[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 8278-8280]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                 CONSIDERATION OF THE NEW START TREATY

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I rise today to address some very 
important concerns that arise in my mind in the evaluation of the new 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, that was submitted yesterday to 
the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. I do not believe 
that the Senate must ratify this treaty, as some of my colleagues 
suggest. But, rather, I begin with the proposition that a new treaty 
with Russia is not essential for our national security; may well be a 
distraction from addressing the real threats of nuclear proliferation 
by other nations and nuclear terrorism; and to the extent the President 
puts forth this treaty as a step toward his idea of a world without 
nuclear weapons, it is a naive and potentially risky strategic 
approach.
  Basically, the purpose of arms control is to reduce the risk of war 
by enhancing strategic stability and security and, if possible, lessen 
the costs of preparing for war. It is clear that the strategic balance 
between the United States and Russia is, for the most part, stable, 
while U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are already on a downward 
slope.
  Both sides had made a commitment, under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, to 
reduce deployed nuclear weapons to a range between 2,200 and 1,700 
warheads, which was a significant reduction from the START I level of 
6,000 warheads. Furthermore, the United States has no plans to increase 
the size of its nuclear force, and it appears to most informed 
observers that Russia, for economic reasons, was headed to even lower 
levels. Quite simply, there is no responsible prospect of an expanding 
nuclear weapons competition between our two nations. The United States 
and Russian nuclear arsenals are not the real problem today. 
Regrettably, the one category of nuclear weapons in which there is a 
true imbalance--tactical nuclear weapons--is not addressed by the new 
treaty.
  I would agree with my colleagues, such as Senator Dick Lugar, that 
the verification provisions under START I should not have been allowed 
to expire with the treaty on December 5, but this could have been dealt 
with through a simple 5-year extension as permitted by the START I 
treaty. Instead, the administration was committed to a more ambitious 
approach which it has found to be more challenging than expected, which 
in turn has led to more U.S. concessions.

[[Page 8279]]

  The President wanted to take a significant, tangible step toward his 
vision of a more peaceful world without nuclear weapons--a vision I 
find naive at best and, if achieved, likely to make the world less 
safe. As nuclear strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling has 
recently observed, a world without nuclear weapons would be one in 
which countries would make plans to rearm in order to preempt other 
countries from going nuclear first. Schelling writes: ``Every crisis 
would be a nuclear crisis. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever 
gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a 
nervous world.''
  So far, at least, nuclear weapons have imposed restraint on world 
powers--what will happen to that restraint in the absence of nuclear 
weapons? What conclusions will the Russians and our allies draw from 
this vision of nuclear disarmament? Will our allies and partners, who 
have come to depend on U.S. nuclear security guarantees, pursue their 
own nuclear arms? Will Russia, which is increasing its dependence on 
nuclear weapons, interpret this as a sign of weakness and perhaps 
pursue a more muscular foreign policy directed against the west?
  Additionally, if we draw our weapon numbers too low, the perverse 
result may be that smaller nations, or rogue states may believe they 
could become peer competitors.
  In addition to the dream of nuclear disarmament, the administration's 
case for the new treaty rests on three principal arguments: No. 1, that 
it will improve U.S. and international security by reducing U.S. and 
Russian strategic nuclear forces; No. 2, that it will transform or 
``reset'' relations with Russia, such that Russia will now become a 
partner with the United States in addressing the true nuclear dangers 
of proliferation and terrorism; and No. 3, that it will provide the 
United States the moral credibility and leadership needed to pursue its 
nonproliferation objectives with the rest of the world.
  First, the current declining stockpile of U.S. and Russian nuclear 
weapons is not a factor contributing to international instability, and 
reducing our current nuclear arsenal to the new START limit of 1,550 
warheads will not have any impact on the nuclear or nonproliferation 
policies of the rest of the world. If reducing U.S. deployed nuclear 
forces from Cold War highs of over 10,000 nuclear warheads to the 
current level of some 2,000 has had no impact, why should the reduction 
of another 500 warheads make a difference?
  States decide whether to acquire nuclear capabilities not because the 
United States and Russia have large nuclear arsenals but because those 
states believe nuclear weapons will enhance their national security, 
preserve their regimes, enhance their prestige, or further their 
ambitions. Likewise, states will determine whether to support U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts on the basis of their national interests, not 
on how low Russian and American nuclear stockpiles go.
  As to the claim that a new START treaty with the Russians will 
improve relations or secure Russia's assistance in addressing other 
threats to international stability, there is little evidence to suggest 
this is the case. To the contrary, these negotiations have provided the 
Russians leverage over missile defense, prompt global strike, and 
verification issues that have marred the final agreement.
  Finally, I don't see any significant cooperation from Russia in 
securing meaningful sanctions against Iran. To be sure, if we had any 
expectation that the new START treaty would secure Russian assistance 
in dealing with Iran, we should have drawn a more explicit linkage 
between the two. In other words: no new START treaty without concrete 
Russian assistance in obtaining a United Nations Security Council 
resolution imposing real, crippling sanctions on Iran. This may have 
been a missed opportunity.
  Thus far, my remarks suggest I don't see decisive reasons to vote for 
the new START treaty--but are there reasons to vote against the treaty? 
The ratification process can help us examine several concerns.
  As I evaluate the treaty, I will take a broad view that examines not 
only the implications for U.S. strategic nuclear forces but how this 
treaty impacts our relationship with allies and other military 
capabilities important to our national security. I will want to know 
whether this treaty disadvantages the United States in any way or makes 
us less safe or constrains our ability to extend nuclear security 
guarantees to our allies.
  Finally, my decision whether to support this treaty will depend on 
the administration's firm commitment to a serious nuclear modernization 
effort for our weapons, nuclear laboratories, and delivery systems--for 
as we go to lower numbers of nuclear weapons, it becomes increasingly 
important that those remaining weapons be safe, secure, and reliable.
  The central consideration in evaluating this treaty is the impact the 
proposed numerical limitations will have on U.S. nuclear forces and in 
particular our ability to extend the nuclear umbrella to our allies and 
partners.
  The administration will have to provide additional details regarding 
the number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers the United States will 
field under the 700 strategic delivery system limitation--and how it 
plans to modernize those forces.
  Last year, we were told by Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright that 
reductions below 800 delivery systems may be cause for some concern, 
while former Secretary James Schlesinger, in testifying on the new 
START treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recently 
noted that the ``numbers specified are adequate, though barely so.''
  We need to understand, therefore, the implications of this 
limitation, which requires a reduction of about 180 in the number of 
currently deployed U.S. delivery systems. In fact, the reduction in 
nuclear capability will be larger for the United States since the 
treaty requires that conventionally-armed--nonnuclear--ballistic 
missiles, in the case of prompt global strike, be counted against the 
700 total.
  Likewise, we need to understand how the Russians might configure 
their nuclear forces under the treaty and then conduct a net assessment 
to appreciate the true implications of the new START treaty for U.S. 
national security.
  Perhaps the greatest deficiency of the new START agreement is that it 
does not address the 10-to-1 disparity between Russia and the United 
States in the area of tactical nuclear weapons. As Secretary 
Schlesinger recently testified, ``the significance of tactical nuclear 
weapons rises steadily as strategic nuclear arms are reduced.''
  Russia simply refused to allow these into the negotiations. So the 
administration has left this for the ``next agreement,'' though I am 
not sure what leverage the United States will have over a Russia that 
has become more, not less, dependent on its tactical nuclear weapons.
  An irony of this is that Russian tactical nuclear weapons, because 
they are more widely dispersed and greater in number, pose a greater 
risk of contributing to nuclear proliferation and terrorism which, 
according to the administration, this treaty is supposed to help us 
avert.
  The Strategic Posture Commission estimates Russia may have 
approximately 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads and that the 
combination of new warhead designs and precision delivery systems 
``open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use 
nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.''
  Likewise, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy has 
observed that the Russians are ``actually increasing their reliance on 
nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in their strategy.''
  What if you are one of the 31 countries dependent on the United 
States for nuclear security guarantees? How would you interpret the 
fact that the United States is going down to 1,550 strategic warheads 
while the Russians maintain at least twice that number of shorter range 
nuclear warheads that in most cases are able to reach your country? 
What impact will this have on the credibility of U.S. nuclear 
guarantees

[[Page 8280]]

and upon the incentives other countries may have to acquire their own 
nuclear capabilities?
  One final point on this issue: It disturbs me that Russian tactical 
nuclear weapons were not addressed in this treaty, yet the United 
States conceded to Russian demands to place limits on conventional 
prompt global strike capabilities by counting conventional ICBMs under 
the limits for delivery systems.
  It is striking, moreover, that the preamble would be ``mindful of the 
impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic 
stability,'' yet be silent on the impact of tactical nuclear weapons on 
this very same strategic stability. What is more destabilizing: 
conventionally armed ICBMs or thousands of tactical nuclear weapons?
  Despite being told consistently from the very beginning of 
negotiations that missile defense will be addressed only in the 
preamble of the treaty, we now discover that article V contains a 
direct restriction on U.S. missile defense activities (i.e., cannot 
convert ICBM or SLBM launchers into launchers for missile defense 
interceptors). Will this establish a dangerous precedent with respect 
to including missile defense limitations in future offensive arms 
control agreements? Why did the U.S. side feel it necessary to concede 
this point?
  What raises concern, with respect to article V, are other efforts by 
the Russians to create a linkage between U.S. missile defense 
activities and Russian adherence to the new START treaty. When viewed 
together, the treaty's preamble, the Russian unilateral statement on 
missile defense, and remarks by senior Russian officials provide the 
potential for Russia to threaten or blackmail the United States against 
increasing its missile defense capabilities by threatening to withdraw 
from the treaty:
  When the preamble states that ``current strategic defensive arms do 
not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic 
offensive arms of the parties,'' does this not suggest that moving 
beyond ``current'' systems could provide grounds for withdrawal?
  When the Russian's note in their unilateral statement that the treaty 
can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains 
from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or 
qualitatively, and then links American missile defense capabilities to 
the treaty's withdrawal clause, should we not read this as an attempt 
to exert political pressure to forestall continued development and 
deployment of U.S. missile defenses?
  Finally, what are we to make of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's 
warning on March 28 that ``the treaty and all the obligations it 
contains are valid only within the context of the levels which are now 
present in the sphere of strategic defensive systems''? Does this mean 
the Russians will pull out of START if we deploy additional ground-
based interceptors in Alaska or if we deploy the SM-3 block IIB missile 
in Europe?
  Despite the administration's assurances that none of this is legally 
binding, and that the U.S. unilateral statement counters this by 
expressing our intent to continue to deploy missile defenses, I can not 
help but worry that these provisions will have a negative impact on 
U.S. decisionmaking with respect to missile defense. After all, the 
administration did abandon plans to deploy ground-based interceptors in 
Europe--an action most believe was an irritant in United States-Russian 
relations.
  There is something fundamentally disturbing about entering into a 
treaty with the Russians when we have such a divergence in view over a 
substantial issue like missile defense. To be sure, the Russian side 
has already expressed displeasure with U.S. plans to deploy missile 
defenses in Europe and to enhance the capability of the SM-3 missile to 
intercept long-range missiles launched from the Middle East.
  Adding to my apprehension is recent testimony before the House Armed 
Services Committee by a senior Department of Defense official, who 
stated that the United States has not yet even approached the Russians 
to determine whether the SM-3 IIB is, will cause them to withdraw from 
the treaty. They can withdraw for any reason.
  This likely sets the stage for misunderstanding and confrontation as 
the United States continues its missile defense activities, 
particularly in Europe.
  Clarifying this ambiguity, coupled with affirmation by the 
administration that it intends to improve the defense of our homeland 
and go forward with all phases of its planned missile defense 
deployments in Europe, is a prerequisite for ratification of the new 
START treaty.
  Our ability to verify Russian compliance with the new agreement is 
also important. One could even argue that as we go to lower levels of 
nuclear weapons, verification becomes more important, as the 
consequences of cheating become more profound. But the standard should 
not be whether we can verify Russian compliance with the terms of the 
treaty per se--though this is important--but whether we maintain 
sufficient confidence in our national ability to monitor developments 
in Russian strategic forces that, if gone undetected, could alter the 
strategic balance.
  So when the administration argues that ``verification procedures in 
this Treaty will be simpler and less costly to implement than the old 
START treaty,'' I am inclined to ask why verification procedures have 
become less stringent and whether such procedures make it harder for 
the United States to fully account for Russian strategic forces. 
Specifically:

  Will we be able to determine whether the Russians are developing new, 
more powerful missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads?
  Are the Russians capable of secretly producing and storing missiles 
and warheads that could afford them a military advantage?
  While we may have confidence in the number of missiles deployed by 
Russia today, can we maintain this confidence over the life of the 
treaty?

  Ultimately, it falls upon our intelligence community to monitor 
Russian strategic force developments. Thus it is important for the 
Senate, as part of its advice and consent responsibilities, to review 
carefully the National Intelligence Estimate on our ability to 
effectively verify the treaty that normally accompanies arms control 
agreements. I don't believe we have seen that document yet.
  I have identified just a few important issues the Senate will 
consider as we move forward, and it is likely there will be others as 
we continue to examine the treaty text, protocol, and annexes. 
Particularly troubling at this time is the disparity in tactical 
nuclear weapons which are not addressed in this treaty, and the 
constraints on missile defense and conventional prompt global strike in 
a treaty intended only to limit offensive nuclear weapons. At the very 
least this is a bad precedent, and I have no doubt Russia is attempting 
to revive the ABM Treaty regime and forestall U.S. prompt global strike 
capabilities.
  This was a treaty that Russia needed more than the United States. Not 
only were Russian strategic nuclear forces headed to lower numbers for 
economic reasons, Russia wants an arms control agreement with the 
United States. Such a binational agreement validates its superpower 
status. The United States therefore had an opportunity to leverage 
Russian desire for an agreement to obtain Russian cooperation on a host 
of issues, starting with Iran. But the administration missed this 
opportunity because it was so anxious to advance its vision of a world 
without nuclear weapons that it failed to see how START could help 
address the more immediate threat of nuclear proliferation.

                          ____________________