[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 11907-11908]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

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   SENATE RESOLUTION 573--URGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE 
    STRATEGY TO ENSURE STABILITY IN SOMALIA, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

  Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Ms. Klobuchar, and Mr. Franken) submitted 
the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations:

                              S. Res. 573

       Whereas Somalia has been without a functioning central 
     government since 1991, resulting in lawlessness and an 
     increasingly desperate humanitarian situation;
       Whereas, despite the return of the internationally 
     recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu 
     and ongoing diplomatic efforts through the Djibouti Peace 
     Process, supported by the United Nations, there has been 
     little improvement in the governance or stability of southern 
     and central Somalia, and armed opposition groups continue to 
     exploit this situation;
       Whereas the traditional mediation role played by Somali 
     elders has been eroded as the dynamics of conflict and the 
     proliferation of weapons make it difficult to influence 
     warring parties;
       Whereas, since 2007, armed violence has resulted in the 
     deaths of at least 21,000 people in Somalia and the 
     displacement of nearly 2,000,000 people, including over 
     500,000 refugees in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
     Djibouti, Tanzania, and Uganda;
       Whereas the United Nations estimates that 3,200,000 people, 
     or 43 percent of the population of Somalia, are in need of 
     humanitarian assistance and livelihood support to survive;
       Whereas the United Nations reports that almost 1,000,000 
     displaced Somalis in need of aid cannot be reached by United 
     Nations refugee and food agencies because of growing 
     insecurity and the threat of kidnappings to staff;
       Whereas local humanitarian organizations are trying to meet 
     the needs of the Somali people by restoring basic social 
     services in urban and rural communities, which places them on 
     the front lines of the conflict and make them vulnerable 
     targets for killings, kidnappings, or being accused of 
     working for foreign governments;
       Whereas al Shabaab, which has been designated as a foreign 
     terrorist organization by the Department of State, and other 
     armed groups continue to wage war against the Transitional 
     Federal Government in Mogadishu and one another to gain 
     control over territory in Somalia;
       Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many 
     bombings--including suicide attacks--in Mogadishu, as well as 
     in central and northern Somalia, typically targeting 
     officials of the Government of Somalia and perceived allies 
     of the TFG;
       Whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, al Shabaab is 
     subjecting inhabitants of areas under its control in southern 
     Somalia to executions, cruel punishments, including 
     amputations and floggings, and repressive social control;
       Whereas the human rights situation in Somalia has 
     dramatically worsened over the past several years with 
     increased numbers of killings, torture, kidnappings, and 
     rape;
       Whereas the 2009 Department of State Country Terrorism 
     Report notes that ``Somalia's fragile transitional Federal 
     government, protracted state of violent instability, its 
     long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to 
     the Arabian Peninsula, made the country an attractive 
     location for international terrorists seeking a transit or 
     launching point for operations in Somalia or elsewhere'';
       Whereas the situation in southern and central Somalia, 
     particularly the activity of al Shabaab, poses direct threats 
     to the stability of Puntland and Somaliland regions, as well

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     as the stability of neighboring states and the wider region;
       Whereas al Shabaab leaders have stated their intent to 
     provide recruits and support for al Qaeda in the Arabian 
     Peninsula in Yemen;
       Whereas the Government of Eritrea has provided military and 
     financial support for armed opposition groups, including al 
     Shebaab, in part as a proxy front in its continuing tensions 
     with Ethiopia;
       Whereas, according to the most recent report by the United 
     Nations Somalia Monitoring Group, arms, ammunitions, and 
     military or dual-use equipment continue to enter Somalia at a 
     fairly steady rate, primarily from Yemen and Ethiopia;
       Whereas, in July 2009, the Department of State confirmed 
     that, in addition to other support for the TFG, it had 
     provided cash to purchase weapons and ammunitions for the 
     TFG's efforts ``to repel the onslaught of extremist forces 
     which are intent on destroying the Djibouti peace process'';
       Whereas, according to most recent report by the United 
     Nations Somalia Monitoring Group, ``[d]espite infusions of 
     foreign training and assistance, government security forces 
     remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt--a composite of 
     independent militias loyal to senior government officials and 
     military officers who profit from the business of war and 
     resist their integration under a single command'';
       Whereas, on April 24, 2010, President Barack Obama issued 
     an executive order to sanction or freeze the assets of 
     militants who threaten, both directly and indirectly, the 
     stability of Somalia, as well as individuals involved in 
     piracy off Somalia's coast;
       Whereas, in March 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, 
     Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the 
     National Counterterrorism Center, noted that ``[s]ince 2006, 
     a number of U.S. citizens [have] traveled to Somalia, 
     possibly to train in extremist training camps'';
       Whereas, in September 2009, at a hearing of the Committee 
     on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, 
     the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Michael 
     Leiter testified that ``the potential for al-Qaeda operatives 
     in Somalia to commission Americans to return to the United 
     States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains of 
     significant concern''; and
       Whereas the extraordinary and ongoing crisis in Somalia has 
     enormous humanitarian consequences and direct national 
     security implications for the United States and our allies in 
     the region: Now therefore be it
       Resolved, That the Senate--
       (1) acknowledges the urgency of addressing the threats to 
     United States national security in Somalia and the conditions 
     that foster those threats;
       (2) reaffirms its commitment to stand with all the people 
     of Somalia who aspire to a future free of terrorism and 
     violence through advancing political reconciliation and 
     building legitimate and inclusive governance institutions;
       (3) recognizes the difficult, but very important, work 
     being done by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
     to help secure parts of Mogadishu, and reaffirms its support 
     for the mission;
       (4) calls on the Transitional Federal Government in 
     Somalia--
       (A) to cease immediately any use of child soldiers;
       (B) to ensure better accountability and transparency for 
     all received security assistance;
       (C) to renew its commitment to political reconciliation; 
     and
       (D) to take necessary steps toward becoming a more 
     legitimate and inclusive government in the eyes of the people 
     of Somalia;
       (5) calls on all actors and governments in the region, 
     particularly the Government of Eritrea, to play a productive 
     role in helping to bring about peace and stability to 
     Somalia, including ceasing to provide any financial or 
     material support to armed opposition groups in Somalia;
       (6) welcomes efforts by the President to bring greater 
     focus and resources toward understanding and monitoring the 
     situation in Somalia;
       (7) urges the President to develop a comprehensive strategy 
     to ensure that all United States humanitarian, diplomatic, 
     political, and counterterrorism programs in Somalia and the 
     wider Horn of Africa are coordinated and making progress 
     toward the long-term goal of establishing stability, respect 
     for human rights, and functional, inclusive governance in 
     Somalia;
       (8) urges the President and Secretary of State, as part of 
     a comprehensive strategy--
       (A) to provide greater support for a range of diplomatic 
     initiatives to engage clan leaders, business leaders, and 
     civil society leaders in Somalia and the Somali Diaspora in 
     political reconciliation and consensus-building;
       (B) to ensure better oversight, monitoring, and 
     transparency of all United States security assistance 
     provided to the TFG;
       (C) to increase and strengthen the United States diplomatic 
     team working on Somalia, including the appointment of a 
     senior envoy, and to ensure that these officials have the 
     necessary resources, access, and mandate;
       (D) to pursue opportunities for periodic, temporary United 
     States Government travel to Somalia, consistent with any 
     security concerns;
       (E) to expand and deepen our engagement with the regions of 
     Somaliland and Puntland and other regional administrations in 
     order to promote good governance, effective law enforcement, 
     respect for human rights, and stability in these regions;
       (F) to explore, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, increased options for pressuring individuals, 
     governments, and other actors who undertake economic 
     activities that support armed opposition groups and violence 
     in Somalia; and
       (G) to develop, in consultation with the Administrator of 
     the United States Agency for International Development, 
     creative and flexible mechanisms for delivering basic 
     humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia while 
     minimizing the risk of significant diversion to armed 
     opposition groups.

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