[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 8685-8686]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




           THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY: LEADERS WITHOUT FOLLOWERS

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my 
remarks today to the National Policy Conference of The Nixon Center and 
The Richard Nixon Foundation be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       A central tenet of the Obama Administration's security 
     policy is that, if the U.S. ``leads by example'' we can 
     ``reassert our moral leadership'' and influence other nations 
     to do things. It is the way the President intends to advance 
     his goal of working toward a world free of nuclear weapons 
     and to deal with the stated twin top priorities of the 
     Administration: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. 
     This morning, I want to test this thesis--to explore whether, 
     for example, limiting our nuclear capability will cause 
     others who pose problems to change their policies.
       To begin the discussion, let me mention just three specific 
     examples of things the administration has done to ``lead by 
     example.''
       First, the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
     changed U.S. declaratory policy to limit the circumstances 
     under which the U.S. would use nuclear weapons to defend the 
     nation on the theory that if we appear to devalue nuclear 
     weapons, other states will similarly devalue them and choose 
     not to obtain them. The downside, of course, is that such 
     emphasis on nuclear weapons only reminds states, including 
     rogue regimes, of their value.
       Second, the central point of the START agreement, was a 
     significant draw down of our nuclear stockpiles. And, the 
     Administration has already been talking about a next phase 
     that could even include reductions by countries in addition 
     to the U.S. and Russia.
       Third, President Obama wants to commit the U.S. never again 
     to test nuclear weapons under the CTBT so that, hopefully, 
     others will follow our example.
       I'll discuss these three examples in more detail in a 
     minute.
       Obviously, if the theory is wrong, we could be risking a 
     lot. For example, we could be jeopardizing our own security 
     and the nuclear umbrella that assures 31 other countries of 
     their security. Ironically, as our capacity is reduced, their 
     propensity to build their own deterrent is increased--the 
     opposite of what we intend.
       We could be sacrificing our freedom to deploy the full 
     range of missile defenses we need by agreeing to arms control 
     agreements like START or other agreements or unilateral 
     actions like the U.S. statement on missile defense 
     accompanying the START treaty.
       Were we to ratify the CTBT, we would forever legally give 
     up our right to test weapons. That's a very serious 
     limitation.
       The point is, leading by example means sacrifices on our 
     part that could have significant consequences. The question 
     is whether the risks are justified.
       Zero nukes: what does President Obama want to achieve with 
     this strategy? Barack Obama has long advocated zero nuclear 
     weapons going all the way back to his writings as a college 
     student in 1983. In fact, he wrote then that the drive to 
     achieve a ban on all nuclear weapons testing would be ``a 
     powerful first step towards a nuclear free world.'' He's even 
     cast it in moral terms, saying that ``as a nuclear power, as 
     the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the 
     United States has a moral responsibility to act.''
       There are four big assumptions here: that the Global Zero 
     idea, a world without nuclear weapons, is necessarily a good 
     thing; that such a world could realistically be achieved; 
     that our leadership here will help to reestablish previously 
     lost moral force behind U.S. policy; and that, if we lead by 
     example, others will follow.
       The first three assumptions need to be carefully examined; 
     though this morning, I will focus only on the last.
       Suffice it to say the following about the first three 
     assumptions: first, is ``zero'' really desirable? If nuclear 
     deterrence has kept the peace between superpowers since the 
     end of World War II, which itself cost over 60 million lives 
     by some estimates, are nuclear weapons really a risk to peace 
     or a contributor to peace?
       Second, since the know-how exists to build nuclear weapons 
     and they can't be disinvented, is it really realistic to 
     think they could be effectively eliminated? For example, if 
     we get near to zero, any nation that can breakout and build 
     even a few nuclear weapons will become a superpower.
       And the superpowers themselves will find it difficult to 
     get close to zero. For example, if Russia deploys ten extra 
     nuclear weapons today, that's not a big deal, we have 2,200 
     deployed. If, however, each side is at 100 weapons, and one 
     side deploys an extra ten, that's a significant military 
     breakout. And while we will have 1,550 deployed weapons under 
     the new treaty, and China will still have only several 
     hundred, as we go lower, China has every incentive to build 
     up quickly and become a peer competitor to the U.S. How do we 
     deal with these problems? It's not clear we know.
       Third, do we really have to ``restore our moral 
     leadership'' and is it necessarily more moral or moral at all 
     to eschew weapons that have been a deterrent to conflict, but 
     the elimination of which could make the world again safe for 
     conventional wars between the great powers? Again, World War 
     2 cost an estimated 60 million lives. After 1945, the great 
     powers have been deterred from war with each other.
       These three questions deserve full debate--but, it is the 
     last assumption I want to explore today--that if we lead, 
     others will follow.
       Put another way: is the world just waiting for the U.S. to 
     further limit or eliminate its nuclear weapons? Is it true 
     that if we lead by example, others will follow, and nuclear 
     weapons will cease to exist? And, does our credibility in the 
     world depend on taking these actions?
       The President outlined his vision in an interview with the 
     New York Times last year: ``it is naive for us to think that 
     we can grow our nuclear stockpiles, the Russians continue to 
     grow their nuclear stockpiles, and our allies grow their 
     nuclear stockpiles, and that in that environment we're going 
     to be able to pressure countries like Iran and North Korea 
     not to pursue nuclear weapons themselves.''
       The first problem with that is that it's factually wrong--
     we are not growing our nuclear stockpiles, we're reducing 
     them, and we have been for years. The second problem is that, 
     notwithstanding our reductions, others are not following 
     suit.
       One of the first places President Obama chose to lead was 
     to modify our approach to the use of nuclear weapons in his 
     new Nuclear Posture Review. I previously mentioned his new 
     policy of non-use against certain kinds of non-nuclear 
     attacks.
       A second feature of the NPR was to artificially take off 
     the table some necessary options like replacement of nuclear 
     components to make them more reliable and safe. This is 
     leading by example that other nuclear powers aren't following 
     and we shouldn't be doing if we want to ensure that our 
     weapons will do what we want them to do.
       The Administration's next step was signing the NEW START 
     treaty, with significant reductions to our deployed warheads 
     and delivery vehicles and potential limitations on missile 
     defense. But Russia was going to reduce its numbers with or 
     without the treaty--so we should not conclude their acts were 
     because we led by example. And it remains to be seen whether 
     what we gave up will be worth the ostensible ``reset'' in our 
     relations.
       And, after NEW START, there is another arms control treaty. 
     Let me quote Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller 
     in a speech titled ``The Long Road from Prague'': ``The 
     second major arms control objective of the Obama 
     Administration is the ratification of the Comprehensive 
     Nuclear Test-Ban

[[Page 8686]]

     Treaty (CTBT). There is no step that we could take that would 
     more effectively restore our moral leadership and improve our 
     ability to reenergize the international nonproliferation 
     consensus than to ratify the CTBT.''
       Is it true we have acted badly and must atone to restore 
     our moral leadership? Here's what we've done in disarmament 
     already: the U.S. has reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile 
     by 75 percent since the end of the Cold War and 90 percent 
     since the height of the Cold War (this doesn't even include 
     the NEW START figures). The U.S. has not conducted a nuclear 
     weapons test since 1992. It has not designed a new warhead 
     since the 80s nor has it built one since the 1990s. We have 
     pulled back almost all of our tactical nuclear weapons, and 
     in the new NPR, we will retire our sea launched cruise 
     missile.
       And what has this ``leadership'' gotten us? Has it 
     impressed Iran and North Korea? Has it kept Russia and China 
     and France and Great Britain and India and Pakistan from 
     modernizing (and in some cases growing) their nuclear weapons 
     stockpiles?
       Russia is, in fact, deploying a new multipurpose attack 
     submarine that can launch long range cruise missiles with 
     nuclear warheads against land targets at a range of 5,000 
     kilometers . . . just barely missing the threshold to be 
     considered a strategic weapon under the New START treaty. Of 
     course, a tactical nuclear weapon has a strategic effect if 
     it is detonated above a U.S. or allied city.
       Will Pakistan or North Korea ratify the CTBT just because 
     the U.S. does? Not likely. In fact, both nations continued 
     their nuclear weapons tests after the U.S. unilaterally 
     stopped testing and even after the U.S. signed the CTBT.
       Have these steps motivated our allies to be more helpful in 
     dealing with real threats like Iran and North Korea and with 
     nuclear terrorism? If we ratify CTBT, would Great Britain 
     suddenly have a new motivation to help us more on Iran? If we 
     cut more nuclear weapons from our stockpile would France now 
     be willing to cut back on its force de frappe?
       Was Russia willing to discuss its tactical nuclear weapons 
     as part of the current START treaty? Russia's President has 
     said that ``possessing nuclear weapons is crucial to pursuing 
     independent policies and to safeguarding sovereignty.'' In 
     fact, Russia appears to be as difficult as ever, announcing 
     that it will build a nuclear reactor in Syria on the same day 
     that the U.S. announced it will begin nuclear cooperation 
     with Russia.
       Has all of our work toward disarmament impressed Turkey to 
     play a constructive or obstructive role in reining in Iran?
       The recent Nuclear Security Summit saw no meaningful new 
     commitments because of our newfound moral leadership. In fact 
     the most the Administration could say for it is 47 nations 
     signed a non-binding communique.
       And with regard to the Non Proliferation Treaty review 
     conference, which is underway as we speak in New York, will 
     our moral leadership bring us any benefit there? It is not 
     encouraging to see the conference devolve into a discussion 
     of Israel's nuclear weapons program as opposed to Iran's.
       When countries have cut back their nuclear weapons 
     programs, it was for other reasons, namely, their own 
     security interests or economic requirements. Nations, with 
     the exception of the U.S. it seems, take actions that they 
     perceive to be in their best interests. They do not change 
     their national security posture merely because of U.S. 
     disarmament. They may even observe these steps as weakness 
     and opt to double down on their aggressive outlaw actions as 
     a result.
       For example, Russia agreed to the limits in the new START 
     treaty, but, as I noted, that was only because it was already 
     going down to those levels, not because of some U.S. moral 
     leadership.
       Nor did South Africa abandon its nuclear weapons program 
     because of our leadership--it was because of the fall of the 
     apartheid regime.
       Did Libya end its program because we opted not to go ahead 
     with RNEP or RRW? No, Libya saw 160,000 U.S. troops in Iraq 
     enforcing UN Security Council Resolutions on nuclear 
     proliferation and feared it would be next.
       These same interests, security and commercial, also dictate 
     nations' actions with regard to the nuclear terrorism and 
     proliferation issues. For example, Russia says that an Iran 
     with nuclear weapons is a threat. And it will go along with 
     some sanctions, e.g., sanctions that raise the global price 
     of energy, of which Russia is the world's leading exporter--
     but it won't go along with sanctions cutting off Iran's flow 
     of weapons, which Russia sells in great quantity.
       And even a European country like Germany would like the 
     U.S. to remove from that country the tactical nuclear weapons 
     we deploy there for the defense of NATO, but, at the same 
     time, is actually growing its economic links to Iran--and it 
     appears willing only to impose sanctions agreed to by the 
     U.N. and the E.U.
       Bottom line: there is no evidence our moral leadership in 
     arms control and disarmament will convince countries to set 
     aside their calculations of the impact of nuclear 
     proliferation and nuclear terrorism on their national 
     security, and help us address these threats.
       The Administration's security agenda is based on the notion 
     of the U.S. making substantive changes to our national 
     security posture in the hopes of persuading others to act, 
     frequently contrary to their economic or security interests.
       But this good faith assumption that others will reciprocate 
     is not supported by any evidence--it is certainly not 
     informed by any past experience. Before big changes are made 
     to our security posture, the President owes it to the 
     American people to explain exactly how the changes will 
     improve our security. It cannot just be a matter of change 
     and hope. Too much is at stake.
       I also think the American people will be quite surprised to 
     learn that their nation lost its moral leadership somewhere 
     and that concessions to their security are now necessary to 
     reestablish it.
       As a complete aside, the most recent example of the Obama 
     Administration's thinking in this regard is the Assistant 
     Secretary of State for Democracy and Human Rights' comparison 
     of the immigration law passed by my state of Arizona to the 
     systematic policy of abuse and repression by the ``People's 
     Republic of China.''
       As you can tell by now, I am not much impressed with the 
     notion that we can achieve important U.S. security goals by 
     leadership which stresses concession by the U.S. Rather than 
     change and hope, I adhere to the philosophy of President 
     Reagan epitomized in the words ``peace through strength.''
       A strong America is the best guarantor of a peaceful world 
     that has ever been known. And there is nothing immoral about 
     strength that keeps the peace.

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