[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 156 (2010), Part 2]
[House]
[Pages 1869-1917]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2701.

                              {time}  1321


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 2701) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2010 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Ms. Edwards of Maryland in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. REYES. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Chair, I am proud to rise today in support of H.R. 2701, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This is an unusual 
time of the year for us to be considering this legislation. However, it 
is and remains a very important bill which addresses critical national 
security issues, and one that we ultimately need to see enacted.
  As chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, my 
most important job is to guide the committee in providing appropriate 
tools, resources, and authorities to aid the dedicated men and women of 
the intelligence community in keeping our Nation safe. I believe that 
H.R. 2701 does just that.
  First and foremost, this bill authorizes the activities and the funds 
for the 16 agencies of the intelligence community. It is difficult to 
talk about their roles and their missions in the open, but in some ways 
it is probably one of the most important things that we do on the 
Intelligence Committee. In addition to providing authorization for 
intelligence activities, this bill takes the initial important steps to 
improve congressional oversight of that intelligence community.
  I want to highlight two legislative provisions from this year's bill 
that I believe will significantly improve oversight.
  When this bill was marked up in committee, we made significant 
changes to the so-called ``Gang of Eight'' procedures. As Members know, 
the President has had the statutory authority to limit briefings to the 
Gang of Eight

[[Page 1870]]

when they involve sensitive covert actions. It was the sense of the 
committee that the Gang of Eight statutory authority had been overused, 
and that, on matters of critical importance, the committee as a whole 
should have been informed. For that reason, that earlier version of the 
bill removed the statutory authority for limiting briefings to the Gang 
of Eight.
  Last July, the administration issued a statement of policy on H.R. 
2701 that included a veto threat with respect to the provisions that 
would modify the Gang of Eight notification procedures. I believe that 
some level of concern at that point was justified, and I have been 
working with the administration over the past several months to resolve 
those differences. Since July, there have already been noticeable 
improvements in the way the administration and the intelligence 
community are communicating and briefing Congress.
  Accordingly, the manager's amendment I will offer includes a revised 
provision on Gang of Eight reform. I know that many Members have strong 
feelings about this issue on both sides of the aisle. The provision 
that is in the manager's amendment is intended to be a strong and 
significant step towards better oversight which still respects the 
constitutional authorities of the President. It recognizes that both 
elected branches have a role in national security.
  I fully expect that once we pass this bill we will then revisit this 
issue during conference between the House and the Senate. And I am 
happy to work with Members to seek improvements at that time. Through 
this process, we will be able to find a workable solution to a problem 
that has persisted over the past several years, if not longer.
  Another provision that I think is absolutely critical establishes a 
statutory Inspector General for the intelligence community. This 
provision will eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse, and it will also help 
keep a close eye on the protection of the rights of Americans.
  This year's bill is truly a product of many hands. The Inspector 
General provision, which I just spoke about, in large part is due to 
the efforts of Ms. Eshoo, the chair of the Intelligence Community 
Management Subcommittee. The vice chairman of the full committee, Mr. 
Hastings, has offered an amendment to include critical provisions on 
our shared interest in promoting diversity as a mission imperative. He 
has been working at this long and hard for many, many years. Our newest 
majority member, Mr. Boren, has worked hard to develop a pilot program 
to improve language capability in African languages.
  The chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, has worked hard on the classified annex to make sure our 
approach to acquisitions and our most technical programs make good 
sense. He has been a pivotal part to the committee's oversight process 
in these very important areas.
  The bill includes several provisions offered by Ms. Schakowsky, the 
chairwoman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, which 
relate to her longstanding interest in appropriately monitoring and 
managing contractors in the intelligence community.
  Mr. Holt, the chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel, 
advocated for a provision addressing the videotaping of interrogations 
and another on intelligence information on the health risks faced by 
Desert Storm veterans.
  Mr. Thompson of California, another subcommittee chairman, has worked 
hard on this bill as well. He pushed successfully for the inclusion of 
a provision to study the benefits paid to the families of the men and 
women of the intelligence community who have made the ultimate 
sacrifice. I am proud to support that as well.
  We also received important input from the committee's minority 
members. Mr. Kline of Minnesota offered an excellent amendment, which 
we were pleased to accept, that requires the National Reconnaissance 
Organization to rewrite its charter to meet its current missions. Mr. 
Conaway's personal interest in auditable financial statements led to a 
provision in the bill that requires the intelligence community to focus 
on its internal financial management and to provide a system that 
achieves auditability.
  Madam Chair, I believe that this bill will provide the resources and 
the tools that the intelligence community needs to do its important 
work in keeping our Nation safe. That includes collection and analysis 
of human intelligence, signals intelligence, and geospatial 
intelligence.

                              {time}  1330

  It includes funds to detect and disrupt terrorist plots, to provide 
for intelligence support to the warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and also improves the recruitment and training of a diverse and capable 
workforce.
  During my time on this committee, I've had the good fortune to be 
able to travel and to meet the brave men and women of the intelligence 
community, both uniformed and civilian, and I am continually impressed 
and in awe of the great work that they do and the great morale that 
they have. They are dedicated, professional and highly skilled 
patriots, and I'm proud to offer a bill that supports them and all that 
they do for our great Nation.
  This past December, we lost seven of those brave men and women in the 
attack in Khost, Afghanistan. It is for them, and for those who carry 
on their mission, that I proudly submit this bill today.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I shall 
consume.
  Madam Chairman, annual Intelligence authorization bills should be 
bipartisan legislation designed to address critical national security 
issues and deal in a deliberate and considered way with legislation 
affecting the intelligence community, the personnel within the 
intelligence community. Unfortunately, this bill does neither. I'm 
forced to rise in strong opposition.
  When this bill was first reported almost 8 months ago, the bill 
failed to address critical national security issues such as Guantanamo 
detainees, attempts by this administration to convert intelligence and 
counterterrorism into matters of criminal law and meaningful reforms to 
the congressional notification process.
  In the nearly 8 months since this bill was reported out of committee, 
our country has suffered two major terrorist attacks and a significant 
number of near misses. During that time, the majority took no time and 
no action to bring this bill to the floor.
  In 8 months nothing was done to fix the flaws in our intelligence 
community that were apparent to every American in the wake of the first 
attack at Fort Hood and, later, the Christmas bombing attack on an 
American airliner.
  In 8 months, nothing was done to clarify who is in charge of 
interrogation of high-value terrorist detainees, these people that are 
captured around the world who want to do harm to America.
  In 8 months, nothing was done to provide a long-term renewal of our 
critical intelligence authorities under the USA PATRIOT Act.
  In 8 months, nothing was done to, once and for all, stop hard-core, 
radical jihadist terrorists from being brought into the United States, 
despite the clear opposition that has arisen to this ill-considered 
idea from average Americans across the country.
  In 8 months, nothing has been done to clarify how covert actions 
should be conducted or authorized when they could have deadly effects 
on American citizens. Nothing has been done.
  Then, you go through and you take a look at the amendments that we 
wanted to propose that would have addressed these issues, and all of 
these were thrown out by the majority, an amendment that would direct 
the DNI to establish a panel to review the intelligence relating to 
weapons of mass destruction programs of Iran. Politically speaking, our 
intelligence community is now to the left of the United Nations as to 
our assessment of what Iran's capabilities are, to the left of the ill-
fated National Intelligence Estimate that came out under the previous 
administration.

[[Page 1871]]

  We've asked for an independent panel of experts to give us a red team 
review. Our colleagues on the other side of the aisle said, no, that's 
not necessary.
  We asked for an amendment that would require the CIA to release 
publicly unclassified versions of documents relating to the use of 
enhanced interrogation techniques, this controversial background as to 
who knew what when, including some of the leading Members of this body. 
We asked for those documents to be released. The majority said no.
  We asked for the prohibition of funds to bring Guantanamo detainees 
into the United States. The majority said, we won't even debate it. We 
won't consider it. We won't allow for an amendment that would do just 
that.
  We asked for a report requiring the DNI to submit a report detailing 
steps taken to fix problems identified in the President's Fort Hood 
intelligence review prior to December 25. Why? Because the incident on 
November 5 had striking parallels to what happened on December 25, and 
we thought it was fair to ask the question and ask the Director of 
National Intelligence: With the information that you gained on November 
5, what actions did you take that might have helped prevent what 
happened on Christmas Day? And the answer was, no, we don't think that 
that would be a worthwhile effort to ask the intelligence community 
those kinds of tough and difficult questions and be held accountable to 
this body.
  And then we said we had another amendment that said, Don't we think 
it would be appropriate that we actually establish a process for the 
authorization and the notification of covert actions that may result in 
the death of a targeted U.S. citizen? It doesn't get into a debate as 
to whether that is appropriate, an appropriate course of action. It 
just says, don't we think that the intelligence community and the 
executive branch should have in place a detailed process of how these 
decisions are made, how they are authorized, and when Congress would be 
notified? And the answer from the majority was no. A process that would 
give us an idea as to how the administration would authorize and notify 
Congress when they took actions that might result in the death of a 
targeted U.S. citizen, a targeted U.S. citizen.
  And these are just the amendments that were not considered, 
substantive, serious issues that the majority is unwilling to debate, 
to discuss and to address.
  Later on, as we go through the day and as we take a look at the 
manager's amendment and the other amendments, we'll take a look at the 
striking contrast between what the majority is willing to debate and 
discuss and to act on, and what they are unwilling to debate and 
discuss. And it has a direct impact on the safety of each and every 
American.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, now it's my privilege to yield 3 minutes 
to my good friend and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), who actually has jurisdiction 
over some of the issues that the ranking member mentioned just a couple 
of minutes ago.
  Mr. SKELTON. Madam Chairman, first, let me thank the gentleman from 
Texas, Chairman Silvestre Reyes, for the hard work that he did on this 
bill. So I rise today in strong support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act.
  From my perspective as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, it's 
a good bill, one that will support the intelligence needs of our 
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Every day, American men and 
women who are deployed into harm's way depend on the intelligence 
capabilities authorized by this bill to achieve their missions. I 
cannot state strongly enough about how those in uniform who are in 
harm's way depend upon the intelligence that they receive.
  This legislation ensures continued delivery of quality intelligence 
products and capabilities through our warfighters. It will lead to 
important improvement in the future.
  As I've said before, the relationship between the intelligence 
community and the Department of Defense is fundamental to the success 
on the battlefield. This bill strengthens the relationship by expanding 
the intelligence community's technical and human collection 
capabilities.
  It adds significant resources to modernize signals intelligence 
capabilities, and other cutting-edge technologies that are the 
foundation for intelligence support for our warfighters in Afghanistan. 
The bill also adds resources for HUMINT collection against terrorists 
and other enduring and emerging global security issues in Asia, Africa, 
as well as in Latin America.
  This measure will improve oversight of the intelligence community by 
creating a statutory and independent intelligence community-wide 
inspector general.
  And, finally, this bill enhances cybersecurity, which is becoming 
very, very important, cybersecurity efforts by authorizing significant 
investments to support the President's comprehensive cybersecurity 
strategy.
  I congratulate Chairman Reyes on bringing this bill to the floor and 
urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this very, very important 
measure.
  And I might add, Madam Chairman, that we, on the Armed Services 
Committee, have dealt with some, and have the jurisdiction of dealing 
with some, matters that my friend from Michigan mentioned a few moments 
ago. They are within our jurisdiction.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 4 
minutes to a member of the committee, Mr. Thornberry from Texas, who 
will talk about the continued efforts by this administration in what 
appears to be a war on the intelligence community, a legal war on our 
intelligence community, the brave men and women in that community.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the distinguished 
ranking member yielding to me.
  In many ways, this bill is a tale of two bills. Part of this bill is 
the classified annex where specific dollar amounts are allocated to 
various programs. And the classified annex, I'm happy to report, is a 
bipartisan product. And I appreciate the chairman of this committee, 
Subcommittee Chairman Ruppersberger, and others working with 
Republicans compromising from both sides, but having a bipartisan 
product that has the support, I believe, of the full Intelligence 
Committee and should have the support of the full House. Unfortunately, 
that is not the case with the other provisions of this bill, the policy 
provisions of this bill, which are deeply disturbing.
  As the ranking member has indicated, a number of key issues, whether 
it's Guantanamo, to reading Miranda Rights, have not even been allowed 
to be debated and voted on on the floor of the House. Those issues have 
been shoved aside.
  Instead, what we have in the underlying bill are 41 new reports, plus 
an additional 17 more reports that would be required of the 
intelligence community in the manager's amendment. But deeply buried 
within the blizzard of all those reporting requirements is something 
that is deeply disturbing, and that is a new criminal part of the 
statute that would apply only to the intelligence community when they 
try to elicit information from a terrorist that can prevent future 
terrorist attacks.
  And I think it would be helpful for all our Members to just remember 
a bit of the history here. Last year the Obama administration released 
a number of classified memos detailing interrogation techniques, 
despite the appeal of five former CIA directors not to do it, because 
doing so would harm our efforts against a terrorist. They did it 
anyway.
  Then, secondly, last year, the administration decided that they would 
re-investigate CIA personnel who were involved in interrogations, even 
though it had been thoroughly investigated and there was no basis found 
for any sort of prosecution. Instead, the Obama administration decided 
they wanted to appoint a special prosecutor to go after those people 
again.
  Third, there's an effort to bring lawyers up on ethics charges 
because some people disagree with the legal opinion that they reached. 
And, of course, just

[[Page 1872]]

recently we found that that effort has failed.
  Fourth, last year, the Speaker, under pressure from questions about 
what she knew about these interrogations, alleged that the CIA lies all 
the time, despite the considerable evidence that she had been fully 
briefed about the interrogations. And the Speaker's charge was so 
indefensible that this bill got postponed for 7 months and couldn't 
even come to the floor, in order to protect her.

                              {time}  1345

  So you see that string of going after the intelligence community of 
making accusations against them. And then what we find in the manager's 
amendment is this provision that creates new crimes only for the 
intelligence community when they try to illicit information. It is 
rather remarkable.
  Anywhere in America, if a prison guard tries to wake a prisoner up, 
it's okay; it's part of the prison routine. Under this provision, if a 
terrorist does not get a proper amount of sleep, the intelligence 
community can be prosecuted and sent to jail for 15 years.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield the gentleman an additional 2 minutes.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Anywhere in America there is a criminal 
investigation, it might be pointed out to a criminal suspect that it 
would be better to cooperate or the death penalty could be a potential 
punishment for his crime. It is against the law under this McDermott 
provision for an intelligence professional to in any way threaten 
physical harm or coercion against a terrorist in order to get 
information. In other words, what goes on every day all across America 
in the criminal justice system would be prohibited in this provision in 
the manager's amendment.
  It is in many ways unthinkable. In many ways, it's topsy-turvy land 
where we forget who the good guys are, who the guys trying to keep us 
safe are, and who the bad guys are. It's all turned upside down.
  We all remember the photos of abuses from Abu Ghraib in Iraq. They 
were deplorable. The people responsible were prosecuted under the 
criminal law, as they should have been. But to extrapolate from that, 
the source of restrictions here starting on page 33 of the manager's 
amendment is, I think, indefensible.
  Intelligence is a serious business. The people who are involved in it 
risk their lives to keep us safe. And to threaten, as this law would, 
to put them in jail for 15 years if they don't give somebody, whatever 
the terrorist says is part of their individual religious beliefs, I 
think, is dangerous, irresponsible. And it tells the intelligence 
community that we talk so much but we're not going to back up our 
words; in fact, we're going to prosecute you. That's a mistake.
  I am deeply disturbed by some of the trends in this bill, and I hope 
that the manager's amendment will not be adopted, and if it is, this 
bill should certainly be rejected.
  Mr. REYES. It's now my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my good 
friend and former member of the House Intelligence Committee who still 
is a valued resource for us, Mr. Boswell from Iowa.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Madam Chair, I would like to engage the chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee for the purposes of a colloquy.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I am happy to oblige my good friend, Mr. 
Boswell.
  Mr. BOSWELL. I would like to clarify the intent of section 312 of 
H.R. 2701 regarding the authorization of the Intelligence Officer 
Training Program.
  As I understand it, that section will authorize the Director of 
National Intelligence to provide grants to institutions of higher 
learning to develop, among other things, innovative methods of teaching 
high-priority foreign language skills.
  Is my understanding of this provision correct?
  Mr. REYES. You are correct, Mr. Boswell.
  Mr. BOSWELL. My understanding is that Drake University in Des Moines, 
Iowa, has a highly innovative foreign language skills program. Under 
that program, Drake students work with native speakers in groups of 
five or fewer three times a week. Such students may also take a 
``strategies'' course, which has several goals, including helping 
students approach the culture they are studying through a 
nonethnocentric lens.
  Former students of this program have gone on to teach in China, 
become Fulbright Scholars, provide translation services, perform 
nonprofit and missionary work in El Salvador, complete advanced degrees 
in languages, and excel in the corporate world more generally.
  Is Drake University's language program the type of program that the 
intelligence community believes would be a good candidate to receive a 
grant from the ODNI under section 312 of H.R. 2701?
  Mr. REYES. Having had the opportunity to visit Drake University with 
you, you are correct.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. REYES. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Chairman Reyes, for that comment and that 
visit. That is correct. I appreciate that.
  I want to thank you for the clarification.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to yield 4 minutes to my colleague from 
Michigan, a strong defender of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Rogers.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I can't tell you how disappointed I am in 
this bill for all that is at stake in the country.
  When there was a switch in debate about how we approach the war on 
terror, that's a legitimate argument, a legitimate debate to have, and 
we should do it under the light of day with all of the sets of 
consequences that come with any change of policy about how we go after 
terrorists overseas. And the notion that was brought out that, gee, if 
we just treat this like a law enforcement environment, if we treat it 
the way we would treat the average American citizen and extend the 
rights and the privileges to foreign-trained terrorists, the world will 
like us, the world will be a better place, we will have no more 
problems, they're going to go away, we will get them in the courtrooms 
of America, there is a fundamental flaw with doing this.
  In order to fully function as a law enforcement effort, the 
administration has sent FBI agents overseas into the battlefield to 
read Miranda rights to tell foreign-trained terrorists who probably 
couldn't find, some of them, America on a map that you have the right 
to remain silent; if you can't afford a lawyer the United States will 
appoint one for you; we will pay for it.
  The fact that if they get to the airport and stand in line with an 
explosive device next to you or your children or a family member or 
some other American citizen, we will catch them then, and we will put 
them in trial and read them their Miranda rights even though they were 
recruited overseas, trained overseas, in many cases surreptitiously 
moved to different parts of different countries in order to get every 
aspect of their training. And they're taught that they are on a combat 
mission. That is what they're taught, that your goal in this event is 
to go cause harm and casualties and chaos to Americans on American soil 
or to our allies on their soil. So they look at this as they have when 
they've declared war numerous times. They have declared war on the 
United States, and they're ready to kill Americans to prove their 
point.
  So some notion that by the time they get to the airport or board the 
plane we've been successful because we've had the opportunity to read 
them the Miranda rights is fundamentally flawed, and that is a fight 
that we will lose. We're going to lose that fight. You can't hire 
enough TSA agents. You can't hire enough domestic FBI agents. You can't 
send enough FBI agents into the battlefield to read Miranda rights to 
stop their effort.
  When you treat them like a criminal and read them their rights, you 
allow a defense attorney to start the negotiations about how much they 
will or will not cooperate. That starts. That happens. Clearly, the 
Christmas Day bomber enjoyed that same benefit.

[[Page 1873]]

  And I'll tell you, that first 24 to 48 hours is critically important 
in the intelligence community because of a small thing. This guy isn't 
going to be able to give you all of the layout of al Qaeda and all of 
their financing and all of their logistical movements, but he could 
have given us incredibly valuable information--maybe the name of 
another airline that may have been targeted on that day that we didn't 
know about, maybe the name or the description of a bad guy who trained 
in how to use that explosive device or a place or a town or a person 
that they may have seen in their training cramp. To most people, that 
wouldn't mean a lot. To trained professionals in the intelligence 
business, it means the difference between stopping them and them being 
successful. That little, small piece of information can save lives.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield my colleague 1 more minute.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. They made a fundamental shift, from proactive 
intelligence overseas to find them where they train, to where they 
finance, to where they recruit, to a law enforcement effort to bring 
them back to the United States. We're bringing foreign-trained 
terrorists to the United States and putting them in mainstream 
courtrooms. We're prosecuting CIA officers for following legal advice 
from the Department of Justice in interrogation. So we're treating CIA 
officers like criminals, and we're treating foreign-trained terrorists 
like Americans with all of the benefits and the privileges therein.
  You almost couldn't make this up. You couldn't come to this 
conclusion. And with it, we've got consequences.
  When you look at the series of events from the Fort Hood shootings to 
the Christmas Day bomber and the mistakes that were made and the lost 
opportunity for disruption, we all ought to sit down and work this out 
and get us back to where we're putting the interests of Americans first 
versus the interests of the rights of terrorism before the safety and 
security of the United States.
  I strongly urge a rejection of this bill.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I don't quibble with the opinions that my 
friends on the other side of the aisle have. It's just facts that don't 
support those opinions that I quibble with. They're not entitled to 
their own facts.
  I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to a new member of our committee, the 
gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Boren), a valued member of our committee.
  Mr. BOREN. Madam Chair, I rise today in support of H.R. 2701, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This bill makes an 
excellent product and much needed investment in many critical areas, 
including those that have been previously underresourced.
  One of the most important investments is this bill's commitment to 
developing foreign language capabilities, specifically in African 
languages that have historically been underrepresented within the 
intelligence community. The bill creates a pilot program under the 
National Security Education Program, or the NSEP. It expands the David 
Boren Scholars by requiring the Director of National Intelligence to 
identify high-priority African languages for which language education 
programs do not currently exist. The NSEP would then develop intensive 
training programs for implementation in both the United States and in 
countries where these languages are spoken.
  Let's not forget that 10 years ago we didn't anticipate the conflicts 
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the need for speakers of the 
local languages and dialects. When the need arose, we didn't have the 
capabilities to meet immediate demands, and to this day, we are still 
playing catch-up.
  Similarly, we cannot predict from where the next crisis will emerge, 
but by recognizing the current instability in the Horn of Africa, 
Sudan, and Congo, we can anticipate crises that will impact national 
security.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. REYES. I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.
  Mr. BOREN. We should be training the linguists and translators in the 
relevant languages now so that once again we are not reactive in our 
efforts; we're proactive in our actions.
  I urge support for this bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I'd like to yield 2 minutes to my 
colleague from Texas (Mr. Burgess).
  Mr. BURGESS. I thank the ranking member for yielding.
  This is a very unfortunate bill, and I think this side of the aisle 
has sufficiently laid out abundant reasons why it should be sent to the 
committee and fixed. The intelligence community is too important to our 
national security to allow a bill with as many concerns as this one to 
pass.
  However, I am here also to discuss what I see as a fatal flaw in the 
way information is disseminated to Members of the House who are not 
committee members.
  Nothing is more critical to the role each of us plays in representing 
our districts and this country than for us to have every relevant piece 
of information available to us prior to casting an important vote--
certainly prior to casting a vote on one updating the authorizations 
for the way our government gathers intelligence. Yet many Members of 
this House have been denied access to key pieces of information simply 
by virtue of the fact that they do not sit on the Intelligence 
Committee.
  I recognize that membership on any given committee in this Chamber 
means that one is given access to matters in a special capacity. I 
respect that. I would even say that dividing up responsibilities is 
critical in achieving everything in a body as large as this one, but 
not being a member of the committee should not translate into having 
access to nothing that falls under the jurisdiction of this committee. 
Certainly, there are some pieces of information that are so important, 
of such importance to national security, that every Member of this 
body, should they so desire, should have access.
  Last summer, the story broke about photographs alleging detainee 
abuse at Guantanamo.

                              {time}  1400

  I formally requested, through the Intelligence Committee, access to 
these photos. I assumed it would be a simple request. In 2005, similar 
photos at Abu Ghraib were made readily available to every Member of 
this House by the same committee under the leadership of then-Chairman 
Hoekstra.
  This time, after months of no response, I was informed that the 
committee did not retain the photos and could not or would not allow 
nonmembers of the Intelligence Committee access. At the same time as my 
request to view these photos, I requested to review the classified CIA 
Inspector General report titled ``Counterterrorism Detention and 
Interrogation Activities.''
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. BURGESS. After months, I was denied my request, no reason given 
for the denial. I can hardly believe that on an issue as critical and 
crucial as this I would not be allowed access. I believe strongly that 
for me to vote on something as important as the Intelligence 
Authorization Act I should have access to every bit of information.
  Finally, on the shooting at Fort Hood, I asked to have attendance at 
the briefing that was being given. But because a business meeting had 
to occur before I would be granted permission and none was scheduled, I 
simply could not attend.
  Madam Chair, this bill has problems on many, many levels, but it is 
impossible for me to vote in the affirmative given the restrictions on 
activities of members of the minority from this committee.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, just so we are clear, it doesn't appear that 
some members of the other aisle realize how important the rules are. 
The rules of the House apply to everyone on a bipartisan basis. The 
information he

[[Page 1874]]

sought was denied from our committee because it didn't fit the criteria 
and the rules of the House.
  With that, I now yield 2 minutes to my friend from the Armed Services 
Committee, chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, and a new member of 
our House Intelligence Committee this year, Mr. Smith of Washington.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. I certainly think there are a lot of very 
good things in this bill. Our intelligence community is a critical 
piece of fighting terrorism. Their counterterrorism efforts are 
absolutely at the top of the list of what the Intel Committee does.
  We are supporting all of our agents in the CIA and throughout the 
intelligence community, and we thank them for their brave efforts. We 
are aware that they are putting their lives on the line to prosecute 
this war every single day. This bill supports them across the board. It 
has the resources and support they need to do their job.
  I could say a lot more about that, but I really want to take issue 
with some of the things that the minority has said, in particular with 
these alleged massive changes to our approach to counterterrorism. We 
have heard about Miranda all day long and what the Justice Department 
does.
  It would surprise people listening to the debate to know this 
administration has not changed the policy on when or when not to give 
Miranda to people in the field. Under the Bush administration, the 
Justice Department went through the same set of issues. If you are 
looking at a domestic U.S. prosecution of that individual, then you 
give Miranda. If not, you don't.
  There is no blanket order across the Justice Department right now 
telling the FBI to give Miranda to everybody it has captured throughout 
the world. It does not exist. It did not happen, despite what the 
minority has said. You have to make that decision.
  In addition, we continue, under the Obama administration, to hold 
people right now, without Miranda, without trial, without those rights, 
terrorists from foreign places that we can't do anything else with but 
we understand they are a threat. That policy has not changed.
  What we have attempted to do is clarify those policies for the 
members of the intelligence community in the field so they know what 
they are supposed to do and, yes, also to prevent things like Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo, which every single member of the Armed Forces 
and the intelligence community has told us was a crushing blow to our 
effort in the counterterrorism effort. To do that, to make those 
changes is necessary.
  But to listen to the minority, you would think that we have given up 
prosecuting terrorists outside of civilian court.
  We haven't. You would think that we would read Miranda to absolutely 
everybody. We don't. We are trying to make intelligent decisions.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. REYES. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. We need to do a better job of intelligence. 
We need to better coordinate that intelligence. That's what I think we 
learned from the Christmas Day attack. There is stuff in this bill to 
try to do this.
  We need to do oversight better. We need to have a better idea from 
the intelligence community to do what they are going to tell us and 
when, and to make sure there is a record of it, which is in this bill, 
so that no one can later dispute what they were or were not told.
  The minority has a critical role to play in making that happen. 
Instead they make these baseless charges that somehow we have given up 
in the fight on terror and we are not supporting the intelligence 
community. That is absolutely untrue. Majority and minority strongly 
support our intelligence community, and we are absolutely committed to 
prosecuting this war to the fullest extent possible.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, how much time do we have remaining on each 
side?
  The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas). The gentleman from 
Michigan has 10\1/2\ minutes and the gentleman from Texas has 13\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to reserve my time until we are more 
equal.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the chairman of the 
Terrorism-HUMINT, Analysis and Counterintelligence Subcommittee, my 
good friend from California (Mr. Thompson).
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
  I am pleased that this legislation supports critical U.S. 
intelligence capabilities at a level higher than we ever have in past 
years. This bill improves the intelligence community's ability to 
understand hard targets, those countries that pose the greatest 
strategic threat to U.S. interests.
  But it also increases funds for intelligence collections that will 
support U.S. policy decisions in other important regions such as 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia. We must continue to focus our 
resources on our priority targets, but we can't neglect emerging 
threats. This bill does both.
  The bill also includes an amendment that I introduced in committee in 
conjunction with our colleague, David Price of North Carolina, to 
improve the effectiveness of interrogations and prevent a return to 
past abuses.
  It calls on the Director of National Intelligence to evaluate 
scientific research on interrogations and assess how to improve our 
U.S. interrogators' training. It also requires the DNI to assess the 
ethics training provided to interrogators so they understand the 
boundaries within which they can operate.
  Finally, the bill contains a provision that I sponsored that requires 
the newly created Inspector General of the intelligence community to 
study the intelligence community's electronic waste disposal 
procedures. This provision was designed to protect not just our 
environment, but also our security. The Inspector General must assess 
both the environmental impact of these practices and the steps taken to 
ensure that discarded devices do not contain sensitive information that 
our adversaries would be able to exploit.
  Madam Chair, this legislation will strengthen the capabilities of our 
intelligence communities and makes our Nation safer.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.
  I hope that as we have the general debate on this bill right now that 
we have at least one person who will come up on the other side and 
explain exactly what is in the McDermott amendment, what it means and 
what the implication will be to our men and women in the intelligence 
community. We hear over and over again how ``we support the 
intelligence community''--without a single hearing.
  Perhaps with about 1 minute of debate on the manager's amendment that 
has been allotted to that McDermott amendment, we will fundamentally 
change the nature of the intelligence community, how they work and how 
they operate by creating new criminal statutes, not a minute of 
hearings in this committee, and all of a sudden it appears out of 
nowhere in a manager's amendment.
  Would someone on the other side please explain the rationale for 
bringing that in this bill with having no hearing when it will have a 
fundamental impact on the intelligence community? What is the 
rationale, and why was the majority unwilling to have hearings on this 
issue? Why were they unwilling to debate this issue, and why did they 
bury it into a manager's amendment with 22 other amendments?
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I am now pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, and our former 
ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, Ms. Harman of 
California.
  Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me and hope that 
what I am about to discuss is supported by the current ranking member.
  I rise in strong support of the manager's amendment, which includes 
two

[[Page 1875]]

provisions which I authored and which address problems continuing to 
impede our efforts to keep our country safe.
  First, it requires the Inspector General of the intelligence 
community to report to Congress in 180 days on overclassification of 
intelligence. Stamping documents ``secret'' or ``top secret'' for the 
wrong reasons interferes with accurate, actionable, and timely 
information sharing within the Federal Government and with State and 
local law enforcement. Protecting sources and methods is the right 
reason to classify information, but protecting turf or personal 
embarrassment is not.
  D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier says she hesitates to share 
information with the Federal Government for fear it will be immediately 
classified and rendered useless because she can't tell her officers in 
the field what to look for when on patrol. A variety of civil liberties 
and good government groups support our amendment, and I am glad it's in 
the manager's amendment.
  Second, Madam Chair, the manager's amendment requires the Director of 
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, to assess intelligence on harmful radiological materials, 
including highly disbursable substances like Cesium-137. It's not 
possible in this open setting to describe the threat posed by unsecured 
radiological materials, but a range of experts, including the Defense 
Science Board, have warned about the danger posed by medical equipment 
that uses this material.
  These machines are in hospitals across the country, in every major 
town and city. They are not tamper-proof. The Departments of Energy and 
Homeland Security are adding short-term hardening measures to these 
machines, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is investigating 
alternatives. They need more support.
  My thanks to the Rules Committee and to Chairman Reyes for including 
my provisions in the manager's amendment. I am very pleased that after 
4 long years we will probably pass an intelligence authorization bill 
today. I urge an ``aye'' vote.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank my colleague from California for coming down 
and explaining her amendments. These are issues that we have talked 
about in the past, and congratulations for having them included in the 
manager's amendment. I support those kinds of amendments, because they 
have been discussed and they have broad bipartisan support.
  There are other parts of the manager's amendment which I am strongly 
opposed to because they haven't even had any dialogue, debate or 
hearings on that.
  To discuss one of those, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Texas 
(Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, I agree with much of what has been said 
on the other side of the aisle about the good provisions in this bill. 
I am also disappointed, as the ranking member talked about, that a 
number of substantive issues were not even allowed to be discussed and 
voted on.
  But in my mind all of that is dwarfed by the provisions in the last 
section of the manager's amendment beginning on page 32, and I would 
recommend every Republican and Democrat in this House read for him- or 
herself this language, because it is a devastating blow to the 
professionals in our intelligence community who we ask to keep us safe. 
This language delineates a number of specific acts that it says by law 
are cruel and degrading treatment. One of those acts is prolonged 
isolation.
  As I mentioned earlier, any prison or county jail anywhere around the 
country sometimes has to put a prisoner into solitary confinement. But 
under this law, if an intelligence community professional does that, he 
is liable for up to 15 or more years in jail for prolonged isolation.
  If he does anything that would blaspheme a terrorist's religious 
beliefs, or cause him to participate in action intended to violate his 
individual religious beliefs, he is guilty of violating a criminal 
statute and that intelligence professional whom we count on to keep us 
safe goes to jail--not the terrorists, but the guy or lady that we are 
counting on to keep us safe.
  There is provision after provision, whether it's deprivation of 
sleep, even threatening to use force, the religious provisions, as I 
mentioned, or any act that is the equivalent of this laundry list--
sensory deprivation--the terrorists who would be captured would be 
treated more gingerly than any criminal in any county jail or any 
prison across the country. This is wrong, and it's reason enough to 
reject the bill.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the chairwoman of 
the Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, a valued member 
of my committee, Ms. Eshoo from California.

                              {time}  1415

  Ms. ESHOO. I thank the chairwoman, and I thank our distinguished 
chairman for his wonderful and dedicated leadership of the House 
Intelligence Committee.
  It's been far too long since we've had an Intelligence authorization 
bill enacted. Because Congress has the responsibility to set guidance 
for the intelligence community to strengthen our national security, 
which is really our highest obligation here in Congress, I am really 
pleased that this critical legislation is on the floor today.
  This bill take some very important steps to increase congressional 
oversight of the intelligence community, which is very much needed. I 
would like to address two in particular that came out of the 
subcommittee that I am proud to chair.
  First, the bill creates an independent intelligence community 
inspector general. So many of the issues in the intelligence community 
cut across multiple agencies, and today there is no one who can look at 
all sides of these issues. This inspector general will have the dual 
responsibility to report to the Congress, not just to the Director of 
National Intelligence, increasing our oversight.
  Second, this bill allows the GAO to conduct audits and reviews of the 
intelligence community. We all know the value of the GAO's assessments 
firsthand. Their reputation for objective, thorough reviews is second 
to none. But today, the intelligence community refuses to allow GAO in 
the door, even when Congress has asked them to investigate. This is not 
going to stand because the bill corrects it.
  The bill increases oversight of the security clearance process and 
takes steps to improve information sharing, both high priorities of my 
subcommittee. We have had numerous hearings on these topics and will 
continue to do so.
  Finally, my colleagues, we all take this responsibility to oversee 
the intelligence community very seriously. We are the eyes and ears of 
the American people to examine the issues that are hidden behind the 
walls of classification, and as the voice of the American people to ask 
the questions which they cannot. This bill strengthens our ability to 
do just that, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
  Mr. REYES. I yield the gentlelady 15 additional seconds.
  Ms. ESHOO. Finally, I would like to say in response to really a 
terrible charge that was made by one of our colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle that this bill weakens the intelligence community, 
that it is an attack on the intelligence community: we can't let that 
stand. There isn't anything farther from the truth. This is singularly 
the largest Intel authorization with its base budget in the history of 
the United States of America. We are giving to the intelligence 
community the very tools that it requires, that it has requested, and 
are glad to do so.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I would like to yield 2 minutes to my 
colleague from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I, too, along with my colleague from Texas, 
and certainly the ranking member from Michigan, want to bring to the 
attention of this body just how dangerous the amendment is that says 
this, ``Any officer or employee of the intelligence community who, in 
the course of or in anticipation of a covered interrogation, knowingly 
commits, attempts to commit or conspires

[[Page 1876]]

to commit an act of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.'' And it 
goes on to talk about infringing on their religious beliefs by any 
notion whatsoever that isn't defined in the bill.
  Sleep--it talks about lack of sleep. As a matter of fact, the 
interrogators are probably getting a lot less sleep than actually the 
terrorists they are interrogating because they also process the 
information before and after the interrogations.
  You have created a whole new direction to go after the very people 
who are interrogating people trying to kill Americans, and you are 
saying we are going to put you in jail if you push your limits. And by 
the way, torture is already against the law. Nobody, and I mean nobody, 
is pushing torture. What we're saying is, you cannot make this so 
unreasonable that they won't do it. And if you don't think that this 
will have an impact on an agent making the determination, should I or 
shouldn't I, you know what? I was hoping to turn around and find 300 
screaming, cheering Americans saying thank you for your patriotism and 
your service, not 25 Justice Department lawyers with subpoenas.
  You will absolutely freeze the intelligence community's ability to go 
out and get information that they need, and it is absolutely naive to 
believe that they're going to do it anyway. I'm sorry, that's not the 
way it works. These folks want to follow the law; they want to follow 
the Constitution. And guess what? At the end of the day, they're 
willing to risk their lives to protect their country and their fellow 
Americans, and this is the treatment that we give them.
  This one provision alone will disrupt I can't tell you how many 
operations worldwide and is worthy of our rejection of this direction 
in the intelligence community.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my privilege to yield 2 minutes to 
the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, first, I would like to focus on two 
of this bill's most important provisions as it relates to technical and 
tactical: first, cybersecurity, and, number two, space.
  The bill makes significant investments in the variety of critical 
cybersecurity programs, a need highlighted by repeated attacks on the 
information technology systems of the Federal Government and private 
industry over the past year.
  As cybersecurity evolves and intensifies, our intelligence community 
must be able to respond quickly and with the latest technologies 
available. The National Security Agency, which I'm proud to say is in 
my district, has already developed a number of technologies that are 
already helping to protect us against these threats; but we need to 
ensure that NSA and other intelligence agencies have the resources that 
they need to develop and deploy the defenses that will keep our 
networks running and information secure. This bill helps do that.
  Second, this bill makes important investments in space. It supports 
the President's request to develop a new imagery capability. In 
addition, it supports the Senate proposal, which we must start funding 
to continue building upon our known capabilities.
  These are critical investments, and we are prepared to see them 
through. We must keep major space acquisitions on budget and on 
schedule. We do not have unlimited resources and cannot afford to have 
these critical acquisitions spin out of control.
  I am also pleased that the bill encourages the DNI and Director of 
the NRO to leverage commercial capabilities to the fullest extent 
possible. Commercial tools have significantly improved in recent years. 
Using these capabilities to complement government efforts will not only 
provide a cost-effective way of meeting our needs; it will support the 
revitalization of the long-struggling commercial space industry.
  I also want to make just some response to my peers on the other side. 
The Intelligence Committee is a very important committee; national 
security is at stake. We must come together as citizens first. There 
are a lot of allegations--we understand there are some politics in 
whatever we do--but when it comes to national security intelligence, we 
have got to find a way to make sure we focus on the priorities. Those 
priorities are in this budget.
  There are some things that we might not all agree with; but in the 
end, we vote on the bill that we feel is right for our Nation. And 
believe me, there is nothing that either side will do to help the 
terrorists; we will go after the terrorists with a vigor.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.
  There are a lot of things in this bill that are not addressed, that 
were not allowed to be put in order as we went through the rules 
process. One of those things is how we are going to deal with the 
detainees from Guantanamo.
  You know, at one time they were going to be moved into Kansas; the 
people in Kansas stood up and said no. They then were going to moved to 
Michigan, and the people in Michigan stood up and said no. They then 
were going to be moved to South Carolina, and the leadership in South 
Carolina said no. Now it is the people in Illinois that are fighting 
the valiant battle and saying, no, we don't want them in our State 
either.
  There has been a fundamental problem in each case where the 
administration has proposed moving these individuals into a State; 
there has been absolutely no transparency. People in Michigan, people 
in Illinois, people in South Carolina and Kansas have all asked for the 
fundamental information: Who are these individuals? Why are they in 
Guantanamo? What did they do to deserve to be there? What has their 
behavior been while they have been in Guantanamo? In each case, for 
each of those States we've said, before the States make up their mind 
as to whether they are going to accept these individuals or not, share 
these individuals with the policymakers and the decision-makers in that 
State.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is probably a good point that the ranking 
member makes that there should be a debate on Guantanamo; 
unfortunately, this is not the right bill to have that debate on.
  I now yield 2 minutes to the chairman of the Select Intelligence 
Oversight Panel, and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, a 
valued member, Mr. Holt from New Jersey.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I thank the distinguished Chair of the House 
Permanent Select Committee for bringing this bill to the floor. As he 
said, it is not perfect, and there are some things that have developed 
since the committee sent this bill to the floor, but on balance, we 
need it and I support it.
  I am pleased that the bill includes language I developed that 
mandates video recording of detainee interrogations by the Central 
Intelligence Agency. This provision's purpose is simple: to improve the 
intelligence operations of the CIA and enhance our national security by 
ensuring the video recording of each detainee interrogation. It 
requires the Director of the CIA to promulgate and to provide to 
Congress the guidelines under which such video recording shall be done. 
And it requires that the video recordings have to be maintained and so 
forth. I note that this provision is extremely similar to the one that 
was included in last year's National Defense Authorization Act and that 
now serves as the legal basis for video recording of detainee 
interrogations within the Department of Defense.
  The benefits of video recording and electronically recording 
interrogations are evident, and law enforcement organizations across 
the United States routinely use the practice to both protect the person 
being interrogated and the officer conducting the interrogations and, 
importantly, to get better, more useful information. Clearly, the CIA 
itself valued this tool as well, otherwise it would not have made the 
recordings that it did of interrogations of ``high-value'' detainees 
that were captured in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The amendment will 
allow the CIA Director to determine how to conduct the

[[Page 1877]]

recordings in a way that protects the identity of interrogators and 
protects other material that must be kept secret.
  Finally, the bill also advances some of my other priorities, 
including a sustained emphasis on improving foreign language 
capabilities, expanding GAO's ability to conduct investigations of 
intelligence community activities, and a long-overdue declassification 
review requirement for gulf war illness-related records at the CIA.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for this bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield my colleague from Texas (Mr. Thornberry) 1\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, our colleague on the Intelligence 
Committee from New Jersey talked about the importance of 
interrogations. It is absolutely true that much of the information that 
the United States has received since 9/11 which has prevented further 
successful terrorist attacks on our homeland has come from 
interrogations. That is why it is so important that we maintain that 
tool done by professionals in the right way, absolutely. But to tie 
their hands and allow those professionals conducting interrogations of 
terrorists even less latitude than the county sheriff or the FBI 
investigating a bank robbery have just seems to me to be madness. And 
yet the manager's amendment, which has traditionally been used for 
technical-type corrections, less controversial sorts of issues, the 
manager's amendment on this bill includes an amazing expansion of 
criminal liability only for those in the intelligence community.
  It seems to me that before we start prosecuting members of the 
intelligence community for not giving terrorists the amount of sleep 
they ask for or for doing something that may violate whatever they 
describe as their religious beliefs, we ought to think twice about it.
  It is important to say there is no reasonableness standard to say 
what is reasonably your intelligence belief or a reasonable amount of 
sleep; this is all at the discretion of the terrorist. We are jumping 
to their tune under this language. It is dangerous, and it should be 
rejected.

                              {time}  1430

  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, may I inquire of the time remaining on both 
sides?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas has 3\1/4\ minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I am going to be the last speaker, so we 
only have one speaker left.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the chairwoman 
of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, the gentlewoman from 
Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Madam Chair, I am proud to support this legislation 
because it will provide the men and women of our intelligence community 
with the tools they need to protect the Nation while implementing vital 
provisions to promote accountability and oversight.
  As the Chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, I 
have worked to limit the intelligence community's dangerous 
overreliance on private contractors. To that end, I have worked hard to 
include section 338 in this bill, which requires the Director of 
National Intelligence to provide a comprehensive report to Congress on 
the intelligence community's use of personal service contracts. It is 
my hope that this report will finally give us a clear picture of how 
much our national security has been doled out to the lowest bidder.
  I want to talk for a minute about the issue of torture. I think it is 
so important to underscore that the manager's amendment includes 
language originally proposed by Mr. McDermott that reiterates existing 
law on torture and that provides statutory criminal penalties for 
individuals who knowingly commit an act of cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading treatment.
  What I have been hearing from the Republicans is that somehow we are 
sacrificing our national security by not allowing the torture of our 
enemies. In fact, I think we are enhancing our national security by 
saying that we will eliminate provisions which allow for terrorists to 
be empowered and to recruit more people. If we stick to our values, we 
enhance our national security. These are already in law right now, and 
that is all this bill does is underscore the lawfulness of the new 
rules.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to a valued member of our 
committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Madam Chair, I rise in support of the intelligence authorization 
bill. As a member of the committee, I am confident it provides our 
intelligence community with the tools it needs to keep our country 
safe. There are two aspects of the bill that I would like to highlight.
  First, the bill includes the most substantial reform to the oversight 
relationship between Congress and the executive branch in a generation. 
The bill requires that the President provides all notifications in 
writing and to maintain a record of briefings. It requires the 
President to inform all members of the Intelligence Committees when a 
Gang of Eight briefing is conducted, giving members who are not in the 
Gang of Eight the awareness they need to prevent abuse of the process. 
It requires the President to open up the briefing to the full committee 
after 180 days unless the Director of National Intelligence recertifies 
that the standards of the statute are still met.
  Second, the bill makes critical investments in our overhead 
infrastructure and architecture. This is essential to our intelligence 
capability and wouldn't be possible without the work of some of the 
most brilliant minds in the country, like the scientists at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory.
  We are not giving the administration a blank check. It is imperative 
that our major acquisitions stay on budget and on schedule. Resources 
are scarce, and we cannot allow a handful of programs to spin out of 
control. The committee will keep a close eye on those programs.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, my colleague on the other side of the 
aisle, Chairman Reyes, has said now is not the time to talk about 
Gitmo. Obviously, the majority has also said now is not the time to 
talk about getting an independent assessment of what is going on in 
Iran. Now is not the time to talk about the release of unclassified 
versions of documents related to the use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques. Now is not the time to talk about bringing the Gitmo folks 
here. Now is not the time to talk about the time lapse between Fort 
Hood and Christmas Day and what did and did not happen during that 
period of time. Now is not the time to talk about a process for the 
authorization and notification of covert actions that may result in the 
death of a targeted U.S. citizen.
  So it is not time to talk about any of those or to debate any of 
those issues which are absolutely critical to the effectiveness of our 
intelligence community and to keeping America safe.
  Interestingly enough, it is the day not to talk about but to bury 
into a manager's amendment 22 different amendments, including one that 
will fundamentally change the way our intelligence community has to do 
business. No hearings. No discussions. No debate. Buried in there is 
the McDermott amendment. We are now limited to, at most, 10 minutes per 
side to talk about 22 amendments in the manager's amendment, which will 
come up immediately following this general debate. Yet it is 
interesting that, in the discussion of general debate, not one person 
on the other side was willing to defend this amendment and the process 
by which it was included--meaning no discussions, no debate--or to 
defend the content of what is included in the manager's amendment.
  Is this what the process in the House has now come down to, that we 
bury these critical amendments between 22

[[Page 1878]]

other amendments? If we split up the time equally, let's see. We have 
22 amendments divided by 20 minutes. We will, maybe, have 1 minute of 
debate. We will have 1 minute of debate on this amendment. It will be 
interesting when our folks in the intelligence community see what our 
friends on the other side of the aisle have done to them today, our 
friends on the other side who talk about how they so strongly defend 
our intelligence community. When they go visit them in the field, I 
would guess that they are going to get a very cold reception.
  The other thing that they are going to do is they are going to have 
questions, and they are going to expect the majority to explain how 
they did this with no hearings. They are going to have to explain 
exactly, Now, what does this amendment do? How does it impact us? What 
does it mean? How is it operational?
  I assume you knew that before you voted on it on the floor of the 
House, and my answer is going to be, I don't think they do.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I understand the frustration on the minority 
side. As an Army veteran, as a veteran of Federal law enforcement for 
26\1/2\ years, I understand and value the United States Constitution. I 
understand and value that we have to live by the rules. I understand 
and value the fact that we are a global leader that is much respected.
  The gentleman talks about one amendment, and that amendment simply 
says, Follow the rules. Follow the law. Follow the principles that have 
made this country great. I understand that.
  Apparently, the minority does not understand that, and I feel for 
them because, in the final analysis, I have been with members of the 
intelligence community in faraway places around the world. I have been 
with them and their families at Bethesda when they were recuperating 
from the attack in Khost. I have been to the ceremony at the CIA. I 
understand what they go through. This is a good bill. It deserves 
everybody's support.
  Mr. HOYER. Madam Chair, I rise in support of this Intelligence 
Authorization bill, which authorizes the tools America needs to detect 
and combat its greatest threats, including what President Obama called 
``a far-reaching network of violence and hatred.''
  In the past weeks, we've seen a great deal of evidence that policies 
adopted by President Obama and Democrats are working to keep Americans 
safer. In Pakistan, the government is cooperating for the first time in 
the arrest of top Taliban leaders, including second-in-command Abdul 
Ghani Baradar and Abdul Kabir, a member of the senior leadership. At 
home, Najibullah Zazi has just pled guilty in federal court for 
attempting to bomb New York City's subway, and the Christmas Day bomber 
is giving us timely intelligence.
  This bill continues the policies that are working and strengthens 
America's intelligence collection. It significantly increases funding 
for human intelligence, a resource that is irreplaceable in disrupting 
terrorist networks. To ensure the broad reach of our intelligence 
community, it makes important investments in language training and 
scholarships, so that our personnel will have the resources to 
infiltrate networks and intercept communications around the world. It 
also strengthens our defenses against the emerging threats of 
cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare, which, if unchecked, could have a 
crippling effect on our military and economy. And this legislation 
makes an important contribution to America's nuclear non-proliferation 
efforts by requiring reports on the nuclear intentions and capabilities 
of Iran, Syria, and North Korea, as well as on the worldwide black 
market in materials that could contribute to nuclear weapons.
  At the same time as it strengthens our intelligence capabilities, 
this authorization bill also ensures that they receive reasonable and 
responsible oversight to protect Americans' rights. It creates an 
independent inspector general with responsibility for the entire 
intelligence community; protects the Intelligence Committees' access, 
through the Government Accountability Office, to the information it 
needs to conduct proper oversight of intelligence activities; and 
requires that the CIA Inspector General audit each covert action at 
least once every three years. To prevent the abuse of detainees that 
weakens our moral case to the world without making Americans safer, 
this bill also prohibits private contractors from interrogating 
detainees in CIA custody. Finally, this bill, like the recently-passed 
Defense Authorization bill, prevents the release or transfer of 
Guantanamo detainees until the president provides a plan for dealing 
with those detainees and mitigating any risk their release or transfer 
might cause.
  Madam Chair, the Founders spoke of providing ``for the common 
defense'' not only because we face common threats, but because the work 
of overcoming them must be common to all of us. That work is far too 
important to be subjected to fear-mongering or the demands of the 
political cycle. That doesn't obligate all of my colleagues to vote for 
this bill, though I hope they will; but it does oblige us to conduct 
this debate, today and in the days to come, with the respect and 
responsibility that our common defense from common danger demands.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Madam Chair, I stand in support of the 2010 
Intelligence Authorization Act.
  This measure continues congress' commitment to delivering to the men 
and women who serve in the country's intelligence community the 
resources they need to conduct the vital work of protecting American 
lives. This bill ensures that these resources are delivered in a manner 
that strengthens accountability.
  In addition to authorizing funding for 16 U.S. intelligence agencies 
and intelligence-related activities of the government, the bill 
contains important provisions to expand independent government 
oversight of the intelligence community so that the American public can 
be confident that the essential work of intelligence gathering is done 
in a manner that comports with the highest moral standards.
  To ensure that all relevant members of congress are kept abreast of 
all important intelligence developments, the bill repeals the ``Gang of 
Eight'' provision which has for years limited some congressional 
intelligence committee member access to intelligence information and 
activities. With the passage of this measure, the president will be 
required to brief all covered members of congress on the covert actions 
and programs of the government. This will ensure that all officials who 
have been elected to oversee intelligence matters are briefed and aware 
of events as they unfold.
  To help combat waste, fraud and abuse, the bill creates a new Office 
of the Inspector General and invests the office with subpoena powers 
and important protections to ensure its independence.
  Madam Chair, Congress has not sent an intelligence authorization bill 
to the president for his signature in more than 5 years. That means for 
five years, congress has not been a full partner in the development of 
this country's national security policy. We need to pass this bill, not 
only to fulfill our oversight responsibilities, but also for the sake 
of the brave men and women in and out of uniform who have dedicated 
themselves to the important work this bill helps to fund.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chair, I rise today in strong 
support of this legislation. It has been five long years since an 
intelligence authorization bill was last signed into law, and each new 
revelation about the conduct of the previous administration testifies 
to the need for effective congressional oversight of the intelligence 
community.
  This bill also provides an opportunity to move beyond questions of 
misconduct and abuse to address the longer-term challenges of improving 
our intelligence capabilities, making them responsive to cyber-security 
and other new threats, and ensuring that they are accountable to 
Congress and the American public.
  I'd like to highlight two aspects of the bill on which I have worked 
in recent years (along with colleagues such as Ms. Schakowsky and Mr. 
Holt), and which I believe are important steps toward improving the 
effectiveness of our intelligence operations.
  First, the bill contains several provisions dealing with the use of 
private contractors by the intelligence community, which by some 
reports has come to consume nearly half of the annual intelligence 
budget.
  It would require a comprehensive report on the number and cost of 
contractors employed by the intelligence community and the extent of 
their use for intelligence collection, analysis, and other covert 
activities including detention and interrogation.
  It also explicitly prohibits the use of contractors for the 
interrogation of detainees, codifying a prohibition that the CIA itself 
has already adopted.
  Both of these measures are based on my Transparency and 
Accountability in Intelligence Contracting Act (H.R. 963), and both 
were approved by the House in the last intelligence authorization bill 
but were not signed into law.
  Secondly, the bill lays a foundation for making the practice of 
interrogation more effective, professional, and ethical.

[[Page 1879]]

  I have worked closely with Subcommittee Chairman Mike Thompson in 
crafting a section of this bill based on H.R. 591, my comprehensive 
interrogation and detention reform bill.
  Our provision would require the DNI to report to Congress on:
  The quality and value of existing scientific research on 
interrogation;
  The state of interrogation training within the intelligence 
community, including its ethical component;
  Efforts to enhance career paths for interrogation specialists; and
  The effectiveness of existing processes for studying and implementing 
best practices.
  These and other key provisions of this bill are only a start, but 
they represent an important first step toward improving the 
effectiveness and accountability of our intelligence community, and 
ensuring that the necessary measures we take to protect our country do 
not come at the cost of our fundamental values.
  Finally, I feel compelled to add that my colleagues on the other side 
of the aisle who are claiming that this bill--and this Administration--
somehow do not appreciate the threat our nation is facing have clearly 
neither read the text of this legislation nor given the issue much 
serious thought. Rather than holding up military commissions at 
Guantanamo Bay as a panacea for all of our ills, we should be 
confronting the threats we face squarely, soberly, and with vigilant 
attention to questions of effectiveness and ethicality--which is 
exactly what this bill does.
  I thank Chairman Reyes, Ranking Member Hoekstra, and the members of 
their committee for their leadership and their continued attention to 
these vital issues, and I urge my colleagues to support this 
legislation.
  Mr. ETHERIDGE. Madam Chair, I rise today in support of H.R. 2701 the 
Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act. This bill will make 
our nation safer by improving federal intelligence operations and 
supporting a national defense strategy that is both strong and smart.
  I am proud to represent Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base. For many 
years I was the only member from North Carolina on the Homeland 
Security Committee. I am also a veteran of the United States Army. All 
these experiences make me particularly mindful of the importance of 
intelligence. Successful intelligence makes our men and women in the 
military safer. This is the least we can do for those who voluntarily 
put themselves in harm's way.
  I am also aware of the cost of intelligence failures, where either 
oversight or intelligence falls short. H.R. 2701 is an important bill 
that both provides necessary investments in intelligence, and 
implements the democratic controls needed to be certain that those 
investments are well managed.
  This bill will ensure that Congress fully understands own responses 
to terror. Complete review of the recent, failed attempt at an attack 
on Northwest Airlines flight 253 can make future attempts more likely 
to fail as well. Similarly, the mandated report on the anthrax attacks 
of nine years ago will publicize lessons learned about emerging 
threats, helping us to deal with similar threats more effectively in 
the future.
  Madam Chair, I support this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to 
join me in passing H.R. 2701.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the dedicated 
public servants of our intelligence community. Their work to ensure our 
national security is to be commended. However, I must oppose the 
Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010.
  This legislation contains provisions that implement vital measures of 
accountability, such as a provision to prohibit the use of funds for 
payment to any contractor to conduct interrogations of detainees 
currently in custody. I also support the provision in this legislation 
to establish an independent intelligence community-wide Inspector 
General. These provisions are an important step to ensure that 
mechanisms of accountability and oversight are in place. However, I 
remain concerned that some of the methods being employed by our 
intelligence community may amount to serious violations of 
international law and our Constitution.
  Last month, The Washington Post and New York Times reported that the 
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) maintained lists of ``high 
value individuals'' targeted for assassination abroad, and that those 
lists contain U.S. citizens. What's more, the President may have 
authorized military operations with the express understanding that a 
U.S. citizen might be killed, or may be killed in the future.
  Under such a policy, U.S. citizens are added to the list simply for 
being suspected of involvement in terrorism, in subversion of their 
basic constitutional rights to due process of law. Their right to a 
trial and to present a defense is summarily and anonymously stripped 
from them. History has demonstrated that the U.S. government has been 
mistaken when accusing someone of involvement in terrorism. Most 
recently, following the 2008 Supreme Court decision to afford detainees 
held indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay habeas corpus rights, the 
government was forced by federal judges to release thirty-three of 
thirty-nine detainees on the grounds of insufficient evidence to 
support accusations of their involvement in terrorism. U.S. citizens 
accused of involvement in terrorism are not even afforded the same 
rights that Guantanamo detainees are--if they are added to the targeted 
assassination list, their punishment is murder.
  In response to these reports, I submitted a common-sense amendment 
that would have required the President to report to the congressional 
intelligence committees the identities of all U.S. citizens included on 
such lists, currently or in the future. My amendment was about 
accountability. If the Administration sees fit to revoke unilaterally 
the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens abroad based on suspicion of 
involvement in terrorism, devoid of any judicial review, it must at 
least be required to report to the congressional intelligence 
committees each time a U.S. citizen is added to a targeted 
assassination list.
  Since the beginning of the War in Iraq more than eight years ago, I 
have expressed grave concern that intelligence is being fabricated or 
abused by the Executive Branch to justify the war in Iraq. More 
recently, The Nation reported that Blackwater was intimately involved 
in a targeted assassination program run by the JSOC and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Pakistan--a country with which we are not 
at war. I am gravely concerned about the use of private security 
contractors in intelligence work, particularly in programs that have 
virtually no transparency, accountability, or oversight. I remain 
concerned that we are continuing to conduct intelligence work in 
contravention of international law and in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution.
  I will continue to work to ensure that all have equal protection 
under the law; and that Congress conducts its constitutionally mandated 
oversight of the Executive Branch effectively.
  Mr. REYES. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the 
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered 
read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H.R. 2701

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Prohibition on earmarks.
Sec. 106. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Temporary appointment to fill vacancies in Presidentially 
              appointed and Senate confirmed positions in the Office of 
              the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 303. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements 
              of the intelligence community.
Sec. 304. Provisions relating to the Defense Civilian Intelligence 
              Personnel System.

                         Subtitle B--Education

Sec. 311. Permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence 
              Scholars Program.
Sec. 312. Intelligence officer training program.
Sec. 313. Modifications to the Stokes educational scholarship program.
Sec. 314. Pilot program for intensive language instruction in African 
              languages.

[[Page 1880]]

         Subtitle C--Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions

Sec. 321. Reporting on covert actions.

         Subtitle D--Reports and Other Congressional Oversight

Sec. 331. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 332. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 333. Semiannual reports on nuclear weapons programs of Iran, 
              Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 334. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 335. Government Accountability Office audits and investigations.
Sec. 336. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.
Sec. 337. Reports on foreign industrial espionage.
Sec. 338. Report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 339. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of 
              the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 340. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and 
              Afghanistan.
Sec. 341. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 342. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 343. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized 
              disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 344. Study on electronic waste destruction practices of the 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 345. Report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air 
              America.
Sec. 346. Study on college tuition programs for employees of the 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 347. National Intelligence Estimate on global supply chain 
              vulnerabilities.
Sec. 348. Review of records relating to potential health risks among 
              Desert Storm veterans.
Sec. 349. Review of pensions of employees affected by ``five and out'' 
              program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 350. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of 
              detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
              Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 351. Summary of intelligence on Uighur detainees held at United 
              States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 352. Report on interrogation research and training.
Sec. 353. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 354. Review of Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of 
              enforcement jurisdiction in foreign nations.
Sec. 355. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 356. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 357. Conforming amendments.

                       Subtitle E--Other Matters

Sec. 361. Modification of availability of funds for different 
              intelligence activities.
Sec. 362. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 363. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt 
              and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 364. Exemption of dissemination of terrorist identity information 
              from Freedom of Information Act.
Sec. 365. Misuse of the intelligence community and Office of the 
              Director of National Intelligence name, initials, or 
              seal.
Sec. 366. Security clearances: reports; ombudsman; reciprocity.
Sec. 367. Limitation on use of funds for the transfer or release of 
              individuals detained at United States Naval Station, 
              Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 368. Intelligence community financial improvement and audit 
              readiness.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of 
              the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
              Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy 
              efficiency reports.
Sec. 405. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
              Community.
Sec. 406. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 411. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the 
              Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 412. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for 
              interrogations involving persons in the custody of the 
              Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Appeals from decisions of Central Intelligence Agency 
              contracting officers.
Sec. 414. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 415. Protection against reprisals.
Sec. 416. Requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons 
              in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements

Sec. 421. Homeland Security intelligence elements.
Sec. 422. Clarification of inclusion of Drug Enforcement Administration 
              as an element of the intelligence community.
Sec. 423. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the 
              National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 424. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of 
              the intelligence community.
Sec. 425. Associate Director of the National Security Agency for 
              Compliance and Training.
Sec. 426. General Counsel of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 427. Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 428. Charter for the National Reconnaissance Office.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the 
              Research and Development Programs of the United States 
              Intelligence Community.
Sec. 502. Expansion and clarification of the duties of the program 
              manager for the information sharing environment.
Sec. 503. Classification review of executive branch materials in the 
              possession of the congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 504. Prohibition on use of funds to provide Miranda warnings to 
              certain persons outside of the United States.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

Sec. 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
              of 1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision of 
              Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.
Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
              Act of 1978.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to section 105 of the Intelligence 
              Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
              Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
              Intelligence Program.
Sec. 518. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 519. Technical amendments to title 10, United States Code.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2010 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, 
     subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as

[[Page 1881]]

     of September 30, 2010, for the conduct of the intelligence 
     activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through 
     (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill 
     H.R. 2701 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the 
     President. The President shall provide for suitable 
     distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of 
     the Schedule, within the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2010 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to 
     in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2010 the sum of $672,812,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2011.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 853 full-time or full-
     time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2010. Personnel 
     serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the 
     Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel 
     detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available 
     to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 
     are also available to the Director for the adjustment of 
     personnel levels within the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account.
       (d) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2010 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for 
     advanced research and development shall remain available 
     until September 30, 2011.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2010, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

     SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON EARMARKS.

       (a) In General.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations, a report of the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate to accompany the bill 
     H.R. 2701 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress, a joint 
     statement of the managers accompanying a conference report on 
     such bill, or the classified annex to this Act, shall be 
     construed to authorize or require the expenditure of funds 
     for a congressional earmark.
       (b) Congressional Earmark Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``congressional earmark'' means a provision or report 
     language included primarily at the request of a Member, 
     Delegate, or Resident Commissioner of the House of 
     Representatives or a Senator providing, authorizing, or 
     recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget 
     authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for 
     a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or 
     other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a 
     specific State, locality, or congressional district, other 
     than through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or 
     competitive award process.

     SEC. 106. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2010 the sum of $290,900,000.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO FILL VACANCIES IN 
                   PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED AND SENATE CONFIRMED 
                   POSITIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3) is amended by--
       (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
       (2) inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Temporary Appointment to Fill Vacancies.--
     Notwithstanding section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, 
     if an officer of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence, other than the Director of National 
     Intelligence, whose appointment to office is required to be 
     made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
     the Senate, dies, resigns, or is unable to perform the 
     functions and duties of the office--
       ``(1) if during the 365-day period immediately preceding 
     the date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to 
     serve of the applicable officer, the person serving as the 
     first assistant to the office of such officer served as such 
     first assistant for not less than 90 days, such first 
     assistant shall perform the functions and duties of the 
     office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time 
     limitations of section 3346 of title 5, United States Code;
       ``(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President may 
     direct a person who serves in an office for which appointment 
     is required to be made by the President, by and with the 
     advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions 
     and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting 
     capacity subject to the time limitations of such section 
     3346; or
       ``(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall recommend to the President, and 
     the President may direct, a person to perform the functions 
     and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting 
     capacity subject to the time limitations of such section 
     3346, if--
       ``(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of 
     death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the 
     applicable officer, such person served in a position in an 
     element of the intelligence community for not less than 90 
     days;
       ``(B) the rate of pay for the position described under 
     subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the minimum rate 
     of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of the General 
     Schedule; and
       ``(C) in the case of a person who is employed by an element 
     of the intelligence community--
       ``(i) the Director of National Intelligence shall consult 
     with the head of such element; and
       ``(ii) if the head of such element objects to the 
     recommendation, the Director of National Intelligence may 
     make the recommendation to the President over the objection 
     of the head of such element after informing the President of 
     such objection.''.

     SEC. 303. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO 
                   ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 113 the following new section:


                      ``detail of other personnel

       ``Sec. 113A. Except as provided in section 904(g)(2) of the 
     Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 
     402c(g)(2)) and section 113 of this Act, and notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, an officer or employee of the 
     United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed 
     to an element of the intelligence community funded through 
     the Community Management Account from another element of the 
     United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable 
     basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the head of the detailing element, for a 
     period not to exceed two years.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 113 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 113A. Detail of other personnel.''.

     SEC. 304. PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE CIVILIAN 
                   INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM.

       (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       (1) the term ``covered position'' means a defense 
     intelligence position in the Department of Defense 
     established under chapter 83 of title 10, United States Code, 
     excluding an Intelligence Senior Level position designated 
     under section 1607 of such title and any position in the 
     Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service;
       (2) the term ``DCIPS pay system'', as used with respect to 
     a covered position, means the

[[Page 1882]]

     provisions of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel 
     System under which the rate of salary or basic pay for such 
     position is determined, excluding any provisions relating to 
     bonuses, awards, or any other amounts not in the nature of 
     salary or basic pay;
       (3) the term ``Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel 
     System'' means the personnel system established under chapter 
     83 of title 10, United States Code; and
       (4) the term ``appropriate pay system'', as used with 
     respect to a covered position, means--
       (A) the system under which, as of September 30, 2007, the 
     rate of salary or basic pay for such position was determined; 
     or
       (B) if subparagraph (A) does not apply, the system under 
     which, as of September 30, 2007, the rate of salary or basic 
     pay was determined for the positions within the Department of 
     Defense most similar to the position involved,

     excluding any provisions relating to bonuses, awards, or any 
     other amounts which are not in the nature of salary or basic 
     pay.
       (b) Requirement That Appointments to Covered Positions 
     After June 16, 2009, Be Subject to the Appropriate Pay 
     System.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law--
       (1) the DCIPS pay system--
       (A) shall not apply to any individual holding a covered 
     position who is not subject to such system as of June 16, 
     2009; and
       (B) shall not apply to any covered position which is not 
     subject to such system as of June 16, 2009; and
       (2) any individual who, after June 16, 2009, is appointed 
     to a covered position shall accordingly be subject to the 
     appropriate pay system.
       (c) Termination of DCIPS Pay System for Covered Positions 
     and Conversion of Employees Holding Covered Positions to the 
     Appropriate Pay System.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall take all 
     actions which may be necessary to provide, within 12 months 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, for the termination 
     of the DCIPS pay system with respect to covered positions and 
     for the conversion of any employees holding any covered 
     positions which, as of such date of enactment, remain subject 
     to the DCIPS pay system, to the appropriate pay system. No 
     employee shall suffer any loss of or decrease in pay because 
     of the preceding sentence.
       (2) Report.--If the Secretary of Defense is of the view 
     that the DCIPS pay system should not be terminated with 
     respect to covered positions, as required by paragraph (1), 
     the Secretary shall submit to the President and both Houses 
     of Congress as soon as practicable, but in no event later 
     than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, a 
     written report setting forth a statement of the Secretary's 
     views and the reasons therefor. Such report shall 
     specifically include--
       (A) the Secretary's opinion as to whether the DCIPS pay 
     system should be continued, with or without changes, with 
     respect to covered positions; and
       (B) if, in the opinion of the Secretary, the DCIPS pay 
     system should be continued with respect to covered positions, 
     with changes--
       (i) a detailed description of the proposed changes; and
       (ii) a description of any administrative action or 
     legislation which may be necessary.

     The requirements of this paragraph shall be carried out by 
     the Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Director of 
     the Office of Personnel Management.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     considered to affect--
       (1) the provisions of the Defense Civilian Intelligence 
     Personnel System governing aspects of compensation apart from 
     salary or basic pay; or
       (2) the application of such provisions with respect to a 
     covered position or any individual holding a covered 
     position, including after June 16, 2009.

                         Subtitle B--Education

     SEC. 311. PERMANENT AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PAT ROBERTS 
                   INTELLIGENCE SCHOLARS PROGRAM.

       (a) Permanent Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:


     ``program on recruitment and training of intelligence analysts

       ``Sec. 1022.  (a) Program.--(1) The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall carry out a program to ensure that 
     selected students or former students are provided funds to 
     continue academic training, or are reimbursed for academic 
     training previously obtained, in areas of specialization that 
     the Director, in consultation with the other heads of the 
     elements of the intelligence community, identifies as areas 
     in which the current capabilities of the intelligence 
     community are deficient or in which future capabilities of 
     the intelligence community are likely to be deficient.
       ``(2) A student or former student selected for 
     participation in the program shall commit to employment with 
     an element of the intelligence community, following 
     completion of appropriate academic training, under such terms 
     and conditions as the Director considers appropriate.
       ``(3) The program shall be known as the Pat Roberts 
     Intelligence Scholars Program.
       ``(b) Elements.--In carrying out the program under 
     subsection (a), the Director shall--
       ``(1) establish such requirements relating to the academic 
     training of participants as the Director considers 
     appropriate to ensure that participants are prepared for 
     employment as intelligence professionals; and
       ``(2) periodically review the areas of specialization of 
     the elements of the intelligence community to determine the 
     areas in which such elements are, or are likely to be, 
     deficient in capabilities.
       ``(c) Use of Funds.--Funds made available for the program 
     under subsection (a) shall be used to--
       ``(1) provide a monthly stipend for each month that a 
     student is pursuing a course of study;
       ``(2) pay the full tuition of a student or former student 
     for the completion of such course of study;
       ``(3) pay for books and materials that the student or 
     former student requires or required to complete such course 
     of study;
       ``(4) pay the expenses of the student or former student for 
     travel requested by an element of the intelligence community 
     in relation to such program; or
       ``(5) for such other purposes the Director considers 
     appropriate to carry out such program.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by 
     section 303 of this Act, is further amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 1021 the following new 
     item:

``Sec. 1022. Program on recruitment and training of intelligence 
              analysts.''.

       (2) Repeal of pilot program.--Section 318 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public 
     Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 441g note) is repealed.

     SEC. 312. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.

       (a) Program.--Subtitle C of title X of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by 
     section 311 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the 
     end the following new section:


                ``intelligence officer training program

       ``Sec. 1023.  (a) Programs.--(1) The Director of National 
     Intelligence may carry out a grant program in accordance with 
     subsection (b) to enhance the recruitment and retention of an 
     ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence community 
     workforce with capabilities critical to the national security 
     interests of the United States.
       ``(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall identify the skills necessary to 
     meet current or emergent needs of the intelligence community 
     and the educational disciplines that will provide individuals 
     with such skills.
       ``(b) Institutional Grant Program.--(1) The Director of 
     National Intelligence may provide grants to institutions of 
     higher education to support the establishment or continued 
     development of programs of study in educational disciplines 
     identified under subsection (a)(2).
       ``(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may, with 
     respect to the educational disciplines identified under 
     subsection (a)(2), be used for the following purposes:
       ``(A) Curriculum or program development.
       ``(B) Faculty development.
       ``(C) Laboratory equipment or improvements.
       ``(D) Faculty research.
       ``(3) An institution of higher education seeking a grant 
     under this section shall submit an application describing the 
     proposed use of the grant at such time and in such manner as 
     the Director may require.
       ``(4) An institution of higher education that receives a 
     grant under this section shall submit to the Director regular 
     reports regarding the use of such grant, including--
       ``(A) a description of the benefits to students who 
     participate in the course of study funded by such grant;
       ``(B) a description of the results and accomplishments 
     related to such course of study; and
       ``(C) any other information that the Director may require.
       ``(c) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry 
     out this section.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Institution of higher education.--The term 
     `institution of higher education' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1001).
       ``(2) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of 
     National Intelligence.''.
       (b) Repeal of Duplicative Provisions.--
       (1) In general.--The following provisions of law are 
     repealed:
       (A) Section 319 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 403 note).
       (B) Section 1003 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 441g-2).
       (C) Section 922 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 
     50 U.S.C. 402 note).
       (2) Existing agreements.--Notwithstanding the repeals made 
     by paragraph (1), nothing in this subsection shall be 
     construed to amend, modify, or abrogate any agreement, 
     contract, or employment relationship that was in effect in 
     relation to the provisions repealed under paragraph (1) on 
     the day prior to the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401 note), as amended by section 311 of this Act, is further 
     amended by--
       (1) striking the item relating to section 1003; and
       (2) inserting after the item relating to section 1022 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 1023. Intelligence officer training program.''.

     SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO THE STOKES EDUCATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Expansion of Program to Graduate Students.--Section 16 
     of the National Security

[[Page 1883]]

     Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``undergraduate'' and inserting 
     ``undergraduate and graduate''; and
       (B) by striking ``the baccalaureate'' and inserting ``a 
     baccalaureate or graduate''; and
       (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``undergraduate'' and 
     inserting ``undergraduate and graduate''.
       (b) Termination.--Section 16(d)(1)(C) of such Act is 
     amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that 
     follows and inserting the following: ``terminated by--
       ``(i) the Agency due to misconduct by the person;
       ``(ii) the person voluntarily; or
       ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the person to 
     maintain such level of academic standing in the educational 
     course of training as the Director of the National Security 
     Agency specifies in the agreement under this paragraph; 
     and''.
       (c) Authority To Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With 
     NSA.--Section 16(e) of the National Security Agency Act of 
     1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When 
     an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency 
     efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''.
       (d) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
       (1) Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441g et seq.), as amended by 
     section 312 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the 
     end the following new section:


                      ``stokes scholarship program

       ``Sec. 1024. The head of an element of the intelligence 
     community may establish an undergraduate and graduate 
     training program with respect to civilian employees of such 
     element in the same manner and under the same conditions as 
     the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish such a 
     program under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act 
     of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note).''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by 
     section 312 of this Act, is further amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 1023 the following new 
     item:

``Sec. 1024. Stokes scholarship program.''.

     SEC. 314. PILOT PROGRAM FOR INTENSIVE LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION IN 
                   AFRICAN LANGUAGES.

       (a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the National Security Education Board 
     established under section 803(a) of the David L. Boren 
     National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1903(a)), 
     may establish a pilot program for intensive language 
     instruction in African languages.
       (b) Program.--A pilot program established under subsection 
     (a) shall provide scholarships for programs that provide 
     intensive language instruction--
       (1) in any of the five highest priority African languages 
     for which scholarships are not offered under such Act, as 
     determined by the Director of National Intelligence; and
       (2) both in the United States and in a country in which the 
     language is the native language of a significant portion of 
     the population, as determined by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       (c) Termination.--A pilot program established in accordance 
     with subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 5 
     years after the date on which such pilot program is 
     established.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
     carry out this section $2,000,000.
       (2) Availability.--Funds authorized to be appropriated 
     under paragraph (1) shall remain available until the 
     termination of the pilot program in accordance with 
     subsection (c).

         Subtitle C--Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions

     SEC. 321. REPORTING ON COVERT ACTIONS.

       (a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall 
     provide to the congressional intelligence committees all 
     information necessary to assess the lawfulness, 
     effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary 
     authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including--
       ``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence 
     activity is being or was conducted;
       ``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in 
     carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including 
     dissenting legal views;
       ``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the 
     intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing 
     intelligence sources or methods;
       ``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will 
     exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or 
     other resources; and
       ``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will 
     fail.''.
       (b) Procedures.--Section 501(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
     413(c)) is amended by striking ``such procedures'' and 
     inserting ``such written procedures''.
       (c) Intelligence Activities.--Section 502(a)(2) of such Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``(including 
     any information or material relating to the legal authority 
     under which an intelligence activity is being or was 
     conducted, and any information or material relating to legal 
     issues upon which guidance was sought in carrying out or 
     planning the intelligence activity, including dissenting 
     legal views)'' after ``concerning intelligence activities''.
       (d) Covert Actions.--Section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
     413b) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``(including any 
     information or material relating to the legal authority under 
     which a covert action is being or was conducted, and any 
     information or material relating to legal issues upon which 
     guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the covert 
     action, including dissenting legal views)'' after 
     ``concerning covert actions'';
       (2) in subsection (c)--
       (A) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(2) If, pursuant to the procedures established by each of 
     the congressional intelligence committees under section 
     501(c), one of the congressional intelligence committees 
     determines that not all members of that committee are 
     required to have access to a finding under this subsection, 
     the President may limit access to such finding or such notice 
     as provided in such procedures.''; and
       (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``is limited to the 
     Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2)'' and 
     inserting ``is not provided to all members of one of the 
     congressional intelligence committees in accordance with 
     paragraph (2)'';
       (3) in subsection (d)--
       (A) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting 
     ``(d)(1) The President'';
       (B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph (A) of 
     this paragraph, by striking ``specified in'' and inserting 
     ``informed in accordance with''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall 
     constitute a `significant undertaking' if the activity--
       ``(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
       ``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, 
     including authorities relating to research, development, or 
     operations;
       ``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or 
     other resources;
       ``(D) requires notification under section 504;
       ``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing 
     intelligence sources or methods; or
       ``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic 
     relations of the United States if such activity were 
     disclosed without authorization.''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
       ``(g)(1) A Member of Congress to which a finding is 
     reported under subsection (c) or notice is provided under 
     subsection (d)(1) may submit to the Director of National 
     Intelligence an objection to any part of such finding or such 
     notice. Not later than 48 hours after such an objection is 
     submitted to the Director of National Intelligence, the 
     Director shall report such objection in writing to the 
     President and such Member of Congress.
       ``(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under 
     subsection (c) or notice provided under subsection (d)(1) is 
     not made available to all members of a congressional 
     intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), 
     the President shall provide such members with general 
     information on the content of the finding or notice.
       ``(3) The President shall--
       ``(A) maintain a record of the Members of Congress to which 
     a finding is reported under subsection (c) or notice is 
     provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each 
     Member of Congress receives such finding or notice; and
       ``(B) not later than 30 days after the date on which such 
     finding is reported or such notice is provided, provide such 
     record to--
       ``(i) in the case of a finding reported or notice provided 
     to a Member of the House of Representatives, the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       ``(ii) in the case of a finding reported or notice provided 
     to a Member of the Senate, the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate.
       ``(h) Any requirement under section 501, 502, or this 
     section to provide information to the congressional 
     intelligence committees shall be construed to require the 
     submission of such information to all members of such 
     committees, unless such information is specifically 
     authorized not to be submitted to all members of one of such 
     committees in accordance with subsection (c)(2).''.

         Subtitle D--Reports and Other Congressional Oversight

     SEC. 331. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST 
                   ASSETS.

       Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     404m) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and 
     inserting ``annual'';
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and 
     inserting ``Annual'';
       (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and inserting ``annual 
     basis''; and
       (ii) by striking ``preceding six-month period'' and 
     inserting ``preceding one-year period'';
       (C) by striking paragraph (2); and
       (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs 
     (2) and (3), respectively; and
       (3) in subsection (d)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed 
     Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the Committee on Armed 
     Services,'' after ``the Committee on Appropriations,''.

[[Page 1884]]



     SEC. 332. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 
     et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 507 the 
     following new section:


   ``annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community

       ``Sec. 508.  (a) Assessment.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each 
     element of the intelligence community, prepare an annual 
     personnel level assessment for such element that assesses the 
     personnel levels of such element for the fiscal year 
     following the fiscal year in which the assessment is 
     submitted.
       ``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence 
     committees each year along with the budget submitted by the 
     President in accordance with section 1105 of title 31, United 
     States Code.
       ``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) 
     shall include, for the element of the intelligence community 
     concerned, the following information:
       ``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs of such 
     element for the upcoming fiscal year.
       ``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current 
     fiscal year.
       ``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the 
     preceding five fiscal years.
       ``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for such 
     element for the upcoming fiscal year.
       ``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such number as compared to the number of personnel positions 
     of such element of the current fiscal year.
       ``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such number as compared to the number of personnel positions 
     of such element during the preceding five fiscal years.
       ``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of 
     contractors to be funded by such element for the upcoming 
     fiscal year.
       ``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of 
     the costs of contractors to be funded by such element during 
     the current fiscal year.
       ``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
     such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of 
     contractors, and the number of contractors, of such element 
     during the preceding five fiscal years.
       ``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel 
     and contractor levels.
       ``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts 
     employed or contracted by such element.
       ``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject 
     of an investigation completed by the inspector general of 
     such element during the preceding fiscal year, or are or have 
     been the subject of an investigation by such inspector 
     general during the current fiscal year.
       ``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence 
     of whether, based on current and projected funding, such 
     element will have sufficient--
       ``(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested 
     personnel and contractor levels;
       ``(B) training resources to support the requested personnel 
     levels; and
       ``(C) funding to support the administrative and operational 
     activities of the requested personnel levels.''.

     SEC. 333. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF 
                   IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 332, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


 ``semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of iran, syria, 
                            and north korea

       ``Sec. 509.  (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less 
     frequently than every 180 days, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on the intentions and capabilities of the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the 
     nuclear weapons programs of each such country.
       ``(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
     the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea--
       ``(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each 
     country;
       ``(2) an evaluation of the sources upon which the 
     intelligence used to prepare the assessment referred to in 
     paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources 
     and an assessment of the reliability of each source;
       ``(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any program 
     gathered or developed since the previous report was submitted 
     under subsection (a), including intelligence collected from 
     both open and clandestine sources for each country; and
       ``(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
     knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence 
     in the assessment referred to in paragraph (1).
       ``(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence 
     Estimate on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic 
     People's Republic of Korea in lieu of a report required by 
     subsection (a) for that country.
       ``(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In 
     this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees' 
     means--
       ``(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       ``(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
       ``(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate.''.
       (b) Applicability Date.--The first report required to be 
     submitted under section 509 of the National Security Act of 
     1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted not 
     later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 334. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 
     et seq.), as amended by section 333 of this Act, is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:


 ``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community

       ``Sec. 510. Each year on the date provided in section 507, 
     the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on 
     Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
     a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as 
     appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the 
     intelligence community, including--
       ``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element 
     that require foreign language proficiency and the level of 
     proficiency required;
       ``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each 
     element will require during the five-year period beginning on 
     the date of the submission of the report;
       ``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element 
     that require foreign language proficiency that are filled 
     by--
       ``(A) military personnel; and
       ``(B) civilian personnel;
       ``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such 
     element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign 
     language proficiency, including the foreign language 
     indicated and the proficiency level;
       ``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with 
     foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language 
     and proficiency level;
       ``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently 
     attending foreign language training, including the provider 
     of such training;
       ``(7) a description of the efforts of such element to 
     recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are 
     proficient in a foreign language;
       ``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
     advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
       ``(9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, 
     dialect of a foreign language--
       ``(A) the number of positions of such element that require 
     proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
       ``(B) the number of personnel of such element that are 
     serving in a position that requires proficiency in the 
     foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of 
     the position;
       ``(C) the number of personnel of such element that are 
     serving in a position that does not require proficiency in 
     the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty 
     of the position;
       ``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each 
     level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
       ``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level of 
     proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the 
     requirements of such element;
       ``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as 
     linguists for such element that are not qualified as 
     linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language 
     Roundtable;
       ``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists 
     for such element during the preceding calendar year;
       ``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that 
     discontinued serving such element during the preceding 
     calendar year;
       ``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills 
     that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and
       ``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills 
     that is fulfilled by contractors;
       ``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and 
     capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole;
       ``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
     relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of 
     National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer 
     relevant; and
       ``(12) an assessment of the feasibility of employing 
     foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States who 
     have previously worked as translators or interpreters for the 
     Armed Forces or another department or agency of the Federal 
     Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical 
     language needs of such element.''.

     SEC. 335. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AUDITS AND 
                   INVESTIGATIONS.

       Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 
     et seq.), as amended by section 334 of this Act, is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:


     ``government accountability office analyses, evaluations, and 
                             investigations

       ``Sec. 511.  (a) In General.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     ensure that personnel of the Government Accountability Office 
     designated by the Comptroller General are provided with 
     access to all information in the possession of an

[[Page 1885]]

     element of the intelligence community that the Comptroller 
     General determines is necessary for such personnel to conduct 
     an analysis, evaluation, or investigation of a program or 
     activity of an element of the intelligence community that is 
     requested by one of the congressional intelligence 
     committees.
       ``(b) Exception.--(1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the 
     Director of National Intelligence may restrict access to 
     information referred to in subsection (a) by personnel 
     designated in such subsection if the Director determines that 
     the restriction is necessary to protect vital national 
     security interests of the United States.
       ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not 
     restrict access under subparagraph (A) solely on the basis of 
     the level of classification or compartmentation of 
     information that the personnel designated in subsection (a) 
     may seek access to while conducting an analysis, evaluation, 
     or investigation.
       ``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under 
     paragraph (1), the Director shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement 
     of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7 
     days.
       ``(3) The Director shall notify the Comptroller General at 
     the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to 
     the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods, provide the Comptroller General with a 
     copy of such report.
       ``(4) The Comptroller General shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees any comments on a 
     report of which the Comptroller General has notice under 
     paragraph (3) that the Comptroller General considers 
     appropriate.''.

     SEC. 336. CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OVERSIGHT 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 335 of 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:


       ``certification of compliance with oversight requirements

       ``Sec. 512. The head of each element of the intelligence 
     community shall semiannually submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees--
       ``(1) a certification that, to the best of the knowledge of 
     the head of such element--
       ``(A) the head of such element of the intelligence 
     community is in full compliance with the requirements of this 
     title; and
       ``(B) any information required to be submitted by such head 
     of such element under this Act before the date of the 
     submission of such certification has been properly submitted; 
     or
       ``(2) if such head of such element is unable to submit a 
     certification under paragraph (1), a statement--
       ``(A) of the reasons such head of such element is not able 
     to submit such a certification;
       ``(B) describing any information required to be submitted 
     by such head of such element under this Act before the date 
     of the submission of such statement that has not been 
     properly submitted; and
       ``(C) that the head of such element will submit such 
     information as soon as possible after the submission of such 
     statement.''.
       (b) Applicability Date.--The first certification or 
     statement required to be submitted by the head of each 
     element of the intelligence community under section 512 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) 
     of this section, shall be submitted not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 337. REPORTS ON FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.

       (a) In General.--Section 809(b) of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. app. 
     2170b(b)) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``Annual'' and inserting 
     ``Biannual'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(1) Submission to congress.--The President shall 
     biannually submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, and congressional leadership 
     a report updating the information referred to in subsection 
     (a)(1)(D).'';
       (3) by striking paragraph (2); and
       (4) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).
       (b) Initial Report.--The first report required under 
     section 809(b)(1) of such Act, as amended by subsection 
     (a)(2) of this section, shall be submitted not later than 
     February 1, 2010.

     SEC. 338. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 
     2010, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees 
     on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the 
     Senate a report describing the use of personal services 
     contracts across the intelligence community, the impact of 
     the use of such contracts on the intelligence community 
     workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into 
     Federal Government employment, and the accountability 
     mechanisms that govern the performance of such personal 
     services contracts.
       (b) Content.--
       (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (A) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance 
     issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head 
     of an element of the intelligence community relating to 
     minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, 
     security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and 
     how those standards may differ from those for Federal 
     Government employees performing substantially similar 
     functions;
       (B) an identification of contracts where the contractor is 
     performing substantially similar functions to a Federal 
     Government employee;
       (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by 
     awarding contracts for the performance of such functions 
     referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time 
     employees of the elements of the intelligence community to 
     perform such functions;
       (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using 
     contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph 
     (2);
       (E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number 
     of personnel working under such contracts, related to the 
     performance of activities described in paragraph (2);
       (F) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees 
     and Federal Government employees performing substantially 
     similar functions;
       (G) an analysis of the attrition of Federal Government 
     personnel for contractor positions that provide substantially 
     similar functions;
       (H) a description of positions that will be converted from 
     contractor employment to Federal Government employment;
       (I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability 
     mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts awarded 
     for intelligence activities by each element of the 
     intelligence community during fiscal years 2008 and 2009;
       (J) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence 
     community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure 
     identification and prosecution of criminal violations, 
     financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by 
     contractors or contract personnel; and
       (K) an identification of best practices for oversight and 
     accountability mechanisms applicable to personal services 
     contracts.
       (2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are 
     the following:
       (A) Intelligence collection.
       (B) Intelligence analysis.
       (C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, and 
     interrogation activities.

     SEC. 339. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and 
     the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate a report describing the 
     Director's long-term vision for transforming the intelligence 
     capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the internal 
     reforms of the Bureau intended to achieve that vision. Such 
     report shall include--
       (1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the 
     intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
       (2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence 
     and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
       (3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms 
     at the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau 
     towards achieving the goals of the Director for the 
     intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau; 
     and
       (4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks 
     that are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau 
     as an intelligence agency, including--
       (A) identifying new intelligence targets within the scope 
     of the national security functions of the Bureau, outside the 
     parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation;
       (B) collecting intelligence domestically, including 
     collection through human and technical sources;
       (C) recruiting human sources;
       (D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit, and 
     handle human sources;
       (E) working collaboratively with other Federal departments 
     and agencies to jointly collect intelligence on domestic 
     counterterrorism and counterintelligence targets;
       (F) producing a common intelligence picture of domestic 
     threats to the national security of the United States;
       (G) producing high quality and timely intelligence 
     analysis;
       (H) integrating intelligence analysts into its intelligence 
     collection operations; and
       (I) sharing intelligence information with intelligence 
     community partners.

     SEC. 340. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ 
                   AND AFGHANISTAN.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on 
     Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
     a report on intelligence collection and analysis resources 
     (1) dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal years 
     2008 and 2009, and (2) planned to be dedicated during fiscal 
     year 2010. Such report shall include detailed information on 
     fiscal, human, technical, and other intelligence collection 
     and analysis resources.

     SEC. 341. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS 
                   REGULATIONS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2011, the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
     the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate a report assessing the threat to 
     national security presented by the

[[Page 1886]]

     efforts of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage, 
     diversion, or other means, sensitive equipment and 
     technology, and the degree to which United States export 
     controls (including the International Traffic in Arms 
     Regulations) are adequate to defeat such efforts.
       (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The 
     term ``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means 
     those regulations contained in parts 120 through 130 of title 
     22, Code of Federal Regulations (or successor regulations).

     SEC. 342. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.

       (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2010, the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services and 
     the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the 
     illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and 
     equipment.
       (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include, for a period of time including at least the 
     preceding three years--
       (1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit 
     sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of--
       (A) nuclear or radiological material;
       (B) equipment useful for the production of nuclear or 
     radiological material; or
       (C) nuclear explosive devices;
       (2) an assessment of the countries that represent the 
     greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
       (3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
     knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence 
     in the assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
       (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted 
     in classified form, but shall include an unclassified 
     summary.

     SEC. 343. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT 
                   UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions 
     of personnel of the intelligence community who commit 
     unauthorized disclosures of classified information, including 
     whether revoking such pensions is feasible under existing law 
     or under the administrative authority of the Director of 
     National Intelligence or any other head of an element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report containing the results of the study conducted under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 344. STUDY ON ELECTRONIC WASTE DESTRUCTION PRACTICES OF 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Study.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall conduct a study on the electronic waste 
     destruction practices of the intelligence community. Such 
     study shall assess--
       (1) the security of the electronic waste disposal practices 
     of the intelligence community, including the potential for 
     counterintelligence exploitation of destroyed, discarded, or 
     recycled materials;
       (2) the environmental impact of such disposal practices; 
     and
       (3) methods to improve the security and environmental 
     impact of such disposal practices, including steps to prevent 
     the forensic exploitation of electronic waste.
       (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report containing the results of 
     the study conducted under subsection (a).

     SEC. 345. REPORT ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES 
                   OF AIR AMERICA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to 
     United States citizens for the service of such citizens prior 
     to 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company 
     during a period when Air America or the associated company 
     was owned or controlled by the United States Government and 
     operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The history of Air America and the associated companies 
     prior to 1977, including a description of--
       (A) the relationship between Air America and the associated 
     companies and the Central Intelligence Agency or any other 
     element of the United States Government;
       (B) the workforce of Air America and the associated 
     companies;
       (C) the missions performed by Air America, the associated 
     companies, and their employees for the United States; and
       (D) the casualties suffered by employees of Air America and 
     the associated companies in the course of their employment.
       (2) A description of--
       (A) the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to 
     the employees of Air America and the associated companies 
     prior to 1977;
       (B) the contributions made by such employees for such 
     benefits;
       (C) the retirement benefits actually paid such employees;
       (D) the entitlement of such employees to the payment of 
     future retirement benefits; and
       (E) the likelihood that such employees will receive any 
     future retirement benefits.
       (3) An assessment of the difference between--
       (A) the retirement benefits that former employees of Air 
     America and the associated companies have received or will 
     receive by virtue of their employment with Air America and 
     the associated companies; and
       (B) the retirement benefits that such employees would have 
     received or be eligible to receive if such employment was 
     deemed to be employment by the United States Government and 
     their service during such employment was credited as Federal 
     service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits.
       (4) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of 
     legislative action to treat such employment as Federal 
     service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in 
     light of the relationship between Air America and the 
     associated companies and the United States Government and the 
     services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the 
     United States.
       (5) If legislative action is considered advisable under 
     paragraph (4), a proposal for such action and an assessment 
     of its costs.
       (6) The opinions of the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, if any, on any matters covered by the 
     report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     considers appropriate.
       (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air 
     America, Incorporated.
       (2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company'' 
     means any entity associated with, predecessor to, or 
     subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company 
     Limited, CAT Incorporated, Civil Air Transport Company 
     Limited, and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, 
     during the period when such an entity was owned and 
     controlled by the United States Government.

     SEC. 346. STUDY ON COLLEGE TUITION PROGRAMS FOR EMPLOYEES OF 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     conduct a study on the feasability of--
       (1) providing matching funds for contributions to college 
     savings programs made by employees of elements of the 
     intelligence community; and
       (2) establishing a program to pay the college tuition of 
     each child of an employee of an element of the intelligence 
     community that has died in the performance of the official 
     duties of such employee.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to Congress a report containing the results of 
     the study conducted under subsection (a).
       (c) College Savings Program Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``college savings program'' means--
       (1) a qualified tuition program, as defined in section 529 
     of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
       (2) a Coverdell education savings account, as defined in 
     section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and
       (3) any other appropriate program providing tax incentives 
     for saving funds to pay for college tuition, as determined by 
     the Director of National Intelligence.

     SEC. 347. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL SUPPLY 
                   CHAIN VULNERABILITIES.

       (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate or 
     National Intelligence Assessment on the global supply chain 
     to determine whether such supply chain poses a risk to 
     defense and intelligence systems due to counterfeit 
     components that may be defective or deliberately manipulated 
     by a foreign government or a criminal organization.
       (b) Review of Mitigation.--
       (1) NCIX review.--The National Counterintelligence 
     Executive shall conduct a review of the adequacy of the 
     mechanisms to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in the 
     global supply chain that pose a risk to defense and 
     intelligence systems due to counterfeit components that may 
     be defective or deliberately manipulated by a foreign 
     government or a criminal organization.
       (2) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the National Counterintelligence 
     Executive shall submit to Congress a report containing the 
     results of the review conducted under paragraph (1).

     SEC. 348. REVIEW OF RECORDS RELATING TO POTENTIAL HEALTH 
                   RISKS AMONG DESERT STORM VETERANS.

       (a) Review.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency shall conduct a classification review of the records 
     of the Agency that are relevant to the known or potential 
     health effects suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm 
     as described in the November 2008, report by the Department 
     of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War 
     Veterans Illnesses.
       (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress the results of 
     the classification review conducted under subsection (a), 
     including the total number of records of the Agency that are 
     relevant.

[[Page 1887]]

       (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 349. REVIEW OF PENSIONS OF EMPLOYEES AFFECTED BY ``FIVE 
                   AND OUT'' PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION.

       None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
     may be used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation requiring the mandatory reassignment of a 
     supervisor of the Bureau after such supervisor serves in a 
     management position for seven years (commonly known as the 
     ``seven and out'' program) until the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation submits to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a certification that the Director has 
     completed a review of issues related to the pensions of 
     former employees of the Bureau affected by a previous program 
     of mandatory reassignment after serving in a management 
     position for five years (commonly known as the ``five and 
     out'' program) and the effect of such program on the Bureau 
     and the results of such review.

     SEC. 350. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST 
                   RECIDIVISM OF DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES 
                   NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
     shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of--
       (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees 
     currently or formerly held at United States Naval Station, 
     Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
       (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees 
     will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in 
     terrorist organizations.

     SEC. 351. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE ON UIGHUR DETAINEES HELD AT 
                   UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, 
                   CUBA.

       Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
     shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of--
       (1) intelligence relating to threats posed by Uighur 
     detainees currently or formerly held at United States Naval 
     Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; 
     and
       (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees 
     will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in 
     terrorist organizations.

     SEC. 352. REPORT ON INTERROGATION RESEARCH AND TRAINING.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than December 31, 
     2009, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
     with the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence 
     community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the House 
     of Representatives and the Senate a report on the state of 
     research, analysis, and training in interrogation and 
     debriefing practices.
       (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) an assessment of--
       (A) the quality and value of scientific and technical 
     research in interrogation and debriefing practices that has 
     been conducted independently or in affiliation with the 
     Federal Government and the identification of areas in which 
     additional research could potentially improve interrogation 
     practices;
       (B) the state of interrogation and debriefing training in 
     the intelligence community, including the character and 
     adequacy of the ethical component of such training, and the 
     identification of any gaps in training;
       (C) the adequacy of efforts to enhance career path options 
     for intelligence community personnel that serve as 
     interrogators and debriefers, including efforts to recruit 
     and retain career personnel; and
       (D) the effectiveness of existing processes for studying 
     and implementing lessons learned and best practices of 
     interrogation and debriefing; and
       (2) any recommendations that the Director considers 
     appropriate for improving the performance of the intelligence 
     community with respect to the issues described in 
     subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1).

     SEC. 353. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 
     2010, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
     with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the plans of each element to increase diversity 
     within the intelligence community.
       (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include specific implementation plans to increase diversity 
     within each element of the intelligence community, 
     including--
       (1) specific implementation plans for each such element 
     designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic 
     plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal 
     employment opportunity and diversity;
       (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
     increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
       (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
     improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, 
     midgrade, senior, and management levels;
       (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training 
     and education programs for senior officials and managers of 
     each such element; and
       (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the 
     success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs 
     described in paragraphs (1) through (4).

     SEC. 354. REVIEW OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION EXERCISE 
                   OF ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION IN FOREIGN NATIONS.

       Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
     review of constraints under international law and the laws of 
     foreign nations to the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction 
     with respect to criminal investigations of terrorism offenses 
     under the laws of the United States conducted by agents of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation in foreign nations and 
     using funds made available for the National Intelligence 
     Program, including constraints identified in section 432 of 
     the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
     United States.

     SEC. 355. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Annual Report on Intelligence.--Section 109 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed.
       (b) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence 
     Initiatives.--Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The 
     Director'' ; and
       (2) by striking paragraph (2).
       (c) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification 
     Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (d); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as 
     subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
       (d) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.--
     Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 
     note) is repealed.

     SEC. 356. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional 
     intelligence committees that is included in the classified 
     annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is 
     hereby made a requirement in law.

     SEC. 357. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Report Submission Dates.--Section 507 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (G);
       (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), (D), (E), 
     (F), (H), (I), and (N) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), 
     (E), (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(I) The annual report on financial intelligence on 
     terrorist assets required by section 118.
       ``(J) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in 
     the intelligence community required by section 510.''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (D); and
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by 
     section 313 of this Act, is further amended by--
       (1) striking the item relating to section 109; and
       (2) inserting after the item relating to section 507 the 
     following new items:

``Sec. 508. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence 
              community.
``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of Iran, 
              Syria, and North Korea.
``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
              community.
``Sec. 511. Government Accountability Office analyses, evaluations, and 
              investigations.
``Sec. 512. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.''.

                       Subtitle E--Other Matters

     SEC. 361. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT 
                   INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an 
     emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases 
     efficiency; and''.

     SEC. 362. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover 
     Intelligence Officers and Agents.--
       (1) Disclosure after access to information identifying 
     agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking 
     ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''.

[[Page 1888]]

       (2) Disclosure after access to classified information.--
     Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five 
     years'' and inserting ``10 years''.
       (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of 
     Intelligence Identities.--The first sentence of section 
     603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     423(a)) is amended by inserting ``including an assessment of 
     the need for any modification of this title for the purpose 
     of improving legal protections for covert agents,'' after 
     ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents,''.

     SEC. 363. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT 
                   RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND 
                   DECORATIONS.

       Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of 
     the intelligence community, the head of such element may 
     delete the information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) 
     of paragraph (2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph 
     (3) if the head of such element certifies in writing to the 
     Secretary of State that the publication of such information 
     could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or 
     methods.
       ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of 
     State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be 
     transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who 
     shall keep a record of such information.
       ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' 
     has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.

     SEC. 364. EXEMPTION OF DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST IDENTITY 
                   INFORMATION FROM FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

       Section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     Section 404o) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(k) Exemption of Dissemination of Terrorist Identity 
     Information From Freedom of Information Act.--(1) Terrorist 
     identity information disseminated for terrorist screening 
     purposes or other authorized counterterrorism purposes shall 
     be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, 
     United States Code.
       ``(2) In this section:
       ``(A) Authorized counterterrorism purpose.--The term 
     `authorized counterterrorism purpose' includes disclosure to 
     and appropriate use by an element of the Federal Government 
     of terrorist identifiers of persons reasonably suspected to 
     be terrorists or supporters of terrorists.
       ``(B) Terrorist identity information.--The term `terrorist 
     identity information' means--
       ``(i) information from a database maintained by any element 
     of the Federal Government that would reveal whether an 
     individual has or has not been determined to be a known or 
     suspected terrorist or has or has not been determined to be 
     within the networks of contacts and support of a known or 
     suspected terrorist; and
       ``(ii) information related to a determination as to whether 
     or not an individual is or should be included in the 
     Terrorist Screening Database or other screening databases 
     based on a determination that the individual is a known or 
     suspected terrorist.
       ``(C) Terrorist identifiers.--The term `terrorist 
     identifiers'--
       ``(i) includes--
       ``(I) names and aliases;
       ``(II) dates or places of birth;
       ``(III) unique identifying numbers or information;
       ``(IV) physical identifiers or biometrics; and
       ``(V) any other identifying information provided for 
     watchlisting purposes; and
       ``(ii) does not include derogatory information or 
     information that would reveal or compromise intelligence or 
     law enforcement sources or methods.''.

     SEC. 365. MISUSE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OFFICE OF 
                   THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NAME, 
                   INITIALS, OR SEAL.

       (a) Intelligence Community.--Title XI of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:


     ``misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or seal

       ``Sec. 1103.  (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except 
     with the written permission of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the 
     words `intelligence community', the initials `IC', the seal 
     of the intelligence community, or any colorable imitation of 
     such words, initials, or seal in connection with any 
     merchandise, impersonation, solicitation, or commercial 
     activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the 
     impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized 
     by the Director of National Intelligence, except that 
     employees of the intelligence community may use the 
     intelligence community name, initials, and seal in accordance 
     with regulations promulgated by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       ``(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney 
     General that any person is engaged or is about to engage in 
     an act or practice which constitutes or will constitute 
     conduct prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General 
     may initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of the 
     United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court 
     shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and 
     determination of such action and may, at any time before 
     final determination, enter such restraining orders or 
     prohibitions, or take such other action as is warranted, to 
     prevent injury to the United States or to any person or class 
     of persons for whose protection the action is brought.''.
       (b) Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--Title 
     XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et 
     seq.), as amended by subsection (a) of this section, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


 ``misuse of the office of the director of national intelligence name, 
                           initials, or seal

       ``Sec. 1104.  (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except 
     with the written permission of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the 
     words `Office of the Director of National Intelligence', the 
     initials `ODNI', the seal of the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence, or any colorable imitation of such 
     words, initials, or seal in connection with any merchandise, 
     impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a 
     manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that 
     such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director 
     of National Intelligence.
       ``(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney 
     General that any person is engaged or is about to engage in 
     an act or practice which constitutes or will constitute 
     conduct prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General 
     may initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of the 
     United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court 
     shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and 
     determination of such action and may, at any time before 
     final determination, enter such restraining orders or 
     prohibitions, or take such other action as is warranted, to 
     prevent injury to the United States or to any person or class 
     of persons for whose protection the action is brought.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by 
     section 357 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the 
     end the following new items:

``Sec. 1103. Misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or 
              seal.
``Sec. 1104. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National 
              Intelligence name, initials, or seal.''.

     SEC. 366. SECURITY CLEARANCES: REPORTS; OMBUDSMAN; 
                   RECIPROCITY.

       (a) Reports Relating to Security Clearances.--
       (1) Quadrennial audit; security clearance determinations.--
       (A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 336 of 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:


                    ``reports on security clearances

       ``Sec. 513.  (a) Quadrennial Audit of Position 
     Requirements.--(1) The President shall every four years 
     conduct an audit of how the executive branch determines 
     whether a security clearance is required for a particular 
     position in the Federal Government.
       ``(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of an 
     audit conducted under paragraph (1), the President shall 
     submit to Congress the results of such audit.
       ``(b) Report on Security Clearance Determinations.--(1) Not 
     later than February 1 of each year, the President shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the security clearance 
     process. Such report shall include, for each security 
     clearance level--
       ``(A) the number of Federal Government employees who--
       ``(i) held a security clearance at such level as of October 
     1 of the preceding year; and
       ``(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such level 
     during the preceding fiscal year;
       ``(B) the number of contractors to the Federal Government 
     who--
       ``(i) held a security clearance at such level as of October 
     1 of the preceding year; and
       ``(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such level 
     during the preceding fiscal year; and
       ``(C) for each element of the intelligence community--
       ``(i) the amount of time it took to process the fastest 80 
     percent of security clearance determinations for such level;
       ``(ii) the amount of time it took to process the fastest 90 
     percent of security clearance determinations for such level;
       ``(iii) the number of open security clearance 
     investigations for such level that have remained open for--
       ``(I) 4 months or less;
       ``(II) between 4 months and 8 months;
       ``(III) between 8 months and 12 months; and
       ``(IV) more than a year;
       ``(iv) the percentage of reviews during the preceding 
     fiscal year that resulted in a denial or revocation of a 
     security clearance;
       ``(v) the percentage of investigations during the preceding 
     fiscal year that resulted in incomplete information;
       ``(vi) the percentage of investigations during the 
     preceding fiscal year that did not result in enough 
     information to make a decision on potentially adverse 
     information; and
       ``(vii) for security clearance determinations completed or 
     ongoing during the preceding fiscal year that have taken 
     longer than one year to complete--
       ``(I) the number of security clearance determinations for 
     positions as employees of the Federal Government that 
     required more than one year to complete;
       ``(II) the number of security clearance determinations for 
     contractors that required more than one year to complete;
       ``(III) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such 
     determinations; and
       ``(IV) the cause of significant delays in such 
     determinations.

[[Page 1889]]

       ``(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Director of 
     National Intelligence may consider--
       ``(A) security clearances at the level of confidential and 
     secret as one security clearance level; and
       ``(B) security clearances at the level of top secret or 
     higher as one security clearance level.''.
       (B) Initial audit.--The first audit required to be 
     conducted under section 513(a)(1) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall be completed 
     not later than February 1, 2010.
       (C) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by 
     section 365 of this Act, is further amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 512 the following new 
     item:

``Sec. 513. Reports on security clearances.''.

       (2) Report on metrics for adjudication quality.--Not later 
     than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall submit to Congress a report on security 
     clearance investigations and adjudications. Such report shall 
     include--
       (A) Federal Government wide adjudication guidelines and 
     metrics for adjudication quality;
       (B) a plan to improve the professional development of 
     security clearance adjudicators;
       (C) metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of interagency 
     clearance reciprocity;
       (D) Federal Government wide investigation standards and 
     metrics for investigation quality; and
       (E) the feasibility, counterintelligence risk, and cost 
     effectiveness of--
       (i) by not later than January 1, 2012, requiring the 
     investigation and adjudication of security clearances to be 
     conducted by not more than two Federal agencies; and
       (ii) by not later than January 1, 2015, requiring the 
     investigation and adjudication of security clearances to be 
     conducted by not more than one Federal agency.
       (b) Ombudsman for Intelligence Community Security 
     Clearances.--
       (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 303 of 
     this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103G 
     the following new section:


       ``ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances

       ``Sec. 103H.  (a) Appointment.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence 
     community security clearances.
       ``(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of 
     the intelligence community shall provide a person applying 
     for a security clearance through or in coordination with such 
     element with contact information for the ombudsman appointed 
     under subsection (a).
       ``(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the 
     ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
       ``(1) the number of persons applying for a security 
     clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the 
     preceding 12 months; and
       ``(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and questions 
     received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security 
     clearances.''.
       (2) Appointment date.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence 
     community security clearances under section 103H(a) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by paragraph (1), not 
     later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (3) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by 
     subsection (a)(1)(C) of this section, is further amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 103G the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 103H. Ombudsman for intelligence community security 
              clearances.''.

       (c) Security Clearance Reciprocity.--
       (1) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall conduct an audit of the reciprocity of 
     security clearances in the intelligence community.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report containing the results of 
     the audit conducted under paragraph (1). Such report shall 
     include an assessment of the time required to obtain a 
     reciprocal security clearance for--
       (A) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     detailed to another element of the intelligence community;
       (B) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     seeking permanent employment with another element of the 
     intelligence community; and
       (C) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an 
     element of the intelligence community.

     SEC. 367. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE TRANSFER OR 
                   RELEASE OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED 
                   STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

       (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence may 
     not use any of the amounts authorized to be appropriated in 
     this Act for fiscal year 2010 or any subsequent fiscal year 
     to release or transfer any individual described in subsection 
     (d) to the United States, its territories, or possessions, 
     until 120 days after the President has submitted to the 
     congressional defense committees the plan described in 
     subsection (b).
       (b) Plan Required.--The President shall submit to Congress 
     a plan on the disposition of each individual described in 
     subsection (d). Such plan shall include--
       (1) an assessment of the risk that the individual described 
     in subsection (d) poses to the national security of the 
     United States, its territories, or possessions;
       (2) a proposal for the disposition for each such 
     individual;
       (3) a plan to mitigate any risks described in paragraph (1) 
     should the proposed disposition required by paragraph (2) 
     include the release or transfer to the United States, its 
     territories, or possessions of any such individual; and
       (4) a summary of the consultation required in subsection 
     (c).
       (c) Consultation Required.--The President shall consult 
     with the chief executive of the State, the District of 
     Columbia, or the territory or possession of the United States 
     to which the disposition in subsection (b) includes a release 
     or transfer to that State, District of Columbia, or territory 
     or possession.
       (d) Detainees Described.--An individual described in this 
     subsection is any individual who is located at United States 
     Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, who--
       (1) is not a citizen of the United States; and
       (2) is--
       (A) in the custody or under the effective control of the 
     Department of Defense, or
       (B) otherwise under detention at the United States Naval 
     Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

     SEC. 368. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT AND 
                   AUDIT READINESS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) it is no longer excusable to allow poor business 
     systems, a deficiency of resources, or a lack of commitment 
     from senior leadership of the intelligence community to 
     foster waste or nonaccountability to the United States 
     taxpayer;
       (2) the Director of National Intelligence has not made 
     compliance with financial management and audit readiness 
     standards a top priority; and
       (3) the Director of National Intelligence should require 
     each element of the intelligence community to develop and 
     implement a specific plan to become compliant with the law.
       (b) Review; Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall--
       (1) conduct a review of the status of the auditability 
     compliance of each element of the intelligence community; and
       (2) develop a plan and timeline to achieve a full, 
     unqualified audit of each element of the intelligence 
     community not later than September 30, 2013.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3), as amended by section 302(1) of this Act, is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (f) (as so redesignated)--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of 
     Headquarters With Headquarters of'';
       (B) by striking ``Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the'' 
     and inserting ``(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     the'';
       (C) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (2) of 
     this section, by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before 
     ``the Office'';
       (D) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking ``any 
     other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters of any other 
     element''; and
       (E) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph 
     (1) if the President determines that--
       ``(A) a waiver is in the interests of national security; or
       ``(B) the costs of a headquarters of the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence that is separate from the 
     headquarters of the other elements of the intelligence 
     community outweighs the potential benefits of the 
     separation.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(g) Location of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director 
     of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington 
     metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, 
     United States Code).''.

     SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the 
     Director's designee.''.

     SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND 
                   TECHNOLOGY.

       Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
       (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and inserting 
     ``;''; and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(5) assist the Director of National Intelligence in 
     establishing goals for basic, applied,

[[Page 1890]]

     and advanced research to meet the technology needs of the 
     intelligence community;
       ``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
     an annual report on the science and technology strategy of 
     the Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the 
     intelligence community; and''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)(3)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;'';
       (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); 
     and
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research 
     programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence 
     community; and''.

     SEC. 404. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA 
                   CENTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORTS.

       (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report 
     submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled 
     ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient 
     computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 
     120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report containing the plan developed under 
     subsection (a).
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 405. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
       (3) in subsection (c) in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1), by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after 
     ``Chief Information Officer''; and
       (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.

     SEC. 406. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Establishment.--
       (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 366 of 
     this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 103H 
     (as added by such section 366) the following new section:


           ``inspector general of the intelligence community

       ``Sec. 103I.  (a) Office of Inspector General of 
     Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector 
     General of the Intelligence Community.
       ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector 
     General of the Intelligence Community is to--
       ``(1) be an independent and objective office appropriately 
     accountable to Congress and to initiate and conduct 
     investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within the 
     responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
     Intelligence;
       ``(2) recommend policies designed--
       ``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in 
     the administration and implementation of matters within the 
     responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       ``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such 
     matters;
       ``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National 
     Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
       ``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters within 
     the responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective 
     actions; and
       ``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that 
     the congressional intelligence committees are kept informed 
     of--
       ``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to 
     matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
     Director of National Intelligence; and
       ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective 
     actions.
       ``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) 
     There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
     who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as 
     Inspector General shall be made--
       ``(A) without regard to political affiliation;
       ``(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with the 
     security standards of the intelligence community, and prior 
     experience in the field of intelligence or national security;
       ``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, 
     financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
     administration, or auditing; and
       ``(D) on the basis of expertise in investigations.
       ``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to the 
     Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only 
     by the President. The President shall communicate in writing 
     to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for 
     the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector 
     General not later than 30 days before the date on which the 
     Inspector General is removed from office.
       ``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections 
     (g) and (h), the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall--
       ``(1) provide policy direction for, and plan, conduct, 
     supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, 
     inspections, and audits relating to matters within the 
     responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
     Intelligence to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in 
     accordance with applicable law and regulations;
       ``(2) keep the Director of National Intelligence and 
     Congress fully and currently informed concerning violations 
     of law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and 
     privacy, fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and 
     deficiencies that may occur in matters within the 
     responsibility and authority of the Director, and report the 
     progress made in implementing corrective action;
       ``(3) take due regard for the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued 
     by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with 
     the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures 
     as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of 
     intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; 
     and
       ``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities 
     under this section, comply with generally accepted Federal 
     Government auditing standards.
       ``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1)(A) Subject to 
     subparagraph (B), the Director of National Intelligence may 
     prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
     from initiating, carrying out, or completing any 
     investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director 
     determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect 
     vital national security interests of the United States.
       ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not 
     prohibit an investigation, inspection, or audit under 
     subparagraph (A) solely on the basis of the level of 
     classification or compartmentation of information that the 
     Inspector General may seek access to while conducting such 
     investigation, inspection, or audit.
       ``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under 
     paragraph (1), the Director shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement 
     of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7 
     days.
       ``(3) The Director shall notify the Inspector General at 
     the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to 
     the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a 
     copy of such report.
       ``(4) The Inspector General shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees any comments on a 
     report of which the Inspector General has notice under 
     paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers 
     appropriate.
       ``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to 
     the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any 
     purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the 
     Inspector General.
       ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any 
     employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of 
     the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the 
     performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all 
     records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
     recommendations, or other material which relate to the 
     programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector 
     General has responsibilities under this section.
       ``(C) The Director or, on the recommendation of the 
     Director, another appropriate official of the intelligence 
     community, shall take appropriate administrative action 
     against an employee, or employee of a contractor, of an 
     element of the intelligence community that fails to cooperate 
     with the Inspector General. Such administrative action may 
     include loss of employment or termination of an existing 
     contractual relationship.
       ``(3) The Inspector General shall, in accordance with 
     subsection (g), receive and investigate complaints or 
     information from any person concerning the existence of an 
     activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the 
     Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of 
     laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of 
     funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
     danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint 
     or information has been received from an employee of the 
     Federal Government--
       ``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity 
     of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless 
     the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is 
     unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the 
     disclosure is made to an official of the Department of 
     Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution 
     should be undertaken; and
       ``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
     reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
     employee, unless the complaint was made or the information 
     was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with 
     willful disregard for its truth or falsity.

[[Page 1891]]

       ``(4) The Inspector General shall administer to or take 
     from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever 
     necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector 
     General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when 
     administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office 
     of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
     designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force 
     and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an 
     officer having a seal.
       ``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the 
     Inspector General may require by subpoena the production of 
     all information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
     accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence 
     necessary in the performance of the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Inspector General.
       ``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other 
     elements of the United States Government, the Inspector 
     General shall obtain information, documents, reports, 
     answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and 
     evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using 
     procedures other than by subpoenas.
       ``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, 
     or on behalf of, any element of the intelligence community, 
     including the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       ``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a 
     subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be 
     enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the 
     United States.
       ``(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as 
     authorized under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, 
     at rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent 
     of the maximum annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-
     15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, 
     United States Code.
       ``(7) The Inspector may, to the extent and in such amounts 
     as may be provided in advance by appropriations Acts, enter 
     into contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, 
     analyses, and other services with public agencies and with 
     private persons, and to make such payments as may be 
     necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
       ``(g) Coordination Among the Inspectors General of the 
     Intelligence Community.--(1)(A) If a matter within the 
     jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community that may be subject to an investigation, 
     inspection, review, or audit by both the Inspector General of 
     the Intelligence Community and an inspector general with 
     oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence 
     community, the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community and such other inspector general shall 
     expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general 
     shall conduct such investigation, inspection, review, or 
     audit to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of 
     the inspectors general.
       ``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under 
     subparagraph (A), the inspectors general concerned may 
     request the assistance of the Intelligence Community 
     Inspectors General Forum established under subparagraph (C). 
     If a dispute between an inspector general within an agency or 
     department of the United States Government and the Inspector 
     General of the Intelligence Community has not been resolved 
     with the assistance of the Forum, the inspectors general 
     shall submit the question to the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the head of the affected agency or 
     department for resolution.
       ``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community 
     Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory 
     or administrative inspectors general with oversight 
     responsibility for an element of the intelligence community. 
     The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
     serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have no 
     administrative authority over any inspector general, but 
     shall serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the 
     work of individual members of the Forum that may be of common 
     interest and discussing questions about jurisdiction or 
     access to employees, employees of a contractor, records, 
     audits, reviews, documents, recommendations, or other 
     materials that may involve or be of assistance to more than 
     one of its members.
       ``(2) The inspector general conducting an investigation, 
     inspection, review, or audit referred to in paragraph (1) 
     shall submit the results of such investigation, inspection, 
     review, or audit to any other inspector general, including 
     the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with 
     jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, 
     review, or audit who did not conduct such investigation, 
     inspection, review, or audit.
       ``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of 
     the Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate 
     office space at central and field office locations and with 
     such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and 
     communications facilities and services as may be necessary 
     for the operation of such offices.
       ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall select, appoint, and 
     employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to 
     carry out the functions, powers, and duties of the Inspector 
     General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer 
     or employee selected, appointed, or employed has a security 
     clearance appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer 
     or employee.
       ``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the 
     Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and 
     employees have the requisite training and experience to 
     enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the 
     Inspector General effectively.
       ``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the 
     Inspector General shall recommend policies to the Director of 
     National Intelligence to create within the intelligence 
     community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide 
     appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the 
     effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(3)(A) The Inspector General may, in consultation with 
     the Director, request such information or assistance as may 
     be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
     of the Inspector General from any department, agency, or 
     other element of the United States Government.
       ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information 
     or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the 
     department, agency, or element concerned shall furnish to the 
     Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such 
     information or assistance.
       ``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
     may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the 
     intelligence community and in coordination with the inspector 
     general of that element pursuant to subsection (g), conduct 
     an inspection, review, or audit of such element and may enter 
     into any place occupied by such element for purposes of the 
     performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) Not later than January 31 and July 
     31 of each year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall prepare and submit to the Director of 
     National Intelligence a report summarizing the activities of 
     the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community during the preceding six-month period. The 
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall provide 
     any portion of the report involving a component of a 
     department of the United States Government to the head of 
     that department simultaneously with submission of the report 
     to the Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include the 
     following:
       ``(i) A list of the titles or subjects of each 
     investigation, inspection, review, or audit conducted during 
     the period covered by such report, including a summary of the 
     progress of each particular investigation, inspection, or 
     audit since the preceding report of the Inspector General 
     under this paragraph.
       ``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and 
     deficiencies relating to the administration and 
     implementation of programs and operations of the intelligence 
     community, and in the relationships between elements of the 
     intelligence community, identified by the Inspector General 
     during the period covered by such report.
       ``(iii) A description of the recommendations for 
     disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during the 
     period covered by such report with respect to significant 
     problems, abuses, or deficiencies described in clause (ii).
       ``(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective or 
     disciplinary action has been completed on each significant 
     recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, 
     in a case where corrective action has been completed, a 
     description of such corrective action.
       ``(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector 
     General has had full and direct access to all information 
     relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector 
     General.
       ``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
     authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General 
     during the period covered by such report.
       ``(vii) Any recommendations that the Inspector General 
     considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, 
     efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and 
     implementation of matters within the responsibility and 
     authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to 
     detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters.
       ``(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a 
     report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit the 
     report to the congressional intelligence committees together 
     with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
       ``(D) Each report submitted under subparagraphs (A) and (C) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to 
     the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
     particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
     deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility 
     and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Director shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) 
     within 7 days of the receipt of such report, together with 
     such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The 
     Director shall submit to the committees of the Senate and of 
     the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
     department of the United States Government any portion of 
     each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, 
     abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such 
     department simultaneously with transmission of the report to 
     the congressional intelligence committees.
       ``(3) The Inspector General shall immediately notify and 
     submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees 
     on an investigation, inspection, review, or audit if--
       ``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
     significant differences with the Director affecting the 
     execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector 
     General;

[[Page 1892]]

       ``(B) the investigation, inspection, review, or audit 
     carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any current 
     or former intelligence community official who--
       ``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the 
     intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the 
     President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent 
     of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting 
     basis;
       ``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the 
     intelligence community, including a position held on an 
     acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence; or
       ``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an element of 
     the intelligence community or a position covered by 
     subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
       ``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General 
     to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by 
     a current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
       ``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
     Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of 
     possible criminal conduct of any current or former official 
     described in subparagraph (B); or
       ``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of such investigation, inspection, 
     review, or audit.
       ``(4)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence 
     community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of 
     the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor of 
     the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress 
     a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern 
     may report such complaint or information to the Inspector 
     General.
       ``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-day period beginning 
     on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or 
     information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General 
     shall determine whether the complaint or information appears 
     credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Director a notice of that 
     determination, together with the complaint or information.
       ``(C) Upon receipt of a submittal from the Inspector 
     General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, not later 
     than 7 days after such receipt, forward such transmittal to 
     the congressional intelligence committees, together with any 
     comments the Director considers appropriate.
       ``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible 
     under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted 
     under subparagraph (A), or does not submit the complaint or 
     information to the Director in accurate form under 
     subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may 
     submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting 
     either or both of the congressional intelligence committees 
     directly.
       ``(ii) An employee may contact the congressional 
     intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i) 
     only if the employee--
       ``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
     Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the 
     employee's complaint or information and notice of the 
     employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence 
     committees directly; and
       ``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the 
     Inspector General, direction on how to contact the 
     intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate 
     security practices.
       ``(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional 
     intelligence committees who receives a complaint or 
     information under clause (ii) does so in that member or 
     employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such 
     committee.
       ``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
     reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General 
     under this paragraph of each action taken under this 
     paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such 
     notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such 
     action is taken.
       ``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector 
     General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial 
     review.
       ``(G) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit 
     the protections afforded an employee of or contractor to the 
     Central Intelligence Agency under section 17(e)(3) of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
     403q(e)(3)).
       ``(H) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means 
     any of the following:
       ``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of 
     law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the 
     funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence 
     activity involving classified information, but does not 
     include differences of opinions concerning public policy 
     matters.
       ``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
     withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
     relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an 
     intelligence activity.
       ``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described 
     in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, 
     constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under 
     subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section.
       ``(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United 
     States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the 
     Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint 
     received by the Inspector General relating to violations of 
     Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of 
     an element of the intelligence community, or in the 
     relationships between the elements of the intelligence 
     community, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued 
     by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such 
     section. A copy of each such report shall be furnished to the 
     Director.
       ``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be 
     issued by the Director in consultation with the congressional 
     intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence 
     Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector 
     General of the Intelligence Community.
       ``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of 
     Intelligence Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to 
     subsection (g), the performance by the Inspector General of 
     the Intelligence Community of any duty, responsibility, or 
     function regarding an element of the intelligence community 
     shall not be construed to modify or affect the duties and 
     responsibilities of any other inspector general having duties 
     and responsibilities relating to such element.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 
     note), as amended by section 366 of this Act, is further 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103H 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 103I. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.

       (b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.--
     Section 8K of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App.) is repealed.
       (c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new item:
       ``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
       (d) Applicability Date; Transition.--
       (1) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (b) 
     shall apply on the earlier of--
       (A) the date of the appointment by the President and 
     confirmation by the Senate of an individual to serve as 
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community; or
       (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the 
     duties of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
     by the individual serving as the Inspector General of the 
     Office of the Director of National Intelligence as of the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) Transition.--The individual serving as the Inspector 
     General of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence as of the date of the enactment of this Act 
     shall perform the duties of the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community until the individual appointed to the 
     position of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
     assumes the duties of such position.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     SEC. 411. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR 
                   GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b), as amended by section 321 of this 
     Act, is further amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (i) and 
     transferring such subsection to the end; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector 
     General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an 
     audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such 
     audits shall be conducted subject to the provisions of 
     paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
       ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector 
     General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to 
     conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that 
     has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was 
     terminated or suspended prior to the last audit of such 
     covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not 
     been restarted after the date on which such audit was 
     completed.
       ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion 
     of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the 
     Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     containing the results of such audit.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking 
     ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)'';
       (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by 
     striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''; and
       (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking 
     ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''.

     SEC. 412. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR 
                   INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY 
                   OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


  ``prohibition on the use of private contractors for interrogations 
  involving persons in the custody of the central intelligence agency

       ``Sec. 24.  (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency shall not expend or obligate funds for payment to any 
     contractor to conduct the interrogation of a detainee or 
     prisoner in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.

[[Page 1893]]

       ``(b) Exception.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence 
     may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under 
     subsection (a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency determines that--
       ``(A) no employee of the Federal Government is--
       ``(i) capable of performing such interrogation; and
       ``(ii) available to perform such interrogation; and
       ``(B) such interrogation is in the national interest of the 
     United States and requires the use of a contractor.
       ``(2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any 
     contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver 
     under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the 
     conduct of interrogations that would apply if an employee of 
     the Federal Government were conducting the interrogation.''.

     SEC. 413. APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY CONTRACTING OFFICERS.

       Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 
     U.S.C. 607(d)) is amended by inserting before the sentence 
     beginning with ``In exercising'' the following new sentence: 
     ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an appeal from 
     a decision of a contracting officer of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency relative to a contract made by that 
     agency may be filed with whichever of the Armed Services 
     Board or the Civilian Board is specified by the contracting 
     officer as the Board to which such an appeal may be made and 
     the Board so specified shall have jurisdiction to decide that 
     appeal.''.

     SEC. 414. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Establishment and Duties of Deputy Director of CIA.--
     Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 
     et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104A the 
     following new section:


          ``deputy director of the central intelligence agency

       ``Sec. 104B.  (a) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
     Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President.
       ``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall--
       ``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
       ``(2) during the absence or disability of the Director of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy in the 
     position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, act 
     for and exercise the powers of the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Executive schedule iii.--Section 5314 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``Deputy Directors 
     of Central Intelligence (2)'' and inserting ``Deputy Director 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
       (2) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 
     note) is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 104A the following new item:

``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

       (c) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply on the earlier of--
       (1) the date of the appointment by the President of an 
     individual to serve as Deputy Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, except that the individual 
     administratively performing the duties of the Deputy Director 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties 
     until the individual appointed to the position of Deputy 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency assumes the 
     duties of such position; or
       (2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the 
     duties of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency by the individual administratively performing such 
     duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 415. PROTECTION AGAINST REPRISALS.

       Section 17(e)(3)(B) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
     of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)(B)) is amended by inserting 
     ``or providing such information'' after ``making such 
     complaint''.

     SEC. 416. REQUIREMENT FOR VIDEO RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS 
                   OF PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), as amended by section 412 of 
     this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:


 ``requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons in the 
               custody of the central intelligence agency

       ``Sec. 25.  (a) In General.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (b), the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency shall establish guidelines to ensure that each 
     interrogation of a person who is in the custody of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency is recorded in video form and 
     that the video recording of such interrogation is 
     maintained--
       ``(1) for not less than 10 years from the date on which 
     such recording is made; and
       ``(2) until such time as such recording is no longer 
     relevant to an ongoing or anticipated legal proceeding or 
     investigation or required to be maintained under any other 
     provision of law.
       ``(b) Exception.--The requirement to record an 
     interrogation in video form under subsection (a) shall not 
     apply with respect to an interrogation incident to arrest 
     conducted by Agency personnel designated by the Director 
     under section 15(a) that are assigned to the headquarters of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency and acting in the official 
     capacity of such personnel.
       ``(c) Interrogation Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `interrogation' means the systematic process of attempting to 
     obtain information from an uncooperative detainee.''.
       (b) Submission of Guidelines.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees the guidelines developed under 
     section 25(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 
     as added by subsection (a) of this section. Such guidelines 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements

     SEC. 421. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS.

       Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (H), by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' 
     after ``the Marine Corps,''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``The elements'' and 
     all that follows through ``the Coast Guard'' and inserting 
     ``The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department 
     of Homeland Security''.

     SEC. 422. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
                   ADMINISTRATION AS AN ELEMENT OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)(H)), as amended by section 421 of this Act, is 
     further amended by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement 
     Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation,''.

     SEC. 423. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
                   EXECUTIVE.

       (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the 
     Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of 
     Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), 
     and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), 
     respectively; and
       (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of 
     this subsection, by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) 
     of this section--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (f)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (e)''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (f)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (e)''; and
       (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (e)(1)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

     SEC. 424. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF HEADS OF CERTAIN 
                   COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National 
     Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended 
     by inserting after the first section the following new 
     section:
       ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security 
     Agency.
       ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be 
     appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate.
       ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be 
     the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge 
     such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or 
     otherwise by law.''.
       (b) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The 
     Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be 
     appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 106(b)(2) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B);
       (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (I) as 
     subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively; and
       (3) by moving subparagraph (G), as redesignated by 
     paragraph (2) of this subsection, two ems to the left.
       (d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendment made 
     by subsection (a) and the provisions of subsection (b) shall 
     apply upon the earlier of--
       (1) the date of the nomination by the President of an 
     individual to serve in the position concerned, except that 
     the individual serving in such position as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties 
     after such date of nomination and until the individual 
     appointed to such position, by and with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such position; 
     or
       (2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the 
     duties of such position by the individual performing such 
     duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 425. ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
                   FOR COMPLIANCE AND TRAINING.

       The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 
     note), as amended by section 424 of

[[Page 1894]]

     this Act, is further amended by inserting after section 2 (as 
     added by such section 424) the following new section:
       ``Sec. 3. (a) There is an Associate Director of the 
     National Security Agency for Compliance and Training, who 
     shall be appointed by the Director of the National Security 
     Agency.
       ``(b) The Associate Director of the National Security 
     Agency for Compliance and Training shall ensure that--
       ``(1) all programs and activities of the National Security 
     Agency are conducted in a manner consistent with all 
     applicable laws, regulations, and policies; and
       ``(2) the training of relevant personnel is sufficient to 
     ensure that such programs and activities are conducted in 
     such a manner.''.

     SEC. 426. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       (a) General Counsel.--The National Security Agency Act of 
     1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by section 425 of this 
     Act, is further amended by inserting after section 3 (as 
     added by such section 425), the following new section:
       ``Sec. 4. (a) There is a General Counsel of the National 
     Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by 
     and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency 
     shall serve as the chief legal officer of the National 
     Security Agency.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date 
     on which the Director of the National Security Agency is 
     appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in 
     accordance with section 2 of the National Security Agency Act 
     of 1959, as added by section 424 of this Act.

     SEC. 427. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       Section 12 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App.) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National Security 
     Agency;'' after ``the Federal Emergency Management Agency,''; 
     and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National Security 
     Agency,'' after ``the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration,''.

     SEC. 428. CHARTER FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
     defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 
     10, United States Code) a revised charter for the National 
     Reconnaissance Office (in this section referred to as the 
     ``NRO''). The charter shall include the following:
       (1) The organizational and governance structure of the NRO.
       (2) NRO participation in the development and generation of 
     requirements and acquisition.
       (3) The scope of NRO capabilities.
       (4) The roles and responsibilities of the NRO and the 
     relationship of the NRO to other elements of the intelligence 
     community and the defense community.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

     SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF 
                   THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Extension.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public 
     Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking 
     ``September 1, 2004'' and inserting ``February 1, 2011''.
       (2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the 
     amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if 
     included in the enactment of such section 1007.
       (3) Commission membership.--
       (A) In general.--The membership of the National Commission 
     for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of 
     the United States Intelligence Community established under 
     subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-
     306; 116 Stat. 2438) (referred to in this section as the 
     ``Commission'') shall be considered vacant and new members 
     shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as 
     amended by subparagraph (B).
       (B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section 1002(b) 
     of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy Director of 
     Central Intelligence for Community Management.'' and 
     inserting ``The Principal Deputy Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.
       (4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act 
     is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking 
     ``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research 
     and development programs and activities. Such review shall 
     include--''.
       (b) Funding.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall make $2,000,000 available to the Commission to carry 
     out title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2437).
       (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until 
     expended.

     SEC. 502. EXPANSION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE DUTIES OF THE 
                   PROGRAM MANAGER FOR THE INFORMATION SHARING 
                   ENVIRONMENT.

       Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``terrorism and homeland 
     security information'' and inserting ``national security 
     information'';
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as 
     paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) National security information.--The term `national 
     security information' includes homeland security information 
     and terrorism information.'';
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``terrorism 
     information'' and inserting ``national security 
     information''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2) in the first sentence of the matter 
     preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``terrorism 
     information'' and inserting ``national security 
     information''; and
       (3) in subsection (f)(1)--
       (A) in the second sentence, by inserting ``in the Executive 
     Office of the President and shall serve'' after ``The 
     individual designated as the program manager shall serve''; 
     and
       (B) in the third sentence, by striking ``homeland security 
     information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass 
     destruction information'' and inserting ``national security 
     information''.

     SEC. 503. CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH MATERIALS 
                   IN THE POSSESSION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.

       The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance 
     with procedures established by each of the congressional 
     intelligence committees, conduct a classification review of 
     materials in the possession of each of those committees 
     that--
       (1) are not less than 25 years old; and
       (2) were created, or provided to that committee, by the 
     executive branch.

     SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PROVIDE MIRANDA 
                   WARNINGS TO CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
     may be used to provide the warnings of constitutional rights 
     described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966), to 
     a person located outside of the United States who is not a 
     United States person and is--
       (1) suspected of terrorism, associated with terrorists, or 
     believed to have knowledge of terrorists; or
       (2) a detainee in the custody of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

     SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY ACT OF 1949.

       The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a 
     et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 5(a)(1), by striking ``authorized under 
     paragraphs (2) and (3)'' and all that follows through ``(50 
     U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 
     405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''; and
       (2) in section 17(d)(3)(B)--
       (A) in clause (i), by striking ``advise'' and inserting 
     ``advice''; and
       (B) in clause (ii)--
       (i) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' 
     and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
       (ii) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National 
     Clandestine Service'';
       (iii) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence'';
       (iv) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and
       (v) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
     Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science 
     and Technology''.

     SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
                   PROVISION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                   RETIREMENT ACT.

       Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(A) Upon reaching age 65, in the case of a participant in 
     the system who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank of 
     level 4 or above; and''.

     SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the 
     following new item:
       ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
       (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the General Counsel of the Office of the National 
     Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item:
       ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 101--
       (A) in subsection (a), by moving paragraph (7) two ems to 
     the right; and

[[Page 1895]]

       (B) by moving subsections (b) through (p) two ems to the 
     right;
       (2) in section 103, by redesignating subsection (i) as 
     subsection (h);
       (3) in section 109(a)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 112.;'' and 
     inserting ``section 112;''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the second period;
       (4) in section 301(1), by striking ```United States''' and 
     all that follows through ``and `State''' and inserting 
     ```United States', `person', `weapon of mass destruction', 
     and `State''';
       (5) in section 304(b), by striking ``subsection (a)(3)'' 
     and inserting ``subsection (a)(2)''; and
       (6) in section 502(a), by striking ``a annual'' and 
     inserting ``an annual''.

     SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 105 OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                   2004.

       Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 
     U.S.C. 311 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after 
     ``subsection (a)),''.

     SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND 
                   TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

       The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended--
       (1) in section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by 
     striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and 
     inserting ``Department of Justice'';
       (2) in section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
       (A) in subsection (c)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional 
     culture'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National 
     Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 
     112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National 
     Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; 
     and
       (C) in subsection (f) in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1), by striking ``shall,'' and inserting ``shall''; and
       (3) in section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and 
     inserting ``Federal''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and 
     inserting ``specific''.

     SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``FOREIGN'';
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign'';
       (B) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears; and
       (C) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'';
       (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``The Director'' and 
     inserting ``The Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (4) in subsection (c)--
       (A) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (B) by striking ``section 114a'' and inserting ``section 
     221''.

     SEC. 518. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 
                   OF 1947.

       The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) 
     is further amended--
       (1) section 3(4)(L), by striking ``other'' the second place 
     it appears;
       (2) in section 102A--
       (A) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets 
     for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual 
     budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
     program'';
       (B) in subsection (d)--
       (i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence 
     Program or any successor program'';
       (ii) in paragraph (3) in the matter preceding subparagraph 
     (A), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' and inserting 
     ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
       (iii) in paragraph (5)--

       (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or personnel'' in 
     the matter preceding clause (i); and
       (II) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or agency 
     involved'' in the second sentence and inserting ``involved or 
     the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case 
     of the Central Intelligence Agency)'';

       (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and 
     inserting ``paragraph''; and
       (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' after 
     ``Acquisition'';
       (3) in section 103(b), by striking ``, the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),'';
       (4) in section 104A(g)(1) in the matter preceding 
     subparagraph (A), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' 
     and inserting ``National Clandestine Service'';
       (5) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by 
     striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)'';
       (6) in section 701(b)(1), by striking ``Directorate of 
     Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service'';
       (7) in section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 
     432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking ``responsible'' and inserting 
     ``responsive''; and
       (8) in the table of contents in the first section--
       (A) by striking the item relating to section 1002; and
       (B) by inserting after the item relating to section 1001 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and 
              training.''.

     SEC. 519. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES 
                   CODE.

       Section 528(c) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``Associate Director of CIA 
     for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of 
     Military Affairs, CIA''; and
       (2) by striking ``Associate Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs'' and inserting 
     ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central 
     Intelligence Agency, or any successor position''.

  The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order 
except those printed in House Report 111-419. Each amendment may be 
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated 
in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the 
time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the 
proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall 
not be subject to a demand for division of the question.


                  Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Reyes

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Reyes:
       Page 9, line 21, strike ``$672,812,000'' and insert 
     ``$643,252,000''.
       Page 23, line 14, strike ``a grant program'' and insert 
     ``grant programs''.
       Page 23, line 15, strike ``subsection (b)'' and insert 
     ``subsections (b) and (c)''.
       Page 24, after line 10, insert the following:
       ``(c) Grant Program for Historically Black Colleges and 
     Universities.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may 
     provide grants to historically black colleges and 
     universities to provide programs of study in educational 
     disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2) or described 
     in paragraph (2).
       ``(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may be used to 
     provide programs of study in the following educational 
     disciplines:
       ``(A) Foreign languages, including Middle Eastern and South 
     Asian dialects.
       ``(B) Computer science.
       ``(C) Analytical courses.
       ``(D) Cryptography.
       ``(E) Study abroad programs.''.
       Page 24, line 11, strike ``(3) An'' and insert ``(d) 
     Application.--An''.
       Page 24, line 15, strike ``(4) An'' and insert ``(e) 
     Reports.--An''.
       Page 25, line 1, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(f)''.
       Page 25, line 4, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(g)''.
       Page 25, line 10, strike the quotation mark and the second 
     period.
       Page 25, after line 10, insert the following:
       ``(3) Analytical courses.--The term `analytical courses' 
     mean programs of study involving--
       ``(A) analytic methodologies, including advanced 
     statistical, polling, econometric, mathematical, or 
     geospatial modeling methodologies;
       ``(B) analysis of counterterrorism, crime, and 
     counternarcotics;
       ``(C) economic analysis that includes analyzing and 
     interpreting economic trends and developments;
       ``(D) medical and health analysis, including the assessment 
     and analysis of global health issues, trends, and disease 
     outbreaks;
       ``(E) political analysis, including political, social, 
     cultural, and historical analysis to interpret foreign 
     political systems and developments; or
       ``(F) psychology, psychiatry, or sociology courses that 
     assess the psychological and social factors that influence 
     world events.
       ``(4) Computer science.--The term `computer science' means 
     a program of study in computer systems, computer science, 
     computer engineering, or hardware and software analysis, 
     integration, and maintenance.
       ``(5) Cryptography.--The term `cryptography' means a 
     program of study on the conversion of data into a scrambled 
     code that can be deciphered and sent across a public or 
     private network, and the applications of such conversion of 
     data.
       ``(6) Historically black college and university.--The term 
     `historically black college and university' means an 
     institution of higher education that is a part B institution, 
     as such term is defined in section 322 of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061).
       ``(7) Study abroad program.--The term `study abroad 
     program' means a program of study that--

[[Page 1896]]

       ``(A) takes places outside the geographical boundaries of 
     the United States;
       ``(B) focuses on areas of the world that are critical to 
     the national security interests of the United States and are 
     generally underrepresented in study abroad programs at 
     institutions of higher education, including Africa, Asia, 
     Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Latin American, and the 
     Middle East; and
       ``(C) is a credit or noncredit program.''.
       Page 30, strike lines 10 through 12.
       Page 30, line 13, strike ``(C)'' and insert ``(B)''.
       Page 30, line 16, strike ``(D)'' and insert ``(C)''.
       Page 30, line 19, strike ``(E)'' and insert ``(D)''.
       Page 31, line 1, strike ``any information'' and all that 
     follows through ``dissenting legal views'' and insert ``the 
     legal authority under which the intelligence activity is 
     being or was conducted''.
       Page 31, line 11, strike ``any information'' and all that 
     follows through ``legal views'' and insert ``the legal 
     authority under which the covert action is being or was 
     conducted''.
       Page 31, strike line 18 and all that follows through line 8 
     on page 32 and insert the following:
       (2) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``in writing'' after 
     ``be reported'';
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``If the President'' and 
     inserting ``Subject to paragraph (5), if the President''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5)(A) The President may only limit access to a finding 
     in accordance with this subsection or a notification in 
     accordance with subsection (d)(1) if the President submits to 
     the Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2) a 
     certification that it is essential to limit access to such 
     finding or such notification to meet extraordinary 
     circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States.
       ``(B) Not later than 180 days after a certification is 
     submitted in accordance with subparagraph (A) or this 
     subparagraph, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
       ``(i) provide access to the finding or notification that is 
     the subject of such certification to all members of the 
     congressional intelligence committees; or
       ``(ii) submit to the Members of Congress specified in 
     paragraph (2) a certification that it is essential to limit 
     access to such finding or such notification to meet 
     extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the 
     United States.'';
       Page 32, strike lines 12 through 15 and insert the 
     following:
       (B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph (A) of 
     this paragraph, by inserting ``in writing'' after 
     ``notified''; and
       Page 33, line 13, insert ``or to the limiting of access to 
     such finding or such notice'' after ``notice''.
       Page 33, line 13, strike ``48 hours'' and insert ``seven 
     days''.
       Page 33, line 22, strike ``on the content of'' and insert 
     ``regarding''.
       Page 34, strike lines 14 through 20.
       Strike section 334 (Page 41, line 8 and all that follow 
     through line 25 on page 44) and insert the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 334. REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and annually thereafter for four years, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on 
     Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
     a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as 
     appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the 
     intelligence community, including--
       (1) the number of positions authorized for such element 
     that require foreign language proficiency and the level of 
     proficiency required;
       (2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each 
     element will require during the five-year period beginning on 
     the date of the submission of the report;
       (3) the number of positions authorized for such element 
     that require foreign language proficiency that are filled 
     by--
       (A) military personnel; and
       (B) civilian personnel;
       (4) the number of applicants for positions in such element 
     in the preceding fiscal year that indicated foreign language 
     proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the 
     proficiency level;
       (5) the number of persons hired by such element with 
     foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language 
     and proficiency level;
       (6) the number of personnel of such element currently 
     attending foreign language training, including the provider 
     of such training;
       (7) a description of the efforts of such element to 
     recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are 
     proficient in a foreign language;
       (8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
     advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
       (9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, dialect 
     of a foreign language--
       (A) the number of positions of such element that require 
     proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
       (B) the number of personnel of such element that are 
     serving in a position that requires proficiency in the 
     foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of 
     the position;
       (C) the number of personnel of such element that are 
     serving in a position that does not require proficiency in 
     the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty 
     of the position;
       (D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each 
     level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
       (E) whether the number of personnel at each level of 
     proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the 
     requirements of such element;
       (F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as 
     linguists for such element that are not qualified as 
     linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language 
     Roundtable;
       (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for 
     such element during the preceding calendar year;
       (H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that 
     discontinued serving such element during the preceding 
     calendar year;
       (I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that 
     is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and
       (J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that 
     is fulfilled by contractors;
       (10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and 
     capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole;
       (11) an identification of any critical gaps in foreign 
     language proficiency with respect to such element and 
     recommendations for eliminating such gaps;
       (12) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
     relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of 
     National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer 
     relevant; and
       (13) an assessment of the feasibility of employing foreign 
     nationals lawfully present in the United States who have 
     previously worked as translators or interpreters for the 
     Armed Forces or another department or agency of the Federal 
     Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical 
     language needs of such element.
       Page 45, beginning on line 18, strike ``one of the 
     congressional intelligence committees'' and insert ``a 
     committee of Congress with jurisdiction over such program or 
     activity''.
       Page 46, beginning on line 8, strike ``the congressional 
     intelligence committees'' and insert ``each committee of 
     Congress with jurisdiction over the program or activity that 
     is the subject of the analysis, evaluation, or investigation 
     for which the Director restricts access to information under 
     such paragraph''.
       Page 46, line 13, strike ``report'' and insert 
     ``statement''.
       Page 46, line 16, strike ``report'' and insert 
     ``statement''.
       Page 46, beginning on line 17, strike ``the congressional 
     intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the 
     Comptroller General has notice under paragraph (3)'' and 
     insert ``each committee of Congress to which the Director of 
     National Intelligence submits a statement under paragraph (2) 
     any comments on the statement''.
       Page 46, line 21, strike the closing quotation mark and the 
     final period.
       Page 46, after line 21, insert the following:
       ``(c) Confidentiality.--(1) The Comptroller General shall 
     maintain the same level of confidentiality for information 
     made available for an analysis, evaluation, or investigation 
     referred to in subsection (a) as is required of the head of 
     the element of the intelligence community from which such 
     information is obtained. Officers and employees of the 
     Government Accountability Office are subject to the same 
     statutory penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use of 
     such information as officers or employees of the element of 
     the intelligence community that provided the Comptroller 
     General or officers and employees of the Government 
     Accountability Office with access to such information.
       ``(2) The Comptroller General shall establish procedures to 
     protect from unauthorized disclosure all classified and other 
     sensitive information furnished to the Comptroller General or 
     any representative of the Comptroller General for conducting 
     an analysis, evaluation, or investigation referred to in 
     subsection (a).
       ``(3) Before initiating an analysis, evaluation, or 
     investigation referred to in subsection (a), the Comptroller 
     General shall provide the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the head of each relevant element of the intelligence 
     community with the name of each officer and employee of the 
     Government Accountability Office who has obtained appropriate 
     security clearance and to whom, upon proper identification, 
     records and information of the element of the intelligence 
     community shall be made available in conducting such 
     analysis, evaluation, or investigation.''.
       Page 48, line 15, strike ``Biannual'' and insert 
     ``Biennial''.
       Page 48, line 19, strike ``biannually'' and insert 
     ``biennially''.

[[Page 1897]]

       Page 62, line 14, strike ``NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE'' 
     and insert ``REPORT''.
       Page 62, beginning on line 18, strike ``National 
     Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence Assessment'' 
     and insert ``report''.
       Page 62, strike line 20 and insert the following: ``supply 
     chain and global provision of services to determine whether 
     such supply chain and such services pose''.
       Page 62, line 21, strike ``counterfeit''.
       Page 62, line 22, strike ``defective'' and insert 
     ``counterfeit, defective,''.
       Page 62, line 23, insert ``or services that may be managed, 
     controlled, or manipulated by a foreign government or a 
     criminal organization'' after ``organization''.
       Page 63, beginning on line 5, strike ``counterfeit''.
       Page 63, line 6, strike ``defective'' and insert 
     ``counterfeit, defective,''.
       Page 63, line 8, insert ``or services that may be managed, 
     controlled, or manipulated by a foreign government or a 
     criminal organization'' after ``organization''.
       Page 63, at the end of line 8 insert the following: ``Such 
     review shall include an examination of the threat posed by 
     State-controlled and State-invested enterprises and the 
     extent to which the actions and activities of such 
     enterprises may be controlled, coerced, or influenced by a 
     foreign government.''.
       Strike section 353 (Page 67, line 20 and all that follows 
     through line 25 on page 68).
       Page 69, beginning on line 5, strike ``Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation'' and insert ``Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of State,''.
       Insert after section 354 (Page 69, after line 15) the 
     following new sections:

     SEC. 355. REPORT ON QUESTIONING AND DETENTION OF SUSPECTED 
                   TERRORISTS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, shall submit to 
     Congress a report containing--
       (1) a description of the strategy of the Federal Government 
     for balancing the intelligence collection needs of the United 
     States with the interest of the United States in prosecuting 
     terrorist suspects; and
       (2) a description of the policy of the Federal Government 
     with respect to the questioning, detention, trial, transfer, 
     release, or other disposition of suspected terrorists.

     SEC. 356. REPORT ON DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
                   INFORMATION TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to Congress a report on the dissemination of critical 
     counterterrorism information from the intelligence community 
     to local law enforcement agencies, including recommendations 
     for improving the means of communication of such information 
     to local law enforcement agencies.

     SEC. 357. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF STATE AND 
                   LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to Congress a report on the intelligence capabilities of 
     State and local law enforcement agencies. Such report shall 
     include--
       (1) an assessment of the ability of State and local law 
     enforcement agencies to analyze and fuse intelligence 
     community products with locally gathered information;
       (2) a description of existing procedures of the 
     intelligence community to share with State and local law 
     enforcement agencies the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
     for intelligence collection, data management, and analysis 
     learned from global counterinsurgency and counterterror 
     operations;
       (3) a description of current intelligence analysis training 
     provided by elements of the intelligence community to State 
     and local law enforcement agencies;
       (4) an assessment of the need for a formal intelligence 
     training center to teach State and local law enforcement 
     agencies methods of intelligence collection and analysis; and
       (5) an assessment of the efficiently of co-locating such an 
     intelligence training center with an existing intelligence 
     community or military intelligence training center.

     SEC. 358. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON OVER-CLASSIFICATION.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to Congress a report 
     containing an analysis of the problem of over-classification 
     of intelligence and ways to address such over-classification, 
     including an analysis of the importance of protecting sources 
     and methods while providing law enforcement and the public 
     with as much access to information as possible.
       (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 359. REPORT ON THREAT FROM DIRTY BOMBS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall 
     submit to Congress a report summarizing intelligence related 
     to the threat to the United States from weapons that use 
     radiological materials, including highly dispersible 
     substances such as cesium-137.

     SEC. 360. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   IN ARGENTINA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report containing the following:
       (1) A description of any information in the possession of 
     the intelligence community with respect to the following 
     events in the Republic of Argentina:
       (A) The accession to power by the military of the Republic 
     of Argentina in 1976.
       (B) Violations of human rights committed by officers or 
     agents of the Argentine military and security forces during 
     counterinsurgency or counterterror operations, including by 
     the State Intelligence Secretariat (Secretaria de 
     Inteligencia del Estado), Military Intelligence Detachment 
     141 (Destacamento de Inteligencia Militar 141 in Cordoba), 
     Military Intelligence Detachment 121 (Destacamento Militar 
     121 in Rosario), Army Intelligence Battalion 601, the Army 
     Reunion Center (Reunion Central del Ejercito), and the Army 
     First Corps in Buenos Aires.
       (C) Operation Condor and Argentina's role in cross-border 
     counterinsurgency or counterterror operations with Brazil, 
     Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, or Uruguay.
       (2) Information on abductions, torture, disappearances, and 
     executions by security forces and other forms of repression, 
     including the fate of Argentine children born in captivity, 
     that took place at detention centers, including the 
     following:
       (A) The Argentine Navy Mechanical School (Escuela Mecanica 
     de la Armada).
       (B) Automotores Orletti.
       (C) Operaciones Tacticas 18.
       (D) La Perla.
       (E) Campo de Mayo.
       (F) Institutos Militares.
       (3) An appendix of declassified records reviewed and used 
     for the report submitted under this subsection.
       (4) A descriptive index of information referred to in 
     paragraph (1) or (2) that is classified, including the 
     identity of each document that is classified, the reason for 
     continuing the classification of such document, and an 
     explanation of how the release of the document would damage 
     the national security interests of the United States.
       (b) Review of Classified Documents.--Not later than two 
     years after the date on which the report required under 
     subsection (a) is submitted, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall review information referred to in 
     paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) that is classified to 
     determine if any of such information should be declassified.
       (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.

     SEC. 361. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY STRATEGY TO 
                   PROTECT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NETWORKS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the strategy of the National 
     Security Agency with respect to securing networks of the 
     Department of Defense within the intelligence community.

     SEC. 362. REPORT ON CREATION OF SPACE INTELLIGENCE OFFICE.

       Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to Congress a report on the feasibility and advisability of 
     creating a national space intelligence office to manage 
     space-related intelligence assets and access to such assets.

     SEC. 363. PLAN TO SECURE NETWORKS OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       (a) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress 
     a plan to secure the networks of the intelligence community. 
     Such plan shall include strategies for--
       (1) securing the networks of the intelligence community 
     from unauthorized remote access, intrusion, or insider 
     tampering;
       (2) recruiting, retaining, and training a highly-qualified 
     cybersecurity intelligence community workforce and include--
       (A) an assessment of the capabilities of such workforce;
       (B) an examination of issues of recruiting, retention, and 
     the professional development of such workforce, including the 
     possibility of providing retention bonuses or other forms of 
     compensation;
       (C) an assessment of the benefits of outreach and training 
     with both private industry and academic institutions with 
     respect to such workforce; and
       (D) an assessment of the impact of the establishment of the 
     Department of Defense

[[Page 1898]]

     Cyber Command on personnel and authorities of the 
     intelligence community;
       (3) making the intelligence community workforce and the 
     public aware of cybersecurity best practices and principles;
       (4) coordinating the intelligence community response to a 
     cybersecurity incident;
       (5) collaborating with industry and academia to improve 
     cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, the defense 
     industrial base, and financial networks;
       (6) addressing such other matters as the President 
     considers necessary to secure the cyberinfrastructure of the 
     intelligence community; and
       (7) reviewing procurement laws and classification issues to 
     determine how to allow for greater information sharing on 
     specific cyber threats and attacks between private industry 
     and the intelligence community.
       (b) Updates.--Not later than 90 days after the date on 
     which the plan referred to in subsection (a) is submitted to 
     Congress, and every 90 days thereafter until the President 
     submits the certification referred to in subsection (c), the 
     President shall report to Congress on the status of the 
     implementation of such plan and the progress towards the 
     objectives of such plan.
       (c) Certification.--The President may submit to Congress a 
     certification that the objectives of the plan referred to in 
     subsection (a) have been achieved.

     SEC. 364. REPORT ON MISSILE ARSENAL OF IRAN.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     assessing the threat posed by the missile arsenal of Iran to 
     allies and interests of the United States in the Persian 
     Gulf.

     SEC. 365. STUDY ON BEST PRACTICES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN 
                   COMBATING VIOLENT DOMESTIC EXTREMISM.

       (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     conduct a study on the best practices of foreign governments 
     (including the intelligence services of such governments) to 
     combat violent domestic extremism.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report containing the results of the study conducted under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 366. REPORT ON INFORMATION SHARING PRACTICES OF JOINT 
                   TERRORISM TASK FORCE.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the best practices or 
     impediments to information sharing in the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation-New York Police Department Joint Terrorism Task 
     Force, including ways in which the combining of Federal, 
     State, and local law enforcement resources can result in the 
     effective utilization of such resources.

     SEC. 367. REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TO ENABLE INFORMATION SHARING.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to Congress and the President a report describing the 
     improvements to information technology needed to enable 
     elements of the Federal Government that are not part of the 
     intelligence community to better share information with 
     elements of the intelligence community.

     SEC. 368. REPORT ON THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY OF THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to Congress a report in unclassified form describing the 
     future threats to describing the future threats to the 
     national security of the United States from continued and 
     increased dependence of the United States on oil sources from 
     foreign nations.
       Page 70, strike lines 1 through 7.
       Page 74, line 16, strike ``includes'' and insert ``means''.
       Page 75, line 24, strike the closing quotation mark and the 
     final period.
       Page 75, after line 24, insert the following:
       ``(D) Terrorist screening purpose.--The term `terrorist 
     screening purpose' means--
       ``(i) the collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of 
     terrorist identity information to determine threats to the 
     national security of the United States from a terrorist or 
     terrorism; and
       ``(ii) the use of such information for risk assessment, 
     inspection, and credentialing.''.
       Page 86, line 11, strike ``the congressional defense 
     committees'' and insert ``Congress''.
       Page 87, line 17, strike ``the''.
       At the end of subtitle E of title III (Page 88, after line 
     18), add the following new section:

     SEC. 369. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MONITORING OF NORTHERN BORDER 
                   OF THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Finding.--Congress finds that suspected terrorists have 
     attempted to enter the United States through the 
     international land and maritime border of the United States 
     and Canada.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the intelligence community should devote sufficient 
     resources, including technological and human resources, to 
     identifying and thwarting potential threats at the 
     international land and maritime border of the United States 
     and Canada; and
       (2) the intelligence community should work closely with the 
     Government of Canada to identify and apprehend suspected 
     terrorists before such terrorists enter the United States.
       Page 96, line 14, insert after the period the following: 
     ``Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit a personnel action 
     with respect to the Inspector General otherwise authorized by 
     law, other than transfer or removal.''.
       At the end of subtitle A of title IV (Page 116, after line 
     6), add the following new section:

     SEC. 407. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR 
                   REVIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS 
                   REGULATIONS AND EXPORT ADMINISTRATION 
                   REGULATIONS.

       The Director of National Intelligence may provide support 
     for any review conducted by a department or agency of the 
     Federal Government of the International Traffic in Arms 
     Regulations or Export Administration Regulations, including a 
     review of technologies and goods on the United States 
     Munitions List and Commerce Control List that may warrant 
     controls that are different or additional to the controls 
     such technologies and goods are subject to at the time of 
     such review.
       Strike section 411 (Page 116, line 9 and all that follows 
     through line 2 on page 118) and insert the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 411. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR 
                   GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(4)--
       (A) by striking ``(4) If'' and inserting ``(4)(A) If''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) The Director may waive the requirement to submit the 
     statement required under subparagraph (A) within seven days 
     of prohibiting an audit, inspection, or investigation under 
     paragraph (3) if such audit, inspection, or investigation is 
     related to a covert action program. If the Director waives 
     such requirement in accordance with this subparagraph, the 
     Director shall submit the statement required under 
     subparagraph (A) as soon as practicable, along with an 
     explanation of the reasons for delaying the submission of 
     such statement.'';
       (2) in subsection (d)(1)--
       (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) and (F) as 
     subsections (F) and (G), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(E) a list of the covert actions for which the Inspector 
     General has not completed an audit within the preceding 
     three-year period;''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(h) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `covert action' has the meaning given the term in section 
     503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     413b(e)).''.
       Strike section 426 (Page 128, line 21 and all that follows 
     through line 15 on page 129).
       Strike section 427 (Page 129, lines 16 through 25).
       Strike section 502 (Page 133, line 1 and all that follow 
     through line 10 on page 134).
       At the end of subtitle A of title V (Page 135, after line 
     12), add the following new section:

     SEC. 505. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established a cybersecurity 
     task force (in this section referred to as the ``Task 
     Force'').
       (b) Membership.--
       (1) In general.--The Task Force shall consist of the 
     following members:
       (A) One member appointed by the Attorney General.
       (B) One member appointed by the Director of the National 
     Security Agency.
       (C) One member appointed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       (D) One member appointed by the White House Cybersecurity 
     Coordinator.
       (E) One member appointed by the head of any other agency or 
     department that is designated by the Attorney General to 
     appoint a member to the Task Force.
       (2) Chair.--The member of the Task Force appointed pursuant 
     to paragraph (1)(A) shall serve as the Chair of the Task 
     Force.
       (c) Study.--The Task Force shall conduct a study of 
     existing tools and provisions of law used by the intelligence 
     community and law enforcement agencies to protect the 
     cybersecurity of the United States.
       (d) Report.--
       (1) Initial.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to 
     Congress a report containing guidelines or legislative 
     recommendations to improve the capabilities of the 
     intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to 
     protect the cybersecurity of the United States. Such report 
     shall include guidelines or legislative recommendations on--
       (A) improving the ability of the intelligence community to 
     detect hostile actions and attribute attacks to specific 
     parties;

[[Page 1899]]

       (B) the need for data retention requirements to assist the 
     intelligence community and law enforcement agencies;
       (C) improving the ability of the intelligence community to 
     anticipate nontraditional targets of foreign intelligence 
     services; and
       (D) the adequacy of existing criminal statutes to 
     successfully deter cyber attacks, including statutes 
     criminalizing the facilitation of criminal acts, the scope of 
     laws for which a cyber crime constitutes a predicate offense, 
     trespassing statutes, data breach notification requirements, 
     and victim restitution statutes.
       (2) Subsequent.--Not later than one year after the date on 
     which the initial report is submitted under paragraph (1), 
     and annually thereafter for two years, the Task Force shall 
     submit to Congress an update of the report required under 
     paragraph (1).
       (e) Termination.--The Task Force shall terminate on the 
     date that is 60 days after the date on which the last update 
     of a report required under subsection (d)(2) is submitted.

     SEC. 506. CRUEL, INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT IN 
                   INTERROGATIONS PROHIBITED.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Cruel, 
     Inhuman, and Degrading Interrogations Prohibition Act of 
     2010''.
       (b) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The United States is a world power and an exemplar of 
     the merits of due process and the rule of law.
       (2) The use of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
     treatment harms our servicemen and women because it removes 
     their assurance that they are operating under a legally 
     acceptable standard, brings discredit upon the US and its 
     forces, and may place US and allied personnel in enemy hands 
     at a greater risk of abuse by their captors.
       (3) The use of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
     treatment gives propaganda and recruitment tools to those who 
     wish to do harm to the people of the United States.
       (4) Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment do 
     not produce consistently reliable information or 
     intelligence, and are not acceptable practices because their 
     use runs counter to our identity and values as a nation.
       (5) The moral standards that reflect the values of the 
     United States governing appropriate tactics for 
     interrogations do not change according to the dangers that we 
     face as a nation.
       (6) Every effort must be made to ensure that the United 
     States is a nation governed by the rule of law in every 
     circumstance.
       (7) Executive Order 13491 requires those interrogating 
     persons detained as a result of armed conflicts to follow the 
     standards set out in Army Field Manual FM 2-22.3.
       (8) The Congress should act in affirmation of its 
     principles and the Executive Order 13491 by enacting 
     standards for interrogations and providing criminal liability 
     for those who do not adhere to the enacted standards.
       (9) The courageous men and women who serve honorably as 
     intelligence personnel and as members of our nation's Armed 
     Forces deserve the full support of the United States 
     Congress. The Congress shows true support, in part, by 
     providing clear legislation relating to standards for 
     interrogation techniques.
       (c) Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment Prohibited.--
     Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after chapter 26 the following:

         ``CHAPTER 26A--CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT

``531. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
``532. Definitions.
``533. Application.
``534. Exclusive remedies.

     ``Sec. 531. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment

       ``Any officer or employee of the intelligence community 
     who, in the course of or in anticipation of a covered 
     interrogation, knowingly commits, attempts to commit, or 
     conspires to commit an act of cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
     treatment--
       ``(1) if death results from that act to the individual 
     under interrogation, shall be fined under this title or 
     imprisoned for any term of years or for life;
       ``(2) if that act involves an act of medical malfeasance 
     (as defined in section 1371), shall be fined under this title 
     or imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both; and
       ``(3) in any other case, shall be fined under this title or 
     imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both.

     ``Sec. 532. Definitions

       ``In this chapter:
       ``(1) The term `act of cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
     treatment' means the cruel, unusual, and inhuman treatment or 
     punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
     Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as 
     defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and 
     Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against 
     Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
     Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984, 
     and includes but is not limited to the following:
       ``(A) Any of the following acts, knowingly committed 
     against an individual:
       ``(i) Forcing the individual to be naked, perform sexual 
     acts, or pose in a sexual manner.
       ``(ii) Beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of 
     inflicting physical pain.
       ``(iii) Waterboarding.
       ``(iv) Using military working dogs.
       ``(v) Inducing hypothermia or heat injury.
       ``(vi) Depriving the individual of necessary food, water, 
     sleep, or medical care.
       ``(vii) Conducting mock executions of the individual.
       ``(B) Any of the following acts, when committed with the 
     intent to cause mental or physical harm to an individual:
       ``(i) Using force or the threat of force to compel an 
     individual to maintain a stress position.
       ``(ii) Exploiting phobias of the individual.
       ``(iii) Using force or the threat of force to coerce an 
     individual to desecrate the individual's religious articles, 
     or to blaspheme his or her religious beliefs, or to otherwise 
     participate in acts intended to violate the individual's 
     religious beliefs.
       ``(iv) Making threats against any individual that, if 
     carried out, would result in death or serious bodily injury 
     (as defined in section 1365(4)) to that individual.
       ``(v) Exposure to excessive cold, heat, or cramped 
     confinement.
       ``(vi) Sensory deprivation or overload, including the 
     following:

       ``(I) Prolonged isolation.
       ``(II) Placing hoods or sacks over the head of the 
     individual.
       ``(III) Applying duct tape over the eyes of the individual.

       ``(C) Any act that causes pain or suffering to an 
     individual equivalent to the acts described in subparagraph 
     (B) or (C).
       ``(2) The term `covered interrogation' means an 
     interrogation, including an interrogation conducted outside 
     the United States, conducted--
       ``(A) in the course of the official duties of an officer or 
     employee of the Federal government; and
       ``(B) under color of Federal law or authority of Federal 
     law.
       ``(3) The term `intelligence community' has the meaning 
     given such term under section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       ``(4) The term `interrogation' means the questioning of an 
     individual for the purpose of gathering information for 
     intelligence purposes.
       ``(5) The term `US national' means any national of the 
     United States as defined in section 101 of the Immigration 
     and Nationality Act.
       ``(6) The term `United States' means the several States of 
     the United States, the District of Columbia, and the 
     commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United 
     States.
       ``(7) The term `waterboarding' includes any act in which an 
     individual is immobilized on the individual's back with the 
     individual's head inclined downwards, while water is poured 
     over the individual's face and breathing passages.

     ``Sec. 533. Application

       ``Section 531 applies to any alleged offender who is--
       ``(1) a US national; or
       ``(2) any officer, employee, or contractor (including a 
     subcontractor at any tier and any employee of that contractor 
     or subcontractor) of the Federal Government--
       ``(A) who is not a US national; and
       ``(B) while acting in that capacity.

     ``Sec. 534. Exclusive remedies

       ``Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as precluding 
     the application of State or local laws on the same subject, 
     nor shall anything in this chapter be construed as creating 
     any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any 
     party in any civil proceeding.''.
       (d) Medical Malfeasance.--Part I of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 65 the following:

                   ``CHAPTER 66--MEDICAL MALFEASANCE

``1371. Medical malfeasance.
``1372. Definitions.

     ``Sec. 1371. Medical malfeasance

       ``Any medical professional who, in the course of or in 
     anticipation of a covered interrogation (as defined in 
     section 532(2)), knowingly commits, attempts to commit, or 
     conspires to commit an act of medical malfeasance with the 
     intent to enable an act of cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
     treatment shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
     more than 5 years, or both.

     ``Sec. 1372. Definitions

       ``In this chapter:
       ``(1) The term `medical professional' means any individual 
     who--
       ``(A) has received professional training, education, or 
     knowledge in a health-related field (including psychology) 
     and who provides services in that field; and
       ``(B) is a contractor (including a subcontractor at any 
     tier and any employee of that contractor or subcontractor), 
     officer, or employee of the intelligence community (as 
     defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))).

[[Page 1900]]

       ``(2) The term `covered interrogee' means an individual who 
     is interrogated in a covered interrogation (as defined in 
     section 532(2) of this title).
       ``(3) The term `act of medical malfeasance'--
       ``(A) means the use by a medical professional of his or her 
     training, education, or knowledge in a health-related field 
     to cause a significant adverse effect on the physical or 
     mental health of a covered interrogee; and
       ``(B) includes but is not limited to any of the following 
     contraventions of the principles of medical ethics with 
     respect to a covered interrogee:
       ``(i) To be involved in any professional relationship with 
     a covered interrogee, the purpose of which is not solely to 
     evaluate, protect, or improve the physical and mental health 
     of that covered interrogee.
       ``(ii) To fail to protect the physical or mental health of 
     a covered interrogee in the same way as a medical 
     professional would protect the physical or mental health of 
     any prisoner of war pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention 
     Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at 
     Geneva, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316).
       ``(iii) To fail to treat any disease or condition of the 
     covered interrogee in the same way as a medical professional 
     would treat a disease or condition of any prisoner of war 
     pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention Relative to the 
     Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 
     (6 UST 3316).
       ``(iv) To certify, or to participate in the certification 
     of, the fitness of a covered interrogee for any form of 
     treatment or punishment that may have a significant adverse 
     effect on the physical or mental health of the covered 
     interrogee.
       ``(v) To participate in any way in the infliction of any 
     treatment or punishment referred to in clause (iv).
       ``(vi) To participate in any procedure for restraining a 
     covered interrogee unless such a procedure is determined, in 
     accordance with purely medical criteria, as being necessary 
     for the protection of the physical or mental health of the 
     covered interrogee or of others, and presents no additional 
     hazard to the covered interrogee's physical or mental 
     health.''.
       (e) Clerical Amendments.--The table of chapters at the 
     beginning of part I of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting, after the item relating to ``Criminal 
     street gangs'' the following:
``26A. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment................531'';....

       and
       (2) by inserting, after the item relating to ``Malicious 
     mischief'' the following:
``66. Medical malfeasance...................................1371''.....

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. REYES. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, the manager's amendment includes a number of revisions 
to H.R. 2701 along with a number of technical changes. I would like to 
highlight several of these key provisions.
  The manager's amendment makes significant changes to the underlying 
bill's reforms to the process for notifying Congress on sensitive 
covert actions.
  As my colleagues know, the National Security Act requires that the 
President inform Congress through the intelligence committees about all 
significant intelligence activities including covert actions.
  In very limited circumstances, it allows the President to limit 
briefings on certain highly sensitive covert actions to the Gang of 
Eight--the leadership of the Intelligence Committees and the leadership 
of both Houses.
  Over the past several months, we have carefully considered the 
administration's objections to the reforms that the committee included 
in the underlying bill. The manager's amendment is a product of that 
work.
  The bill, as amended, would require the President to maintain a 
record of all Gang of Eight briefings. It also requires that the full 
committee be notified every time that a Gang of Eight briefing is 
conducted and be provided with general information regarding that 
briefing.
  In the event the President decides that a briefing must be limited to 
the Gang of Eight, the manager's amendment also requires that he submit 
a certification stating that extraordinary circumstances require the 
briefing to be limited.
  In the case of a limited briefing, the DNI will have to reissue that 
certification every 180 days or open the briefing to all members of the 
committee.
  This reform is a substantial improvement over the language we 
included in previous authorization bills and which some of my 
colleagues still support. This earlier language would have actually 
expanded the President's authority to conduct restricted briefings, 
going so far as to include all intelligence activities, not just covert 
actions. It would also result in more restricted briefings and not 
fewer.
  I am interested in passing laws that reform the notification process, 
not, as some would say, in sending political messages.
  The manager's amendment also includes a number of provisions proposed 
by my colleagues. These include an amendment by Mr. Bishop, which would 
require the DNI and the Attorney General to provide Congress with a 
strategy on balancing intelligence collection needs with the interests 
of the United States in prosecuting terrorist suspects.
  The questioning and prosecution of terrorist suspects has been the 
subject of some controversy in recent weeks, and I believe that 
Congress could benefit from understanding how the administration plans 
to handle such cases in the future.
  A second provision included in the manager's amendment was proposed 
by Mr. Marshall of Georgia. It requires the DNI to study the best 
practices of other foreign governments to combat violent domestic 
extremism.
  A number of our allies, including the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, have established programs to stop individuals from turning 
to terrorism. This is a growing problem here in the United States, and 
we could benefit from learning how our friends and allies have dealt 
with this problem.
  Madam Chair, I urge the passage of the manager's amendment.
  At this point, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I claim time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Since the other side doesn't want to talk about this amendment, I 
find myself having to come back and, once again, bring up the McDermott 
amendment. I would just appreciate, since there have been no hearings 
on this and it has slipped into this in the dead of night, just some 
answers to questions that maybe someone on the majority side can 
answer.
  Remember, we are in a community now where the people at the front 
lines realize, when they have been asked by Congress and the President 
to do something, that, 3 or 4 years later, they may be prosecuted for 
those very activities by following the requests of this Congress.
  We are talking about enhanced interrogation techniques. The record 
indicates that even people as high as the Speaker of this House knew 
about it. Yet this House is supporting those efforts to perhaps go back 
and prosecute this. Now we open up a whole new set of legal risk for 
our people in the intelligence community. I wish this thing just said, 
``Follow the rules,'' but it doesn't. It's 11 pages of legalese, 
creating all types of new and ambiguous rules for our people in the 
intelligence community.
  Would someone please answer the question: Why did we never have any 
hearings on this? Why no discussion? Why no debate? Why does this 
amendment define a criminal offense that only intelligence community 
personnel would be guilty of? This only applies to intelligence 
community personnel. Answer the question.
  The amendment would make it a crime for depriving the individual of 
necessary food, water, sleep, or medical care. How does the bill define 
``necessary''? How will we explain that to the people in the 
intelligence community?
  The amendment would make it a crime to require someone to participate 
in acts intended to violate the individual's religious beliefs. Is 
there any objective standard to define that term or is it a subjective 
standard? Is there any requirement of reasonableness?
  The amendment would make it a crime to exploit phobias of the 
individual. Phobias? Could you explain why

[[Page 1901]]

this would be a criminal offense for a member of the intelligence 
community but not a criminal offense for a prosecutor who threatens a 
detainee with increased jail time if he does not cooperate?
  These are just some simple questions--questions that I would think 
people in the intelligence community would ask the next time someone 
from this body comes and visits with them and tells them how much we 
support them and how great of a job we think they're doing. I would 
think they would hold this amendment up and say, Sir, Madam, did you 
vote for this? Did you understand what it meant when you voted for it? 
Could you explain it to me? Somebody please answer these questions.

                              {time}  1445

  We sure didn't have the opportunity to ask this in committee, to get 
any briefings on this, to have any hearings, for someone to explain 
this to us. But, no, if the other side has its way, soon this will be 
law.
  Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Rhode Island, and a valued member of our committee, Mr. Langevin.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his 
leadership on the Intelligence Committee.
  Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2701.
  This bill before us today funds critical intelligence activities that 
are vital to our national security. Of particular interest to me, it 
provides the resources for the foundational capabilities of a 
comprehensive cybersecurity strategy.
  As the recent cyberattacks against Google and U.S. networks have 
demonstrated, our information infrastructure is far more vulnerable 
than many realize. It is absolutely imperative that the United States 
strengthen its cyberdefenses to ensure government and commercial 
functions are protected and to improve our ability to attribute attacks 
and hold aggressors accountable. The intelligence community has begun 
this work, and the President has committed to developing a broad 
strategy to secure U.S. information networks. I applaud those efforts.
  In order to further foster cyberreadiness of our intelligence 
agencies, I offered an amendment requiring the administration to submit 
to Congress a plan for securing intelligence networks and determining 
whether we have the workforce we need to secure this vital part of 
cyberspace as well as the ability to recruit and retain the best and 
brightest in this field. I'm truly grateful this provision has been 
included in the manager's amendment that we're debating today.
  Another issue of great importance is congressional oversight of our 
intelligence community. I'm pleased that this bill modifies the Gang of 
Eight notification process currently used to brief Congress on 
intelligence activities. During the last administration, we saw the 
danger of giving the executive branch too much leeway to engage in 
activities outside of congressional review. Reforming the mechanism 
governing congressional notification will restore Congress's ability to 
conduct oversight on our intelligence activities.
  So with that I just want to thank Chairman Reyes for his leadership 
in crafting this bill as well as his general leadership of the 
Intelligence Committee itself and particularly the attention he's paid 
to the issue of cybersecurity. I support the bill and I urge my 
colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, just to further again tell you 
how dangerous the amendment is on making it a criminal act for CIA 
officers to try to conduct interrogations, again I just want to read--
this goes after specifically any intelligence officer or employee of 
the intelligence community. So saying we're just restating law simply 
isn't true. And then it goes on to say ``interrogation knowingly 
commits, attempts to commit, or conspires to commit an act of cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading treatment.'' ``Degrading,'' of course, is 
undefined.
  But think of this: It goes on to explain at a further portion in 
their language ``if you seek to blaspheme his or her religious 
beliefs.'' Now, we know that al Qaeda through their training always 
says when you're caught by the United States, allege abuse. It shuts 
the system down. Guess what we just did. Does that mean a Jewish FBI 
official is no longer able to go in and conduct an interview? I don't 
know. Does it mean that if an uncovered woman goes in to conduct an 
interview, we've blasphemed their beliefs and their religion? I don't 
know. But we've certainly made it easier to make the allegation, 
haven't we? We have made it almost impossible for them to do what we 
have to have them do, and that's extract information that's going to 
save lives. I mean you could go on to any sector of any religion that 
has become radicalized and understand it's impossible to meet that 
standard. Impossible. We are hugely restricting and handcuffing our 
intelligence community from doing what they need to do, and that's to 
get information, without torture, that keeps Americans safe and alive.
  And, again, al Qaeda, Madam Chair, uses the technique, and we know 
this through a whole series of sources, to allege abuse. They use it in 
their media campaign, and they know it makes us chase our tail for 
weeks on end. This only enhances, this only strengthens their cause and 
al Qaeda's operational tactic to slow us down in the obtaining of that 
information.
  I can't tell you how serious this amendment is with no debate and no 
discussion. It's dangerous. I urge rejection on this alone.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my privilege to yield 1 minute to 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Richardson), who is a member of 
the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats.
  Ms. RICHARDSON. Madam Chair, I rise to engage the chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee for purposes of a colloquy.
  Mr. REYES. I am happy to oblige.
  Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Homeland Security 
Committee and subcommittee Chair, I'm concerned that the members of the 
Homeland Security Committee have not consistently and were not 
adequately briefed by the administration on the events surrounding the 
failed Christmas Day terrorist attack. The Homeland Security Committee 
has an important role in congressional oversight over agencies within 
its jurisdiction.
  Mr. Chairman, do you agree with me and Chairman Thompson that the 
Homeland Security Committee should be briefed in a timely manner on 
national security matters that play a central role in homeland 
security?
  Mr. REYES. I believe that the Homeland Security Committees have an 
important role to play in congressional oversight of national security 
matters and that the committee should be briefed on national security 
matters that fall within its jurisdiction.
  Ms. RICHARDSON. I thank the chairman for that response.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to my colleague from 
Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, a few moments ago, a Member stated that 
the McDermott language only restates what's in current law. I would be 
very interested for any Member who can come to the floor and tell me 
where in current law it says any officer or employee of the 
intelligence community who forces an individual to be naked goes to 
jail for 15 years. Sometimes there's a good reason to ask someone to 
take their clothes off--to make sure they don't have bombs strapped 
around their waist. And yet an intelligence officer who does that under 
the McDermott language is liable for 15 years in jail.
  The McDermott language says an officer or employee in the 
intelligence community who deprives an individual of necessary sleep 
goes to jail for 15 years.
  Now, I cannot believe the many good Members on both sides of the 
aisle who are concerned about prosecuting terrorists, about keeping the 
country safe,

[[Page 1902]]

have thought through the implications of this language. And to have it 
included in a manager's amendment along with 20 other amendments is 
just amazing to me.
  I strongly encourage every Member of the House to read this language 
and be careful before you vote on it.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  The manager's amendment includes language originally proposed by Mr. 
McDermott that reiterates existing law on torture and provides 
statutory criminal penalties for individuals who knowingly commit an 
act of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. Torture is a 
reprehensible and counterproductive practice. The U.S., as we all know, 
has no business engaging in that. The language in the manager's 
amendment simply reasserts existing law.
  Executive Order 13491 prohibits interrogators from engaging in any of 
the activities highlighted in the manager's amendment language. This 
Executive Order limits interrogations to the interrogation techniques 
that are authorized by the Army Field Manual. It also spells out the 
terms of Common Article 3 and relevant provisions of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment as the minimum standard for the United States to follow.
  The language in the manager's amendment restates existing criminal 
law prohibitions like those in the Detainee Treatment Act and clearly 
establishes that the United States will adhere to the rule of law. It 
provides a specific criminal penalty for those who knowingly cause the 
death of a detainee. It is already a crime for an interrogator to 
knowingly murder a detainee. This provision merely adds a concrete 
statutory penalty to that conduct.
  This language does not, does not, give terrorists greater rights than 
ordinary criminals.
  We cannot afford another Abu Ghraib, and the language in the 
manager's amendment simply reasserts these important provisions already 
codified in law, plain and simple.
  Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 1 minute.
  I wish it were plain and simple. It's 11 pages, 11 pages dropped in 
in the middle of the night. No debate, no discussion, just inserted.
  If it's already a crime, why are you putting it in here?
  We haven't answered all the questions that we asked before. I notice 
that the sponsor of the amendment, who was here for an extended period 
of time, I'm not sure if he wanted to speak on the amendment or not but 
obviously wasn't given the opportunity to speak on the amendment if he 
wanted to. It's too bad because I think there's legitimate need for 
discussion and debate because I don't think it's at all clear that this 
is just a restatement of current law.
  Answer the questions. The amendment would make it a crime to exploit 
phobias of the individual. Why is this a criminal offense for a member 
of the intelligence community but for no one else, not a criminal 
offense for a prosecutor? Why didn't we ever talk about this in 
committee? Why didn't we ever debate it?
  Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I now yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Barrow).
  Mr. BARROW. I thank the Chair for yielding.
  I rise to commend Chairman Reyes for including in the manager's 
amendment my amendment to develop a competitive grant program that will 
encourage the U.S. intelligence community to partner with Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities to recruit, train, and retain an 
ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence workforce.
  We face a diverse and growing array of threats around the globe. As 
the means used by our enemies become more advanced, so must our 
defenses. Cultural, language, and educational barriers affect the 
quality of intelligence we can gather, and it's critical that our 
intelligence community have the human assets to overcome these 
barriers.
  The area of Georgia that I represent is home to several HBCUs with 
specific expertise in languages and computer sciences. Engaging these 
centers of academic excellence, as this amendment does, will produce 
more sophisticated intelligence officers, who will in turn make our 
country more secure.
  I want to thank Chairman Reyes for his work on this important 
legislation, and I urge my colleagues to support passage of this bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my colleague 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, it's not that you're giving 
terrorists better rights than Americans. It's the fact that you're 
extending to foreign terrorists, foreign nationals, foreign-trained 
individuals coming here to commit acts of violence and kill civilians 
the same rights as Americans. That's wrong. They are enemy combatants.
  You say, well, we can't have Abu Ghraib. You're right; we can't. 
Torture is illegal. It was illegal then, and guess what? It was 
investigated and they have been prosecuted, rightly so. They abused 
people. Wrong. They go to jail. That's what happens in this system.
  What you're doing now is interjecting mass confusion into the people 
who are going to try to conduct debriefings all over the world, and 
they're going to go to dangerous places, and guess what? You've engaged 
one of the worst parts of the al Qaeda playbook that says, remember, 
when Americans are shooting at themselves and chasing their tail, they 
are not shooting at us. Allege abuse. You've just put 11 confusing 
pages right into the hands of our enemy to say, make it really hard on 
the folks who are risking their lives to save Americans so that we can 
continue to do what we do, and that's plan, train, recruit, and we will 
send people to America to kill American civilians.
  This is a dangerous, dangerous, dangerous step that you take. No 
debate. No discussion. Lots of confusion. Don't do this to the men and 
women who risk their lives every day to protect the United States of 
America.

                              {time}  1500

  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 1 minute.
  Mr. REYES. Thank you, Madam Chair.
  I rise to inform my colleagues on the other side that the men and 
women protecting this country are clear about their duties. They are 
focused on keeping us safe. They are not concerned about the political 
spin here. They are not concerned about the rhetoric that they hear. 
But they do appreciate actions more than rhetoric.
  I know because I have been around the world visiting them. I have 
been to talk to various groups in the intelligence community. They know 
that we appreciate the work that they do each and every day to keep us 
safe. And they are not going to be fooled, like the American people are 
not going to be fooled, by the rhetoric that comes up, the spin that 
they try to put on the manager's amendment, and in particular the 
reiteration of something that is fundamentally American, and that is we 
have a Constitution. We have rules that we all have to live by. We 
understand the law. And we have to have respect for that law. It does 
not undermine any of that.
  It is a good manager's amendment. I urge the adoption of the 
manager's amendment.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you.
  Madam Chair, my colleague on the other side of the aisle is exactly 
right. The people in the intelligence community are watching exactly 
what we are doing. And actions do speak louder than words. The actions 
that they have seen, their colleagues were asked by this Congress, 
including, the record shows, the leadership of this House and

[[Page 1903]]

the former administration, to do things on their behalf to keep America 
safe, and they see their colleagues now potentially being prosecuted 
because the rules changed under this administration.
  As they see the rules changed for them and perhaps their colleagues 
being prosecuted, they see a global justice initiative coming out of 
the FBI where we are reading Miranda rights to our enemies on the 
battlefield in Afghanistan. They see the actions and they see the 
actions are very, very different.
  They see that we are moving KSM from Gitmo to trial in New York City. 
Thankfully, the people in New York City are saying no way, we are not 
doing it. And at the same time that KSM is being promised a trial in 
civilian courts in the United States, they are seeing 11 pages of new 
vulnerabilities being placed on them after no hearings and no debate.
  Yes, our men and women in the field are seeing a real difference. 
They are seeing a real difference in actions by this Congress and by 
this administration. They see that they have become kind of a target of 
this administration, that this is now not about keeping America safe, 
it is about putting them into a legal framework, an ugly legal net.
  Madam Chair, I rise in strong opposition to this bloated Manager's 
Amendment. Its flaws powerfully demonstrate how the Intelligence 
Committee is failing to do its work and has in fact become 
counterproductive to the work of the intelligence community.
  This amendment is everything that is wrong with intelligence policy 
in 2010. It is politicized, it fails to recognize or act on the serious 
threats that we continue to face as a nation, and it puts off the tough 
decisions indefinitely. Where it does take a substantive action, 
instead of taking meaningful steps to fix the problem it blames the men 
and women of the intelligence community for failing to follow a 
politically correct policy, even though that policy was ratified by 
Members of Congress at the highest levels. I think we have heard this 
story before.
  The Managers Amendment contains the text of 22 Democratic amendments, 
and no Republican amendments. The Committee minority was not consulted 
on a single one of these amendments--in fact, one of them continues to 
reverse a bipartisan agreement on notification reform from last year.
  Instead of taking meaningful steps to address critical national 
security problems such as the threat posed by bringing Guantanamo 
detainees to the United States, the flaws revealed in our intelligence 
sharing by the Fort Hood and Christmas attacks, and the issues posed by 
American citizens who join terrorist groups abroad, it would require 16 
new reports, to bring the total for the bill to at least 57 new 
reports. And instead of supporting the men and women of our 
intelligence community, it would create a new criminal offense that not 
only would duplicate an existing law--it would apply only to our 
intelligence personnel. How's that for gratitude?
  Instead of trying to provide proper procedures are in place to govern 
the conduct of covert action activities that could impact American 
citizens, the Majority believes it is more important to order yet 
another duplicative report on foreign language proficiency when the 
Committee is already briefed regularly and repeatedly on the efforts 
that are ongoing in this area.
  Instead of trying to fix the intelligence sharing problems that were 
laid bare at the Fort Hood shooting and shown to be critical during the 
Christmas bombing attack, the Majority has instead chosen to put its 
head in the sand and order up a report on events in Argentina between 
the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.
  Instead of resolving the serious problems in coordinating the 
interrogation of the high-value detainees that became apparent when 
Miranda rights were read to a foreign radical jihadist, the Majority 
has chosen to require the intelligence community to write up not one, 
but two new reports and a ``Task Force'' on cybersecurity even though 
the Committee is in the middle of a series of comprehensive briefings 
and hearings on the subject and has conducted repeated oversight.
  Madam Chair, I can't think of a single terrorist plot that has ever 
been disrupted by a report to Congress.
  In addition to these more fundamental issues, I need to note for the 
record some specific serious problems with this amendment.
  First, the amendment does even further damage to the bipartisan 
agreement that had been reached on reform of congressional 
notification. Instead of providing a mechanism that respects the 
separation of powers and the various equities of the President and the 
Congress, this amendment has ceded the decision of which Members of 
Congress will be briefed on sensitive covert actions entirely to the 
President, apparently to avoid the White House's veto threat on the 
bill. That is ironic for a majority who has claimed so long and so 
loud--despite clear records and the recollection of others to the 
contrary--that it was never briefed on intelligence policies that they 
explicitly helped to ratify on a bipartisan basis.
  Second, the amendment does even further damage to years of carefully 
developed practice and procedure for how the congressional intelligence 
committees conduct oversight by attempting to cede its responsibility 
to the GAO. The original bill was flawed because it would have provided 
the GAO with virtually unfettered authority to insert itself into 
intelligence community matters without applying the same rules that 
govern the congressional intelligence committees or limiting the 
dissemination of any work product to protect sources and methods.
  It was so bad that even the Obama administration objected that the 
bill ``would fundamentally shift the longstanding relationship and 
information flow between the IC and intelligence committee members and 
staff.'' This Managers Amendment makes these problems even worse by 
allowing the Comptroller General to unilaterally develop procedures for 
handling of highly sensitive material with no requirement that it 
follow House or Committee rules, and in fact would allow committees 
other than the intelligence committees to request GAO review of the 
intelligence community.
  This is contrary to the Rules of the House and the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission. How many times do we have to learn the simple 
lesson that intelligence oversight is most effective when it is 
conducted by the intelligence committees--at least when those 
committees do more than just require new reports.
  Third, buried deep within the 22 amendments contained in this 
Managers Amendment is an extraordinary provision that would create a 
new criminal offense that would only apply to the men and women of the 
intelligence community. Title 18 of the U.S. Code, section 2340A, 
already gives effect to the Convention Against Torture and makes 
torture a criminal offense in the United States. Torture is already 
against the law.
  Apparently, that's not enough for the Majority--it has to have a 
special offense that would apply only to the men and women of the 
Intelligence Community--just as Attorney General Holder has appointed a 
special prosecutor to investigate them. There is no legal reason to do 
this--it apparently exists only to make a political statement. The 
intelligence operatives on the front lines deserve our thanks and our 
support for doing hard things in hard places, like the men and women 
who made the ultimate sacrifice this year in Khost, Afghanistan. They 
do not deserve to be singled out for special criminal offenses. I 
believe that this is wrong.
  Madam Chair, I strongly oppose this amendment.
  Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania. Madam Chair, I'd like to 
extend my sincere thanks to Chairman Reyes for accepting this amendment 
and taking an important step toward strengthening our Nation's cyber 
infrastructure against attack. Madam Chair, the protection of our 
country's cyber infrastructure is one of today's most pressing--and 
challenging--national security issues. Computers and Internet device 
technology have become pervasive in every type of crime and federal 
agencies are experiencing an increase in cyber-intrusions into our most 
secure and sensitive government computer networks. This growing threat 
is extraordinarily difficult to address. The technology used to 
perpetrate these crimes evolves constantly and rapidly, and it can be 
exceedingly difficult to track down the perpetrators. It is our duty to 
ensure that our Intelligence Community and our Nation's law enforcement 
agencies have every tool necessary in their arsenal to combat cyber 
criminals and cyber terrorists who seek to access or steal protected 
information.
  To be successful in preventing security breaches, Madam Chair, the 
agencies tasked with protecting the country from cyber attacks must 
constantly revise and improve their primary functions of data 
collection, analysis, and dissemination to keep pace with expanding 
threats. Experts in the field have pointed to several areas of the law 
which may need to be reviewed and updated to ensure their effectiveness 
and to best protect American individuals, businesses, and our national 
security.
  Our proposal would establish the Cybercrime Task Force to analyze the 
current tools available to the Intelligence Community

[[Page 1904]]

and law enforcement and provide legislative recommendations on ways to 
strengthen those resources, reduce our national exposure, and prevent 
and deter cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage, and 
cybercrimes.
  The goals of the task force include improving attribution to specific 
criminals, understanding the nontraditional targets of attackers, and 
strengthening federal computer crime statutes to deter would-be 
perpetrators.
  First, crucial to better deterrence--and the possibility of 
implementing sanctions--is improving the IC's ability to designate 
concrete attribution for cyber attacks. Attacks committed with the aid 
of computer or Internet device technology are often cleared with 
negative clearance. In order words, the IC is not able to detect and 
identify hostile foreign actors because of missing data at Internet 
service providers. The task force shall provide evidence-based 
recommendations on mandatory data retention requirements that balance 
the privacy of an individual's data, the technical and financial 
limitations of companies and Internet service providers, and the need 
to ensure effective cybercrime investigation.
  The task force shall incorporate in their recommendations suggestions 
to minimize barriers to entry into the service provider industry and to 
lessen any negative impact on innovation or new start-ups in the 
industry.
  Second, Madam Chair, in light of the rapidly evolving nature of the 
crimes, we must better understand the likely, but nontraditional, 
targets to which perpetrators may seek unauthorized access. Cyber 
attacks are increasingly the preferred method of foreign intelligence 
services collection of data against the U.S., raising a host of novel 
training, counterintelligence and investigative issues. To improve 
these operations in the IC's understanding of the extent to which 
computer and Internet device technology pervades traditional crimes, 
the task force shall compile a list of nontraditional targets (i.e., 
economic or industrial bases) in the U.S. that the IC has not 
traditionally dealt with as a target for foreign intelligence services.
  Finally, Madam Chair, an increasing number of ``terrestrial'' (i.e., 
physical) crimes are being committed with the aid of a computer or 
Internet services. The task force shall survey the current federal 
crime statute for computer fraud and abuse to determine whether it is 
sufficient in light of the advanced nature of the crimes being 
committed and to enhance the ability of our law enforcement agencies to 
identify, detect and apprehend suspects as well as enhance 
investigative and prosecutorial efforts.
  The task force shall survey the current federal crime statute for 
computer fraud and abuse (as provided in 18 U.S.C. 1030) to determine 
whether it is sufficient in light of the advanced nature of the crimes 
being committed. It shall determine the adequacy of the laws for which 
cybercrime and cyber espionage constitute a predicate offense and 
provide recommendations for updating those statutes when warranted. The 
task force shall establish and disseminate guidelines for States to 
revise their State-level statutes equivalent to 18 U.S.C. 1030 to help 
ensure they keep pace with Federal changes.
  An increase in the prevalence of crimes facilitated through computer 
fraud and abuse raises novel investigative, prosecutorial and training 
issues because of the complex and unique attributes of computer and 
Internet technology. To improve law enforcement's understanding of the 
extent to which computer technology pervades traditional crimes, the 
task force shall compile a list of which crimes are most often 
committed with the aid of computers or Internet devices, determine 
whether the relevant prosecutorial tools are up to date, and provide 
specific legislative recommendations on how to update the statute to 
improve prosecution efforts while simultaneously providing for 
individual privacy and data security.
  The task force shall also advise whether a need exists to outlaw, or 
more clearly prohibit, certain behavior (i.e., unauthorized access) 
regardless of intent or resulting damage, whether monetary or to a 
computer system. The recommendations should take into account the 
increasing prevalence of individuals using pre-programmed hacking tools 
to commit a crime without necessarily understanding the full 
implications or potential consequences of the technology.
  The task force shall analyze existing Federal and State data breach 
notification requirements and advise whether and how current law should 
be amended to strengthen requirements and improve compliance, including 
notification of relevant law enforcement authorities as well as any 
individuals whose personally identifiable information may be at risk 
from the breach. Currently, forty-three States have enacted breach 
notification requirements, and they vary widely, resulting in low 
compliance levels. The task force shall analyze discrepancies among 
existing State-level statutes, determine barriers to compliance, and 
provide recommendations for overcoming such barriers (i.e., through 
Federal legislation, tying a company's obligations to specific 
jurisdiction and their requirements, or through some other means).
  Finally, the task force shall determine whether and how current 
victim restitution statutes should be amended in order for victims of 
cyber attacks to be made whole. Currently States have varying forms of 
recourse for victims of cyber attacks, particularly when a person is 
hurt because a company's data was breached. The task force shall 
recommend whether a Federal law is needed to address this and if so, 
how it should be structured.
  Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to ensure that we stay a step ahead 
of hackers and cyber terrorists seeking to cause us harm and to pass 
this important amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas will 
be postponed.


                Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Hoekstra:
       Insert after section 354 the following new section:

     SEC. 355. PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON PROCEDURES USED IN 
                   NARCOTICS AIRBRIDGE DENIAL PROGRAM IN PERU.

         Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     shall make publicly available an unclassified version of the 
     report of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency entitled ``Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge 
     Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001'', dated August 25, 2008.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I would like to yield myself as much time 
as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, this is a very straightforward amendment. I thank the 
Rules Committee for making it in order. It basically says that for not 
later than 30 days after the enactment of this act, the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency shall make publicly available an 
unclassified version of the report of the Inspector General entitled 
``Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru.''
  Many of you may remember that this was a very tragic incident where, 
with the assistance of our intelligence community, two of my 
constituents were tragically killed in Peru, shot down by the Peruvian 
Air Force. We need an unclassified version of this report being made 
available to the public, and more importantly, to the families, the 
families of those who were killed.
  You know, it wasn't that long ago, it was within the last month that 
there was a discussion about an accountability review. Almost 9 years 
after that tragic shoot-down, there was an Accountability Board that 
had been convened. And its results have been made or were reported to 
our committee. Roughly 4 weeks ago I asked the Director of the CIA 
whether the families of those killed would be briefed on what was found 
in the Accountability Board and the accountabilities that were put in 
order. To date I am yet waiting for an answer.
  This has been unfair to these families, it has been unfair to the 
American public that when we have had such a tragic failing in the 
intelligence community, which included, from my perspective, an 
attempted coverup by the previous administration or by the intelligence 
community as to exactly

[[Page 1905]]

what happened, how it happened, and how these Americans were killed, 
that we have been so closed in sharing that information with the 
American public and the families.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. I would like to claim the time in opposition, even though 
I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. REYES. I yield such time as she may consume to my friend from 
California (Ms. Harman).
  Ms. HARMAN. I thank the chairman for yielding, and surely hope that 
we will accept his amendment. I recall during my years as ranking 
member on the committee when we were, in quotes, ``briefed'' on this 
incident. I am very disappointed about the way it was handled. I 
personally think the gentleman from Michigan is correct, and I applaud 
what he is doing.
  As we debate this bill, we must thank again the thousands of 
patriotic and courageous women and men who are serving in our 
intelligence community around the world. As I so often say, a grateful 
Nation salutes them for their efforts to keep us safe. Our Nation also 
remembers and honors those who lost their lives, most recently at 
Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan.
  Madam Chair, in addition to this excellent amendment, I applaud the 
underlying bill's provisions to reform the way Congress is notified of 
sensitive covert programs, briefings that for too long were limited to 
the so-called ``Gang of Eight.'' During my years as ranking member, it 
was clear that effective oversight required providing the entire 
committee with information previously limited to its leadership. And so 
this bill rightly provides for full committee notice of Gang of Eight 
briefings, a contemporaneous record of those briefings, something we 
sorely lacked, and it entitles the full committee to receive the same 
briefings as the Gang of Eight within 180 days.
  These changes go a long way toward correcting the frustration felt on 
both sides of the aisle during my tenure on the committee. We should 
not have been put in the position of on the one hand upholding our oath 
of secrecy, while on the other hand being starved for information to 
conduct necessary oversight.
  Just last week, pursuant to a FOIA request, memoranda describing some 
of our briefings were declassified. The documents, which are available 
to the public, show repeated pushback from Intelligence Committee 
members, surely including me, about the failure to brief us or to 
provide documents or other timely information.
  Madam Chair, last time I checked, Congress was an independent branch 
of government. We must assert our prerogative to monitor and rectify 
problems that surface in the programs we oversee. In the intelligence 
world, some of these problems affect our core values as well as our 
Constitution. Security and liberty are not a zero sum game. It is our 
sworn duty to protect both. The language in the underlying bill and 
this amendment offered by Mr. Hoekstra go a long way to rectify long-
existing problems.
  I urge support for the bill and support for this amendment.
  Mr. REYES. I reserve the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan has the right to close.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairwoman, I am prepared to accept the amendment, 
and want the record to reflect that Ms. Schakowsky from Illinois is 
very much in agreement with Mr. Hoekstra.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Madam Chair.
  I would like to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
and the chairman for accepting the amendment, my colleague from 
California for the kind words that she had to say. We worked on this 
program for a number of years together. And it has taken us such a long 
period of time to get the answers that help understand but do not 
explain what happened.
  This amendment is intended to get more information to the American 
people, more information to the families. I do hope that over the 
coming days that the Director of the CIA, that the people in the 
intelligence community decide to give the families full access to the 
Accountability Board.
  I appreciate the support of the chairwoman of the subcommittee, Ms. 
Schakowsky from Illinois. This is a case where we have worked uniquely 
in a bipartisan way to address failings within the intelligence 
community, to try to right those wrongs, and to try to move us forward 
in a constructive and positive way. I thank my colleagues who have 
enabled that process to work and to work effectively.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
  The amendment was agreed to.


           Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida:
       Insert after section 352 the following new section:

     SEC. 353. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) To most effectively carry out the mission of the 
     intelligence community to collect and analyze intelligence, 
     the intelligence community needs personnel that look and 
     speak like the citizens of the many nations in which the 
     United States needs to collect such intelligence.
       (2) One of the great strengths of the United States is the 
     diversity of the people of the United States, diversity that 
     can positively contribute to the operational capabilities and 
     effectiveness of the intelligence community.
       (3) In the past, the intelligence community has not 
     properly focused on hiring a diverse workforce and the 
     capabilities of the intelligence community have suffered due 
     to that lack of focus.
       (4) The intelligence community must be deliberate and work 
     hard to hire a diverse workforce to improve the operational 
     capabilities and effectiveness of the intelligence community.
       (b) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the 
     elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans 
     of each element to increase diversity within the intelligence 
     community.
       (c) Content.--The report required by subsection (b) shall 
     include specific implementation plans to increase diversity 
     within each element of the intelligence community, 
     including--
       (1) specific implementation plans for each such element 
     designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic 
     plan of the Director of National Intelligence on equal 
     employment opportunity and diversity;
       (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
     increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
       (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
     improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, 
     midgrade, senior, and management levels;
       (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training 
     and education programs for senior officials and managers of 
     each such element; and
       (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the 
     success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs 
     described in paragraphs (1) through (4).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Hastings) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chair, I would like to correct some 
things, because I have been here all day listening to our colleagues 
complain about the process. This is the beginning of the process. And 
it is an important one, one that has not been undertaken in 4 years, 
such that we have not

[[Page 1906]]

had an authorization bill for all that time.
  Now, I am sure that my colleagues know that when this measure is 
completed, and on the other side in the other body, that we will have a 
conference. And many of the discussions that are being heard here today 
are likely to be addressed in that conference report.
  Now, I have stated time and again that the intelligence community is 
not diverse enough to do its job of obtaining and analyzing foreign 
countries' secrets. Diversity is a mission imperative. We need people 
who blend in, speak the language, and understand the cultures and the 
countries that we are targeting.
  The intelligence community is our Nation's first line of defense 
against the increasing dangers and threats we face around the world. 
From the scourge of terrorism, to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, to hostile governments, intelligence work is often unseen, 
and mostly thankless.
  Now, I keep hearing all this talk about Mirandizing people on the 
battlefield. I have a lot of difficulty understanding when that 
happened. I have been on the committee for 10 years, and I don't know 
that that is a methodology that is being employed with any regularity.
  I have had the honor and privilege of meeting many of our 
intelligence professionals during my oversight travel as a member of 
the Intelligence Committee to more than 50 countries. I cannot 
overstate how much all of us, Democrats and Republicans, every Member 
of this House and every President that I have known, are appreciative 
and humbled by their service. And yes, I will stand and say that when 
this authorization measure passes that I do support the men and women 
in the 16 elements of the intelligence services and appreciate them 
very much.
  I am proud to support this measure for several reasons. It 
substantially increases funding for human intelligence collection and 
counterintelligence activities, tools that have been underresourced in 
the past years.

                              {time}  1515

  The bill continues the essential funding to support the critical 
efforts of U.S. warfighters in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 
provides additional funding to address significantly emerging issues in 
Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. And I would urge my colleagues to 
footnote that.
  There is no place that I think that we should focus as much attention 
as we have with Iran as Yemen. It is going to be critical for us to pay 
attention to that area of the world.
  This bill also adds funds and authorities for language programs. 
Chairman Reyes and I and countless other members on this committee have 
fought this issue repeatedly for us to make progress in languages; and, 
I might add, we have been successful. If you see the new people 
entering the service, if you visit our operational activities, you 
begin to see more and more people that are in the service.
  I do have something to quarrel about, and that is, the gays in the 
military provision that allows, among other things, that we're putting 
people out of the service who are Farsi and Arabic speakers because 
they're gay, and I think that's ridiculous in the environment that 
we're operating in.
  But we still don't have enough women. We still don't have enough 
Arabs. We still don't have enough North Koreans, and I could go on and 
on.
  While the intelligence community has made some progress in hiring 
people with diverse backgrounds, education and experience, including, 
indeed, more women and minorities, this progress has been at a glacial 
speed. The intelligence community has been historically slow to 
recognize the wealth and abundance of talent and skills that reside in 
first-, second-, and even third-generation Americans. We still don't 
have an intelligence workforce that looks like our country. We aren't 
even close.
  The bottom line is that we, until we have every segment of society 
participating in the intelligence community, our capabilities will not 
rise to the level needed to defeat terrorism.
  I'd like to yield the balance of my time to the distinguished 
chairperson of the Intelligence Committee, and to thank the Members of 
the Democrat and Republican staff on the House Intelligence Select 
Committee.
  Mr. REYES. I just want to thank the vice chair of our Intelligence 
Committee for his hard work. I know he's worked ever since he's been on 
the committee on this very important issue that keeps, I think, the 
face of the intelligence community reflecting the face of this Nation.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I'd like to claim the time in 
opposition, although I will not be opposed to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to recognize my colleague from Texas (Mr. 
Thornberry) for 1 minute.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) has been a 
forceful and eloquent advocate for greater diversity in the 
intelligence community. And he's exactly right: we will be more 
effective when we have greater diversity in the intelligence community. 
We're more effective human collectors when we look like those from whom 
we are collecting. We will be more effective when we have a greater 
range of language talents including dialects. All of that is absolutely 
true.
  My point, in addition, however, is that it's not just getting them 
into the intelligence community. It's how we treat them once they're 
hired. And some of the recent actions over the last year, whether it's 
a special prosecutor to go after, again, interrogators after they have 
already been investigated, or whether it's releasing classified memos, 
even though five CIA directors recommend not having it done, that cuts 
against the ability to keep these qualified people in government 
service after we have them hired. And I can think of nothing worse than 
to threaten these people with 15 years of prison if they stray across 
the line in an interrogation as far as encouraging our intelligence 
professionals to stay with the government.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.
  Madam Chairman, I will not oppose the amendment. I support the 
amendment. I think the report on highlighting the progress that we have 
made or that we may not have made toward our objectives of increasing 
the diversity within the intelligence community is something that is 
needed and something that my colleague has been championing for all the 
years that we have served on the committee together. I support the 
amendment and urge my colleagues to support it as well.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will 
be postponed.


           Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan:
       Strike section 349 (page 64, lines 8 through 24) and insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 349. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE 
                   SUPERVISORY TERM LIMIT POLICY.

       None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
     may be used to implement the field office supervisory term 
     limit policy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

[[Page 1907]]

     requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the 
     Bureau after a specific term of years.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, it's with a heavy heart I 
rise with this amendment. This has been a bipartisan issue for, I hate 
to say it, going on 5 years where the Director of the FBI implemented a 
new policy, and the policy was designed to try to get a different 
talent pool of individuals to come to Washington, D.C. to be 
supervisors in their new bureaucracy of the intelligence community, if 
you will. They were having a difficult time doing it.
  So what they ended up doing is they forced supervisors in the field. 
These are FBI experts in a whole variety of fields--it could be white- 
collar crime, it could be organized crime, it could be foreign 
counterintelligence, could be counterterrorism efforts--and arbitrarily 
said, after 5 years you're done. You either have to step down, you have 
to come to Washington, D.C. and apply to be an ASAC or other job, or 
you have to move on. You can either leave the Bureau, you can step down 
and go back to the ranks of what we used to call a brick agent in the 
FBI.
  Five years ago we said, you know this is really unfair to a lot of 
agents. You're going to lose agents. Unfortunately, they implemented 
it, we lost agents, senior agents, talented agents. And from both sides 
of this aisle we heard stories after stories where we represented about 
good, quality, talented, seasoned FBI agents being forced to make 
decisions based on their families. Some were just not in a position to 
come back to Washington, D.C., so their reward for all that honorable 
service is get out.
  Well, the Director cut a deal with this Congress, not this particular 
session, but a Congress a few years ago, 5 years ago: I will fix this 
problem for the agents who this harmed. We are still waiting today.
  This is called the up-and-out policy of the FBI. It is wrong, Mr. 
Director. It is absolutely unconscionable that this continues to be a 
problem, after they've given the Congress of the United States your 
word it would be fixed. I just implore the Director to fix this 
problem.
  The only way for us to join together to get this fixed for the men 
and women who have risked their lives, who moved their families, who 
make the difficult choices to be an agent of the FBI, is to offer this 
amendment and say, no more. We're not playing anymore. Fix this 
problem. It's wrong to treat the men and women of the FBI with this 
blatant disregard for what has been harmful to them and their families, 
in some cases, their pensions as well. It's wrong.
  I know it has been bipartisan in the past, and I hope that it 
continues to be a bipartisan effort. And, Madam Chairman, I can't 
strongly enough say that I support it. But also, I have a letter here 
from the FBI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents Association, 
representing literally tens of thousands of former and current agents 
all across the country who have stood up and said this is the right 
thing. They support this amendment unconditionally.
  Let us stand with those men and women who are doing so much to keep 
us safe today. This is the one thing that we can do and send a message 
to this Director. For all the good and all the bad that happened since 
9/11 and he's been part of a lot of good things, this could be a 
horrible black mark on what could otherwise be a great career there if 
you don't take care of the people who have been taking care of America.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek time?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Seeing there's no further speakers, I would 
just urge the body's quick support and, again, hopefully we can stand 
with the men and women who have stood with us in difficult times across 
the country. I yield back my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 5 Offered by Ms. Eshoo

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Ms. Eshoo:
       At the end of subtitle A of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 305. CONFLICT OF INTEREST REGULATIONS AND PROHIBITION ON 
                   CERTAIN OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.

       (a) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--Section 102A of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(s) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--(1) The Director 
     of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director 
     of the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations 
     prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the 
     intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if 
     such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance 
     thereof.
       ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall annually 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     describing all outside employment for officers and employees 
     of elements of the intelligence community that was authorized 
     by the head of an element of the intelligence community 
     during the preceding calendar year. Such report shall be 
     submitted each year on the date provided in section 507.''.
       (b) Outside Employment.--
       (1) Prohibition.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


 ``prohibition on certain outside employment of officers and employees 
                     of the intelligence community

       ``Sec. 120. An officer or employee of an element of the 
     intelligence community may not personally own or effectively 
     control an entity that markets or sells for profit the use of 
     knowledge or skills that such officer or employee acquires or 
     makes use of while carrying out the official duties of such 
     officer or employee as an officer or employee of an element 
     of the intelligence community.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note) is further 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 119B 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 120. Prohibition on certain outside employment of officers and 
              employees of the intelligence community.''.

       Page 71, strike line 11 and insert ``section 510.''.
       Page 71, after line 11 insert the following:
       ``(K) The annual report on outside employment required by 
     section 102A(s)(2).''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Eshoo) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I rise to offer an important amendment to 
the Intelligence Authorization Act.
  Madam Chairman, many of the provisions that I supported and authored 
are already in the legislation that was reported out of the committee. 
Today I'm offering this amendment to address a problem that arose after 
our consideration of the bill last year.
  Earlier this month we discovered that intelligence community 
employees have been starting businesses to sell private companies the 
very skills they use in their employment for the government. For 
example, a number of CIA employees launched a company to sell deception 
detection services to hedge funds and ran this company while they were 
Federal employees. I'm very troubled by this. I questioned the Director 
of National Intelligence about this at HPSCI's worldwide threats 
hearing, and he said he would look into it. While waiting for a formal 
answer, I discovered, to my great surprise, that this activity had 
already been approved by their agencies. Clearly, we need to tighten up 
that process.
  All Federal agencies are required to have conflict of interest 
guidelines that set limits on employees' outside employment. Now, these 
guidelines are developed jointly by the agency and by the Office of 
Government Ethics. But the DNI has not issued intelligence

[[Page 1908]]

community-wide policy guidance on conflicts of interest for outside 
employment.
  So this amendment does two things. First, it requires the DNI to 
establish an intelligence community-wide conflict of interest 
regulation working in connection with, and in conjunction with, the 
Office of Government Ethics to establish a community-wide process for 
checking outside employment for conflicts of interest, and also to 
submit an annual report to the intelligence committees on outside 
employment activities that were approved in the last year.
  Second, it would prohibit employees from owning companies that sell 
skills that are related to their government service.
  I think that government employees, and especially those in the 
intelligence community, should adhere to the highest ethical standards. 
The American people have to have confidence that government employees 
are working in the best interest of the Nation and not in just a 
personal self-interest.
  I want to thank my colleagues from the HPSCI, Representatives 
Tierney, Boren, Schakowsky, Thompson, Holt, Rogers and Myrick, for 
cosponsoring this amendment. And I urge the adoption of it.
  Madam Chairman, how much time do I have left?
  The Acting CHAIR. 2\1/2\ minutes is remaining.
  Ms. ESHOO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) 1\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I want to thank my good 
friend, Ms. Eshoo from California. You know, sometimes you can get 
ahead of a problem. We don't often do that in Congress. I think this is 
a great way to get ahead of a problem.
  Given the fact that these individuals who have, who are doing great 
things for their country, we're thankful for it, takes sometimes a 
piece of intellectual property that really belongs to the people of the 
United States, and some of it is very sensitive, very 
compartmentalized. It's information that is shared with very few. So it 
is an incredible responsibility. And for us not to have a policy on how 
we make sure that those people don't use that information for personal 
gain on the outside of that community, especially the intelligence 
community, I think is wrong. And I think this is a good measure that 
puts some really basic protections, not only for them, but for the 
intelligence community and the people of America.
  And I want to commend the gentlelady for her work and effort on this. 
And I wholeheartedly support this effort.

                              {time}  1530

  Ms. ESHOO. I want to thank the gentleman for his support. This is a 
bipartisan amendment.
  I just want to add, Madam Chair, this is in no way a ban across the 
entire Federal Government and Federal workers. There are some that 
teach at universities at night; there are others that make really very 
low salaries--GS-1s in the $17,000 range--that do have some outside 
employment.
  This goes directly to the skill set that the American people train 
these CIA officers and others in the intelligence community to do their 
work relative to national security. That shouldn't be sold off in bits 
and parts by moonlighting.
  So I think that we've done that respectfully, and I think that we've 
done it thoughtfully. And I'd like to thank the chairman again for 
this, Mr. Rogers, and Members that have supported it. I think it's a 
good amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. Who seeks time in opposition?
  With no one seeking time in opposition, the question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Conaway

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. CONAWAY. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Conaway:
       Page 87, strike line 21 and all that follows through page 
     88, line 9, and insert the following:
       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) it is imperative that intelligence community-wide 
     auditability be achieved as soon as possible;
       (2) the Business Transformation Office of the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence has made substantial 
     progress and must be of sufficient standing within the Office 
     of the Director of National Intelligence to move the plan for 
     core financial system requirements to reach intelligence 
     community-wide auditability forward;
       (3) as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     National Reconnaissance Office is the only element of the 
     intelligence community to have received a clean audit; and
       (4) the National Reconnaissance Office should be commended 
     for the long hours and hard work invested by the Office to 
     achieve a clean audit.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Conaway) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Madam Chair.
  This amendment is a pretty simple, straightforward one. It's about 
good governance. It's about protecting the assets of the American 
taxpayer as utilized by the intelligence community.
  This bill came out of committee 8 months ago. We've now learned some 
things in the last 8 months that we didn't know then, and this 
amendment would simply substitute a new paragraph A for the old 
paragraph A. This paragraph would simply say it's an important 
initiative for the intelligence community to work to get audited 
financial statements across all of the entities. This takes a lot of 
work, a lot of effort to make that happen.
  I'd like to call the Chair's attention to the National Reconnaissance 
organization, who is the only entity within the intelligence community 
that has, in fact, achieved an unqualified audit opinion on their 
financial statements. Under Dr. Scott Large's leadership, that hard 
work was done. And then more directly, Karen Landry, the Chief 
Financial Officer for the NRO, and Sandra Van Booven, the Director of 
Financial Management, led an incredible team to do an awful lot of hard 
work to make that happen. I don't discount how hard that is. From my 
professional experience, I know it's hard. But they're to be commended 
as the agency that has achieved clean audited financial statements.
  As important as that is, it's an ongoing effort, and I hope that 
General Bruce Carlson, who is now the leader at NRO, will continue to 
lead the efforts needed to make that happen.
  This is a top-down function. It has to have the initiative of the 
leadership. The Office of Director of Intelligence has to make this a 
priority. And this amendment would seek to recognize that priority and 
continue to draw attention to it from our body so that the executive 
branch body, in fact, knows that we believe that it's important to get 
this done. So it's a pretty straightforward amendment, Madam Chair.
  I recognize the hard work of some of the folks over at NRO is kind of 
a pat on the back for having done it correctly, shown us how it can be 
done, an incredible amount of hard work done by the team led by Ms. 
Landry and Ms. Van Booven.
  So, with that, I encourage my colleagues on the floor today to 
support this good governance amendment that would further the hard 
efforts being done across the community to achieve unqualified audit 
opinions on their financial statements and all of the internal controls 
and systems that go behind that.
  One final comment. There are some tough decisions ahead for Director 
Blair and others to make this happen, and I encourage them to make 
those decisions sooner than later. And I encourage my colleagues to 
support the amendment.
  I yield back.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Conaway).
  The amendment was agreed to.

[[Page 1909]]




                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Arcuri

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. ARCURI. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Arcuri:
       Insert after section 354 the following new section:

     SEC. 355. CYBERSECURITY OVERSIGHT.

       (a) Notification of Cybersecurity Programs.--
       (1) Requirement for notification.--
       (A) Existing programs.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 
     to Congress a notification for each cybersecurity program in 
     operation on such date that includes the documentation 
     referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph 
     (2).
       (B) New programs.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the commencement of operations of a new cybersecurity 
     program, the President shall submit to Congress a 
     notification of such commencement that includes the 
     documentation referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of 
     paragraph (2).
       (2) Documentation.--A notification required by paragraph 
     (1) for a cybersecurity program shall include--
       (A) the legal justification for the cybersecurity program;
       (B) the certification, if any, made pursuant to section 
     2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) of title 18, United States Code, or other 
     statutory certification of legality for the cybersecurity 
     program;
       (C) the concept for the operation of the cybersecurity 
     program that is approved by the head of the appropriate 
     agency or department;
       (D) the assessment, if any, of the privacy impact of the 
     cybersecurity program prepared by the privacy or civil 
     liberties protection officer or comparable officer of such 
     agency or department; and
       (E) the plan, if any, for independent audit or review of 
     the cybersecurity program to be carried out by the head of 
     the relevant department or agency of the United States, in 
     conjunction with the appropriate inspector general.
       (b) Program Reports.--
       (1) Requirement for reports.--The head of a department or 
     agency of the United States with responsibility for a 
     cybersecurity program for which a notification was submitted 
     under subsection (a), in consultation with the inspector 
     general for that department or agency, shall submit to 
     Congress and the President, in accordance with the schedule 
     set out in paragraph (2), a report on such cybersecurity 
     program that includes--
       (A) the results of any audit or review of the cybersecurity 
     program carried out under the plan referred to in subsection 
     (a)(2)(E), if any; and
       (B) an assessment of whether the implementation of the 
     cybersecurity program--
       (i) is in compliance with--

       (I) the legal justification referred to in subsection 
     (a)(2)(A); and
       (II) the assessment referred to in subsection (a)(2)(D), if 
     any;

       (ii) is adequately described by the concept of operation 
     referred to in subsection (a)(2)(C), if any; and
       (iii) includes an adequate independent audit or review 
     system and whether improvements to such independent audit or 
     review system are necessary.
       (2) Schedule for submission of reports.--The reports 
     required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted to Congress and 
     the President according to the following schedule:
       (A) An initial report shall be submitted not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (B) A second report shall be submitted not later than one 
     year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (C) Additional reports shall be submitted periodically 
     following the submission of the reports referred to in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) as necessary, as determined by the 
     head of the relevant department or agency of the United 
     States in conjunction with the inspector general of that 
     department or agency.
       (3) Cooperation and coordination.--
       (A) Cooperation.--The head of each department or agency of 
     the United States required to submit a report under paragraph 
     (1) for a particular cybersecurity program, and the inspector 
     general of each such department or agency, shall, to the 
     extent practicable, work in conjunction with any other such 
     head or inspector general required to submit such a report 
     for such cybersecurity program.
       (B) Coordination.--The heads of all of the departments and 
     agencies of the United States required to submit a report 
     under paragraph (1) for a particular cybersecurity program 
     shall designate one such head to coordinate the conduct of 
     the reports on such program.
       (c) Information Sharing Report.--Not later than one year 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector 
     General of the Department of Homeland Security and the 
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall jointly 
     submit to Congress and the President a report on the status 
     of the sharing of cyber threat information, including--
       (1) a description of how cyber threat intelligence 
     information, including classified information, is shared 
     among the agencies and departments of the United States and 
     with persons responsible for critical infrastructure;
       (2) a description of the mechanisms by which classified 
     cyber threat information is distributed;
       (3) an assessment of the effectiveness of such information 
     sharing and distribution; and
       (4) any other matters identified by the Inspectors General 
     that would help to fully inform Congress or the President 
     regarding the effectiveness and legality of cybersecurity 
     programs.
       (d) Personnel Details.--
       (1) Authority to detail.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the head of an element of the intelligence 
     community that is funded through the National Intelligence 
     Program may detail an officer or employee of such element to 
     the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force or to the 
     Department of Homeland Security to assist the Task Force or 
     the Department with cybersecurity, as jointly agreed by the 
     head of such element and the Task Force or the Department.
       (2) Basis for detail.--A personnel detail made under 
     paragraph (1) may be made--
       (A) for a period of not more than three years; and
       (B) on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.
       (e) Sunset.--The requirements and authorities of this 
     section shall terminate on December 31, 2012.
       (f) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Cybersecurity program.--The term ``cybersecurity 
     program'' means a class or collection of similar 
     cybersecurity operations of an agency or department of the 
     United States that involves personally identifiable data that 
     is--
       (A) screened by a cybersecurity system outside of the 
     agency or department of the United States that was the 
     intended recipient of the personally identifiable data;
       (B) transferred, for the purpose of cybersecurity, outside 
     the agency or department of the United States that was the 
     intended recipient of the personally identifiable data; or
       (C) transferred, for the purpose of cybersecurity, to an 
     element of the intelligence community.
       (2) National cyber investigative joint task force.--The 
     term ``National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force'' means 
     the multi-agency cyber investigation coordination 
     organization overseen by the Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation known as the Nation Cyber Investigative 
     Joint Task Force that coordinates, integrates, and provides 
     pertinent information related to cybersecurity 
     investigations.
       (3) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical 
     infrastructure'' has the meaning given that term in section 
     1016 of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Arcuri) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. ARCURI. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The threat of cyberattack on our computer and Internet infrastructure 
as well as the threat of cyberwarfare cannot be overstated. The need 
for congressional action to assure adequate funding is in place to 
guarantee that our country is prepared for any contingency that may 
arrive in this relatively new area of warfare is critical. I believe, 
as a nation, our investment in cybersecurity will be the Manhattan 
Project of our generation.
  H.R. 2701 authorizes the funding to make this investment a reality. 
Cyberthreats and attacks are real, and they threaten our financial and 
defense networks every day. Nearly every aspect of everyday life in our 
global society is dependent on the security of our cybernetworks. We 
rely on these systems to carry virtually all of our business 
transactions, control our electric grid, emergency communication 
systems, and even traffic lights.
  The most troubling cyberthreat may be the very real prospect of 
state-sponsored cyberattacks against sensitive national security 
information. We must take steps to protect our cyberinfrastructure, but 
to do that in such a way that we do not infringe on individuals' rights 
to privacy.
  We have a number of organizations in government that work on 
cybersecurity, and we in Congress need to ensure

[[Page 1910]]

that these organizations are sharing this information with each other 
in an effective, reliable, and safe manner. This must be one of our top 
priorities.
  Over the next few years, the administration and the intelligence 
community will begin new and unprecedented cybersecurity programs to 
combat these threats with cutting-edge technologies. These new programs 
will present new legal and privacy challenges.
  To ensure that Congress can properly oversee these programs, my 
amendment requires the President to submit detailed notifications to 
Congress on current and newly created cybersecurity programs so that 
Congress may perform the oversight that the Constitution requires.
  My amendment sets a preliminary framework for the administration and 
congressional oversight to ensure that the government's national 
security programs are consistent with legal authorities and preserve 
individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy. It requires the 
President to notify Congress of new and existing cybersecurity programs 
and provide Congress with the program's legal justification, a general 
description of its operation, and describe how it impacts privacy and 
sensitive data and to detail any plan for any independent audit or 
review of the program. This amendment is a reasonable and responsible 
continuation of this effort.
  Earlier this month, the House approved a Cybersecurity Enhancement 
Act to expand programs to strengthen our Nation's cybersecurity and to 
require a cybersecurity workforce assessment to give us a clearer 
picture of our cybercapabilities in both the Federal Government and 
private sector to combat future attacks.
  Given the increasing number and sophistication of cyberattacks that 
are being aimed at our networks and the degree to which we must expand 
our cybercapabilities, we must also ensure that we maintain our 
oversight abilities. My amendment is similar to the oversight 
provisions included in the Senate legislation, and I ask that all 
Members support these important safeguards.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. I seek to claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I don't think anyone in this House can deny the 
importance of cybersecurity. Certainly the Intelligence Committee is 
devoting a great deal of time and effort to understanding the threat to 
our potential responses and how we go about it. I am perhaps, however, 
a lonely voice expressing caution about the number of reports that 
accumulate on top of one another year after year after year and weigh 
down our intelligence community.
  I mentioned earlier that there are 41 new reports of one kind or 
another that are in the underlying bill. The manager's amendment, which 
we've debated, has at least 17 more reports on top of that. And I 
believe, if you look at all of the 20, 21 provisions of the manager's 
amendment, there are at least two reports on cybersecurity plus a task 
force.
  Now, the issue is important, but surely the goodness--we have some 
responsibility in Congress to pay attention to the cost in terms of 
dollars, the cost in terms of manpower to do all of these reports that 
get added on top of the intelligence community but often never go away, 
that just stack on top of each other year after year.
  So I appreciate the gentleman's interest in cybersecurity. I share 
that, by the way. I think the gentleman's right on the importance of 
it. But I would just encourage him and all Members, before you come 
demanding another report of one sort or another, maybe it would be good 
to inquire as to what it would take to actually complete that report, 
how much money that costs the taxpayers. If we do, I think we are going 
to be a little more hesitant to stack report upon report upon report.
  With that, I would yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ARCURI. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for his comments, and 
I think he's right. I think, clearly, the fact that a report is 
requested simply for the sake of requesting a report is redundant and 
is taxing on our intelligence community. But I think when we look at 
what happened during 9/11 and the fact that some of the intelligence 
branches of government were not sharing information, I think we need to 
learn something from that.
  In my district, I have an Air Force research lab that really focuses 
a great deal on cybersecurity, and I want to make sure the information 
that they're developing and the technologies that they're developing 
are being shared with other branches of the military and the 
intelligence community. And I think it's very important that we allow 
congressional oversight and that we ensure that in our role as 
Congressmen, that we are making sure that they are doing that, that 
they are sharing the information the way they should.
  So I certainly appreciate your point, but I think this is one of the 
places where it's critically important that we ensure that the 
information sharing is being done.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Arcuri).
  The amendment was agreed to.


            Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Burton of Indiana

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Burton of Indiana:
       Page 135, after line 12, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 505. SENSE OF CONGRESS HONORING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       It is the sense of Congress to--
       (1) honor the Central Intelligence Agency for its 
     contributions to the security of the United States and its 
     allies;
       (2) recognize the Central Intelligence Agency's unique role 
     in combating terrorism;
       (3) praise the Central Intelligence Agency for its success 
     in foiling recent terrorist plots and capturing senior 
     members of al-Qaeda;
       (4) thank the Central Intelligence Agency for its crucial 
     support of United States military operations in Afghanistan 
     and Iraq;
       (5) commend the men and women who gave their lives 
     defending the United States in the service of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, especially noting those individuals who 
     remain unnamed; and
       (6) urge the Central Intelligence Agency to continue its 
     dedicated work in the field of intelligence-gathering in 
     order to protect the people of the United States.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Burton) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. First of all, Madam Chair, I want to thank the 
Rules Committee for making this amendment in order. It is a very 
straightforward amendment, and it's one that I think is very, very 
important because the CIA has been under such intense criticism over 
the last several months--maybe the last few years--that it's time to 
let them know and the people of this country know that we really 
appreciate what they're doing to secure the safety of this country.
  What the bill does is:
  It honors the Central Intelligence Agency for its contributions to 
the security of the United States and our allies;
  It recognizes the Central Intelligence Agency's unique role in 
combating terrorism;
  It praises the Central Intelligence Agency for its success in foiling 
recent terrorist plots and capturing senior members of al Qaeda;
  It thanks the Central Intelligence Agency for its crucial support of 
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq;

[[Page 1911]]

  It commends the men and women who gave their lives defending the 
U.S.--named and unnamed; and, finally,
  It urges the Central Intelligence Agency to continue its dedicated 
work in the field of intelligence gathering in order to protect the 
people of the United States.
  I believe that all of us would agree with everything that is in this 
amendment. But I'd like to add just a couple of things that I've been 
watching during this debate that really concerns me.

                              {time}  1545

  There is language in here that is going to, I think, have an adverse 
impact on the Central Intelligence Agency's agents who are out in the 
field and doing their job and are trying to protect us against the 
terrorists. You know, some of the things that they say may be abrasive 
or objectionable to some of the people they are interrogating. The way 
this language reads, it could be interpreted to mean that they are 
guilty of not following the intent of the law in dealing with the 
terrorists.
  Also, there are prison sentences for people who are involved in 
terrorist or torturous activities such as ``waterboarding.'' I would 
like to point out to my colleagues, many of whom don't know this, 
waterboarding has been a technique that has been used in the training 
of U.S. Navy SEALs and our Special Forces people over the years.
  Now, let me say that one more time. Waterboarding and other 
techniques have been used in the training of our Navy SEALs so they 
would know how to deal with an enemy if they were captured, and it's 
been used by Special Forces military personnel in their training. So it 
has never been considered torture by our own military personnel.
  Now, we have three Navy SEALs right now that are being court-
martialed, and they are being court-martialed because they captured an 
al Qaeda terrorist in Fallujah in Iraq. And this al Qaeda terrorist 
took four American contractors, tortured them, dragged them through the 
streets, burned their bodies and hung them from a bridge.
  He also cut off the head of a leading person that was over there 
gathering news and information for the news media. This guy is really 
an out-and-out horrible terrorist. Now, when he was captured he was 
turned over to the Iraqi military for 2 days, and he came back and he 
said that he had been hit in the stomach and they split his lip, and 
because of that these three Navy SEALs are being prosecuted. They are 
being prosecuted in a court martial.
  What kind of a message does that send to our Navy SEALs, to the 
people in the field who are capturing and fighting these al Qaeda and 
Taliban terrorists? What kind of a message does that send? We are 
trying to send the same kind of message to the CIA operatives who are 
out there trying to get information that will protect this country and 
protect the American people around the world against these people who 
want to destroy us and want to destroy our way of life.
  It really bothers me, and I do appreciate the House approving this 
amendment that I have introduced. Obviously it's something that I think 
is very important. But, in addition to that, I don't believe we ought 
to be sending a message to the CIA or the Navy SEALs or our Special 
Forces men and women in the field that we are not going to back them up 
when they go out and get a terrorist or extract information from them 
that is vital in securing the safety of the people of this country.
  One of the al Qaeda terrorists they are going to bring to New York. 
The main al Qaeda terrorist that was involved in the 9/11 attack, after 
he was waterboarded about 80 times, and he wouldn't give up 
information, he finally did. He said that there was an attempt going to 
be made to fly a plane into a building in Los Angeles. Had he not 
choked up and given that information, we might have lost another 2,000 
or 3,000 people like we did on 9/11.
  It just seems silly to me and crazy to me that we are not going to 
allow our intelligence-gathering operatives to do their job. We ought 
to be supporting them completely day and night in anything they do to 
protect this Nation.

            [From the National Review Online, Feb. 25, 2010]

 While You Are Distracted by the Summit, Obama Democrats Are Targeting 
                                the CIA

                           (By Andy McCarthy)

       The Obama Democrats have outdone themselves.
       While the country and the Congress have their eyes on 
     today's dog-and-pony show on socialized medicine, House 
     Democrats last night stashed a new provision in the 
     intelligence bill which is to be voted on today. It is an 
     attack on the CIA: the enactment of a criminal statute that 
     would ban ``cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.''
       The provision is impossibly vague--who knows what 
     ``degrading'' means? Proponents will say that they have 
     itemized conduct that would trigger the statute (I'll get to 
     that in a second), but it is not true. The proposal says the 
     conduct reached by the statute ``includes but is not limited 
     to'' the itemized conduct. (My italics.) That means any 
     interrogation tactic that a prosecutor subjectively believes 
     is ``degrading'' (e.g., subjecting a Muslim detainee to 
     interrogation by a female CIA officer) could be the basis for 
     indicting a CIA interrogator.
       The act goes on to make it a crime to use tactics that have 
     been shown to be effective in obtaining life saving 
     information and that are far removed from torture.
       ``Waterboarding'' is specified. In one sense, I'm glad 
     they've done this because it proves a point I've been making 
     all along. Waterboarding, as it was practiced by the CIA, is 
     not torture and was never illegal under U.S. law. The reason 
     the Democrats are reduced to doing this is: what they've been 
     saying is not true--waterboarding was not a crime and it was 
     fully supported by congressional leaders of both parties, who 
     were told about it while it was being done. On that score, it 
     is interesting to note that while Democrats secretly tucked 
     this provision into an important bill, hoping no one would 
     notice until it was too late, they failed to include in the 
     bill a proposed Republican amendment that would have required 
     full and complete disclosure of records describing the 
     briefings members of Congress received about the Bush CIA's 
     enhanced interrogation program. Those briefings, of course, 
     would establish that Speaker Pelosi and others knew all about 
     the program and lodged no objections. Naturally, members of 
     Congress are not targeted by this criminal statute--only the 
     CIA.
       More to the point, this shows how politicized law-
     enforcement has become under the Obama Democrats. They could 
     have criminalized waterboarding at any time since Jan. 20, 
     2009. But they waited until now. Why? Because if they had 
     tried to do it before now, it would have been a tacit 
     admission that waterboarding was not illegal when the Bush 
     CIA was using it. That would have harmed the politicized 
     witch-hunt against John Yoo and Jay Bybee, a key component of 
     which was the assumption that waterboarding and the other 
     tactics they authorizied were illegal. Only now, when that 
     witch-hunt has collapsed, have the Democrats moved to 
     criminalize these tactics. It is transparently partisan.
       In any event, waterboarding is not defined in the bill. As 
     Marc Thiessen has repeatedly demonstrated, there is a world 
     of difference between the tactic as administered by the CIA 
     and the types of water-torture methods that have been used 
     throughout history. The waterboarding method used by the CIA 
     involved neither severe pain nor prolonged mental harm. But 
     it was highly unpleasant and led especially hard cases like 
     Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (i.e., well-trained, committed, 
     America-hating terrorists) to give us information that saved 
     American lives. The method was used sparingly--on only three 
     individuals, and not in the last seven years. The American 
     people broadly support the availability of this non-torture 
     tactic in a dire emergency. Yet Democrats not only want to 
     make it unavailable; they want to subject to 15 years' 
     imprisonment any interrogator who uses it.
       What's more, the proposed bill is directed at ``any officer 
     or employee of the intelligence community'' conducting a 
     ``covered interrogation.'' The definition of ``covered 
     interrogation'' is sweeping--including any interrogation done 
     outside the U.S., in the course of a person's official duties 
     on behalf of the government. Thus, if the CIA used 
     waterboarding in training its officers or military officers 
     outside the U.S., this would theoretically be indictable 
     conduct under the statute.
       Waterboarding is not all. The Democrats' bill would 
     prohibit--with a penalty of 15 years' imprisonment--the 
     following tactics, among others:
       --``Exploiting the phobias of the individual''
       --Stress positions and the threatened use of force to 
     maintain stress positions
       --``Depriving the individual of necessary food, water, 
     sleep, or medical care''
       --Forced nudity
       --Using military working dogs (i.e., any use of them--not 
     having them attack or

[[Page 1912]]

     menace the individual; just the mere presence of the dog if 
     it might unnerve the detainee and, of course, ``exploit his 
     phobias'')
       --Coercing the individual to blaspheme or violate his 
     religious beliefs (I wonder if Democrats understand the 
     breadth of seemingly innocuous matters that jihadists take to 
     be violations of their religious beliefs)
       --Exposure to ``excessive'' cold, heat or ``cramped 
     confinement'' (excessive and cramped are not defined)
       --``Prolonged isolation''
       --``Placing hoods or sacks over the head of the 
     individual''
       Naturally, all of these tactics are interspersed with such 
     acts as forcing the performance of sexual acts, beatings, 
     electric shock, burns, inducing hypothermia or heat injury--
     as if all these acts were functionally equivalent.
       In true Alinskyite fashion, Democrats begin this attack on 
     the CIA by saluting ``the courageous men and women who serve 
     honorably as intelligence personnel and as members of our 
     nation's Armed Forces'' who ``deserve the full support of the 
     United States Congress.'' Then, Democrats self-servingly tell 
     us that Congress ``shows true support'' by providing ``clear 
     legislation relating to standards for interrogation 
     techniques.'' I'm sure the intelligence community will be 
     duly grateful.
       Democrats also offer ``findings'' that the tactics they aim 
     to prohibit cause terrorism by fueling recruitment (we are 
     never supposed to discuss the Islamist ideology that actually 
     causes terrorist recruitment, only the terrible things 
     America does to provide pretexts for those spurred by that 
     ideology). These ``findings'' repeat the canards that these 
     tactics don't work; that they place our captured forces in 
     greater danger (the truth is our forces captured by 
     terrorists will be abused and probably killed no matter what 
     we do, while our enemies captured in a conventional war will 
     be bound to adhere to their Geneva Convention commitments--
     and will have the incentive to do so because they will want 
     us to do the same); and that ``their use runs counter to our 
     identity and values as a nation.''
       Unmentioned by the Obama Democrats is that officers of the 
     executive branch have a solemn moral duty to honor their 
     commitment to protect the American people from attack by 
     America's enemies. If there are non-torture tactics that can 
     get a Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to give us information that 
     saves American lives, how is the use of them inconsistent 
     with our values?
       Here is the fact: Democrats are saying they would prefer to 
     see tens of thousands of Americans die than to see a KSM 
     subjected to sleep-deprivation or to have his ``phobias 
     exploited.'' I doubt that this reflects the values of most 
     Americans.

  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I rise to claim time in opposition to the 
Burton amendment, even though I am not opposed to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I want to tell the gentleman I appreciate him wanting to 
honor the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. As I have said 
many times on the floor, I have had the privilege of visiting with 
members of the CIA and members of their families, members of the CIA 
throughout the world under probably the most difficult of 
circumstances. I understand the hardships that they face.
  Most recently, I was with family members and survivors of the Khost 
bombing, which illustrates the danger they put themselves in willingly 
to protect our country. I would also remind the gentleman that we 
should not mix and compare apples to oranges. There is a big difference 
between a training exercise that simulates waterboarding and 
waterboarding an individual for 183 times. That's a huge difference.
  The other thing I would point out is that when the last 
administration decided to take us down that road, that enhanced 
interrogation techniques would be authorized and approved. There has 
been a great amount of disagreement in terms of the legal authorization 
of these techniques, considered torture by most anybody's standards. I 
would also remind us that the CIA did not have any expertise in 
waterboarding. They had to actually go out and contract DOD personnel 
to be able to acquire that technique. It puts them in a tough 
situation.
  I will tell you what I hear from the men and women of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. They understand the difference between politics 
and bad policy. They understand the difference between doing the kinds 
of things that they are expected to do to keep our country safe and 
responding to the kind of political spin that, unfortunately, we hear 
about their work.
  But, the one thing that comes across when I hear from them is they 
appreciate the support that they receive from the Congress. They 
appreciate the fact that regardless of what side of the aisle we sit 
on, we respect the work that they do.
  We, despite all of the arguments that are proffered here in this 
great Chamber, in the final analysis they know that they have a job to 
do. They know that they have a duty to perform. They know that they are 
committed professionals and that they expect and deserve the support of 
every member of this Chamber. That's why I appreciate the gentleman's 
sponsoring this amendment.
  That's why I think we ought to accept it. I accept it. I think we 
ought to leave it at that and leave the politics and leave the rhetoric 
and remind ourselves that the message we need to send them is that we 
support their work. The message we should send them is that we honor 
them for their service to this great country.
  The message that we deliver to the families of those victims of the 
Khost bombing is that we will support them. We will have our 
differences politically, we will articulate those differences, but we 
will never stop supporting the great work that the men and women of the 
Central Intelligence Agency do for all of us.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Holt

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 9 offered by Mr. Holt:
       At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 505. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE TO DETERMINE IF FOREIGN 
                   CONNECTION TO ANTHRAX ATTACKS EXISTS.

       (a) Review.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall conduct a review of available intelligence, 
     including raw and unfinished intelligence, to determine if 
     there is any credible evidence of a connection between a 
     foreign entity and the attacks on the United States in 2001 
     involving anthrax.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--The Inspector General shall submit to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
     the Senate a report containing the findings of the review 
     conducted under subsection (a).
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, as you may know, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation announced last week that it is formally closing its 
investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, a major bioterrorist 
attack on America. Those attacks are believed to have originated from a 
postbox in New Jersey, disrupting the lives and livelihoods of many of 
my constituents and yours.
  We already know that the FBI too quickly jumped to conclusions about 
the nature and the profile of the culprit or culprits and quickly 
zeroed in on one individual who later received a multimillion dollar 
settlement and apology for mistaken accusations.
  Subsequently, the investigators focused on another individual, who 
then killed himself. Although the FBI never produced any physical 
evidence tying that individual specifically to the attacks, they closed 
the case.

[[Page 1913]]

  Indeed, this investigation was botched at multiple points, which is 
why reexamining it is so important. Given that the samples of the 
strain of anthrax that was used in the attacks may have been supplied 
to foreign laboratories, we think it's prudent to have the Inspector 
General of the intelligence community examine whether or not evidence 
of a potential foreign connection to the attacks was overlooked, 
ignored, or simply not passed along to the FBI.
  Mr. Bartlett and I are offering an amendment that would require the 
Inspector General to examine whether or not evidence of a potential 
foreign connection to the attacks was overlooked, ignored or simply not 
passed along. The report would be unclassified with a classified annex 
and would go to Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary and Homeland 
Security Committees.
  To date, there has been no independent comprehensive review of this 
investigation, and a number of important questions remain unanswered. 
This amendment would address one of those questions.
  I reserve the balance of my time. May I ask how much time is 
remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from New Jersey has 3 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).
  Mr. BARTLETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to thank him 
very much for his initiative in this effort. Dr. Ivins was my 
constituent, the laboratory at which he worked is in my district, 
indeed, just a few miles from my home, so I was very much involved in 
this case. His colleagues say that he would not have done it, and the 
FBI said early on that he could not have done it because the spores 
were weaponized, and he had no ability to do that. More recently, they 
have been saying something a bit different than that.
  I have here some quotes that I think will be relevant here. Jeffrey 
Adamovicz, the former chief of bacteriology--``former'' is important 
here, because they would not let the current scientist at Fort Detrick 
talk to me. He just left. The former chief of bacteriology for the U.S. 
Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases in Frederick, 
Maryland, where Ivins worked, wrote to The Frederick News-Post 
expressing serious misgivings about the FBI findings that Ivins sent 
the deadly letters that killed 5 and sickened 17 in 2001.
  ``The evidence is still very circumstantial and unconvincing as a 
whole,'' he wrote. ``I'm curious as to why they closed the case while 
the National Academy of Science review is still ongoing. Is it because 
the review is going unfavorable for the FBI?
  ``Ivins' death came about a month after the Justice Department agreed 
to pay an out-of-court settlement valued at $5.85 million to scientist 
Steven Hatfill, who had long been the key suspect in the case. Hatfill 
had sued the Justice Department, which had labeled him `a person of 
interest.' He alleged that the Federal Government went on a smear 
campaign and leaked information that was damaging to his reputation.''
  Apparently they agreed they had. They paid him $5.85 million. They 
subsequently agreed, conceded that he was not involved in the case.
  Gary Andrews, another former chief of the bacteriology lab in 
Frederick, said it wouldn't have been unusual for Ivins to work odd 
hours because he was working with animals, and it was more convenient 
to do it then. He says that ``Bruce didn't have the skill to make spore 
preps of that concentration. He never ever could make a spore prep like 
the ones found in the letters.''
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. HOLT. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

                              {time}  1600

  Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much for your lead in this.
  This has been devastating to my constituents and the scientists at 
Fort Detrick. This needs to be brought to a proper close. They did not 
believe he would have done it; the FBI said earlier on he couldn't have 
done it. Thank you very much for leading in this.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, it is beyond question that the FBI jumped to 
conclusions at least once, perhaps more than once, and many questions 
remain. This amendment would address one of those questions.
  Beyond this amendment, we still need a more complete examination of 
our government's response to these attacks, the most serious 
bioterrorist attack against the United States. This will look at 
whether there is a foreign connection to those attacks that has been 
overlooked, ignored, or not pursued.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time, asking support for 
this amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Castle

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. CASTLE. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Castle:
       Insert after section 354 (page 69, after line 15) the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 355. REITERATION OF REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT REPORT ON 
                   TERRORISM FINANCING.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President, acting through the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, shall submit to Congress the report required to be 
     submitted under section 6303(a) of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 
     Stat. 3750).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Delaware (Mr. Castle) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Delaware.
  Mr. CASTLE. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  This amendment, offered with Mr. Lynch, requires the President, 
through the Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to Congress a 
comprehensive report on terrorism financing that was first mandated by 
the Intelligence Reform Bill of 2004, but has yet to be submitted.
  Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, our government acted quickly to 
combat terrorist financing. However, post-9/11 terrorist financing has 
become more decentralized, and those involved are using less 
sophisticated means to move money and avoid official banking systems. 
Terrorist financiers are exploiting new technology to transfer money 
electronically and employing money laundering schemes to cover up their 
activities.
  In response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Congress passed 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section 
6303 of this 2004 law required the President to submit to Congress a 
comprehensive report evaluating and making recommendations on the 
current state of U.S. efforts to fight terror financing. This important 
report was due in September of 2005, but it has never been completed.
  Multiple U.S. Government departments and agencies are involved in the 
effort to combat terrorist financing, including Treasury, Justice 
Department, Homeland Security, State Department, Defense Department, 
FBI and the CIA. These various entities are to be commended for their 
efforts to track and disrupt complex terrorist financing schemes since 
2001. Still, with so many government entities involved in combating 
terrorist financing, it is critical that we heed the lessons of the 
past and undertake a thorough assessment of our progress.
  The amendment I am offering today with Congressman Lynch reiterates 
Congress' requirement that the President undertake a thorough 
evaluation of our efforts to disrupt terrorist financing, including the 
ability to coordinate our intelligence and keep pace with evolving 
trends.
  The bottom line is that terrorists need money to operate, and we need 
to

[[Page 1914]]

 be fully prepared and adaptable to combating their ability to access 
these funds. There is no room for delay in this endeavor, especially 
since top U.S. intelligence officials indicate a possible likelihood of 
another attempted terrorist attack on the United States at some time in 
the relatively near future.
  Thank you for the opportunity to discuss my amendment. I look forward 
to working with the members of the committee on these important 
matters.
  Madam Chairwoman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LYNCH. Madam Chair, I rise to claim time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Massachusetts 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. LYNCH. Madam Chair, I actually rise to support my colleague's 
amendment.
  As the co-chairman of the Task Force on Terrorist Financing and 
Proliferation, I, too, am well aware that having an effective strategy 
on targeting the sources of terrorists in financing their operations is 
a very important part of our strategy.
  This straightforward amendment offered by my friend, Mr. Castle of 
Delaware, simply restates the basic requirement that the President, 
through the Treasury Department, report to Congress on the current 
status of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism financing. This reporting 
requirement is not new; in fact, it was mandated in the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. A report was due out in 
2005, but here today it has yet to be submitted.
  I've had an opportunity, as co-chair of the task force, to spend a 
lot of time with our Treasury employees, very brave and courageous 
Treasury and State Department employees, in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
and Jordan and the Maghreb, North Africa; and they're doing wonderful 
and courageous work. However, that much being said, Congress still 
retains its oversight responsibility; and without this report we are 
not able to be certain, I think, that we have an accurate picture of 
the entire antiterrorist financing protocol and we are not fully 
informed as to whether or not we are operating as effectively as we 
could be. Only by understanding where we currently stand--what our 
strengths are and, indeed, what our weaknesses are--can we ensure that 
the best possible strategy for cutting out terrorist financing is 
ultimately accomplished.
  Again, I want to thank Congressman Castle, the gentleman from 
Delaware, for his support of this amendment, and I urge my colleagues 
to support it.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CASTLE. Madam Chairwoman, we hope this report can be done 
relatively soon. The amendment actually allows for 180 days more from 
this time in order to submit it. We have been in touch with the 
administration. We know that they're aware of this, and hopefully it 
can be completed. I think it may help with the safety of our country 
and perhaps dealing with the financing of terrorists in this world, so 
we look forward to it.
  I appreciate the support. I also appreciate all the words and support 
of Mr. Lynch in getting to this point.
  With that, I encourage everyone to support it and yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Walz

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. WALZ. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 11 offered by Mr. Walz:
       Page 85, after line 20 insert the following:
       (d) Education on Combat-Related Injuries.--Section 3001 of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (50 U.S.C. 435b) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (j); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (h) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(i) Education on Combat-Related Injuries.--
       ``(1) In general.--The head of the entity selected pursuant 
     to subsection (b) shall take such actions as such head 
     considers necessary to educate each authorized adjudicative 
     agency that is an element of the intelligence community on 
     the nature of combat-related injuries as they relate to 
     determinations of eligibility for access to classified 
     information for veterans who were deployed in support of a 
     contingency operation.
       ``(2) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Contingency operation.--The term `contingency 
     operation' has the meaning given the term in section 
     101(a)(13) of title 10, United States Code.
       ``(B) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence 
     community' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       ``(C) Veteran.--The term `veteran' has the meaning given 
     the term in section 101(2) of title 38, United States 
     Code.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Walz) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota.
  Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And I thank the chairman of 
the committee and the ranking member for your work in securing our 
Nation and bringing this piece of legislation to the floor.
  The amendment that I am offering, Madam Chair, serves a twofold 
purpose. First, it allows us to fulfill our obligation to our returning 
combat veterans coming back and integrating back into civilian life. 
And it also recognizes the unique skill set that these veterans have 
that are absolutely perfectly suited for intelligence and national 
security work.
  What I am asking for in this amendment is to make sure there is a 
level playing field for these warriors. A large number of our troops 
are coming back; and either through a lack of understanding or a 
misunderstanding, the security adjudicators are either revoking or 
denying security clearances for wounds that were received, either 
physical or mental--PTSD, and others--during the conflicts that they 
served in.
  What this amendment asks for is it requires the intelligence 
community to educate security clearance adjudicators on the nature of 
these wounds. The purpose is to make sure that they have the best 
knowledge available to make informed decisions and give our returning 
warriors the opportunity to receive their clearances, to retain their 
clearances, and then go on to further serve this Nation in these 
critical capacities.
  So I thank the committee for their work. The Intelligence Committee, 
the Armed Services and the Veterans' Affairs Committee are all in 
support of this. I think it will go a long ways toward leveling the 
playing field and allowing this Nation to use the incredible skills and 
resources that those wounded warriors bring back, but still have the 
capacity to serve.
  With that, Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I agree with what the gentleman said about our 
wounded warriors and how we ought to be giving them all the support 
that we possibly can, but the reason I took this time in opposition is 
because the chairman and I couldn't reach an agreement to discuss one 
of the provisions in the bill.
  I sincerely feel, Madam Chairman, that we are endangering our 
capability of getting information from terrorists because we are 
limiting our CIA and our intelligence officials with this legislation 
and these procedures that they can use to elicit that information. I 
know there are some differences of opinion, and I know we have in our 
hearts the best security that we can think of for the American people, 
but the one thing that really, really bothers me is we're telling CIA 
officials--and some of our military people in the field, not with this 
bill--but we are

[[Page 1915]]

telling a lot of our intelligence officials and people in the field 
that they have to be very, very careful and walk on eggs when they are 
trying to get information from a terrorist, al Qaeda or Taliban 
terrorist, to make sure that we aren't violating or torturing them in 
any way.
  The American people certainly don't want torture, and there is a big 
difference of opinion on whether or not water boarding, for instance, 
is torture. But the fact of the matter is if we have another major 
attack like the one we had on 9/11, the American people are going to 
come down like a ton of bricks on the people in this House that put 
restrictions on our intelligence-gathering capability. They're going to 
say, why didn't you do whatever it took to secure the safety of the 
people of this country? And because we are putting this language in 
this bill, we are saying to the CIA and the other intelligence 
agencies, you've got to be real careful; you've got to make absolutely 
sure you don't do something that might get you in trouble and might 
even put you in jail.
  And when you say things like that to the people that are out there in 
the field risking their lives, what you do is you intimidate them, 
maybe not intentionally, but you intimidate them and you stop the 
possibility of getting all the information that we need to protect this 
country.
  Now, I know there is a disagreement; I just talked to some people on 
the other side. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was water boarded 80-something 
times, I think, or something like that; and when he first started out, 
he said, well, you'll find out what's going to happen. And later, after 
he was water boarded, he said, yes, there was going to be a plane that 
was going to fly into a building in Los Angeles. Well, that plane, had 
it flown into a building in Los Angeles, might have killed another 
2,000 or 3,000 people.
  And so the only reason I came here is to just say, let's don't break 
the legs of our intelligence officers who are trying to protect this 
country. It's just too important. We ought to be doing everything we 
can to back them up to make sure this country is safe. Our intelligence 
people are telling us right now we're likely to have another attack 
within the next 6 months or 1 year. So we ought to be giving every 
intelligence agency and every officer we possibly can all the support 
they need to stop that.
  With that, I thank you very much for yielding and yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. WALZ. I hope I have the gentleman's support on this bill, 
providing the trained and courageous veterans who are returning home. 
We are not asking for preferential treatment. What we are asking is 
that our adjudicators be clearly informed what these combat veterans 
have gone through, making sure we are able to bring them back, place 
them in their positions if they choose to continue to serve this 
Nation. I would ask for the support of this body on this amendment.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Walz).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Schauer

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 
printed in House Report 111-419.
  Mr. SCHAUER. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 12 offered by Mr. Schauer:
       Insert after section 354 the following new section:

     SEC. 355. REPORT ON ATTEMPT TO DETONATE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ON 
                   NORTHWEST AIRLINES FLIGHT 253.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to Congress a report on the attempt to detonate an explosive 
     device aboard Northwest Airlines flight number 253 on 
     December 25, 2009. Such report shall describe any failures to 
     share or analyze intelligence or other information within or 
     between elements of the United States Government and the 
     measures that the intelligence community has taken or will 
     take to prevent such failures, including--
       (1) a description of the roles and responsibilities of the 
     counterterrorism analytic components of the intelligence 
     community in synchronizing, correlating, and analyzing all 
     sources of intelligence related to terrorism;
       (2) an assessment of the technological capabilities of the 
     intelligence community to assess terrorist threats, 
     including--
       (A) a list of all databases used by counterterrorism 
     analysts;
       (B) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence 
     community to integrate all relevant terrorist databases and 
     allow for cross-database searches; and
       (C) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence 
     community to correlate biographic information with terrorism-
     related intelligence;
       (3) a description of the steps taken by the intelligence 
     community to train analysts on watchlisting processes and 
     procedures;
       (4) a description of how watchlisting information is 
     entered, reviewed, searched, analyzed, and acted upon by the 
     relevant elements of the intelligence community;
       (5) a description of the steps the intelligence community 
     is taking to enhance the rigor and raise the standard of 
     tradecraft of intelligence analysis related to uncovering and 
     preventing terrorist plots;
       (6) a description of the processes and procedures by which 
     the intelligence community prioritizes terrorism threat leads 
     and the standards used by elements of the intelligence 
     community to determine if follow-up action is appropriate;
       (7) a description of the steps taken to enhance record 
     information on possible terrorists in the Terrorist 
     Identities Datamart Environment;
       (8) an assessment of how to meet the challenge associated 
     with exploiting the ever-increasing volume of information 
     available to the intelligence community; and
       (9) a description of the steps the intelligence community 
     has taken or will take to respond to any findings and 
     recommendations of the congressional intelligence committees, 
     with respect to such failures, that have been transmitted to 
     the Director of National Intelligence.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 1105, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Schauer) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. SCHAUER. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  As a member of the Aviation Subcommittee of the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee, I believe it is critical for the Director of 
National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the attempted 
bombing of Northwest Flight 253.
  The failed Christmas day attack over Detroit reinforces the notion 
that the threat of al-Qaeda is real and that our intelligence 
community, whether under a Democratic or Republican administration, 
must improve the way it protects the United States against terrorist 
attacks.

                              {time}  1615

  People in Michigan want answers.
  My amendment says, not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of the act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to Congress a report on the attempt to detonate an explosive 
device aboard Northwest Airlines Flight No. 253 on December 25, 2009.
  This amendment will require the Director of National Intelligence to 
report to Congress information about any failures to share or to 
analyze intelligence within or between elements of the Federal 
Government related to this failed terrorist attack.
  More importantly, the Director of National Intelligence also must 
submit a description of the measures that the intelligence community 
has taken or will take to prevent such failures from occurring again. 
This would include information on how the government intends to improve 
the interoperability of terrorist screening databases and to improve 
airline watch listing procedures. These tools are critical in 
preventing terrorists from getting an opportunity to kill innocent 
civilians.
  It is imperative that Congress be fully informed so that it may 
conduct rigorous oversight on this important national security concern.
  I appreciate President Obama's candor and openness when speaking to 
the American people about the improvements needed to our intelligence 
community, and I applaud the President for taking swift action in 
ordering a

[[Page 1916]]

thorough review of the incident. President Obama has stated his 
willingness to work with Congress to solve this problem. This amendment 
will help ensure that Congress will be fully briefed on the results of 
that review. I urge the full support of this amendment.
  I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I want to say I appreciate the amendment and 
the gentleman's interest.
  This amendment would require the director of the DNI to submit to the 
Intelligence Committees a report on the attempted bombing of Northwest 
Airlines Flight No. 253.
  This report would provide an assessment on any failures to share 
information within or between elements of the Federal Government and 
the measures that the intelligence community has taken or will take to 
prevent such failures in the future.
  This report also covers issues such as analytic tradecraft, watch 
listing procedures, technical deficiencies, training database 
management. Many of the elements of this report mirror portions of the 
review of the DNI, which they are currently doing.
  Requiring the DNI to provide this report will allow the Intelligence 
Committees to conduct rigorous oversight on this important national 
security concern.
  Additionally, this amendment requires the DNI to submit responses to 
any findings or recommendations made by the Intelligence Committees.
  With that, Madam Chair, I fully support this amendment.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I rise to claim the time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I will not oppose the amendment. Although, 
I do believe, and I would hope that my colleague from Michigan would 
agree that, perhaps, when we are talking about the scope of this 
amendment, it is broader than what is just written here.
  One of the things that we are very, very concerned about which, I 
believe, should be included in this--because, like you, I believe, if 
the intelligence community had worked properly, perhaps we could have 
stopped this attack; but this is not just a matter of connecting 
databases and those types of things. It is also about missing clues 
that we had that were highlighted before Christmas Day.
  What am I talking about?
  We have known for quite some time that Awlaki was a concern. We saw 
kind of a mirror image of what happened on Christmas Day a couple of 
months earlier at Fort Hood, where 14 Americans were killed and where 
14 Americans died in a tragic terrorist attack, linked to Awlaki, 
linked to al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula.
  I had an amendment that went along those lines, but it was not 
accepted by the majority, and I think it may well have fallen within 
the scope of the amendment of yours, Mr. Schauer, which you are 
offering, which says:
  If we had had these insights into al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, 
if we had had these insights into Awlaki's involvement with Major 
Hasan, if we had had these insights into the communications, the 
emails, between Hasan and Awlaki, what did we do between November 5 and 
Christmas Day to target Awlaki, to target al Qaeda on the Arabian 
Peninsula and to use this information that these individuals and this 
group might be targeting the U.S. and whether we missed opportunities 
in those 2 months to identify the threat and respond to it?
  Are those the kind of questions that you might see which could also 
be addressed in this or are these outside of the scope of what you are 
looking for?
  I yield to my colleague from Michigan.
  Mr. SCHAUER. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra, and thank you for your 
leadership on the Intelligence Committee.
  Absolutely, my amendment deals directly with having the Director of 
National Intelligence describe failures and to share or to analyze 
intelligence or other information within or between elements of the 
United States Government. So I think it is clearly my intent that the 
dots be connected.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Reclaiming my time, I thank my colleague for that 
clarification because I think that is probably the bigger untold story 
here of how much and how many insights we might have had into al Qaeda 
on the Arabian Peninsula and how we failed to act on that intelligence 
and how we failed, as we've now been saying for a long period of time, 
to connect those dots, to be able to put in preventative measures and 
to actually have stopped Awlaki and al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula 
from carrying out this attack on Detroit and on the State of Michigan.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHAUER. Madam Chair, how much time remains?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Schauer) has 1\1/
2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) 
has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. SCHAUER. I yield 1 minute 20 seconds to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Peters).
  Mr. PETERS. Madam Chair, I rise today in support of the Schauer 
amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
  Like many Americans, my Christmas Day spent with family was 
interrupted by the news of the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest 
Flight No. 253 to Detroit.
  As a lifelong Michigan resident whose friends, family, and 
constituents regularly fly in and out of Detroit Metropolitan Wayne 
County Airport, the Christmas Day attempt was especially chilling. 
While it was certainly fortunate that no lives were lost in the 
Christmas Day attempt, the attack exposed serious and unacceptable 
shortcomings in our ability to gather intelligence and to connect the 
dots.
  I believe that protecting the American people is Congress' number one 
priority and responsibility. The Christmas Day incident showed us that 
security officials need to work more closely with their counterparts 
overseas and within the United States intelligence community to ensure 
tougher and more coordinated screening.
  I appreciate my friend Congressman Schauer's leadership on this 
important issue, and I am proud to support the Schauer amendment 
because it will help ensure that we learn as much as possible about the 
failures that allowed the events of Christmas Day 2009 to transpire.
  I urge the adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I will not oppose the amendment. As a 
matter of fact, I will support the amendment in its larger context, 
recognizing that this report by the DNI has to include the time prior 
to Fort Hood, the Fort Hood attack, and then the time from Fort Hood 
until Christmas Day. That is the area that we have been trying to get 
information on from the intelligence community over the last 3 or 4 
months, and it has been the area that they have been most reluctant to 
provide us information on.
  As a matter of fact, when I was in Yemen on New Year's Day, less than 
2 months ago, I was specifically prohibited from getting information on 
exactly those kinds of questions as to what did the intelligence 
community know about Awlaki, about al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. 
The individuals both in the intel community and with the Ambassador 
were specifically instructed not to share that information, which tells 
me that there is some information there, and for some reason, they have 
not wanted to share that information with us.
  So, with the understanding that that type of information will be 
shared with Congress in this report, also then recognizing that this 
may end up being a classified report which you may not have access to 
unless the committee agrees to provide you access to it, I support the 
amendment. I look forward to the DNI's completing this report and to 
his submitting it to the committee.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHAUER. I thank Mr. Hoekstra for his support, and I urge Members 
to support this amendment.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

[[Page 1917]]

  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Schauer).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. SCHAUER. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
will be postponed.
  Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Capuano) having assumed the chair, Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas, Acting 
Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, 
reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill 
(H.R. 2701) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2010 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________