[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 7907-7908]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about progress and 
challenges in Afghanistan in light of President Karzai's visit to 
Washington this week. Last month, I returned from my third trip to 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq as part of a codel with Senators Hagan 
and Reed. What stood out most from our trip was the quality, caliber, 
and courage of U.S. troops and civilians, who risk their lives every 
day to defend our national security interests in these two critical 
regions. I was humbled by the opportunity to thank them for their 
sacrifice and service and impressed by the progress which has been 
made.
  At the same time, I was taken aback by the myriad of challenges that 
lie ahead, especially in Afghanistan. Chief among them is walking the 
tightrope required to balance our complex relationship with President 
Karzai. Partnership with President Karzai is required for success. He 
needs to work with the United States in both word and deed to promote 
economic development, build the Afghan security forces, combat 
extremists, tackle the drug trade, eliminate corruption, and improve 
systems of governance.
  In Afghanistan, we have begun to successfully implement the strategy 
outlined by President Obama in December, as evidenced by ongoing 
operations against the Taliban, greater emphasis on subnational 
governance, and a renewed training and partnering effort with the 
Afghan Army and police. While much attention has been paid to the 
deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops, it is clear that 
success in counterinsurgency requires far more than a large military 
footprint, as there is no purely military solution to this problem.
  In order to meet our goals of ``shape, clear, hold, build, 
transfer,'' we must also have a strong and capable civilian presence to 
establish good governance; increase training of Afghan national 
security forces; and further improve cooperation with Pakistan, 
especially when it comes to securing the border and targeting the 
Afghan Taliban. Without these other elements of our broader 
counterinsurgency strategy, military success will not be sustained and 
authority cannot be transferred to the Afghans. And make no mistake--
the transfer of power is our ultimate goal, beginning with the 
President's announced conditions-based drawdown starting in July 2011.
  While in Afghanistan in April, we met with President Karzai and gave 
suggestions of steps we thought he could take to lay the groundwork for 
a successful visit to Washington. We raised the issue of corruption, 
which, if left unaddressed, threatens to undermine nearly all other 
areas of progress. After all, counterinsurgency is not a struggle 
between the United States and the insurgents. It is a battle for 
legitimacy between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, and 
perceptions of corruption only further distance the Afghan Government 
from the population.
  I am pleased that President Karzai has said many of the right things, 
starting with commitments made in his November inauguration speech. He 
has also recently issued a decree giving power to the High Office of 
Oversight and Anti-Corruption to investigate government corruption 
cases and has granted greater budgeting and implementation powers to 
provincial and district officials.
  These are good first steps, but progress requires more than decrees 
and rhetoric. There is far more that must be done because--as I have 
said before--our best defense in Afghanistan is a strong, efficient, 
and accountable Afghan Government. In order to defeat an insurgency, 
there must be capable and transparent governance and not just in Kabul. 
Effective government must extend to the subnational level, where it can 
provide essential services and secure the population.
  On my trip, I was encouraged to learn of district teams collaborating 
with trainers and mentors to strengthen systems of local governance, 
especially in Regional Commands South and East. In these areas, 
civilian officials are working at the provincial and district levels 
with their Afghan counterparts--especially those from the so-called 
``line ministries'' of agriculture, education, health, security, and 
reconstruction and rural development--to provide basic services and 
improve the lives of Afghan citizens. They are implementing a system to 
strengthen the country from the bottom up, which will minimize the 
influence of the Taliban and marginalize its shadow governments. This 
was especially evident in Marjah, where we just concluded the first 
jointly planned and implemented U.S.-Afghan, civilian-military 
operation.
  Last week, the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the 
``Meaning of Marjah'' to explore lessons learned as we look toward this 
summer's Kandahar offensive. While the clearing phase in Marjah was 
quick and decisive, we have now entered the ``hold and build'' stage, 
which presents a spectrum of new challenges. As BG

[[Page 7908]]

John Nicholson noted in the hearing, ``The challenge here is to connect 
the people with their government, thereby creating a nexus between the 
citizens of Marjah and government officials.'' Thus far, a small group 
of Afghan civil servants is working with U.S. civilians to provide 
basic services, but more must be done. A sustained and effective 
government presence free from the stigma of corruption is an essential 
prerequisite to success not just in Marjah, but in all 
counterinsurgency operations.
  This was evidenced by a recent community council meeting, or shura, 
attended by President Karzai and General McChrystal in Marjah. At the 
shura, members of the local population made it clear to President 
Karzai that the people surrounding him were contributing to the 
problem. They told him that corrupt government officials, such as the 
former chief of police, were creating reasons for the population to 
support the Taliban. It is my understanding that this event, which was 
followed by a similar experience in Kandahar, may have given President 
Karzai pause, as he realized that he must address the root causes of 
corruption in order to win over the population.
  Corruption remains a large hurdle in this effort, but it is not the 
only one. We must also ensure there are enough civilians to partner 
with the Afghans. While I am pleased that the Obama administration has 
made this a priority, tripling the number of deployed civilians over 
the past year, it must continue to ensure that there are enough 
civilians outside of Kabul to engage with the population. It is 
remarkable that 13 U.S. Government agencies are now represented, and 
the recent civilian uplift has been the biggest since Vietnam. At the 
same time, 1,000 U.S. civilians with less than 400 outside of Kabul is 
simply not enough to partner with 100,000 U.S. troops and reach a 
population of 28 million.
  We must also continue to focus on increased training for the Afghan 
national security forces so they can assume responsibility for securing 
the population. We are on track to reach at least 134,000 in the Afghan 
National Army, ANA, by October, and the quality of officers and 
recruits has risen in recent weeks. This is due in part to recent pay 
raises and increased effectiveness given intensified partnering with 
U.S. troops. I am pleased that nearly 90 percent of all units are now 
partnered, and large military operations--such as Marjah--were truly 
joint operations.
  Unfortunately we have not yet seen the same levels of progress toward 
building the Afghan National Police, ANP, as we have with the army. In 
a Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee hearing 
chaired by Senator McCaskill last month, we discussed the range of 
problems that has hampered the growth and training of the ANP. I was 
appalled to hear that $6 billion has been spent to date on training 
contracts with very little to show for it. I understand the challenges 
of training a police force which is largely illiterate and suffering 
from high rates of attrition, but the answer is not to repeat the same 
mistakes or renew inefficient contracts.
  The stakes are simply too high. We cannot afford for this training 
effort to be ineffective or approach police training as an ad hoc 
mission. We must demonstrate better oversight of this critical training 
program and ensure that our efforts result in the establishment of a 
qualified and committed Afghan police force. Moreover, we must consider 
building a stronger U.S. Government capacity to oversee future police 
training missions. As we look toward a future with fewer conventional 
threats and an increased number of insurgencies, there is no question 
that this capacity is needed to defend our security interests globally.
  President Karzai is under enormous pressure to meet our high 
expectations and demands. In our recent meeting, we discussed our 
shared interest in a strong partnership and a productive visit to 
Washington. I understand that the pressure is growing as we focus on 
building subnational governance and as our military plans focus 
squarely on Kandahar, which is the home of the Taliban and an area 
where Karzai's family and tribe still exercise great influence.
  I look forward to seeing President Karzai when he is here, and I hope 
to hear more about his plans to address corruption, improve governance, 
and enhance economic development. I hope he understands that the United 
States shares an enduring commitment to building a strong and sovereign 
Afghanistan, both in the near term and well into the future, so that 
our joint efforts now can benefit future generations.

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