[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Page 2844]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                    STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to speak 
today in support of our administration's efforts to negotiate a follow-
on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START. Our 
negotiating team in Vienna is currently working with the Russian 
delegation to finalize this agreement, and I look forward to reviewing 
the treaty when it is submitted to the Senate.
  The United States and Russia maintain over 90 percent of the world's 
approximately 23,000 nuclear weapons. Each of these weapons has the 
capacity to destroy an entire city; collectively, they can destroy the 
world. The mere existence of these weapons creates the risk of a 
nuclear accident, unauthorized use, and theft by a terrorist group. The 
size and structure of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals reflect 
an antiquated Cold War mindset that we must move beyond.
  It is in the national security interest of the United States to reach 
an agreement with Russia to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and 
ensure that strong verification and transparency measures remain in 
effect. This is the core purpose and focus of the START follow-on 
agreement.
  The START follow-on agreement is an important component of our 
efforts to work with Russia and other international partners to 
collectively address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. These 
dangers include the vulnerability of nuclear material to theft by 
terrorists, as well as the risk of nuclear proliferation by other 
countries.
  Ratification of a START follow-on agreement would also be a clear 
signal that the United States is upholding our obligations under the 
nonproliferation treaty. It would reaffirm our leadership on 
nonproliferation issues and demonstrate, as the President has 
advocated, that we are serious about moving towards a world without 
nuclear weapons while maintaining a reliable deterrent for so long as 
it is needed. We cannot afford to miss this opportunity; without a 
demonstrated effort to fulfilling our nonproliferation responsibilities 
through a new START agreement, it will be increasingly difficult for 
the U.S. to secure the international support needed to address the 
urgent security threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons.
  The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 
States concluded that ``terrorist use of a nuclear weapon against the 
United States or its friends and allies is more likely than deliberate 
use by a state.'' Our priority, therefore, should be to work together 
with Russia to reduce the size and vulnerability of our nuclear 
arsenals, and ensure that proper security and surveillance safeguards 
are in place.
  Unfortunately, today Russia continues to possess huge stores of 
nuclear materials that are inadequately secured and which, if stolen by 
terrorists, could be used to destroy an American city. The size of our 
own nuclear arsenal is also unsustainable, both from a security and 
cost perspective, and should be tailored to the new 21st century 
threats we face.
  The reductions required by the START follow-on agreement will not 
adversely affect our national security. The United States could pursue 
much deeper reductions in the size of our arsenal and still have more 
weapons that we would ever need. In fact, it is precisely the size of 
our nuclear arsenal and complex that makes them vulnerable to 
exploitation by terrorists. There is no longer any compelling national 
security reason to maintain or expand the size of our nuclear 
stockpile.
  Nor is there any reason to continue to develop new nuclear weapon 
technologies or warheads. Our brightest experts have concluded that we 
no longer need new nuclear weapons in order to maintain a credible 
deterrent. A recent report from the independent JASON Defense Advisory 
Group concluded that, as a result of our nuclear laboratories' 
successful life-extension programs, the lifetimes of our nuclear 
warheads can be extended for decades.
  I am encouraged that efforts to negotiate a START follow-on agreement 
have bipartisan support among national security experts. Notably, the 
bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 
United States, headed by former Defense Secretaries William Perry and 
James Schlesinger, endorsed a follow-on agreement to START. Similarly, 
Secretary Perry joined with former Senate Armed Services Committee 
Chairman Sam Nunn and former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and 
George Shultz to pen an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for 
the extension of the key provisions of START and further reductions in 
our nuclear stockpile.
  In conclusion, I commend the administration for its efforts to 
reinvigorate the nonproliferation regime by negotiating a follow-on to 
the START treaty. We must act now to address the spread of nuclear 
weapons and materials, which is one of the gravest dangers facing the 
United States. In a time of terrorism and of rising international 
concern about Iran's nuclear program, international cooperation remains 
key to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The START 
follow-on agreement is an essential step towards that goal, and towards 
a world without nuclear weapons.

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