     than a person that is subject to the sanctions under 
     paragraph (1)) if the President--
       (i) determines that such approval is vital to the national 
     security interests of the United States; and
       (ii) not later than 15 days before issuing such license or 
     approving such transfer or retransfer, submits to the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
     and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the 
     justification for approving such license, transfer, or 
     retransfer.
       (D) Construction.--The restrictions in subparagraph (A) 
     shall apply in addition to all other applicable procedures, 
     requirements, and restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 and other related laws.
       (E) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``agreement 
     for cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section 
     11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(b)).
       (F) Applicability.--The sanctions described in subparagraph 
     (A) shall apply only in a case in which a person is subject 
     to sanctions under paragraph (1) because of an activity 
     described in such paragraph in which such person engages on 
     or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Persons Against Which the Sanctions Are to Be 
     Imposed.--The sanctions described in subsections (a) and 
     (b)(1) shall be imposed on--
       (1) any person the President determines has carried out the 
     activities described in subsection (a) or (b), respectively; 
     and
       (2) any person that--
       (A) is a successor entity to the person referred to in 
     paragraph (1);
       (B) owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph 
     (1), if the person that owns or controls the person referred 
     to in paragraph (1) had actual knowledge or should have known 
     that the person referred to in paragraph (1) engaged in the 
     activities referred to in that paragraph; or
       (C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or 
     control with, the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the 
     person owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or 
     control with (as the case may be), the person referred to in 
     paragraph (1) knowingly engaged in the activities referred to 
     in that paragraph.

     For purposes of this title, any person or entity described in 
     this subsection shall be referred to as a ``sanctioned 
     person''.
       (d) Publication in Federal Register.--The President shall 
     cause to be published in the Federal Register a current list 
     of persons and entities on whom sanctions have been imposed 
     under this title. The removal of persons or entities from, 
     and the addition of persons and entities to, the list, shall 
     also be so published.
       (e) Publication of Projects.--The President shall cause to 
     be published in the Federal Register a list of all 
     significant projects that have been publicly tendered in the 
     oil and gas sector in Iran.
       (f) Exceptions.--The President shall not be required to 
     apply or maintain the sanctions under subsection (a) or (b)--
       (1) in the case of procurement of defense articles or 
     defense services--
       (A) under existing contracts or subcontracts, including the 
     exercise of options for production quantities to satisfy 
     requirements essential to the national security of the United 
     States;
       (B) if the President determines in writing that the person 
     to which the sanctions would otherwise be applied is a sole 
     source supplier of the defense articles or services, that the 
     defense articles or services are essential, and that 
     alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available; 
     or
       (C) if the President determines in writing that such 
     articles or services are essential to the national security 
     under defense coproduction agreements;
       (2) in the case of procurement, to eligible products, as 
     defined in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
     (19 U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any foreign country or 
     instrumentality designated under section 301(b) of that Act 
     (19 U.S.C. 2511(b));
       (3) to products, technology, or services provided under 
     contracts entered into before the date on which the President 
     publishes in the Federal Register the name of the person on 
     whom the sanctions are to be imposed;
       (4) to--
       (A) spare parts which are essential to United States 
     products or production;
       (B) component parts, but not finished products, essential 
     to United States products or production; or
       (C) routine servicing and maintenance of products, to the 
     extent that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably 
     available;
       (5) to information and technology essential to United 
     States products or production; or
       (6) to medicines, medical supplies, or other humanitarian 
     items.

     SEC. 106. DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS.

       (a) In General.--The sanctions to be imposed on a 
     sanctioned person under section 105 of this Act are as 
     follows:
       (1) Export-import bank assistance for exports to sanctioned 
     persons.--The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of 
     the United States to not give approval to for the issuance of 
     any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or 
     participation in the extension of credit in connection with 
     the export of any goods or services to any sanctioned person.
       (2) Export sanction.--The President may order the United 
     States Government not to issue any specific license and not 
     to grant any other specific permission or authority to export 
     any goods or technology to a sanctioned person under--
       (A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in 
     effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act);
       (B) the Arms Export Control Act;
       (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
       (D) any other law that requires the prior review and 
     approval of the United States Government as a condition for 
     the export or reexport of goods or services.
       (3) Loans from united states financial institutions.--The 
     United States Government may prohibit any United States 
     financial institution from making loans or providing credits 
     to any sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in 
     any 12-month period unless such person is engaged in 
     activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or 
     credits are provided for such activities.
       (4) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The following 
     prohibitions may be imposed against a sanctioned person that 
     is a financial institution:
       (A) Prohibition on designation as primary dealer.--Neither 
     the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the 
     Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the 
     continuation of any prior designation of, such financial 
     institution as a primary dealer in United States Government 
     debt instruments.
       (B) Prohibition on service as a repository of government 
     funds.--Such financial institution may not serve as agent of 
     the United States Government or serve as repository for 
     United States Government funds.

     The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or 
     (B) shall be treated as one sanction for purposes of section 
     105 of this Act, and the imposition of both such sanctions 
     shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of section 105 
     of this Act.
       (5) Procurement sanction.--The United States Government may 
     not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement 
     of, any goods or services from a sanctioned person.
       (6) Foreign exchange.--The President may prohibit any 
     transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned 
     person has any interest.
       (7) Banking transactions.--The President may prohibit any 
     transfers of credit or payments between financial 
     institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, 
     to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to 
     the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any 
     interest of the sanctioned person.
       (8) Property transactions.--The President may prohibit any 
     person from--
       (A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, 
     withdrawing, transporting, or exporting any property that is 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with 
     respect to which a sanctioned person has any interest;
       (B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege 
     with respect to such property; or
       (C) conducting any transaction involving such property.
       (9) Grounds for exclusion.--The Secretary of State may deny 
     a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security may deny 
     admission into the United States to, any alien whom the 
     Secretary of State determines is an alien who, on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, is a--
       (A) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a 
     controlling interest of a person against whom sanctions have 
     been imposed under subsection (a) or (b);
       (B) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a 
     controlling interest of a successor entity to or a parent or 
     subsidiary of such a sanctioned person;
       (C) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a 
     controlling interest of an affiliate of such a sanctioned 
     person, if such affiliate engaged in a sanctionable activity 
     described in subsection (a) or (b) and if such affiliate is 
     controlled in fact by such sanctioned person; or
       (D) spouse, minor child, or agent of a person inadmissible 
     under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
       (10) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The 
     President may impose on the principal executive officer or 
     officers of any sanctioned person, or on persons performing

[[Page 19941]]

     similar functions and with similar authorities as such 
     officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this 
     subsection. The President shall include on the list published 
     under section 105(d) of this Act the name of any person 
     against whom sanctions are imposed under this paragraph.
       (11) Additional sanctions.--The President may impose 
     additional sanctions, as appropriate, in accordance with the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.).
       (b) Additional Measure Relating to Government Contracts.--
       (1) Modification of federal acquisition regulation.--The 
     Federal Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section 
     1303 of title 41, United States Code, shall require a 
     certification from each person that is a prospective 
     contractor that such person and any person owned or 
     controlled by the person does not engage in any activity for 
     which sanctions may be imposed under section 105 or section 
     304 of this Act.
       (2) Remedies.--
       (A) In general.--If the head of an executive agency 
     determines that a person has submitted a false certification 
     under paragraph (1) after the date on which the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation is revised to implement the 
     requirements of this subsection, the head of that executive 
     agency shall terminate a contract with such person or debar 
     or suspend such person from eligibility for Federal contracts 
     for a period of not less than 2 years. Any such debarment or 
     suspension shall be subject to the procedures that apply to 
     debarment and suspension under the Federal Acquisition 
     Regulation under subpart 9.4 of part 9 of title 48, Code of 
     Federal Regulations.
       (B) Inclusion on list of parties excluded from federal 
     procurement and nonprocurement programs.--The Administrator 
     of General Services shall include on the List of Parties 
     Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs 
     maintained by the Administrator under part 9 of the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section 1303 of 
     title 41, United States Code, each person that is debarred, 
     suspended, or proposed for debarment or suspension by the 
     head of an executive agency on the basis of a determination 
     of a false certification under subparagraph (A).
       (3) Clarification regarding certain products.--The remedies 
     specified in paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to 
     the procurement of eligible products, as defined in section 
     308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
     2518(4)), of any foreign country or instrumentality 
     designated under section 301(b) of such Act (19 U.S.C. 
     2511(b)).
       (4) Rule of construction.--This subsection shall not be 
     construed to limit the use of other remedies available to the 
     head of an executive agency or any other official of the 
     Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false 
     certification under paragraph (1).
       (5) Waiver.--The President may, on a case-by-case basis, 
     waive the requirement that a person make a certification 
     under paragraph (1) if the President determines and certifies 
     in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an 
     unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national 
     security interests of the United States.
       (6) Executive agency defined.--In this subsection, the term 
     ``executive agency'' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 133 of title 41, United States Code.
       (7) Applicability.--The revisions to the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation required under paragraph (1) shall 
     apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are 
     issued on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 107. ADVISORY OPINIONS.

       The Secretary of State may, upon the request of any person, 
     issue an advisory opinion to such person as to whether a 
     proposed activity by such person would subject such person to 
     sanctions under this title. Any person who relies in good 
     faith on such an advisory opinion which states that such 
     proposed activity would not subject such person to such 
     sanctions, and any such person who thereafter engages in such 
     activity, shall not be made subject to such sanctions on 
     account of such activity.

     SEC. 108. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.

       (a) Certification.--The requirement under section 105 of 
     this Act to impose sanctions shall no longer have force or 
     effect with respect to Iran if the President determines and 
     certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     Iran--
       (1) has ceased and verifiably dismantled its efforts to 
     design, develop, manufacture, or acquire--
       (A) a nuclear explosive device or related materials and 
     technology;
       (B) chemical and biological weapons; and
       (C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch 
     technology;
       (2) no longer provides support for acts of international 
     terrorism; and
       (3) poses no threat to the national security, interests, or 
     allies of the United States.
       (b) Notification.--The President shall notify the 
     appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days 
     before making the certification described in subsection (a).

     SEC. 109. DURATION OF SANCTIONS.

       (a) Delay of Sanctions.--
       (1) Consultations.--If the President makes a determination 
     described in section 105 of this Act with respect to a 
     foreign person, Congress urges the President to initiate 
     consultations immediately with the government with primary 
     jurisdiction over such foreign person with respect to the 
     imposition of sanctions under such section.
       (2) Actions by government of jurisdiction.--In order to 
     pursue consultations under paragraph (1) with the government 
     concerned, the President may delay for up to 90 days the 
     imposition of sanctions under section 105 of this Act. 
     Following such consultations, the President shall immediately 
     impose on the foreign person referred to in paragraph (1) 
     such sanctions unless the President determines and certifies 
     to Congress that the government has taken specific and 
     effective actions, including, as appropriate, the imposition 
     of appropriate penalties to terminate the involvement of the 
     foreign person in the activities that resulted in the 
     determination by the President under section 105 of this Act 
     concerning such foreign person and the foreign person is no 
     longer engaged in such activities.
       (b) Duration of Sanctions.--A sanction imposed under 
     section 105 of this Act shall remain in effect--
       (1) for a period of not less than 2 years beginning on the 
     date on which such sanction is imposed; or
       (2) until such time as the President determines and 
     certifies to Congress that the person whose activities were 
     the basis for imposing such sanction is no longer engaging in 
     such activities and that the President has received reliable 
     assurances that such person will not knowingly engage in such 
     activities in the future, except that such sanction shall 
     remain in effect for a period of at least one year.
       (c) Waiver.--
       (1) Authorization.--
       (A) In general.--The President may waive the requirements 
     in section 105(a) or 105(b)(2) of this Act to impose a 
     sanction or sanctions, and may waive, on a case-by-case 
     basis, the continued imposition of a sanction or sanctions 
     under subsection (b) of this section, if the President 
     determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional 
     committees 15 days prior to the exercise of waiver authority 
     that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an 
     unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national 
     security interests of the United States.
       (B) Contents of report.--Any report under subparagraph (A) 
     shall provide a specific and detailed rationale for a 
     determination made pursuant to such paragraph, including--
       (i) a description of the conduct that resulted in the 
     determination under section 105(a) or section 105(b)(2) of 
     this Act, as the case may be;
       (ii) in the case of a foreign person, an explanation of the 
     efforts to secure the cooperation of the government with 
     primary jurisdiction over such person to terminate or, as 
     appropriate, penalize the activities that resulted in the 
     determination under section 105(a) or 105(b)(2) of this Act, 
     as the case may be;
       (iii) an estimate of the significance of the conduct of the 
     person concerned in contributing to the ability of Iran to 
     develop petroleum resources, produce refined petroleum 
     products, or import refined petroleum products; and
       (iv) a statement as to the response of the United States in 
     the event that the person concerned engages in other 
     activities that would be subject to a sanction or sanctions 
     under section 105(a) or 105(b)(2) of this Act, as the case 
     may be.
       (2) Waiver with respect to persons in countries that 
     cooperate in multilateral efforts with respect to iran.--
       (A) In general.--The President may, on a case-by-case 
     basis, waive for a period of not more than 12 months the 
     application of section 105(a) of this Act with respect to a 
     person if the President, at least 30 days before the waiver 
     is to take effect--
       (i) certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 
     that--

       (I) the government with primary jurisdiction over the 
     person is closely cooperating with the United States in 
     multilateral efforts to prevent Iran from--

       (aa) acquiring or developing chemical, biological, or 
     nuclear weapons or related technologies; or
       (bb) acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers and 
     types of advanced conventional weapons; and

       (II) such a waiver is vital to the national security 
     interests of the United States; and

       (ii) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report identifying--

       (I) the person with respect to which the President waives 
     the application of sanctions; and
       (II) the actions taken by the government described in 
     clause (i)(I) to cooperate in multilateral efforts described 
     in that clause.

       (B) Subsequent renewal of waiver.--At the conclusion of the 
     period of a waiver under subparagraph (A), the President may 
     renew the waiver--
       (i) if the President determines, in accordance with 
     subparagraph (A), that the waiver is appropriate; and

[[Page 19942]]

       (ii) for subsequent periods of not more than 12 months 
     each.
       (3) Publication in the federal register.--Not later than 15 
     days after any waiver authority is exercised pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, the name of the 
     person or entity with respect to which sanctions are being 
     waived shall be published in the Federal Register.

     SEC. 110. REPORTS REQUIRED.

       (a) Report on Certain International Initiatives.--Not later 
     than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     every 180 days thereafter, the President shall transmit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     describing--
       (1) the efforts of the President to mount a multilateral 
     campaign to persuade all countries to pressure Iran to cease 
     its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile weapons 
     programs and its support of acts of international terrorism;
       (2) the efforts of the President to persuade other 
     governments to ask Iran to reduce in the countries of such 
     governments the presence of Iranian diplomats and 
     representatives of other government and military or quasi-
     governmental institutions of Iran, and to withdraw any such 
     diplomats or representatives who participated in the takeover 
     of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, on November 4, 
     1979, or the subsequent holding of United States hostages for 
     444 days;
       (3) the extent to which the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency has established regular inspections of all nuclear 
     facilities in Iran, including those facilities presently 
     under construction; and
       (4) Iran's use of Iranian diplomats and representatives of 
     other government and military or quasi-governmental 
     institutions of Iran to promote acts of international 
     terrorism or to develop or sustain Iran's nuclear, chemical, 
     biological, or missile weapons programs.
       (b) Report on Effectiveness of Actions Under This Act.--Not 
     later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to 
     Congress a report that describes--
       (1) the extent to which actions relating to trade taken 
     pursuant to this title have--
       (A) been effective in achieving the policy objective 
     described in section 103 of this Act and any other foreign 
     policy or national security objectives of the United States 
     with respect to Iran; and
       (B) affected humanitarian interests in Iran, the country in 
     which a sanctioned person is located, or in other countries; 
     and
       (2) the impact of actions relating to trade taken pursuant 
     to this title on other national security, economic, and 
     foreign policy interests of the United States, including 
     relations with countries friendly to the United States, and 
     on the United States economy.

     The President may include in such reports the President's 
     recommendation on whether or not this Act should be 
     terminated or modified.
       (c) Other Reports.--The President shall ensure the 
     continued transmittal to Congress of reports describing--
       (1) the nuclear and other military capabilities of Iran, as 
     required under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Act of 1978 and section 1607 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993; and
       (2) the support provided by Iran for acts of international 
     terrorism, as part of the Department of State's annual 
     reports on international terrorism.
       (d) Reports on Global Trade Relating to Iran.--Not later 
     than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the this Act 
     and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report, with respect 
     to the most recent 12-month period for which data are 
     available, on the dollar value amount of trade, including in 
     the energy sector, between Iran and each country maintaining 
     membership in the Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central 
     Bank Governors.

     SEC. 111. DETERMINATIONS NOT REVIEWABLE.

       A determination to impose sanctions under this title shall 
     not be reviewable in any court.

     SEC. 112. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Act of international terrorism.--The term ``act of 
     international terrorism'' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on 
     Banking and Financial Services, the Committee on Financial 
     Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
     of Representatives; and
       (B) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, 
     Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate.
       (3) Component part.--The term ``component part'' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 11A(e)(1) of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410a(e)(1)).
       (4) Credible information.--The term ``credible 
     information'' means, with respect to a person, such person's 
     public announcement of an investment described in section 105 
     of this Act, Iranian governmental announcements of such an 
     investment, reports to stockholders, annual reports, industry 
     reports, Government Accountability Office products, State and 
     local government reports, and trade publications.
       (5) Develop and development.--The terms ``develop'' and 
     ``development'' mean the exploration for, or the extraction, 
     refining, or transportation by pipeline of, petroleum 
     resources.
       (6) Financial institution.--The term ``financial 
     institution'' includes--
       (A) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1) 
     of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), including a branch or 
     agency of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of 
     the International Banking Act of 1978);
       (B) a credit union;
       (C) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer;
       (D) an insurance company, including an agency or 
     underwriter; and
       (E) any other company that provides financial services 
     including joint ventures with Iranian entities both inside 
     and outside of Iran and partnerships or investments with 
     Iranian government-controlled entities or affiliated 
     entities.
       (7) Finished product.--The term ``finished product'' has 
     the meaning given such term in section 11A(e)(2) of the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
     2410a(e)(2)).
       (8) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means--
       (A) an individual who is not a United States person or an 
     alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence into the 
     United States; or
       (B) a corporation, partnership, joint venture, cooperative 
     venture, or other nongovernmental entity which is not a 
     United States person.
       (9) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign 
     terrorist organization'' means an organization designated by 
     the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization in 
     accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
       (10) Goods and technology.--The terms ``goods'' and 
     ``technology'' have the meanings given such terms in section 
     16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
     2415).
       (11) Investment.--The term ``investment'' means any of the 
     following activities if any of such activities is undertaken 
     pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of 
     rights under such an agreement, that is entered into with the 
     Government of Iran or a nongovernmental entity in Iran, on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act:
       (A) The entry into a contract that includes responsibility 
     for the development of petroleum resources located in Iran, 
     or the entry into a contract providing for the general 
     supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of 
     such a contract.
       (B) The purchase of a share of ownership, including an 
     equity interest, in the development described in subparagraph 
     (A).
       (C) The entry into a contract providing for the 
     participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in the 
     development described in subparagraph (A), without regard to 
     the form of such participation.
       (D) The provision of goods, services, or technology related 
     to petroleum resources.
       (12) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or 
     instrumentality of Iran.
       (13) Iranian diplomats and representatives of other 
     government and military or quasi-governmental institutions of 
     iran.--The term ``Iranian diplomats and representatives of 
     other government and military or quasi-governmental 
     institutions of Iran'' includes employees, representatives, 
     or affiliates of Iran's--
       (A) Foreign Ministry;
       (B) Ministry of Intelligence and Security;
       (C) Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated entities;
       (D) Crusade for Reconstruction;
       (E) Qods (Jerusalem) Forces;
       (F) Interior Ministry;
       (G) Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled;
       (H) Prophet's Foundation;
       (I) June 5th Foundation;
       (J) Martyr's Foundation;
       (K) Islamic Propagation Organization; and
       (L) Ministry of Islamic Guidance.
       (14) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to 
     conduct, a circumstance, or a result means that a person has 
     actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the 
     circumstance, or the result of such conduct, circumstance, or 
     result.
       (15) Nuclear explosive device.--The term ``nuclear 
     explosive device'' means any device, whether assembled or 
     disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous 
     release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear 
     material (as defined in section 11(aa) of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa))) that is greater than the 
     amount of energy that would be released from the detonation 
     of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
       (16) Person.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``person'' means--
       (i) a natural person;

[[Page 19943]]

       (ii) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
     society, trust, financial institution, insurer, underwriter, 
     guarantor, or any other business organization, any other 
     nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any 
     governmental entity operating as a business enterprise; and
       (iii) any successor to any entity described in clause (ii).
       (B) Exclusion.--The term ``person'' does not include a 
     government or governmental entity that is not operating as a 
     business enterprise.
       (17) Petroleum resources.--The term ``petroleum resources'' 
     includes petroleum and natural gas resources, refined 
     petroleum products, oil or liquefied natural gas, oil or 
     liquefied natural gas tankers, and products used to construct 
     or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquefied 
     natural gas.
       (18) Refined petroleum products.--The term ``refined 
     petroleum products'' means diesel, gasoline, jet fuel 
     (including naphtha-type and kerosene-type jet fuel), and 
     aviation gasoline.
       (19) United states or state.--The terms ``United States'' 
     and ``State'' mean the several States, the District of 
     Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth 
     of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the 
     United States Virgin Islands, and any other territory or 
     possession of the United States.
       (20) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States 
     or who owes permanent allegiance to the United States; and
       (B) a corporation or other legal entity that is organized 
     under the laws of the United States or any State if a natural 
     person described in subparagraph (A) owns more than 50 
     percent of the outstanding capital stock or other beneficial 
     interest in such corporation or legal entity.

     SEC. 113. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       This title shall take effect on the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and shall apply with respect to an investment or 
     activity described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 105 of 
     this Act that is commenced on or after such date of 
     enactment.

     SEC. 114. REPEAL.

       (a) In General.--The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) is repealed.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--The Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public 
     Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 103(b)(3)(E), by striking ``section 14 of 
     the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note)'' and inserting ``section 112 of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction Act of 2011'';
       (2) in section 111(a)(1), by striking ``section 5 of the 
     Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 102 of this 
     Act'' and inserting ``section 105 of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction Act of 2011'';
       (3) in section 112(3), by striking ``Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996, as amended by section 102 of this Act,'' and inserting 
     ``Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011''; and
       (4) in section 201(2), by striking ``section 14 of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note)'' and inserting ``section 112 of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction Act of 2011''.
       (c) References.--Any reference in a law, regulation, 
     document, or other record of the United States to the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 shall be deemed to be a reference to 
     this title.
       (d) Federal Acquisition Regulation.--Notwithstanding the 
     repeal made by subsection (a), the modification to the 
     Federal Acquisition Regulation made pursuant to section 
     6(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 shall continue in 
     effect until the modification to such Regulation that is made 
     pursuant to section 106(b)(1) of this Act takes effect.

                     TITLE II--IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT

     SEC. 201. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.

       United States sanctions with respect to Iran imposed 
     pursuant to--
       (1) sections 1 and 3 of Executive Order 12957,
       (2) sections 1(e), 1(g), and 3 of Executive Order 12959,
       (3) sections 2, 3, and 5 of Executive Order 13059,
       (4) sections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Executive Order 13553, or
       (5) sections 1, 2, and 5 of Executive Order 13574,

     as in effect on September 1, 2011, shall remain in effect 
     until the President certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees, at least 90 days before the removal 
     of such sanctions, that the Government of Iran has verifiably 
     dismantled its nuclear weapons program, its biological and 
     chemical weapons programs, its ballistic missile development 
     programs, and ceased its support for international terrorism.

     SEC. 202. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
                   SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership, 
     association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other 
     organization.
       (2) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means, 
     with respect to an entity--
       (A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by 
     vote or value in the entity;
       (B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors 
     of the entity; or
       (C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions of the entity.
       (3) Subsidiary.--The term ``subsidiary'' means an entity 
     that is owned or controlled by a United States person.
       (4) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a natural person who is a citizen, resident, or 
     national of the United States; and
       (B) an entity that is organized under the laws of the 
     United States, any State or territory thereof, or the 
     District of Columbia, if natural persons described in 
     subparagraph (A) own or control the entity.
       (b) In General.--A United States person shall be subject to 
     a penalty for a violation of the provisions of Executive 
     Order 12959 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) or Executive Order 13059 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), or any other prohibition on 
     transactions with respect to Iran imposed under the authority 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), if the President determines that a subsidiary 
     of the United States person that is established or maintained 
     outside the United States engages in an act that, if 
     committed in the United States or by a United States person, 
     would violate such provisions.
       (c) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (b) shall take effect on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to 
     acts described in subsection (b)(2) that are--
       (A) commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act; or
       (B) except as provided in paragraph (2), commenced before 
     such date of enactment, if such acts continue on or after 
     such date of enactment.
       (2) Exception.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect 
     to an act described in paragraph (1)(B) by a subsidiary owned 
     or controlled by a United States person if the United States 
     person divests or terminates its business with the subsidiary 
     not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 203. DECLARATION OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES 
                   POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

       It shall be the policy of the United States to support 
     those individuals in Iran seeking a free, democratic 
     government that respects the rule of law and protects the 
     rights of all citizens.

     SEC. 204. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.

       (a) Assistance Authorized.--The President is authorized to 
     provide financial and political assistance (including the 
     award of grants) to foreign and domestic individuals, 
     organizations, and entities that support democracy and the 
     promotion of democracy in Iran. Such assistance may include 
     the award of grants to eligible independent prodemocracy 
     broadcasting organizations and new media that broadcast into 
     Iran.
       (b) Eligibility for Assistance.--Financial and political 
     assistance authorized under this section shall be provided 
     only to an individual, organization, or entity that--
       (1) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism 
     and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist 
     organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) at any time during the 
     preceding 4 years;
       (2) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation 
     regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and 
     materiel;
       (3) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the 
     adoption of a democratic form of Government in Iran;
       (4) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the 
     fundamental equality of women;
       (5) works to establish equality of opportunity for all 
     people; and
       (6) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech, 
     freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
       (c) Funding.--Financial and political assistance authorized 
     under this section may only be provided using funds available 
     to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Broader 
     Middle East and North Africa Initiative, the Human Rights and 
     Democracy Fund, and the Near East Regional Democracy Fund.
       (d) Notification.--Not later than 15 days before each 
     obligation of assistance under this section, and in 
     accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-l), the 
     President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate of such 
     obligation of assistance. Such notification shall include, as 
     practicable, a description of the types of programs supported 
     by such assistance and an identification of the recipients of 
     such assistance.
       (e) Sense of Congress Regarding Diplomatic Assistance.--It 
     is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) contacts should be expanded with opposition groups in 
     Iran that meet the criteria for eligibility for assistance 
     under subsection (b);
       (2) support for those individuals seeking democracy in Iran 
     should be expressed by United States representatives and 
     officials in all appropriate international fora; and

[[Page 19944]]

       (3) officials and representatives of the United States 
     should--
       (A) strongly and unequivocally support indigenous efforts 
     in Iran calling for free, transparent, and democratic 
     elections; and
       (B) draw international attention to violations by the 
     Government of Iran of human rights, freedom of religion, 
     freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.

     SEC. 205. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE 
                   RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN OR 
                   THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS AFTER THE JUNE 12, 2009, 
                   ELECTIONS IN IRAN.

       (a) List of Persons Who Are Responsible for or Complicit in 
     Certain Human Rights Abuses; Sanctions on Such Persons.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a list of all 
     persons who are senior officials of the Government of Iran, 
     including the Supreme Leader, the President, Members of the 
     Cabinet, Members of the Assembly of Experts, Members of the 
     Ministry of Intelligence Services, or any Member of the 
     Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with the rank of brigadier 
     general and above, including members of paramilitary 
     organizations such as Ansar-e-Hezbollah and Basij-e 
     Mostaz'afin.
       (2) Certification.--The President shall impose on the 
     persons specified in the list under paragraph (1) the 
     sanctions described in subsection (b). The President shall 
     exempt any such person from such imposition if the President 
     determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that such person, based on credible evidence, is 
     not responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for 
     ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission 
     of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Iran or 
     their family members on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of 
     whether such abuses occurred in Iran.
       (3) Updates of list.--The President shall transmit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees an updated list under 
     paragraph (1)--
       (A) not later than every 60 days beginning after the date 
     of the initial transmittal under such paragraph; and
       (B) as new information becomes available.
       (4) Form of report; public availability.--
       (A) Form.--The list required under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
     annex.
       (B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the 
     list required under paragraph (1) shall be made available to 
     the public and posted on the Web sites of the Department of 
     the Treasury and the Department of State.
       (5) Consideration of data from other countries and 
     nongovernmental organizations.--In preparing the list 
     required under paragraph (1), the President shall consider 
     credible data already obtained by other countries and 
     nongovernmental organizations, including organizations in 
     Iran, that monitor the human rights abuses of the Government 
     of Iran.
       (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are ineligibility for a visa to enter the United 
     States and sanctions described in section 106 of this Act, 
     subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe, 
     including regulatory exceptions to permit the United States 
     to comply with the Agreement between the United Nations and 
     the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of 
     the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into 
     force November 21, 1947, and other applicable international 
     obligations.
       (c) Termination of Sanctions.--The provisions of this 
     section shall terminate on the date on which the President 
     determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that the Government of Iran--
       (1) has unconditionally released all political prisoners, 
     including the citizens of Iran detained in the aftermath of 
     the June 12, 2009, presidential election in Iran;
       (2) has ceased its practices of violence, unlawful 
     detention, torture, and abuse of citizens of Iran while 
     engaging in peaceful political activity;
       (3) has conducted a transparent investigation into the 
     killings, arrests, and abuse of peaceful political activists 
     that occurred in the aftermath of the June 12, 2009, 
     presidential election in Iran and prosecuted the individuals 
     responsible for such killings, arrests, and abuse; and
       (4) has--
       (A) established an independent judiciary; and
       (B) is respecting the human rights and basic freedoms 
     recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

     SEC. 206. CLARIFICATION OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
                   PURPOSES OF PROCUREMENT BAN.

       The Secretary of State shall--
       (1) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, issue guidelines to further describe the goods, 
     services, and technologies that will be considered 
     ``sensitive technologies'' for purposes of section 106 of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515), and publish those guidelines in 
     the Federal Register;
       (2) determine the types of goods, services, and 
     technologies that enable any indigenous capabilities that 
     Iran has to disrupt and monitor information and 
     communications in that country, and consider adding 
     descriptions of those items to the guidelines; and
       (3) periodically review, but in no case less than once each 
     year, the guidelines and, if necessary, amend the guidelines 
     on the basis of technological developments and new 
     information regarding transfers of goods, services, and 
     technologies to Iran and the development of Iran's indigenous 
     capabilities to disrupt and monitor information and 
     communications in Iran.

     SEC. 207. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM 
                   AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a comprehensive 
     strategy to--
       (1) help the people of Iran produce, access, and share 
     information freely and safely via the Internet, including in 
     Farsi and regional languages;
       (2) support the development of counter-censorship 
     technologies that enable the citizens of Iran to undertake 
     Internet activities without interference from the Government 
     of Iran;
       (3) increase the capabilities and availability of secure 
     mobile communications among human rights and democracy 
     activists in Iran;
       (4) provide resources for digital safety training for 
     media, unions, and academic and civil society organizations 
     in Iran;
       (5) increase the amount of accurate Internet content in 
     local languages in Iran;
       (6) increase emergency resources for the most vulnerable 
     human rights advocates seeking to organize, share 
     information, and support human rights in Iran;
       (7) expand surrogate radio, television, live stream, and 
     social network communications inside Iran, including by 
     assisting United States telecommunications and software 
     companies to comply with the United States export licensing 
     process for such purposes;
       (8) expand activities to safely assist and train human 
     rights, civil society, and union activists in Iran to operate 
     effectively and securely;
       (9) defeat all attempts by the Government of Iran to jam or 
     otherwise deny international satellite broadcasting signals, 
     including by identifying foreign providers of jamming 
     technology;
       (10) expand worldwide United States embassy and consulate 
     programming for and outreach to Iranian dissident 
     communities;
       (11) expand access to proxy servers for democracy activists 
     in Iran; and
       (12) discourage telecommunication and software companies 
     from facilitating Internet censorship by the Government of 
     Iran.
       (b) Eligibility for Assistance.--Assistance authorized 
     under the comprehensive stategy required under subsection (a) 
     shall be provided only to an individual, organization, or 
     entity that meets the eligibility criteria in section 204(b) 
     of this Act for financial and political assistance authorized 
     under section section 204(a) of this Act.
       (c) Form.--The comprehensive strategy required under 
     subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and 
     may include a classified annex.

  TITLE III--IRAN REGIME AND IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 
                             ACCOUNTABILITY

     SEC. 301. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

       (a) Transactions With Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
     Corps.--No United States person shall knowingly conduct any 
     commercial transaction or financial transaction with, or make 
     any investment in--
       (1) any person or entity owned or controlled by Iran's 
     Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;
       (2) any instrumentality, subsidiary, affiliate, or agent of 
     Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
       (3) any project, activity, or business owned or controlled 
     by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
       (b) Transactions With Certain Foreign Persons.--No United 
     States person shall knowingly conduct any commercial 
     transaction or financial transaction with, or make any 
     investment in, any foreign person or foreign entity that 
     conducts any transaction with or makes any investment with 
     Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which, if conducted 
     or made by a United States person, would constitute a 
     violation of subsection (a).
       (c) Penalties.--Any United States person who violates 
     subsection (a) or (b) shall be subject to 1 or more of the 
     criminal penalties under the authority of section 206(c) of 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705).
       (d) Waiver.--
       (1) In general.--The President is authorized to waive the 
     restrictions in subsection (a) or (b) on a case-by-case basis 
     if the President determines and notfies the appropriate 
     congressional committees that failure to exercise such waiver 
     authority would pose an

[[Page 19945]]

     unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security 
     interests of the United States.
       (2) Publication in the federal register.--Not later than 15 
     days after any waiver authority is exercised pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) of this subsection, the name of the person with 
     respect to which sanctions are being waived shall be 
     published in the Federal Register.
       (e) Amendments to Code of Federal Regulations.--Not later 
     than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall amend part 544 of title 31, Code of Federal 
     Regulations (``Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators 
     Sanctions Regulations''), to incorporate the provisions of 
     this section.
       (f) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``foreign 
     person'', ``knowingly'', and ``United States person'' have 
     the meanings given such terms in section 112 of this Act.

     SEC. 302. ADDITIONAL EXPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 103(b)(2)(B)(iv) 
     of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 
     8512(b)(2)(B)(iv)) or section 1606 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
     Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note) or any other provision of law, effective on the date of 
     the enactment of this Act--
       (1) licenses to export or reexport goods, services, or 
     technology for the repair or maintenance of aircraft of 
     United States origin to Iran may not be issued, and any such 
     license issued before such date of enactment is no longer 
     valid; and
       (2) goods, services, or technology described in paragraph 
     (1) may not be exported or reexported to Iran.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to repeal or otherwise supersede the requirements 
     of section 740.15(d)(4) of title 15, Code of Federal 
     Regulations (relating to reexports of vessels subject to the 
     Export Adminstration Regulations).

     SEC. 303. SANCTIONS AGAINST AFFILIATES OF IRAN'S ISLAMIC 
                   REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the 
     President shall identify in, and, in the case of a foreign 
     person or foreign entity not already so designated, shall 
     designate for inclusion in the Annex to Executive Order 13382 
     (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to blocking property of weapons 
     of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters) and 
     shall apply all applicable sanctions of the United States 
     pursuant to Executive Order 13382 to each foreign person or 
     foreign entity for which there is a reasonable basis for 
     determining that the person or entity is as an agent, alias, 
     front, instrumentality, official, or affiliate of Iran's 
     Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or is an individual serving 
     as a representative of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
     Corps.
       (b) Priority for Investigation.--In carrying out this 
     section, the President shall give priority to investigating 
     foreign persons and foreign entities identified under section 
     560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to 
     the definition of the Government of Iran) and foreign persons 
     and foreign entities for which there is a reasonable basis to 
     suspect that the person or entity has conducted or attempted 
     to conduct one or more sensitive transactions or activities 
     described in subsection (c).
       (c) Sensitive Transaction or Activity.--A sensitive 
     transaction or activity referred to in subsection (b) is--
       (1) a transaction to facilitate the manufacture, import, 
     export, or transfer of items needed for the development of 
     nuclear, chemical, biological, or advanced conventional 
     weapons, including ballistic missiles;
       (2) an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq 
     or Afghanistan, or equip or train, or encourage violence by, 
     individuals or groups opposed to the governments of those 
     countries;
       (3) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement, 
     or sale of goods, services, and technology relating to Iran's 
     energy sector, including the development of the energy 
     resources of Iran, export of petroleum products, and import 
     of refined petroleum and refining capacity available to Iran;
       (4) a transaction relating to the procurement of sensitive 
     technologies (as defined in section 106(c) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 8515(c)); or
       (5) a financial transaction or series of transactions 
     valued at more than $1,000,000 in the aggregate in any 12-
     month period involving a non-Iranian financial institution.
       (d) Inadmissiblity to United States.--The Secretary of 
     State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall deny admission into the United States to, any 
     alien who, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     is a foreign person designated for inclusion in the Annex to 
     Executive Order 13382 pursuant to subsection (a).
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to remove any sanction of the United States in 
     force against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as of 
     the date of the enactment of this Act by reason of the fact 
     that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is an entity of 
     the Government of Iran.

     SEC. 304. MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
                   SUPPORTING IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 
                   CORPS.

       (a) Identification and Notification.--The President shall 
     notify the appropriate congressional committees in any case 
     in which the President determines that there is credible 
     information indicating that a foreign person or foreign 
     entity, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     knowingly--
       (1) provides material support to Iran's Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps or any foreign person or foreign 
     entity that is identified pursuant to section 303(a) of this 
     Act as an agent, alias, front, instrumentality, official, or 
     affiliate of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or an 
     individual serving as a representative of Iran's Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
       (2) conducts any commercial transaction or financial 
     transaction with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or 
     any such person or entity.
       (b) Waiver.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this title and subject to paragraph (2), the President is not 
     required to make any identification or designation of or 
     determination with respect to a foreign person or foreign 
     entity for purposes of this title if doing so would cause 
     damage to the national security of the United States through 
     the divulgence of sources and methods of intelligence or 
     other critical classified information.
       (2) Notice to congress.--The President shall notify 
     Congress of any exercise of the authority of paragraph (1) 
     and shall include in the notification an identification of 
     the foreign person or foreign entity, including a description 
     of the activity or transaction that would have caused the 
     identification, designation, or determination for purposes of 
     this title.
       (c) Sanctions.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall apply to each foreign 
     person or foreign entity identified in a notice under 
     subsection (a) for a period determined by the President a 
     majority of the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this 
     Act.
       (2) Termination.--The President may terminate the sanctions 
     applied to a foreign person or foreign entity pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) if the President determines that the person or 
     entity no longer engages in the activity or activities for 
     which the sanctions were imposed and has provided assurances 
     to the United States Government that it will not engage in 
     the activity or activities in the future.
       (d) IEEPA Sanctions.--The President may exercise the 
     authorities provided under subparagraphs (A) and (C) of 
     section 203(a)(1) of the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)) to impose additional 
     sanctions on each foreign person or foreign entity identified 
     pursuant to subsection (a), for such time as the President 
     may determine, without regard to section 202 of that Act.
       (e) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of any 
     measure described in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign 
     person or foreign entity if the President--
       (1)(A) determines that the person or entity has ceased the 
     activity that resulted in the notification under subsection 
     (a) with respect to the person or entity (as the case may be) 
     and has taken measures to prevent its recurrence; or
       (B) determines and so reports to the appropriate 
     congressional committees 15 days prior to the exercise of 
     waiver authority that failure to exercise such waiver 
     authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to 
     the vital national security interests of the United States; 
     and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report that contains the reasons for the determination.
       (f) Foreign Person Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``foreign person'' has the meaning given the term in section 
     112 of this Act.

     SEC. 305. SPECIAL MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
                   SUPPORTING IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 
                   CORPS.

       (a) Sanctions.--With respect to any foreign entity 
     identified pursuant to section 304(a) of this Act that is an 
     agency of the government of a foreign country, the President 
     shall, in addition to applying to the entity the sanctions 
     described in section 304(c) of this Act, apply to the agency 
     of the government of the foreign country the following 
     measures:
       (1) No assistance shall be provided to the agency of the 
     government of the foreign country under the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961, or any successor Act, or the Arms 
     Export Control Act, or any successor Act, other than 
     assistance that is intended to benefit the people of the 
     foreign country directly and that is not provided through 
     governmental agencies or entities of the foreign country.
       (2) The United States shall oppose any loan or financial or 
     technical assistance to the agency of the government of the 
     foreign country by international financial institutions in 
     accordance with section 701 of the International Financial 
     Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).
       (3) The United States shall deny to the agency of the 
     government of the foreign

[[Page 19946]]

     country any credit or financial assistance by any department, 
     agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.
       (4) The United States Government shall not approve the sale 
     to the agency of the government of the foreign country any 
     defense articles or defense services or issue any license for 
     the export of items on the United States Munitions List.
       (5) No exports to the agency of the government of the 
     foreign country shall be permitted of any goods or 
     technologies controlled for national security reasons under 
     the Export Administration Regulations.
       (6) At the earliest practicable date, the Secretary of 
     State shall terminate, in a manner consistent with 
     international law, the authority of any air carrier that is 
     controlled in fact by the agency of the government of the 
     foreign country to engage in air transportation (as defined 
     in section 40102(5) of title 49, United States Code).
       (7) Additional restrictions may be imposed in accordance 
     with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       (b) Termination.--The President may terminate the sanctions 
     applied to an entity or government of a foreign country 
     pursuant to subsection (a) if the President determines that 
     the entity or government, as the case may be, no longer 
     engages in the activity or activities for which the sanctions 
     were imposed and has provided assurances to the United States 
     Government that it will not engage in the activity or 
     activities in the future.
       (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of any 
     measure described in subsection (a) with respect to an entity 
     or government of a foreign country if the President--
       (1)(A) determines that the entity or government, as the 
     case may be, has ceased the activity that resulted in the 
     notification under section 304(a) of this Act with respect to 
     the entity or government and has taken measures to prevent 
     its recurrence; or
       (B) determines and so reports to the appropriate 
     congressional committees 15 days prior to the exercise of 
     waiver authority that failure to exercise such waiver 
     authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to 
     the vital national security interests of the United States; 
     and
       (2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report that contains the reasons for the determination.

     SEC. 306. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO 
                   RESTRICT CONTRACTS OR LICENSES FOR CERTAIN 
                   SANCTIONABLE PERSONS.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a State or 
     local government may adopt and enforce measures to prohibit 
     the State or local government, as the case may be, from 
     entering into or renewing any contract with, or granting to 
     or renewing any license for persons that conduct business 
     operations in Iran described in section 309 of this Act.

     SEC. 307. IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.

       (a) Freezing of Assets.--In accordance with subsection (b), 
     all property and interests in property of the foreign persons 
     described in Executive Orders 13382 and 13224, or their 
     affiliates, that are in the United States, that on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act come within the United 
     States, or that on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act come within the possession or control of United States 
     persons, are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, 
     exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in with respect to 
     any such person determined by the Secretary of State, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
     Secretary of Defense to--
       (1) have committed, or to pose a significant risk of 
     committing, an act or acts of violence that have the purpose 
     or effect of threatening United States efforts to promote 
     security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan;
       (2) have knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or 
     provided financial, material, logistical, or technical 
     support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act 
     or acts of violence or any person or entity whose property 
     and interests in property are blocked pursuant this 
     subsection; or
       (3) be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or 
     purported to act for or on behalf of any person whose 
     property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to 
     this subsection.
       (b) Description of Prohibitions.--The prohibitions 
     described in subsection (a) include--
       (1) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, 
     goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person 
     whose property and interests in property are blocked; and
       (2) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, 
     goods, or services from any such person.
       (c) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) an increase in both the quantity and quality of Iranian 
     arms shipments and technological expertise to the Iraqi 
     insurgents, the Taliban, other terrorist organizations and 
     criminal elements has the potential to significantly change 
     the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and lead to a 
     large increase in United States, International Security 
     Assistance Force, Coalition and Iraqi and Afghan casualties; 
     and
       (2) an increase in Iranian activity and influence in Iraq 
     threatens the safety and welfare of the residents of Camp 
     Ashraf.
       (d) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
     United States to urge the Government of Iraq to--
       (1) uphold its commitments to the United States to ensure 
     the continued well-being of those individuals living in Camp 
     Ashraf;
       (2) prevent the involuntary return of such individuals to 
     Iran in accordance with the United States Embassy Statement 
     on Transfer of Security Responsibility for Camp Ashraf of 
     December 28, 2008; and
       (3) not close Camp Ashraf until the United Nations High 
     Commission for Refugees can complete its process, recognize 
     as political refugees the residents of Camp Ashraf who do not 
     wish to go back to Iran, and resettle them in third 
     countries.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``foreign 
     person'' and ``United States person'' have the meanings given 
     such terms in section 112 of this Act.

     SEC. 308. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

       (a) National Strategy Required.--The President shall 
     develop a strategy, to be known as the ``National Strategy to 
     Counter Iran'', that provides strategic guidance for 
     activities that support the objective of addressing, 
     countering, and containing the threats posed by Iran.
       (b) Annual Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than January 30 of each year, 
     the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on the current and future strategy of the 
     United States toward Iran, and the implementation of the 
     National Strategy to Counter Iran required under subsection 
     (a).
       (2) Form.--If the President considers it appropriate, the 
     report required under this subsection, or appropriate parts 
     thereof, may be transmitted in classified form.
       (c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under 
     subsection (b) shall include a description of the security 
     posture and objectives of Iran, including at least the 
     following:
       (1) A description and assessment of Iranian grand strategy 
     and security strategy, including--
       (A) the goals of Iran's grand strategy and security 
     strategy, and strategic objectives; and
       (B) Iranian strategy to achieve such objectives in the 
     Middle East, Europe, Africa, Western Hemisphere, and Asia.
       (2) An assessment of the capabilities of Iran's 
     conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces, 
     including--
       (A) the size and capabilities of Iran's conventional forces 
     and Iran's unconventional forces;
       (B) an analysis of the formal and informal national command 
     authority for Iran's conventional forces and Iran's 
     unconventional forces;
       (C) the size and capability of Iranian foreign and domestic 
     intelligence and special operations units, including the 
     Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force;
       (D) a description and analysis of Iranian military 
     doctrine;
       (E) the types and amount of support, including funding, 
     lethal and nonlethal supplies, and training, provided to 
     groups designated by the United States as foreign terrorist 
     organizations and regional militant groups; and
       (F) an estimate of the levels of funding and funding and 
     procurement sources by Iran to develop and support Iran's 
     conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces.
       (3) An assessment of Iranian strategy and capabilities 
     related to nuclear, unconventional, and missile forces 
     development, including--
       (A) a summary and analysis of nuclear weapons capabilities;
       (B) an estimate of the amount and sources of funding 
     expended by, and an analysis of procurement networks utilized 
     by, Iran to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities;
       (C) a summary of the capabilities of Iran's unconventional 
     weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise 
     missile forces, including developments in the preceding year, 
     the size of Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise 
     missile forces, and the locations of missile launch sites;
       (D) a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's 
     unconventional weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces 
     and Iran's cruise missile forces; and
       (E) an estimate of the amount and sources of funding 
     expended by, and an analysis of procurement networks utilized 
     by, Iran on programs to develop a capability to develop 
     unconventional weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces 
     and Iran's cruise missile forces.
       (4) The Government of Iran's economic strategy, including--
       (A) sources of funding for the activities of the Government 
     of Iran described in this section;
       (B) the role of the Government of Iran in the formal and 
     informal sector of the domestic Iranian economy;
       (C) evasive and other efforts by the Government of Iran to 
     circumvent international and bilateral sanctions regimes;
       (D) the effect of bilateral and multilateral sanctions on 
     the ability of Iran to implement its grand strategy and 
     security strategy described in paragraph (1); and

[[Page 19947]]

       (E) Iran's strategy and efforts to leverage economic and 
     political influence, cooperation, and activities in the 
     Middle East Europe, Africa, Western Hemisphere, and Asia.
       (5) Key vulnerabilities identified in paragraph (1), and an 
     implementation plan for the National Strategy to Counter Iran 
     required under subsection (a).
       (6) The United States strategy to--
       (A) address and counter the capabilities of Iran's 
     conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces;
       (B) disrupt and deny Iranian efforts to develop or augment 
     capabilities related to nuclear, unconventional, and missile 
     forces development;
       (C) address the Government of Iran's economic strategy to 
     enable the objectives described in this subsection; and
       (D) exploit key vulnerabilities identified in this 
     subsection.
       (7) An implementation plan for United States strategy 
     described in under paragraph (6).
       (d) Classified Annex.--The reports required under 
     subsection (b) shall be in unclassified form to the greatest 
     extent possible, and may include a classified annex where 
     necessary.
       (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, 
     the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the 
     Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the 
     Committee on Finance, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate.

     SEC. 309. DEFINITIONS.

       Except as otherwise provided, in this title:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Finance, and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) Iran's ballistic missile forces.--The term ``Iran's 
     ballistic missile forces'' includes ballistic missiles, 
     goods, and associated equipment and those elements of the 
     Government of Iran that employ such ballistic missiles, 
     goods, and associated equipment.
       (3) Iran's ballistic missile and unconventional weapons.--
     The term ``Iran's ballistic missile and unconventional 
     weapons'' means Iran's ballistic missile forces and chemical, 
     biological, and radiological weapons programs.
       (4) Iran's cruise missile forces.--The term ``Iran's cruise 
     missile forces'' includes cruise missile forces, goods, and 
     associated equipment and those elements of the Government of 
     Iran that employ such cruise missiles capable of flights less 
     than 500 kilometers, goods, and associated equipment.
       (5) Iran's conventional forces.--The term ``Iran's 
     conventional forces''--
       (A) means military forces of Iran designed to conduct 
     operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran's 
     unconventional forces and Iran's ballistic missile forces and 
     Iran's cruise missile forces; and
       (B) includes Iran's Army, Air Force, Navy, domestic law 
     enforcement, and elements of the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary 
     Guard Corps, other than Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
     Corps-Quds Force.
       (6) Iran's unconventional forces.--The term ``Iran's 
     unconventional forces''--
       (A) means forces of Iran that carry out missions typically 
     associated with special operations forces; and
       (B) includes--
       (i) the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds 
     Force;
       (ii) paramilitary organizations;
       (iii) formal and informal intelligence agencies and 
     entities; and
       (iv) any organization that--

       (I) has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization 
     under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
     (8 U.S.C. 1189(a));
       (II) receives assistance from Iran; and
       (III) is assessed--

       (aa) as being willing in some or all cases of carrying out 
     attacks on behalf of Iran; or
       (bb) as likely to carry out attacks in response to an 
     attack by another country on Iran or its interests.
       (7) Affiliate.--The term ``affiliate'' means any individual 
     or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common 
     control with, the company, including without limitation 
     direct and indirect subsidiaries of the company.
       (8) Business operations.--The term ``business operations'' 
     means--
       (A) carrying out any of the activities described in section 
     105(a) and (b) of this Act that are sanctionable under such 
     section;
       (B) providing sensitive technology (as defined in section 
     106(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
     and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 
     8515(c))) to the Government of Iran; and
       (C) carrying out any of the activities described in section 
     304(a) of this Act.
       (9) Company.--The term ``company'' means--
       (A) a sole proprietorship, organization, association, 
     corporation, partnership, limited liability company, venture, 
     or other entity, its subsidiary or affiliate; and
       (B) includes a company owned or controlled by the 
     government of a foreign country, that is established or 
     organized under the laws of, or has its principal place of 
     business in, such foreign country and includes United States 
     subsidiaries of the same.
       (10) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a sole 
     proprietorship, a partnership, limited liability corporation, 
     association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other 
     organization.
       (11) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has 
     the meaning given the term in section 133 of title 41, United 
     States Code.
       (12) Government of iran.--The term ``Government of Iran'' 
     includes the Government of Iran, any political subdivision, 
     agency, or instrumentality thereof, and any person owned or 
     controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government 
     of Iran.
       (13) Petroleum resources.--The term ``petroleum resources'' 
     has the meaning given the term in section 112 of this Act.
       (14) Sensitive technology.--The term ``sensitive 
     technology'' has the meaning given the term in section 106(c) 
     of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 
     8515(c)).

     SEC. 310. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the 
     authority of the President to otherwise designate foreign 
     persons or foreign entities for inclusion in the Annex to 
     Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to 
     blocking property of weapons of mass destruction 
     proliferators and their supporters).

 TITLE IV--IRAN FINANCIAL SANCTIONS; DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES 
  THAT INVEST IN IRAN; AND PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, 
                   SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN

     SEC. 401. IRAN FINANCIAL SANCTIONS.

       (a) Financial Institution Certification.--Section 104(e) of 
     the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 
     8513(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(3) Certification.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this paragraph, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury shall prescribe regulations to require any person 
     wholly owned or controlled by a domestic financial 
     institution to provide positive certification to the 
     Secretary if such person is engaged in corresponding 
     relations or business activity with a foreign person or 
     financial institution that facilitates transactions from 
     persons and domestic financial institutions described in 
     subsection (d).''.
       (b) Central Bank of Iran.--Section 104(c) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(a)) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(4) Central bank of iran.--
       ``(A) Determination.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this paragraph, the President shall 
     determine whether the Central Bank of Iran has--
       ``(i) provided financial services in support of, or 
     otherwise facilitated, the ability of Iran to--

       ``(I) acquire or develop chemical, biological or nuclear 
     weapons, or related technologies;
       ``(II) construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear 
     enrichment facilities; or
       ``(III) acquire or develop ballistic missiles, cruise 
     missiles, or destabilizing types and amounts of conventional 
     weapons; or

       ``(ii) facilitated a transaction or provided financial 
     services for--

       ``(I) Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
       ``(II) a financial institution whose property or interests 
     in property are subject to sanctions imposed pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act--

       ``(aa) in connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass 
     destruction; or
       ``(bb) Iran's support for acts of international terrorism.
       ``(B) Submission to congress.--The President shall submit 
     the determination made under subparagraph (A) in writing to 
     the Congress, together with the reasons therefor.
       ``(C) Imposition of sanctions.--
       ``(i) In general.--If the President determines under 
     subparagraph (A) that the Central Bank of Iran has engaged in 
     any of the activities described in that paragraph, the 
     President shall apply to the Central Bank of Iran sanctions 
     pursuant to the International Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), including blocking of property and 
     restrictions or prohibitions on financial transactions and 
     the exportation of property.
       ``(ii) Effective period of designation.--The President 
     shall maintain the sanctions imposed under clause (i) until 
     such time as the President determines and certifies in 
     writing to the Congress that the Central

[[Page 19948]]

     Bank of Iran is no longer engaged in any of the activities 
     described in subparagraph (A).''.
       (c) Continuation in Effect.--Sections 104, 106, 107, 108, 
     109, 110, 111, and 115 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 shall remain in 
     effect until the President makes the certification described 
     in section 606(a) of this Act.

     SEC. 402. DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN 
                   IRAN.

       Title II of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 shall remain in 
     effect until the President makes the certification described 
     in section 606(a) of this Act.

     SEC. 403. PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, SERVICES, 
                   AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.

       Title III of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 shall remain in 
     effect until the President makes the certification described 
     in section 606(a) of this Act.

              TITLE V--SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

     SEC. 501. DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
                   COMMISSION RELATING TO SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act 
     of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(r) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to Iran, 
     Terrorism, and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
     Destruction.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Commission shall, by rule, require 
     any issuer described in paragraph (2) to disclose on a 
     quarterly basis a detailed description of each activity 
     described in paragraph (2) engaged in by the issuer or its 
     affiliates during the period covered by the report, 
     including--
       ``(A) the nature and extent of the activity;
       ``(B) the revenues, if any, attributable to the activity; 
     and
       ``(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as 
     the case may be) intends to continue the activity.
       ``(2) Issuer described.--An issuer is described in this 
     paragraph if the issuer is required to file reports with the 
     Commission under subsection (a) and the issuer or any of its 
     affiliates has, during the period covered by the report--
       ``(A) engaged in an activity described in section 105 of 
     the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011 for which sanctions may 
     be imposed;
       ``(B) knowingly engaged in an activity described in 
     subsection (c)(2) of section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public 
     Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 8513) or knowingly violated 
     regulations prescribed under subsection (d)(1) or (e)(1) of 
     such section 104; or
       ``(C) knowingly conducted any transaction or dealing with--
       ``(i) any person the property and interests in property of 
     which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. 
     Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting 
     transacting with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or 
     support terrorism);
       ``(ii) any person the property and interests in property of 
     which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. 
     Reg. 38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of 
     mass destruction proliferators and their supporters); or
       ``(iii) any person on the list contained in Appendix A to 
     part 560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly 
     known as the `Iranian Transactions Regulations').
       ``(3) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection and the 
     rules issued by the Commission under paragraph (1) shall 
     terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which 
     the President makes the certification described in section 
     401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
     and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).
       ``(4) Investigation of disclosures.--When an issuer 
     reports, pursuant to this subsection, that it or any of its 
     affiliates has engaged in any activity described in paragraph 
     (2), the President shall--
       ``(A) initiate an investigation into the possible 
     imposition of sanctions under the Iran Threat Reduction Act 
     of 2011, section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513), 
     the Executive Orders or regulations specified in paragraph 
     (2)(C), or any other provision of law; and
       ``(B) not later than 180 days after initiating such an 
     investigation, make a determination with respect to whether 
     sanctions should be imposed with respect to the issuer or the 
     affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect with respect to reports required to be 
     filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the 
     date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

                      TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 601. DENIAL OF VISAS FOR CERTAIN PERSONS OF THE 
                   GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Except as necessary to meet United States 
     obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations 
     and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters 
     of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into 
     force November 21, 1947, and other applicable international 
     treaty obligations, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa 
     to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall deny 
     admission into the United States to, a person of the 
     Government of Iran pursuant to section 6(j)(1)(A) of the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), and section 620A of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), including a person 
     who is a senior official of the Government of Iran who is 
     specified in the list under section 205(a)(1), if the 
     Secretary determines that such person--
       (1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is 
     affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the 
     Government of Iran; and
       (2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated 
     with terrorist organizations.
       (b) Restriction on Movement.--The Secretary of State shall 
     restrict in Washington, D.C., and at the United Nations in 
     New York City, the travel to only within a 25-mile radius of 
     Washington, D.C., or the United Nations headquarters 
     building, respectively, of any person identified in 
     subsection (a).
       (c) Restriction on Contact.--No person employed with the 
     United States Government may contact in an official or 
     unofficial capacity any person that--
       (1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is 
     affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the 
     Government of Iran; and
       (2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated 
     with terrorist organizations.
       (d) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirements of 
     subsection (c) if the President determines and so reports to 
     the appropriate congressional committees 15 days prior to the 
     exercise of waiver authority that failure to exercise such 
     waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary 
     threat to the vital national security interests of the United 
     States.

     SEC. 602. INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ALIENS WHO ENGAGE IN 
                   CERTAIN ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(H) Individuals who engage in certain activities with 
     respect to iran.--
       ``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (iii), any alien 
     described in clause (ii) is inadmissible.
       ``(ii) Aliens described.--An alien described in this clause 
     is an alien who the Secretary of State determines--

       ``(I) engages in--

       ``(aa) an activity for which sanctions may be imposed 
     pursuant to section 105(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction Act 
     of 2011;
       ``(bb) an activity--
       ``(AA) relating to the proliferation by Iran of weapons of 
     mass destruction or the means of delivery of such weapons; 
     and
       ``(BB) for which sanctions may be imposed pursuant to 
     Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567) (or any successor 
     thereto);
       ``(cc) an activity--
       ``(AA) relating to support for international terrorism by 
     the Government of Iran; and
       ``(BB) for which sanctions may be imposed pursuant to 
     Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079) (or any successor 
     thereto); or
       ``(dd) any other activity with respect to Iran for which 
     sanctions may be imposed pursuant to any other provision of 
     law;

       ``(II) is the chief executive officer, president, or other 
     individual in charge of overall management of, a member of 
     the board of directors of, or a shareholder with a 
     controlling interest in, an entity that engages in an 
     activity described in subclause (I); or
       ``(III) is a spouse or minor child of--

       ``(aa) an alien who engages in an activity described in 
     subclause (I); or
       ``(bb) the chief executive officer, president, or other 
     individual in charge of overall management of, a member of 
     the board of directors of, or a shareholder with a 
     controlling interest in, an entity that engages in an 
     activity described in subclause (I).
       ``(iii) Notice; waiver with respect to certain entities.--

       ``(I) Notice.--The Secretary of State may notify an alien 
     the Secretary determines may be inadmissible under this 
     subparagraph--

       ``(aa) that the alien may be inadmissible; and
       ``(bb) of the reason for the inadmissibility of the alien.

       ``(II) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
     this subparagraph and admit an alien to the United States 
     if--

       ``(aa) the alien is described in subclause (II) or 
     (III)(bb) of clause (ii);
       ``(bb) the entity that engaged in the activity that would 
     otherwise result in the inadmissibility of the alien under 
     this subparagraph is no longer engaging the activity or has 
     taken significant steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(cc) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the entity will not knowingly engage in an activity described 
     in clause (ii)(I) again.''.
       (b) Regulations.--Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act 
     of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

[[Page 19949]]

       ``(j) Regulations With Respect to Inadmissibility of Aliens 
     Who Engage in Certain Transactions With Iran.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, 
     the Secretary shall issue regulations and guidelines for 
     interpreting and enforcing the prohibition under subparagraph 
     (H) of section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality 
     Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) on the admissibility of aliens who 
     engage in certain sanctionable activities with respect to 
     Iran.''.

     SEC. 603. AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
                   PROVISIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY 
                   ECONOMIC POWERS ACT.

       (a) In General.--Section 206 of the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``attempt to violate, 
     conspire to violate'' and inserting ``attempt or conspire to 
     violate'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``not to exceed'' and 
     all that follows and inserting ``that is not less than twice 
     the value of the transaction that is the basis of the 
     violation.''; and
       (3) in subsection (c) to read as follows:
       ``(c) Criminal Penalties.--A person who willfully commits, 
     attempts or conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the 
     commission of, an unlawful act described in subsection (a) 
     shall be fined not less than $1,000,000, imprisoned for not 
     more than 20 years, or both. A person other than a natural 
     person shall be fined in an amount not less than the greater 
     of half of the value of the transaction that is the basis of 
     the violation or $10,000,000.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to any violation of section 206(a) of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705(a)) that occurs on or after such date of enactment.

     SEC. 604. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

       Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall 
     apply to--
       (1) activities subject to the reporting requirements of 
     title V of the National Security Act of 1947; or
       (2) involving a natural gas development and pipeline 
     project initiated prior to the date of enactment of this 
     Act--
       (A) to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey;
       (B) in furtherance of a production sharing agreement or 
     license awarded by a sovereign government, other than the 
     Iranian government, before the date of enactment of this Act; 
     and
       (C) for the purpose of providing energy security and 
     independence from Russia and other governments engaged in 
     activities subject to sanctions under this Act.

     SEC. 605. REGULATORY AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--The President shall, not later than 90 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, promulgate 
     regulations as necessary for the implementation of this Act 
     and the amendments made by this Act.
       (b) Consultation With Congress.--Not less than 10 days 
     prior to the promulgation of regulations under subsection 
     (a), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional 
     committees of the proposed regulations and the provisions of 
     this Act and the amendments made by this Act that the 
     regulations are implementing.

     SEC. 606. SUNSET.

       (a) Sunset.--The provisions of this Act and the amendments 
     made by this Act shall terminate, and shall cease to be 
     effective, on the date that is 30 days after the date on 
     which the President certifies to Congress that Iran--
       (1) has ceased and verifiably dismantled its efforts to 
     design, develop, manufacture, or acquire--
       (A) a nuclear explosive device or related materials and 
     technology;
       (B) chemical and biological weapons; and
       (C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch 
     technology;
       (2) no longer provides support for acts of international 
     terrorism; and
       (3) poses no threat to United States national security, 
     interests, or allies.
       (b) Notification.--The President shall notify the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate not later than 
     15 days before making a certification described in subsection 
     (a).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Berman) each will control 20 minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California oppose 
the motion?
  Mr. BERMAN. I do not oppose the motion.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. On that basis, the gentleman from Ohio will 
control 20 minutes in opposition.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) be allowed to control half of 
the time in the affirmative.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on this bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I rise in strong support of the Iran Threat Reduction Act, which I 
introduced together with the distinguished ranking member of our 
committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman). I would also 
like to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking 
member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, 
for his key contributions on this bill.
  As is well known and articulated in the Declaration of National 
Emergency continued by successive U.S. Presidents, the Iranian regime 
poses an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, 
foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
  The revelation in October of Iran's plot to assassinate the Saudi 
ambassador to the United States on our soil and in the process murder 
and maim countless Americans is a stark reminder of the regime's desire 
of a world without America. The exemplary work of U.S. officials foiled 
their plot, but the regime's threat remains. We would be naive to think 
that they will not try again.
  Meanwhile, Tehran continues to call for the destruction of our ally, 
Israel, while denying the Holocaust and making every effort to isolate 
the Jewish state. Ahmadinejad is more than willing to put Iran's money 
where his mouth is, providing weapons, money, and support for several 
terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and Hamas, which are waging war 
against Israel and our allies in the Middle East.
  And last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency released a 
report providing extensive evidence that Tehran has been working on 
nuclear weapons for years, despite repeated calls for the regime to 
abandon these efforts. Their hostility is evident, and their intentions 
are crystal clear. We clearly understand the urgency of the Iranian 
threat.
  Many of our closest allies understand this sense of urgency--from the 
Israelis to the British and the Canadians. We tried the olive branch of 
engagement, negotiation, and diplomacy. And what did we get, Mr. 
Speaker? Diatribes against the United States and our allies and a plot 
to shed blood on our soil.
  The resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors in November does 
not even begin to cover the ground that we need. The resolution had no 
deadline for compliance by the regime and no consequence, just 
rhetoric. We need overwhelming, crippling sanctions against Iranian 
officials and their nuclear program; and we need those sanctions to be 
fully implemented with serious penalties for their violation.

                              {time}  2010

  We must undermine the foundations of the Iranian regime in order to 
compel it to abandon its deadly path. The Iran Threat Reduction Act 
closes loopholes in existing sanctions against Iran's energy and 
financial sectors, sanctions senior Iranian regime officials and 
expands sanctions against those who help rogue regimes expand their 
dangerous weapons programs.
  I hope that our Members join us in stopping this dangerous regime in 
its tracks.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the Record my correspondence 
with the chairmen of other committees of referral on this bill.


[[Page 19950]]


                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                 Washington, DC, November 4, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rayburn House 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing concerning H.R. 
     1905, the ``Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011,'' which the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs reported favorably. As a result 
     of your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 1905 
     that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on 
     the Judiciary, we are able to agree to discharging our 
     Committee from further consideration of this bill in order 
     that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor for 
     consideration.
       The Judiciary Committee takes this action with our mutual 
     understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 1905 at 
     this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject 
     matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our 
     Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the 
     bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may 
     address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our 
     Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an 
     appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and 
     requests your support for any such request.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 1905, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during floor 
     consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Lamar Smith,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                 Washington, DC, November 4, 2011.
     Hon. Lamar Smith,
     Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary Rayburn House 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Smith: Thank you for your letter concerning 
     H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011, and for 
     your agreement to discharge the Committee on the Judiciary 
     from further consideration of this bill so that it may 
     proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
       I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding that, by 
     forgoing consideration of H.R. 1905 at this time, you are not 
     waiving any jurisdiction over the subject matter in that bill 
     or similar legislation. I look forward to continuing to 
     consult with your Committee as such legislation moves ahead, 
     and would be glad to support a request by your Committee for 
     conferees to a House-Senate conference on this, or any 
     similar, legislation.
       I will seek to place a copy of our exchange of letters on 
     this matter into the Congressional Record during floor 
     consideration of H.R. 1905.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC, November 16, 2011.
     Hon. Darrell E. Issa,
     Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
         Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Issa: Thank you for your cooperation with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 1905, the Iran 
     Threat Reduction Act of 2011.
       I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign 
     Affairs Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform 
     Committee regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 
     1905 which the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the 
     jurisdiction of your Committee. In agreeing to waive 
     consideration of that bill, this Committee understands that 
     the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is not waiving 
     jurisdiction over the relevant provisions in that bill or any 
     other related matter. I will seek to place a copy of this 
     letter and your response in the Congressional Record during 
     floor consideration of the bill. Additionally, I will support 
     your request for an appropriate appointment of outside 
     conferees from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate 
     conference on this or similar legislation should such a 
     conference be convened.
       Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and 
           Government Reform,
                                Washington, DC, November 18, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairwoman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rayburn House 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Madam Chairwoman: Thank you for your letter concerning 
     H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011. I concur in 
     your judgment that provisions of the bill are within the 
     jurisdiction of the Oversight and Government Reform 
     Committee.
       I am willing to waive this committee's right to consider 
     the bill. In so doing, I do not waive its jurisdiction over 
     the subject matter of the bill. I appreciate your commitment 
     to insert this exchange of letters into the committee report 
     and the Congressional Record, and your support for outside 
     conferees from the Committee should a conference be convened.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Darrell Issa,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC, November 21, 2011.
     Hon. Spencer Bachus,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Bachus: Thank you for your cooperation with 
     the Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 1905, the Iran 
     Threat Reduction Act of 2011.
       I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign 
     Affairs Committee and the Financial Services Committee 
     regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 1905 which 
     the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the jurisdiction of 
     your Committee. In agreeing to waive consideration of that 
     bill, this Committee understands that the Financial Services 
     Committee is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant 
     provisions in that bill or any other related matter. I will 
     seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     Additionally, I will support your request for an appropriate 
     appointment of outside conferees from your Committee in the 
     event of a House-Senate conference on this or similar 
     legislation should such a conference be convened.
       Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                                Washington, DC, November 23, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of 
         Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing concerning H.R. 
     1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011. Based on the 
     agreement made by the staff of our two committees regarding 
     H.R. 1905 and in the interest of permitting your Committee to 
     proceed expeditiously with the bill, I am willing to forego 
     at this time the consideration of provisions in this bill 
     that fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
     Financial Services under Rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives.
       The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with 
     our mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of 
     H.R. 1905 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over 
     the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, 
     and that our Committee will be appropriately consulted and 
     involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward. 
     Our Committee reserves the right to seek appointment of an 
     appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and 
     requests your support for any such requests.
       Further, I ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on 
     this matter be included in the Congressional Record during 
     floor consideration of this bill. I look forward to working 
     with you as this important measure moves through the 
     legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Spencer Bachus,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2011.
     Hon. Ileana Ros-Legtinen,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rayburn House Office 
         Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen:  I am writing regarding H.R. 
     1905, the ``Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011,'' which was 
     favorably reported out of your Committee on November 2, 2011. 
     I commend you on your efforts to make sure that the United 
     States is better able to address the critical threats that 
     Iran poses.
       There have been productive conversations between the staffs 
     of our Committees, during which we have proposed changes to 
     provisions within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways 
     and Means in the bill to clarify the intent and scope of the 
     bill with respect to compliance with U.S. international trade 
     obligations, thereby reducing our exposure to trade sanctions 
     and retaliation against our exporters. I believe that 
     compliance with our trade obligations makes for a more 
     credible U.S. response to Iran's behavior and helps us 
     develop a stronger multilateral response to Iran. 
     Accordingly, I appreciate your commitment to address the 
     concerns raised by the Committee on Ways and Means in 
     sections 106, 205, 304, 305, 309 and 401 in H.R. 1905.
       Assuming these issues are resolved satisfactorily, in order 
     to expedite floor consideration of the bill, the Committee on 
     Ways and

[[Page 19951]]

     Means will forgo action on H.R. 1905. Further, the Committee 
     will not oppose the bill's consideration on the suspension 
     calendar, based on our understanding that you will work with 
     the Committee as the legislative process moves forward in the 
     House of Representatives and in the Senate, to ensure that 
     the Committee's concerns continue to be addressed. This is 
     also being done with the understanding that it does not in 
     any way prejudice the Committee with respect to the 
     appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this or similar legislation.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 1905, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during Floor 
     consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Dave Camp,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2011.
     Hon. Dave Camp,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Longworth HOB, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Camp: Thank you for your cooperation with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 1905, the Iran 
     Threat Reduction Act of 2011.
       I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign 
     Affairs Committee and the Committee on Ways and Means 
     regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 1905 which 
     the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the jurisdiction of 
     your Committee. In agreeing to waive consideration of that 
     bill, this Committee understands that the Committee on Ways 
     and Means is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant 
     provisions in that bill or any other related matter. I will 
     seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     Additionally, I will support your request for an appropriate 
     appointment of outside conferees from your Committee in the 
     event of a House-Senate conference on this or similar 
     legislation should such a conference be convened
       Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in 
     this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
                                                         Chairman.

  With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to place in the Record an article from the 
Christian Science Monitor entitled, ``Used-car salesman as Iran proxy? 
Why assassination plot doesn't add up for experts,'' and also from 
Mother Jones, ``Four Things You Need to Know About the Iran Bomb 
Plot.''

   [From The Christian Science Monitor--CSMonitor.com, Oct. 12, 2011]

Used-Car Salesman as Iran Proxy? Why Assassination Plot Doesn't Add Up 
                              for Experts

                          (By Scott Peterson)

       The U.S. has blamed the specialist Qods Force in an Iran 
     assassination plot. But those who track the group say the 
     plot doesn't reflect the careful planning, efficiency, and 
     strategy the Qods Force is known for.
       How careful is Iran's Qods Force when it comes to covert 
     operations abroad?
       This wing of the Revolutionary Guard was accused by U.S. 
     military commanders in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 of jeopardizing 
     the efforts of more than 150,000 American troops on the 
     ground, of backing militias of all stripes, and of exercising 
     strong influence on Baghdad's rulers.
       Yet how many Iranian Qods Force operatives did that take? 
     One U.S. diplomat posted to Baghdad at the time had the 
     consensus answer: There were just eight Qods Force men in all 
     of Iraq.


                   IN PICTURES: Iran's military might

       Indeed, the Qods Force has a reputation for careful, 
     methodical work--as well as effective use of local proxies, 
     and ultimately their pragmatic deployment by Tehran as covert 
     tools to expand Iran's influence across a region in flux. 
     That explains why Iran experts are raising questions about 
     fresh U.S. charges of an Iran-backed bomb plot, this time to 
     kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington and blow up the Saudi 
     and Israeli embassies.
       A criminal complaint filed by U.S. prosecutors on Tuesday 
     charge Mansour Arbabsiar--a naturalized U.S. citizen with an 
     Iranian passport from Corpus Christi, Texas--and Gholam 
     Shakuri, ``an Iran-based member of Iran's Qods Force,'' with 
     plotting to kill the Saudi diplomat on U.S. soil in an 
     operation ``directed by factions of the Iranian government.''


                        Details of alleged plot

       Those who know Iran well are skeptical, but do not rule out 
     any possibility. Mr. Arbabsiar may have arranged for $100,000 
     to be transferred from Iran as a downpayment of $1.5 million 
     for the hit, as U.S. charges indicate.
       Arbabsiar may also have boasted to one alleged accomplice 
     in the plot--an associate of Mexico's Zeta drug cartel, who 
     also happened to be an informant of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
     Administration--that his cousin was a ``big general'' in the 
     Iranian military.
       While also describing a series of potential attacks to the 
     associate, he may even have stated--apparently in secretly 
     taped conversations--that mass American casualties as a 
     result were not a problem: ``They want that guy [the 
     ambassador] done [killed], if the hundred go with him f* *k 
     'em,'' reads the legal complaint.


                      Why the plot doesn't add up

       But Iran specialists who have followed the Islamic Republic 
     for years say that many details in the alleged plot just 
     don't add up.
       ``It's a very strange case, it doesn't really fit Iran's 
     mode of operation,'' says Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at 
     the Rand Corp. in Arlington. Va., and coauthor of studies 
     about the Revolutionary Guard.
       ``When you look at Iranian use of terrorism, it has some 
     very specific objectives, whether it's countering the United 
     States in Iraq or Afghanistan, or retaliating against 
     perceived Israeli actions,'' says Mr. Nader.
       ``This [plot] doesn't seem to serve Iran's interests in any 
     conceivable way,'' says Nader. ``Assassinating the Saudi 
     ambassador would increase international pressure against 
     Iran, could be considered an act of war . . . by Saudi 
     Arabia, it could really destabilize the government in Iran; 
     and this is a political system that is interested in its own 
     survival.''


                   No apparent cost-benefit analysis

       Iran has been trying to evade sanctions, strengthen 
     relations with non-Western partners, while continuing with 
     its nuclear program, notes Nader.
       He says it is ``difficult'' to believe that either Qassim 
     Soleimani--the canny commander of the Qods Force--or Iran's 
     deliberative supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali 
     Khamenei, would order such an attack that ``would put all of 
     Iran's objectives and strategies at risk.''
       That view has been echoed by many Iran watchers, who are 
     raising doubts about the assassination plot allegations.
       ``This plot, if true, departs from all known Iranian 
     policies and procedures,'' writes Gary Sick, an Iran expert 
     at Columbia University and principal White House aide during 
     the 1979 Iranian revolution and hostage crisis.
       While Iran may have many reasons to be angry at the U.S. 
     and Saudi Arabia, Mr. Sick notes in a posting on the 
     Gulf2000/Columbia experts list that he moderates, ``it is 
     difficult to believe that they would rely on a non-Islamic 
     criminal gang to carry out this most sensitive of all 
     possible missions.''
       Relying on ``at least one amateur and a Mexican criminal 
     drug gang that is known to be riddled with both Mexican and 
     U.S. intelligence agents'' appears to be sloppy, adds Sick. 
     ``Whatever else may be Iran's failings, they are not noted 
     for utter disregard of the most basic intelligence 
     tradecraft.''
       The odd set of details means that the usual cost-benefit 
     calculation that experts often attribute to Tehran's 
     decisionmaking does not apply here, says Muhammad Sahimi, in 
     an analysis for the Tehran Bureau website.
       At a time when pressure is building on Iran over ``gross 
     human rights violations,'' sanctions are showing signs of 
     working, Iran is ``deeply worried about the fate of its 
     strategic partner in Syria . . . tensions with Turkey are 
     increasing . . . and a fierce power struggle is under way 
     within Iran,'' says Mr. Sahimi, ``it is essentially 
     impossible to believe that the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran] 
     would act in such a way as to open a major new front against 
     itself.''


             Previous assassinations only targeted Iranians

       Sahimi also notes that, even at the height of the regime's 
     assassinations of opponents in the past, it did not target 
     non-Iranians.
       ``It is keenly aware that it is under the American 
     microscope,'' says Sahimi, making even less likely Iran 
     embarking ``on such a useless assassination involving a low-
     level, non-player individual.''
       Such reservations are not the same ones given by Iranian 
     officials when they dismiss the charges of a murder plot. But 
     analysts suggest more information will need to be revealed 
     before judgment can be made.
       ``Iran does have a history of terrorism, but they also like 
     to go through proxies--and true and tested proxies, not 
     necessarily just anybody,'' says Nader of Rand, citing 
     Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, or Iraqi Shiite insurgents 
     trained in Iranian camps.
       The man arrested by U.S. law enforcement at JFK airport on 
     Sept. 29 does not seem to fit that mold.


                         Not your average proxy

       Arbabsiar, a former used car salesman, would appear to have 
     been a surprise choice of the Qods Force. Yet he apparently 
     traveled several times to Mexico to recruit drug-cartel hit 
     men, had $100,000 from Iran paid into a U.S. account and 
     promised much more, and discussed the plot on a normal 
     telephone.
       ``The Iranian modus operandi is only to trust sensitive 
     plots to their own employees,

[[Page 19952]]

     or to trusted proxies such as Hezbollah, Saudi Hezbollah, 
     Hamas, the Sadr faction in Iraq, Iran-friendly extremist 
     Muslims in Afghanistan and other pro-Iranian Muslim groups,'' 
     wrote Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service 
     on Gulf2000 on Wednesday.
       ``Are we to believe that this Texas car seller was a Qods 
     sleeper agent for many years resident in the U.S.? 
     Ridiculous,'' said Mr. Katzman, who authored a study of the 
     Revolutionary Guard in the 1990s. ``They (the Iranian command 
     system) never ever use such has-beens or loosely connected 
     people for sensitive plots such as this.''
       And what kind of man is he? The Associated Press spoke to 
     Arbabsiar's friend and former Texas business partner David 
     Tomscha, who said he was ``sort of a hustler.'' The Iranian-
     American, the AP reported, ``was likable, albeit a bit 
     lazy.''
       ``He's no mastermind,'' Mr. Tomscha told the AP. ``I can't 
     imagine him thinking up a plan like that. I mean, he didn't 
     seem all that political. He was more of a businessman.''
                                  ____


                   [From Mother Jones, Oct. 12, 2011]

           4 Things You Need to Know About the Iran Bomb Plot

                            (By Adam Serwer)

       The assassination was never going to take place. On 
     Tuesday, FBI Director Robert Mueller described Iranian 
     American Mansour Arbabsiar's alleged plot to assassinate the 
     Saudi Ambassador to the United States as straight out of a 
     ``Hollywood script.'' In a sense he was right--because the 
     plot was controlled from the beginning by the FBI. According 
     to the criminal complaint, when Arbabsiar traveled to Mexico 
     in May 2011, to allegedly find an assassin from the ranks of 
     Mexican drug cartels, he ended up talking to a paid DEA 
     informant who dodged drug charges in exchange for cooperating 
     with authorities. In keeping with previous sting cases, the 
     FBI was careful to record statements from Arbabsiar 
     dismissing the possibility of numerous civilian casualties, 
     something that makes an entrapment defense all but impossible 
     to mount.
       The US thinks Iran is responsible. The criminal complaint 
     states that Arbabsiar believed his cousin, Ali Gholam 
     Shakcuri, was a member of the al-Quds Force, an elite faction 
     of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Under interrogation, 
     Arbabsiar allegedly identified two men who were ``known to 
     the United States to be senior members of the Quds Force,'' 
     one of whom allegedly met with Arbabsiar and Shakcuri in Iran 
     to discuss the operation. Despite the al-Quds Force's 
     reputation for lethal effectiveness however, Arbabsiar and 
     his cousin don't come off as any more competent than the 
     average target of an FBI sting. They discuss the plot in ham-
     handed ``code'' in telephone conversations, and Shakcuri 
     allegedly wires $100,000 to an American bank controlled by 
     the FBI. That's not exactly the kind of subtlety you expect 
     from an ``elite unit'' made up of Iranian Revolutionary 
     Guard's ``most skilled warriors,'' a group so effective that 
     attacks in Iraq were attributed to them on the basis of their 
     lethality and sophistication. (Iran's government has denied 
     involvement.)
       So much for Miranda rights halting interrogation. Arbabsiar 
     was arrested in late September, but he wasn't brought before 
     a judge until Tuesday. That's because when he was arrested at 
     the airport upon returning from another trip to Mexico, he 
     ``knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and his 
     right to speedy presentment.'' Not only did he cooperate with 
     interrogators, he flipped and implicated his cousin Shakuri 
     by calling him and discussing the plot while the FBI was 
     listening in. And all without waterboarding.
       So, about targeted killing . . . The New York Times' 
     Charlie Savage recently reported on the contents of the legal 
     memo authorizing the targeting of recently killed radical 
     cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, which concluded that ``Mr. Awlaki 
     could be legally killed, if it was not feasible to capture 
     him, because intelligence agencies said he was taking part in 
     the war between the United States and Al Qaeda and posed a 
     significant threat to Americans, as well as because Yemeni 
     authorities were unable or unwilling to stop him.'' Iran 
     could make similar arguments about the Saudi ambassador if 
     they felt so inclined, if they wanted to justify the plot, 
     true or otherwise. All of which is to say that those rules 
     may not be enough of a framework to prevent a future in which 
     other countries that acquire drone technology decide to use 
     them to eliminate their stated enemies as frequently as the 
     U.S. does.

  I would also like to place in the Record a quote from Mr. Greg 
Thielmann, the former State Department and Senate Intelligence 
Committee analyst who says that ``studies are still going on, but 
there's nothing that indicates Iran is really building a bomb.''
  Mr. Speaker, U.S. policy towards Iran for the last three decades has 
primarily taken the form of economic sanctions, threats, and 
isolationism. While U.S. sanctions have been effective at hurting 
Iran's economy and ordinary Iranian people, it can be argued that U.S. 
policy over the last 30 years has not been effective at creating any 
meaningful change in the conduct of the Iranian Government.
  I would like to place in the Record a reprint from Foreign Affairs 
magazine, November 2011, which cites the ineffectiveness of the United 
States sanctions policy.


  [From Brookings, Dec. 13, 2011, Reprinted by permission of Foreign 
Affairs, November 2011, Vol 87, No 6. Copyright 2011 by the Council on 
                        Foreign Relations, Inc.]

              The Self-Limiting Success of Iran Sanctions

 (By Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for 
   Middle East Policy; Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern 
                 Studies, Council on Foreign Relations)

       Since the 1979 revolution that ousted Iran's pro-American 
     monarchy and replaced it with a theocratic regime hostile to 
     the West, the United States has sought to temper Iran's 
     geopolitical ambitions through a combination of tough 
     rhetoric and economic sanctions. After more than 30 years, 
     the cycle is as unsurpising as it is ineffective; the United 
     States and its allies orchestrate stringent economic measures 
     through the United Nations, and then await concessions that 
     somehow never materialize. Indeed, as UN proscriptions have 
     amassed and Iran's trade with its traditional partners 
     withers, there is no indication that the theocratic state is 
     prepared to adjust its aspirations with respect to either its 
     nuclear programme or its claims to regional power.
       A closer look reveals that the international community 
     missed a critical turning point in Iran's international 
     orientation, and squandered the single obvious opportunity to 
     shift Iranian policies towards a more constructive direction. 
     In the 1990s, Iran appeared to be on the verge of discarding 
     its radical patrimony, at least with respect to its foreign 
     policy, much as other revolutionary states such as China and 
     Vietnam have done. The end of the long war with Iraq and the 
     death of the Islamic Republic's charismatic founder 
     facilitated a period of reconstruction, a respite from the 
     state's existential insecurities, and a predictable 
     reconsideration of the regime's ideological verities. By the 
     end of the decade, a reformist cadre led by President 
     Muhammad Khatami sought to rejoin the international community 
     by conceding to its mandates and adhering to its conventions. 
     At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Iran finally 
     appeared ready to usher in its own Thermidorian Reaction.
       Yet this prospect appeared to fade after the election of 
     hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to succeed Khatami in 2005. In 
     the succeeding years, the Islamic Republic has regressed 
     towards policies that resemble the worst excesses of its 
     zealous early years: at home, unambiguous repression of any 
     dissent and an insistence on absolute fealty to an aging 
     clerical tyrant; abroad, provocative policies towards its 
     neighbours and belligerence towards Washington. Unexpectedly, 
     it has been a younger generation of Iranian politicians--
     Ahmadinejad and his cohort--who have rejected the nascent 
     pragmatism of their elders; these children of the revolution 
     are seeking to revive its mandates rather than to restrain 
     them.
       At the same moment as Iran's formidable new right wing came 
     to the fore, the region began an even more dramatic set of 
     political transformations, first with the US interventions to 
     Iran's east and west that removed the theocracy's most 
     menacing adversaries, and later with the advent of a 
     powerful, far-reaching movement for democratic accountability 
     across the Arab world. As a result of these intersecting 
     trends, Iran's paranoid, combative leadership has been 
     emboldened to take advantage of the opportunities to be found 
     in an uncertain regional environment with a shifting balance 
     of power. For this reason, the threats posed by Iran's 
     domestic and regional policies loom ever larger for 
     Washington and the broader international community.
       To date, however, the Obama administration has stuck to the 
     essential framework of the carrot-and-stick diplomacy it 
     adopted upon taking office in 2009--an approach that differs 
     merely in style from that of the Bush administration during 
     its second term. This self-described `dual-track' strategy 
     relies on economic pressure to persuade Tehran to enter 
     negotiations and moderate its policies, consistent with the 
     basic American formula for dealing with Iran since 1979. The 
     achievements of such an approach have always been open to 
     question.
       Even as the Obama administration has imposed the broadest 
     and most robust multilateral restrictions on Iran in history, 
     all of Tehran's most disturbing policies, including its 
     aggressive nuclear programme, proceed apace. Sanctions have 
     imposed heavy financial and political costs on the Islamic 
     Republic, but they have not convinced Iranian leaders that 
     their interests would be better served by relinquishing their 
     nuclear ambitions, abandoning their other reckless policies, 
     or even opening a serious dialogue with

[[Page 19953]]

     Washington. This obduracy is a function of the complex 
     political transformation within Iran over the course of the 
     past decade, the regime's well-honed capabilities for evading 
     and insulating itself against sanctions, and of course the 
     momentous changes that have swept the broader region. As a 
     result, in dealing with the Islamic Republic of 2011 economic 
     sanctions can have little expectation of achieving meaningful 
     changes in Tehran's policies. This article examines the 
     history of sanctioning the Islamic Republic, and argues that 
     despite their increasing severity, sanctions have failed to 
     achieve their intended policy results thanks to the regime's 
     capacity for resisting international pressure. Moreover, the 
     rise of a new generation of hard-liners and the uncertain 
     aftermath of the Arab Spring has exacerbated the regime's 
     aversion to compromise.

  U.S. policy towards Iran has failed to ensure a peaceful Iran that 
aids regional security. Yet today we are considering legislation that 
significantly restricts any efforts by the U.S. Government, including 
Members of Congress, to engage Iran diplomatically, and it further 
hurts ordinary Iranian people by imposing indiscriminate sanctions. 
Proponents of the Iran Threat Reduction Act claim that it's a last 
ditch effort to prevent military confrontation with Iran. Yet, this 
bill takes away the most effective tool to prevent war--diplomacy. As 
the United States only now begins to extricate itself from the highly 
questionable military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot 
allow the United States to be plunged into yet another disastrous war.
  I oppose nuclear proliferation for military purposes for all 
countries and believe that sanctions have proven to be a failed policy. 
We must rely on diplomacy, not outlaw it, and avoid taking steps which 
push us closer to military confrontation.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  This bill may represent our last chance to find a peaceful means to 
pressure the Iranian regime into stopping its nuclear weapons program. 
Within the next year, possibly in the next 6 months, this program may 
become irreversible unless we act now.
  We know that sanctions are having an impact in Iran. President 
Ahmadinejad recently said that Iranian banks ``cannot make 
international transactions anymore.'' Just this weekend, Iran's Central 
Bank governor said ``the situation of sanctions is harder than a 
physical fight.'' With this bill before us today, we intend to make his 
fight much harder.
  No sanctions can be deemed truly effective until Iran ends its 
nuclear weapons program. We know that Iran is steadily increasing its 
stockpile of low-enriched uranium, moving its centrifuges to a hardened 
underground facility and making progress in other ways towards a 
nuclear-weapons capability. We need to do more and faster.
  H.R. 1905 builds on past efforts by imposing sanctions on foreign 
commercial enterprises that do business with Iran's Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps, by widening the scope of sanctions on 
human-rights abusers, and by other means. But one of the most important 
elements of this bill is my measure to impose sanctions on Iran's 
Central Bank, which provides key financial support for Iran's nuclear-
weapons and terrorism activities. This measure would cut Iran entirely 
off from the world's banking system, dealing an unprecedented blow to 
Iran's economy.
  This may cause short-term difficulties for the world's oil market. 
And it may rankle some of our allies. But it is necessary because 
stopping Iran's nuclear program is of paramount strategic importance--
and we are running out of time.
  Mr. Speaker, our absolute goal must be to stop Iran's nuclear weapons 
program. That's the goal of this bill. We may have only a few more 
months to deal peacefully with this crisis. There is no time to lose.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the Record an 
article from the Washington Post ombudsman entitled, ``Getting ahead of 
the facts on Iran,'' which states that the IAEA report does not say 
Iran has a bomb nor does it say it is building one.

              [From The Washington Post, December 9, 2011]

                   Getting Ahead of the Facts on Iran

                         (By Patrick B. Pexton)

       Headlines are tricky and difficult. They're written 
     quickly, with print and Web publishing deadlines always 
     looming, and with space limitations, yet headline writers try 
     to be creative, informative, and occasionally, humorous.
       Few readers remember the hundreds of well-crafted headlines 
     that entice yet describe a story accurately. But when a 
     headline is bad, it sticks with you, like a burr you can't 
     get out of your sock.
       So it was with recent headlines that appeared on one of The 
     Post's online photo galleries.
       I was bombarded--about 1,500 e-mails--with complaints about 
     this headline (it was an organized campaign, but more about 
     that in a minute).
       The photo slideshow depicted Iran's nuclear research 
     facilities and originally had a headline and subhead that 
     readers felt were misleading: ``Iran's quest to possess 
     nuclear weapons, the main headline said, followed by this 
     subhead: ``Intelligence shows that Iran received foreign 
     assistance to overcome key hurdles in acquiring a nuclear 
     weapon, according to the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency.''
       The gallery was linked to two stories by The Post's 
     national intelligence reporter, Joby Warrick, one on Nov. 6 
     and one on Nov. 8 describing the latest IAEA report, in which 
     the U.N. agency said that Iran's drive for nuclear technology 
     has military aspects that could bring it to the threshold of 
     a nuclear bomb.
       ``But the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb, nor 
     does it say it is building one, only that its multiyear 
     effort pursuing nuclear technology is sophisticated and broad 
     enough that it could be consistent with building a bomb. 
       Iran steadfastly denies it is aiming for a nuclear bomb and 
     says its program is aimed at civilian nuclear energy and 
     research. Of course, Tehran could be lying. But no one knows 
     for sure.
       This is what the U.S. director of national intelligence, 
     James R. Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
     March: ``We continue to assess [that] Iran is keeping open 
     the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing 
     various nuclear capabilities that better position it to 
     produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not 
     know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build 
     nuclear weapons.''
       So are there 1,500 Post readers so attuned to headlines 
     that they wrote me spontaneously to object? Well, no.
       This was an effort organized by a left-leaning nonprofit 
     goup called Just Foreign Policy. On the group's board, among 
     others, are Julian Bond, longtime NAACP chairman, and Tom 
     Hayden, former California legislator and 1960s activist. 
     Founded in 2006, Just Foreign Policy is a shoestring 
     operation, and it has no staff in Washington.
       Robert Naiman, a recent master's degree graduate from the 
     University of Illinois, runs the group's online campaigns 
     from his home in Urbana.
       ``We're not a super-sophisticated operation,'' Neiman 
     acknowledged with a chuckle. But it is savvy enough to use 
     the Web effectively. ``We try to inform and agitate,'' he 
     added. The group works mainly to end the wars in Iraq and 
     Afghanistan and to prevent new ones, such as with Iran.
       ``Most of what I do is read the newspaper and try to tell 
     people about what I read,'' Naiman said. ``I stumbled on the 
     headline, and was astonished, even knowing The Post's 
     editorial line on Iran. I'm old-fashioned. The editorial page 
     is one thing and the news is the other. The gallery headlines 
     belonged more in the former and not the latter.''
       So he spotlighted the headline on the top of Just Foreign 
     Policy's home page, with this message: ``U.S. media helped 
     railroad the nation into war with Iraq by treating unproven 
     claims about Iraq's alleged [weapons of mass destruction] 
     program as facts. Now we're seeing the same behavior 
     concerning Iran.''
       Visitors to Naiman's site could click on a link that sent a 
     pre-written e-mail urging yours truly to fact-check the 
     headline. Daily Kos and other left-leaning Web sites picked 
     it up, adding fuel to the fire. Pretty soon, the ombudsman's 
     inbox was crammed.
       I think Naiman and his Web army were right. The headline 
     and subhead were misleading.
       Photo galleries generally are built by photo editors and 
     then passed to copy editors for captions and headlines. I 
     couldn't identify exactly where in the process these 
     headlines went wrong, but when I raised the issue it was 
     quickly fixed.
       In a Web-driven world, one bad headline can check the globe 
     in minutes and undermine The Post's credibility. It can also 
     play into the hands of those who are seeking further 
     confrontaion with Iran.

  I would like to place in the Record an article, ``Experts Cast Doubt 
on Iran

[[Page 19954]]

Sanction Strategy'' which raises questions about the Iranian stockpile 
and how much enriched uranium they actually have.

             Experts Cast Doubt on Iran Sanctions Strategy

                       Monday, November 28, 2011

                           (By Ardavon Naimi)

       Washington, DC.--``We have succeeded in imposing the 
     strongest sanctions to date on the Iranian regime,'' said Tom 
     Donilon, National Security Advisor, last week at the 
     Brookings Institution. Donilon, addressing the 
     administration's concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program in 
     light of the latest IAEA report, stated that sanctions have 
     isolated Iran internationally, helped delay Iran's nuclear 
     program, and facilitated divisions inside Iran's political 
     establishment.
       But according to some of the experts participating in a 
     panel discussion preceding Donilon's keynote address, the 
     sanctions have largely punished ordinary Iranians and have 
     united, not divided, political factions in Iran.
       According to Kevan Harris, U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings 
     Randolph peace scholar and Ph.D. candidate at the Johns 
     Hopkins University, the sanctions are ``not as smart as we 
     think.''
       Harris described the effects of sanctions inside of Iran. 
     ``Sanctions are having an impact . . . in what I like to call 
     `trickle down' sanctions.'' Sanctions affect the ability of 
     certain banks and large enterprises to obtain foreign 
     exchange and goods, consequently affecting small and medium 
     sized enterprises inside Iran--such as the construction and 
     automobile industry. This process has resulted in the rising 
     cost of business. This trickling down helps to rise 
     ``unemployed to a certain extent, and also decreases wages,'' 
     affecting everyday Iranians.
       Harris challenged the assumption that sanctions facilitate 
     divisions inside Iran's political elite. ``If you threaten 
     countries . . . all of a sudden they have a real big 
     incentive to start working together,'' said Harris. ``At high 
     peaks of perceived external threat, the discourse of unity 
     raises and the discourse of factionalism dies down.''
       We spend a lot of resources on sanctions . . . political 
     and economic . . . we need to ask ourselves, what's the cost 
     benefit of that versus spending resources on diplomatic 
     options.''
       Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the 
     Council on Foreign Relations believes that ``Iran's nuclear 
     program is driven by domestic political factors.'' Yet, 
     Takeyh takes the argument against sanctions a step further. 
     He believes that Iran's nuclear program is actually the 
     Islamic Republic's only perceived path to ``international 
     legitimacy.'' By withstanding sanctions and obtaining a 
     nuclear weapon, Iran would ``extract tributes from 
     international concession.'' ``This program . . . may be 
     beyond diplomatic mediation . . . underpinned by economic 
     coercion,'' said Takeyh.
       Harris challenged Takeyh's assertion, stating ``if the goal 
     of the program is their perceived only path to international 
     legitimacy, then it seems like an alternative policy would be 
     to provide a different path to international legitimacy for 
     Iran that they don't perceive as open.''
       Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American 
     Scientists, discussed the latest IAEA report on Iran's 
     nuclear program. ``Is there anything really new in the annex 
     of the IAEA report?'' asked Ferguson, ``you have to say, not 
     really. There's not a whole lot of new stuff in there.'' 
     Although there are reasons for concern regarding Iran's 
     ongoing efforts, Ferguson says that ``most of the things that 
     are documented, that we know well, happened prior to 2004.''
       Iran continues to build up its stockpile of 19.75 percent 
     enriched uranium, yet Ferguson acknowledges that ``even at 20 
     percent enrichment, it's still going to take a few hundred 
     kilos of that amount of material to have enough for one bomb 
     . . . and Iran so far according to the IAEA, has something 
     like 80 kilograms enriched to that level.'' Even when 
     factoring in Iran's 4900 kilograms of 3.5 percent low 
     enriched uranium, Ferguson concludes that it is ``still not 
     enough material to provide Iran with a true breakout 
     capability.'' Ferguson suggested that the best response to 
     Iran's defiance is not further isolation, but creating 
     openings for dialogue to facilitate increased safeguards and 
     limits on Iran's nuclear program.

  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in permitting 
me to speak on the bill. We will postulate that Iran has been a 
terrible actor and that having nuclear weapons is a threat to 
international stability and something that we should resist.
  I am concerned about the legislation that is before us being 
potentially counterproductive in two areas. It's not something that we 
ought to be coming forward with here at 8:15 at night on the unanimous 
consent calendar. There are legitimate issues here, and there is 
controversy. My friend from California said, well, there may be 
disruptions in the oil markets. Well, I think of what has motivated 
people in terms of their concern about what has happened; according to 
an article in the Wall Street Journal, new sanctions could raise the 
price of gas in the United States by a dollar a gallon. An article in 
The New York Times estimated it could cost Americans $100 billion a 
year. This is not inconsequential. At a time when our economy is in 
tough shape, when we are concerned about being able to move forward, we 
ought to think carefully about doing something.
  Now, if it would stop nuclear weapons for Iran, it might be worth it. 
There's no evidence that that is the case. We look only at the failed 
policy with Cuba where we have had massive efforts at sanctioning Cuba, 
a little, tiny island off the American coast, and what we have done, 
most independent experts agree, is that we have propped up Castro. We 
have given him a reason. If we had been freely trading and interacting 
with the Cuban people, I think Castro would have been a thing of the 
past.
  Being careful about what we do with Iran matters. But I'm deeply 
concerned about language here that would prohibit any official or 
unofficial capacity--having no person employed by the United States 
contacting in an official or unofficial capacity.
  My reading of this is that it is inappropriate to tie the hands of 
the administration to require 15 days' notice to exercise a waiver 
authority. Where we have been successful in the past, for example, in 
defusing a real nuclear problem with Cuba, there was actual engagement 
with the administration. President Kennedy and others were able to work 
dealing with the real problem, dealing with the Soviet Union, our 
adversaries, people who could actually destroy us.
  I am deeply concerned that we not forestall opportunities to engage 
in diplomacy, which needs to be a part of any reasonable sanction 
policy going forward trying to deal with Iran.

                              {time}  2020

  From my vantage point, I think we need to be careful about how we 
move forward dealing with sanctions policies: sanctions first, ask 
questions later. My hope is that we'll have an opportunity to deal with 
this issue with the gravity that it requires, have interaction on the 
floor, be careful about what we're doing going forward with the 
economic impacts and the fact that it may very well likely further 
embolden this administration, the administration of Iran. I don't think 
that's something that is appropriate to us.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  A nuclear Iran is unacceptable. Our fundamental strategic objective 
must be to stop Iran before it obtains nuclear weapons capabilities and 
to compel it to permanently dismantle its pursuit of such weapons. That 
is the test we face. And if we fail, it will come as no consolation to 
the families of the victims of past and future Iranian attacks or to 
our allies.
  We don't know how much time we have left. In its report on Iran's 
nuclear program last November, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
stated that not only has Iran continued to make significant progress 
regarding its nuclear program, but the IAEA said that it had uncovered 
solid evidence that Iran has been working on a nuclear explosive device 
as well.
  Given the Iranian regime's history of concealing its clandestine 
nuclear activities, Tehran may very well be closer to a nuclear weapons 
capability than we even assume. Some estimates now place them a mere 6 
months to a year away from having all the ingredients in place to build 
a nuclear weapon. Every day they move closer and closer to realizing 
their nuclear ambitions, and our nightmare scenario moves closer and 
closer to becoming a reality.
  The Iranian regime is not interested in any outcome other than a 
nuclear Iran, though they are happy to use negotiations to buy time to 
make progress in their nuclear program. Yet we know that when sanctions 
have

[[Page 19955]]

been applied, even limited sanctions, they have had an impact on the 
Iranian regime.
  It is time to build on this lesson and apply crippling sanctions 
against the regime and its enablers. That is the purpose of the bill 
before us, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, which our Foreign Affairs 
Committee adopted unanimously last month. This legislation updates and 
strengthens previous Iran sanctions laws so that the United States can 
take effective action to address the multiple threats posed by the 
regime in Tehran.
  The bill closes loopholes in the energy and financial sanctions that 
are in place now and counters the regime's efforts to evade them, 
including by targeting the Central Bank of Iran. The bill also focuses 
on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the senior Iranian regime 
officials.
  Over 350 Members of Congress have cosponsored this strongly 
bipartisan legislation. Let us meet our responsibilities to the 
American people and protect the security of our Nation from this 
growing threat.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I realize, Mr. Speaker, that there are a number of 
people who want to speak on this who are in favor of this resolution. 
In order to make sure that everyone is provided a chance, although I 
may disagree with what Mr. Sherman is about to say, I'll defend his 
right to speak, and so I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Sherman).
  Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for his generous grant of time, 
especially because he will probably disagree with almost everything I 
have to say.
  I'd like to thank Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for bringing together 
the best ideas of so many Members--and, of course, of her own--to move 
toward another important step toward dissuading Iran from developing 
nuclear weapons and for her ability to build a coalition that has over 
300 Members cosponsoring this bill.
  We have to create circumstances where the regime in Tehran has to 
choose between its nuclear weapons program and regime survival. We owe 
a special debt of gratitude to the mullahs who are running Iran, 
because it is their incompetence and their corruption that creates a 
risk to regime survival even at a time of very high oil prices. And we 
owe a debt of gratitude to the Iranian people, who rose upon against 
this regime in the summer of 2009 and whose desire for freedom poses a 
real threat to regime survival.
  Looking at the particulars of this bill, I want to thank the 
chairwoman for including in this bill, in title III, provisions dealing 
with the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. These are based on the 
Revolutionary Guard Corps Designation Implementation Act, which I 
introduced in 2009 along with the chairwoman, Ed Royce, and Dan Burton. 
This title III makes it clear to foreign companies that, if they do 
business with the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, they cannot do 
business in the United States.
  I also want to thank the chairwoman for cosponsoring, both last year 
and this year, my bill, the Stop Iran's Nuclear Program Act, and for 
including many of those provisions in this legislation that's before us 
today, in particular, including a provision that would sanction those 
companies that loan money to Iran, whether in dollars or in euros or in 
any other currency, that tell the foreign incorporated subsidiaries of 
U.S. multinational corporations that they, too, cannot do business with 
Iran.
  To build upon the provision that Chuck Schumer and I were able to 
write and was included in CISADA, which was adopted last year, to 
indicate that those who give Iran the technologies to suppress the 
Internet and to apprehend dissidents through the Internet will be 
sanctioned. Companies should not be providing that kind of technology 
to Iran. Now, this bill would require the State Department to actually 
implement those provisions by designating the technologies that cannot 
be sold to Iran.
  This bill also includes the provision of the Stop Iran's Nuclear 
Weapons Program Act that allows States to do even more to help this 
Federal policy, by providing that those insurance companies that are 
helping Iran may not be able to do business in their particular State.
  Finally, I want to point out that this bill includes provisions aimed 
at the Central Bank of Iran, but that is not a reason for us not to 
also pass the Menendez-Kirk language that's in the Defense 
authorization bill.
  The Menendez-Kirk language would, like this bill, sanction those U.S. 
banks that violate our law by doing business with Iran and would freeze 
those assets that the Central Bank of Iran has foolishly left in the 
United States or may have done so. But the key thing about the Kirk-
Menendez language is that it tells European and Asian and other non-
U.S. banks that they must stop their business with the Central Bank of 
Iran and virtually all the major banks of Iran as well. It imposes 
secondary sanctions. And I believe the Kirk-Menendez language will make 
it difficult for Iran to sell oil or to buy anything with its oil 
revenue.
  I urge the passage of this bill, the Kirk-Menendez language, and 
other sanctions against Iran.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
Democratic whip for the House, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
  Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) for 
yielding. I also want to thank him and my dear friend Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen for their leadership on this bill. I know that Mr. Berman, in 
particular, is very focused on the central bank and sanctioning of 
them, and so I thank him for his leadership.
  Mr. Speaker, last month the IAEA released a report on Iran's covert 
nuclear program that was troubling, to say the least. Not only is Iran 
continuing to enrich uranium, but they're also believed to be pursuing 
the development of delivery technologies to create a warhead that could 
threaten Israel and our allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf, not to 
mention the over 200,000 Americans that are in the region.

                              {time}  2030

  On top of these dangerous risks, Iran's continued nuclear development 
runs the risk, of course, of launching a nuclear arms race in the 
Middle East. Indeed, just last week, a former Saudi Arabian Ambassador 
to the United States, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, confirmed our worst 
fears, suggesting that his country might begin to pursue a nuclear 
capability in response to Iranian nuclear development.
  Iran has continued its sponsorship of terrorism against our ally, 
Israel, and carries out gross human rights abuses against its own 
people. Sanctions against Iran's energy, transportation, and financial 
sectors are intended to, and I believe, will make clear to Iran the 
steep costs of its choices. That is why I am in strong support of this 
resolution, the Iran Threat Reduction Act and the Iran, North Korea, 
and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act, and I urge my 
colleagues to vote ``yes'' on both.
  We know from history that ignoring the threats of leaders, ignoring 
their building up of capabilities to threaten the rest of the world, is 
done so at great peril and at great cost.
  I urge my colleagues to support this very important piece of 
legislation. I thank Mr. Berman and Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask, Mr. Speaker, how much time all parties 
have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 9\3/4\ minutes, 
the gentleman from California has 6 minutes, and the gentlewoman from 
Florida has 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would like to place in the Record an article from the Arms Control 
Association which states that the IAEA board resolution avoided direct 
censure of Iran, and did not declare Iran to be in noncompliance with 
its nonproliferation activities.

[[Page 19956]]



                  [From armscontrol.org, Nov. 8, 2011]

          The IAEA's Iran Report: Assessment and Implications

       The IAEA report and annex released today provides 
     disturbing and ``credible'' additional details regarding 
     Iranian nuclear warhead development efforts that have allowed 
     Tehran to acquire some of the expertise needed to build 
     nuclear weapons, should it decide to do so.
       The broad outline in the IAEA' s latest report on the 
     military dimensions of Iran's program is not new, but rather, 
     provides greater detail regarding weapons-related activities 
     outlined in previous public reports.
       The IAEA report and annex reinforce what the 
     nonproliferation community has recognized for some time: that 
     Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons development 
     activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but 
     continued other.
       The activities documented in the IAEA report, including 
     research related to nuclear warheads, underscore that 
     Tehran's claims that it is only seeking the peaceful use of 
     nuclear energy are false.
       Iran's warhead work also contradicts its obligation not to 
     pursue nuclear weapons under the nuclear Nonproliferation 
     Treaty (NPT), under which states parties commit ``not to seek 
     or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 
     weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.''
       The report suggests that Iran is working to shorten the 
     timeframe to building the bomb once and if it makes that 
     decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran 
     is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.
       The report should prompt greater international pressure on 
     Tehran to respond more fully to the IAEA's questions, allow 
     for more extensive inspections of its nuclear facilities, 
     engage more seriously in talks on its nuclear program, and to 
     agree to confidence building steps to help resolve the 
     crisis.


    Comparison of the IAEA's Findings with Public U.S. Intelligence 
                              Assessments

       Because the IAEA report is based largely on intelligence 
     the United States and other IAEA member states have been 
     sharing with the agency for some time, in addition to the 
     agency's own investigations, the information in the report 
     likely provides greater insight into current U.S. assessments 
     about Iran's nuclear program.
       The U.S. intelligence community appears to stand by the 
     judgment made in the 2007 NIE that Iran had a nuclear weapons 
     program that was halted in the fall of 2003. Moreover, in his 
     testimony before a Senate committee in March 2011, U.S. 
     Director of National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed 
     that the intelligence community still had a high level of 
     confidence that Iran has not yet made a decision to restart 
     its nuclear weapons program.
       Because the weapons program is believed to refer to the 
     series of projects the IAEA report details, Clapper's 
     statement is not inconsistent with the notion that some 
     weapons-related R&D has resumed which is not part of a 
     determined, integrated weapons-development program of the 
     type that Iran maintained prior to 2003.
       Consistent with the finding of the 2007 U.S. National 
     Intelligence Estimate, the IAEA report says that a 
     comprehensive weapons program (known as the AMAD Plan) ``was 
     stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a `halt order,''' in late 
     2003, but that some of the program's activities were resumed 
     later. Key personnel are still involved in those renewed 
     activities apparently tying up loose ends regarding their 
     prior research and development work.


       Summary of Key IAEA Findings on Weapons-Related Activities

       The IAEA deserves credit for continuing to press the issue 
     and to present this important information to the IAEA Board 
     of Governors in spite of Tehran's unwillingness to cooperate 
     with the investigation. This resolve helps to bolster the 
     integrity of the agency and show that countries cannot simply 
     get away with nonproliferation violations by denial and 
     obfuscation.
       According to the report, Iran was engaged in an effort 
     prior to the end of 2003 which ran the full range of nuclear 
     weapons development, from acquiring the raw nuclear material 
     to working on a weapon they could eventually deliver via a 
     missile. Just as important as the type of work being carried 
     out is how that work was organized. The series of projects 
     that made up Iran's nuclear program appears to have been 
     overseen by ``senior Iranian figures'' and engaged in 
     ``working level correspondence'' consistent with a 
     coordinated program.
       Key components of this program include:
       Fissile Material Production: As documented in previous 
     reports, Iran ran an undeclared effort to produce 
     uraniumtetrafluoride (also known as Green Salt), a precursor 
     for the uranium used in the enrichment process. The 
     affiliation between this project and other projects directly 
     related to warhead development suggests that Iran's nuclear 
     weapons program included both fissile material production and 
     warhead development Although the report does not detail a 
     uranium enrichment effort as part of the AMAD Plan, the 
     secret nature of the Natanz enrichment plant prior to 2002 
     suggests that it was originally intended to produce the 
     highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons.
       High Explosives Testing: Iran's experiments involving 
     exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators and the simultaneous 
     firing of explosives around a hemispherical shape points to 
     work on nuclear warhead design. The agency says that the type 
     of high explosives testing matches an existing nuclear weapon 
     design. Iran admits to carrying out such work, but claims it 
     is for conventional military purposes and disputes some of 
     the technical details.
       Warhead Design Verification: Iran carried out experiments 
     using high explosives to test the validity of its warhead 
     design and engaged in preparatory work to carry out a full-
     scale underground nuclear test explosion.
       Shahab-3 Re-entry Vehicle: Documentation reviewed by the 
     IAEA has suggested that, as late as 2003, Iran sought to 
     develop a nuclear warhead small enough to ft on the Shahab-3 
     missile. Confronted with some of the studies, Iran admitted 
     to the IAEA that such work would constitute nuclear weapons 
     development, but Tehran denies carrying out the research.
       The IAEA admits that it has less information regarding 
     warhead-related work Iran has continued to pursue since 2003, 
     but the report has provided some insight into the type of 
     activities that Iran subsequently resumed, which seems to be 
     focused on warhead design verification. The act that the 
     agency was able to detail some of the organizational changes 
     that have taken place since 2003, including the current 
     position of the person who formerly oversaw the AMAD Plan, 
     suggests that intelligence agencies still have considerable 
     insight into Iran's nuclear program. Tehran will likely be 
     concerned about its inability to hide such important 
     information and will likely engage in further restructuring 
     following this report, which may delay its efforts once 
     again.
       Considering the IAEA's reliance on intelligence information 
     from states, it went through considerable length to 
     demonstrate why it thought this information was credible. It 
     was not just a matter of acquiring consistent information 
     from over 10 countries, but it seems some of the most 
     incriminating evidence comes from the AQ Khan network, which 
     Iran admits it relied upon. The information from the Khan 
     network includes details about nuclear warhead designs the 
     network gave Iran that match up to the research and 
     experiments detailed in the intelligence information.


              The IAEA Board of Governors Needs to Respond

       The report will be considered by the IAEA Board of 
     Governors at its next meeting Nov. 17-18, along with a draft 
     resolution censuring Iran for violating its nonproliferation 
     commitments. The Board's 35 members cannot ignore Iran's 
     warhead development activities or Tehran's refusal to 
     cooperate with the IAEA's investigation into that work. It 
     must also insist that Iran improve its cooperation with the 
     agency prior to the next board meeting.
       A consensus response is unlikely given existing divisions 
     among the 35 countries, and in particular, Cuba's current 
     membership on the board. Beijing and Moscow have also 
     unfortunately played an unhelpful role prior to the release 
     of the report by calling on Director-General Yukiya Amano to 
     limit the information detailed it contains.
       However, it is important that the board's response receives 
     support from as many countries as possible to demonstrate to 
     Tehran that it cannot engage in work directly related to 
     nuclear weapons with impunity.
       In particular, developing countries on the IAEA Board of 
     Governors should no longer treat the Iran nuclear issue as a 
     test case for preserving the right to the peaceful uses of 
     nuclear energy. Rather, it is time that all states insist 
     that Iran stop abusing that right for the development of a 
     nuclear weapons capability and take meaningful steps to 
     cooperate with the IAEA and suspend enrichment work, 
     particularly enrichment of uranium at the 20% level.


                      Rights and Responsibilities

       Iran cannot complain that Western states are trying to deny 
     the Islamic Republic its nuclear ``rights.'' The U.S. 
     position, consistent with the 2006 offer by the P5+1, has 
     been that Iran could resume enrichment some time in the 
     future after it reestablishes confidence with the 
     international community that it is not pursuing nuclear 
     weapons.
       As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton explained it 
     to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 1, 2011, 
     it is the U.S. Government's position is that ``under very 
     strict conditions'' and ``having responded to the 
     international community's concerns,'' Iran would have a 
     ``right'' to enrich uranium under IAEA inspections.
       In response to the IAEA's report, the international 
     community should redouble efforts to implement existing U.N. 
     Security Council-mandated sanctions on Iran's nuclear and 
     missile sectors and, if Iran remains unwilling to cooperate 
     with the IAEA and ignore the Security Council, further 
     isolate Iran diplomatically and economically.


                      Maintain Pressure and Engage

       In response to the report, the White House has 
     appropriately underscored that the

[[Page 19957]]

     United States continues to focus on using diplomatic channels 
     to pressure Iran to abandon its sensitive nuclear activities.
       To keep open the option for an effective negotiated 
     resolution to the crisis, President Barack Obama should also 
     reiterate the willingness of the United States and its P5+1 
     partners to follow-through on the recent letter from the EU's 
     Catherine Ashton to Iran's leaders offering to engage them in 
     further talks to address the nuclear program.
       Continuing pressure through targeted sanctions against 
     Iran's nuclear and missile sectors, coupled with the pursuit 
     of a negotiated agreement to resolve serious concerns over 
     Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and to limit its uranium 
     enrichment capacity provides the best chance of preventing a 
     nuclear-armed Iran.
       Talk of military strikes against Iranian nuclear and 
     military targets is unhelpful and counterproductive. Military 
     strikes by the United States and/or Israel would only achieve 
     a temporary delay in Iran's nuclear activities, convince 
     Iran's leadership to openly pursue nuclear weapons, rally 
     domestic support behind a corrupt regime, and would result in 
     costly long-term consequences for U.S. and regional security 
     and the U.S. and global economy.
       Ultimately, resolving the nuclear issue will require 
     sufficient pressure and inducement to convince Iran that it 
     stands more to gain from forgoing a nuclear-weapons option 
     and much to lose from any decision to build them.

  My friend from Oregon earlier mentioned the question of oil prices, 
and it's something that we ought to be concerned about.
  I would like to place in the Record an article from Slate that says 
that this sanction could lead to an increase in the price of gasoline 
that could be as much as $1.25 a gallon.

                       [From Slate, Dec. 2, 2011]

             Will Sanctions Against Iran Raise Gas Prices?

                           (By Brian Palmer)

       The Senate unanimous passed a bill Thursday that would 
     impose economic sanctions on Iran, over the objection of the 
     White House. One of the administration's complaints was that 
     the move could increase oil prices. How much could 
     sanctioning Iran cost us at the pump?
       The nightmare scenario would be an additional $1.25 per 
     gallon. Iran produces just over 5 percent of the world's 
     crude, which doesn't seem like a lot. But oil demand is 
     price-insensitive--people and businesses refuse to change 
     their fuel-buying habits until the costs go way up. That 
     means a reduction in supply will have a disproportionate 
     affect on prices. In the past, price increases have been 
     about 10 times greater than their precipitating drops in 
     production. Based on the same historical data, and given that 
     oil is currently hovering at around $100 per barrel, a 
     complete shutdown of Iranian exports could force prices as 
     high as $150. (That's 5 percent, times the tenfold 
     multiplier, times the current price of $100.) Since a one-
     dollar change in the cost of a barrel of oil usually 
     translates to a two-and-a-half-cent surge in retail gas 
     prices, cutting Iran off from world oil markets could 
     increase the price of gasoline by a dollar and a quarter.
       This theoretical scenario is extremely unlikely, however. 
     The Senate bill permits the president to delay the sanctions 
     if there isn't adequate supply on the market. In addition, 
     the bill would make it harder for foreign banks to deal with 
     the Iranian central bank, which acts as a middle man in oil 
     transactions. But it wouldn't make buying Iranian crude 
     impossible, and sanctioned countries have historically found 
     ways to sell their oil. (Consider, for example, the oil for 
     food program that undermined sanctions against Iraq. The 
     Senate sanctions against Iran also have a humanitarian 
     exemption.) There hasn't been a truly effective, worldwide 
     boycott of a country's oil exports since 1951-53, when Iran 
     nationalized its oil industry. As long as Iranian oil 
     continues to flow to Asia and parts of Europe, the sanctions 
     would have a relatively small impact on prices.
       There's also the possibility that Saudi Arabia could make 
     up for some of the banned Iranian oil, as it did during the 
     first and second Persian Gulf wars. The Saudis wouldn't be 
     able to plug the gap entirely, because they don't have as 
     much excess capacity as they used to. They could soften the 
     blow, though.
       There is one long-shot scenario that should be mentioned, 
     in which oil prices go even higher than $150 per barrel. When 
     pressured in the past, Iran has threatened to block oil 
     deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz. Around 17 percent of 
     oil traded globally passes through that waterway.
       While such an occurrence could theoretically lead to $8-
     per-gallon gasoline, based on the historic relationship 
     between supply and price, it's a practical impossibility. 
     Demand would drop significantly at those dizzying prices, 
     causing the cost of a barrel of oil to increase more in 
     proportion with changes to supply. More importantly, the 
     economic shock of such a scenario would likely trigger a 
     naval response from the U.S. and its allies.

  Mr. Speaker, an article in the Wall Street Journal raises this 
question as well. It says that crude flirts with $100 a barrel on 
geopolitical unrest. And it also quotes a commodity strategist at the 
Standard Bank in London as saying the timing of an Iranian embargo 
could hardly be worse. Relatively small disruptions could cause spikes 
in oil prices.
  A director of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, Mr. Adam Szubin, stated that there are real scenarios in which 
an oil spike might hit. This is from an article: U.S. officials warn 
that new sanctions could be a boon to Iran. There's another article 
that cites that, and an article from The New York Times which states 
that U.S. officials have declared they'd hold Iran accountable for a 
purported plot, but they've now decided that a proposed move against 
Iran's central bank would disrupt international oil markets and further 
damage the reeling American and world economies. I think that's 
something that we ought to be concerned about; that if, in fact, we are 
moving forward with sanctions, sanctions which will have an effect on 
the price of oil, is this the timing to do that kind of thing, and are 
we prepared in this Congress to accept the responsibility for a sharp 
increase in the price of oil?
  Here's a quote from a blog called San Francisco Gate quoting the 
Undersecretary of State, Wendy Sherman, telling the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, ``There's absolutely a risk the price of oil would 
go up, which would mean that Iran, would, in fact, have more money to 
fuel its nuclear ambitions, not less.''
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), a senior member of the committee, 
a leader in these efforts for many years, the ranking member of the 
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee.
  Mr. ENGEL. I rise in strong support of this legislation.
  Under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to develop a nuclear 
weapon. This is a dangerous regime which supports terrorism and calls 
for the destruction of Israel. And every day they're getting closer to 
weaponizing a stockpile of enriched uranium.
  No amount of naivete or wishful thinking will get the Iranian regime 
to back down. They are liars, and diplomacy hasn't worked and won't 
work. They'll only play for time.
  We heard the same arguments about not putting the sanctions on the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. Now we hear that oil is going to go 
sky high.
  Well, you know what? I think morality is more important than the 
price of oil. I think morality says that this terrible regime should 
not be allowed to have nuclear weapons, should not be allowed to wipe 
Israel off the face of the Earth, should not be allowed to do the 
horrible things that it does.
  This important bill imposes tough sanctions on Iran's Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and against the Central Bank of Iran, and the 
Iranians have to know our sanctions will only be increased if they 
don't back off soon.
  We have bipartisan support here. People say Congress doesn't work 
together. We worked together on this. This is important. We need to 
pass this bill.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  I would respectfully respond to my friend from New York that the 
price of oil is, in fact, a moral question.
  I want to raise the question of the constitutionality of this 
particular proposal. I believe that it's unconstitutional because it is 
an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and freedom of 
association. It is an unconstitutional abridgement of the right of free 
expression by Federal employees. It is a violation of whistleblower 
protections which have been granted a constitutional basis; that, in 
fact, it violates our own speech and debate clause of the Constitution 
of the United States because we have an obligation to inquire and to 
ask questions; that it violates the Constitution's separation of powers 
and challenges the

[[Page 19958]]

President's power to engage in foreign diplomacy; that it is 
operationally impossible; that you can have even Admiral Mullen, former 
Chair of the Joint Chiefs, point out that with the miscommunications 
that can occur from a lack of diplomacy, we could be putting our own 
people at risk.
  In fact, there was an article that was published that deals with a 
scenario that would happen in the Gulf where there are run-ins between 
American and Iranian vessels. The no contact provision, if enacted, 
could outlaw the U.S. Navy's bridge-to-bridge communications with 
Iranian vessels.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Deutch), someone who has provided a major 
contribution to this legislation that's now before the House.
  Mr. DEUTCH. I thank the ranking member, my friend, Mr. Berman.
  The legislation before us today will give the United States the tools 
to impose the most stringent, the most crippling sanctions aimed at 
cracking down on what is the greatest threat to international security, 
a nuclear armed Iran.
  The Iran Threat Reduction Act builds on the already significant steps 
this Congress took, along with our partners in the EU and at the United 
Nations last year, to dramatically ratchet up pressure on the Iranian 
regime in order to thwart its illicit quest for nuclear weapons. The 
bill comes on the heels of the IAEA report that confirmed what we 
already knew--the Iranian regime is pursuing nuclear weapons. It comes 
on the heels of the foiled Iranian assassination plot and the dangerous 
attack coordinated by the regime on the British Embassy. And it comes 
even as the Iranian regime contributes to the brutal crackdown on the 
Syrian people that has left over 5,000 dead, so that the regime can 
continue to use Syria as a conduit for routing weapons to Hezbollah and 
Hamas to be used against Israel.
  Mr. Speaker, I am proud to have authored two provisions contained in 
this bill. And I would like to thank the bill's sponsors, Chairman Ros-
Lehtinen and Ranking Member Berman, for working with me to include the 
Iran Transparency and Accountability Act and the Iran Human Rights 
Democracy Promotion Act.

                              {time}  2040

  The requirements of these provisions put the onus of determining the 
extent and nature of a company's involvement in Iran on that company by 
requiring the disclosure of all material business with Iran on its SEC 
filings. This forced disclosure will accelerate the imposition of 
sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation also includes mandatory sanctions on 
those who perpetrate the most egregious human rights abuses. This 
regime's use of intimidation and brutality to suppress its opposition 
must be stopped, and the United States must stand with the people of 
Iran in their quest for democracy and freedom. Mr. Speaker, a nuclear 
armed Iran is unacceptable, and we cannot permit it to happen. We must 
make it clear that we are serious, determined, and aggressive in our 
approach to halt Iran's illegal, destabilizing, and dangerous pursuit 
of weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would like to place in the Record an article by Seymour Hersh which 
cites the IAE's report suggesting, according to the Arms Control 
Association, that Iran is working to shorten a time frame to build a 
bomb once and if it makes the decision. But it remains apparent that a 
nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent, nor is it inevitable.

     [The New Yorker Online Only Daily Comment, November 18, 2011]

                         Iran and The I.A.E.A.

                      (Posted by Seymour M. Hersh)

       The first question in last Saturday night's Republican 
     debate on foreign policy dealt with Iran, and a newly 
     published report by the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
     The report, which raised renewed concern about the ``possible 
     existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in 
     Iran,'' struck a darker tone than previous assessments. But 
     it was carefully hedged. On the debate platform, however, any 
     ambiguity was lost. One of the moderators said that the 
     I.A.E.A. report had provided ``additional credible evidence 
     that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon'' and asked what 
     various candidates, upon winning the Presidency, would do to 
     stop Iran. Herman Cain said he would assist those who are 
     trying to overthrow the government. Newt Gingrich said he 
     would coordinate with the Israeli government and maximize 
     covert operations to block the Iranian weapons program. Mitt 
     Romney called the state of Iran's nuclear program Obama's 
     ``greatest failing, from a foreign-policy standpoint'' and 
     added, ``Look, one thing you can know . . . and that is if we 
     reelect Barack Obama Iran will have a nuclear weapon.'' The 
     Iranian bomb was a sure thing Saturday night.
       I've been reporting on Iran and the bomb for The New Yorker 
     for the past decade, with a focus on the repeatedly inability 
     of the best and the brightest of the Joint Special Operations 
     Command to find definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons 
     production program in Iran. The goal of the high-risk 
     American covert operations was to find something physical--a 
     ``smoking calutron,'' as a knowledgeable official once told 
     me--to show the world that Iran was working on warheads at an 
     undisclosed site, to make the evidence public, and then to 
     attack and destroy the site.
       The Times reported, in its lead story the day after the 
     report came out, that I.A.E.A. investigators ``have amassed a 
     trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a `credible' 
     case'' that Iran may be carrying out nuclear-weapons 
     activities. The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as 
     declaring that ``the level of detail is unbelievable. . . . 
     The report describes virtually all the steps to make a 
     nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each of 
     those steps. It reads like a menu.'' The Times set the tone 
     for much of the coverage. (A second Times story that day on 
     the I.A.E.A. report noted, more cautiously, that ``it is true 
     that the basic allegations in the report are not 
     substantially new, and have been discussed by experts for 
     years.'')
       But how definitive, or transformative, were the findings? 
     The I.A.E.A. said it had continued in recent years ``to 
     receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to 
     possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program'' and, 
     as a result, it has been able ``to refine its analysis.'' The 
     net effect has been to create ``more concern.'' But Robert 
     Kelley, a retired I.A.E.A. director and nuclear engineer who 
     previously spent more than thirty years with the Department 
     of Energy's nuclear-weapons program, told me that he could 
     find very little new information in the I.A.E.A. report. He 
     noted that hundreds of pages of material appears to come from 
     a single source: a laptop computer, allegedly supplied to the 
     I.A.E.A. by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance 
     could not be established. Those materials, and others, ``were 
     old news,'' Kelley said, and known to many journalists. ``I 
     wonder why this same stuff is now considered `new 
     information' by the same reporters.''
       A nuanced assessment of the I.A.E.A. report was published 
     by the Arms Control Association (A.C.A.), a nonprofit whose 
     mission is to encourage public support for effective arms 
     control. The A.C.A. noted that the I.A.E.A. did ``reinforce 
     what the nonproliferation community has recognized for some 
     times: that Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons 
     development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, 
     but continued others.'' (The American intelligence community 
     reached the same conclusion in a still classified 2007 
     estimate.) The I.A.E.A.'s report ``suggests,'' the A.C.A. 
     paper said, that Iran ``is working to shorten the timeframe 
     to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it 
     remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not 
     imminent nor is it inevitable.'' Greg Thielmann, a former 
     State Department and Senate Intelligence Committee analyst 
     who was one of the authors of the A.C.A. assessment, told me, 
     ``There is troubling evidence suggesting that studies are 
     still going on, but there is nothing that indicates that Iran 
     is really building a bomb.'' He added, ``Those who want to 
     drum up support for a bombing attack on Iran sort of 
     aggressively misrepresented the report.''
       Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshare Fund, a 
     disarmament group, who serves on Hillary Clinton's 
     International Security Advisory Board, said, ``I was briefed 
     on most of this stuff several years ago at the I.A.E.A. 
     headquarters in Vienna. There's little new in the report. 
     Most of this information is well known to experts who follow 
     the issue.'' Cirincione noted that ``post-2003, the report 
     only cites computer modelling and a few other experiments.'' 
     (A senior I.A.E.A. official similarly told me, ``I was 
     underwhelmed by the information.'')
       The report did note that its on-site camera inspection 
     process of Iran's civilian nuclear enrichment facilities--
     mandated under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which 
     Iran is a signatory--``continues to verify the non-diversion 
     of declared nuclear material.'' In other words, all of the 
     low enriched uranium now known to be produced inside Iran is 
     accounted for; if highly enriched uranium is being used for 
     the manufacture of a bomb,

[[Page 19959]]

     it would have to have another, unknown source.
       The shift in tone at the I.A.E.A. seems linked to a change 
     at the top. The I.A.E.A.'s report had extra weight because 
     the Agency has had a reputation for years as a reliable 
     arbiter on Iran. Mohammed ElBaradei, who retired as the 
     I.A.E.A.'s Director General two years ago, was viewed 
     internationally, although not always in Washington, as an 
     honest broker--a view that lead to the awarding of a Nobel 
     Peace Prize in 2005. ElBaradei's replacement is Yukiya Amano 
     of Japan. Late last year, a classified U.S. Embassy cable 
     from Vienna, the site of the I.A.E.A. headquarters, described 
     Amano as being ``ready for prime time.'' According to the 
     cable, which was obtained by WikiLeaks, in a meeting in 
     September, 2009, with Glyn Davies, the American permanent 
     representative to the I.A.E.A., said, ``Amano reminded 
     Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make 
     concessions to the G-77 [the group of developing countries], 
     which correctly required him to be fair-minded and 
     independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on 
     every strategic decision, from high-level personnel 
     appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged nuclear 
     weapons program.'' The cable added that Amano's ``willingness 
     to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his strategy . . 
     . bodes well for our future relationship.''
       It is possible, of course, that Iran has simply 
     circumvented the reconnaissance efforts of America and the 
     I.A.E.A., perhaps even building Dick Cheney's nightmare: a 
     hidden underground nuclear-weapons fabrication facility. 
     Iran's track record with the I.A.E.A. has been far from good: 
     its leadership began construction of its initial uranium 
     facilities in the nineteen-eighties without informing the 
     Agency, in violation of the nonproliferation treaty. Over the 
     next decade and a half, under prodding from ElBaradei and the 
     West, the Iranians began acknowledging their deceit and 
     opened their enrichment facilities, and their records, to 
     I.A.E.A. inspectors.
       The new report, therefore, leaves us where we've been since 
     2002, when George Bush declared Iran to be a member of the 
     Axis of Evil--with lots of belligerent talk but no definitive 
     evidence of a nuclear-weapons program.

  I would ask how much time is left on all sides.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Schweikert). The gentleman from Ohio has 
6 minutes. The gentlewoman from Florida has 3\1/2\ minutes. The 
gentleman from California has 3 minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Olson), an esteemed member of the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce.
  Mr. OLSON. I thank the chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the ranking member for the opportunity to speak here tonight on H.R. 
1905.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight in strong support of H.R. 1905, the Iran 
Threat Reduction Act. While Iranian leadership continues to give public 
assurances that their nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, their 
words don't match their actions.
  A recent International Atomic Energy Agency report makes it clear 
that Iran is developing advanced delivery systems for nuclear weapons. 
Mr. Speaker, the only reason why Iran would develop advanced delivery 
systems is to have the means to deliver a nuclear bomb on peaceful 
neighbors like Israel. This outcome is unacceptable, and the United 
States must continue to enact tougher sanctions to ensure that this 
never happens.
  H.R. 1905 will add new sanctions targeting the Central Bank of Iran, 
making it difficult for foreign companies to do business with Iran. 
H.R. 1905 will also increase sanctions on members of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
  Mr. Speaker, the biggest threat to world peace is the religious 
fanatics in Iran having a nuclear bomb. Iran's acquisition of nuclear 
weapons simply cannot happen. Not on our watch. I implore my colleagues 
to support this bipartisan legislation which will force Iran to abandon 
its quest for nuclear weapons.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I would like to place in the Record a letter from 26 organizations 
that urge Congress to oppose the provision restricting contact with 
Iranian officials.

                                                 December 8, 2011.
       Dear Representative: We urge you to oppose the provision 
     restricting contact with Iranian officials in the Iran 
     sanctions bill H.R. 1905 and to work with your colleagues to 
     remove it from the bill when it comes to the House floor. We 
     are concerned that Section 601c of this legislation would 
     undermine prospects for a diplomatic resolution of Iran's 
     disputed nuclear program, increasing the threat of war.
       This provision was inserted into the bill during committee 
     markup, after most of the cosponsors had already signed onto 
     H.R. 1905. Section 601c of H.R. 1905 would expressly prohibit 
     contact between U.S. government officials and certain Iranian 
     officials, as noted below:
       (c) Restriction on contact.--No person employed with the 
     United States Government may contact in an official or 
     unofficial capacity any person that--(1) is an agent, 
     instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, or is 
     serving as a representative of the Government of Iran; and 
     (2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated 
     with terrorist organizations. (d) Waiver.--The President may 
     waive the requirements of subsection (c) if the President 
     determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional 
     committees 15 days prior to the exercise of waiver authority 
     that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an 
     unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national 
     security interests of the United States.
       If this provision were to be enacted into law, it could 
     have a chilling effect on any diplomatic engagement that this 
     or any future administration might wish to pursue to address 
     Iran's nuclear program, its role in exacerbating or de-
     escalating regional conflicts, and its failure to respect the 
     human rights of its citizens. It would also place 
     restrictions on members of Congress, likely precluding the 
     potential for inter-parliamentary dialogue with Iranian 
     parliamentarians.
       As Ambassadors Thomas Pickering and William Luers have 
     pointed out, this provision also raises ``serious 
     constitutional issues over the separation of powers''. For 
     the administration to exercise its waiver authority, the 
     President would have to certify 15 days in advance that the 
     failure to do so would ``pose an unusual and extraordinary 
     threat to the vital national security interests of the United 
     States''.
       At a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran, 
     sustained and flexible diplomacy is an essential tool to 
     prevent war. Just before he retired from the position of 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen called 
     for an established channel of communications with Iran, 
     noting that: ``We haven't had a connection with Iran since 
     1979. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War we had links 
     of the Soviet Union . . . If something happens it's virtually 
     assured that we won't get it right, that there will be 
     miscalculations which would be extremely dangerous in that 
     part of world . . . I think any channel would be terrific.''
       We urge every member of Congress to oppose Section 601c of 
     H.R. 1905 speak out on the House floor against efforts 
     designed to constrain diplomatic engagement with Iran.
           Sincerely,
         Friends Committee on National Legislation; Americans for 
           Peace Now; Arms Control Association; Center for 
           Interfaith Engagement, Eastern Mennonite University; 
           Church of the Brethren; Council for a Livable World; 
           Fellowship of Reconciliation; Just Foreign Policy; 
           Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness; Mainstream Media 
           Project; Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns; 
           Mennonite Central Committee; Minnesota Peace Project.
         Middle East Peace Now; National Iranian American Council; 
           New Internationalism Project, Institute for Policy 
           Studies; Peace Action; Peace Action West; Peace 
           Catalyst International; Progressive Democrats for 
           America; Project on Middle East Democracy; Student 
           Peace Alliance; United Church of Christ, Justice and 
           Witness Ministries; United Methodist Church, General 
           Board of Church and Society; Women's Action for New 
           Directions; 3P Human Security: Partners for 
           Peacebuilding Policy.

  It's interesting that what we're actually suggesting here is taking 
diplomacy off the table. I was here for the debate in Iraq. I led the 
effort in this Congress in challenging the then-Bush administration's 
assertions that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction which they 
intended to use against the United States. I was here. I don't know how 
many of you were here. But I saw a case being made for war, and that 
case was based on exaggerations and unfortunately in some cases 
distortions and lies.
  We have to be very careful that we're not setting the stage for still 
another war. We must be very careful that when we assert a certain 
level of preparedness on the part of Iran with respect to their nuclear 
capability that we aren't actually shutting the door that needs to be 
open in order to try to resolve any difficulty between our nations. We 
can say, well, we want to get them back to the table, but then don't 
talk to them.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

[[Page 19960]]


  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to one 
of the cofounders of the Iran Working Group, someone who has brought 
the issue of Iran, its policies, and particularly it's nuclear weapons 
program, to the attention of this body and the public, the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
  Mr. ANDREWS. I'd like to thank the chairlady from Florida and the 
ranking member, Mr. Berman from California, for their very forceful and 
effective advocacy.
  Iran made a choice to ignore international standards and comity and 
secretly develop a nuclear weapon. Iran made a choice to eschew sincere 
diplomatic efforts to come up with a deal, an agreement where they 
could have their civilian nuclear energy program but have the fuel 
manufactured outside of Iran. Now, Iran must, in my view, be confronted 
with a choice as to whether it will enjoy economic stability or give up 
its nuclear weapons ambitions.
  I think the time is here to force that choice upon the Iranians. I 
think it's unfortunate it has to be done, but it has to be done. We 
cannot let the world's most horrific weapon fall into the hands of one 
of the world's most horrendous regimes. For that reason, I strongly 
support the legislation by Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and Mr. Berman and urge a 
``yes'' vote.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to say I have respect for all of my colleagues who are 
concerned about nuclear proliferation. We all ought to be concerned 
about nuclear proliferation. We can start with our own country. Right 
now we've set the stage for continuing to develop nuclear weapons. It's 
very difficult to be able to have a strong position of standing on this 
issue if we have one set of rules for ourselves and another set of 
rules for the rest of the world.
  I don't want to see a nuclear proliferation in Iran, but I think that 
if we want to have a standing where people want to take what we say, we 
have to be consistent. We have to make sure that what we do is 
consistent with what we say.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I have no further requests for time, and I reserve 
the balance of my time to close.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to my 
distinguished colleague and good friend who's been very active on these 
issues, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone).
  Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
  I want to take issue with my colleague from Ohio. I don't think there 
is a comparison between the situation in Iraq and Iran because it has 
become abundantly clear that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons; and a 
nuclear Iran would not only threaten the United States but democratic 
nations all across the globe.
  The legislation before us builds on the comprehensive Iran Sanctions 
Act passed last Congress and imposes new and stronger sanctions, and 
this bill is the next logical step in U.S. policy to prevent Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons.
  The Iranian President, a Holocaust denier, has stated that a nuclear 
Iran would use the weapons at its disposal and has even called for the 
destruction of the State of Israel. And I don't think we can let a 
nuclear Iran become a reality.
  I would urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 1905.

                              {time}  2050

  Mr. KUCINICH. I would ask how much time is remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 6 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would respectfully suggest to my friend from New 
Jersey that the certainty that Congress had in the debate in October of 
2002 with respect to Iraq is very much paralleled with the certainty 
that some of my friends here have about not only Iran's intention to 
have a bomb but an intention to use it. That's why we need diplomacy. 
That's why the provisions of this bill in section 603(c), which say 
U.S. Government employees can't have any contact with Iranians, is 
really upside down.
  Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate that very much.
  Just on this one issue, there is nothing in this bill that prohibits 
Americans from having contact with Iranians. There is nothing in this 
bill that prohibits the President of the United States or his Secretary 
of State or such other emissaries or agencies he chooses from engaging 
diplomatically on the issue of ending Iran's nuclear weapons program. I 
would not support a bill that prohibited that.
  Mr. KUCINICH. In reclaiming my time, section 603(c) was added in 
committee. I would inquire of the gentleman, was it stripped from the 
bill?
  Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate the gentleman for yielding.
  Section 603 was not stripped from the bill, and section 603 does not 
prohibit the administration from engaging diplomatically on this issue.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I reclaim my time.
  Perhaps the President is not restricted, which is good for the 
gentleman to say; but the very clear and plain reading of that is that 
it says no U.S. Government employee.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. At this time, the Chair needs to make a time 
correction.
  The remaining time for the gentleman from Ohio is 2 minutes.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I think I am the last speaker on my side of 
our side who intends to speak on this issue.
  How much time remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 1 minute 
remaining, and the gentleman from Ohio has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BERMAN. The chairman of the committee, the gentlelady from 
Florida, has the right to close. Am I correct in that assumption?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Yes.
  Mr. BERMAN. Is the gentleman from Ohio, if I may ask through the 
Chair, the last speaker on his side?
  Mr. KUCINICH. Correct.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, in that case I yield myself the balance of 
my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized 
for 1 minute.
  Mr. BERMAN. Again, I would like to repeat that this crisis only ends 
one of three ways.
  Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability, and don't listen to straw man 
arguments. No one is saying Iran today has a nuclear bomb, but the IAEA 
has made it perfectly clear they are pursuing a nuclear weapons 
capability. Once they have that capability, they throw out the 
inspectors; they shut off the cameras; and they get the bomb.
  Either we stop them from getting the bomb; we have a military 
confrontation; or we have a diplomatic resolution where they end their 
nuclear weapons program through diplomacy.
  The provision the gentleman cited does not prohibit diplomacy by the 
President or his emissaries. Time will not permit me to read the 
statute, itself, right now, but I would be happy to show any of my 
members why diplomacy is still allowed.
  This is not a unilateral effort. This administration and this 
Congress, in working with them, have pursued a multilateral effort with 
the international community to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, 
and we will continue to do that.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
  I am quoting from an article in The Hill, which I cited earlier:
  Section 601 would prohibit U.S. Government employees in any official 
or unofficial capacity from contacting anyone who is affiliated with 
the Iranian Government who presents a threat to the United States or is 
affiliated with a terrorist organization.
  Look, if you want to stop war, you have to have communication with 
people. I mean, if you look back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is 
one of the gravest crises of the 20th century, it was the fact that the 
United States and Russia were able to engage in a communication.

[[Page 19961]]

  So we have to be very careful that we don't pass any kind of a law 
that would restrict, not just First Amendment rights and not just 
freedom of association, but would restrict the basic kind of diplomacy 
that's used, because everyone here knows that diplomacy is not just 
leaders talking to leaders. All kinds of backdoor diplomacy goes on, 
and I think that that needs to be taken into consideration.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. As I said, Mr. Speaker, I am going to close; so the 
gentleman from Ohio must use his time.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute 
remaining.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I thank my colleagues very much, for whom I have the 
greatest respect, for the opportunity to discuss this; although I 
painfully must disagree with you here.
  Broad sanctions against Iran can only further isolate Iran from the 
international community and cause the regime to be increasingly 
secretive. The sanctions actually play directly into the hands of the 
Iranian Government. They directly undermine the efforts of the Iranian 
people, who have courageously challenged their government often at the 
cost of their lives. The sanctions could be seen as a gift to the 
regime, not just a political gift for polarization within their country 
to cross opposition, but also an economic gift because the price of oil 
will go up, and Iran will cash in on that.
  Section 302 of this bill revokes the President's authority to license 
the export of civilian aircraft parts and repairs for Iranian civil 
aircraft, authority which would ensure the safety of flight for 
humanitarian purposes. This provision recklessly places the lives of 
Iranian Americans in danger. We ought to defeat this bill and stand for 
diplomacy.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Iran remains the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. 
According to our Treasury Department, Iran is a critical transit point 
for funding to support al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This 
network serves as the core pipeline through which al Qaeda moves money, 
facilitators, and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia, 
including al Qaeda's operational commander. Also, Tehran is providing 
key support to the regime in Damascus, another state sponsor of 
terrorism that is of proliferation concern and which is currently 
engaged in the violent repression of the people of Syria.
  Iran is also directly responsible for the deaths of many Americans. 
It continues to sponsor violent extremist groups in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that have killed our men and women in uniform. Just last 
week, a Federal judge found that the Iranian regime provided material 
aid and support for al Qaeda's 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania.
  Just imagine what an emboldened Iran would do if allowed to obtain 
nuclear weapons and the means by which to deliver them. Remember what 
the regime has already said that it wants to do. Ahmadinejad has openly 
proclaimed that Iran seeks a world without America and Zionism; and 
Iran's so-called supreme leader has stated that Iran is prepared to 
transfer the experience, knowledge, and technology of its scientists.
  We should take them at their word and impose crippling sanctions on 
this regime, and it starts tonight, Mr. Speaker, with this bill, H.R. 
1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act. Let's pass it tonight.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Speaker, last year, when we passed the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act, I came to the floor stating that we 
must go further. Our stated goal then, as it is now, was to protect 
Americans, our allies, and the Iranians who suffer under a tyrannical 
regime. We have made it clear that it is unacceptable for Iran to 
develop nuclear weapons.
  While a step in the right direction, last year's version of Iran 
Sanctions gave too much flexibility to the administration and included 
vast loopholes that weakened the law's effectiveness. As I speak now, 
the Obama administration has only applied sanctions to ten foreign 
companies and has given leeway to companies operating in Iran. Iran has 
continued development of nuclear weapons and poses an even greater 
threat to America and her allies.
  Today's bill, H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, takes the 
threat of Iran's nuclear program seriously. This legislation would 
mandate sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran. It would also 
impose sanctions on foreign banks that continue to do business with the 
Iranian Central Bank. Just last week the Senate unanimously supported 
sanctioning the Iranian Central Bank. As the House and Senate are 
deeply divided on other major issues, we all believe that Iran is a 
threat that must be dealt with swiftly and that the Central Bank must 
be sanctioned. H.R. 1905 also would reassert that it is U.S. policy to 
ensure Iran does not obtain the ability to produce nuclear weapons. 
Finally, the bill would close the loophole in current U.S. law that 
allows foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations to bypass U.S. 
sanctions.
  Will this legislation single-handedly prevent a nuclear Iran from 
emerging? Likely it will not. We may have waited too long for our 
actions today to single-handedly dismantle Iran's nuclear ambitions. 
However, with this legislation, allies are already indicating they will 
follow our lead and potentially sanction the Iranian Central Bank as 
well. As we show the rest of the world we take this threat seriously, 
they will too. I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of 
the Iran Threat Reduction Act, though I do have concerns about new 
language added to the bill in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is 
my hope that this language will be corrected before this bill advances.
  The passage last year of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) was a key step in the 
effort to prevent Iran from gaining the ability to develop a nuclear 
weapon and it is important that we continue to apply pressure to the 
Iranian regime.
  It is clear that if President Ahmadinejad and his regime were allowed 
to access a nuclear weapon, Iran would pose a significant threat to 
global stability and security and a threat to the security of the State 
of Israel.
  This bill is an appropriate next step as we work to increase pressure 
on Iran to end its nuclear program and end its open hostility toward 
Israel and the United States. By authorizing new sanctions against Iran 
and by imposing sanctions against additional activities, this bill 
successfully expands on the precedent set by CISADA and sends the right 
message to Iran and to the international community.
  However, as I said, changes were made to this bill during the 
committee process that raise questions about whether or not the bill 
inappropriately limits the ability of any American President and his or 
her entire Administration to conduct diplomacy with Iran. This new 
language could end up jeopardizing American security by preventing our 
diplomats from resolving minor issues before they become more serious 
disputes.
  The Obama Administration, for example, has done an excellent job to 
this point in addressing the threat of a nuclear Iran. Just last month, 
the Administration imposed additional sanctions on Iran, including 
labeling Iran as a ``primary money-laundering concern.'' The 
Administration should also be commended for ensuring the success of 
sanctions by securing the cooperation of the international community in 
imposing serious sanctions that had not even been considered by many of 
our allies until President Obama's pressure led them to toughen their 
stance against Iran. It makes no sense to tie the Administration's 
hands now, particularly given the successful efforts by President Obama 
to toughen the international community's stand against Iran.
  The lead Democratic sponsor of this bill and the senior Democrat on 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, my good friend Mr. Berman, has made 
clear that he does not believe that this bill should limit the 
President's ability to conduct diplomacy as he sees fit, and I agree 
with that assessment. Like Mr. Berman, I believe that this issue must 
be clarified in conference to ensure that this bill does not 
inadvertently exacerbate problems that it is intended to fix.
  I believe that it is imperative that we continue working 
constructively with our allies to strengthen sanctions against Iran and 
so I urge my colleagues to support this bill and to ensure going 
forward that it is implemented in a productive way.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this legislation whose 
purpose is to deny Iran both the ability to support terrorist 
organizations and to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

[[Page 19962]]

  I want to express my strong admiration and support for Representative 
Howard Berman, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. Without Representative Berman's forceful and steadfast 
leadership, this legislation to impose the most stringent sanctions yet 
on Iran would not have come before us. We are standing firm against 
Iran because of Representative Berman's ceaseless efforts to forge a 
bipartisan consensus to act against the grave threat to Israel and 
other allies that is posed by Iran and its leadership.
  Iran is a growing danger to peace and stability in the Middle East 
and beyond. Its nuclear program in and of itself is the most dangerous 
threat to peace in the world today. Together with its support for Hamas 
in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian regime, Iran is an ongoing 
and growing danger to the region and the world.
  Iran's unremitting hostility to the United States, to Israel and 
others requires the most forceful response.
  It is clear that Iran's leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. All of the independent international assessments, including 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency, attest to a steady 
progression to weaponize its uranium assets. At the same time, Iran is 
perfecting its medium and long-range missile capabilities.
  Together, these initiatives can only have one purpose: at the least, 
to enable Iran to exercise nuclear blackmail in pursuit of its extreme 
agenda. But this also means that Iran will have the Iranian people. 
capability to actually use a nuclear weapon, and bring a catastrophe 
upon us all--and upon the Iranian people.
  This is unacceptable. Iran's nuclear program must be stopped. Iran 
simply must not be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon.
  President Obama has been exceptionally clear on Iran. Just last week, 
on December 8, President Obama again was emphatic in stating U.S. 
policy:
  ``. . . What I can say with respect to Iran, I think it's very 
important to remember, particularly given some of the political noise 
out there, that this administration has systematically imposed the 
toughest sanctions on Iraq--on Iran ever.
  ``When we came into office, the world was divided, Iran was unified 
and moving aggressively on its own agenda. Today, Iran is isolated, and 
the world is unified in applying the toughest sanctions that Iran has 
ever experienced. And it's having an impact inside of Iran. And that's 
as a consequence of the extraordinary work that's been done by our 
national security team.
  ``Now, Iran understands that they have a choice: They can break that 
isolation by acting responsibly and foreswearing the development of 
nuclear weapons, which would still allow them to pursue peaceful 
nuclear power, like every other country that's a member of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, or they can continue to operate in a fashion that 
isolates them from the entire world. And if they are pursuing nuclear 
weapons, then I have said very clearly, that is contrary to the 
national security interests of the United States; it's contrary to the 
national security interests of our allies, including Israel; and we are 
going to work with the world community to prevent that.''
  With respect to what the United States is willing to do to prevent 
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, President Obama said, ``No options 
off the table means I'm considering all options.''
  The best way to avoid getting to that point is to do everything we 
can to impose the harshest pressure on Iran in order to make its 
present nuclear course unsustainable to the regime.
  The Iran Threat Reduction Act will put into force the strongest 
sanctions yet against Iran. It imposes sanctions on Iran's oil 
industry, including sanctions on the importation of gasoline, which 
Iran desperately needs. There are increased sanctions on defense 
products and technology.
  Sanctions are also imposed on the Central Bank of Iran and across the 
financial and banking sectors. Because Iran is pursuing a nuclear 
weapon, it will become exceedingly impossible for Iran to engage in 
international commerce.
  The best alternative to the present regime is to encourage Iranians 
opposed to its brutal repression to continue to work for democracy and 
freedom. To this end, this bill provides financial and political 
assistance to individuals and organizations that support democracy in 
Iran.
  In addition, the legislation specifically targets for sanctions those 
who are part of, or associated with, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps--the Iranian regime's arm of repression who wantonly violate the 
human rights of the Iranian people.
  Taken together, these measures constitute the imposition of crippling 
sanctions against the Iranian government and those who do business with 
it.
  This bill delivers one message to the Iran's leaders: stop now.
  We cannot tolerate an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, and the means 
to deliver them against Israel and other countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, in the Middle East.
  The very best strategy to stop Iran's nuclear program is to make 
business and commerce in Iran untenable for as long as Iran is pursuing 
a nuclear capability, and to target the regime's repressive elements--
the Revolutionary Guard--with massive penalties.
  By every indication, time--and patience--with Iran is growing 
shorter. This legislation is the least we can do to bring relentless 
pressure on Iran to change course.
  I support this bill and once again thank Representative Howard Berman 
for his courageous leadership in helping us face the most dangerous 
foreign policy crisis in the world today.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, the recent IAEA report on Iran's nuclear 
program indicates that Iran continues to pursue a clandestine nuclear 
weapons program. Specifically, the IAEA's November 2011 report noted 
that Iran has carried out a number of activities that are relevant to 
the development of a nuclear explosive device. These include efforts, 
some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual-use equipment and 
materials by military related individuals; efforts to develop 
undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material; the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and 
documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network; and work on 
the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including 
the testing of components.
  These are ominous developments that the House simply cannot ignore.
  I am glad that the House is considering this legislation. I recognize 
that sanctions like this are crude instruments, but the threatening 
actions of the government of Iran must be countered. This bill will 
help increase diplomatic pressure on Iran by further tightening 
sanctions, particularly on entities associated with Iran's 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is a key player in Iran's 
nuclear weapons acquisition effort. The IRGC's activities are a key 
reason why this legislation is necessary.
  I recognize that this legislation is not perfect. I am particularly 
troubled by a provision that was added during the committee markup that 
would make it extremely difficult for American officials to meet 
directly or indirectly with some Iranian officials. I vote for this 
with the expectation that this particular provision will be modified 
before it goes to the President for his signature.
  Today we are also considering H.R. 2105, which would strengthen our 
nonproliferation regime against Iran, North Korea, and Syria. It's 
worth remembering that Syria had an undeclared nuclear facility under 
construction at the time it was bombed a few years ago. This bill would 
impose a series of new constraints on countries that may be thinking 
about, or are known or suspected to be, supplying proliferation-related 
technology to any of these three states. One provision would prohibit 
U.S. nuclear cooperation with a country that is assisting the nuclear 
program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced 
conventional weapons to such countries.
  I regret that these bills are necessary. I wish that our past 
peaceful, diplomatic efforts had produced changes in their 
proliferation-related behavior. Unfortunately, they have not. These 
rogue regimes are willing to tolerate considerable international 
isolation as they continue to pursue prohibited weapons programs. But I 
believe there is a point at which the diplomatic and economic isolation 
will begin to threaten their hold on power, and it is when that point 
is reached that we will likely have our best chance of peacefully 
disarming these rogue states. That is why I still believe that 
diplomacy, backed by enforceable sanctions, can ultimately achieve the 
goal we all share, and why I will support these bills.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1905, the Iran 
Threat Reduction Act.
  I thank Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Berman for 
crafting this important, bipartisan bill. H.R. 1905 was reported out of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee by voice vote and comes to the floor with 
over 350 cosponsors--of which I am one.
  We must make it clear to Iran that any pursuit of a nuclear weapons 
program is unacceptable. This bill is designed to significantly 
strengthen the hand of the Obama Administration in applying economic 
pressure on the Iranian regime.
  Specifically, the bill targets Iran's petroleum sector by expanding 
the activities that could

[[Page 19963]]

trigger sanctions to include making certain petroleum resource 
agreements with Iran. It also requires the President, subject to a 
national security waiver, to impose sanctions on entities doing 
business with the Central Bank of Iran if he determines the Central 
Bank is linked to the Iranian nuclear program. The measure also 
requires entities filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
disclose business ties with Iran.
  By most accounts, the sanctions passed by Congress last year have 
ratcheted up pressure on the Iranian government. But Iran continues to 
increase its stockpile of enriched uranium. This measure is necessary 
to give the President the tools to penalize the Iranian regime for its 
continual refusal to heed the objections of the international 
community.
  I encourage my colleagues who have not already expressed support for 
H.R. 1905 to join me in support of the bill.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, in June 2010 President Obama signed into law 
the most far-reaching and carefully targeted sanctions ever imposed on 
Iran. Later that same month, the Administration also succeeded in 
bringing the United Nations Security Council to issue further, 
multilateral sanctions. In May, the United Nations issued a report 
demonstrating that these multilateral sanctions were having a serious, 
deleterious impact on Iran's ability to pursue nuclear weapons.
  The reason these sanctions are having such an impact is that they 
have garnered the cooperation of allies around the world, who saw that 
this Administration was willing to engage Iran. If those allies now 
deem that we are turning back from that posture of engagement, and 
returning to the unilateralism of the Bush Administration, I am 
concerned that our effort to isolate the Iranian regime will collapse. 
It is the comprehensive diplomacy of the Obama Administration that has 
unified our European allies and brought them on board. That could end.
  And in addition, the sanctions called for by H.R. 1905, are less 
targeted and more indiscriminate. They will have an impact, but that 
impact will not be directly related to our justified concern over human 
rights or Iran's nuclear military goals. Rather, they would hurt 
Iranians of all walks of life, including those we hope will become an 
effective opposition to the current leadership. The recent IAEA report 
shows that Iran is not complying with its obligations under the treaty. 
We urgently need to keep a united front on the goal of preventing Iran 
from advancing its nuclear military capability. These sanctions could 
undermine that effort.
  This bill is the wrong move for the global economy as well. In the 
middle of a very fragile economic recovery, these new sanctions could 
wreak havoc in the world oil market, right in the middle of winter, a 
time of our highest consumption. Already, we see oil prices rising. 
According to the Wall Street Journal, new sanctions could increase the 
price of oil by up to $1 per gallon. That would be terrible for U.S. 
consumers, businesses and the economy. But it would be very good for 
Iran's leaders.
  In fact, the sanctions would do more to help Iran's Supreme Leader 
and President than hurt them. Last week, the fierce competition between 
President Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei was threatening to boil 
over when an embezzlement scandal roiled the Iranian leadership. The 
Washington Post reported this week that President Ahmadinejad admitted 
that the country is having a hard time with sanctions, and that now is 
not the time to shake things up in the government. In other words, 
external pressure unified rival factions, and helped the repressive 
regime to achieve a united front.
  These sanctions could also hurt Iranian Americans. Sanctions on 
Iran's Central Bank will make it hard for Iranian Americans to send 
money to relatives in Iran. That could mean that an Iranian living in 
the United States has no legal way of helping his parents or 
grandparents. It could force them to pursue unsafe and illegal channels 
to send legal remittances to family members. That would be a terrible 
injustice, and it would be bad for U.S. interests. The Iranian American 
community is our best way to reach out to people in Iran, and we should 
not be making it harder for them to do so.
  The sanctions could also hurt innocent Iranians in other ways. Aside 
from making it harder to import food and medicine, this bill bans the 
licensing of sales of spare parts for civilian airliners. Iran's 
airlines are already among the most dangerous in the world because of 
the difficulty in maintaining them under sanctions. Over 1,000 people 
have died in air crashes in the last ten years.
  Lastly, this bill is wrong because it would be an expression to the 
world that the United States is not interested in having a relationship 
with the people of Iran. As it stands now, we have very little 
understanding of what is really happening inside Iran. The Obama 
Administration has strengthened our capacity to know what is happening 
inside the country by adding to a network of diplomats in missions 
around the world focusing on developments in Iran.
  But we have a long way to go. Recently Admiral Mike Mullen said that 
this absence of contact is hurting us. At a Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace event shortly before he retired, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff said: ``Even in the darkest days of the Cold 
War, we had links to the Soviet Union. We are not talking to Iran, so 
we don't understand each other.''
  I agree with Admiral Mullen: we need more contact with Iran--about 
Afghanistan, the drug trade, and human rights--not less. Ambassador Tom 
Pickering, in a recent Newsweek essay, also criticized this bill 
because of the constitutional questions it raises about the separation 
of powers.
  CISADA sanctions and U.N. measures are having a serious effect, and 
intensifying rifts in Iran's leadership. This bill would close those 
rifts as Iran's leaders circle their wagons, and would give them an 
excuse as to why things are bad on the economic front. I can't support 
it as it is written.
  Mr. YOUNG of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 
1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011. This bill promises to meet 
the threat the Islamic Republic of Iran poses and takes significant, 
tangible steps in limiting Iran's uranium enrichment and targeting 
Iran's nefarious activities.
  The latest United Nations weapons inspectors' disclosure and 
International Atomic Energy Agency report on the Islamic Republic of 
Iran are consubstantial. The Iranian nuclear weapons program is in 
direct contravention to Iran's ratification of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, endangers regional stability, and poses an unfathomable threat 
to international security. The Iranian Regime has defied international 
order and expectations in its undeniable pursuit of nuclear weapons and 
its close relationship with foreign terrorist organizations.
  That is why the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011 is so important. 
These sanctions are right and just based on irrefutable evidence of 
malice on the international stage. We must declare that it is United 
States policy to deny, at every juncture, the ability for Iran to fund 
and pursue its nuclear program and its policy of inciting violence 
abroad. The Iranian regime's continuous circumvention of past sanctions 
and continued noncompliance require more aggressive actions.
  The only way to ensure the Iranian regime cannot circumvent 
international will is to take definitive actions. The sanctions in the 
Iran Threat Reduction Act in conjunction with the language in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 to formally sanction the 
Central Bank of Iran, CBI, are the steps required at this moment to 
impede the progress of Iran's ambitions. By sanctioning the CBI and 
creating accountability to those that deal with Iran, we limit the 
Iranian leadership's ability to function and directly curtail the 
infrastructures that sustain Iran's illicit nuclear ambitions and its 
state sponsorship of terrorist organizations.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Iranian Threat Reduction Act of 
2011 and stand with me against the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear 
program and Iran's known links to various terrorist organizations.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, let's start with what we know:
  First, Iran is actively seeking nuclear weapons, and the 
international community has ratcheted up sanctions to prevent Tehran 
from getting the bomb.
  Second, Iran is attempting to circumvent these sanctions, with 
Iranian nationals establishing front companies in other countries to 
get around U.N. restrictions.
  Just this year, a grand jury indicted a firm established by Iranians 
but operating in Istanbul for allegedly procuring materials for Iran's 
ballistic missile program.
  Third, we must be vigilant about companies that deliberately hide 
their ties to Iran.
  But what about companies that don't even try to conceal their Iranian 
connections?
  In October, this Congress passed H.R. 1904, the Southeast Arizona 
Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This bill will allow Rio Tinto, a 
foreign company that does business with Iran, to obtain public land in 
Arizona so that it can mine for copper here in the United States.
  But when Republicans in this chamber had a chance to join Democrats 
to ensure these business ties between Rio Tinto and Iran were severed 
as a condition of doing business on our land, every single member of 
the Republican majority voted no.
  With the threat of nuclear weapons landing in the hands of 
Ahmadinejad, the stakes are

[[Page 19964]]

simply too high to change the rules when the majority sees fit.
  Vote yes on H.R. 1905 today, and we must insist on strong nuclear 
nonproliferation conditions in H.R. 1904.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, this statement is submitted as an 
extension of my remarks on the House floor, December 13, 2011, 
discussing H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011:
  I thank my friend from California, the Ranking Member of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, for discussing Section 601(c) of the Iran 
Threat Reduction Act of 2011 with me.
  Despite his helpful words, I still have strong reservations about 
language used in this legislation.
  Specifically with the language in Section 601(c) of this bill, which 
states that:

       ``No person employed with the United States Government may 
     contact in an official or unofficial capacity any person that 
     is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated 
     with, or is serving as a representative of the Government of 
     Iran; and presents a threat to the United States or is 
     affiliated with terrorist organizations.''

  As most of my colleagues would agree, the whole of the Iranian 
government is itself a ``threat'' to the United States. Further, Iran 
actively supports terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, 
both listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the State Department. 
It would be strange logic indeed to disassociate any of the officials 
who work for Iran from a ``threat'' to the U.S. It would appear 
impossible to comply with this language.
  Given the inability to comply with this language, this leaves the 
waiver provision by the President as the only means to initiating 
contact with Iran. Diplomacy tied to a 15-day countdown is ineffective 
at best and extremely dangerous at worst. Luckily, this restriction on 
the Executive Power to conduct the country's foreign policy is likely 
unconstitutional. This waiver is, on its face, questionable, 
unnecessarily ties the hands of our President, and is poor policy.
  Congress would be better served in these challenging times to do its 
own job, rather than making it harder for the President to do his.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Iran Threat 
Reduction Act of 2011.
  I want to thank both the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs for their efforts on passing this 
important legislation.
  I am a proud co-sponsor of this bill.
  Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear capabilities and its support for 
terrorism form one of our most serious foreign policy challenges.
  And, the Iranian regime's treatment of its own people horrifies the 
world.
  This legislation sends a strong message to the Iranian government--
there is a price to pay for ignoring the will of the international 
community.
  It is no secret that Iran has been a destabilizing and dangerous 
force in the Middle East.
  From repeatedly threatening our ally Israel to providing support for 
attacks on U.S. troops in the region, Iran has sought at every turn to 
thwart U.S. and international efforts.
  Let's be clear though--while the Iranian government conceives of 
these actions, it is the cruel and twisted core of the Iranian regime--
the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps--that executes its daily threats and 
brutalities. That's why it is so important that this measure targets 
the IRGC.
  This legislation isn't all that we must do. It is also time for tough 
and lasting pressure on those who do business with the Central Bank of 
Iran.
  The world must not allow Iran to obtain nuclear capabilities, for the 
sake of the region and the world.
  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, Iran's quest for nuclear weapons puts the 
entire globe at risk.
  Iran has proven itself to be less than truthful in its discussions 
about its nuclear weapons program. It hid its nuclear enrichment 
facility in Qom from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It 
told the world it was enriching uranium for non-military purposes, but 
the enrichment site at Qom and elsewhere appear to have no civilian 
application.
  And while sanctions have had some impact, Iran has persisted in its 
efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran has also succeeded in evading 
the impact of existing sanctions by creating one front company after 
another to shield its activities.
  What's particularly troubling, is that at the same time as it is 
building its nuclear program, Iran has continued to threaten its 
neighbors. It has armed and funded Hezbollah and Hamas, which are 
dedicated to eradicating the state of Israel. In 2005, Iran's President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Israel should be wiped off the face of 
the map. In 2008, he said: ``The people of the region would not miss 
the narrowest opportunity to annihilate this false regime.''
  But Israel is not Iran's only target. In November a senior commander 
of Iran's Revolutionary Guard threatened to bomb NATO bases in Turkey. 
Iran is currently threatening to close the straits of Hormuz, which 
will affect shipping, with particular impact on the crude oil exported 
from Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Iraq and 
liquid natural gas from Qatar.
  Given Iran's success in developing a nuclear program, a number of its 
neighbors have suggested that they may follow suit, creating further 
instability in the region. Earlier this month, Turki al-Faisal, who has 
served as the Saudi intelligence chief and as ambassador to the United 
States, suggested that Saudi Arabia may seek nuclear weapons. Wikileaks 
revealed that Egypt's leaders told U.S. officials that Egypt would 
acquire nuclear weapons if Iran did. This lends greater urgency to the 
need to persuade Iran to end its nuclear ambitions.
  Nuclear weapons are particularly threatening when held by a nation 
whose leaders have no apparent respect for human life. Iran has an 
unrivaled record of human rights abuses, from the imprisonment of 
people of the Ba'hai faith, to the use of the death penalty against 
minors, to the use of torture and amputation against prisoners, to 
discrimination against women, to the suppression and murder of members 
of the democracy movement. With thousands of its citizens murdered, 
tortured or imprisoned, Iran's record of human rights abuses is among 
the worst in the world.
  History shows that when dictators threaten their neighbors, there's 
good reason to fear. And given Iran's history of threats, its dedicated 
progress in enriching uranium, its evident determination to hide its 
nuclear program from the world and its abysmal human rights record, the 
world should do everything possible to hinder it from obtaining nuclear 
weapons.
  That's why I strongly support H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction 
Act, which would implement a commonsense enhancement of existing 
sanctions--by providing greater options to sanction entities doing 
business with the Central Bank of Iran; by expanding the types 
petroleum-related activities that could trigger sanctions to include 
certain petroleum resource agreements with Iran, purchasing Iranian 
debt and supporting port facility construction and management; by 
imposing sanctions on individuals involved in human rights abuses or 
terrorism; by imposing sanctions on those who do business with Iran's 
Revolutionary Guard; by allowing states or other organizations to 
divest from Iran; by identifying those entities that are helping Iran 
evade sanctions, among other things.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in voting in support of H.R. 1905.
  Ms. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, let's be clear. Iran activities are troubling 
and our Nation must continue to work to build an international 
coalition to pressure and isolate Iran until it verifiably ends such 
activities. The policies we use to effect our goals are as important as 
the rhetoric about being tough on Iran.
  I vote for this legislation while noting it has flaws that must be 
addressed in the other body, in cooperation with the Administration. I 
will speak to some of those needed changes in a minute. However, I 
think other provisions such as language targeting government officials 
who commit human rights abuses and the provisions aimed at stopping 
Iran's Revolutionary Guard from trying to evade current U.S. and 
multilateral sanctions make sense. When the U.S. and our international 
allies work together, our efforts on Iran, including sanctions and 
diplomacy, are more effective and stronger. The same can be said when 
the Congress and the Administration are working together.
  We should not confuse support for this bill with the fact that there 
exists a vast divergence of views in this Congress on the best policy 
to deal with the threat posed by Iran. However, the Republican majority 
determines the schedule and has made a choice to bring this bill up 
under a procedure that prevents any Member with other ideas (either to 
make the bill stronger or weaker depending on your view) from making 
further changes to it.
  Even with my yes vote, I believe this legislation is in need of 
improvement. Sending a strong message is one thing but enacting an 
effective policy that supports that message is another. And this bill 
must be improved so our policy can match the strong message.
  Where can this bill be improved? I have long been concerned and I 
have expressed those concerns on this floor before about unilateral 
sanctions. Treasury Secretary Geithner said last year, ``to be truly 
effective in ending

[[Page 19965]]

Iran's proliferation activities and Iran's support for terrorism, we 
need to have in place a concerted, international approach. This is not 
something the United States can do alone. We need other countries to 
move with us.'' I concur wholeheartedly.
  Yet, I know that the Administration has warned some provisions, like 
mandatory Iranian Central Bank Sanctions, may end up splintering the 
international coalition that it worked relentlessly to build as 
exemplified by passage of last year's UN Security Council Sanction 
Resolution. In a recent letter, Secretary Geithner made clear his 
concerns that sanctioning the Central Bank of Iran could negatively 
affect ``many of our closest allies and largest trading partners.'' 
Again, the most likely to be adversely affected by this bill are our 
closest allies, the ones we depend on to pressure Iran.
  Why would this be so? According to Secretary Geithner, ``rather than 
motivating these countries to join us in increasing pressure on Iran, 
they are more likely to resent our actions and resist following our 
lead--a consequence that would serve the Iranians more than it harms 
them.'' The Administration has suggested ways to achieve the goals of 
this bill while ensuring we don't cripple the international coalition 
and consensus that it has worked so hard to build against Iran. 
Congress should listen. A piece of legislation that results in fewer 
countries working with us to isolate Iran and bring a verifiable end to 
its troubling nuclear activities is not a victory in my book.
  Another provision in the bill--added in Committee--would prohibit 
U.S. diplomatic or other contact, whether intentionally or 
incidentally, with certain Iranian government officials. Whether 
intended by its authors or not, concerns have been raised about 
negative impact on our diplomatic efforts. I urge the Senate to remove 
this provision. It adds nothing to the bill's effectiveness but brings 
unnecessary confusion and controversy.
  H.R. 1905 would also require the President to report, after its 
enactment, on negative impacts the bill would cause on our relations 
with friendly nations and on the U.S. economy. I think this gets it 
backwards. We need to get a better bill that addresses those concerns 
up front, rather than wait until after we have shattered the 
international coalition.
  Again, I support a strong and unified international effort against 
Iran with U.S. leadership but my continued support for this legislation 
requires those in Senate (who will have the opportunity to amend it 
unlike the House did) to work with the Administration to address 
possible negative impacts on our diplomatic efforts, economy, and the 
Iranian people. This occured last year to get CISADA passed and I hope 
we repeat it again this time.
  Lastly, no one should take passage of this legislation as a sign that 
diplomacy is off the table and that the only option going forward is a 
military strike. We need to invest in diplomacy--maybe now more than 
ever--and to continue to work with our international allies and others 
interested in peace and stability in the region.
  Ms. LEE of California. Mr. Speaker, while I am deeply concerned about 
Iran's capacity to develop nuclear weapons and I support targeted 
sanctions against Iran, I voted no on H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat 
Reduction Act of 2011 because I do not believe it would accomplish its 
stated goal of reducing the threat from Iran.
  I am concerned that at a time when more nuanced diplomatic tools are 
needed to successfully address this important and multifaceted effort 
to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, this legislation would 
dangerously limit the flexibility of the U.S. Government to engage 
directly with Iran to turn back these efforts. The Administration has 
made it clear that the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and 
Divestment Act (CISADA), enacted just last year after careful 
deliberation by both the House and Senate, is an adequate and effective 
tool for addressing the threat potentially posed through multilateral 
negotiations with Iran. I have spoken directly with officials at the 
State Department and they tell me they are very concerned that piling 
on additional sanctions could have the counterproductive result of 
sending the already destabilized economies of our European allies into 
a tailspin and threaten the stability of the global economic recovery.
  I am also troubled by the 601(c) provision inserted during mark-up of 
the bill, which takes the unprecedented step of restricting dialogue 
between U.S. and Iranian officials. The controversial provision would 
prohibit contact between U.S. diplomats and any Iranian official who 
``would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national 
security interests of the United States.'' This is dangerous and would 
have prohibited the efforts that secured the release of two of my 
constituents, Sarah Shourd and Shane Bauer, along with their friend and 
fellow U.C. Berkeley alumnus Josh Fattal, who were detained for years 
in Iran after being arrested while hiking near Iran's border with 
Northern Iraq. Furthermore, not only is it unclear how restricting 
negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program would advance our 
security interests, it should be clear that taking this option off the 
table is counterproductive in addressing the very real threats that 
Iran presents.
  It is my hope that my colleagues will address these issues in 
conference and return a bill for final passage that considers what it 
takes to effectively undertake national security strategy execution. It 
is time for us to stop posturing and to understand that far from a 
reward to withhold, diplomacy is a critical tool for protecting United 
States national security interests.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1905, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

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